HOME STATES AND HOMELAND POLITICS:
Interactions between the Turkish State and its Emigrants in France and the United States

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I focus on home state's emigrant engagement policies, and the implications of policy changes on emigrants' transnational political practices, as well as home state-emigrant society relations. By using the case of Turkey, I analyze the continuities and changes in the emigrant policies following the critical rupture in early 2000s, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government's new approach was solidified with an extensive report presented to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. I discuss the impact of home state policies on emigrant agency by considering their interactions with host state policies. I look at two different host country cases of France and the United States and explore how policies have been implemented and what have been the outcomes on Turkish state's relations with the emigrant communities in these two countries. The aim is to discuss how the two sets of inquiry on cross-border practices in the social sciences literature may complement each other: first one dealing with top-down processes of home states that are reconfiguring their institutional settings and conceptions of membership on non-resident citizens, and second looking into the practices, identities, discourses of emigrants that transcend international borders. The argument of this dissertation is that the implementation of home state emigrant policies has an impact on how the emigrants foster transnational political practices. Looking at the history of Turkish state's emigrant policies, I argue that in the post-2000 period the transition from territorial conception of citizenship from an extra-territorial one had a clear impact on how the home state-emigrant society relations have been constructed. However, the implementation of the state's policy agendas has not been isolated from the ideological factors and messy politics; they contained a set of contestations and negotiations between the state and society actors that are politically loaded.

Keywords: Emigrant engagement policies, transnational political practices, home state-emigrant society relations, emigrants, Turkish state, France, the United States.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Armenian Assembly of America
ACORT	Assemblée Citoyenne des Originaires de Turquie (Citizen Assembly of People from Turkey)
ACTIT	Association Culturelle des Travailleurs Immigres de Turquie
ADD	Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Atatürkist Though Association)
ADRI	Agence pour le Développement des Relations Interculturelles (Agency for the Development of Intercultural Relations)
ADTT	Association Démocratique de Travailleurs de Turquie (Democratic Association of Workers from Turkey)
AHI	American Hellenic Institute
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Mainland Party)
ANCA	Armenian National Committee of America
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
ASSTTu	Association de Solidarite avec les Travailleurs Turcs (Association of Solidarity with Turkish Workers)
ATA	Assembly of Turkic American Federations
ATAA	Assembly of Turkish American Associations
ATAF	Assembly of Turkic American Federations
ATC	American Turkish Council
ATS	American Turkish Society
ATT	Association des Travailleurs de Turquie (Association of Turkish Workers)
BIRKOM	Faşizme Karşı Birleşik Direniş (United Front of Antifascist Resistance Europe)
BYEGM	Basın-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü (Directorate General of Press and Information)
CCMTF	Comite de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France (Comity of Coordination for Turkish Muslims in France)
CFAIT	Conseil Français des Associations d’Immigres de Turquie (French Council of Migrant Associations from Turkey
CFCM	Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council of the Muslim Faith)
CGT	Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)

CIMG	Communauté Islamique de Milli Görüş (Religious Community of National View)
COJEP	Conseil de la Jeunesse Pluriculturelle (Council for Justice, Equality and Peace)
DHKP-C	Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front)
DIDF	Fédération des Associations de Travailleurs et de Jeunes (Federation of Associations of Workers and Youth)
DITIB	Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (Religious Affairs Turkish Islamic Union)
DTIK	Dünya Türk İş Konseyi (World Turkish Business Council)
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
ELCO	Enseignement des Langues et de Culture d'Origine (Teaching of Language and Culture of Origin Program)
ELELE	Maison des Travailleurs de Turquie (House of Migrants from Turkey)
FAS	Fonds d'Action Sociale (Social Action Fund)
FEYKA	Federasyona Yekitiya Kakeren Welatparezen-çandiya Kurdistan (Federation of Kurdish Associations in France)
FN	Front National (National Front)
FO	Force Ouvrière (Workers' Force)
FTAA	Federation of Turkish American Associations
FUAF	Fédération de l'Union des Alevis en France (Federation of Union of Alevis in France)
HCI	Haut Conseil a l'Intégration (High Council for Integration)
HDP	Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples' Democratic Party)
HLM	Habitation à Loyer Modéré (Low Rent Housing)
ICNA	Islamic Circle of North America
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IIBK	İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu (Turkish Employment Service)
IKP	Institut Kurde a Paris (Kurdish Institute in Paris)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act
ITTS	Intercollegiate Turkish Students Society
KOMKAR	Yekitiya Komelen Kurdistan (Federation of Associations from Kurdistan)
MERNIS	Ministry of Interior Central Civil Registration System
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)

MUSIAD	Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish American Businessman Association)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
ONI	Office National d'Immigration (National Immigration Office)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAC	Political Action Committee
PCF	Parti Communiste Français (French Communist Party)
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
RACORT	Rassemblement des Associations Citoyennes des Originaires de Turquie (Assembly of Citizen Associations of Originals from Turkey)
SETA	Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research)
SHP	Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party)
STASI	La Commission de Réflexion sur l'Application du Principe de Laïcité dans la République (Commission on the Reflection on the Application of the Principal of Secularism in the Republic)
TAA	Turkic American Alliance
TABAN	Turkish American Broad Advocacy Network
TABID	Turkish American Business Improvement and Development
TACC	Turkish American Community Center
TACCI	Turkish American Chamber of Commerce and Industry
TACS	Turkish American Cultural Society
TAGD	Türk Amerikan Giresunlular Derneği (Turkish American Giresuns Organization)
TAIF	Turkish American Islamic Foundation
TARF	Turkish American Religious Foundation
TAYEF	Turkish American Youth and Education Foundation
TCA	Turkish Coalition of America
TCC	Turkish Cultural Centers
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TIKA	Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency)
TKP-ML	Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist Leninist (Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist)
TKSP	Türkiye Kürdistan Sosyalist Partisi (Kurdistan Socialist Party)
TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals

TRT	Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation)
TSOR	Turkish Society of Rochester
TURGEV	Türkiye Gençlik ve Eğitime Hizmet Vakfı (Foundation of Youth and Education in Turkey)
TWLA	Turkish Women's League of America
UACTF	Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği (Union of Turkish Cultural Associations)
UAMA	United American Muslim Association
UETD	Union of European Turkish Democrats
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
YTB	Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı (Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities)

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

On 28 November 1988, Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister of Turkey consecrated a three-day official visit to France, to restore the bilateral relations between the two countries that were unbalanced for the past decade. During his visit, Özal had met with high-level officials including President Mitterand, Prime Minister Rocard, ministers, presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate, mayor of Paris and numerous grand industrialists (Billion 1989). In an analysis on Turkish-French relations, an expert on Turkey, would indicate that Özal's visit and his book entitled *La Turquie en Europe* (Turkey in Europe) published for the first time in French and in France, had been critical for the new rapprochement between the two countries (Billion 1989: 101). Özal's book was targeting directly for facilitating the candidacy of Turkey to the European Economic Community, and according to historian Etienne Copeaux, was being used as a propaganda tool to emphasize Anatolia's position as the main human and intellectual source of the European Civilization[1]. Özal's program in November 1988 did not include any meetings with the members of the community from Turkey in France, which had reached more than 100,000 persons; or if it did, it was not revealed in the ministerial documents or the media. In fact according to Billion's analysis, emigrants from Turkey (and Anatolia) were often creating tensions in the bilateral relations between the two countries, as in the case of Armenian lobbying pressures and the negative campaigns of the French Communist Party (PCF) against the authoritarian regime in Turkey that would be "remembered by Parisians from the walls of Strasbourg-Saint Denis district, where an important Turkish community worked, and regularly covered by the posters of PCF directed

[1] Copeaux 1998 in Şeyda Barlas Bozkuş. 2016. "Kültür Diplomasisinin Sınırları: Türk Kültür ve Sanatının Uluslararası Platformlarda Tanıtımı (1980-2010)." Accessed April 5. http://globalmediajournaltr.yeditepe.edu.tr/makaleler/GMJ_3._sayi_Guz_2011/PDF/Bozkus.pdf.

towards the Turkish regime" (Billion 1989: 101). One of the issues for the stalling of relations between the two countries in 1990 was again related to the emigrants: the first lady Semra Özal would not be participating to the opening of *Süleyman the Magnificient* exhibition in Paris to avoid first lady Danielle Mitterand, who had entered into good relations with the ethnic Kurds and organized a Kurdish conference in Paris[2].

Nearly 25 years later, on 21 June 2014, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was on the scene at the Euroexpo Hall in Lyon, where he was attending the tenth year anniversary of the foundation of Union of European Turkish Democrats, an association established by emigrants from Turkey living in Europe. To the crowd holding hundreds of Turkish flags in their hands, Erdoğan was sending one of his renowned greetings, self-embodying as the mediator between the citizens of the Turkish Republic living in Turkey, in Europe and elsewhere:

> Dear brothers (and sisters), dear citizens of the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of France, ladies, gentlemen, I salute you with from my heart, with longing and great affection. I greet once again from my heart my esteemed brothers who come to this meeting, this fulfilling of longing, the Lyon meeting from various cities of France and create this enthusiastic crowd. […] Dear brothers, we have met again with thousands of brothers and sisters for the tenth anniversary of the Union of European Turkish Democrats in Cologne, Germany on 24 May, I convey to you the greetings of my brothers again in Germany. The other day we embraced thousands of brothers living, working in Vienna, the capitol of Austria. I also extend the greetings of our brothers in Austria. Of course, I convey the greetings of our brothers in Turkey, the 77 million, your relatives, your friends, your loved ones, to you, their dear relatives here[3].

While emphasizing his accessibility to a nation that comprised beyond the territorial limits of the state, Prime Minister was also conveying his greetings and regards to his counterpart and the lower level decision makers from the Euroexpo Hall in Lyon, with a crowd in front of him that included some of the shared citizens between his country and that of France. Erdoğan's address represented his propagation of "Turkey in Europe", which contrasted sharply from that of Özal by locating the people, not the intellectual, military or political history of his country at the spotlight. He accentuated that "the relations between Turkey and France won a very different dimension" with nearly 620 thousand citizens, half of which were dual citizens. Different from the late 1980s' public diplomacy strategy, which glorified figures like *Süleyman the Magnificient,* the post-2000s were marked by the creation and empowerment of the emigrant community as well as emigrants' becoming of potential

[2] Yalçın Doğan. 1990. "Mitterand'ın Özal'ı 'lütfen' kabulü." Milliyet. February 13.
[3] "Başbakan Erdoğan Fransa Lyon Buluşması." 2014. YouTube. July 6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUoYz3nFbZM.

lobbyists in their countries of residence. For Erdoğan, the emigrant community that had faced the difficulties of adapting to a host country was finally "getting their labours' worth" by becoming more active in the social, economic, cultural, political arenas of the French society:

> You have endured all hardships for decades in France where you came as workers, you had patience and you resisted, praise God. You have become capable of get your labour's worth. Thirty thousand of our brothers set up their own businesses here, they reached a position of employing 50 thousand people. In the last local elections, 194 of our brothers were elected to municipal administration at various levels. Citizens of Turkish Republic started to make their weight felt in arts, sports, politics, and say, "We also belong to France". I want to express here one more time: As much as we longed for you, we also were proud of your achievements[4].

Erdoğan was highlighting that the increased entrepreneurial capabilities of emigrants, their participation to local politics and active citizenship through integration were reinforcing their position in France. Organized two months prior to the first elections in which the emigrants would be allowed to vote from abroad, Lyon meeting was also heightening the significant position that emigrants occupied for the Turkish politics. For Erdoğan's supporters the meeting embodied his interest in reaching out to Turkish citizens; but his opponents argued that this was a political rally disguised under the anniversary of UETD, an association that had close ties with the governing party in Turkey. While inside the hall banners announced their owners' loyalty to Erdoğan, there was a smaller crowd of people protesting against his politics and the meeting on the outside, comprised of an interesting mix of Alevis, Kurds, leftists, Kemalists and Armenians[5].

The two prime ministerial visits that were 25 years apart did not have the same purpose or took place in a similar political atmosphere. However, they both show how the leader of a country represented a nation under a spectacle: one, putting forth diplomacy and a presumed historical grandeur *despite of* the population abroad, the other, making that population *a part of* the spectacle, diplomacy and history. Behind these representations are a plethora of institutional, administrative, legal mechanisms that maintain their divergence. The two historic visits also reveal a glimpse on the relations between a state and its emigrants outside of the territories of that state. The first scenario is marked by the representative of the state, reluctant to incorporate the population living abroad to the national narrative. The conflictual relationship is concretized by the response of the emigrant agency, in which the generality

[4] "Başbakan Erdoğan Fransa Lyon Buluşması." 2014. YouTube. July 6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUoYz3nFbZM.

[5] CNNTurk. 2014. "Erdoğan Paris'te Kazak milli kıyafeti giydi, Lyon'da protesto edildi." June 21. http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/dunya/erdogan-pariste-kazak-milli-kiyafeti-giydi-lyonda-protesto-edildi.

comprises of an engagement with the politics of their homelands in the host country, through bypassing of the impediments of the home state. In the second scenario, a state leader attempts to create a narrative of an integrated and consolidated "imagined community" (Anderson 1991) to politicize and use the agency of its citizens outside of its sovereignty. This instance is corresponded by two public displays: on the one hand is a demonstration of allegiance by those who comply with this narrative, and on the other another, is the representation of those who disavow the transnationalization of domestic politics of their home country and the home state's efforts to extend its capability outside of its borders. The two visits uncover the policies and politics that are related to the relations between the state and the society in a context that overreaches beyond the physical limits of territoriality.

In this research, my aim is to create a bridge between the discussions in the literature of international migration on (a) home states' reconfigurations of their institutional setting and (b) emigrants' transnational political practices. By focusing on the relationship between the Turkish state and its emigrants, I try to uncover how home state policies and the ideological transformations in policy-making result in different patterns of relationship between the state and society, as well as the practices of emigrant agency. My discussions on *policy* refer to the state's "programmatic initiatives to reach out to (emigrant) populations" (Delano and Gamlen 2014: 43), therefore analyzes the institutional, administrative or legal settings and designs. The discussions on *politics* emphasize the interactions and the reactions of emigrants towards the policy makers' agenda setting and implementation related to their inclusion in the national narrative, as well as the spills of domestic political competition at the transnational level (Østergaard-Nielsen 2016).

My argument in this dissertation is that a whole set of structural factors related to home state has an impact on how emigrants build their relations with the home state, as well as how they organize their transnational political practices. Using the analytical premises of transnational political opportunity structures literature, I argue that while the emigrant regime of a given home state determines the initial conditions or motives of the exit, it may also adjust the opportunities and resources available to them for participation in home country or host country related affairs within a transnational setting. These opportunities and resources are not stable over time and across different groups; they are rather prone to change as a result of the conscious strategies of the state and non-state actors (Okyay 2015). Moreover, home country political opportunities do not exist within a politically neutral environment, and they are also determined by how core principles of democratic participation and representation

were constructed and applied, in relation with the society living both inside and outside of the territories of the home state. As a result, the type of relationship between the state and societal actors are critically determined by the regime type, as well as the compatibility between the official state ideology and the self-positioning of the emigrant groups vis-a-vis this ideology.

1.1. Research Questions

Over the last decade, state sovereignty and the relations between the state and society have begun to be considered within the flexibilities and complexities of the transnational age. One of the essential factors for this phenomenon has been related to the permanency of international migrants in their host countries and their continuation of ties, networks, practices and acts that crossed beyond the physical and political boundaries. While the agency of these populations has facilitated the porosity and fluidity across borders, they have not gone uncontested or unsupervised. On the contrary, there is an increasing interest especially by the home states to closely monitor, engage or integrate populations with affiliations to more than one reference or arena of social participation (Gamlen 2011; Kastoryano 2000). This new tendency transforms the traditional conceptions of state sovereignty, while at the same time reconfiguring the relations between the states and the populations it had or continue to have ties based on citizenship.

This research examines how the Turkish state engages with its emigrants or the "domestic abroad" (Varadarajan 2010) and what are the implications of its policies on its interactions with the emigrants, as well as their acts, practices and politics crossing borders. The primary research question that this dissertation seeks to answer is: What are the implications of emigrant engagement policies on home state-emigrant society relations and emigrants' transnational political practices? Based on this primary question, I try to answer three sub-questions on home state policies and emigrants' homeland related politics: What are the continuities and changes in the Turkish state's emigrant policy in the post-2003 period? How were the policy changes implemented in practice? What are the outcomes of the policy changes on home state-emigrant society relations and emigrants' transnational political practices?

While my discussion in this research begins with the home state policies, it aims at analyzing from a different perspective then the purely institutionalist studies, by incorporating the

agency of emigrants, questioning whether and how the policies have an effect on their cross-border practices, and how the interactions between the policies of the state with the politics of emigrants take place. My aim in this research is to converse the two sets of inquiry on cross-border practices in the social sciences literature: first one dealing with top-down processes of home states that are reconfiguring their institutional settings and conceptions of membership on non-resident citizens, and second looking into the practices, identities, discourses of emigrants that transcend international borders.

This research begins with the premise that the Turkish state's policies on its emigrants has underwent through several transformations over the past fifty years, the last of which has been affected and has itself affected the shifts in the conception of sovereignty and territoriality. In fact, this transformation is not an isolated event, but a part of a global phenomenon in which the home states no longer want their emigrants to return but to achieve a secure status where they are (Portes et al. 1999). Moreover, they adopt different strategies in order to build, integrate or benefit from emigrant groups and by this, they re-invent their roles outside of territorial boundaries (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). Many other cases from the world are illustrative of similar transformations: President Aristide of Haiti designated the emigrants living abroad as the *Dizyem*-na, the Tenth Department of Haiti during his electoral campaign in the early 1990s (Basch et al. 1994); as a presidential candidate Vincente Fox announced his intention to "govern on behalf of 118 million Mexicans", a population of some 100 million in Mexico and 18 million overseas (Barry 2006); and Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry organized the first *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas* – the "Day of the Indians Abroad" in 2003, hailing the 20 million Indian emigrants as "national reserves" living abroad" (Varadarajan 2010: 3-4). Many states in the developed world are also increasingly making appeals to the loyalties of populations living abroad that endure their ties with the homeland: in 1990 President Mary Robinson of Ireland declared herself the leader of the extended Irish family abroad; recently the United Kingdom government was advised by a think tank that non-resident Britons were an "under-utilized resource that could be better harnessed for the sake of national interests" (Kalm 2013: 389-390); and the image of New Zealanders leaving the country changed abruptly from 2000 to 2001 from "ratbag traitors who don't deserve a great government" to entrepreneurial "Kiwis" who are "huge assets to the country" (Gamlen 2011). These examples and many more represent the various reifications of the changing relations between the states and their populations abroad (Larner 2007; Gamlen 2011), institutionally maintained by what some

scholars describe today by the concepts of “emigrant or diaspora engagement policies” (Gamlen 2011; Collyer 2013; Delano 2014).

In this research, I suggest that the transition in the Turkish state policies towards the management of emigrants started in the 1980s, however its gaining of impetus in line with the global phenomenon has taken place in the early 2000s. Although the transformation has been a part of the global contexts, the unique conditions related to Turkey and Turkish politics have designated how the policymaking and implementation took place in my case. An era of transition, the period that followed the 1980s saw the paradoxical juxtaposition of securitization of the Turkish state’s relations with its citizens living inside and outside of the country under post-coup mentality, the insertion to world economy and emerging market liberalization, the consolidation of a state-led Kemalist republicanism that incorporated a stricter emphasis on “Turkish historical and moral values” (İçduygu et al. 1999). Building on and altering some of the earlier premises, the 2000s were marked by the abrupt shifts in the governance of Turkey towards increased market liberalism and the infiltration of the EU harmonization. More importantly, this period was shaped by the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) gaining of power that would endure for three consecutive terms, creating incremental estrangements towards the former governance models and official state ideology in Turkey (Keyman and İçduygu 2003; Öniş 2012, 2014). These structural conditions related to the Turkish state determined both why and how its policies on emigrant engagement have taken place. My focus on the shift in the last era pinpoints the year 2003 as the year of critical rupture, as it is the year when the solid foundations of the new emigrant engagement policy under the AKP government have been built in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. I build my work on a temporary division that compares how the emigrant policies have taken shape before and after of this t_0 and therefore the two empirical parts of this research are distinguished according to this timeline.

Following this research interest that focuses on the institutionalist aspects of transformation, my second concern in this dissertation is to shed light on the relational sphere between the state and society; therefore to look into the interactions between the state policies and emigrants’ political practices at the transnational level. Beginning with the 1990s, the social sciences literature has gained a new and rapidly growing understanding on emigrants’ multiple and constant interconnections across international borders. This perspective argued that while emigrants settle and become incorporated in the social, economic, political, cultural spheres of their host countries, they also keep on their engagements with elsewhere

(Schiller et al. 1995). These practices take various forms, ranging from participating in loosely built networks to organizing claims making based on a shared collective identity or the belief in the existence of such an identity (Adamson 2008). Demanding more rights for extending the borders of their home countries and their own boundaries of loyalty, emigrants with transnational linkages are challenging today the deep-rooted distinction between foreign and domestic policy (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 778). Contrary to the earlier characterizations of immigrants as "uprooted", many emigrants are considered in the literature and policy making as "firmly rooted to their new country but maintaining multiple linkages to their homeland" (Schiller, Basch and Blanc 1995: 48). Citing Albert Hirshman's famous typology of voice, exit and loyalty, Portes (2003: 878) notes that emigrants who were neglected or even repressed prior to their moves abroad, can find the opportunity to raise their political voice as a result of the home governments' striving to preserve the emigrants' loyalty to their country. This link between the emigrants and the host countries is not based on a singular relationship between certain migrants and the home states, but involves a multiplicity of cooperating or contradicting actors and complex networks, including political parties, hometown organizations, religious institutions (Levitt 2001) and interest groups. Many single and comparative case studies have resulted in the accumulation of a rich repertoire in the literature on such cross-border practices. This repertoire includes many examples covering the emigrants from Turkey to elsewhere, including Turks, Kurds and/or Alevis in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Ogelman 2003; Argun 2003; Çağlar 2006; Yurdakul 2006; Kaya 2007; Sökefeld 2008; Adamson 2008; Okyay 2015) - including comparative case studies with those in Sweden (Başer 2014), France (Kaya and Kentel 2005), the United States (Anıl 2010); or in France (Akgönül 2009; Kastoryano 1998), the Netherlands (Mugge 2012), Australia (Şenay 2012), the United States (Akçapar 2009; Kılıç 2005). While many of these researches have discussed the relationship between emigrants' transnational practices and the political environment related to their country of origin, only a few looked into how the home state policies affected the way in which emigrants enacted these practices or formed their relational sphere with the home state.

In order to build on the existing theories and conceptualize my framework, I benefit from a number of literatures, including international migration, political theory, citizenship studies and social movements literature. The core of the conceptualization in this research is borrowed from the transnationalism and diaspora studies under the scholarship on international migration. I designate the Turkish state as the "home state", therefore

categorically approach to it based on its relations with the populations that had a history of migration from Turkey. There are two main reasons for focusing on Turkey as the home state: (1) it is a traditional country of origin, which has adopted a certain policy perspective on the permanency of emigrants since the 1980s, and (2) there has been an ongoing transformation in the policy making since the early 2000s that incorporated an extended status to overseas citizens. The Turkish case also provides a rich opportunity to discuss the role of home country political setting on the implementation of emigration policies, as the changes in the emigrant policy overlapped with other structural shifts in Turkey during this period. As argued by Heper and Keyman (1998: 259) in their seminal study on the consolidation of democracy in the context of Turkish modernization, the policy making in Turkey has a long history of overlaps of institutional decisions with the pursuit of political actors towards patronage and garnering votes. Although Heper and Keyman's article had been written to discuss the pre-2002 context, there has been a continuation of this attitude rather than change over the course of the succeeding AKP governments. Therefore, the case of Turkey makes it possible to consider the extension of both nation building and the domestic settings of policy making on home state-emigrant society relations.

In this research, I tackle the persons with the histories of migration as "emigrants", referring to their interfaces with Turkey and the Turkish state. As I discuss in the next chapter, the notion of "emigrant" is used with a caution in this research, to denominate those who had the actual practice of migration as well as their descendants who maintain citizenship ties, hence looking from a generational perspective. I describe their cross-border practices by juxtaposing the terminology referring to bottom-up practices of transnationalism; I benefit from the theoretical affirmations on the study of diasporas to denote the relations between states and populations assumed under a certain "groupness" (Brubaker 2005). Rather than ascribing certain groups (i.e. Turks or Kurds) based on their ethnic or political encounters with the Turkish state as the cases in question, I focus on the ties of citizenship, therefore taking into consideration emigrants with existing or formal ties of citizenship status.

As argued by Østergaard-Nielsen (2016), the policies of the sending countries may intersect with migration and migrant incorporation regimes in the countries of residence. In order to analyze the potentials and limits (Østergaard-Nielsen 2016) that the host country policies create, I look into the interactions between the home country policies, host country policies and emigrant agency. By looking at the host country cases of France and the United States, I explore how policies have been implemented and what have been the outcomes on Turkish

state's relations with the emigrant communities in these two countries. These cases were selected specifically in order to examine the overall policies of the Turkish state on emigrants and its relations with the emigrant society in its generality, as both cases did not receive specific attention in the history of policy making on emigrants in Turkey. By studying the dynamics between the Turkish state and the emigrants from Turkey in these two countries, I am able to grasp the building blocks of the policy making, without incorporating country-specific policies. As I argue in more detail in Chapter 3, the cases of emigrants from Turkey in France and the United States embody significant differences both due to the host country structural factors and the emigrants' characteristics, which might be described their distinct social, economic or cultural capitals. While the history of French case is built around the predominance of communities and grassroots movements in terms of the relations between the home state and emigrant societies, the American case has been fashioned by the core of ethnic lobbying practices as a legacy of the 1980s politicization. In this research, I argue that the Turkish state's projection on emigrants in the post-2003 period was molded around these two narratives of community-building and ethnic lobbying, therefore aiming to influence the political sphere both at the grassroots level and at the level of "high politics". The reflection of this twofold policy making on home state-emigrant society relations has resulted in a shift from differentiation to convergence in the cases of France and the United States, as in both cases, the processes of community-building and ethnic lobbying started to take place in a parallel pattern.

1.2. Data and Methodology

In this dissertation, I use the research design of comparative historical analysis, which according to Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003: 10) is a research tradition that the followers "share a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on process over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison". In order to identify the causal mechanism related to the home state's increased involvement on the changes of emigrants' transnational political practices and the state-society relations, I compare the similar implications of policies on two different emigrant communities. I also benefit from the method of process-tracing, which uses histories, archival documents, interview transcripts or other sources (George and Bennett 2005: 6) consists of analyzing a case into a sequence of events, "and showing how those events are plausibly linked given the interests and situations faced by groups or individual actors" (Goldstone 2003: 47). According to Goldstone (2003: 47-48) process tracing does not

assume that the actions always result in their intended consequences; however it depends on the premise that actions are understandable "in terms of knowledge, intent and circumstances that prevailed at the time decisions were made". This method also enables the use of the evidence on the intervening processes to make inferences about particular causations. At this point Bennett and Checkel (2012: 5-6) give the example of a row of fifty dominoes lying on the table after which they had previously been standing. Scholars argue that the dominoes could have fallen in sequence with increasing or decreasing force depending on the space between them, or with the impact of intervening or exogenous factors such as table shaking at the time or wind blowing at the same time, each with some effects on the falling dominoes. In this research, the process tracing allows me to identify the variable factors that influenced the causal patterns. While my research is based on qualitative analysis, I also employ quantitative data analysis to an extent. I analyze and benefit from different statistical observations related to migration figures; share of different patterns of migration within these overall figures; emigrants' age groups, socioeconomic, professional, educational backgrounds or their access to dual citizenship. However, compatible with the small-N research design and comparative historical analysis, the data is used not to establish statistical significance of different trends or relationships across large numbers of cases, but rather to establish their validity within a small number of cases compared for similarity and difference (Goldstone 2003: 49).

This comparative research is based on content analysis and field research for data collection and analysis, combining methods of moderate participant observation and in-depth interviews. To gather data, I spent a total of one year from November 2013 to December 2014 including desk study and field study in six localities positioned in three countries: Turkey (Ankara and Istanbul), France (Paris and Strasbourg) and the United States (New York metropolitan area and Washington D.C.). The desk study comprised of the analysis of emigrant policies of Turkey in a historical perspective by using a various number of data sources. I also analyzed American and French immigration, incorporation and citizenship policies using mainly secondary literature and statistical analysis; in France I used the available resources at Centre d'Information et d'Etudes sur les Migrations Internationales (CIEMI) in Paris and in the United States, I accessed City University of New York library via my research fellowship at the Center for Urban Research. For the fieldwork I benefited from the limited time period in France and the United States, to become familiar with the migration scene and to get engaged with different societal actors and Turkish state representatives.

Policy Analysis

The two chapters of this dissertation (Chapter 4 and Chapter 7) are allocated to analyze the continuities and changes in the Turkish state's emigrant policies from the early republic up to date. While Chapter 4 gives a general overview of the pre-2003 period, by distinguishing the state policies in three periods (1923-1960, 1960-1980, 1980-2000s), Chapter 7 focuses specifically on the post-2003 period, according to the time frame of the research. For these two chapters, several sources have been used to gather information, due to the lack of an extensive secondary literature on this particular issue in Turkey. These sources include, the debates at the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) from 1960 onwards, proceedings published at the official gazette, contents of the relevant ministries and expert interviews with state officials and experts at relevant institutions. For the content analysis of the debates at TGNA, all available database on debates has been searched by using the keyword *yurtdışı* (abroad), relevant discourses were filtered and then coded, later to be used for content analysis mainly in the two related chapters. More than 30 proceedings published at the official gazette were analyzed searching the keyword *yurtdışı* (abroad) and filtering the relevant proceedings. The content on relevant ministries were reached through: (a) the bureaucrats during ministry interviews, (b) through ministry reports accessed via Koç University Library, National Library at Ankara, Hacettepe University Library and State Planning Institute Library currently positioned within the Ministry of Development, and (c) ministries' official websites. Finally the fieldwork in Ankara and Istanbul comprised of semi-structural in-depth interviews with a total of 22 interviewees, conducted with officials from the related ministries and institutions, including Ministry of Development (former State Planning Institute), Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Presidency on Religious Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, Ministry of Education, The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges and Yunus Emre Institute. I have also conducted interviews with current and former diplomats affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have worked or are currently working in the foreign missions in France and the United States.

As a result of my data collection choices, I was able to juxtapose the analysis of legal or official texts with the apprehension of how the policy-making and implemented process took place in its actuality through interviews with the current and former bureaucrats and diplomats. This was critical in grasping the connections between which actions have been intended by different state and governmental actors, and what have been the actual

consequences of these actions. This position has been central in my analysis of the implications of state policies on state-society relations that I was able to acquire during my fieldwork on societal actors in France and the United States.

Field Research

The field research in France has been organized in the Ile-de-France region, hence centering Paris and its surrounding departments. The choice of the region was based on the quantitative amplitude of emigrants originated from Turkey. Despite the lesser amount of emigrant population, the Alsatian region is considered as highly dense – and for this reason a small number of interviews were also conducted in Strasbourg as well. The field in the United States was separated between the New York metropolitan area and Washington D.C. While the NY metropolitan area was chosen specifically for its higher population of emigrants originated from Turkey, Washington D.C. was selected for its harboring of some of the main umbrella and ethnic lobbying organizations. The interviewees in both contexts included: (a) current and former executive members and leading figures of current and former emigrants' associations, (b) experts, including academics and journalists, and (c) diplomats from the Turkish mission, members of the Advisory Committee on Citizens Living Abroad and other organizations affiliated with the Turkish state. In France, most of the association interviews have been conducted in their headquarters and some others have been conducted in the heavily populated Strasbourg-Saint Denis district in Paris. In the United States, some of the interviews were conducted in the headquarters, but the majority took place in the cafes or the newly established Turkish *Simit Sarayı* on the Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, by the request of the interviewees. I conducted a total of 40 interviews in France and 35 interviews in the United States during my time in the field.

Initially ten associations each in France and the United States were determined as the target groups, representing the diversity of emigrant groups from Turkey to these two countries. However the initial list has changed over time as the focus was given to associations, which might somehow have direct contacts with the Turkish state and, by the recognition of other associations of interest for the research question of the dissertation. In both countries, the interviews were semi-structured, giving ample room for the interviewee to provide anecdotal evidence without much interruption. Nearly half of the interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewees and the average interview interval was 1.5 hours. In addition to

the in-depth interviews I conducted moderate participant observation at the events, meetings, protests, seminars organized by the consulate or the associations.

Every field research is affected by its context and the subjectivity of the researcher. My interest in approaching different ethnic, religious and ideological groups including individuals with former or current ties of citizenship with the Turkish state was challenged with the ongoing conflict between some of these groups and the state in the period covering from late 2013 to early 2015. Both the French and American fieldworks were taken with three critical past events, which had culminated to create tensions among certain migrant groups and/or the Turkish state. This situation has caused reluctance among interviewees to discuss questions about "their relations with the Turkish state" and adopt a certain suspicion towards an outsider. These three events were: (1) specifically for France; the murder of three PKK officials in January 2013, (2) *Gezi* events in Turkey beginning with late May 2013, and (2) the corruption scandal in Turkey, which surfaced in December 2013. The alleged suspect in the first event reported until early 2016 as a member of the Turkish Intelligence Service (MIT) who had infiltrated the PKK in France caused the Kurdish organizations as well as the socialist and communist organizations to be suspicious. The *Gezi* events created and generated new tensions between the politically mobilized groups both in France and the United States. The corruption scandal, which became widespread through tape recordings of Turkish ministers' and officials' private conversations triggered a clash between the members of the *Hizmet* movement and the government, as well as other institutions and associations close to the AKP government. Under such circumstances I have been told by several interviewees that I had passed a certain background check and googling before I was accepted for an interview. This was a clear indication of the potential interviewees' intent to place me in a role in-between an "insider" and "outsider", based on a presumed politico-ideological position. In the overall, I was nicely welcomed by the majority of my target groups, some of whom were very eager to conduct interviews and support me with the follow up of my research. Still, I was kindly rejected several times from conducting interviews with the target groups, which included the members of the *Hizmet* movement in the United States, the members of the *Süleyman Efendi* order, members of the Armenian associations in France and the United States (except for one interviewee who accepted my request). I assume that for *Hizmet* movement and the Armenian associative environment, their ongoing political conflict (and I might even say escalating for the period of late 2014 in relation to both groups) with the Turkish state has been determinant of this lack of interest to participate in a

research that asked for their relations with this particular state. I have been told by some of the other interviewees that the lack of interest by the *Süleyman Efendi* order might have been due to their reluctance to discuss political matters openly. As a result, the findings of this research are constrained by time limitations and inaccessibility to gather sufficient data possibly due to the narrowness of my research network as well as the changing political environment in Turkey and its reflections in the overseas, making it difficult to talk and write about certain matters.

1.3. Plan of the Dissertation

Following this introductory chapter, the dissertation is classified under three sections: *Part I.* Theory and background; *Part II.* Policies and politics before 2003; and *Part III.* Policies and politics after 2003. Accordingly, *Part I* includes two chapters that present theoretical and descriptive background for the empirical chapters under *Part II and Part III*. *Chapter 2* draws on the literature on home state-emigrant relations. Although previous studies on transnationalism and diasporas have received noteworthy scholarly interest over the last three decades, the study on home state involvement in emigrant affairs is relatively new and flourishing. There is a recurrent debate as to whether the states' increased involvement is purely strategic, with an attempt to benefit from their emigrants in terms of social, economic or political affairs, or represent expansion in the citizenship configurations of sovereign states. I argue that under the current state of global affairs, domestic issues are increasingly being diffused in the international arena, placing emigrants at a new position as intermediaries between the nation states. In the Turkish case, the expansion of citizenship rights and obligations, and the strategic maneuvers occur in an intertwined fashion.

Chapter 3 explains why the cases of Turkish migrants in France and the United States have been chosen for comparison in this research. These two cases provide differences to analyze in comparison, as the migration and integration policies in the two countries, *and* the socio-economic backgrounds of the classical Turkish migrant communities in the two cases differ significantly. However despite these significant distinctions, the changes in the Turkish state's approach has created areas of similarity – related to the implications on institutional/administrative change and the transformations in the interactions between state-society representatives. In order to provide a background for my general discussion, I present in this chapter *first* the structural factors related to the two countries (migration histories and

policies, integration and naturalization policies), and *second* the history of Turkish migration to these two countries via analysis of the secondary literature.

After these two chapters that set the background for the main discussions, I present two empirical parts including a total of six chapters. The parts have been designed in an attempt to distinguish the timeline into two complementary parts: *Part II* deals with the state policies and emigrants politics in the pre-2003 period and *Part III* focuses on policies and politics in post-2003 period.

In *Chapter 4,* I provide a backdrop of the Turkish state's previous policies on emigrants living abroad in an attempt to illustrate the main approaches adopted during different epochs. It distinguishes the policies in three periods: (1) territorial configuration of nation-state building in the pre-1960 period and 1960-1980 periods, *and* (2) shift towards an extra-territorial membership configuration based on cultural and social allegiance from 1980s to 2000s. Illustrating the different contextual circumstances determining the policy choices of the three epochs, the chapter delivers foundations on the institutional settings to grasp the path dependencies or changes in the post-2003 period.

In *Chapters 5 and 6,* I focus on the emigrants' practices in France and in the United States in the pre-2003 period, and analyze how the Turkish state's policies have been implemented in practice in both contexts. The chapters illustrate that in the period the preceding 1980s, the state agenda which was based on maintaining territorial integrity and national development, resulted in an alienation between the home state and the emigrant populations. While a transition towards extra-territorial conception of citizenship took place following the 1980 coup, the securitization logic resulted in diverging accounts of engagement in France and in the United States: leading to a competitive environment in the former and in an alliance building in the latter.

In *Part III,* I present the transformations in the Turkish state's emigrant policies, how they are implemented and their outcomes in the cases of Turkish emigrants in France and the United States in the post-2003 period. The section begins with *Chapter 7,* which looks into the changes of state's policies living abroad following the single party rule and the 2003 Parliamentary Report. I elaborate on three main areas, which have been re-codified to create a new emigration polity: (1) changes in the symbolic portrayal of emigrants, (2) the re-configuration of institutional ties between the state and society -through reformation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the establishment of a new governance model incorporating a

specialized presidency-, and (2) the re-definition of citizenship to desegregate increased allegiance with extra-territorial members. While the institutional setting has been designed to determine the opportunity structures and available outlets for the state and emigrants' accessibility to one another, the expanded citizenship regime aimed at establishing the rights and obligations within a contractual relationship between the two parties.

In *Chapters 8* and *9,* I once again focus on emigrants' practices in France and the United States, this time positioning the discussion to the post-2003 period. The results of the two chapters are designed under two main topics. The first topic deals with the transformations in the discursive and institutional incorporation of emigrants in the national narratives. The second topic looks into the new rules of engagement, comprising of the implications of extra-territorial voting, the emergence of the rhetoric on active citizenship in the 2000s and the contestations and negotiations on the transnationalization of homeland domestic politics. By looking at the two cases, I argue that while there has been an actual broadening of state-society dialogue, certain emigrant groups' compatibility with the state ideology has been critical in their easier and deepened accessibility to state resources and opportunities.

In the *Conclusion* chapter I both summarize the findings from each chapter and provide a temporal and cross-case comparison for the whole of this dissertation. I emphasize that the chief finding in this dissertation is that Turkish state's policies had an impact on how emigrants fostered transnational political practices. As a result of the comparative analysis, I illustrate that the two cases represented shifts from difference toward convergence in the post-2003 period in relation with the home state-emigrant society relations, as well as the transnational practices of emigrants based on this relationship. The analysis of the two different cases showed that in the post-2003 period, two narratives have emerged simultaneously in both contexts and were even portrayed as the complementary factor to one another: building/integrating a community that would consolidate emigrants at the grassroots level and reinforcing ethnic lobbying aiming for higher-level politicization. While in France, ethnic lobbying entered the language of emigrants' political practices and as a force that would reinforce the consolidation of the existing communities, the case of United States exhibited the positioning of grassroots building/integrating as a central place in both the professional and grassroots lobbying practices. I therefore argue that the implementation of the Turkish state's emigrant engagement policy in the post-2003 period took place mainly around the projection of these two narratives for establishing its relations with the emigrant society. As a result, despite the overall broadening and deepening of the Turkish state's

relations with the emigrant communities in France and the United States, the core of the political opportunity structures at the transnational level are activated for populations that were conducive to work on these two fields.

In addition to this finding, I also discuss that the translation of Turkish state's engagement policies into political opportunities was also related to two political questions: how the nature of the system as a whole affected the functioning of political institutions and how the dominant political elite exerted its power over citizens, not only in the public but also in the private domain. In this research, I have shown that while there has been a continuity of selectivity in terms of the interactive sphere between the Turkish state and the emigrant community, there has been a change regarding who would become prioritized in the home state-emigrant society relations. The post-2003 period differed as the changing ideological premises of the ruling party and its overall governance perspective resulted in a new framework of compliance with the state-led management of ideology.

PART I
THEORY AND BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 2

Linking Home State Policies and Homeland Politics: Retracing Existing Theories and Concepts

> "[…] *states* make migrations international by bounding territories and defining the nationals they seek to enfold (Zolberg 1999). Population movement across state boundaries is inherently a *political* matter: it threatens to sever the alignment of territory, political institutions, and society that states try so hard to create." (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004: 1183).

The literature on international migration has been dealing with two sets of very closely interrelated but separately developed discussions on cross-border relations in the last decades. One of these discussions is related to states' migration policies, focusing on how states attempt to regulate the mismatches between the states as territorially bounded jurisdictions and the emerging questions of membership and rights due as a result of the migration of individuals (Bauböck 2010: 297). Although until recently states' migration policies have been dealt with from the perspective of host states' management of arriving migrants (and their descendants), the new tendencies among home states to take sturdier initiatives towards emigration and emigrants has led to a new focus on home states policies (Delano and Gamlen 2014: 43). This new discussion focuses on the home states' reconfigurations of their institutional settings, as well as the new conceptions of membership and citizenship that tie them to the societies living outside of the physical boundaries. The second line of research concentrates on the agency of emigrants, and questions why and how migrants engage in cross-border practices. The discussions on the agency of emigrants look into processes, identities and discourses that transcend international borders (Faist 2010), as well as their political relationship with the homeland in particular. According to Bauböck (2010: 319), while the first set of discussions on home states' engagement delves from an institutionalist perspective of "cold constellations", the second set on emigrant agency refers to "hot" collective identities and actions. The important link missing between the two sets of inquiry is from the words of Bauböck (2010: 320) to look into how "cold constellations" and "hot identities" complement each other, therefore analyze how home state policies meet with

emigrant transnationalism in practice. My research aims to contribute to filling this gap by providing an explanation of continuity and change in home state policies, how they are implemented, and what are the outcomes of these policies on emigrants' transnational political practices and home state-emigrant society relations.

In the social sciences literature, studies related to or focusing on home states' policies on emigrants or emigrants' politics on their homelands have taken place under different dialogues, until becoming juxtaposed recently within new theoretical frameworks. In Table 1, I recapitulate some of the concepts that have been previously employed to refer to the relationship between the home states and emigrant societies. While being related to the similar phenomena, these concepts signify disparities among differences of practices or processes in cross-border relations, as well as the different schools of thought in which the discussions have taken place. This literature chapter aims to position my analysis within these different schools of thought, and to create causal linkages to shed light on the interactions between the home state policies towards emigrants and emigrants' transnational practices related to their countries of origin.

Table 1: Denominations related to home state-emigrant society relations

Home state ➔ Emigrants/non-resident citizens	**Emigrants/non-resident citizens ➔ Home state**
Sending state policies	Ethnic politics/ethnic lobbying
Emigration (state) policies	Exile politics
Emigrant engagement policies	Expatriate politics
Diaspora (engagement) policies	Emigrant politics
Policies for non-resident citizens	Homeland politics
External, extra-territorial citizenship	Diaspora politics
Extra-territorial governance	Migrant (political) transnationalism
Transnational governmentality	Transnational (political) participation

As a result, this literature chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, my objective is to provide an analytical overview and to clarify the theoretical and conceptual premises of the different scholar discussions on cross-border relations. Therefore I open up the existing literatures on transnationalism and diasporas, in order to position my research

within the two literatures, as well as provide clarification for the use of certain concepts in this dissertation. My analysis on transnationalism begins with the presentation of its conceptualizations, followed by a specific focus on the concepts that define the bottom-up processes of cross-border relations of migrants; namely, migrant transnationalism and migrants' political transnationalism. The discussion on transnationalism is followed by an analysis on the theories on diasporas. In this dissertation, I intentionally do not use the concept of diasporas or diaspora politics to refer to emigrants' political practices on homeland matters. However, I benefit from this literature, which essentially deals with this particular aspect of migrant transnationalism. In the second section, I develop on these building blocks on the inquiry of cross-border relations, in order to identify exclusive interpretations related to home state engagement and emigrant (political) transnationalism. The section begins with the elucidation of the novel literature on home state engagement policies, followed by explanations of why and how home state engagement takes place. My discussion finalizes with an attempt to build a causal pattern on the interaction between home states' emigrant engagement policies and emigrants' transnational practices, with the employment of the analytical framework provided by the concept of political opportunity structures.

2.1. Building Blocks for the Inquiry of Cross-Border Linkages

In this first section, I position the theoretical and conceptual premises of my dissertation within the literary sphere on the inquiry of cross-border linkages, and specifically in relation with the scholarship and debates on transnationalism and diasporas. Described as "awkward dance partners" by Faist (2010), the concepts of diasporas and transnationalism (and transnational communities) have been increasingly coined together within the international migration scholarship in the last decades. While the old concept of transnationalism evokes continuous ties across states' physical borders, it has become approximated with the concept of diaspora, which has initially been used to characterize specific (and usually victimized) populations living outside of an (imagined) homeland. Even though many scholars agree that both terms address cross-border linkages of certain populations, the intellectual debate lingers on how well the two terms overlap with each other. As I benefit from the existing debates in both fields, this section aims to grasp the emergence and development of the two concepts.

Scholarship and Debates on Transnationalism

Transnationalism is a widely used concept by social sciences scholars since the 1970s. Broadly, it refers "to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states" and is argued to reflect the current state of affairs on the systems of ties, interactions, exchange and mobility. Transnationalism is a condition in which impediments (concrete and symbolic borders) against the exchange and circulation of people, ideas, interest etc. are bypassed (Vertovec 1999: 447). In fact, transnational ties and long distance networks defining the concept of transnationalism are not new phenomena and they precede "the nation". Yet, they represent a novel perspective of reading and understanding the particular conditions, which have been intensified in the global scale. Although very meager compared to the fast accumulation of knowledge and communication today, plenty of instances of transnationalism existed in the past, such as in the history of immigration or religions. These relations remained usually as sporadic, mainly due to the lack of steady networks and knowledge and information accumulation.

As a concept, the concept of "transnational" was first used by neoliberal international relations scholars Keohane and Nye (1971) to describe the importance of global interactions and impact on interstate politics. Criticizing the state-centric realist approach, scholars argued that "in many issue systems, non-governmental actors account(ed) for a major portion of activities that cross(ed) national boundaries" (Keohane and Nye 1974: 55). A transnational system included nongovernmental actors, constituting the "basic initiating and compelling forces in it" and a government whose actions "will be largely focused on regulation and control of transnational activities" (1974: 55-56). In spite of their inclusion of nongovernmental actors in their analysis, the first accounts on transnationalism approached to the issue from more statist and top-down perspectives, making "transnational" a vague concept together with international and multinational.

Over a period of forty years, the concept was broadened and bounded all at the same time, and disseminated to nearly all fields of social sciences, bringing into existence a multidisciplinary scholarship juxtaposing micro, mezzo and macro perspectives. The gaining of the multidisciplinary impetus occurred in the early 1990s, with its earlier use in the disciplines of cultural studies and migration studies (for instance in the works of Appadurai 1990; Bhabha 1990; Clifford 1992; Schiller et al. 1995). Often celebrating "the liberatory character of transnational practices", the earlier studies in these two fields represented transnationals "as engaged in a dialectic of opposition and resistance to the hegemonic logic

of multinational capital" (Smith and Guarnizo 1998: 4-5). Whereas the control and domination by the state and capital were implied as the processes "from above", the popular resistance which was correlated with cultural hybridity, multi-positional identities and border-crossings was identified with the processes "from below" (Smith and Guarnizo 1998: 4-5). The earlier accounts on the agency-oriented transnational scholarship coined the term with the lasting relationships and repeated movements across borders, in which the agents were not states or nations, but individual actors or associations (Kokot et al. 2004: 4). The resistant perspective regarding transnational actors was questioned and challenged by scholars who demonstrated in their research that transnational spaces could also be used for the purposes of capital accumulation (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). According to Smith and Guarnizo (1998: 6), asymmetries of domination (i.e. inequality, racism, sexism, class conflict and uneven development) were also embedded in the transnational practices. And in fact, such logics were even sometimes perpetuated by transnational processes. The way the agents defined their motivations mattered significantly in determining the formulation of the transnational processes and their implications over time.

To make sense of transnationalism, it is useful to discuss the similarities and divergences of the term with other neighboring concepts. Transnationalism is very often used interchangeably and mistakenly with the concept of globalization, probably because both phenomena emerged concurrently. Similar to the concept of globalization, transnationalism refers to the importance of cross-border or "deterritorialized" politics, economics and culture. However rather than referring to the porosity of borders, transnationalism emphasizes the intensity of connections to national or local territories (Faist 2010: 14). Despite the new modality, which extends beyond borders, territoriality "continues to define the state even as its citizens crosses state borders" (Fitzgerald 2000: 29). Moreover transnationalism differs from globalization in regards to the appeal for a global consciousness or "oneworldness"; it does not imply a linear dissemination of ideas or norms, but rather the complexity of consenting, contesting or overlapping cross-border transactions. The linearity argument had been previously made by scholars looking from the lens of post-nationalism including Soysal (1994) and Joppke (2005) who support that liberal Western norms could potentially translate into increased political rights and citizenship. Still, the perspective is challenged by many who addressed that transnational transactions may occur synchronically as universalizing and particularizing processes (Faist 2010).

The emerging rhetoric on the emancipating characteristics of transnationalism in the mid-1990s brought about discussions about whether the concept of “trans-nationalism” harbored within itself a meaning of crossing beyond nationalism towards a more cosmopolitan world. This argument was criticized by scholars who emphasized that even though nationalism did not entail in itself trans-border nationalism, many instances of nationalism could be found in transnational processes. At this point Faist (2010) argued that “human mobility (could) buttress and recreate all kinds of beliefs and –isms, including nationalism, patriarchism, sexism, sectarianism and ethno-nationalism”. Case studies illustrated that transnational loyalties and political engagements around communitarian sentiments guided by an “imagined geography” often led into new forms of nationalism (Kastoryano 2006). Moreover, such conceptions of membership and allegiance could be promoted, reinforced or countered by the origin state (Şenay 2013). By reaching out to its external members, state power maintained itself through the prevailing processes of nation building that reconstructed popularized memories of a shared past and historical narratives to authenticate and validate a commonality of purpose (Schiller et al. 1995: 51; Anderson 1991), resembling to the enactments of state nationalism.

Steven Vertovec’s appraisal on the usages of the concept of transnationalism is helpful for grasping this catch-all phrase. According to Vertovec (2009: 4-12), the concept of transnationalism is grounded upon distinct but “not mutually exclusive” meanings, including (1) a social morphology referring to social formations spanning borders, (2) a type of consciousness, (3) a mode of cultural reproduction, (4) an avenue of capital, (5) a site of political engagement, *and* (6) (re)construction of “place” or locality. As a *social morphology*, students of transnationalism focused on its characteristics as a social formation spanning borders, through systems of relationships best described as networks. The current debate on networks –formed of hubs and nodes- assumes that in comparison to the previous periods, the new technologies facilitated the density and the fluidity of these networks (Vertovec 2009), and “enabled the creation of forms of solidarity and identity that do not rest on an appropriation of space where contiguity and face-to-face contact are paramount” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 9). Here, I am focusing on the three usages of transnationalism in Vertovec’s analysis, which mainly take place within the literature of migration and diaspora studies, for its convenience with the research agenda of this dissertation. As a *type of consciousness,* Vertovec (2009: 5) maintains that the implications of multi-locality on identity, in which the individuals become aware of themselves as the holders of multiple identities is emphasized.

More simply put, transnationalism is employed in such instances to denote that agents who recognize themselves as being simultaneously “here and there” become “new subjectivities” in the global area (Nonini and Ong 1997). Transnationalism is also referred to as a *(re)construction of “place” or locality,* replacing the existing territorial understandings of place with others connecting multiple locations as “social fields” or “social spaces” (Vertovec 2009: 12).

Migrant Transnationalism

From the bottom-up perspective, the concept of transnationalism introduces new dynamics on the non-state actors who are capable of extending or by-passing the physical, legal and institutional borders of the states. One of the main discussions in this field is related to the migrants’ transnational activities. “Migrant transnationalism” is classified broadly by Vertovec under the conceptualization of social formations, and is defined as a “category referring to a range of practices and institutions linking migrants, people and organizations in their homelands or elsewhere in a diaspora” (Vertovec 2009: 13). By nature, the migrant group embodies the ability to exercise cross-border practices, despite of being bound by the constraints by the prevailing nation-states like visa restrictions, apparatus on status (i.e. work and residence permits, citizenship) and the actual physical borders.

Scholars that bridged transnationalism and migration came up with a number of concepts, which highlighted the migrants’ preservation of multiple linkages. Nina Glick Schiller and colleagues (1995: 48) used the concept of *transmigrant,* to denote “immigrants whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state”. According to the scholars, transmigrants settled and became incorporated in the economy and political institutions of the host country, but at the same time engaged elsewhere “in the sense that they maintain connections, build institutions, conduct transactions and influence local and national events in the countries from which they emigrated”. The concept of *transnational communities* also gained recognition in the literature, referring to communities that settled in different national societies, sharing common interests and references – territorial, religious and linguistic- and using transnational networks to consolidate solidarity beyond national borders (Faist 1998; Kastoryano 2000). Levitt (2001: 200-201) developed subcategories to transnational communities, including *rural-to-urban trasnational villages* or

urban-to-urban transnational villages based on the sociopolitical determinants of social connections.

Nevertheless, such descriptions can be problematic since the limits of transnationality, or in other words, what counts as transnational remains as a question to be answered. The characterization of certain populations as transnational can lead to reifying the concept, or attributing as a constant identifier of certain populations. Furthermore, the supposed groups may not be homogeneously transnational, or this characteristic of having multiple ties might change over time. Not all migrants can or are willing to practice a cross-border relationship, or feel a sense of affinity or solidarity toward one another (Levitt 2001: 201). As a challenge, many scholars referred to transnational not as a constant element, but as a process or a practice. For instance Itzgsohn et al. (1999) sought to scale the concept by using categorizations such as "broad" and "narrow" transnational practices: the narrowness was determined by the degree of institutionalization of the political practices. Others, as Guarnizo (2000) used other classifications, such as "core transnationalism" and "expanded transnationalism" based on whether the activities are ingrained in the regular lives of migrants or remain as occasional. Such classifications are crucial for emphasizing and differentiating diverging patterns of action that might be realized by the groups of concern.

Another discussion that needs to be addressed is related to the use of "migrant" to describe transnational practices of populations who had a history of migration. Even though the conceptualization of "migrant transnationalism" contributes to the understanding of practices by individuals who are bounded by a multiplicity of locations, the concept is controversial in contexts where the action of migration had occurred not by the actors in question but by their predecessors. Many researchers today refer to migrant transnationalism as the cross-border actions of certain populations who have a history of migration and attribute a social continuity across generations. However in most cases the actions of interest are not carried out by individuals who have migrated themselves, but their descendants, who are bounded by very different structural factors or reproduce very different patterns of action. Migrant transnationalism embodies an evident concept stretching, since the notion of migrant is used as a broader concept, rather than as a signifier of a certain action.

In order to understand the persistent use of the concept of migrant in such situations, it is necessary to refer to another concept, that of migrant generations. As argued by Skrbis et al. (2007) belongingness and the migrant generations are concepts, which can hardly be separated, and this can also be argued for migrant transnationalism. The study of generations

has actually not been limited to the study on transnationalism, and it had received widespread attention in migration studies. Skrbis et al. (2007: 262-263) suggest three ways of defining the concept of generation:

> *statistically,* referring to the children born in the host country to foreign-born parents; *social,* which extends the first definition to include those foreign-born who migrated during infancy or early childhood; […] *subjectively,* depending on whether individuals consider themselves to be, for example, Lebanese, Australian, Lebanese-Australian or Australian-Lebanese.

There are a number of consequences of this threefold definition. For one thing, the statistical and subjective determination as a "new generation" may be incompatible. An individual born to foreign-born parents in a certain country may choose to not consider herself as belonging to the origin society, while another individual with a more deep-rooted history of migration can blend cultural beliefs and practices of that society. The statistical or social attributions to populations are used in formal account (i.e. as institutional or academic data), however may not always comply with the subjective self-definitions. Another problem is related to the age cohort. The discussions on generations assume that the members of a particular generation are of the same age group, who has experienced same events at the similar points in their lives. Nevertheless, migration from a country of origin to a host country can happen over a long period of time, with certain points of rupture and climax, making it difficult to pinpoint a certain generational characteristic to different groups of migrants. The envisioned generations may include a variety of experiences, based on gender, socio-economic, educational and regional background, which can result in diverging ideas about identity (Skrbis et al. 2007: 263-264). Still more and more people subjectively feel or consider themselves as the descendants of migrant populations; this is reinforced by increasing linkages across borders and circulating multiculturalist policies (Skrbis et al. 2007). Despite its controversies, the conceptualization on generations remains as a useful lens to address shared patterns and similarities across groups, which have experienced same social events.

Although the concept of migrant transnationalism is controversial in many aspects, this dissertation will benefit from the framework provided by it. This research captures the transnational practices of populations who have had a history of migration; therefore it includes the collective practices by some individuals who had the experience of migration and some others who did not have that experience. Many of the interviewees who participated in this research are the first generation and the so-called *socially* second generation who emigrated with their families during their childhood years. Yet, some of the

interviewees have never experienced migration, but were affected by the consequences of the migration process by the older members of their family. As it will be clarified in the next section, this research focuses on migrants and their relations with the homeland. As it grasps this sort of relationship, it entails the individuals as emigrants and uses it juxtaposed to other neighbor concepts. The concepts of "emigrant" and "emigrant society" will be used together with other concepts including "external citizen" or "non-resident citizen" –which represent the institutional and legal linkage between the individuals and the state- where they are seen as fit when referring to the population in question.

This dissertation also focuses predominantly on the political practices of emigrants in relation with their cross-border linkages. The concept of political transnationalism is employed in many fields of social sciences, including migration, to denote activities, ranging from individual mobilization to organizational participation and involvement in formal politics. In the field of migration studies, political transnationalism broadly refers to:

> any political activity undertaken by migrants who reside mainly outside their homeland and that is aimed at gaining political power or influence at the individual or collective level in the country of residence or in the state to which they consider they belong. Such power or influence may be achieved by interacting with all kinds of institutions (local, subnational, national or international) in the country of residence and/or the home country, by supporting movements that are politically active in the country of origin or by intervening directly in the country of origin's politics (Martinello and Lafleur 2008).

Political transnationalism differs from other social, economic or cultural processes of transnationalism as it involves "the state as an agent or the nation as an imagined political community" (Bauböck 2003: 702). Bauböck (2003: 702) maintains that since the multilocality is somehow strategic, it ultimately affects the very definition of the entity whose borders are crossed. In instances where political transnationalism involves migrants, hence individuals who are bounded by a variety of determinants of status and membership, the political transnationalism "is more than political activity across territorial borders" as it prompts to overlapping boundaries of membership in political communities (2003: 703). In addition to Martinello and Lafleur's definition of political transnationalism, Bauböck accentuates its relation to the changing conceptions of membership (2003: 720):

> […] political transnationalism is not only about a narrowly conceived set of activities through which migrants become involved in the domestic politics of their home countries; it also affects collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native population in both receiving and sending societies. […] A transnational perspective that focuses on overlapping memberships can help to explain how patterns of integration into the receiving

> polity and unfinished projects of nation-building in the homeland shape migrants' attitudes towards countries or origin.

As migrants are positioned in multiple spaces involving home countries and host countries, the political conditions in the two countries have direct influence on the migrants' ability to perform.

According to Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a: 21) migrants may enter into dialogue on a range of issues during their transnational political mobilization, depending on their objectives for mobilization. Even though these range of issues and places of claims-making may be interwoven with each other, the analysis of their distinct patterns facilitates the analysis of the researcher who aims to elaborate on the different forms of transnational practices. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a) mainly distinguishes between "immigrant politics" and "homeland politics" that denote a distinction based on which locality has been addressed as the target of claims-making. In immigrant politics the objective is the improvement of migrants' situation in the receiving country, "such as obtaining more political, social and economic rights, fighting discrimination and the like" (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 21). While immigrant politics may remain as merely a domestic matter, it might also become transnational if the country of origin becomes involved in helping (and sometimes even impeding) the conditions of its nationals living abroad. Homeland politics on the other hand deals with migrants' political activities related to the assumed homeland. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a) argues that these generally refer to political activities on domestic or foreign policy of the homeland, but also may insinuate to migrants' claims making for expanding their legal, political, economic situation related to the homeland. In order to describe this second subset of emigrant politics, she uses the concept of "emigrant politics". Another subset of homeland politics is described as "diaspora politics", which she describes as the political activism of groups, usually related to sensitive issues including national sovereignty and security political disputes. Finally, referring to the discussions on the sub-scales of national geographical imaginations (such as Itzigsohn 2000; Levitt 2001), Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a: 21) adds "trans-local politics" in her typology as a sub-set of homeland politics; which refer to migrants' engagement at the local community level in their homelands.

As discussed before, migrants' claims-making and practices on identity have triggered a stimulating debate in the literature, on whether transnationalism harbored within itself practices of trans-border practices of nationalism. This discussion was mainly centered on migrants' cross-border political practices, where membership was not deemed to be delimited

by the national borders. Beginning with the 1990s, the social sciences literature was marked by the new concept of "long-distance nationalism" that was popularized by Anderson (1993; 1998). Anderson (1998) argued that even though the population of a nation extended beyond the territorial boundaries of a given land, the political focus continued to remain on the territory of the homeland. Long-distance nationalists were considered to be positioned in a relationship of attachment with what they referred to as homeland, based on loyalty and allegiance, depending on the political and economic situation of that place (Schiller 2005: 571). The experiences of identification described in the concept of long-distance nationalism approximated the concept of transnationalism with forms of diasporic belonging, which also refers to self-ascribed or ascribed identifications of dispersed people with imagined homelands.

Over the last decades, the literature on diasporas has emerged as a separate field, which brought novel and stimulating debates on the relations between emigrants and their countries of origin. Different from the concept of transnationalism, the current uses of diaspora within and outside of the academia are not isolated from its intentional employment by political entrepreneurs, to create a kind of groupness around communities that are assumed to have practices of identification with their homelands. In the analysis of home states' emigrant engagement policies, the debates on diasporas goes beyond a perspective that deals with the bottom-up processes, and incorporates the top-down strategies of such actors. In the next section, I elaborate on how the concept of diaspora emerged in the literature and how it developed up to date.

Scholarship and Debates on Diasporas

"Diaspora" has become a buzzword, not only in the academia, but also among the policy-circles, international institutions, policy consulting companies as well as the public opinion, even in countries where it had never been referred to before. According to the precursors of "diaspora studies" (Sheffer 1986; Safran 1991; Cohen 1997), the earlier accounts of the concept can be traced back in the ancient Greece, where it has derived from the verb "diaspeiro", meaning "to sow widely". Remaining latent for a long period until the 1970s, the concept regained attention during the advent of globalization and increased mobility across borders. Based on Sheffer's (1986) criteria, the classical and widespread definition of the concept pointed out to three conditions: (a) dispersed group holding a distinctive collective identity across international locations; (b) withholding some kind of internal organization;

and (c) keeping ties with the imagined or real homeland (Gamlen 2008). This broad definition is used to cover both the archetypical cases such as the Jews and Armenians that refer to the forced mobility of victimized populations, and other groups, which also take their place in the discussions on globalization and transnationalism (Gamlen 2008: 842).

The initial impetus of the dispersion of the concept of diaspora in the academia occurred in 1991 after the launch of *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* (Dufoix 2008: 32). In its first issue, editor in chief Tölölyan (1991: 4) wrote that the world had entered a "transnational moment" where non-state actors emerged as a challenge to the state borders. The editors of the journal adopted and transformed the concept of diaspora to signify new and broader meanings:

> We use "diaspora" provisionally to indicate our belief that the term once described Jewish, Greek and Armenian dispersion now shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrants, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community.

As a result of the broadened framework on diasporas, scholars came up with new typologies and classifications on the concept since the 1990s. These include victim, trade, labor and colonial diasporas (Cohen 1997); classical and contemporary diasporas (Reis 2004); *and* entrepreneurial, religious, political, racial/cultural diasporas (Bruneau 2010). However different nation cases with diverse mobility histories have shown that the categorization of certain nations under certain subheadings of diaspora was not possible[6]; and that the term could not be attributed to any single type of community representing all times (Kokot et al. 2004: 3; Brubaker 2005). While the older conceptualizations of diaspora clearly implied a return to an (imagined) homeland (Safran 1991), newer uses of the term replaced it "with dense and continuous linkages across borders" (Faist 2010: 12). Rather than bounding within the imagery of origin and destination, the new meanings employing the constructivist framework treated it as a transnationally-organized "imagined community" (Anderson 1991), which occurred as a result of a process of strategic social construction (Adamson 2008: 7).

Despite the numerous attempts to classify the criteria for diaspora, there are recurring ambiguities about its definition. While the research on diasporas which was centered around

[6] Kokot et al. (2004) give the example of Greek communities. Greek enclaves that had significant input in the 15th century after the fall of Constantinople represent an archetypal "victim" diaspora. Greek communities emigrating to United States and Australia in the 19th and 20th centuries were also exemplified as a "diaspora" group, yet this time they would be defined under the "labor diaspora" subheading.

the migrants' practices in the past, it has shifted towards an approach which also includes the role of origin and host states. This way of thinking points out that diasporas are not necessarily pre-existing groups with static characteristics (Dufoix 2008; Gamlen 2008; Ragazzi 2012) and echoes with the criticisms against definitions that define diasporas "as destiny" or stretched it to include any dispersed population. Diaspora is very often used in parallel with the concept of transnationalism. The two concepts are recognized as similar since both tackling cross-border processes. However, many scholars argue that they distinguish significantly. Employing an approach which focuses on the groupness of the dispersing populations, Sheffer (2006: 121) argues that transnational and ethnonational approaches to dispersion needed to be distinguished since cases representing the two approaches (Latino or Muslim transnational networks vs. Jewish, Armenian or Indian ethnonational diasporas) face different challenges and have diverging capacities for persisting. Faist (2010: 9) on the other hand, compared to the concept of diaspora which is used to denote to "religious or national groups living outside an (imagined) homeland; transnationalism is a more neutral concept indicating ties across borders, capturing either certain communities such as migrants, or all sorts of social formations (i.e. transnationally active networks, groups and organizations).

Such struggles within the framework of diasporas are tackled by Dufoix's (2008) ideal types on the relations between migrant populations, states and referent-origin (not the origin state but the one envisioned by the populations). Dufoix (2008: 66-67) emphasizes that the configurations based on these relationships vary in time and space, making it impossible to capture them in reality. Focusing on the multitude of actors, Dufoix (2008) proposed alternative modalities extending beyond the duality of migrant community-country or origin relations, which facilitates grasping spatial, political or ideational frameworks without overgeneralizing. Rather than concretizing typologies of certain groups of people, Dufoix's modes present ideal types of community behavior, which can exist in a combined matter in a particular period of time or interchange occasionally. Diasporas are not groups *per se*, but they exist as a result of different ways of constructing, imagining and managing the relations between states and populations, which in the contemporary situation has become reinforced with the added value given to dispersion (Waldinger 2008: xvi). As asserted by Brubaker

(2005: 13), the "'groupness' of putative diasporas, like that of putative 'nations', is precisely what is at stake in [political, social and cultural][7] struggles".

Adamson's (2008) attempt to bridge diaspora politics and transnational networks is fruitful for building an analytical framework, which illustrates how the processes of linkages occur. Using the social movement framework, Adamson argues that diasporas are social constructs, "but one can hypothesize that they are constructed by political entrepreneurs who are acting rationally and strategically through the strategic deployment of identity frames and categories" (2008: 12). Borrowing Keck and Sikkink's categorization of transnational networks, Adamson (2008: 12) adds a fourth dimension, which may overlap with the first three but is analytically different:

> 1. those with essentially *instrumental goals*, especially transnational corporations and banks,
> 2. those motivated primarily by *shared causal ideas*, such as scientific groups or epistemic communities,
> 3. those motivated primarily by *shared principled ideas* or *values* (transnational advocacy networks)
> 4. those defined primarily by a *shared collective identity* – common identity marker or category, such as an ethnic, national or religious identity- or a *shared belief.*

As such, diaspora politics is a form of strategic social identity construction, which emphasizes a certain identity or a belief category that is imagined as shared among the assumed members. In order for diasporic politics to emerge, there is a need for "the activation of a transnational constituency from the mass of entangled and messy social networks that characterize the transnational social dimension of the international system" (Adamson 2008: 14). According to this perspective, diasporas are not only "actors" that have "effects" as described in the earlier conceptualizations, but also themselves are "effects" of processes of political mobilization, socially constructed identity communities and transnational imaginaries (Adamson 2008: 14-25).

The review provided in the preceding sections attempted to reflect the general panorama of the literatures on transnationalism and diasporas. Accordingly, the concept of transnationalism designates the durable ties between states, migrants, and of other social formations across physical boundaries. The concept of diaspora, on the other hand, has initially designated specific religious or national groups living outside of an (imagined)

[7] Brackets are by Brubaker.

homeland. The recent scholarship on cross-border ties often use the two terms interchangeably; expanding the notion of diasporas to include a wider range of agents (Faist 2010: 15). The social constructivist views in the literature go beyond the traditional reified images of transnational communities and diasporas, and argue that these need to be comprehended as processes of social formation performed by policy entrepreneurs, migrant elites, states or epistemic communities. In this research, I benefit from this perspective that looks into the processes in order to grasp the interactions between various institutions and actors, rather than schematizing groups of people with certain practices under specific categorizations. Therefore I avoid using the concepts of "transnational communities" or "diasporas" to refer to migrants (and their descendants). I rather discuss the transnational or diasporic (political) processes undertaken by certain groups of individuals with migration histories, and in order to concentrate on home country-emigrant relations, I employ the concepts of "home state engagement policies" and "homeland politics".

The Trilateral Relationship

The literatures on transnationalism and diasporas position the intensified and expedited interactions across borders as novelties of the global era. In fact, such interactions have already existed in the past however through informal channels and sporadically rather than widespread (Varadaradjan 2010: 7). In the global age physical, political, institutional or symbolic borders of the states have become more porous and concurrently led to the increase in the multilocality of economic, social and political processes. While for the emigrants, this guides to the accessibility to new resources and opportunities that are present outside the jurisdictions of their affiliated states, for the states, the situation creates controversies related to managing the membership conditions of citizens abroad and foreign citizens in the territory (Bauböck 2010: 297). Beyond the bounding factors of status and opportunities, migrant transnationalism is an expression of multiple belonging, where more than one national reference and at least two arenas of social participation exists (Kastoryano 2000: 311):

> [...] the country of origin becomes a source of identity, the country of residence a source of rights, and the emerging transnational space, a space of political action combining the two or more countries.

The most recent debates on home state-emigrant society relations oblige us to have a look back at the customary trinity of migration studies: home state, host state, migrants and the relations among these three actors. In order to elaborate more on this issue, I benefit from

Başer's (2015: 25-27) typology of the tripartite relationship that deals with cross-border linkages.

Hostland-Immigrant Relations: From the perspective of the host countries, international migration creates aliens*,* as well as foreigners*,* whose relations with the nationals makes it a matter of domestic and foreign policy (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004: 1183). The nature of the hostland regime determines the existence and degree of opportunities and resources that are available for the mobilization or participation of migrants in both homeland and host state related affairs (Başer 2015: 26). The hostland regime denotes primarily how citizenship and policies of incorporation have been conceived, but also how the core principles of citizenship rights on democratic participation and representation were developed by the host state. In the post-World War II era, liberal ideologies gradually and evenly liberalized their conceptions of citizenship in a variety of patterns including quasi citizenship and long-term residence (Bauböck 2010: 298). However, some of the opportunities granted by the host states are not static and are very often open to change (Başer 2015: 27). A crucial reason for this variability is related to the disagreement on the positive effect that transnational engagement may have on the host country, on whether or not homeland related politics erode political integration in the country of settlement (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 777). While optimists welcome the empowering aspect of migrant transnationalism on the development of multicultural democracy, pessimists focus on its security aspects, arguing that it might provide the vehicle for diffusing conflicts from home to host country settings (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 777; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004: 1185). Therefore, host states may lay down rules and constraints on tolerable and inadmissible transnational practices (Başer 2015: 27) or make categorical demarcations amongst different groups with same country of origin.

Homeland-Emigrant Relations: Population movements traditionally create a controversial situation for the home states: on the one hand the exit might hamper states' ability to enclose and penetrate their populations, and on the other hand, the access to resources at another territory may support them with new leverage to effect change at home (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004: 1183). Still, in parallel with the widening opportunity regarding membership in the host countries, there has been another change that occurred among home countries, which began to consider external citizenship "as a persistent link with their expatriates abroad that could be activated for economic, political and cultural policy goals" (Bauböck 2010: 298). Moreover, in cases where external citizenship could not be maintained due to the reluctance of the host countries to provide dual citizenship, states arranged more flexible

forms of citizenship, in order to keep or rebuild their ties in spite of distance or institutional impediments. Students of transnational citizenship and emigration policies have discussed in the recent years whether this was a strategic tactic or a part of the wider shift in the restructuring of the states (Gamlen 2011; Larner 2007). While many governments want supportive lobby groups abroad, not all emigrant groups are interested in transnational practices. The contribution of transnational networks may not always be in favor of the home state, depending on their political-ideological compatibility with the state (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 776). Moreover, the effectiveness of these networks for the home state depends on to what extent they represent the groups in the country of origin and to what extent the strong policy entrepreneurs represent those living in the host country.

Hostland-Homeland Relations: The relationship among states also effects and is affected by the transnational political practices of emigrants and their descendants. Koslowski (2005: 9) argues that although international migration has been in general neglected by the international relations literature, the movement of persons is politically significant, as they can participate in homeland politics, influence foreign policy-making of host and home states, and develop alternative political identities transcending existing borders. The scholar suggests that these processes breach the boundary between the globalization of domestic politics and international politics, traditionally understood as state-to-state relations (Koslowski 2005: 15). The effects of transnational political activity on host and home states are dependent on the political-ideological orientations of the migrants, their objectives, the forms of activity they use or the impact they may have. As argued by Koslowski (2005: 26) these variable factors make it difficult to make generalizable assumptions on the consequences of political activity:

> Depending on the case at hand, emigrants may be forces for liberal democracy in their homelands or supporters of authoritarian nationalists. Emigrant political activity may further the national interests of their host states or they may frustrate host-state foreign-policy objectives at every turn. Just because one cannot make easy generalizations across cases, however, does not mean that this political activity is without consequence on world politics as a whole.

The specifics of relations between the states determine the available space for the emigrants' transnational practices. Hostile, ally or neutral relations may model to what extent emigrants may be tolerated in a security/solidarity nexus (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004: 1185). The existing leverages between the two countries or the history of inter-state affairs may result in demands to curb or accelerate the formation of diasporic ties of all or some of the migrant

groups (Başer 2015: 28). For instance, giving the example of German-Turkish relations, Başer (2015: 28) argues that the Turkish state has recurrently demanded from the German state to curb Kurdish activism on its soil. Two cases in this dissertation illustrate the variable role of inter-state relations on emigrants' practices: at the curbing end is the case of Turkish state's requests from the French state to hamper Kurdish activity; at the accelerating end is the case of Turkish-American relations, in which the formation of elite migrants' transnational ties has been supported historically.

In the following section, I will specifically focus on home state-emigrant society relations, which is the primary area of investigation in my dissertation. While concentrating on these two actors, the dissertation maintains that the host country structures and the relationships between the host state with both the home state and the migrants is a crucial aspect determining how the home state emigrant engagement policies are implemented in practice. Therefore the dissertation retains the perspective based on the interplay between the three actors: namely, host states, home states and migrants.

2.2. Concentrating on Home State-Emigrant Society Relations

Home states are today increasingly interested in involving in and regulating the economic, political and social conditions of the migrants originated from their borders. Contrary to the earlier periods when the membership to a community was commonly defined in terms of territoriality, many home country governments no longer want their migrants to return but to "achieve a secure status in the wealthy nations to which they have moved and from which they can make sustained economic and political contributions in the name of patriotism and home town loyalty" (Portes et al. 1999: 467). The simultaneous increase in engagement and the change of discourse in many countries is not incidental. In the past recent decades, the major changes brought by globalization, including developments in communication technologies, the easing and affordability of mobility, the intensification of networks gave rise to the emergence of transnational networks as effective actors in the international and domestic political realms. Among such processes are migrant transnationalism (Vertovec 2004), in which migrants who were once characterized as the "uprooted" have become firmly rooted in their countries while at the same time maintaining multiple linkages to their homeland (Schiller et al. 1995). These linkages very often translated into more or less intense and institutionalized forms of political engagement with homelands, ranging widely from party politics, electioneering and lobbying to mass demonstrations, post conflict

reconstruction and support for insurgency or terrorism (Vertovec 2004). Notwithstanding the strengthening role of the migrant agency and its accessibility beyond definite territory, the predominance of the nation-states, as the coming of existence of sovereignty, did not perish. On the contrary, reinforced with the neoliberal restructuring of the state, the exercise of power also underwent a change in which the state reinvented itself as a more "flexible" entity (Ong 1999; Laguerre 1999). In this section, I present the recent scholarship on why and how home states are becoming increasingly engaged with their citizens living abroad.

Deviations from the Territorial Nation-State

Until recently, scholars working on home state-emigrant society relations discussed why increased cross-border linkages were a novelty, by referring to two explanatory frameworks: (a) analysis giving weight on *macro-structural elements*, including the facilitation of mobility thanks to globalization, transport and communications, *and* (b) analysis based on the *strategic-tactical reasons* behind states' increased involvement (Ragazzi 2009: 383). While the discussions on globalization stressed primarily on the agency of emigrants without taking into consideration the role of the states, the strategic-tactical explanations that looked into the relationship between migration and national development overemphasized states' interests (Ragazzi 2009). By the same token, Gamlen (2008: 841) argues that two positions had their share in the literature on what the emigrant referred to in terms of her political relations with the home country: (a) the migrant was either placed as an *active agent* (i.e. ethnic chauvinist or freedom fighter) in the face of the "domestic politics", either of the country of origin or the host country, *or* (b) she was referred to *as straddled* between the "international sphere of politics" (i.e. human capital for the host state or remittance machine for the sending state). This basic assumption of this binary perspective in fact reflects what Agnew (2003) called as "the modern geopolitical imagination":

> A vision of the world as an integrated whole, comprises advanced and primitive areas, in which the highest form of political organization is the territorial nation-state. […] Domestic policies beyond borders are considered a deviation from the standard model of the territorial nation-state (Gamlen 2008: 841).

The main bulk of literature that encompasses empirical studies on developing and underdeveloped countries illustrates this perception of homeland-emigrant relations "as a symptom of backwardness" of either the home societies or the emigrant groups themselves (Gamlen 2008: 841). The newly emerging literature that looked into the developed states'

rising interest to adopt new forms of allegiance with their citizens and other members living abroad (i.e. the works of Hugo (2006) on Australian diaspora; Gamlen (2007) and Larner (2007) on New Zealander diaspora) discuss it in relation with neoliberalism. For scholars who accentuate that the new configurations between the home states and emigrants is not only a symptom of increased linkages across borders, the fundamental shift is related to the neoliberalism or the neoliberal restructuring of the state (Gamlen 2011; Larner 2007; Ragazzi, 2009; Varadaradjan 2010). As a catch-all word today, neoliberalism is a theory that fundamentally suggests that the well-being of the human beings can only be achieved through mechanisms in which the role of the state in markets has been kept to a bare minimum (Harvey 2007: 2). In theory, neoliberalism is grounded on the maintenance of individual freedoms; nevertheless the determination of what counts as freedom creates its contradictions. Critiques against neoliberalism contend that the urge for the protection of private property eventually takes over the putative expansion of personal freedoms, through authoritative statecraft (Harvey 2007). The contradictions in the meanings of freedom create tensions between what neoliberalism theoretically represented, and how it has been experienced in practice. In the neoliberal era the market values are crucial; they need to be disseminated and kept under surveillance.

As a result, neoliberalism gives consequence to the expansion of domestic markets in the international scale and to the broadening of the information technologies. At this point, Varadarajan (2010: 6) argues there is a "new, widespread form of transnationalism" in which the states enter into new relations with the populations that it regards as its members and she defines that situation by entitling such populations as "domestic abroad". In her analysis on the transformation of Indian states' emigrant policies, Varadarajan (2010: 7) illustrates that the new imagination of the diasporic membership "rests on the constitution of diasporas as subjects of an expanded, territorially diffused nation", therefore marking a shift in the ways in which nations are configured. This transformation can also be read by a comparison with the former imaginations of states' relations with the migrants and the current ones. The changes in the states' expectations towards emigrants are addressed in the literature as a shift from economic benefits to social, cultural and political interests. Looking from the perspective of neoliberal critique, in the current state of affairs the economic phenomena cannot be isolated from the dynamic alignment of social forces: "what counts as the 'economic' cannot and should not be seen as distinct from what counts as the 'social'" (Varadarajan 2010: 12). As a result, the relations between the "domestic abroad" and the

states encompass the traditional relations of economic gains and begin to include the transnationalization of domestic politics.

A parallel strand of scholars suggest that what appeared as the "retreat of the state" through the fabrication of techniques to autonomize other non-state entities reflected in fact another modality of government (Osborne et al. 1996). According to its critiques, the neoliberal statecraft gives attention to the emergence of new political strategies and programs, and the re-articulation of identities and subjectivities rather than imposing prefabricated programs (Bröckling et al. 2011). Rather than adopting coercive measures to discipline populations, the new modality of government use more subtle means for acquiring the consent of the populations, like autonomization or responsibilization of the individuals who were "increasingly empowered to discipline themselves" (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 990). Hence, the neoliberal state "aims to optimize population rather than to control territory, and operate through the active consent of self-governing citizens rather than through discipline and sovereignty" (Gamlen 2011: 7).

This perspective finds its source from Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality, which was first introduced during his lectures in Collège de France in late 1970s. Deriving from the French adjective of *gouvernemental*, the term signifies a range of forms of action and fields of practice that occurred in a complex way and acted and shaped individuals and collectives. According to Foucault, with the rise of modern power, the art of government perspective gains strength, shifting the concern from the nature of the state to the economic management society. Governmentality totalizes and individualizes power and it comprised of a number of mechanisms. These include the monitoring, classification and control of population, family and economy and governing the knowledge with statistics; the manipulation of the body with "disciplinary technologies", normalization and standardization of actions; designation of the social through spatial ordering and architectural perfection (Rabinow 1984: 14-22).

The new art of government also signifies a shift in the conceptualization of "territory". In the former era, sovereignty was understood in relation to the fundamental link between the sovereign and a territory, determining the resources to be controlled and extracted. The modern conduct of power embeds the social in this picture, being concerned with men within the state's borders, in their relations to those other things, such as wealth, resources, accidents and misfortunes and the territory with its specific qualities (Rabinow 1984: 16). The social separation is no more only about distinguishing own subjects and others' subjects via frontiers. It is a conduct that is experienced in everyday lives, via dividing practices and

disciplines of body, not only in prisons and asylums but also in a large number of settings, such as workshops, schools and hospitals (Rabinow 1984: 17).

While Foucault centered his analysis to the period of modernism and liberalism, his concept found its audience in an era of neoliberalism, with the fragmented and complex government structures and the expansion of the spatial imagination of the states. According to the scholars on neoliberal governmentality, the states' actions surpass beyond their territories and transformed the existing relations between the states and their populations abroad (Larner 2007; Gamlen 2011: 7). For instance, exemplifying the New Zealander governments' changing attitudes towards these populations, Larner (2007) and Gamlen (2011) claim that in the age of neoliberalism, states adopt new mechanisms "to construct emigrants and their descendants as part of a community of knowledge-bearing subjects, as part of a neoliberal, globalizing project" (Gamlen 2011: 7). These strategies are performed through transformations in the institutional structures managing the populations living abroad, as well as measures to integrate other actors like social scientists, economic circles and non-state actors in order to enhance the existing knowledge[8]. While the Foucauldian perspective assumes that the governmentality takes place in a consensual manner, their applicability to outside of advanced liberal democracies can be problematic. As it will be elaborated more in the next section on how emigrant engagement policies are implemented, states adopt different strategies in order to keep, build, integrate or maintain, and benefit from emigrant groups. Not all states develop similar strategies and the divergences in the policy choices among states might be dependent on the costliness of such policies, the states' capacities in implementing them (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003: 606), their regime type (Brand 2006) or ideological positions of the policy actors (Şenay 2012; Okyay 2015).

The kinds of policies the states implement are related to how they re-invent their roles outside of territorial boundaries. According to Levitt and de la Dehesa (2003: 606), the emigrant engagement policies are not programs that take place within the traditional territorial conception of the nation-state; by introducing new policies, home states are reconfiguring "traditional understandings of sovereignty, nation and citizenship". Going further, Gamlen (2008: 843) argues that the states' involvement cannot be reduced to a zero-sum-game of

[8] Gamlen's (2014: 193) recent proposal on the rise of state institutions specifically created for emigrant populations -which he denominates as "diaspora institutions"- goes beyond the deliberations on isolated states. Scholar advocates that the transformations in the institutional settings and governance of emigrants are not acts of individual states, but are the effects of a global phenomenon, where norm entrepreneurs and epistemic communities influence global migration governance through programs, models and best practices (Gamlen 2014: 200-201).

granting rights to emigrants and extracting benefits in return. This new conception of sovereignty is experienced in the classical form of citizenship, based on the extension of rights and the extraction of obligations, “not as a strategy in a game between separate partners, but rather a form of sovereignty claim of state over citizen- albeit one that operates through consent rather than coercion” (Gamlen 2008: 837). As a result, the transformations in the imagination and institutionalization of the relations between the international migrants and the states require looking into the issue of membership and citizenship (Collyer 2014: 60). In the next section, I provide a brief survey on the debates on citizenship, and more specifically on the transnational and extraterritorial processes and practices in the relationship between states and citizens.

Places of Citizenship

Beginning with the 1990s a stimulating debate has taken place in the literature on citizenship, on how to read national conceptions of citizenship in the global age. According to a strand of scholars which initiated this dialogue, international mobility and the formation of cross-border networks led to the emergence of new locations of citizenship outside the confines of the national state, which made it possible to imagine post-national forms of citizenship (Sassen 2002: 277; Soysal 1994). The followers of this school mainly looked into the new political spaces or arenas of participation that take place outside of the sovereignty regimes of nation-states, through the mediation of international non-state actors or supranational entities. While this perspective approached the issue of citizenship by digressing the impeding structural aspects of states, others emphasized the availability of rights provided in a multiplicity of places of citizenship. The opponents of this perspective argued that the differences in state policies on citizenship provided alternatives for those who could maintain multiple citizenship through mobility. In her seminal depictions of overseas Chinese, Ong (1999: 5) proposed that cosmopolitan individuals used the availability of different citizenship regimes in order to maintain certain flexibility and accumulate capital and power. However, as argued by Balta and Altan-Olcay (2016) the accessibility to various citizenship regimes through market mechanisms was often available to only a limited group of privileged individuals, who could well beyond deepen existing national inequalities.

The two groups of discussions took place within the territorially delimited conceptions of citizenship, even though they suggested the possibility of accessibility beyond the physical impediments (Collyer 2014). Recently, a third group of scholars advocate that the mobility of

individuals goes parallel with the mobility of certain rights, such as right to return, diplomatic protection, which constituted the core of “external citizenship” (Bauböck 2003). The changing relations between the states and emigrants, who are now referred to as non-resident citizens, encompass the reconfiguration of citizenship rights and obligations. Therefore, challenging the former models of citizenship where it is bounded by the conceptions of territory, the new theories on citizenship tackle it in relation with the possibilities of extending the territory, therefore drawing attention to the changing spatiality of state authority (Collyer 2014: 62).

In his analysis of citizenship relations between the Mexican state and the Mexican transnational communities, Fitzgerald (2000: 19) suggests the term “extra-territorial citizenship” to refer to “citizenship in a territorially bounded political community without residence in the community”. According to Fitzgerald (2000: 20), in an extra-territorially positioned conception of citizenship, the relations between the state and citizens are both determined by rights and obligations of legal citizenship, and by a moral basis that bonds them, resembling to the conceptualizations of diasporic or transnational community. Although Fitzgerald (2000), and later Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) refer to extra-territorial citizenship as a passive process, due to the political constraints faced by emigrants, Collyer (2014: 61) argues that transnational political activism is a common phenomenon, therefore positioning citizens in an active place vis-à-vis the state. Looking into the processes of voting from abroad (Collyer 2014) and extra-territorial political engagement (Collyer 2006), Collyer contends that emigrants can actively be involved in the practices of citizenship outside of the state’s territories, not as subjects but as active participants.

Among the followers of the literature on external or extra-territorial citizenship, there is a general conception that the core citizenship rights are being extended by the home states, as a new claim of sovereignty beyond territory and to enhance the competitiveness of the nationals residing abroad (Collyer and Vathi 2007; Kalm 2013; Gamlen 2011). Recent developments in the research on voting rights, which today includes ability to vote for directly elected special representation of emigrants in several countries, are given as examples to the extension of non-resident citizens’ incorporation to home state politics (Collyer and Vathi 2008; Collyer 2014; Gamlen 2015). Some authors even reason that the enfranchisement of expatriates reflects the linear progression towards fuller rights to all citizens (Rhodes and Harutunyan 2010). In an analysis including 144 countries conducted in 2007, Collyer and Vathi (2007: 15) discovered that 80% of the countries allowed citizens

who are permanently resident outside the country to participate in elections. The study illustrates that the issue of external voting is not a question of binary between existent and non-existent, but includes gray areas in which different countries adopted different extra-territorial electoral systems depending on their regime types. In accordance with Collyer and Vathi's analysis, Gamlen (2008: 848) suggests that transnational inclusion can exist in a spectrum of inclusiveness based on the rights that are granted by the states:

> At one extreme would be states that try to shut out emigrants – such as in Sri Lanka, Palestine, and Afghanistan, where the state is mired in conflict that encompasses parts of the diaspora (Van Hear 2006). In the middle are states such as Mexico and India, which have made several historical transitions between "extension" and "introversion" (Sherman 1999) with respect to diaspora rights (also see Cano&Delano 2007; Lall 2003). However the most numerous are those at the inclusive end of the spectrum; these include developed post-imperial countries like Spain (Rhodes&Harutyunyan 2007), Canada and New Zealand, which have long regarded themselves as part of a wider transnational polity but never been much remarked on for doing so.

While these large-N studies provide scales based on the inclusiveness of states in relation with their regime types, they fail to grasp how the implementation of policies takes place in practice. As I have discussed before, the discussions on home state engagement policies are primarily distinguished between those who position the states solely as strategic actors that aim to attract benefits from migrants, and others who claim that there is a linear extension of rights by state actors towards liberalization of their citizenship regimes. Even though scholars such as Collyer (Collyer and Vathi 2008; Collyer 2014) and Gamlen (2008; 2011) systematically renounce this zero-sum perspective in their successive researches, they isolate looking into the "messy politics" in policy-making. As evident in this section, which dealt with "why" states engage in increased relations with emigrants in the global era, the question of "why" harbors in itself the question of "how". The previous discussion that I have presented maintains that in its generality, the emerging emigrant engagement policies elucidate the widespread shifts in the statecraft, compatible with the neoliberal logics of governing. Strategically created or not, they reveal that the home states are reconfiguring the notions of nation, citizenship or membership, which have been severed as a result of the movement of populations to outside of their borders. Still, how these policies are implemented in practice is illustrative of the states' choices of adopting certain policies to engage increasingly with their citizens living abroad. How do state policies are translated into practice? What do they represent in terms of the relations between a given home state and its non-resident citizens?

State-Society Relations in the Transnational Context: How?

As argued by Collyer (2014: 72), despite relatively long history of home states' engagement with emigrants or non-resident citizens, there is a novel interest in analyzing the nature and content of this engagement. The ongoing changes in the home states' configurations of membership outside of their borders had a significant role in the emergence of new policies and academic discussions that have become epistemic over the recent decades. Moreover, the history of emigrant engagement policies, marked by the temporary perception vis-à-vis emigrant populations and the emphasis on the host countries rather than the countries of origin particularly in the European geography had also caused only a limited interest in the academia, before the emergence of the new discussions (Collyer 2014).

Among the earlier researches in the field, Schmitter-Heisler's (1985; 1986) analysis on the relations between sending countries and immigrant communities is remarkable for providing a discussion about the conditions before the diffusion of dual citizenship rights and the expansion of emigration engagement policies. In her study on the immigration towards Western Europe, Schmitter-Heisler's (1985) had emphasized that the high-level relations between the states, rather than the relations between a state and its emigrant populations, had initiated the continuation of home states' engagement in temporary migration; permitting, and even encouraging sending countries to set up and maintain a network of organizations to support the emigrant in the host countries. The analysis on the institutional arrangements by the home states focused mainly on how the migratory processes were channeled and controlled within a framework of temporariness and workforce. Therefore the interactive mechanisms between the home states and emigrants were limited with consular offices and the related organizational framework including; social workers, consultants, specialists (on education, social security, employment, family), consular coordinating committees, and private organizations subsidized by the governments (i.e. trade union federations, cultural and social services). Analyzing Italian, Turkish and Yugoslav populations in West Germany, Schmitter-Heisler (1985; 1986) had argued that a home state's engagement policies were determined by its structural factors (whether it was a traditional emigrant sending country or a new one; whether its political and socio-economic conditions provided sufficient space for effectively engaging with emigrants) that determined the extent to which it could mobilize the migrant communities living abroad. Among the cases of Italy, Turkey and Yugoslavia, the Italian state – the most democratic and economically developed - created the most active network through well-developed consular services, social welfare organizations and political

parties. In comparison, the Turkish state – described as authoritarian, far less developed and lacking in substantial relevant prior-experience with emigration - was slow to develop appropriate organizational structures, resulting in the multiplicity and fragmentation among emigrant organizational networks (Schmitter-Heisler 1986).

In the early 2000s, there has been a budding interest to classify policy choices of home countries in relation with the extra-territorial conception of citizenship. Commencing this debate, Bauböck (2003: 709) argued that there were mainly three areas of benefit that determined how home countries become involved with their emigrants. These three areas were: (1) human capital upgrading, (2) political lobbying of receiving governments and (3) remittances. Based on this classification, home states attempted to incorporate institutional processes that will make it possible for them to attract social, economic and political remittances from the emigrant communities. Although providing a clear definition of the expected areas of engagement, this classification lacked the policy positions of the states to incorporate emigrants in the official imagination of the nation. Levitt and de la Dehesa's (2003: 589-590) discussion on state policies provided a wider array of policy choices, which included:

> (1) ministerial or consular reforms; (2) investment policies which seek to attract or channel migrant remittances; extension of political rights in the form of dual citizenship or nationality; (3) the right to vote from overseas, or the right to run for public office; (4) the extension of state protections or services to nationals living abroad that go beyond traditional consular services; (5) and the implementation of symbolic policies designed to reinforce emigrants' sense of enduring membership.

Levitt and de la Dehesa's (2003) classification denoted that the engagement policies extended beyond the expected benefits from emigrants and include new mechanisms of interaction through symbolic and political participation. According to scholars, not all states adopted the same policy processes and the divergences in the policy choice among states might be dependent on the costliness of such policies and the states' capacities in implementing them (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003: 606).

Table 2: Emigrant Engagement Policies

High-level policy	Low-level policy
Symbolic policies	Discursive practices and naming Inclusion of the diaspora in the national calendar of celebrations Honoring expatriates with awards Convening diaspora congresses Proclaiming affinity and loyalty with and responsibility for diaspora Issuing special IDs/visas Extended media coverage
Institution-building policies	Expanded consular and consultative bodies Commissioning studies or reports, improving statistics Maintaining a diaspora program, bureaucratic unit or dedicated ministry Expanding ministerial posts to include extra-territorial relations Religious institutions or personnel abroad, co-financed with the community or fully-financed by the home state Cultural centers abroad, co-financed or fully-financed by the home state Schools, language and cultural programs abroad (with partly or entirely corresponding to the national curriculum) Consulting expatriate councils or advisory bodies
Citizenship policies	
Extending rights	**Civil and social rights** Regulations on mobility rights Extensive bilateral agreements, intervening in labor relations Supplementing health Welfare and education services support Upholding property rights **Political rights** Regulations on access to or loss of citizenship, dual citizenship External voting rights and special legislative representation
Extracting obligations	Taxing expatriates *Anticipated commitments* Facilitating remittances, fellowships, skilled expatriate networks, investment services, diaspora bonds and financial products Promoting expat lobby and active participation

Table generated by author based on Gamlen (2006); Gamlen (2008) and Ragazzi (2014).

For my analysis, I am going to introduce here a typology on home state policies based on the categorizations by Gamlen (2006; 2008) and Ragazzi (2014). This typology furthers Bauböck (2003) and Levitt and de la Dehesa's (2003) frameworks by systematically distinguishing between the three main components of emigrant engagement policies that complement each other: (1) symbolic policies, (2) institution-building policies and (3) citizenship policies (See Table 2). In the empirical analysis of Turkish state's policies in Chapters 4 and 7, I will be employing this threefold classification for my analysis.

By *symbolic policies*, Gamlen (2006: 6) and Ragazzi (2014) refer to how the home states discursively attempt to produce a national diasporic population, which has close ties of allegiance to the home state. The symbolic policy is described as the transformation of the image of migrants, and refugees, from "traitors who had left their homeland" to "extended members of the community" or even "heroes", leading to the praise of the populations living abroad. In practice, these policies include changes in the discursive practices (from *gurbetçi* to *yurtdışı vatandaşlar* – citizens abroad, in the case of Turkey), their inclusion in the national calendar of celebrations or introduction of new celebratory events for these populations (*Pravasi Bharatiya Divas* in India and the national Day of the Moroccan Community Abroad) or providing extended media coverage (Hungary's Duna TV, Turkey's TRT International, Italy's RAI International) (Ragazzi 2014: 75; Gamlen 2006: 7). For Gamlen (2006: 7), these interactive forums do not only work to diffusing propaganda, but also become spheres to produce a communal mentality, or a sense of common belonging to the home state.

Institution-building policies are related to how populations living abroad are included from a bureaucratic point of view (Ragazzi 2014: 75) and how the institutional ties are constructed by the home state. The institution-building referred here is not limited with specifically designed institutions for the use of emigrants and non-resident citizens; it also covers a set of policy making practices in order to expand the workings of the institutions in the extra-territorial level. From a governmentality perspective, institution-building policies furnish the state with technologies that make it possible to make the emigrant populations governable (Gamlen 2006: 8). The traditional institution-building policies included surveillance mechanisms – through the foreign service or the immigration bureaucracy – and for the case of labour sending countries, institutions designed for collecting social and economic remittances, as well as providing social services. The new emigrant engagement policies typically include additional institutions dedicated government offices for populations living

abroad, ranging from directorates to specifically designed ministries (i.e. Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, Armenia's Ministry of Diaspora, Haiti's Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad, India's Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs). To engage through what Althusser (1970) refers to as "ideological apparatus", home states benefit from the religious, educational and cultural arenas (i.e. mosque/church, language education, cultural centers) to both cater to the demands of need and to retain their power through ideology (Ragazzi 2014: 82). Finally, home states also often introduce their own transnational migrant organizations as consultative institutions, in order to avoid existing political tensions within the communities (Gamlen 2006: 8), as well as to symbolically proclaim affinity and representation between the state and society.

The final component of *citizenship policies* looks into the rights and obligations that are regulated by the home states vis-à-vis their citizens living abroad. The discussion on rights benefits from Marshall's (1950) classic conception of citizenship, which comprises of civil, political and social rights, extending it to the extra-territorial setting. Looking from the beginning of the migration process, the right to retain citizenship is a basic right that is given by the states to emigrants; however the degree of this right depends on how much the state is willing to accept the expansion of citizenship rights beyond its boundaries (Gamlen 2008: 847). Increasingly, home states are offering status entitlements for the preservation or access to citizenship for their nationals living abroad, sometimes putting into practice new forms of more flexible citizenship, such as ethnic origin cards (Ragazzi 2014: 75-76). Right to consular services is a corresponding feature of the mobility rights, which makes it possible for emigrants to reach basic or more complex state provisions through institutional engagement. In terms of social rights, the portability of security and pension benefits, which may or may not be solidified via bilateral agreements, supplements to healthcare services, welfare and education services support and upholding property rights designate the lower level politics that home states extend rights to their citizens living abroad (Gamlen 2008: 348-389). As discussed before, states are introducing increased opportunities for the political participation to national elections, ranging from permitting extra-territorial voting to allowing special legislative representation allocated for these populations.

Gamlen's (2006; 2008) classification introduces an additional mechanisms through which home states aim to employ the feelings of responsibility, loyalty or obligation from their non-resident citizens. The scholar argues that since the coercive power of the origin state is restricted in attaining obligations, these mechanisms emerge more or less as political and

economic favors that are expected from citizens to comply with (Gamlen 2008). Among these obligations is the levying of taxes on all expatriates, only applied by a few number of states (i.e. the United States and Switzerland), which emerge as the most coercive measure by home states. The other obligations designated by Gamlen (2008) are typically extracted through consent, rather than coercion, and therefore I choose to employ "anticipated commitments" to refer to these policies. In terms of economic commitments, home states may expect their non-resident citizens to support national development through remittances, and implement policies to capture and facilitate them. Various investment and development programs by the expatriates, ranging from foreign-currency bank accounts to preferential interest rates or diaspora bonds are today presented by home states, as well as international institutions such as the World Bank as best examples, which the migrant sending countries can benefit from. In the area of political participation, many home states assume from their citizens abroad to become ethnic lobbyists or spokespeople. This expectation is very much intertwined with the social upgrading of emigrants, which is related to their active participation as citizens of the host country in social, economic and political spheres.

The typology presented here on how states create policies to engage with emigrants or non-resident citizens provides an overview of alternative mechanisms and strategies available in different country contexts. However, home states' policies are not always implemented in a unilateral fashion, they are not univocal to all groups from the same country and, more importantly, they are not absorbed as they are by passive subjects. Looking into the typologies of emigrant engagement policies is only one way of understanding home state-emigrant society relations. How do these policies influence emigrants' transnational political practices and home state-emigrant society relations? How are these policies implemented, particularly when met with emigrants' "hot identities"? What is the interplay between the policies of the state and the politics of emigrants? The possible answers to these questions lie in the juxtaposition of existing discussions in transnationalism and diaspora studies with the debates on home state engagement policies.

When Policies Meet Politics

In the literature on the political dimension of transnationalism, the 1990s witnessed the dissemination of discussions on how national political contexts impact collective actions and claims making. In an early study on the forms of political activism by migrants in France and Switzerland, Ireland (1994) adopted the concept of "institutional channeling" in order to

argue how different national forms of participatory mechanisms in the host country, and particularly legal and political institutions *and* citizenship rights, shaped or limited migrant political activism. Contrary to the previously developed theories on the role of ethnic origin or social class, Ireland's theory positioned the political structural conditions as a better explanation to describe the mobilization practices of migrants (Koopmans and Statham 1999: 662). In Ireland's approach, not only the state institutions, but also political parties, religious organizations, judicial bodies and humanitarian institutions could act as institutional gatekeepers, to control the access to the venues of political participation (Kaya 2011: 502). Expanding Ireland's discussion, Koopmans and Statham (1999) appended the concept of "political opportunity structures" from the literature on social movements, to argue that national models of citizenship accounted for the distinct patterns of migrant claims making in different country contexts. According to Koopmans (2004: 451) political opportunity structure approach consisted of (a) an institutional side, including the structure of the political system and the composition of power in the party system, and (b) a discursive side, which included established notions of who and what are considered reasonable, sensible and legitimate. In the context of the mobilization of migrants, citizenship and integration regimes acted as a "field-specific political opportunity structure" that shaped migrant identities and their patterns of participation (Koopmans 2004: 452).

While both "institutional channeling" and "political opportunity structures" theories improved the understanding on the role of institutional and political context of the host country on migrants' political practices, both remained limited in grasping the complexities when it came to migrants' transnational political practices. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a: 24) contended that even though host country political institutions provided available outlets for participation in general, the nature and the objective of the homeland political activities, which did not comply with the host country agenda, could constrain the political space. Moreover, migrants' political organizations did not always remain in the boundedness of the local political sphere and often used political or material resources in other countries or transnational networks (including media and internet) to organize their activities. Finally, scholar argued that often migrants were also benefiting from the global institutional structures and mainly international organizations to gain support or to by-pass the impediments of the national political structures (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 24-25).

Two alternative frameworks were proposed to include the interactions transcending sovereign nation-states to this discussion. One of these frameworks was offered by Østergaard-Nielsen

(2003: 26) who suggested that a process of “multi-level institutional channeling” took place in the complex institutional environment. In Østergaard-Nielsen’s (2003a: 71) framework, while the compatibility with the agenda of the political actors in the receiving country created boundedness to the institutional and political setting, the transnational orientation and ties with home country institutions and counterparts allowed for unboundedness. Based on this perspective, migrants’ strategies to choose institutional participation, confrontational strategies, or a mix of two, depended on their relations both with the home country and host country political institutions and institutional gatekeepers (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 70-71). The other alternative was proposed by Ogelman (2003) with the concept of “transnational political opportunity structure”, which introduced boundedness in relation with the home state institutional structures. According to Ogelman (2003: 70), the way the home state manages domestic social conflicts and the openness of the home state institutional environment acted as incentives for individuals to migrate, return or remain politically active from a distance. While Ogelman’s (2003) analysis was constrained as it looked into the territorially bounded structural conditions of the home state that facilitated or allowed for migrants’ political participation, Mügge’s (2010) discussion also incorporated the extra-territorial institutional settings. According to Mügge (2010: 30) the political opportunity structures of the home country included institutional settings and political rights, which did not only influence Hirshmanian voice, exit and loyalty practices, but also how migrants engaged in transnational political practices. In her analysis, institutional settings accounted for those specifically designed for migrants (i.e. specific ministries or consular services) and political rights linked the state and the emigrant society in an extra-territorial sphere, through processes such as dual nationality, right to vote from overseas and right to run for public office (Mügge 2010: 30-31).

In this dissertation, I follow the theories on multi-level channeling and transnational political opportunity structures, but give greater emphasis to the home state setting. While the followers of the two theories have in general constricted the host country structures in their physical limits, the discussion here follows Collyer’s (2014) argumentation on the changing spatiality of the home state authority and its influence on home state-emigrant relations. Similar to the role of host country political opportunity structures, home country political opportunities denote how the institutions and gatekeepers control access to channels of political participation. These are determined primarily by the emigrant regime of a given home state. Accordingly, while the nature of the emigration regime establishes the initial

conditions of the exit and motives of emigrants to quit the country, it may also adjust the opportunities and resources available to emigrants for participation in the home country and host country related affairs. The continuity of the role of home country structures matters particularly in situations where the home state has particular tools and mechanisms to engage in its emigrants' affairs. From a politically neutral point of view, emigrant engagement policies refer to both a *broadening* and *deepening* of the home state's relations with the emigrants or non-resident citizens. While broadening denotes accessibility to a wider range of populations through state institutions, deepening signifies more frequent and sustainable relations with individuals and collectivities. Under the availability of dual citizenship, the relations between the home state and the emigrant society embody certain *boundedness* due to the citizenship rights and obligations that encumber both sides with regarding one another. The positioning of these relations under another sovereignty regime lead to both *boundedness* and *unboundedness,* making both state and non-state actors circumscribed in the opportunity structures of the host country, while at the same time providing them available outlets outside of the nation-state impediments through host country channels, transnational networks or even global institutional structures.

Not all emigrants or non-resident citizens comprise of a unique group; different politico-ideological positions may exist with regarding the collectivities' self-identification in relation with one another, with the host state, home state or another place of reference. The denominations such as exile politics, expatriate politics, diaspora politics etc. to indicate different transnational political engagements illustrate distinctions based on emigrants' initial migration motives, their self-identification vis-à-vis the home state, as well as their objectives. Dufoix's (2008: 65) discussion on the four modes of structuring on the collective experience (mentioned above in section *Scholarship and Debates on Diasporas*) is analytically valuable to refer to possible relationship models between the community and the existing regime in a given home state. Those who have emigrated from a certain place or their descendants may represent all four of the modes of relationship that were discussed by Dufoix (2008: 62-66), as in the case of Chinese and Chinese-born populations abroad:

> The Chinese and Chinese-born population abroad displays four structuring modes in institutional form: "colonies" built around loyalty to the Beijing regime (*centroperipheral mode)*; Chinatown "enclaves" (*enclaved mode)*; the exile polity of opponents to the regime (*antagonistic mode*); and certain very significant forms of transstateness, notable economic (*atopic mode*) (Dufoix 2008: 67).

As discussed by both Dufoix (2008) and Okyay (2015) none of the modes of relationship between the emigrants and home states are mutually exclusive or eternally held, and therefore are open to change. These changes may be the result of conscious strategies of the state and non-state actors on group-making, or driven as a result of the shifting political and social developments within the home states or host states (Okyay 2015: 26). The attributions of certain transnational practices in the literature on emigrants' transnational practices as examined before should therefore not be considered as static denominations on certain populations, but classifications that correspond to certain periods and contexts.

The discussion on different modes of relationship complies with Vertovec's (2010) classification about transnational political activities, which can be both nation building and nation wrecking. As argued by Vertovec (2010: 99) "in all their forms, homeland political allegiances, mobilizations and engagements rest on the re-configuration of identities". Therefore the re-configuration of identities is a crucial part of transnational mobilization for political entrepreneurs, on both the state and non-state side. In her analysis of Algerian and Kurdish non-state transnationalism, Adamson (2002: 103) argues that activation of a transnational constituency from a mass of entangled and messy social networks is the first step to politicization. Bringing together a "groupness" or "collectivity" begins with the creation of categories, discourses and symbols in order to tie together a dispersed society, which might be then converted into activated and politicized networks that can be employed for a certain political goal (Adamson 2002: 103). Citing Tilly, Adamson (2002: 112) indicates that groupness consists of two components: (a) a category, which enables those inside and outside the group to recognize common characteristics of the group members, and (b) networks, which link people to one another. The process of activation creates encounters between the individual political entrepreneurs -transnational movements and state elites- that may be engaged in pursuing political projects that are competing (Adamson 2002: 112), or complementing. While the traditional case of Kurdish transnational activism in the literature positions it as competing the political projects of the state elites (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Adamson 2012; Başer 2014), Başer's (2015) recent analysis on the Turkish transnational community in Germany and Sweden illustrates the activation of groupness from sporadic and weak networks, which complements with the Turkish state's emigrant engagement policies.

The primary objective of emigrant engagement policies is also to create increased linkages between the home state and emigrants/non-resident citizens. The policies related to institutions and citizenship are supported by the discursive practices in order to emphasize a

certain unity among the society or community in the host country. This interest is one of the fundamental reasons for the mounting dissemination of the concept of "diaspora" -to denote a community away from home but with continuous ties with the homeland - among the policy circles. At this point, the transnational activities that are at the grassroots level are not necessarily isolated from the institutional initiatives of the state actors. For instance, material or symbolic support of the home state institutions towards emigrants may trigger or obstruct their interest to establish or participate in hometown associations, organize monetary contributions to development or disaster relief projects in the country of origin or even involve in confrontational activities advocating for the home country domestic politics. In a similar vein, transnational electoral participation (such as membership in a political party, monetary contributions, participating in elections through voting or representation) may be hindered or facilitated via home country institutional setting.

Home country political opportunities do not exist within a politically neutral environment, and they are also determined by how core principles of democratic participation and representation were constructed and applied, in relation with the society living both inside and outside of the territories of the home state. As I have discussed in a previous section, *regime type* is a critical determinant of how policies of the home states vis-à-vis emigrant populations take place. Focusing on the cases of democratic transition, Brand (2006: 17) argues that movement toward more open or participatory political systems after years of authoritarianism could transform the perception of emigrants towards potential sources of support (political and financial) for new or ascendant political forces. Political opening and liberalization take place in a piecemeal fashion related to institution-related recognition, shifting the treatment of citizens from subjects to participants, not only inside of the borders of the nation-state but also with regarding the relations with those living abroad (Brand 2006: 18). However, Brand (2014) puts a cautious note on the changes in the institutional setting which appear as liberalization towards extra-territorial citizenship regime (such as improved voting rights for non-resident citizens). Based on the trajectories of the democratic transition, the ostensible changes do not always correspond to a tangible deepening of the practice of citizenship, but rather emerge as the new strategies of the new regimes for further control or increasing leverage vis-à-vis domestic opposition (Brand 2014). Brand's (2006; 2014: 62) studies emphasize that a state's claims over its emigrants and its offering of greater rights have to be taken as a part of the ongoing negotiations (or contestations) between the state and non-state actors, over new forms and content of membership and identity.

While the regime type incorporates the discussion on how the nature of the system as a whole affects the functioning of political institutions, *official state ideology* posits how the dominant political elite exerts its power over citizens not only in the public but also in the private domain. The official state ideology determines the ideational compatibility between the state actors and the various members of the emigrant community, settling the demarcations of different interactive processes. In cases where the home states' inclusiveness or openness towards its citizens is marked by its ideological premises, the official ideology plays a crucial role in facilitating or delimiting the availability of institutional, cognitive or administrative tools. It also shapes the emigrant communities' self ascription vis-à-vis the home state, based on whether they deem it complying with their own agenda or not.

Two recent studies on Turkey as a home state examine the implications of official state ideology on how the emigrant engagement policies are implemented. In her analysis on the relations between the Turkish state and the emigrant community in Australia, Şenay (2012; 2013) maintains that the transnationalization of the official state ideology through state institutions abroad might engender a top-down scheme of long-distance nationalism. According to her analysis, the Turkish state's building of institutional ties (works of the consular bodies and religious institutions) as well as state-civil society dialogue (via creation of an ideologically compatible civil society) since the 1970s has worked within the social engineering agenda of secular-nationalist Kemalism. This political position of the state has affected both the breadth of its outreach (which excluded a range of non-state actors non-compatible with the state ideology) and the extent of the political opportunities that are made available to different emigrant groups. Şenay's (2012: 1626-1627) illustration on the propagation of what she calls as "trans-Kemalist" ideology through community building and religious practices around state Islam is an example of home state became involved in the everyday private practices, in addition to the politico-institutional setting.

This ideological aspect determines how the policies are implemented in reality, as well as the nature of relationship between state institutions and different emigrant communities from the same place of origin. In a similar vein, Okyay's study (2015: 267) demonstrates that the construction of state identity and narrative of nationalism translates into state practices of selection, prioritization and hierarchization within the populations that it designates within the membership perspective. While Şenay (2012: 1630) delimits her discussion within the framework of trans-Kemalism and puts a note on the possibilities of change with the new state elites, Okyay (2015: 269) illustrates that the changes and continuities in the official state

ideology in the home country also reflects on the changes and continuities in the state's relations with different emigrant communities.

As I have discussed in the introductory chapter, the relations between the home state and the emigrant communities, as well as the political opportunities made available by the home state in the transnational sphere are dependent on how the emigrant policies have been constructed. The three policy aspects (symbolic, institutional and citizenship-related) form the contours of the sphere of availability for emigrants' interaction and participation with the home country related affairs, as well as the host country related affairs. While this perspective, that finds its roots in the Foucauldian understanding of power as the creation of governable subjects (via the "conduct of conducts") provides the new predicaments between the home states and emigrants in the theoretical sense, it fails to grasp first, the part played by the ideational aspects that may determine how the exertion of power takes place, and second, the function of agency that absorb or reject the processes presented by power. Hence, in addition to this politically neutral perspective, my analysis on the interaction between the home state policies and the emigrants' transnational practices takes the role of regime type and official state ideologies into consideration in a parallel vein with the analyzes by Şenay (2012) and Okyay (2015). By incorporating the these two factors, the dissertation elaborates on how the state's implementation of policies takes place in actuality, while at the same time determining the relational environment between the state and different societal actors.

Concluding Remarks

In this first chapter I positioned my discussion in this dissertation within the broader literature on cross-border linkages and then concentrated on the discussions on home state-emigrant society relations. As this dissertation looks into both state policies and emigrants' homeland politics, and more importantly the interactions between the two, the debates presented here looked into both the structure and agency aspect in the analysis of cross-border relations. In the first section of this chapter, I presented the emergence and development of the building blocks in the field of international migration on cross-border relations. This way, I was able to situate the different denominations related to home state-emigrant society relations that I have presented in Table 1. My analysis on transnationalism began with the presentation of its conceptualizations, followed by specific focus on the concepts that define the bottom-up processes of cross-border relations of migrants. It was followed by the scholarship and debates on diasporas, as the recent literature which concentrates on home state-emigrant

relations primarily takes place within the literary world created around this notion. Despite its positioning within this particular scholarship, I emphasized my decision not to use the concept of diasporas and diaspora politics for my analysis. The concept accommodates strong reification of certain populations in relation with the assumed or imagined homelands; and in its current state of affairs, this identity ascription process is a symbolic struggle between different political entrepreneurs, both from the side of the states and societal actors. I rather use the term emigrant to denote those who have had histories of migration, however by putting a cautionary note on the possibility that the transnational practices on homeland may also be actualized by persons who did not individually live the actual mobility, but had predecessors that did. Before beginning the second section of this chapter, I have given the threefold relationship framework between the home states, host states and emigrants. While my dissertation essentially looks into the home state structures, emigrants' agency and the interplay between the two, the role of the host countries and their relations with the two other actors cannot be neglected. Therefore, my analysis throughout this dissertation follows this threefold perspective, although retaining distance regarding host country structures.

In the second section of this chapter I focused on the home state-emigrant society relations. Although there is a long history of home states' policy making on emigrants or citizens in other countries, the current interest both in the academia and around policy circles conceive of this issue as a novelty. I have begun the first section by providing alternative debates on why this issue is considered as a novelty and what makes it as such. In the following sections, I shifted my perspective towards how states adopt and implement policies for their emigrants, and what type of policy instruments and mechanisms are used by states in their new emigrant engagement policies. Based on the existing framework built by other scholars, I classified these policies as symbolic, institutional and citizenship policies. The way in which these policies interacted with the politics of emigrants was analytically incorporated under the framework of political opportunity structures. With the support of the existing literature, I maintained that although emigrant and citizenship policies determined the availability of opportunities and resources for emigrants, they were not isolated from the impeding role of the regime type and official state ideology, which determined the compliance between the home state and the different societal actors. Following this chapter where I provided a review of the existing literature and the conceptual framework, Part I continues in the next chapter, which elaborates on the selected cases, looking into the host country structures and the characteristics of emigrants.

CHAPTER 3

Comparing Emigrants from Turkey in France and the United States

In this chapter I set the scene on the two case studies of this dissertation, migrants originated from Turkey in France and the United States, in relation with their countries of immigration. The discussion in this chapter touches upon the existing literature in France and the United States on transnational links established by immigrants with their home countries. As argued by Çağlar (2006: 3) until very recently the transnationalism literature was mainly centralized in the American context, with a limited number of studies focusing on migrants' transnational practices in the European geography. According to Çağlar (2006: 3-6), compared to the intense focus on homeland ties founded in the United States particularly by Latino migrants, there have been fewer researches on the transnationalism of migrants in Europe. This difference could be on the one hand explained by the rapid increase in the number of homeland associations in the United States in the last two decades, and on the other by the different trajectories followed in the two regions related to migration, including the different models of migrant incorporation and the initial assumptions of their temporariness/permanency by the host countries (Çağlar 2006: 4-5). In the United States, the migrants from different countries settled in one country, making it important for the scholars of transnational migration to criticize the linear perceptions of migrant incorporation by emphasizing the homeland ties. Nevertheless, the transformation of migration in Europe from temporariness to permanency in the 1980s led to the assumption that migrants' homeland oriented activities were indicators of the failures of the incorporation regimes and policies of these countries, impeding their integration to the country of settlement (Çağlar 2006: 5).

In this research, I therefore focus on two different contexts affected by different structural factors that influenced the policy making and incorporation of migrants at different spheres. Moreover, the research concentrates particularly on the post-migratory processes from

Turkey to the United States and to France, therefore embracing another significant difference in terms of the migration motives, socioeconomic characteristics and ideological orientations of the migrant populations. In a special issue for *Turkish Studies* in 2009, Akçapar and Yurdakul have brought together research on Turkish identity in Europe and in Northern America, providing the first transatlantic comparison of political mobilization of migrants from Turkey. In their introductory note, scholars discussed some of the difficulties that arose choosing the articles for their special issue. These included the proliferation of articles on Muslim Turks in Europe compared to few articles representing the heterogeneity of non-Muslim or non-Turkish groups, *and* the shortage of research on skilled migration in Europe compared to a collection of studies on brain drain to North America. These two lines of research are representative of both the migration histories from Turkey to the two continents, but also to how these migrant populations have been seized by the states and societies in the host countries. In this chapter I attempt to illustrate that the cases diverge significantly, as a result of the structural factors (i.e. migration and integration regimes in the countries) that determine the opportunities available to immigrants, but also due to the collective characteristics of the migrants from Turkey in these two countries. The chapter is divided in two main sections, *first* looking into the migration history, policies in France in general and migration from Turkey in particular and *second* analyzing the migration history and policies in the United States, again with a particular attention to the migration from Turkey.

3.1. France as a Host Country: Migration History and Policies

Situated on the Turkish-European migration corridor, mobility towards France has been one of the most populous waves for the Turkish society, taking the position of second place demographically, following Germany. Despite the relatively high numbers of migrants from Turkey in France, this particular mobility pattern and the post-migratory conditions have taken little interest in the wider literature on migration from Turkey until the 1990s. As it will be elaborated more in the upcoming sections, the field has been marked mainly on the relations of the communities from Turkey with French state and society, problematized around the issue of integration, the role of Islam/Islamic communities, the position of political migrants and especially Kurds, as well as the associational life; with no holistic research conducted up to date on home state-emigrant relations. The reason for the emergence of these particular areas of research can be found in the conditions related to the host country and the migrant communities from Turkey, as well as the relationship between

these two actors. In the next sections, my aim is to shed light on the interaction of these two actors.

La France "Une et Indivisible"[9]

Since the mid-nineteenth century France is considered as one of the main countries of immigration, especially in the Western European region. In fact, between the two world wars France had a higher proportion of foreign population to national population than in the United States, the archetypal case of immigration country in the literature[10]. As argued by Hargreaves (2005: 248) several reasons were behind France's initial openness towards immigration: relatively low birth rates in the country, labour shortages especially in the post-war era, heavy population losses military conflicts, the tradition of offering asylum as a result of the values of the French Revolution and finally, the legacy of overseas colonization. Nevertheless, with the emerging economic crisis in the period of 1973-1974 there has been a sharp change in the policy towards more restrictive and controlled economic migration. In the last decades there is an overall orientation shared by policy-makers of controlling migration at a certain ratio around 5.6% (Schain 2012: 39). Against a background of a very open approach towards migration, the restrictive measures reinforced by recurrent debates on identity, integration and ethnicity instigate everlasting struggles between inclusionary and exclusionary measures.

Ethnic identity represents a controversy for the "republican French model", which ostensibly resurfaces in the recurrent debate on national statistical data. The use of ethnic data was legally outlawed as a result of the law of 1872 prohibiting the French Republic from conducting census by making any distinction between citizens in terms of race or religious beliefs. Currently the official census uses three categories to classify the resident population: (a) French by birth, (b) French by naturalization, and (c) foreigners. The population statistics also include data on "previous nationality" and "country of birth" which have been made available via provisions to the census in the 1990s. Therefore rather than identifying the ethnicity of populations, the statistics expose nationality and to a certain extent national origin[11] of people with history of migration (Kastoryano 2010: 87).

[9] France, "One and Indivisible".

[10] For instance in the period of 1920-1930 France saw a net immigration of nearly 1.2 million, and in 1930 it had 515 foreigners for every 100,000 inhabitants against 492 in the United States (Weil 2004: 23).

[11] Still, there are ongoing public debates about the collection of ethnic data, which surfaced in 2009 by Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy's attempt to find a way for "measuring the diversity of society".

The migration to France in the early 20th century was marked by labour migration from neighbouring countries, especially Italy and Belgium, which was oriented to respond to the national manpower needs. The need for labour marked the immigration patterns in the country and eventually was organized through bilateral state agreements, in which the French state acted as "a bargaining agent for the employers". With the new agreements, migrants' countries of origin shifted towards Poland, Italy and Czechoslovakia, and the newcomers concentrated in particular geographical areas and certain industries, such as mining, steel mills, quarrying and construction[12] (Schain 2012: 43). The early patterns of migration also included that of political exiles and asylum seekers especially from countries including the Ottoman Empire (as a result of the stern repressive policies to certain ethnic groups, i.e. Armenians), the Russian Empire (earlier the opponents of the Bolshevik Revolution and later, Jews), Italy (after Mussolini's accession to power in 1922) and Spain (during the Spanish Civil War) (Hargreaves 2005: 248-249).

Labour migration continued to be considered as a solution to the significant decrease of the French population and the labour shortages, in the following period after WWII. A significant step in institutionalizing migration was taken in 1945, with the foundation of *Office National d'Immigration* (National Immigration Office, ONI) in order to "control, regulate, oversee, carry through, and ensure the smooth recruitment of immigrants and their families" (Constant 2005: 273). While the foreign-born population grew significantly, the question of the management of post-migration processes entered into debates among policy makers and the academia. One of the main debates between the population demographers and labour-manpower advocates in France was the assimilation or integration of migrants to the French society. The ideologues of the moment proposed measures in which nationalities would be accepted based on their alleged proximity to French society and culture, as in the case of pre-war ethnic quotas in the United States (Weil 2004; Schain 2012). Even though the system of ethnic quotas was not implemented due to criticisms, successive governments sought to encourage European nationals rather than African or Asian migrants (Hargreaves 2005: 251).

In the period following the 1940s the geography from which France attracted migrants continued to expand towards Southern European (Spanish and Portuguese) and Northern African countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and sub-Saharan Africa) in the south and

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Economist. 2014. "To count or not to count." Accessed October 3. http://www.economist.com/node/13377324

[12] The number foreigners residing in France reached one of its highest points of 2.7 million, comprising of 6.6% of the whole population by 1931 (Schain 2012: 39).

Eastern Europe in the east. Moreover, the competition among European developed-countries for attracting labour force migration and the role of decolonization led to the migration of many groups assumed as "undesired" (Weil 2004: 81):

> Immigration from North Africa continued to grow, relative to that from Europe, while immigration from Western Europe grew less rapidly. Italians were replaced by Spanish and Spanish by Portuguese and then Portuguese by North Africans (Schain 2012: 48).

One of the main reasons for the expansion towards south was the French-Algerian war, which resulted in Algerian Muslims' gaining of citizenship rights and free movement in mainland France (Hargreaves 2005: 249). In the 1960s, France was among the main countries attracting labour migrants in Europe, due to changes in the political environment as well as the newly retained labour agreements with 16 countries, including Turkey (Schain 2012: 48).

The sharp change in the French system on migration took place following the economic crisis of the early 1970s. According to Patrick Weil (2004: 81) when migration was halted in 1974, France had a population of 3.5 million foreigners[13] and the suspension created a rapid decline in the overall labour migrant inflows to France. As the major source of entry of foreign-born populations to France since the early 20th century declined rapidly, other migration patterns emerged and augmented in the following period. The diversification of migration was reinforced by the succeeding laws by the socialist governments of the 1980s that enabled the emergence of the new patterns, such as family reunification and asylum migration (Constant 2005: 274-275)[14]. In the 1980s family unification saw its peak point, reaching 77% in 1984 and the number of asylum seekers in France increased from less than 20,000 in 1981, to over 60,000 in 1989 and to around 48,000 by 2009 (Schain 2012: 68). The migration from non-European countries continued in the following period and the origin mix changed over the years with the new migration patterns.

Most recent population statistics illustrate that South European and North African countries have a major share in the foreign-born population in France. Migrant populations from Turkey follow North Africans in France both in the statistics on migrant stock and migration flows. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), 5.5 million people were born outside of France in 2010, with the majority being from Algeria

[13] The foreigner population was comprising mainly of 750,000 Portuguese and similar number of Algerians, 500,000 Spaniards, 460,000 Italians and 260,000 Moroccan people (Weil 2004).

[14] While in 1982 only 22.3% of migrant workers were women, in 1990 their share increased to 27.6% and to 35.3% in 1999 (Constant 2005: 269).

(730,000 people) followed by Morocco, Portugal, Italy, Spain and Turkey. Non-EC countries have higher rates of mobility towards France than EC countries in the current age and this reflects on the statistics regarding the inflows of foreigners. The three North African countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) continue to be among the first five nationalities as a percentage of total inflows of foreigners in 2010 and they were followed by Turkey. Continuing the trend of the 1980s, the majority of flows towards France are due to family unification (42.9%), followed by free movements (30.3%) and work related migration (11.9%) (OECD International Migration Outlook 2012).

Migration is one of the highly politicized subjects affecting the policy making and elections in France. The policies on migration-related issues in France have been significantly affected by the left/right cleavage among the ruling governments, and their approaches towards immigration. While the measures taken by the right-wing governments aimed at tightening the conditions of migration and naturalization, the left-wing governments eased to a certain extent both the entry conditions and the rights of migrants and their descendants in France. Despite the divergence of each government in hardening or softening aspects of immigration, there has been an overall "commitment to specific forms of control" remaining firm (Schain 2012: 54-56). The politicization of the immigration issue was also marked by the emergence of the nationalist political party *Front National* (National Front*,* FN*),* transforming the way that immigration issue was framed in the mid-1980s. Following FN's electoral breakthrough in 1983, migration became an important aspect of electoral competition in the country. This transformation is critical for understanding the emergence of the identity discussions, which created a rupture from the previous approaches towards migration framed as a need of the labour market and demographics (Schain 2012: 97). The following section gives a brief background on the politics and policies of migration in France. It focuses on the period of post-1960 period and two key aspects, related to migration and post-migration processes: (1) incorporation and citizenship, *and* (2) political participation.

Challenges of Incorporation to the French Model

This section maps out incorporation and citizenship policies and practices in France by first elaborating on (a) the mainstream political attitudes that marked the history of migration in the country, (b) their institutionalization, (c) the applications regarding citizenship and naturalization *and* (d) the reflection of integration on the themes of education and religion. The migration policy in France before the 1980s was marked by a utilitarian perspective,

which justified it as an economic necessity, similar to the other countries in Europe as well as in the United States. Since the majority of migrants were considered within the scheme of guest-worker regime, the post-migratory conditions of immigrants were not necessarily thought of. This perspective went along well with the logic of *insertion,* which denoted incorporation in the society through socio-economic means. According to Favell (2001), *insertion* was often presented "as an *ad hoc,* unprincipled idea that focused too much on the immigrants' social specificities". The concept had a dual role: first it "track(ed) and respond(ed) to the presence of new immigrants through a concern for their basic welfare and social needs" and second, it "play(ed) down the issue, away from the centre of party political cleavages" (Favell 2001: 46). Aside from its labour-oriented practice, *insertion* also included a certain social aspect, which reflected as the encouraging of migrants to participate in local self-help associations or trade unions (Favell 2001: 46-48).

Beginning with the 1980s, the situation of migrants in the French society emerged as a public problem, mainly as the idea that many migrants would in fact not be temporary anymore became consolidated. This was especially the case for non-European originals, especially post-colonial migrants, such as Algerians, who were not expected to assimilate easily in the French society and culture. Favell (2001: 52-53) argues that the influence of regionalism and *laissez-faire* politics sweeping globally on the one hand, and the rising visibility of FN at the heart of French politics on the other triggered the new framing of migrants in terms of another notion, *différence*[15]. *Différence* was marked by a certain relaxation towards cultural rights, and was reinforced by the easing of migration by the left-wing government, including the regularization of 150,000 illegal migrants, the fight against illegal labour migration[16] and the general freedom of association of foreigners in 1981. For Favell (2010), the changes in the politics on migration and citizenship reflect a paradigm shift in the policy-making in France, from referencing of equality through quantitative means towards qualitative references. In the pre-1980 period, policies based on *insertion* defined and measured equality

[15] The decentralization wave in public administration during the early 1980s had also reflected on the cultural policies whereas the Jacobin republican ideology was aimed to be relaxed for "right to culture". As such, the Minister of Culture Jack Lang proposed the idea of the *droit à la différence* (the right to be different), "initially conceived as a vehicle for increasing institutional autonomy in the regions, symbolized around cultural issues" (Favell 2010: 51). Even though the concept was initially regarded positively as treatment of North African immigrants in France, the discourse had been transformed by FN's Jean-Marie Le Pen to signify different, "not one of us" (Favell 2010: 53).

[16] The law on October 1981 on entrance and stay aimed at sanctioning employers of irregular migrants and fighting illegal migration while strengthening the legal status of those who had settled in France (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 70).

strictly in socio-economic terms. In the succeeding period, new policies of integration were introduced (Favell 2001: 70):

> the *diversité* of cultural pluralism is recognised openly as integral and beneficial to the vision of France it promotes. […] But this acceptance in itself defines a particular problematic for the political unity of the nation: to achieve 'cultural integration' there must be both 'diversity and cohesion', a balance, that is, compatible with the maintenance and renewal of a strong idea of French national identity.

Hence the incorporation policies began putting a "new accent on social integration": equality was no more defined quantitatively, but qualitatively, through a reference to citizenship with political obligations that needed to be maintained (Favell 2001: 72). In contrast to the advent of inclusive and expansive policies in the early 1980s, the following decade was marked by this new attitude especially towards citizenship (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 71). In 1986, the right-wing Chirac government introduced a bill suppressing direct acquisition of French citizenship for second-generation migrants who would now have to demand from and be accepted by the state (Brubaker 1992: 138). In 1989, *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration* (High Council for Integration, HCI) was founded to inform and give advice to the authorities on the integration of migrants (Escafre-Dublet et al. 2009: 8). The tightening continued with the Pasqua laws in 1993, when the right-wing government required the second generation immigrants actively declare their desire to be French. In 2003, another law was passed which required applicants to prove sufficient knowledge of rights and responsibilities to gain French citizenship. In a parallel manner, the newly arriving migrants were encouraged in the mid-2000s to learn French language and laws. The controversies on migration reached their peak point in 2007 when President Sarkozy created a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity, emphasizing the link between migration and national identity (Kastoryano 2010). The ministry was later abolished in 2011 and the regulation of migration flows was re-assigned to the Ministry of Interior's General Direction of Foreigners in France in 2013[17].

Currently the French nationality law is based on the principle of *jus soli* (right of soil); however residency and integration into the French society must be proven for naturalization. A person aged 18 or above can apply for citizenship in France after residing in the country continuously for five years by declaring a source of income in the country during this period. Children born in France of foreign parents are considered as foreigners at birth, but become French when they reach 18, or in earlier ages when they request for citizenship. Moreover,

[17] Ministère de L'Intérieur. 2014. "Immigration, asile, accueil et accompagnement des étrangers en France." Accessed on October 4. http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/La-Direction-generale/Presentation.

the French laws allow migrants to keep their former citizenship and have dual citizenship. According to a survey by National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED), 41% of migrants aged 18-60 living in metropolitan France are French citizens. The report illustrates that the vast majority of descendants of immigrants become French and the reporting of a foreign nationality varies with countries of origin: on average less than 3% reports only foreign nationality, Turkish immigrants report this at 5% and Portuguese report at 8%. This variation also exist among those who have dual citizenships: less than 10% of Southeast Asians have dual citizenship, yet this number increases to two-thirds of North African migrants and to 55% of Turkish migrants (Simon 2012: 3-6).

The issue of integration has reflected not only on the policies on citizenship, but also in other policy areas, including education. In 1977, a European Directive introduced *Enseignements de langue et de culture d'origine* program (Teaching of Languages and Cultures of Origin, ELCO) for non-native language speaking children. The program was introduced as a result of bilateral agreements with nine countries (Algeria, Croatia, Spain, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Serbia, Tunisia and Turkey). According to this program, foreign instructors are selected and paid by these countries, and the education takes place in the regular school hours[18] (Brubaker 2001: 536). The initial justification for ELCO program was training children with their origin culture in order to facilitate their repatriation to their home countries and the inclusion of intercultural education for migrants' children (Payet and Henriot-Van Zanten 1996: 99). In 1980s the rising problems of school dropouts and student failures among the children of immigrants led to the establishment of several affirmative action (*discrimination positive*) programs, including *zones d'éducation prioritaire* (zones of educational priority, ZEP). The program determines "positive discrimination" for certain regions which are most usually populated by migrant populations, therefore deals with the existing differences as a part of the urban policy, rather than an ethnicity based one (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 82).

Another highly debated issue on migration and integration is religion, as France has the biggest presence of Muslims in Europe with a population of five million people (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 86). The legal separation of church and state has a long history going back to 1905, when the principle of *laicité* was established as a replacement of religious community with the political community. Contrary to the American secularism in which "social and civic integration is obtained through religious participation in ethnic churches", the French *laicité*

[18] Eduscol. 2014. "Portail national des professionnels de l'éducation, Enseignement des langue et de culture d'origine (ELCO)." Accessed October 3. http://eduscol.education.fr/cid52131/enseignements-de-langue-et-de-culture-d-origine-elco.html#lien4.

"implies the participation of the individual in politics as a citizen, free of community and ethnic ties and equal before the law" (Kastoryano 2004: 1243). While in the United States the phenomenon of migration has been related with ethnicity, the public opinion, researchers and politicians in France focus on the religious aspect of migration. In the words of Kastoryano (2002 in Kastoryano 2004: 1246), Islam currently raises a double challenge in France:

> that of a minority in a republican state that rhetorically rejects the very concept of minority, and that of a religion in the public space. […] It is nonetheless an issue that necessitates negotiation with public authorities: the negotiations of the permanent cultural and structural presence of Islam and its cultural expression.

In the recent decades Islam emerged as "an agent in the discourse of action or reaction" and challenged the difficult *status quo* between religion and state in France (Kastoryano 2004: 1243). This confrontation reached a climax with the *foulard* (headscarf) affair, which began in November 1989. The affair occurred when three teenage girls were suspended for refusing to remove their headscarves in Creil. The suspension unleashed public debates, on the compatibility of religious expression with *laicité* and on the difference between discreet and conspicuous religious symbols. The debates on headscarf issue regained impetus in the period of 2003-2004, and led to the establishment of "Commission on Reflection on the Implementation of the Principle of *Laicité* in the Republic" also known as the "Stasi Commission" by former President Jacques Chirac. The 2003 Stasi Report suggested that all conspicuous religious symbols, including Islamic veil, Jewish kippa and large Christian crosses, should be removed from public schools and the suggestion was enacted as a law in March 2004 (Escafre-Dublet et al. 2009: 19).

Since the 1980s, there have been a number of initiatives to "establish a permanent dialogue between religious leaders and to manage Islam within secularised rules" (Wihtol de Wenden, 2011: 87). In 1989, *Conseil de Reflexion sur l'Avenir de l'Islam en France* (Council for Reflection on Islam in France, CRAIF) was founded in order to monitor the Islamic practices in the country. It was followed by the setting up of *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* in 2003 (French Council of the Muslim Faith, CFCM), which brings together representatives of France's main Islamic associations, based on the number of square meters of an association's prayer room[19]. Such initiatives for institutionalizing the management of Islam and bringing different Islamic doctrines under the same roof have been coupled with a quest for finding a

[19] This criterion for participation in CFCM received criticism as big associations became more influential and smaller ones could not find a place for representation, as in the case of Turkish Alevi groups (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 87).

"French Islam" that can bring it together with the "values of the French Republic" (Green 2009, 81). The emergence of particular institutions becoming representatives of the religious communities vis-à-vis the state may alter immigrants' conditions of incorporation to the mainstream society, leaving them as quasi members (Kaya 2009; 1998). As argued by Kaya (2009: 197) such attempts to institutionalize Islam underscores French state's interest in integrating it with the society within a republican egalitarian perspective, while threating it through the prism of difference.

Political Participation of the Diversity

The history of migrants' political participation in France is brief, compared to that of its migration history and has begun around associations and political mobilization for migrants' rights. In 1981, the prohibition of associative rights imposed on foreigners was lifted by a law, which brought migrants' associations under the same roof with the general law of associations of 1901, as *associations culturelles* (cultural associations). Before 1981, migrants could only participate in the associations, which were founded by French nationals, from 1981 onwards migrants could administer their own associations and receive public funding (Schain, 2011: 109). Many migrants' associations were founded under the regime of 1901 law, except for *associations cultuelles* (religious and worshiping associations) which are decreed by the law of 1905. The Alsace-Moselle region has specific judicial structure due to its late annexation to France in 1918. There is a looser understanding of *laicité* in this region, and therefore the state and religion is not separated. Based on the regional regime, which has a history since the 19th century, Catholic, Protestant and Jewish beliefs benefit from certain advantages from the state as *cultes reconnus* (recognized public churches). Although Islam is not recognized in this regime, Muslim associations are mandated according to 1908 law on associations and can benefit from specific benefits if their objective is strictly religious (Akgönül 2009: 220-222). Despite the distinction between associations of law of 1901 and law of 1905, many Muslim associations are still established with the decree of 1901 (Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau 2007: 11). Otherwise as in the case of mosques founded by Turkey-originated populations, many are founded as two sister associations, one for the cultural affairs (law of 1901) and the other specifically founded for religious affairs which are exempted from taxing such as collection of donations (law of 1905).

In the preceding period, migrants' issues in France had taken its place within established unions (such as *Confédération Générale du Travail* - General Confederation of Labor, CGT)

or political parties (mainly *Parti Communiste Français* - French Communist Party, PCF) where they would be articulated within the framework class identity rather than ethnic identity. Swiftly the associations founded by migrants became networks for establishing negotiations with trade unions, political parties and the state at the local and national level, and became new venues where ethnic mobilization could be voiced (Schain 2011: 109-110). Already in 1985, there were more than 4,000 associations founded by populations of all nationality groups[20]. Until recently many migrants associations received funding from *Fonds d'Action Sociale* (Social Action Fund, FAS) or its derivatives[21]. For Schain (2011: 110) although the funds provided by FAS increased the opportunities for these associations, they also made many associations dependent on state and local government financing, reducing their capabilities for negotiating in the political processes. This dependence became more visible after the funds available to migrants' associations were limited to the integration of foreigners who migrated to France in the last ten years. As a result, many associations working on populations with a history of migrant-origin had to either close down or delimit their activities.

The associative movement in France went in parallel with the increasing political visibility of migrants and the emergence of ethnic claims making. In an analysis on Jewish and Muslim ethno-religious politics, Safran (2004: 423-424) argues that although lobbying of ethnic minorities are unacceptable in France, as they call into question the belief in a "France One and Indivisible"[22], its existence can no longer be denied. The policy issues voiced by the

[20] Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau (2007: 52) estimate the numbers of associations for certain nationalilty groups as: 950 Portuguese, 850 Maghrebins (including 350-450 para-governmental *amicales*), 500 Italian, 450 Spanish, 350 Turkish, 300 Yugoslav, 200 Sub-Saharan African, 200-250 Polish, 250 South-East Asian and about 1,000 mutual aid and reception associations. This emerging field of civil society attempted in its early days to create a council in order to advocate the rights of immigrants, namely *Conseil des Associations Immigrés en France* (Council for Immigrant Associations in France, CAIF) among which were representatives from migrant associations, including *Association des Travailleurs Turcs* (Association of Turkish Workers, ATT). This council founded by the "first generation" associations began its advocacy on defending the foreign workers' rights and their cultural identities and over time oriented towards working on their judicial and pedagogical (educational) problems (Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau 2007: 52-53).

[21] Created in 1958 by Charles de Gaulle, FAS aimed at financing the social action of algerian workers residing in the French metropolitan. Following the halt of migration influx in 1974, the role of FAS was enlarged to intervene and finance social actions, including education, professional formation and the promotion of associative life for diversified populations. In 1983, FAS started to include representatives of migrant populations and regionalized (Politix 1990: 70). FAS was replaced with Action and Support Fund for Integration and the Fight Against Discrimination (FASILD) in 2001 and by Agency for Social Cohesion and Equality (ACSE) in 2006.

[22] French laws impede against ethnic demands and claims for group rights, based on the Article 1 of the 1958 constitution which emphasizes that the French Republic "shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law regardless of their origin, race or religion". Based on this understanding of civic equality, "political

ethnic migrant groups in France can be differentiated based on immigrant politics and homeland (diaspora) politics based on the distinction made by Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a). Regarding politics related to the conditions of migrants, while the earlier mobilizations were marked by the problems regarding worker's rights, issues of permits and fight against racism, more recent mobilizations are announced as related to the issues related to integration issues including unemployment, education or housing. Already in the 1970s, Portuguese who had migrated to France mainly as irregular migrants took part in French industrial conflicts, making political claims on freedom of expression and social demand. Following the Portuguese who assumed the political leadership among migrant groups in France during the 1970s, Maghrebis emerged in the 1980s as political actors (Wihtol de Wenden 2013: 98-99).

According to Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau (2007: 11), the change in the legislation on foreigners' associative rights in 1981 was crucial for triggering the increased participation of migrants and their children in public life, as the emergence of the law was at a period tangled with the youth migrant revolts, especially that of the Northern African youth in France, demanding for increased political and social rights for foreigners[23]. This period also saw the emergence of multi-ethnic movements, such as the *sans-papiers* movement, where irregular migrants were threatened with deportation, in the 1990s (Hargreaves 2007: 133). A more recent moment in the history of French ethnic mobilization was the *banlieue* riots in 2005[24], mainly centered around Clichy-sous-Bois, a suburb north of Paris, largely populated with first- and second- generation migrants. According to Kastoryano (2010: 90), the riots in the French suburbs unleashed new debates on whether the "French model" based on a Republican individualism and the assimilation of individuals who made the decision to become "French" could really be performed in practice.

While migrants' earlier associational life in France was highly oriented towards immigrant politics (Wihtol de Wenden 2007), there has been an upsurge over the last decades in such activities aiming at reflecting the issues in the overseas to French public opinion and policy

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claims articulated in ethnic or religious terms is considered favouring the pursuit of particular interests over general interest" (Kastoryano and Escafre-Dublet 2012: 5).

[23] Such protests have begun with the riot in Lyon in 1981 as a response to the establishment of the highly debated Interministerial Commission on the Social Development of Neighbourhoods and the Commission of Mayors on Security (Schain 2012: 81) and reached its peak point with the anti-racist movements in 1983 (*Marché pour l'égalité et contre le racisme* - March against racism and equal rights) and 1984, which according to Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau (2007: 45-48) marked the emergence of a *mouvement beur* (Arab movement).

[24] Beginning after a triggering clash between three teenagers and the police, the riot spread around especially poor housing projects (*Habitation à Loyer Modéré*, HLM) around France, finalizing in the declaration of state of emergency by the President Chirac.

makers, especially related to certain cases including Gulf War, Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Armenian-Turkish conflict. For instance, beginning with 2001 ethnic Armenians started campaigning for France to officially recognize the massacres of 1915 as genocide, which has received counter-claims making by Turkish migrant groups especially in 2012. In 2001 another social movement was organized by the black population in France, which lobbied in the parliament for the recognition of slavery as a "crime against humanity". Long lasting conflicts, such the Israeli-Palestinian continue on creating tensions in France among groups of different origins, emerging through demonstrations, boycotts and attacks (Hargreaves 2007: 130-131). Such social movements illustrate that despite the recurrent attempts to reinforce the "French model", ethnic claims making cannot be silenced at least on the streets.

The participation to local and national politics either as voters or as candidates also began in the 1980s, only for those who became French citizens[25]. Scholars suggest that the election of nearly 200 Franco-Maghrebins in the 1989 elections, as a result of a campaigning process by migrant associations paved the way for a certain "ethnic lobbying" (Hargreaves 2007: 129; Wihtol de Wenden 2013: 104). Despite this tendency, political parties have very often been reluctant to present minority candidates for fear of alienating mainstream electorate (Escafre-Dublet et al., 2009: 117), except for local politics where they give room to minority representatives to be able to reach out to communities among their electorate (Wihtol de Wenden 2007). For instance, according to a research by Geisser and Soum (2008: 191) only 3.02% of all candidates in the French elections to the National Assembly in 2007 were of "diversity candidates", being represented highest by the Greens (12.05%) and the centrist Democratic Movement party - MoDem (11.61%). Moreover, although French citizens of immigrant descent hold political rights, their participation in politics in the practice remains highly limited, as demonstrated by a survey that shows lower registration dates among second generation migrants in comparison with non-migrant French people of the same age (Richard 1998, in Escafre-Dublet and Kastoryano, 2012: 5).

Migration from Turkey: Fragmentations and the Debate on Voluntary Isolationism

Even though the classical period of migration from Turkey to France is renowned as the follow up of the post-1960s labour migration, there is a long history of mobility, which influenced the political, social and cultural phenomena in both geographies. With that said, it

[25] Non-nationals in France do not have political rights, except for European citizens who can vote in local and European elections since 1992 (Kastoryano and Escafre-Dublet 2012: 2).

is necessary to note here for providing a background on our future analysis in this research on diplomatic aspect of migration, that there is a much longer history of diplomacy, going back to the 18th century when the first ambassador of the Ottoman Empire, Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi was sent by the palace to strengthen the ties with France of Louis XV (Rado 2006). Following this first encounter was a rush of elite mobility from the Ottoman Empire to France in the late 19th and early 20th century, which can mainly be described as the mobility of *talebeler*, *münevverler ve muhalifler* (students, intellectuals and opponents). The intellectual elite, including opinion leaders, artists and writers moved back and forth during this period. Influenced by the new constitution movement triggered by the French Revolution, an opposition group challenging the monarchic power in the Ottoman Empire emerged and gradually gained strength, forming the *Jeunes Turcs* (Young Turks) movement, demanding for political reforms in the country[26] (Danış and Üstel 2008:12). Even though the migration during this early period was sporadic compared to that of the following periods it remains a key historical event, as it prompted social and political transformations in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. It is also substantial for constituting the cornerstone of the "Young" Turk image – which has been utilized by various tardier political movements to refer to their own organization, assuming it as a progressive youth movement.

The collapse of the empire and the nation building process, which followed, were marked by politics of ethnic and religious homogenization sweeping across Anatolian sociocultural environment. The most populous and tragic of these forced migrations from Anatolia occurred following *Sevk ve İskan Kanunu* (Dispatchment and Settlement Law) passed by the Ottoman Parliament on May 1915, which caused the deportation and death of more than 500,000 to 1.5 million people depending on the different sources. After the mass deportation, France became the second biggest host of Armenians after the United States (Danış and Üstel 2008: 13) and Armenians entered into the classical diaspora literature characterized as a "victim diaspora" (Cohen 1996). The recurrent stark debate based on the polarized usage of the two notions – that of genocide and exile - adopted by the Armenian side and the Turkish state still disturbs the relations between these communities (Danış and Üstel, 2008: 13). This

[26] Many military students were sent during this period to France and this led to the establishment of Mekteb-i Osmani in 1855, where they could receive education in French. France became a crucial center of opposition for such groups as the first publication of this society *Meşveret* (Consultancy) and *Mechveret Supplément Françis* (Mechveret French Supplement) were published in this country, and the First and Second Young Turks Congresses were hosted in Paris. Ironically, in the succeeding period France also hosted the opposition groups of *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress) (Danış and Üstel 2008: 12).

conflict is also infused in a larger arena of international diplomacy in relation to the legal recognition or non-recognition of genocide by different states.

From the early days of the modern Turkey to the beginning of the labour migration, mobility of "students, intellectuals and opponents" as well as of non-Turkish and non-Muslim populations and political migrants from Turkey continued towards France, although with smaller numbers. In the 1920s to 1940s the state organized student migration in order to train young students who were expected to become the future pioneers in the academia, arts and public administration (Şarman 2006). Although the student migration remained sporadic, returning students influenced the Turkish culture and society and disseminated the French culture, which predominated until the 1980s (Danış and Üstel 2008: 13). From the 1910s onwards, many Jews migrated from Turkey to France, making up of nearly 20,000 among a total of 300,000 Jews living in France in the 1940s. While the majority of the Jewish population quit Turkish citizenship after migration, certain historical accounts argue that during the heyday of the Second World War some of these groups regained their citizenship by the aid of Turkish diplomats in Paris. The account between the Turkish embassy and the Turkish Jews in France gives an interesting account of the flexibility of citizenship practices and services provided by the state towards certain non-Turkish or non-Muslim populations abroad (Kıvırcık 2007: 35-41)[27].

The classical epoch of migration from Turkey to France began following the first waves of migration from Turkey to Federal Germany, especially after the 1961 bilateral recruitment agreement between the two countries. In 1962, already before the signing of a French-Turkish bilateral recruitment agreement in May 1965, there were 111 Turkish workers in France according to the statistics of ONI. The earlier migrations included many qualified workers, including especially tailors and confectioners who settled and worked in the Parisian district of Strasbourg St. Denis. Many migrated to France as "tourists" and "tried their chances in the French capital" and lingered as irregulars in the country. The bilateral agreement in 1966 aimed at reinforcing especially the industry, especially the construction and automobile sectors (Kastoryano 1988: 145-146). This major event urged many migrants to settle outside of the Parisian center, to a vast geography, from the northern *banlieues* of Paris to Rhones-Alpes in the east and to Alsace and Lorraine in the north, close to the

[27] According to the memoirs of Behiç Erkin, the ambassador of Turkey to Paris and Vichy in 1939-1943, the Turkish embassy attempted to protect Turkish Jews during the German occupation to France in June 1940 by providing citizenship to those who had quitted their Turkish citizenship after being naturalized in France. The memoirs report that nearly 50% of Turkish Jews had demanded to regain their citizenship, and many were sent to Turkey by trains arranged by the Turkish embassy (Kıvırcık 2007: 35-41).

factories of Peugeot, Verstraeten and Pirault (Güzel 1995: 205-207). The state-led labour migration from Turkey to France came to a halt in 1974, following the European economic crisis.

Despite the halt for migration in 1974, the number of people from Turkey increased significantly after the mid-1970s, reaching from 5,164 people in 1965 to 45,363 in 1973 and to 103,946 in 1980 (Wisniewski 1981). There are at least three explanations for this increase after the 1970s. The most prominent argument is the continuity of migration through family unification and formation. In her analysis on the identity creation among Turkish women in France, Ak Akyol (2007: 226) argues that there have been two patterns of family unification: (a) a woman follows her husband after his initial migration, or (b) women and men are drawn into France as spouses after they reach a certain age, to marry especially those of the second generation. Marriage to a person born and raised in the home country is still a significant source of migration to France, and is described by Akgönül (2013: 165-166) as a "perpetual first generation strategy", enabling Turks in France and across Europe to remain in close contact with Turkey, the Turkish culture and the religion, against the fear of assimilation. The second argument is the increase in the number due to the regularization of irregular migrants. Scholars argued that the population statistics were "underestimating the number of Turkish people" especially in the 1980s (Wisniewski 1981) and the number of people recorded in the statistics increased significantly following the regularizations in 1979 and in 1981. Moreover, the regularizations by the socialist French state, which gained power in May 1981, also attracted more migration of Turkish originals, especially of those who were in the irregularity elsewhere in Europe, especially in Germany.

A third explanation for the upsurge of migration from Turkey to France is the sudden increase in asylum seekers and irregular migrants shortly before and after the September 1980 coup in Turkey. According to the statistics by French Office for Protection of Refugees and Expatriates (OFPRA), the number of asylum seekers from Turkey increased significantly from 1,316 in 1981, to 5,000 in 1984 and to nearly 17,400 by 1989. This number started to decrease in the preceding decade, to 11,800 in 1990, 9,700 in 1991 and to 1,800 in 1992 (Rigoni 2000: 274-280). Asylum applications reached another high level around 2000s (from 2,219 in 1999 to 6,582 in 2002) and kept at an average of 2,000 people since 2008 (Weil 2004: 538; Eurostat 2014). Although the objective of the coup was announced as the suppression of all political radicalization, the main target emerged as the leftist ideology in practice (Bora and Can 2009). The reflection of the coup on the Turkish-French migration

corridor was contingent with this selective penalization: supporters of leftist groups and Kurds were the main groups who migrated to France (Danış and Üstel 2008: 17). Many were the supporters of the left or the radical left, members of organizations including Dev Sol, Dev Yol, TIKKO, TKP-ML whose members were suppressed, imprisoned or tortured by the military regime (Chevallier 2009).

The state repression in the post-1980 period and the emergence of the conflict between the Turkish army and ethno-nationalist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) after 1984 constituted a significant factor increasing the number of Kurdish asylum seekers in France (Bozarslan 1995: 116-118). Although many Kurds had migrated as labour migrants following the bilateral agreement between Turkey and France, the main Kurdish migration intensified in the 1970s and 1980s. According to Bozarslan (1995: 116-117), this late mobility began with the economic crisis in the 1970s, which affected the agricultural sector in regions inhabited by Kurdish populations, yet continued and intensified following the 1980s. The political instability and insecurity in the post-1980 period prompted other ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey to move elsewhere as well. Kurdish and Turkish Alevi populations had already started to quit the country since the 1970s, as a result of the violent attacks in the Anatolian cities (Bozarslan 1995: 118). The Alevi exodus mounted after July 1993, following the killing of 33 Alevi intellectuals by a religious extremist mob in Sivas. Finally, the repressions in the country especially in the southeast regions caused many Chaldeans and Armenians to seek security in Europe and in France, where they could be granted with refugee status in the 1980s (Rigoni 2000: 280; Danış and Üstel 2008: 14).

According to the 2010 Census in France, Turkey was the sixth main country of origin with a Turkey-born population of 245,714. Among this population 37% had no professional activity, 32% were blue-collar workers and 10% were workers in some company (See Appendix 1). The statistics by the Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security in its 2013 report on France announced that there were 576,986 Turkish people registered to the Turkish consulate in 2009, including dual citizens. In spring 2014, the Turkish Embassy announced this number as 611,515. Based on the records by the ministry in 2013, the concentration of the population occupied mainly three regions: more than 56,000 people lived in the Ile-de-France region with the main city of Paris (comprised only 3.8% of all migrants in this region), nearly 39,000 people in the Rhone-Alpes region with main city of Lyon (comprising 9.7% of all migrants) and 27,145 people in the Alsatian region with the main city of Strasbourg

(comprising of 19.3% of all migrants) (Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2013; see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3).

Scholarship on migration from Turkey to France has emerged in the 1980s, with the short analyses and reports by academics and social workers including Wisniewski (1981), Gökalp (1984) and Petek Şalom (1984) written for French institutions and journals on migration. Among the earlier empirical researches are Kastoryano's *Etre Turc en France: Réflexions sur familles et communauté* (Being Turkish in France: Reflections on families and the community, 1986) which compared familial relations from Paris and Terrason, and *Paris-Berlin Politiques d'Immigration et Modalités d'Integration des Familles Turques* (Paris-Berlin Politics of Immigration and Modalities of Integration of Turkish Families, 1988) comparing the integration of migrant populations in France and in Germany. These early publications have emphasized the integration issues of the predominantly male worker migrants from Turkey, focusing on the theme of temporariness or their emerging permanency. Following these early ethnographic research, nation-wide investigation was conducted by scholars such as Tribalat from *Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques* (National Institute on Demographic Studies, INED) emphasizing the "integration difficulties" of immigrants, especially of Turkish origin in France. Tribalat and collaborators contended that the Turkish population that was primarily of rural origins (70%) and with a very weak education history especially among women (8% of men and 30% of women were illiterate) constituted a community that was the least "assimilated" and "assimilable". The researchers argued thus the population represented an exception that was characterized by "*un repli identitaire volontaire"* (voluntary isolationism) and that Turkish populations in France would be "ready to defend their prerogatives without considering that it is going to pose a significant problem to the French society" (Tribalat 1995: 223; Aksaz 2015: 23). Using Tribalat's study as a scientific knowledge, the discussion around "integration difficulties" was merged into the public debate as a problem to be cautioned against. This issue also entered into the policy-making and implementation agenda on immigration by newly established institutions such as *Haut Conseil a l'Integration* or Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration (Aksaz 2015: 20-21).

Distinct from the deep-rooted and highly politicized discussion on integration, a fertile field flourished since the 1990s, criticizing Tribalat and collaborators' arguments and focusing on a variety of topics, reflecting the highly fragmented nature of the population that migrated from Turkey. This development was also thanks to collective books and several special issues

by academic journals, including *CEMOTI* (1992), *Hommes et Migrations* (1998), *Migrations Société* (2005) and bilingual magazines published by civil society organizations founded by people of Turkish origin during this period, such as Oluşum (*Genèse*), Altyazı (*Multitudes*), Gözlem (*L'Observateur*) which provided a semi-academic literature especially focusing on associative life in France. The wide range of topics that emerged after the 1990s can be cumulated under several main topics: (1) demographic aspects of migration, including flows, patterns and the migratory field (Jund et al. 1995; Gökalp 1995; including many works by de Tapia including 2000, 2005; Kuzucuoğlu 2004; Danış and İrtiş 2008); (2) associative life (Hüküm 1989; many works by Petek including 1996; Wihtol de Wenden 1992; Yalaz 1997); (3) Islam and the religious communities in France (Gökalp 1998; Fregosi 2001; Caymaz 2002; many works by Akgönül including 2008; Bruce 2009; Yalçın 2009; Akıncı and Yağmur 2011); (4) Kurds and their political practices (many works by Bozarslan, including 1995, 1998; Burchaianti 2003; Mohseni 2002; Grojean 2011); (5) minority religious groups of Turkey, including Alevis and Assyro-Chaldeans (Yalap 2003; Fliche 2007); (6) families, familial life, and women (Petek 1995; Ak Akyol 2008; Aksaz 2006); (7) youth (Tietze 2002; İrtiş 2003); (8) regional analyses, especially on the Alsatian region (Erpuyan 1995; Weibel 1995; Guilliou 2007; Akgönül et al. 2009) and Strasbourg St. Denis district in Paris (Barthon 1993); (9) debates on transnationalism and European identity (de Tapia 1996; many works by Kastoryano including 1998, 2005; Kaya and Kentel 2005), *and finally* (10) political groups and political participation (Antakyalı 1992; Brouard and Tiberj 2007; Petek 2008; Chevallier 2009). While the earlier research concentrated primarily on migrants' ties and interactions with the French state and society, the emerging scholarship after the 1990s began to question new issues, bringing to the fore the question of migrants' ties with their country of origin. Although no holistic research has been conducted until now in relation to the different migrant groups' relations with Turkish state, there is an emerging interest to discuss diverging aspects of transnational links with Turkey (Aksaz 2015: 72).

3.2. United States as a Host Country: Migration History and Policies

The topic of migrations from Turkey to the United States did not receive much attention until a very recent period in the field of international migration. Even though the American field remained outside the fray of discussions on the intensive and vibrant migration from Turkey to Europe of the more classical age of migration from modern Turkey, it received considerable migrant populations in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods.

Furthermore, the American field embodies some of the earliest associative and political movements as well as transnational political activities, not at the grassroots but elite level, among the overall Turkey-origined migration populations, which could provide a very fertile environment for research. Along with the long distance between Turkey and the United States, many reasons including the small scale of migration from Turkey compared to the vastness of migrant population in this immigration country, the migrant incorporation policies of the U.S., the changing characteristics of the migrant population, as well as the patterns of migration can be reported to shed light on this issue. In the following sections, I delve into the structural factors on the U.S. as the host country and the conditions related to migrants from Turkey, to discuss the interactions between these two actors.

E Pluribus Unum

The archetypal case of immigration in the literature, the United States is a country born out of immigration as represented by one of the nation's main mottos frequently repeated by its presidents: *E pluribus unum* – out of many, one. As argued by Martin (2005: 634) immigration is considered as a shared history among most Americans, as well as serving for the U.S. interest, which enriches in parallel with the enhancement of the immigrants. This perspective is mainly due to the long and high-volume history of migration. Throughout the 19th century, the U.S. welcomed as many as four times greater than its population in 1815 which created a foreign-born population comprising of the 13.1% of the whole population by the 1910s. Hence, immigration contributed majorly to the growth of the population in the country during this period (Schain 2012: 196-199). In contrast to the restrictive policies for half of the 20th century, migration regained impetus over the last five decades. Politically, migration is of broad and current interest both in the public opinion and the decision making process. Its history in the U.S. has been marked by the confrontation of inclusive and restrictions policies which have affected the influxes in one time or another. The recurrent debates are especially centered on determining the main mechanisms of immigration (how many, from where, which status) and integration (education, welfare and politics) from an increasingly securitarian perspective.

In the United States a variety of categories are used in order to classify foreigners, as subcategories of the main three: (a) immigrants, (b) nonimmigrants and, (c) unauthorized foreigners. Since naturalization in the U.S. is based on the principle of *jus soli,* anyone who is born in the U.S. becomes directly its citizen. Immigrants from other countries who are legally

entitled to live and work in the country can become citizens after five years of residence in the country. Nonimmigrants are granted temporary permissions to reside in the country as a result of a purpose that can be related to visit, work and study. Unauthorized or undocumented migrants are those who have entered the country through illegal means, or fell into illegality through over-staying their tourist visas. Immigrants are further subdivided under four groups: (a) relatives of U.S residents which comprise the largest category, (b) those admitted for work purposes, (c) diversity and other immigrants, who are generally admitted as a result of the green card lottery, and (d) refugees and asylum seekers (Martin 2005: 635-636). The U.S. census statistics make a distinction between native-born and foreign-born population and report self-identification data on race and ethnicity since the late 19th century.

According to Martin (2005: 638), the history of migration in the United States can be classified under four major waves. The *first wave* consists of the pre-1820 period, therefore before the annual arrivals began to be recorded by the state. The majority of the migrants moving to the New World during this period were of Western European origin, mainly comprising of English, Germans and Spaniards. Following this wave, a *second wave* occurred until the 1860s, marked by the Irish migration. Beginning with the 1880s a *third and more diverse migration wave* took place, bringing millions of Southern and Eastern Europeans, Chinese, Japanese and other Asian groups along with Jews. However, the halt of migration during the World War I and then the immigration restrictions through annual quotas declined the immigration until the 1960s. The *fourth and final wave* of immigration began after 1965 when the legislation was changed from national quota system to one favoring those with family ties to the U.S. or foreigners who were to be hired by the U.S. employers. This last period shifted the main region of birth for foreigners from Europe to South America (mainly from Mexico) and Asia (Martin 2005: 638-639). All along the history of influx to the U.S., the migration from Turkey never constituted a significant portion. However, the history of migration from Turkey to the U.S. is condensed in two main periods, pre-1920s and post-1960s period in relation to the environment in both Turkey (and the Ottoman Empire) and the U.S. Since this research is limited within the temporal boundaries of the post-1923 era and the specific pattern of migration from Turkey, the following paragraphs elaborate mainly on the history and policies in the 20th century, which may have affected our main topic.

After two centuries of *laissez-faire* politics towards immigration, the early 20th century was marked by restrictionist policies in the U.S. based on a “racial version of nativism” (Barkan

2013: 1486). The nativist perspective was especially oriented towards the Chinese populations (resulting in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882) and the increasing numbers of Southern and Eastern Europeans, outnumbering the favored Northern and Western Europeans by the late 1800s. In 1917 an Immigration Act was put in practice, “barring the Asiatic zone” and expanding the Chinese exclusion laws to most Asians. The restrictionist policies reached their peak point in the 1920s, with the 1921 Act, Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 and the National Origins Act of 1929 placing numerical ceiling upon immigration. While the 1924 Act established the definition of excluded populations, tightened the quotas and further discriminated against Southern and Eastern European nations, the 1929 Act stipulated new and permanent quotas based on the proportion of each nationality[28]. The quota was maintained with the 1952 McCarran-Walter bill which introduced a 50% preference within the quota system to those with higher education and “exceptional abilities” (Schain 2012: 208). As a result, from 1921 to 1952, the quota for all countries was decreased for 356,965 to 154,887; with the majority distributed among European countries (149,597 people in 1952) and minor quotas granted to originals from other regions[29]. Defined among European countries in the definition of quota system, Turkey received a yearly quota of around 200 in the period of 1920-1960 similar to that of Greece, Romania and Spain[30].

The restrictions to immigration established in the earlier period were removed with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Removing the national and ethnic preference, the expansive 1965 Act established the current system of migration in the U.S, based on a preference system based on family unification and needed job skills. As argued by Schain (2012: 210) in the succeeding epoch the policy approach towards migration focused on how to expand legal migration, contrary to Europe where the question of how to reduce immigration was of interest among policy makers. While the legal migration was becoming a policy preference, the control of irregular migration quickly reached high on the agenda throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The main attitude during this period was reducing the number of undocumented migrants through restrictions, while at the same time providing amnesty programs for those who were already in the country for a certain period of time. In

[28] The 1929 act established minimum quotas of 100 for all quota areas and introduced national proportion whereas the quota of any country would have the same ratio to 150,000 as the number of persons of that national origin living in the United States had to the total population living in the United States, as determined from the 1920 Census of Population.

[29] Immigrants from certain countries including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic and refugees who were not included in the quota system increased the total influx of migrants higher than the total allocated quotas (US Census Bureau 1961).

[30] The annual immigration quotas for Turkey were determined as such: 656 in 1921, 100 in 1924, 226 in 1929, 225 in 1952 (US Census Bureau 1961).

1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was adopted to reduce unauthorized migration by imposing penalties as "employer sanctions" to those employing undocumented migrants coupled with a mass amnesty program. A number of acts were introduced in the 1990s for bolstering border control, facilitating removal, tightening asylum procedures and reducing the welfare provisions for the newcomers (Schain 2012: 213; Martin 2005: 641).

The political concerns over undocumented migration overlapped with the growing concerns on homeland security in the period following September 11 attacks in 2001 (Schain 2012: 213). The initial response to the attacks was the adoption of restrictive laws that would significantly diminish the legal rights of current and future migrants. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred almost all functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to multiple agencies in the new Department of Homeland Security (Schuck 2008: 160). Moreover the Real ID Act of 2005 barred noncitizens from the right of *habeas corpus* review for most detention and deportation orders, tightened requirements for asylum and facilitated deportation (Schain 2012:213). Even though the new approach to migration did not curtail it qualitatively or quantitatively, it did have direct effects as the new laws introduced restrictions to the rights of both U.S. citizens and foreigners.

Despite the securitarian logic sweeping through policy making in the post-2001 period, the U.S. is still among the most welcoming country for migrants. As of 2010, a total of 37 million foreign-born people were in the U.S, among which 16 million were naturalized citizens and 13 million entered the country in the period of 2000 to March 2010. The majority of this population reported their place of birth as Latin America (mainly Mexico and Caribbean), followed by Asia, Europe and Africa. The statistics illustrate that the overall characteristics of migration changed significantly in the post-1960 period, which created a shift in the origin of the migrant population from Europe to South America. In this period total yearly flows were more than 1 million, comprising mainly of family and immediate relatives of the U.S. citizens (66%), work related migration (14%) and refugee migration (13%). While the legal migration was kept at this pace, as much as 11 million people are estimated to be in the U.S. as unauthorized immigrants, comprising mainly of Mexicans and South American citizens (US Census 2010).

The history of policy making on migration in the United States comprises of numerous laws and regulations as well as many proposals for policy change, which have been lay on the table. In contrast to unitary political systems like in France where the territorial and governmental organization is centralized, the federal system and the organization of national

government has created many veto points in the U.S. which can both prevent and delay policy change (Schain 2012: 196). Rather than being a product of the central government machinery, the policy making is a co-production of the local government, individual states and the federal government in Washington, as well as other intermediary mechanisms including courts, committees and subcommittees in both congress and the senate as well as associational interest groups (Schain 2012: 191-196). The system also allows for the existence of systems and cultures at diverging levels, which enables migrants to have different and multiple opportunities of incorporation in the social and political arenas. The following section gives a brief background on the politics and policies of migration in the United States. It focuses on the period of post-1960 period and two key aspects, related to migration and post-migration processes: (1) incorporation and citizenship, and (2) political participation.

From Melting Pot to Multiculturalism

This section maps out incorporation and citizenship policies and practices in the United States by first elaborating on (a) the mainstream political perspectives that marked the history of migration in the country, (b) the institutionalization of these perspectives, (c) the applications regarding citizenship and naturalization and (d) the reflection of incorporation issues on the themes of education and religion. The incorporation regime in the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries were based on the idea of fusion of peoples into one society, represented through images of "(s)melting pot", "cauldron" or "crucible". The image of fusion entailed the Americanization of the populations through liberation (Martin 2005: 643). The notion of Americanization during the early ages was strongly defined through racialized and unequal measures, which reflected on the legislation and court decisions, which proceeded as instruments in the separation of individuals into distinct groups (Bloemraad, 2013: 63). This perspective was set aside as many migrant groups with diverging social and cultural histories migrated to the country. Moreover, in the U.S. no ethnic group established the political identity of the country as all citizens were considered as individuals, rather than a member of an officially defined ethnic group. In terms of the management of culture, the succeeding governments implemented *laissez faire* politics, allowing migrants to keep certain institutions for a time. As a result, the incorporation regime in the country faced with two different approaches in the recent century: *integration* and *pluralism* (multiculturalism). While integrationist position aimed at eliminating ethnic

boundaries, the multiculturalist position aimed at maintaining them – reflecting on the ideal that democracy was an equality of groups rather than equality of individuals (Martin 2005: 643). In the policy making, multiculturalism marks the citizenship regime through an understanding of difference based on race, rather than ethnicity as in France. Bloemraad (2006: 680) argues that U.S. citizenship regime cannot be understood without taking account of the legacy of slavery and the racial predicaments that have reflected on the hierarchical structure in the past. Especially the civil, social and native rights movements in the 1950s and 1960s forced American governments to take measures against the racial inequalities in the political and social spheres. The policy responses to develop affirmative action and other group-oriented governmental policies in the most recent eras had the side effect of creating an understanding of multiculturalism couched in broad classifications based on race (i.e. black, white, Asian-American, Latino) (Bloemraad 2006: 680; Connoly 2006: 72). Connoly (2006: 72) emphasizes that serve as a convenient means to mobilize individuals through these racial identities, which might represent a transition from long-established identities (i.e. Mexican-Americans, Vietnamese) towards broader categories (i.e. Hispanics, Asian-American).

The naturalization and incorporation regime in the U.S. is based on a securitarian perspective, which takes settlement as a private concern. Therefore incorporation is very much dependent on the individuals' own resources or the assistance they may obtain from their familial or community networks. Until 2003, the process of naturalization was executed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), as a part of the Department of Justice. In the last decade, this task was given to the Bureau of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) under the Department of Homeland Security. In the two bureaucratic machineries naturalization has been referred to as an issue of law enforcement and security. In terms of the settlement of the newcomers no programs and grants for community-based integration programs are provided by the federal government, except to those officially recognized as refugees (Bloemraad 2006: 679-680). The available welfare benefits in the pre-1990 period were blocked following *The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996* which dramatically changed the U.S. welfare system. The law introduced bans against the application of migrant populations for benefits (food stamps of supplemental security income) until five years after entering the country legally, in the discretion of each state. It also barred nonimmigrants and undocumented migrants from receiving any benefits[31].

[31] Migration Policy Institute. 2014. "Immigrants and Welfare Use." Accessed October 22. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-and-welfare-use.

In the United States, citizenship can be obtained through two ways: (a) at birth, or (b) via naturalization. At birth, citizenship can be attributed through *jus soli* principle if the individuals are born on American soil or through *jus sanguinis* if they are born in another country to parents who have American citizenship. For those who were not born in the U.S. the principle of *jus soli* applies. Currently foreign-born people are eligible to naturalize after a minimum of five continuous years of legal permanent residence in the United States or three years if they are married to a U.S. citizen. The naturalization requires proof of knowledge of both the English language and American history and government. Moreover, applicants should pay an application fee, take an oath of allegiance, demonstrate good moral character and renounce their previous citizenship. Dual citizenship is not *de jure* recognized or encouraged in the U.S. but is tolerated as increasingly source countries (especially of the South America) allow dual citizenship (de Graauw 2013: 1875-1878). Despite the relative ease in the application process, a minority of the migrants are naturalized citizens. According to de Graauw (2013: 1877) only 42.5% of the foreign-born population was estimated to be naturalized in the period of 2006-2008. Among this population, migrants from Europe (60.2%) had higher rates of naturalization, compared to those from Asia (57.1%) and South American countries (30.9%).

Since the majority of the migrants in the United States are not native speakers of English, the toleration of other languages and the education of English has become an issue among debates on the incorporation of migrants. The issue of native-language is also debated regarding migrants' access to government information and public services. The initial response to migration in the 19th century was based on toleration and the state allowed the use of other languages in the public space and bilingual education in the schools. This tolerance was challenged with the Americanization movement of the 20th century, which aimed at creating the national unity through cultural homogeneity and migrants' adoption of the English language. This was a period when schools became crucial instruments of Americanization. From the 1965 liberalization of migration policy and the civil rights movements of the era to 2001, there have been a number of enactments that allowed bilingual education and the maintenance of minority languages and courses. The controversial No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 signaled a stepping down from federal support for native-language instruction and accountability in English only. In the recent decade, states developed their own standards adopted more or less enabling policies regarding bilingual education (de Graauw 2013: 1883-1884). There is no systematic allocation of social

citizenship rights in the U.S. in areas such as education and social welfare. Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2010: 30-31) assert that despite this general attitude, certain public schools facilitate the accessibility of students from low-income families or did poorly during their high school years, and provide opportunities for upward mobility for the second generation migrants.

In the United States, the free exercise of religion is guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution, which also prevents the government from establishing a state religion. On paper, there is no state sponsorship in the U.S. for religious organizations, however under specific conditions they are granted a special tax status, permitting them to be exempt from local and national taxes. As the other religious communities, Islamic communities can use funds from foreign sources for constructing mosques. According to Schain (2012: 242) even though the easy relationship between some local governments and religious communities declined after 2001, there have been cases in Massachusetts and California where the construction of mosques were facilitated by the local governments. Religion and Islam became part of the recurrent debates since the 2001 attacks in the U.S. which was taken upon by the religious fundamentalist organization Al-Qaeda. Along with the sweeping changes in the U.S. migration and security system that increasingly paved the way for government's monitoring and intervention to individuals' private spheres, the scrutiny towards Muslim communities in the country took place in the following period.

Paving the Way for Ethnic Politics

In the U.S., a country formed of many migrant populations; ethnic politics always had a significant role in the American politics. As emphasized by Connoly (2006: 59) the role of ethnic politics and the way the relationship between ethnicity and politics was understood has transformed over time. Connoly (2006) argues that setting aside the cultural and social issues related to these different migrant populations, the state and the affair of politics are critical in understanding the difference in the experiences and migrants' self understandings. As such, the incorporation of the Irish of the 19th century, Italians of the 20th century or the most recent South American migrants into the political environment exposed diverging trajectories. In the 19th century, the newly emerging political environment of universal manhood suffrage attracted many newly arriving Irish populations as electorates, creating a sharp partisan identity and credentials as bona fide Americans. This was not the case for the succeeding periods; in the early 20th century patronage politics declined the need for encouraging

electoral participation among the migrant populations, and in the recent decades the decline of party politics created alternative forms of political action inspired by the civil rights movements of the 1960s (Connoly 2006: 60).

The history of United States includes many examples of migrant mobilization that have shaped the decisions of the policy makers on the issue of migration as well as national politics. In the late 1700s migrants opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts which aimed at reducing access to naturalization and eased deportation of immigrants, contributing the defeat of the Federalists and the Thomas Jeffersons's gaining of power in the 1800 elections. In the early 20th century, migrants' organizing against prohibition and later regarding the economic crisis brought about the foundation of the Roosevelt coalition and a succession of Democratic dominance (DeSipio 2011: 1194). Even though these experiences have illustrated that mass mobility was always a part of ethnic politics in the United States, the social and political environment towards migration in the most recent decades made it the most basic and common pattern available to migrants who lacked resources and organizational capacity (Connoly 2006: 70). An efficient example was the migrant protests in spring 2006 where as many as five million migrants and their families protested the debated legislation that would raise penalties for illegal immigration and classify undocumented migrants as U.S. felons. The protesters did not only demand for the rejection of the bill but also the adoption of comprehensive reforms to the country's migration laws. Although neither reform was passed by the congress, the demonstrations attracted considerable attention both by the media and the policy makers (DeSipio 2011: 1194).

In the earlier epochs of migration to the United States, local party organizations were actively supporting migrants for naturalization, participation in the electoral processes or becoming members of the parties. However more recently scholars argue that the changes in the electoral processes have weakened the role of political parties in migrants' political incorporation (DeSipio 2001: 67; de Graauw 2013). De Graauw (2013: 1891) suggests that the current state of affairs in local elections, which has become nonpartisan and noncompetitive, has undermined the relationship between parties and migrants. As political parties no longer need migrant votes to win elections, they no longer provide incentives to reach out to new voters. Even in main migrant receiving cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago and Miami, there is minimal incentive to reach out to migrant communities (DeSpio 2001: 90). The decline in party politics triggered the emergence of other civic institutions in the domain of migrants' political incorporation, mainly nonprofit

organizations, religious organizations and labour unions. By providing new opportunities to participate, these institutions with different scopes and capacities to reach policy making through lobbying become bridges between migrant communities and the American political system (de Graauw 2013: 1891).

The emergence of the nonprofit organizations in the social and political arena also coincides with the Reagan-era policy initiatives to reduce the size and influence of the federal government and the push for privatization. As a result there is very broad arena of nonprofit organizations of 27 types entitled as 501(c) organizations that are exempt from tax in the United States. Among these organizations, the most common type is 501(c)(3) which delimits the activities and purposes including immigrants, charitable, religious, educational and scientific and is divided under *private foundations* and *public charities*. This type of nonprofit organization has limited capability to engage in legislative advocacy (i.e. lobbying) as long as it is not a substantial part of the organizations' overall activities, and is barred from partisan politics at any level of the government. Based on an empirical research on immigrant nonprofit organizations in San Francisco, de Graauw (2007: 5) emphasizes that despite the legal impediments against their active participation to politics, some nonprofits are in fact very active in local and state politics. As argued by de Graauw (2007: 18) nonprofits can become political actors through various means to affect policymaking processes, including agenda setting, seeking access to decision-making arenas, legislative advocacy, monitoring, shaping and challenging legislation through administrative and judicial advocacy. These mobilization techniques, which benefit from advocacy, are capable of changing the framing the issues or creating awareness on certain aspects of the policy arenas that are included in their objectives.

Although it remains very limited, electoral representation is a crucial aspect of migrants' incorporation into American politics. A crucial change on the structuring of ethnic politics in the United States occurred as a result of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. It was designated to eliminate formal barriers in the southern states to hinder African American vote, including outright intimidation, literacy tests and other tactics such as changing the place of polling one night before the elections. The Act provided nationwide protections for voting rights, prohibiting any state or local government to impose discrimination against minority populations. It also established majority-minority districts, where a sufficient majority of votes from the targeted could elect the candidate of its choice to the office (DeSipio 2001: 96). Despite such reforms, migrants and their children are in the overall underrepresented in

the national legislature in the United States, although with higher numbers compared to the European countries (Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009: 32). In the domain of local politics, migrants and people of migrant ancestry are more visible as politicians. Putting aside the fact that almost the entire population of the U.S. is of people with migrant backgrounds, several explanations can be provided for the relatively higher visibility of migrants in the U.S. political arena, related to the system of party politics in the country. The political party system in the U.S. allows individuals to run for office only by meeting only a few procedural rules, without the need for gaining the approval of the party leader or the organization. Hence, there are more opportunities of first or second-generation migrants to run for office and to continue on running even though he/she fails the first times. Moreover, in order to gain locally, parties make appeals to mobilize the ethnic and other interest groups to support candidates allied with the party (Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009: 33-34). Still, only a small share of U.S. Senate and House Representatives and officeholders are naturalized citizens. In the last elections, only eight members (1.8%) of the House of Representatives and no U.S. senators were naturalized citizens, excluding two senators who were born abroad to U.S. citizen parents. This was also the case in the local sphere, as of 2010; only two governors were naturalized U.S. citizens (DeSipio 2011: 1204).

Transnationalism is one of the most discussed topics within the framework of migrants' political incorporation in the United States. The literature on transnationalism that roared in the last two decades finds its sources on the American experiences, which seem to have become denser with the advent of globalization. Despite the novelties in the current age of transnationalism, the U.S. history on migration includes many instances of transnational links and practices. Criticizing theories on transnationalism which underscore its novelty, Morawska (2001: 184-185) argues that there have been similar practices among Southern and Eastern European migrants in the U.S. during the 19th and early 20th century. According to Morawska (2001: 185-186), the enduring group identity among these populations had pushed for the continuation of ties across the Atlantic. A significant aspect that diverges the current transnational practices from the past ones is the attitudes of home countries that are more and more eager to maintain the their status as citizens and voters. The issue of dual loyalties has particularly become a widespread issue among the South American populations, especially Mexicans and Dominicans who voice out homeland politics and actively become a part of the official politics in their homelands (Connoly 2006: 72).

Migration from Turkey: "Brain Drain" and Beyond

The United States is one of the earliest host countries that accommodated migrants from Turkey. This route of migration emerged in the nineteenth century, before the establishment of modern Turkey, constituting a significant movement compared to much smaller patterns of migrations towards the Russian territory from the lands of the Ottoman Empire, encompassing beyond the current territories of the Turkish Republic (Karpat 1985: 175). According to Karpat (1985: 177), this sudden rise was mainly as a result of the changes in the economic and ethno-cultural structure of the Ottoman society, as well as the industrialization of North America. As many as 320,000 "Turks"[32] were reported to have obtained lawful permanent resident status from 1820 to 1920, with more than 288,000 of the resident status having been granted in the period of 1900 to 1920 (DHS 2014). Karpat (2008: 173) argues that the overwhelming majority of the population included "Christian Arabs from Syria and Lebanon; Armenians and Greeks from south, and west and central Anatolia; and Slavs from the Balkans". A small population, estimated around 15,000 to 20,000 consisted of Muslims and among those, only 10-15 percent were ethnic Turks (Karpat 2008: 1). This migration corridor narrowed down following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the Immigration Act of 1924 in the United States, plummeting the number of migrants to nearly 40,400 in the period of 1920-1929 and to 1,300 in 1930-1939 (DHS 2014).

The characteristics of migration and the post-migratory processes during this earlier period is crucial for understanding some of the past and current political disputes involving different ethnic groups, Turkish state and even the U.S. Congress. In his studies on the earlier migrants Karpat (2008: 173) emphasizes that during the earlier days of migration, Turks, Armenians and Greeks from the Ottoman Empire typically lived together, oftentimes fighting but also helping and befriending each other. According to Karpat (2008: 174) the emergence of nationalisms in the early 20th century and the changing social and demographic environment as a result of the population exchanges and the forced displacements have confused the difficult interactions among these various ethnic populations who had migrated from the same political setting. This environment continued and was reinforced over many decades generating ethnic tensions during times of political crisis.

[32] The Official U.S. records on migration at the time did not specify the ethnicity or the birthplace of the migrants. Those originating from the Ottoman Empire were referred to either from "Turkey in Asia" or "Turkey in Europe". For this reason, the specification of "Turks" did not refer to any ethnic identity.

Despite the existence of several historical studies on the first migrants from the Ottoman Empire, only a few studies (Ahmed 1986; Bakalian 2001; Bali 2004, 2008) survey the succeeding generations of these early arrivers. Referring to the ethnic Turkish population, Karpat (2008: 176) suggests that the early migrant groups "disappeared" as a result of assimilation or returning to the country of origin[33]. The earlier settlers were seeking for better quality of life in the United States, many for fleeing from the political and social oppression in the home country, but also significantly in search of the American dream. The evidence for the role of economic pull factors can be addressed by the characteristics of the population: predominantly male, almost all peasants usually in their twenties and thirties, many working at factories in emerging industrial cities such as Detroit or Chicago and spent their leisure time in the *kahvehane* (coffeehouses) (Grabovski 2005: 90).

Following the inertia of migration from mid-1920s to late 1940s, a new trend of migration emerged in the 1950s within the limits of a quota of 225 people per year (INS 1961). Different from the early wave, the second flow of skilled migrants consisted considerably of the owners of small to medium-scale businesses, engineers, technical personnel – some affiliated with the military - and doctors who migrated for specialization, advanced training or better work conditions (Karpat 2008: 177; Akcapar 2005). The changing political dynamics between Turkey and the United States towards "closer ties marked by security concerns" as a result of the Truman Doctrine and the NATO Alliance (Yılmaz 1999: 6) is portrayed in the literature as one of the main factors for the increase in the number of Turkish professionals in the U.S. (Karpat 1995: 238). Having received the republican values of the young Turkish Republic, many graduates of American colleges, with a good knowledge of English preferred the U.S. to obtain education in the fields of medicine or engineering. This pattern of skilled migration was categorized as "brain drain" by Kurtuluş (1999: 57) and Akçapar (2005) due to the highly skilled migrants' preference to permanency in the U.S. and their assumed "loss" from the home country labor market. Another pattern of semi-skilled workers' migration also occurred during this period, especially consisting of highly skilled artisans, including tailors who settled in Rochester in the New York State area (Ahmed 1986: 86; Kaya 2003: 56). The second wave gained impetus after the 1965 Immigration Act that liberalized the conditions of migration to the United States. As a result on the liberalization

[33] Grabovski (2005: 88) notes that eighty percent of Turks who arrived to the U.S. before 1924 were guessed to have returned to Turkey.

the number of Turkish citizens obtaining legal permanent resident status increased from 9,400 in 1960-1969 to 12,209 in 1970-1979 (DHS 2011; see Appendix 4).

The first wave of migration to the United States had left behind ethnic conflicts and the historical accounts about a series of interrelated communities, which either returned to the homeland or dissolved within the American society. The participants of the second wave are characterized by their higher education and higher socioeconomic status. During my interviews in the United States, many interviewees emphasized the substantial role of individualism among the participants of migration in the post-1950s period. Rather than creating communities living together in the same districts around cultural signifiers (i.e. mosques), the migrants adopted individual lifestyles, dispersed around the vast geography of the United States. Despite the relative individualism, the flourishing of associationalism marked the 1960s and 1970s. Many of the early associations were founded for cultural reasons, intended to bring the society during Turkish national or religious holidays) (Akçapar 2005: 81). This period was also marked by the migration of significant number of ethnic Turks from the Soviet Union, particularly from the Crimea and the Caucasus, who have transited Turkey on their ways and applied for refugee status in the United States (Kaya 2003: 56). Contrary to the early period of migration when the ethnic identity did not act as a unifier, the earlier contacts and alliances around the Turkish identity emerged during this second period, bringing together these diverse populations under the same umbrella organizations.

Similar to the situation in France, migration from Turkey to the United States increased significantly beginning with the 1980s. At least two main explanations can be suggested for the rise in the number of Turkish citizens in the last three decades. One line of argumentation emphasizes the role of economic and social liberalization by the Özal administration in Turkey, which linked the Turkish society with the outside world (Kaya 2003; Şanlıer Yüksel 2008). Growing openness and competitiveness resulted in the increased mobility small and medium business owners as well as unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The Green Card Lottery, which is a part of the Diversity Immigrant Visa program in the United States since the 1990 also facilitated the mobility of many Turkish citizens who took a chance on entering the U.S. The increased possibilities for obtaining education on language or higher education in the United States through funding or easier networking possibilities among the young population also triggered the considerable rise in the student migration, especially over the past decade. As a result, the number of people obtaining legal permanent resident status

increased significantly over the 1990s (from 19,200 people in the 1980s to 38,700 people in the 1990s) and reached its highest in the decade following the year 2000 (48,400 people) (See Appendix 4).

The emerging migrant networks between Turkey and the U.S. pushed many others to leave their homeland, especially for those who migrated from Anatolian cities such as Çorum, Giresun, Yozgat or Ankara (Karpat 2008: 180). A well-documented migration network is among the *hemşehri* (regional compatriots) of Yağlıdere in Giresun. Leaving Turkey for the United States already in the late 1960 by the help of an old *Pontic Greek* from Giresun who lived through forced displacement in the 1920s, three social entrepreneurs helped many residents of Yağlıdere to get into America during the 1980s and 1990s (DiCarlo 2008: 66). Based on the information provided to the *Giresunlu* association by the Turkish consulate in New York, as many as 30 thousand people in the U.S. are originated from this region, as a result of the upsurge of migrants from Yağlıdere in Giresun and the succeeding family reunifications. It is noted by Güler (2008: 157) and has been mentioned several times to the author of this dissertation that this high flow caused the American consulate to become reluctant to issue visas to those with the birthplace of Yağlıdere. As a result, many Yağlıdere residents enter the United States through visas obtained by paying significant sums of money to agencies or entering the country via illegal means.

Irregularity is very common among Turkish citizens in the United States, and a significant population is reported to be staying without any official documents in the country. This trend also emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, when many migrants entered the country through Canadian or Mexican borders, jumped off the migrant vessels arriving to the country before docking or fled from the international cargo ships that they were working in. The intensification of border patrols in the post-9/11 period changed the conditions of entry for irregular stayers. Many migrants from Turkey enter the United States today via tourist visas or apply for studying in the country and overstay their visa periods to become irregular migrants. Waiting for an opportunity to receive green cards or U.S. citizenship, through regularized work or amnesties, the unskilled workers are mostly employed in grocery stores, restaurants, gas stations or construction companies on wage labor (Kaya 2003: 58).

Even though the main drive for migration from Turkey to the United States is predominantly related to economic factors or the upward social mobility, the role of the political push factors have also been significant for some of the individual decisions for migration. It should be indicated that the number of people who were granted by refugees or asylum seekers or

permanent status through asylum in the United States from Turkey is fairly low compared to the numbers in the European countries. In the period of 1946-2004, nearly 7,300 refugees and asylum seekers were granted permanent status, with the majority of this population having acquired this status in the decade following the 1980 coup (nearly 1,900 people). Since the late 1990s an average of 33 people are being granted asylum, with a certain rise to more than 70 people in 2001 and 2002 (DHS 2014). Despite these low numbers, I have been reported by many interviewees that the political environment led a certain number of Turkish citizens to leave the homeland permanently or temporarily for the United States. Among these reasons were the coup of 1980, ethnic conflict throughout the 1990s, military memorandum of 1997 that forced Islamist Prime Minister Necbettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party to resign from his post and end the coalition government, and more recently the emigration of Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen to the United States driving many of his followers along with him. These phenomena in Turkey have pushed groups of people with dissimilar political or ideological interest to migrate to the United States.

The diversity among the participants of the third wave of migration from Turkey to the United States has generated new dynamics among the Turkish-American population. Recent scholarship on this field suggests that different from the secular "Republican Children" of the second wave, the participants of the third wave identified themselves also with their Muslim identity (Kaya 2003; Karpat 2008). Whereas the members of the second wave were represented with individualism and dispersion, many participants of the more populated third wave are described through communitarianism and concentration in certain localities such as Queens and Brooklyn in New York and Clifton and Paterson in New Jersey (Kaya 2003: 34). A member of the second wave even described this situation as the "Germanification" of Turkish Americans due to the increasing resemblance of their socioeconomic and cultural profile to that of Turkish guest workers of the 1960s (Akıncı 2002, in Kaya 2003: 58).

According to the data provided by the Turkish Embassy in Washington, nearly 195,000 Turkish citizens in the United States were registered to the embassy in 2014. The majority of this population was registered to the consular area of New York (97,000 people), followed by Los Angeles (33,000 people) and Chicago (21,000 people) (See Appendix 5). However, the officials reported that due to the lack of previous research to document the population and the existence of a significant irregular population, the real figures are estimated around 300,000 people. The American Community Survey by the Census Bureau estimated the total number of people born in Turkey in 2013 as 110,000; with 25 percent in aged 35-44 years, 55 percent

male and 50 percent entered the country before 2000. The Survey indicated that among the students enrolled in education, 80 percent were in college or graduate school and among those aged 25 years and over, 58 percent had bachelor's degree or higher education. The majority of the working population (60 percent) were employed in management, business, science and arts occupations; 27 percent of the population was reported to work in educational services, health care and social assistance, 11 percent worked in manufacturing and another 11 percent worked in retail trade (United States Census Bureau 2013; see Appendix 6). Since dual citizenship is not recognized but allowed in the United States, there are no official data on people who hold citizenship of both the U.S. and Turkey. The officials from the Embassy reported that one third of the Turkish citizens were estimated to be dual citizens.

Despite the increasing interest in the wider literature, the academic studies on migration from the geography that is now called Turkey are dominated by historical studies by historians and a focus of ethnic Turks. The scarce earlier line of research that focused on the late Ottoman and early Republican migration began with *Turks in America* (1986) by Frank Ahmed, a second generation Turkish American who worked as a Foreign Service officer with the State Department of the United States and was assigned for several years to Ankara. This study was very rich ethnographically as it provided the life history of the writer, his family and acquaintances, along with an exploration of the Turkish society in the Ottoman era, modern Turkey and the United States. This study was followed by more academic accounts on the subject, beginning with the works of historian Kemal Karpat, including *The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860-1914* (1985) and *Turks in America* (1993). Opening up a new venue of research, Karpat's work provided insights on the Ottoman emigration policies and migration patterns from the empire to the new lands. The research on the late 19th and early 20th century continued with other works that focused on diverging aspects including the migratory processes (Grabowski 2005, 2008, 2013; Ipek and Cağlayan 2008; Ekinci 2008), post-migratory conditions and integration (Bali 2004, 2008; Şahin 2008), as well as various studies on different ethnic groups from the Ottoman Empire (Ipek 1995; Acehan 2005, 2009).

Studies on more recent waves of migration and post-migratory processes developed within the framework of four main themes: (1) research on blue-collar migration very often juxtaposed with analyzes on the reconstruction of the Turkish or Muslim identity; (2) studies on migration of students and professionals, tackled from the theoretical lens of brain drain; (3) migrants' transnational networks and interactions, *and finally* (4) associative life and

political incorporation. Among studies on the *first theme*, Tokatlı's (1991) PhD dissertation on labour migrants in Paterson, New Jersey, provided the earlier field studies on the region. Beginning with the early 2000s, comprehensive investigations and analyzes by Kaya (2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009) focusing mainly on the Muslim identity, by Saatçi (2003, 2008) on socio-cultural shifts and segmented assimilation and DiCarlo's (2008a, 2008b) ethnographic work on the regional identity of Giresun-origin migrants in New Jersey enriched the grounds on this line of research. The studies by the three scholars were followed by others mainly centered on the topic of integration (Aydın 2012; Mirici and McKay 2014), some of which concentrated specifically on migrants from Giresun (Güler 2008; Karaca 2009) or socialization around mosques in the United States (Yavuzer 2010; Güngör 2011, 2012; Erman 2013; Orhaner 2013; Işık-Ercan 2014). The *second main theme of research* evolved around the topic of brain drain beginning with Kurtuluş (1999) and later elaborated by Akçapar (2005). This theme has looked mainly into the migration of the Turkish elite through student or professional migration, and their distinctive characteristics from the classical migration patterns from Turkey to Europe, embodied in the framework of labour migration.

Over the last years, discussions on transnational networks and processes are gaining impetus comprising the *third main theme*, thanks to Angın's (2003) comparative research of Germany, Canada and the US, as well as Ataselim's (2014) study focusing on the Turkish diaspora's entrepreneurial leap in organizing developmental projects in Turkey. Several researches have juxtaposed the role of the facilitated communication technologies along with these new debates on transnationalism (Şanlıer Yüksel 2008; Yeşil 2013a, 2013b). The *final main theme* ponders upon the theme of associative life (see the works of Micallef 2004; Akçapar 2009; Yavuzer 2009a; Heck 2011; Öztürk 2012), including discussions on political incorporation (Yavuzer 2009b; Anıl 2010) and the role of migrants in the Turkish-American relations (Akgün 2000; shortly mentioned in Yılmaz 1999). A special issue and an edited volume (*Turkish Immigrants in Western Europea nd North America: Immigration and Political Mobilization*) by Şebnem Akçapar brought together discussions within this theme and made one of the initial efforts to provide a trans-Atlantic comparison. In addition to the four main themes, scholars have focused on the Gülen movement in the United States (Ebaugh 2009; Hendrick 2009, 2011; Aziz and Friedman 2013; Acar 2013), debates on education (on Atatürk school by Otçu-Grillman 2014; on Gülen-inspired schools Özipek 2009; İncetaş 2014), the adaptation and immigrant identification of the overall migrant population (Kılıç 2006; Kılıç and Menjivar 2013); Armenians of Turkey (mentioned in

Bakalian's thorough account on Armenian Americans, 2001), and the gendered aspects of migration (Şenyürekli 2008).

Concluding Remarks

This chapter laid the foundations on the two cases studied in this dissertation. I *first* focused on the different trajectories of migration and policy-making on migration and integration in France and the United States, and *second* scrutinized the histories of migration from Turkey to these two countries and post-migratory conditions of these groups. The chapter asserted that the two countries of immigration have received noteworthy migration waves, placing migration as a highly politicized subject. However, it was argued that distinctive aspects have marked the politicization of migration, such as the predominance given on ethnicity/race in the United States versus religion in France. It was also underlined that migration from Turkey to France and the United States diverged sharply in its classical period – as France attracted mainly Turkish workers with rural background, while the United States has been preferred by the members of the Turkish elite who migrated for professional and educational purposes. Still, the most recent waves of migration to the two countries have created a new generation and more diverse group of migrants, which relatively approximated in terms of their initial motivation and socio-economic backgrounds.

PART II
POLICIES AND POLITICS BEFORE 2003

CHAPTER 4

"Take It or Leave It": Turkey's Policies for Emigrants before 2003

This chapter sets off Part II of this dissertation, where I focus on home state policies, emigrants' homeland politics and the interactions between the two in the pre-2003 period. The pre-2003 period represents the t_{-1} of this study, therefore the period that precedes the critical rupture of 2003 (t_0) in the changing emigrant policies of the Turkish state and their repercussions on the relational environment with the emigrants. This part is vital for understanding the temporal sequence of events in my analysis: it provides a *descriptive* component as I aim to take "good snapshots at a series of specific moments" of the period before the critical rupture, and a *causal* component where I infer continuity, change and sequence on these specific moments (Collier 2011: 824). In this first chapter of Part II, I analyze Turkish state's policies on citizens living outside of Turkey's territories in the period that precedes 2003. At the center of the discussion here is the argument that Turkey's policies on emigrants have undergone through transformation, as a result of the diverging emigration patterns but also as compatible with the social and political environment in Turkey. Compatible with my general discussion in this dissertation, I distinguish the pre-2003 period under two distinct modalities: (1) the management of emigrants from the perspective of territoriality, covering the pre-1960 and 1960-1980 periods, and (2) the transition towards extraterritorial governance of citizenship and management of emigration policies in the period that follows 1980 coup. After briefly presenting the context within the two modalities, I provide a more specific focus on the post-1980 period.

Turkey's emigration policy and the relations between the state and society in the period that preceded the 2000s is very much related with the republican history of modern nation-building in the country and its transition towards a new liberal model following the 1980

coup. *First,* the history of Turkish modernization distinguishes from the modern capitalist development in Europe in terms of its economic and social policy aspects, as it was primarily marked by the predominance of agrarianism, low level of urbanization and underdevelopment of industrial working class (Buğra 2007: 36). The early social policies of the state were shaped by the attempts to prevent the dissolution of the village economy and its societal relations, rather than supporting migration or urban industrialization (Buğra 2007: 40). Despite the emerging flexibility towards urban settlement with the rising internal migration in the multiparty period during the 1950s, the survival of peasantry dominated the objective of planned development and industrialization until the 1980s. Regarding the emigration of Turkish citizens to abroad, these conditions prompted to the predominance of remittances for local development and the near absence of social provisions in emigration state-migrant society relations. While the period that followed the 1980s was marked by insertion to the world economy and emerging market liberalization, the state-society relations continued to be shaped by a scarcity of social citizenship rights (Buğra 2007: 48), which continued to influence state's relations with citizens living abroad.

Second, in terms of the definition of citizenship and the official state ideology, beginning with the 1920s the civilizing mission of the Kemalist republicanism attributed to the Turkish citizen the characteristics of being "civilized" and "patriotic", therefore establishing a strong link between citizenship and national identity. The orientation towards western modernization was coupled with the defining of the national and cultural identity of citizens, in order to suppress the Ottoman legacy that was considered as a reason for backwardness in the country (İçduygu et al. 2000, 194). The secular notion of Turkishness that occupied the conception of citizenship until the 1980s was therefore formulated "on the basis of homogeneous, generalized and unique secular national culture" (İçduygu et al. 2000: 196), defined within a territorial conception of membership. The period that followed the 1980 coup was paradoxical in terms of the construction of citizenship inside and outside of the country. On the one hand, the citizenship regime became more receptive to the non-residential rights and obligations related to citizenship in the case of its emigrants, by facilitating dual citizenship in 1981. On the other hand, the original Kemalist ideology was replaced with an emphasis on "Turkish historical and moral values" that introduced the recognition of Islam, alongside Turkish ethnicity as instruments to maintain Turkish identity and unity. This reinforced challenges regarding securing the loyalty of those who were excluded from this definition (i.e. Kurds, Alevis and Islamists), who had begun to emerge as

distinct identities demanding for recognition (İçduygu et al. 1999) particularly outside of Turkey.

As I focus on transnational ties, home state's policies on emigrants living abroad and homeland politics in this dissertation, the discussion on emigration from Turkey in this section elaborates mainly on the state's approach vis-à-vis the mobility that has led to more permanent patterns of settlement. With this background, I discuss in the following sections the Turkish emigration policies in the period that preceded 2000s, by distinguishing between territorial processes of identifying membership (in the pre-1980 period) and the transitions to extra-territoriality in the post-1980 period marked by dual citizenship. The continuities and ruptures in the republican modernization process are critical for grasping the transformations in the emigration state-migrant society relations, as well as the emerging identity conflicts both within Turkey and abroad in most recent era.

Table 3: Selected policies for emigrants until 2003

Date	Laws, Regulations and Programs
1923	Establishment of the Ministry of Population Exchange, Development and Settlement
1923	People's Exchange Agreement with Greece
1933	University Reform allowing for successful students to receive state funding for education abroad
1961	First labour recruitment agreement with Germany
1963	First Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967)
1964	Law No. 499 on Provision of Residence and Small Artisanal Credits and Lending for Workers Abroad
1967	Establishment of the International Organization of the Ministry of Labour
1971	Establishment of 'Directorate of External Services' attached to the Presidency on Religious Services and Maturing of Religious Officials
1971	Establishment of Interministerial Common Culture Commission
1972	Establishment of General Directorate of Workers' Problems Abroad
1976	Establishment of General Directorate on Training and Education of the Children of Workers Abroad under the Ministry of Education
1981	Law No. 2383/1981 amending the Citizenship Law by the National Security Council
1982	Article 62 of the new Constitution of the Republic of Turkey introducing state's obligation to support and protect emigrants and their family inside and outside of Turkey
1993	Decision on the Establishment of a Parliamentary Investigation Commission to Determine and Take Precautions against the Administrative, Financial, Economic, Social and Cultural Issues faced by Workers and Citizens Abroad
1995	Law No. 4121 on Political Parties
1995	Law No. 4112/1995 amending the Citizenship Law, instituting the privileged non-citizens status (*pink card*)
1998	Establishment of the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad

4.1. Territorial Processes of Governing Citizenry from 1923 to 1980

Emigration from Turkey took place in a variety of patterns and contexts since the establishment of republic, reflecting diverging state policies and public perceptions regarding membership to the nation state. As such, it is possible to classify major emigration waves from the territories forming modern Turkey under five different groups: (1) the emigration of non-Muslim communities from the late nineteenth century until 1960s, (2) mass labor and family migration to Europe and Australia from 1960s until mid-1970s, (3) brain drain migration towards Northern America in from 1960s onwards, (4) political migration to Europe during 1980s and 1990s, (5) temporary labor migration to Middle East and North Africa from 1980 to mid-1990s and former Soviet countries since 1990s and, (6) diverging patterns of more sporadic emigration, especially after 1990s onwards including high skilled and student migration to Europe, USA, Canada and Australia. This section concentrates on the period that has been largely shaped by territorial processes of governing citizenry until the 1980s, covering the policy making both causing and resulting the first three of the above mentioned migration patterns.

Territorial Integrity and Homogenization (1923-1960s)

The history of the early republic of Turkey was marked by populous waves of migration as a result of the establishment of the nation-state and the solidification of its borders. This period can be called as what Brubaker describes as “national unmixing”, since the expected mobility was for leading out the non-Muslim communities to outside while gathering certain communities that “the state felt secure about” inside (Kirişci 2000). At the core of the migration policy was settling the newly comers from ex-Ottoman lands: the conception of *migrant* was referred by the state to those of Turkish culture, moving “back to Turkey” (even though they never lived within the territories of the Turkish Republic before), not the migrants of other origins or the non-Muslim populations who voluntarily or involuntarily left the country (İçduygu and Sert 2012). The projects of homogenization were at the center of policy making from the foundation of the republic to the 1960s. During this period, the policies on emigration and ethnic kin were complementary of one another; policies on the kin determined which immigrants could be naturalized, while the emigration policies dealt with the voluntary or involuntary resettlement of non-Turkish non-Muslims (Aksel 2014; İçduygu and Aksel 2014).

The naming practices about immigration during the early period were centered on the population exchanges: *muhacir* or *mülteci,* referring to immigrants (and refugees), *gayri mübadil/établis* for those who were non-exchanged (Aksel 2014). The institutional setting was formed according to the immigration-emigration nexus. At the core of this policy was the issue of settling the newly arriving populations, and deporting or resettling non-Muslim communities. The most populous emigration waves from Anatolia occurred in the late Ottoman period: *first* nearly 800,000 Armenians were forced to quit the country as a result of *Sevk ve İskan Kanunu* (Dispatchment and Settlement Law) that was passed by the Ottoman Parliament on 27 May 1915[34], and *second* following the Turkish national forces' regain of Western Anatolia, half a million Ottoman Greeks fled mainly to Greece and some to the USA (Akgündüz 1998: 102).

In addition to these two main non-economic emigration patterns, an economic mass emigration of Turkish speaking populations occurred during in the period of 1860-1914, to the United States including many Armenians, Greek and Arab populations and a smaller group of ethnic Turks. The institution for settling the immigrants (*Muhacirin Komisyon Alisi*) was established in 1872, which was later transformed into *Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi* in 1916 (General Directorate on Tribes and Immigrants) (İçduygu et al. 2009). In the early days of the republic, the mobility was initially managed initially by *Mübadele, İmar, İskan Bakanlığı* (Ministry of Population Exchange, Development and Settlement) founded on 13 October 1923 (and abolished on 11 December 1924) and then the Minister of Development and *Nafia Vekaleti* (Ministry of Public Works)[35]. The population exchange agreement with Bulgaria in 1913, with Greece in 1923 and the Turkey-Bulgaria Settlement Agreement in 1925 determined the principles of reciprocity during the early state-led mobility across borders.

Although mainly focusing on the international affairs rather than citizens' affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was at the core of the institutional setting on emigration. The two-way immigration and emigration circulation resulted in the reduction of the non-Muslim population in Turkey from 19% in 1914 to 3% in 1927, and then later on decreased to nearly 1%, approximately 225,000 people. One reason of the continuation of the decline can be pointed to the events occurring on 6-7 September 1955, which led to violence against the

[34] Main countries of settlement after the Armenian deportation were the former Soviet Union, France, the USA and the neigboring countries (McCarthy 1983: 129-30 in Akgündüz 1998: 102).

[35] Turkish Republic Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning. 2014. "History of our Ministry" Accessed March 10. http://www.csb.gov.tr/turkce/index.php?Sayfa=sayfa&Tur=webmenu&Id=15.

non-Muslim population. Other events, which caused the decrease of the non-Muslim population, were the displacement of the Greek population from Istanbul after the 1963-64 crisis in Cyprus and increasing violence against the minority populations during the 1960s, along with the effects of the Turkish intervention to Northern Cyprus in 1974. In addition, the migration of the Jewish population to Israel after the establishment of the state of Israeli also caused an increase in non-Muslims leaving Turkey (İçduygu and Aksel 2014). In the period 1950-1980, the non-Muslim population would decrease from 225,000 to less than 150,000 (İçduygu et al. 2008).

The emigration policy and the institutional setting were shaped during this period convenient to the homogenizing mentality of the nation-state, determining the citizenship status based on Turkish-Islam synthesis. Those from Turkey who remained/could remain citizens after having emigrated abroad, sporadic labor migrants, and students could obtain consular services from embassies and consulates. Laws that were put into practice on the eve and after the foundation of the republic, including the Settlement Law of 1923, the 1924 Constitution, the Turkish Citizenship Law of 1928 and the Law on Settlement of 1934 regulated the naturalization of new comers. The practices of naturalization and settlement of immigrants during this period evoke the conceptions of membership by the policy makers. According to Kirişci (2000: 18), despite the formal definitions of citizenship and national identity emphasizing territoriality rather than ethnicity in the 1924 Constitution, "Turkish descent and culture" was the main principle in determining those who would be included (Kirişci 2000: 3-4). Moreover, in the actual practice the boundaries were more limited comprising of a religious basis as well and only Hanefi Muslims who spoke Turkish were privileged communities who were accepted to enter the territory as immigrant and refugee with the intention to settle and take up citizenship. These were the people whom "the state ha(d) felt constitutes the very core of the Turkish national identity on which it (could) unyieldingly rely" (Kirişci 2000: 18). With the amendment of 1934 Law on Settlement the state provided refugee and immigrant status to such groups, including Muslim Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians and Tatars (Kadirbeyoğlu 2010).

Aside from the homogenization efforts through forced or voluntary displacements, there have been sporadic movements of citizens from Turkey to abroad, some of them supported by the state. Among these movements was the student movement. Sending Turkish students to European countries (mainly France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and to the United States and Canada, in an attempt to create a Turkish

intelligentsia was among the projects of the early republic to promote the rapid growth of the post-war population and to support the modernization process (İçduygu and Aksel 2015). These highly qualified students had received a farewell from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which placed an emphasis on their importance or perceived significance in molding society: “I am sending you as a spark, come back as volcanoes!” Students were expected to receive a “Western-style education” and return to the republic, in order to respond to the need for qualified labour. Many of them actually returned to the country and participated in the University Reform of 1933, laying the foundations for modern higher education in Turkey (Şarman 2006). Many students individually went abroad to study in the following years, marking a distinction among the policy-makers between “students sent by the state” and “those who study with foreign currency” (*dövizle giden öğrenciler*). The Ministry Education’s scholarship opportunities and the inter-state agreements on education in the years that followed the 1950s, such as the launching of Fulbright Scholarship with the United States, facilitated the movement of students, some of who would remain in the host countries following their education.

From the foundation of modern Turkey to the beginning of bilateral labour agreements the emigration management was established by a concern over territoriality and the realization of projects and institutions of “nation-building”. The relations between the state and the emigrants living abroad were managed by the consular services under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Emigrants outside of the state watch were viewed through a Schmittian lens of friends and foes: they had been considered as the “others within” Turkish borders and were approached with suspicion after leaving the country. Such groups included particularly the Armenian or Greek populations of the early days of the republic. The few number of citizens living abroad with whom the state guarded its relations included the state-employed personnel and students, who were expected to return to the country once their reasons for stay had ended.

Managing for Remittances and Returns (1960s to 1980)

The beginning of the labour recruitment agreements with the European countries marked a significant turning point for Turkish emigration policies; as it intensified the number of people sent by the state abroad drastically, led to other patterns of emigration (first labour migration outside of state intervention and later family reunification) and marked a shift in the migration motive. In the backdrop of the guestworker programs was the post-World War

II economic restructuring particularly of the European governments that led them to seek the benefits from temporary labour migration. The main aim during these labor agreements was different from the viewpoint of the labor requesting and labor requested country- Turkey, reflecting the classical core-peripheral model of migration theories: the interest of the European core countries was to respond to the post-war labor shortage via short term migration from less developed countries, while the interest of the peripheral countries in sending migrants was to benefit from emigrants' economic (export of surplus labor power and remittances) and social (transfer of knowledge and know-how) capitals that they would gain in Europe. For either side, migration was supposed to be temporary. These programs had a dual consequence both on host and origin countries: it was a win-win situation for national development (Castles and Miller 1998) and it exported the obligations of long-distance governmental care (Zolberg 1989: 408) which had been adopted in Europe through technologies of social welfare and social insurance (Rose et al. 2006: 91).

From 1961 to the 1980s, Turkey signed bilateral labor recruitment agreements with the majority of European governments, including Federal Germany (1961)[36], United Kingdom (1961), Austria (1964), Netherlands (1964), Belgium (1964), France (1965), Sweden (1967), Australia (1967), Switzerland (1971), Denmark (1973) and Norway (1981). While the early recruitment programs aimed at employing or training semi-qualified and qualified workers, the latter programs targeted for non-qualified workers (Akgündüz 2013: 4). The workforce based mentality of the 1960s and 1970s transited from the territorial understanding of membership towards externalizing the economic problems in the domestic sphere without reasoning on long-term social consequences, mainly due to the appraisal of mobility as temporary. In an address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in February 1962, Minister of Labour Bülent Ecevit underscored the benefits of temporary labour emigration to the existing unemployment in Turkey during the 1960s. His remarks also indicate that the remittance-earning mentality which preoccupied the state-migrant worker relations over the 1970s and 1980s have not developed through unanimity but received early criticisms from within the government.

> As you know workers from various countries work in Germany. Based on the information we received from Germany I should tell proudly that Germans, who are known to be meticulous

[36] With the intention of enhancing the economic relations between Turkey and Germany, the labour programs between the two countries had actually began as early as 1957. The program was initiated with the training of 12 qualified workers in Kiel, and then with the internship of 150 Turkish workers in the Ford Factory in Cologne, who would later stay in Germany as qualified workers (Çelik 2012: 149-151).

> about work discipline, are most satisfied with the Turkish worker among all foreign workers. [...] Sending workers to Germany is not disadvantageous for the worker life and professional life, but rather helpful. Because since a few years it is known that unemployment has become a trouble in our country. Under such circumstances, the opening of this door has reduced the problem of unemployment, and increased the negotiation possibility between employees and business owners. [...] If I understood correctly, a spokesman friend demanded to make it an obligation for the Turkish workers in Germany to send money to Turkey. Our opinion is that this is impracticable and against human rights. In practice, many workers already send back money to their families they leave behind. However, I should note the bitter truth that the difference between the official and free rate unfortunately decreases the amount of foreign exchange earnings of our country and our treasury receives through the money sent to Turkey (TBMM 1962, Author's translation).

Despite these early criticisms, the reluctance of attracting economic and social capital of the workers abroad has lifted in a short period, leaving its place to a new policy that prioritized a developmental logic through migrant remittances. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's speech on the Council of Ministers Program at the TGNA on November 1965 illustrates this change and the emergence of the new developmental program.

> We find it beneficial for our workers who went abroad to raise their knowledge and experience, to send their earnings to the home country and reinforce our foreign currency assets. We will take all necessary measures to achieve the desires our workers who wish to work abroad, and to meet their needs while living abroad. There will be efforts and intergovernmental contacts to look after the families of workers abroad and support them, help meet their religious needs, education issues, so that they will be able to work in peace and confidence. As the state every assistance and facilitation needed will be provided to them to organize them upon return to the home country, invest with their savings and in the field of operation they are interested in establishing (TBMM 1965, Author's translation).

Prime Minister Demirel's remarks summarize the state's policy choices, which have taken place in the following period. Centralizing its emigration policy on workforce, the state would attempt to assure the efficiency of migrants' works in the foreign countries, in order to benefit from it within Turkey, through remittances during their stay and through developmental projects upon their return. The three areas of social policy have also been referred to during this speech, limited to (a) workers' families conditions (although not defined clearly), (b) religious needs, (c) education issues, not of the new generations but of guestworkers. According to Sayarı (1986: 91) in the 1960s the labor-recruitment policies of the Western States and the growing demand in Turkey for employment abroad created a favorable environment for transnational migration. Still, the Turkish state's policy of promoting migration, which included both abstaining from formulating specific legislation *and* attempting to regulate the phenomenon to secured desired outcomes, was crucial in augmenting the scale of mobility. The Turkish state's involvement during the early periods

after the labor recruitment agreements was based on two main policy concerns: (1) using migration as a means for alleviating the pressures on the domestic labor market and (2) coping with the perennial foreign-exchange crises of the Turkish economy (Sayarı 1986: 91). Other concerns were also coupled to these major macroeconomic concerns:

> (1) the acquisition of new skills and training in the industrial working environment, which could translate into the transfer of know how after the return of migrants (Sayarı 1986: 92),
>
> (2) promoting development in the local communities through orientating migrants' investments in small or medium-sized public or private enterprises migrants (Sayarı 1986: 92),
>
> (3) slowing down the rush to the cities in Turkey from the rural areas (Levine 1980 in Sayarı 1986: 92),
>
> (4) accelerating the restructuring of disadvantaged regions, including forest and mountain villages (Çalışma Bakanlığı 1964) and certain cities after disasters such as earthquakes, floods, landslides and the construction of dams (Aksel 2015).

From 1964 to 1971 a total of 526,249 people emigrated from Turkey to a wide geography reaching from the United Kingdom in the west to Australia in the east, in search of work. The ratio of remittances to exports rose from 14.2 percent in 1964 to as high as 69.6 percent in 1971. The pattern of temporary labour emigration continued until 1973 oil crisis, which triggered economic stagnation and the halt of state-led labor migration in Western Europe. Contrary to the previous flows of emigrants consisting primarily of young single men and women from rural backgrounds, subsequent emigration waves comprised of family reunifications, family formations, refugee movements and clandestine labor migration, and other family members of the already settled emigrants (Abadan-Unat 2011). Moreover, many contractors and workers began going to countries in the Middle East and North Africa as temporary migrants, as the state provided increasing support to overseas construction business (İçduygu and Sert 2012). By 1981, there was a total of 2,225,000 Turkish citizens living abroad, including nearly 960,000 workers, 450,000 non-working spouses and 815,000 children (Akgündüz 2008).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Labour participated actively in the preparation and signing of labour recruitment agreements in the 1960s (Çelik 2012: 153). Compatible with the 1960s state of mind founded on planned economy for boosting economic growth and development, the Ministry of Labour and *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı* (State Planning Organisation) were the main institutions in the administrative circle

regulating the flows of labour migrants (Akgündüz 2008). *İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu* (Turkish Employment Service, IIBK) working under the Ministry of Labour was settled as the sole institution regulating the recruitment of workers and operated as an intermediary between the workers and the labour-demanding countries who applied to its offices in Ankara and Istanbul (Akgündüz 2008: 56-62). Despite the obligation to apply through IIBK, many workers went abroad with tourist visas (i.e. tourist workers). As a solution to this issue, which was problematized during the 1970s in the Turkish Parliament, Bülent Ecevit suggested in January 1970 to increase the volume of the official recruitment and to apply for European Common Market. The management of remittances and investments were supported by a number of other institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Village Affairs and Real Estate Credit Bank (Uras 1971) and State Industry and Workers' Investment Bank founded in 1975 (Akgündüz 2008).

"Overseas Workers' Problems"

With the emergence of "overseas workers' problems" occupying the public and political discourse on emigration from 1960s to 1990s, the establishment of overseas branches was assumed obligatory. The embassies and consulates served citizens with basic consular services, but did not deal with issues regarding problems with employees, health and social security since they were not included in their work definitions and the rising number of workers boosted their already existing work. Founded on 8 May 1967 (with the amendments to Article 6 of Law No. 4841), the overseas organization of the Ministry of Labour was institutionalized as a directorate general on 6 April 1972 (with the amendments on Law No. 1579) under the title of *Yurtdışı İşçi Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü* (Directorate General of Overseas Workers' Problems). The amendment in 1967 determined the conditions of labour counselors and attachés, as well as religious officials and syndicate experts who would be nominated and administrated by the Ministry of Labour. It also emphasized that the new posts could share the premises of embassies and consulates if there was place to allocate. Despite the legal basis, many labour representatives worked in offices and received salaries by the host states and many religious officials were employed by the mosque associations founded by the emigrants until 1980s. The new representatives at the diplomatic missions maintained the paternal image of the Turkish state, involving in both professional and personal matters, and reminding their role in Turkey's development for good and all. In his

memoirs on the 35 years in the Ministry of Labour, Ünver recounts social workers' recurring suggestions to Turkish emigrants for sending foreign currency.

> From the families who lived in Turkey we would receive complaint letters that their husbands in Germany did not send financial assistance, so we would invite our worker citizens to the attaché's office about a "personal matter to discuss' and give advices to them! Think about a 25-year-old officer telling in harsh words to send money to his wife and children who stayed at the country! I used to witness citizens entering the public office being crushed and cast their eyes down. […] Some of our workers would go directly to the post office, transfer money to his family and bring to show the receipt soon after my advice (Ünver 2008: 20).

Ünver's memories illustrate the role undertaken by state officials in the individual money transfers that were expected of migrant workers. It also emphasizes the distance between state officials and citizens that had existed in Turkey during this period, and its continuation in the overseas. Another instances of promoting investing in remittances can be read in the history of worker enterprises, which was also supported by the Turkish state. The first workers' enterprise was founded in 1964 under the name of *Türksan İşçi Emeği Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.* (Türksan Workers' Labour Industry and Trade) by a small group of intellectuals, including entrepreneurs (factory managers), social workers and translators. In an attempt to become an exemplary to other potential migrant entrepreneurs, this group of intellectuals acted as the first board of directors for this enterprise and later transferred their posts to other workers. Over time, the company would act as a reference point to other workers' enterprises (Penninx and Renselaar 1979: 20).

Beginning with mid-1960s the social and cultural concerns were raised by the policy-makers who accentuated that it was necessary to send teachers and religious officials against "the menace of losing national and cultural values". The change from an imagined "Turkish way of living" towards a hybrid identity also reflected on the circulation of the rhetoric of *Alamancı* in the everyday lives of citizens in Turkey. Even though *Alamancı* literally signified a Turkish person living in Germany, it has spread to epitomize a Turkish citizen living in any European country. Representing groups in between Turkish-Islamic traditions nested in the mentality of peasants, Western individualism and modernization, *Alamancı* was regarded by the public opinion with suspicion[37]. With the Council of Ministers' decision on 25 May 1975 the Directorate General of External Affairs was founded under *Diyanet İşleri*

[37] Ragazzi (2009: 389) notes that similar "pejorative folk terms" were also adopted in other emigrant-sending countries to denote the differentiation of non-residents from the resident citizens, such as: *Nuyoricans* in Puerto Rico, *Gastici* in Yugoslavia, *American Born Confused Indians* in India, *Pochos* in Mexico, *Jook-sing* in China and *Yordim* in Israel.

Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs). From 1971 onwards the state began sending religious officials for temporary periods during Ramadan and *Kurban Bayramı* (Eid al-Adha) and social workers (religious officials) selected by *Diyanet* employed by the Ministry of Labour. Until July 1985 many religious officials were sent to mosques founded by the emigrants, their salaries to be covered by the mosque associations, for a period of maximum four years. In July 1976, *Yurtdışı İşçi Çocukları Eğitimi Öğretimi Genel Müdürlüğü* (Directorate General for Education of Workers' Children Abroad) was founded under the Ministry of Education to operate with *Bakanlıklararası Ortak Kültür Komisyonu* (Interministerial Common Culture Commission) founded in 1971. Established with the aim of "promoting Turkish culture abroad" the Commission comprised of representatives from Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, *Diyanet*[38]. The Commission was responsible of the selection and assignment of three categories: (1) teachers, (2) instructors and (3) religious officials[39]. From 1976 onwards the Ministry of Education began sending teachers for classes on Turkish language and culture, as well as education counselors and attachés, to work under the same roof with embassies and consulates.

Although the Turkish state has initiated institutional and administrative structures to manage the mobility of workers and their incorporation to Turkish economy since the initiation of recruitment agreements, it lagged in establishing a systematic social and political service structure in the period of 1961-1980s. According to Schmitter-Heisler (1985: 479; 1986: 83) a newcomer to emigration in the 1960s, the first major goal of Turkish migration policies was "to export as many workers as possible, without considering negative consequences". As a consequence, Turkey possessed the least developed official network of organizations abroad in comparison to the Yugoslavian and Italian emigration to Western Germany (Akre 1976 in Schmitter-Heisler 1985). Even though the number of consular services increased over the 1980s, due to the inability of exerting greater control over the process of early stages of emigration, the state could not rally Turkish organizations with strong fractionalizations around itself (Schmitter-Heisler 1985; 1986).

[38] The Presidency of Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, which was established in 2010, became a member of this committee upon its foundation.

[39] Interview with the author, Ankara, February 26, 2014.

4.2. Following the 1980 coup: Transitions to Extra-territoriality

The post-1980 period was characterized by the increasing engagement of the Turkish state with the emigrants in the host countries rather than within Turkish territories. It is argued in the literature that a number of reasons were behind this policy change. *First*, despite efforts for promoting returns, most emigrants who went abroad for temporary work stayed and settled in the European countries and this has become an accepted fact by the Turkish state and public opinion in the late 1970s and 1980s. *Second,* the political migration of all sorts of opposition groups (communists, Islamists, Alevis and Kurdish nationalists) fleeing from the military junta to Europe as political refugees emerged as a new pattern of migration. With this, the 1980s had witnessed the rising cultural revivalist movements of Turkish citizens in European countries. Beginning with the military rule, the state underwent the effort to reduce the political opposition both within the territories of Turkey and abroad (Mügge 2012). Therefore the position of the state vis-à-vis emigrant populations was described in the literature as "reactive", signifying its defensive character as a response to the pre-established communitarian and political structures abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Avcı 2005; Yükleyen and Yurdakul 2011; Mügge 2012). This situation was reinforced with the intention to o display "a good image of Turkey" at the international arena, which had already been flooded by criticisms regarding human rights violations in Turkey in the post-coup period. *Third,* in addition to the reasons related to the migrants' characteristics and the political environment in Turkey, legal, political and social conditions in Europe were creating an unwelcoming environment for transnational relations. On the one hand strict citizenship policies in counties such as Germany were obliging emigrants to give up their Turkish citizenships, while on the other hand rising xenophobia was threatening the security and welfare of emigrants in Europe. Perceived as a path to cultural assimilation of the emigrants, the renouncement of one's citizenship or membership bonds was not welcome by the Turkish state. But at the same time, the political and economic integration of emigrants in the host countries was considered as a solution to the integration and violence problems (Kadirbeyoğlu 2007). *Finally,* while the remittances occupied a critical share compared to the gross domestic product in the preceding period, the trade reforms and export promotion of the 1980s created new alternatives for economic growth. The insertion of the Turkey to world economy and the emerging market liberalization has opened up the outlets of the mobility of goods, finances, people and communications, facilitating the emergence of transnational links beyond its physical borders. As confidence in the international financial institutions and

external creditors was restored (Öniş and Webb 1992: 1), exports and foreign direct investments took the heat out of the expectation from remittances (İçduygu and Aksel 2014). This situation replaced the predominance of remittances in the state discourse – although they endured for a longer period – with a culture-based rhetoric that emphasized shared national identity.

From "Distant Workers" to "Citizens Living Abroad"

The territorial modality on the governance of emigrants in the period before 1980s was centralized on the temporality of emigrants upon their grasping of the social and economic benefits from the host countries, or the acceptance of their permanency – as becoming a member of another society-, which would be resolved by their potential loss of citizenship. This situation was parallel for labour migrants, professionals and students; those who went abroad were expected to acquire professional skills, know-how and the foreign currency, which would later be employed in the national development back at home. As a result, particularly in the context of Turkish-European migration corridor, the pre-1980 period was marked by the efforts of both the Turkish state and of the European states to sustain the return of emigrants.

However, despite these efforts most emigrants stayed in the European countries and this has become an accepted fact by the Turkish state and public opinion in the late 1970s and 1980s. The change in perception from *distant workers* to *migrant workers, Turkish citizens abroad* and even to *minorities* in Europe can be found in the language used in the parliamentary debates and newspapers of the period. The awareness of permanence was nested in this new discourse. In 1976, the journal Milliyet had reported a speech by the Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, Minister of Labor of the period about return migrants:

> Paksu stated that 'in parallel to the economic improvements of Western Germany collective mandatory worker returns to homeland have nearly totally halted' and 'from the end of 1973 to August 1975, 75 thousand Turkish workers have made definite returns to homeland[40].

Such discourses about returns were replaced by new ones in the second half of 1980s, which referred to the conditions of those who stayed, such the maintenance of their social, cultural and economic ties with Turkey, the services to be provided (i.e. social security rights, the arrangements on dual taxation, Turkish language courses, religious services), as well as

[40] Aytekin Yıldız. Milliyet. 1976. "Her beş işçinin yerine iki Türk iş buluyor. Paksu: Yurda işçi dönüşü durdu." April 10.

discussions around the topic of extra-territorial voting rights. For instance in a parliamentary debate in 1989, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz made a statement on the state policies related to emigrants and the new programs that were going to be introduced by the government to increase the coordination of the emigrant policies by different ministries and institutions:

> When ANAP came to power in late 1983, there were no teachers who provided services to the children of Turkish workers in Germany by being paid from the Turkish state; today we have around 2,000 teachers. There were no religious officials. […] You have even made the topic of voting rights an issue of criticism. We are the first ones to provide the right to participate in the national elections in Turkey for citizens in Germany and abroad. […] We have signed the double taxation agreement in 1984. […] Unfortunately, Turkey has treated these people as remittance machines for long years. Now we are providing those people more services than the remittances they bring. But I also accept that there are multilayered problems. And since I accept this, I organized a coordination meeting with all consulates there, I chaired it myself for two days from morning till night (TBMM 1989).

The discourse by Yılmaz emphasizes the changing understanding in the governance of emigrants by the Turkish state. It also illustrates that this issue has become a political matter between different political parties that started to closely monitor the increasing number of citizens living abroad, as it began to become a significant source of yet-unreached electorate. The issue of permanency of emigrants also reflected on the media around the same period, leading to a change within the public opinion. As such, in 1989 an article on Milliyet discussed the permanency of emigrants by giving reference to scientific knowledge. The article with the subtitle of "What Kastoryano found out after working for ten years on "our expatriates" (*gurbetçi*): 'Turks have settled in Europe'" was based on an interview with Riva Kastoryano, a sociologist with Turkish origin working in France and United States, and it concluded that "with the emergence of the third generation, Turks were from now on definitely settled in Europe"[41].

While the rhetoric change took place for those who continued to be positioned in the national imagery of membership, for the others who went abroad as political emigrants or refugees, terms such as *anarchists, terrorists, traitors* or *those who fled abroad* were coupled. The acceptability of individuals as citizens was relative to their non-performance in the political environment; as a reflection of 1980s' Turkey no politics done abroad was received well, especially if it criticized the state before the international media and policy makers. The memoirs and discourses of Kenan Evren, the seventh President of Turkey from 1980 to 1989

[41] Ahmet Sever. Milliyet. 1989. "10 yıldır 'gurbetçilerimiz'i inceleyen Kastoryano'nun vardığı sonuç: 'Türkler Avrupa'ya yerleşti.'" October 12.

and the leading figure of the 1980 coup, provide insights about the recurrent criticisms from the international arena, especially regarding human rights violations towards certain ethnic or ideological groups. During an interview with The Times on 29 January 1982, Evren spoke of the political campaigns held by the Turkey-originated refugees in Europe, which according to him affected significantly the public and political opinion towards Turkey:

> I would like to express with pleasure that there is not an important failure in the activities we conduct. […] Maybe there might be a failure, that is not in our hands might be [regarding the misconducts and initiatives of foreigners who do not seek to understand us or have other objectives]. An example is the possibility that the members of the extreme who settled abroad, who had committed crimes or even killed people, are freely traveling. We could also count the way that people or even parliamentarians, who are fooled by or are working in parallel with the biased and purposeful propaganda this kind of people do there, are organizing a campaign against Turkey, and how those who hold the management of the friendly countries lack an effective struggle against them and use the economic and military aid to Turkey as a tool for transition to democracy (Evren 1991b, Author's translation).

The memoirs and discourses reflected the rising interest to suppress political opposition outside of Turkey as well as change the country image abroad through increased involvement through reaching to the foreign press and Turkish populations living abroad (See, Evren 1987; 1991a; 1991b). In a public speech that he has given in Manisa on 28 March 1981, Kenan Evren announced the distinction between the *persona grata* and *non grata* of the 1980s in terms of rights to citizenship:

> Some of the anarchists and terrorists whose plans in the home country were disrupted and whom the majority was captured found salvation now in fleeing abroad. […] Their final resort is the pressures that will come from outside. […] Yes, these traitors who fled from Turkey are capable even to cooperate with Armenian terrorists who brutally murder our diplomats. I am leaving the decision of whether these people are Turkish citizens to you. How could we have embraced them as Turkish citizens? This was because of that that we allowed them a time to come back to home, and for those who did not return in that period we revoked their citizenship without thinking and with a peace of conscience. Because we believe that a large citizen community shares this belief (Evren 1991a, Author's translation).

Evren's remarks illustrated that the continuation or revoking of citizenship consisted a significant part of the Turkish state's policies in the post-1980 period on emigrants living abroad. While in the early republican period the distinction between citizens and non-citizens was modeled in relation with the ethnic and religious identity of the individuals, it was remodeled in relation with oppositional political activism.

The existence of political emigrants, especially of Kurdish origin, with easy accessibility to transnational networks and communications, as well as ability to influence international

opinion through social movements or associational advocacy were considered as among the main reasons for the continuation of armed conflict in the early 1980s. In a speech on the events occurring in the Southeast Anatolia on October 1985, Minister of Interior Yıldırım Akbulut asserted this perception:

> Since 1981 separatist organizations in Europe, have sent their members to training camps in Syria and Lebanon, which they have brought to the organization through associations in particularly in France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden. During the protests, meetings and hunger strikes against Turkey in Western Europe by these destructive and separatist elements the organizations gradually strengthened; they largely seized other separatist organizations and became effective. [...] Following the 1980 operations these organizations established numerous publications and created a press and media network and have managed to make their propaganda in an effective manner, and tried to turn the European public opinion against our country (TBMM 1985, Author's translation).

The speech by Akbulut emphasized the emerging transnational network between Europe, Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries in the mid-1980s, which had become a problem of primary importance for the Turkish state. The existence of the opposition with reachability to a range of resources in the international arena (political, financial, communicational or in terms of human resources) was becoming increasingly attached to the domestic politics, increasing the Turkish state's interest in capturing or monitoring its citizens' (and former citizens') affairs overseas. Nevertheless, this was a challenging issue, given that strict citizenship policies in counties such as Germany were obliging emigrants to give up their Turkish citizenships. Perceived as a path to cultural assimilation of the emigrants, and as losing a potential supporter against the rising oppositions, the renouncement of one's citizenship or membership bonds was not welcome by the Turkish state (Kadirbeyoğlu 2007).

Beginning with the 1980s, monitoring has become a rule in the relations between the foreign mission and associations, compatible with the post-coup mentality of surveillance in Turkey. An example of this interest can be found in the amendments in the Associations Law No. 2908 from 1983 put into force the maintenance of direct contacts with the civil society and declarations of activity:

> Associations founded by Turkish citizens overseas are obliged to present to the consular service in its environs or the closer consular service, the two certified copies of its statutes and a list including the executive committee and the members of the association, to be sent to the Ministry of Interior, within a period of one month. These associations shall notify the changes in the executive committee and the identities of the new members with the same procedure. Turkish citizens cannot establish associations that are prohibited by this law and Turkish citizens cannot become members of such associations (Article 72).

With this article the monitoring of associations were associated with the Ministry of Interior, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore treating it as an issue of national security. Even though in the succeeding period of the coup, marked by the liberal administration of President Turgut Özal, the perspective towards civil society and associative life was relaxed (Göle 1997: 47), the procedures such as sharing information on the establishment of an association for recognition via Turkish state institutions continued to take place.

Configuring Institutional Ties Between Home State and Migrant Society

During a highly dynamic political and social environment in the overseas, the Turkish state policies for emigrants shifted towards a cultural-oriented perspective in order to strengthen the sense of belonging towards Turkey. The main instruments for the exportation of culture were organized through education and religion. In the sphere of *education,* following the institutionalization of Ministry of Education's overseas branch under the heading of Directorate General for Services for Education Abroad in 1976, the state started sending teachers on Turkish language (i.e. *Türkiye Türkçesi*) and culture from Turkey. These teachers would provide extra curriculum education to Turkish students after school hours on Turkish language and culture, as well as Islam, however within the limits of a republican secularism, in the locations provided either by the local administrations or the Turkish missions abroad. In 1985, there were 1015 teaches sent from Turkey and 2000 local teachers. By 1993, the number of students receiving different levels of education by the Ministry reached nearly 680,000: nearly 250,000 students received primary education and another 245,000 received secondary education. Students who received education were not evaluated with grades; the participation was voluntary and usually occurred as a result of the guidance of the parents[42].

In the sphere of *religion*, the sending of religious officials in the 1970s to respond to the demands by the Turkish community living abroad continued over the 1980s, becoming more institutionalized under *Dış İlişkiler Dairesi Başkanlığı* (Presidency of External Affairs Bureau) was founded under *Diyanet* in 1984[43]. The number of religious officials sent abroad increased significantly over the 1980s and 1990s (from 20 in 1980, to 320 in 1985, to 628 in

[42] Interview with the author, Ankara, December 26, 2014.

[43] Presidency of External Affairs Bureau comprised of three directorates: Directorate of External Affairs *(Dış İlişkiler Şubesi Müdürlüğü*), Directorate of Overseas Religious Services (*Yurtdışı Din Hizmetleri Şubesi Müdürlüğü*) and Directorate of Overseas Religious Education *(Yurtdışı Din Eğitimi Şubesi Müdürlüğü*). T.C. Cuhuriyeti Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Dış İlişkiler Genel Müdürlüğü. 2014. Accessed March 4. http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DisIliskilerGenelMudurlugu/Sayfalar/Tanitim.aspx. With the establishment of Promotion Fund of the Turkish Prime Ministry in 1985, the budget for most religious officials started to be covered by the state.

1989 and to 948 in 1995). Guiding teachers and religious officials, education counselors (attachés) and religion counselors (attachés) were appointed to work in the Turkish missions abroad under the coordination of embassies (consulates) but in direct affiliation to their ministries. Despite the increase in the state funding, the employment of a part of religious officials by the Turkish and non-Turkish Islamic associations across Europe lingered as a problem of control for the Turkish state[44]. Especially in the late 1970 and early 1980s the appointment of religious officials had become a double-edged sword between rising expenses and loss of control. In his memoirs, former Consul of Turkey in Karlsruhe Ergun Sav recollected the problem of "other imams", who were deemed as "difficult to control" due to their autonomy from the center.

> We actually had some problems with some religious functionaries. There are imams who are sent from the center (Presidency of Religious Affairs). These people are attached to our state and our Republic. There are also imams that are brought by associations in Germany, and local Muslim communities. It is difficult to control them (Sav 2000: 138).

The role of *Diyanet* and its religious officials had served a dual role of both introducing "state Islam" and gathering the emigrant community under a shared identity, as a response to the emerging alternative community structures perceived as representing the "oppositional Islam" (Akgönül 2009). As I will discuss in Chapter 5 on Turkish state-migrant society relations in France in the period before 2003, the religious sphere has been the main area of Turkish state's reactive policies, whereas *Diyanet* supported umbrella associations and foundations emerged as an alternative of the pre-existing communitarian configurations such as *Milli Görüş* organizations in the European landscape (See Appendix 7).

Along with the new institutions related to language and religion other measures were taken in the post-1980 period under the heading of culture. An example of state's initiatives to import Turkish culture were the Turkish Cultural Centers, established in 1986 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "with a view to promoting Turkish culture, language and art and in order to contribute to bilateral relations between Turkey and other countries, as well as to help Turkish citizens in their adaptation to the country in which they live"[45] (Kaya and Tecmen

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[44] The recruitment of Turkish imams and attachés by the Saudi Arabian fundamentalist organization Rabıtat-al-Alam-al-Islam had become publicized in the late 1980s after journalist Uğur Mumcu's research published into a book entitled "Rabıta" and later recognized by the then-president Kenan Evren in March 1987 (Evren 1987).

[45] As of 2014, these centers are located in Berlin, Frankfurt, Almaty, Ashkhabad, Tehran, Kuwait, Amman, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo. T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. 2014. "Türk Kültür Merkezleri." Accessed March 4. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-kultur-merkezleri___-turk-dili-ve-edebiyati-bolumleri-ve-turkce-egitim-merkezleri.tr.mfa.

2011: 10). Regarding communications*,* the single national television TRT began satellite broadcasting in 1990. The broadcast reached Germany, Belgium, Holland, and Italy, some parts of Eastern Europe and London in 1990 and Chicago, New York and Washington in 1991. Based on the law regulating Turkish Radio and Television Corporation the main principles of the broadcast included: education, culture, arts, national values, news from Turkey and problems of the citizens living abroad (TBMM 1990: 12). In 1991, the Turkish state radio *Türkiye'nin Sesi* (Turkey's Voice) increased its broadcasting in Europe to 24/7, with news from Turkey and educational programs for youth including *Ağaç Yaşken* Eğilir (As the Twig is Bent so is the Tree Inclined) and *İş İşten Geçmeden* (Before It's Too Late). By 1999, TRT had two channels abroad diffusing "Turkish state's version of Turkishness" (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 115):

> In the mornings there are stories of Atatürk, and in children's programmes the viewers are encouraged to sing along when the national hymn is played. Many programmes encourage listeners in Germany to call the studio in Istanbul or Ankara to contribute to discussions on Turkish politics and society. Most famous is the campaign "Hand in hand with Turkish soldiers', a 56-hour live programme that encouraged the "Turkish nation' to donate "moral and economic support' for the Turkish army in 1995 (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 115).

Østergaard-Nielsen's observations illustrate the attempts to publicize the sublimated elements of Turkish nationalism through mass media, very similar to the high school curriculum that could be found in Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s: the strong stress on Atatürk and the founding fathers of the Turkish republic, the ritual of participating in the national hymn, the dignification of the Turkish army and soldiers. Together with the exportation of national culture through language education and religion, the cultural centers and media run by the Turkish state disseminated certain modes of representation to consolidate Turkish citizenry in a transnational sphere. These instruments of the home state had therefore a dual role. On the one hand, they maintained emigrants' links with the home country and established a certain image of Turkish citizenship. On the other hand, they competed with traits of the emigrant society from Turkey, which have emerged before the state's increased intervention. Similar to *Diyanet* institutions' competition with the organizations referred to as "oppositional Islam", the state-led communication channels competed with the instruments of "oppositional politics" (i.e. publications and channels established by the leftists or Kurdish movements).

The rising interest over the 1990s towards emigrant populations living abroad was also in line with the rising conception of a Turkish state that had a zone of influence in the Turkish (speaking) world reaching "from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China" as announced

publicly by former Turgut Özal in the early 1990s (Ataman 2002: 128). Following the fall of Soviet Union, the Turkish state had already begun in the 1990s implementing administrative and institutional practices in order to "guard and restore the cultural, historic and ethnic ties" with Turks who lived in Thrace, Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia. The mass migration waves from these regions were also instrumentalized in the public discourse to maintain this image (Danış and Parla 2009). A crucial step to institutionalizing Turkey's new kin policy based on aiding development of co-ethnics abroad had taken place with the establishment of Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) in 1992, which aimed for conducting economic, social and cultural activities in the so-called "Turkish Geography". Although not becoming converged yet under the institutional setting dealing with the extra-territorial members related to Turkey, the 1990s emphasized the transition towards the reconceptualization of Turkey as "the primary homeland" of both emigrants and of co-ethnics (Aksel 2014).

Defining the Rights and Duties for Non-Resident Citizens

While the state put legalized and implemented incentives in order to keep attached, closely monitor and improve the conditions of Turkish emigrants in Europe, the citizenship regime has changed to define new rights and duties for citizens who did not reside in Turkey. In a secret session in 1981, the National Security Council initiated by the post-coup government introduced a change in the Citizenship Law that allowed dual citizenship, as long as the person acquiring the second nationality informed the government (Keyman and İçduygu 2003). The law facilitated the process of leaving Turkish nationality if individuals wished to acquire another country's citizenship. The clause also toughened the conditions of return for political emigrants; if the individual had been charged, the permission to return to the country was constrained within the three months after the call from Turkish missions: "those who were outside of the borders of Turkey and who have been charged with endangering the internal or external security of the country (would) have their Turkish citizenship withdrawn unless they return(ed) within three months during regular periods and one month under emergency rule" (Kadirbeyoğlu 2010: 296). As a result of this clause many political emigrants including political figures, intellectuals and artists were withdrawn of Turkish citizenship, until the Parliament removed this clause in February 1992. The legal framework for increased involvement in the social and cultural affairs of emigrants was followed by the inclusion of Turkish citizens abroad in the 1982 Constitution, in which the Article 62 noted:

> The Government takes measures to ensure family unity of the Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate their children, to meet their cultural needs and to provide social security, to protect their link to the motherland and to facilitate their coming back.

The early 1990s were marked by a number of incentives facilitating the administrative, cultural and social engagement of emigrants with Turkey who would give up their citizenship. In 1995 an amendment was made to the Turkish Citizenship Law, providing privileged non-citizen status. Known as the "pink card" (replaced with "blue card" in 2009) the status granted rights to those who gave up Turkish nationality: residing, acquiring property, being eligible for inheritance, operating businesses and working in Turkey like any citizen of Turkey. The card only denied emigrants from rights of voting and being elected in national and local elections (Kadirbeyoğlu 2010: 297-298).

In terms of *social security and retirement,* since the 1960s the agreements with the European countries were coined with bilateral social security agreements, as well as international criteria and norms in order to protect the social security of workers. In 1985, the Law Putting Periods of Working Abroad to Use in Respect of Social Security Law (Law No. 3201 dated 8 May 1985) was adopted, granting retirement in Turkey through the pension acquired abroad. Conditions of participation (or non-participation) to the *military service,* which is considered both as right and obligation, was facilitated incrementally: for workers the service could be postponed until the age of 29 in 1979 and age of 32 in 1984. Paid military service was accepted on 20 March 1980 (Law No. 2299 amending Military Law No. 1111) allowing the payment of 20,000 DM and going under service for two months. In 1989 the fee was reduced to 10,000 DM; in 1992, the age for application was increased to the age of 38 and the service was reduced to one month. With these changes, there has been an incremental facilitation against the renunciation of citizenship for non-resident citizens who could not undertake military service.

Concerning *political rights,* limited measures were taken towards institutionalizing and legitimizing moderate and congruent political participation in the post-1980 period. With an amendment in the Constitution (Law No. 4121) in 1995 political parties were allowed to establish branches abroad. Although since the mid-1960s right to voting in national election was a discussed issue in the Parliament, it did not receive a multiparty attention until 1976. Voting rights were voiced numerous times during the late 1970s and 1980s. According to the supporters, emigrants who were paying their duty to the country by closing the budget deficits had to get their dues in the host countries by voting at consulates. For the critics

emigrants were imposed by foreign ideologies and their voting for elections in Turkey could influence the political parties' position regarding them. Finally, in 1987 an amendment was made to the Election Law (Article 94 of Law No. 3377 dated 23.05.1987), allowing Turkish citizens living abroad to vote only in custom gates, beginning 75 days prior to the election day. This period which took place in summer was considered as overlapping with the emigrants' regular vacation trips to Turkey. Despite this legal framework, in the elections of 1987 and 1991 ballots at the gates were only opened 15 days prior to the elections. From 1995 onwards the law also commissioned Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey to take measures for citizens' participation to elections abroad (Kuzu 1999: 258).

Above all, in late-1990s the state began taking measures for monitoring Turkish citizens via committees formed of representatives of the citizens living abroad and related institutions. In 1993, the Parliamentary Investigation Committee to Scrutinize the Administrative, Financial, Economic, Social and Cultural Problems faced by Workers Working and Living Abroad was established (10/21, 47 dated 20.02.1993). *Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaslar Danışma Kurulu* (Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad) and *Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Üst Kurulu* (High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad) were founded in 1998 under Prime Ministry, in order to search and monitor the problems faced by Turkish citizens abroad and communicate them in the Turkish parliament. The High Committee comprised of representatives of six political parties in Turkey, as well as undersecretaries and director generals of related ministries and institutions and 50 members from 12 countries (See Appendix 8). Until 2000, the commission met once a year and the Minister of Foreign Affairs debriefed the government with information gained through embassy and consulates (Mügge 2012: 26).

The committee received many criticisms from representatives of Turkish citizens abroad as the members were appointed by the government, and that it did not have a representative position regarding the citizens who were living abroad. The committee had twofold representative role in terms of the Turkish state's overall approach towards emigrants abroad in the late-1990s and onwards. On the one hand, it had the officially recognized function of representing the Turkey-origined community living abroad, although they were not accepted as such by the wider migrant community. On the other hand, as an intermediary between the state and the emigrant community, it also represented the Turkish state overseas. Constituting an integral part of Turkey's foreign relations with Western Europe, and in particular the EU, the Turkish state incrementally adopted an interest to support the "social capital upgrading"

of citizens abroad, who were expected to become "good and loyal representatives of their country of origin" (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 113). By nominating the members of the committee, the state drew the lines of recognition both in Turkey and in other countries: rather than choosing representatives of communitarian associations or blue collar workers that would embody the majority of emigrants, the Turkish state nominated elites (entrepreneurs, academics, doctors, advocates) who were thought to represent the "more western-oriented and modernized image of Turkey".

Concluding Remarks

Turkey's history of modernization and its reflections on state-society relations have influenced the state's policies on emigrants in the period that preceded the 2000s. This situation has been apparent in two areas, namely social policies and citizenship regime, which have transformed after the 1980 coup and the era that followed it marked by the emerging market liberalization and the emergence of a new emphasis on Turkish-Islam synthesis. In this chapter I distinguished the pre-2003 period into two distinct phases of governing populations living abroad: (1) territorial phase of governing citizenry before 1980, which included the modalities of territorial integrity and homogenization in 1923-1960s and managing for remittances and returns in 1960s-1980; and (2) transitions to extra-territorial phase, following the 1980 coup. In the territorial phase, the Turkish state's objective was initially shaped by a concern over nation building, which transformed with the labour recruitment agreements towards an interest of incorporation of workers to the Turkish economy and developmental programs.

The period that followed the 1980 coup was characterized by the increased engagement of the state with the emigrants in the host countries, reflecting a transition towards extra-territoriality in the governance of non-resident citizens. This new modality was shaped by the symbolic, institutional and citizenship policies of the era. *Symbolically* the image of the temporary workers was transformed into emigrants, whose permanency was deemed acceptable by the Turkish state. In terms of *institutional* policies, the ties were redrawn via new functions given to the foreign missions, supported by the representations of the other ministries, including Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Education and *Diyanet.* In terms of *citizenship* policies, the establishment of dual citizenship and the inclusion of non-resident citizens in the constitution marked the new definition of rights and duties. Although the transition towards extraterritorial governance has begun during this period, the securitization

perspective of the post-coup regime and the strong stress on the secular republican Kemalism resulted in the maintenance of the coercive measures that molded the interactions between the Turkish state and emigrant society. In the next two chapters, I provide a closer scrutiny of the implementation of policies in the host countries and their interaction with the transnational political practices of emigrants in the setting of two cases, namely France and the United States.

CHAPTER 5

All Who Go Do Not Return:
Politics of Emigrants from Turkey in France before 2003

In Chapter 4, I examined the policies through which the Turkish state has attempted to manage its relations with the emigrants and citizens living abroad, through differing conceptions of territorial and extra-territorial governance. Compared to the pre-1980 period, when the primary objective of the Turkish state has been to govern in parallel with a certain "myth of return" both for labour migration and high skilled migration, the post-1980 period marked a transition towards an extra-territorial understanding of membership, based on emigrants' permanency in host countries. The post-1980 period was also critical as the post-coup state aimed to create an authoritative impression by designating who could maintain their citizenship status or how language and religions could be practiced. Whilst the policy changes have translated into new opportunity structures for emigrants at the transnational level, the efforts by the Turkish state to establish its claims to authority have not gone uncontested. This has been especially true at a period when the pre-existing transnational networks have enabled non-state actors to challenge the state's such claims.

In order to discuss the interactions between the state policies and emigrant politics, in this chapter I look into the situation of emigrants from Turkey in France in the pre-2003 period. I begin by examining the emergence and development of emigrants' transnational practices and then seek responses to the questions of how the state policies were implemented in practice and what have been their outcomes on their relations between the Turkish state and emigrants in the pre-2003 period. The next sections will benefit from the existing literature on migration from Turkey in France that was briefly referenced in Chapter 3 and further it with the fieldwork conducted in France during the period of April-June 2014.

5.1. In Between Immigrant Politics and Homeland Politics

Migration from Turkey to France has been marked and is still marked by a geographical clustering, despite the diffusion around many cities in France, and a sharp disintegration based on cultural, religious, ideological and political divisions inherited from migrants' prior settlement in Turkey. The distinction, which often led to conflict-based encounters, has especially been ostensible in the associative and political environment emerging inside the city of Paris and in its outskirts. As described by Rigoni (2000: 348-349) the distinction between the two geographical clusters led to the emergence of two distinct worlds: one symbolized by strong opposition towards the home country politics, and second, marked by the establishment of community structures dominated by Anatolian migrant workers attached to their traditional values.

In fact, the beginning of political migration and the establishment of groups that voiced out their interest in Turkish politics finds its roots to the late 1940s, when a group of socialist intellectuals and artists -including the well-known figures for the Turkish audience such as painter Abidin Dino, writer Atilla Ilhan or scientist Fahrettin Petek- assembled under the name of *İlerici Jon Türkler Birliği* (Union of Progressive Young Turks, IJTB). The group was in close relation with the Turkish Communist Party. This small group –comprising of no more than 50 people- gathered around art, lived in the Parisian center and made publications as well as petitions to the French society about issues including the undemocratic policies of the Democrat Party government, the acknowledgment of dissident writer Nazım Hikmet's imprisonment and Turkey's participation to the Korean War[46] (Güzel 2009). Another group established mainly of Turkish students studying at French universities since the late 1940s under the name of *Union des Etudiants de Turquie en France.* The union had frequent relations with the Turkish Embassy that funded the rent of its office in Saint Michel, as announced by its members (Güzel 2009). Among the members of the students' association were individuals who would later return to Turkey to climb the ladder in the worlds of politics, journalism and academia[47]. Despite the enduring interaction between the group and the foreign mission until the 1980 coup, the *Union's* links with the leftist organizations in France and the state's position often created tensions at certain times.

[46] Interview with the author, Paris, April 21, 2014.
[47] Ertuğrul Özkök. 2011. "O dernek acaba hangisi." March 9. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=17219530

Together with the other refugee groups in Europe, especially in Belgium, the members of the *Union* began awareness raising and information campaigns in the aftermath of 1970 coup on the sociopolitical atmosphere in Turkey and the martial law, via journals such as *Bulletin de Turquie* (Turkish Bulletin), published from 1979 to 1981 in French. The union would occupy a crucial place in the labour protests and strikes until the wave of associationalism in the 1980s, and after the coup it adopted a strong critical position against the Turkish military junta (Güzel 1995). These early movements generally did not aim at institutionalizing but were collective movements attempting to create a network around individuals with the same orientations and recognition of the political environment in Turkey by wider French populations. Aside from *Bulletin de Turquie,* other media outlets have emerged over the 1970s and 1980s: such as *Nouvelles de Turquie* (News from Turkey) published in 1972-1974 and aiming to reach policy makers and gatekeepers for monitoring the situation in Turkey, and *Türk İşçileri* (Turkish workers) magazine published by the Turkish language group in the syndical confederation of CGT to support syndicalism and inform on social rights of newly arriving labour migrants (Hüküm 2005). While the existence of *Bulletin* and *Nouvelles de Turquie* illustrates the continuing transnational links with the homeland in the lack of access to the media services from the country of origin, the emergence of *Türk İşçileri* in the 1980s marks the emergence of the labour and social rights discourse among the Parisian intellectuals around syndical movements.

While these early political groups in the Parisian center were comprised of the Turkish urban elite and intellectuals, there was a growing migration wave from the rural areas of Turkey to French cities and provinces after the mid-1960s. Some of the early comers settled in the city center, around *Petite Turquie* in Strasbourg Saint Denis, working together mainly with Armenian tailors from Anatolia who had earlier migrated to France. However the majority was settled in the periphery of Paris or in other cities, especially in the Alsace, Basse-Normandie, France-Comte, Pays de la Loire or Rhone-Alpes regions. Labour emigrant groups migrated from different regions of Turkey and continued to hold strong regional identities. According to Kastoryano's (1986: 40) comparative study on emigrants' families in the Parisian center and the rural Terrason area, the mode of arrival from Turkey was a crucial factor that constituted this difference. In her analysis of the two different populations, Kastoryano (1986) had distinguished between those in the periphery who had arrived as a result of the "legal" migration organized as a result of the bilateral agreements between the Turkish and French states, *and* others staying in the center, only a part which have made

appeals to these ways of emigration. The process of leaving the home country had a direct effect on how post-migratory conditions were fashioned.

In a report written in 1984 for *Agence pour le Developpement des Relations Interculturelles* (Agency for the Development of Intercultural Relations, ADRI), an association founded by the French state to “promote integration of foreign populations”, Gaye Petek provided the results of the empirical research on Turkish emigrants around France, which marked the identity differences born out of origins in Turkey. Petek (1984) had noted that the majority of the Turkish emigrants living in France were from Central Anatolia (Konya, Kayseri, Nevşehir, Sivas), from Black sea (Samsun, Trabzon, Gümüşhane), from east (Erzurum, Kars, Tunceli, Elazığ), and from southeast (Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Diyarbakır), primarily marked by their Turkish ethnic identity and Sunni Hanefi belief. Petek’s (1984) study underscored the fragmentation within the community of emigrants from Turkey, between those who belonged to this majority population and others of ethnic Kurdish origin or of Alevi belief, who were noted to be “always represented in Turkey as a group less attached to Islamic traditions, even situated politically at left in a country dominated by the right traditions or military authoritarianism”. Together with the sociologist Altan Gokalp’s report to ADRI in 1984, Petek’s research is also illustrative of the distinction among the intellectual elite and the labour migrants that become an object of ethnographic research. These members of the Parisian center who actively became intermediaries between the French state and the migrant groups, as a result of their academic research affiliated with French National Center for Scientific Research, membership to the integration institutions such as *Haut Conseil a l’Integration* (High Council for Integration, HCI) and *la Commission de Reflexion sur l’Application du Principe de Laicite dans la Republique* (Commission on the Reflection on the Application of the Principal of Secularism in the Republic, Commission STASI), their social work or associational activities represent the “migrant gatekeepers”. The early attempts of this group to bridge the society with the French state and to support the labour rights of migrants worked within the framework of encouraging syndicalization. Moreover, their accessibility to the French state and society has also linked them with the Turkish state representatives, despite their oftentimes-conflicting relations with the Turkish state due to ideological disagreements.

In Paris, the first *amicales* (solidarity associations) were founded in late 1970s in the 18th *arrondissement* by labour migrants from the Black Sea region, who were somewhat sympathizers with the Nationalist Action Party in Turkey, although without an announced

political orientation as association (Petek 1985). In addition to this first one, various *amicales* emerged in the center and peripheries around other objectives than political ones, such as the repatriation of remains in cases of death, solidarity around local or regional shared culture or practicing religion. In 1979, Paris's first Turkish mosque *64 Fatih Cami* was established in Strasbourg Saint Denis district, which would over time, become the general secretary of the *Milli Görüş* (National View). In Strasbourg the religious gatherings began in 1974, with the foundation of *Türk Kültür ve İbadet Derneği* (Turkish Cultural and Worship Association) with its headquarters at *Fatih* mosque obtained from the municipality in 1975[48]. Around the same time, an integrationist association named as *Association de Solidarite avec les Travailleurs Turcs* (Association of Solidarity with Turkish Workers, ASSTTu) was established in 1974 with the interest of contributing to the integration of migrants from Turkey in Alsace region (Cuche 2009: 28). Due to the ban against the presidency of foreigners and the strict measures against the membership of foreigners to the associations, these early ones were established by French citizens, usually with a Turkish vice-president, and had very meager legal means to organize their events (Cuche 2009: 28). Even though the objectives and activities of these organizations were primarily shaped by culture, rather than politics, some of the associations and *amicales* had close links either with state officials, or with the ideological or religious movements affiliated with political parties in Turkey, such as MHP or the National Order Party (L'Observateur 1998).

Even though the distinction between the –mainly Parisian- center including the rising political movements and the periphery where the objective for many has been to protect hometown culture existed in the 1970s, the essential fragmentation began following the coup d'état of 1980. The arrival of political migrants after the 1980 coup in Turkey had reinforced the initial difference between the two regions that often led to conflict-based encounters in the associative and political spheres. Once again, the exit conditions from the country of origin had influenced the post-migratory conditions of emigrants, creating political and ideological divisions structured around the cultural and religious diversity of emigrants (Rigoni 2000: 348-349). According to Rigoni (2000) epitomized by *Petite Turquie*, the Parisian center continued to shelter associations and collectivities mainly of political character over the 1980s and 1990s, while the *province* was dominated by associations of religious obedience. Despite the stark differences in their objectives and modes of activity,

[48] CIMG Strasbourg Mosquee Eyyub Sultan. 2015. Accessed July 5. http://www.eyyubsultan.com/cemiyet/tarih%C3%A7e/.

the associations in both contexts served to a similar end: they did not only offer a place to mobilize or a place to pray, but acted as community centers that reinforce the communitarian lifestyle around distinct identities.

The concentration of the social movements and associative life in the 1980s for the population that migrated from Turkey was not only related to the home country related matters. It also depended crucially on the changing political environment in France, where Mitterand's *Parti Socialiste* gained power and relaxed the conditions for migration and post-migration processes, such as allowing for migrants to establish autonomous associations and allowing for an amnesty to irregular migrants. Hence, many groups from both left and right who left Turkey sought refuge in the welcoming atmosphere in France. The closing down of existing political parties in Turkey led to the emergence of a transnational political sphere among migrants in Europe, who used resources and available outlets for mobilization and establish parties – ranging from radical left to radical right- either as parties or associations in these countries. As a result of the drastic measures against human rights and particularly minority rights, through violations, tortures, imprisonments, shadowed deaths and conflict leading to millions to become IDPs inside Turkey led to the rising number of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, especially among minority groups, such as Kurds, Alevis and Assyrians demanding for new rights in France.

Similarly, the limitations to associative life crossed over with the emerging associative opening in France, allowing migrants' social and political participation. An article by Torun entitled "Workers' Associations from Turkey in France" in 1991 that analyzed declarations to the municipality by associations and the publications at the Official Journal sheds light on the associative life in France from late 1970s to 1990. Until the amendment in the law on associations in October 1981, only 17 associations existed in France. The amendment made it possible for migrants to establish their own associations without the need for French executives, and this change resulted in an expansion in the associative life, increasing the number to 33 over a period of one year. Based on the study of 81 associations created in 1986-1990, Torun illustrates that nearly one third of the associations have been found with the title of "Turkish workers", more than 60% including the objective of culture in its manifest, followed by aid, sport and solidarity.

The arrival of refugees and irregular migrants at a politically volatile period in Turkey resulted in the consolidation of fragmentation that continued until today. In this picture, the political activism was not only organized by the incoming migrants, but had become much

widespread among the economic migrants who arrived in the earlier periods, as a result of their politicization towards left or right. During my interviews with individuals who had migrated in the 1980s, the prevalent political socialization of the settled labour migrants by groups of different ideological orientation was mentioned recurrently. According to an executive member of one of the left-wing organizations working on integration in *Petite Istanbul*, the new wave of political migrants from Turkey in the 1980s had led to the establishment of a new sphere among migrants, while at the same time triggering the politicization of those who had arrived in earlier periods:

> Before I came to Paris, there were *amicales* and small organizations of political parties in Turkey, which were not very active. This changed after our arrival. It included people who knew politics in Turkey, who did politics there and continued on doing it here. While we arrived here we did not think of staying here. Some went back, but many stayed, so it wasn't as we imagined before. With the arrival of many people, the number of associations increased, their activities increased, it also influenced the environment here. […] *Amicale* associations started to nearly disappear and rather than them, the branches of political groups in Turkey, with organic ties with them, became their continuities here. They dynamized the population living here, opened their eyes. Migrants living here had felt left alone here before, as *gurbetçi*, only working in factories. With us, they started to become more organized, established their own businesses[49].

As discussed in the quote above, the first solidarity organizations that were created in the earlier periods quickly left their place to the new and more actively working ones that had strong transnational ties with the homeland and migrants in the other European countries. Another interviewee who had arrived as a student in the 1980s, but had the main motive of leaving Turkey due to his political position, underscored that the solidarity built around basic immigration issues, such as the translation of legal documents, led to the consolidation of the population in the city center around these organizations:

> Following the 1980 coup mainly political refugees have arrived here. Most of them were refugees and established contacts with workers and students. […] In the early years, the office would be very crowded all hours of the day, refugees and workers came to ask for translation of their papers. We organized awareness raising activities for political reasons around cultural events: meetings, seminars, events, folklore and *saz* classes. There was a monthly French newspaper called *Realite de Turquie* (Turkish Reality). The youth was much politicized than today[50].

The fragmentation beginning between left and right consolidated into more distinctive alignments during the 1980s and 1990s, marked by religious or ethnic claims inherited from

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[49] Interview with the author, Paris, May 23, 2014.
[50] Interview with the author, Paris, May 26, 2014.

the political environment in the home country, but redefined in the new country of settlement. The late 1980s and 1990s has therefore led to the consolidation around these new identities and identity claims. For Rigoni (2000: 282), the arrival of political migrants following the post-1980 coup had created significant socio-cultural modifications particularly amongst the Kurdish members of the emigrant community, in which the businesses started to ethnicize, exhibiting references to being Kurdish (the use of three colors of Kurdistan – yellow, red, green – the name of a significant locality, etc.) and movements starting to be shaped around Kurdish identity (Rigoni 2000: 282). While this situation was ongoing in the Parisian center, a similar transformation took place in the periphery. In her report for ADRI in 1984, Petek (1984: 40-41) gave the example of Corbeil-Essone, where Turkish emigrants were crowded especially in the low budget housing of Tartelets. According to Petek (1984) in a period of three years, conflicts started to establish between the emigrants from Turkey who had previously been getting along well. The report indicated that the upheaval was initially caused due to the arrival of a Turkish teacher who was affiliated with an Islamic association and the several refugees of Kurdish origin, who had pushed emigrants of the same culture to respond to the attacks or the contempt that they had been victims of, by creating a rival association of leftist ideas (Petek 1984: 40-41). This note indicated that not only the arrival of political migrants, but also others who assumed the role of community leaders with a certain ideological position pushed for the creation and expansion of tensions.

One of the predominant orientations that emerged in the 1990s has been an overarching pro-Kurdish ethno-nationalism among Kurdish groups with an ostensible rivalry against Turkish state and nationalist groups. Nevertheless, even within this orientation itself, have been deep ruptures that hindered the composition of a united block (Başer 2015). Arguing that the ruptures within the pro-Kurdish movements was inherent in their former existence under other larger movements, Bozarslan (1995: 123) underscores that before the foundation of their own organizations, both Kurdish “Marxism” and Kurdish Islamism had their places within the larger movements (i.e. Iraqi, Syrian, Iranian or Turkish Marxism or *Milli Görüş* and *Kaplan order*). Therefore the initial schism between left and right has fragmented even more as a result of the ruptures based on ethnic or religious identities in the years that followed the 1980 coup.

Who Represents Whom?

During my fieldwork in France, asking emigrants from Turkey about the "other associations and groups from Turkey" very often corresponded to receiving a menu clearly defined with certain positions, where everybody knew who belonged to where. In an attempt to portray the different trajectories that were taken by these different groups in relation with the home and host country political settings, in the next part of this chapter, I present the main collective movements and organizations in relation to the continuities and ruptures in their political endeavors over the 1980s and 1990s. Who represents whom? What have been their trajectories of integration in France? What have been their unique positions vis-à-vis the Turkish state and its policies on citizens living abroad? By providing this part, I seek to identify the collectivities and movements in their specificities.

Islamists

In the French system, a distinction exists between *associations culturelles* (cultural associations founded by law of 1901) and *cultuelles* (religious associations founded by law of 1905). While the associations with the Islamist tendency were particularly founded as religious associations, together with a mosque that represents the association, many have also adopted the status of cultural association, in order to organize social activities that were perceived as complementary to the religious practices. Emerged in order to fulfill the conservative labor migrants' religious needs in the host country, the mosque associations that were founded in the 1970s have began to adopt a certain political or ideological position in the 1980s. In this sphere, *Milli Görüş* appeared as the strongest initial voice, followed by other orders, mainly *Süleyman Efendi* order*, Kaplan* order and *Nakşibendi,* until the Turkish state's initiation of state Islam in France, with the foundation of DITIB centers. Based on a survey by Akgönül and Fregosi in 2004, there were 266 Turkish associations with religious objectives existed in France, mainly affiliated to DITIB (126, 47%), followed by *Milli Görüş* (61, 26%), *Süleyman Efendi* order (12, 5%), MHP (11, 4%) and *Kaplan* order (9, 3%) (Akgönül 2005: 44). This section focuses on the two major non-state-led religious movements in France, namely *Milli Görüş* and *Süleyman Efendi* order, leaving the discussion on home state intervention to the next section.

The religious movement *Communaute Islamique de Milli Görüş* (Religious Community of National View, shortly *Milli Görüş* or CIMG) finds its roots in the rising political Islam with Necmettin Erbakan's political activism in Turkey, which found refuge among the migrant

populations in Europe as a result of the recurrent bans to political parties established under this ideology. Following the closing down of the National Order Party in 1971, Erbakan and his supporters had sought refuge in Germany and Switzerland, creating the early core of *Milli Görüş*, which would be founded in Germany in 1971-1973, and later in other European countries, including France (Paris) in 1979 (Caymaz 2002: 211). In the 1980s and 1990s, *Milli Görüş* campaigns were oriented primarily towards claims on religious rights based on *sharia* rule, which very often conflicted with the French state's *laicite* perspective. Aside from the service activities that were introduced to members, including the collective system of insurance in cases of repatriation of returns, the management of *hac* visits to Mecca, the support of alimentary businesses (working on *hallal* meat) or media sector, the organization advocated on issues such as the question of headscarves at school or the construction of mosques (Gökalp 1998: 38).

With its close organic ties with Erbakan's consecutive political parties, *Milli Görüş*'s European offices have received media attention over the 1990s for transferring funds during local and national elections in Turkey and organizing the transport of its supporters' accessibility to border gates at election periods (Caymaz 2002: 212-213). The religious activities of *Milli Görüş* have also been cited as a platform of political gathering, via sermons and discourses of politicians in CIMG mosques[51] or during *hac* travels[52]. As it will be developed more in the next section, the establishment of *Diyanet* supported associations in the mid-1980s have resulted in a challenge between *Milli Görüş* and DITIB. As an example, Caymaz (2002: 218) cites the reluctance of *Milli Görüş* supporters' to send their children to ELCO language schools provided by the Turkish or French states and tendency to prefer extra-curriculum courses provided by *Milli Görüş.* Following the military memorandum of 28 February 1997, *Milli Görüş*'s political agenda has received obstructions due to the bans against Erbakan and his *Refah Partisi.* As it will be elaborated in Chapter 7, the victory of *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party, AKP), as a reformist successor to *Refah Partisi* perspective, and the return of Erbakan to politics with *Saadet Partisi* (Felicity Party) created political schisms among CIMG supporters.

A division within CIMG that needs mentioning is the emergence of *Conseil de la Jeunesse Pluriculturelle* (COJEP). Initially founded as *Association des Jeunes Turcs de Belfort*

[51] Such instances include Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's sermons in Fatih mosque positioned in Strasbourg St. Denis.

[52] Şevki Yılmaz, former vice-president of *Milli Görüş* Europe and MP from Welfare Party, had reached in mid-1990s to *umre* travelers in Mecca on "evils that were brought by secularism" in Turkey (Caymaz 2002: 218).

(Association of Young Turks of Belfort) in 1985 as a youth branch of CIMG, the organization became the first federation bringing together youth of Turkish origin, together with other cultural and sportive associations in eastern France. In 1992, it adopted the name COJEP and started focusing on identity, integration and citizenship, and later positioned in Strasbourg in 1995[53]. COJEP separated from the *Milli Görüş* lines in 1999 as an autonomous organization. With more than 120 member associations, it was marked by its primary distinction from CIMG for supporting citizenship rights of Turkish citizens in France, based on an understanding of the permanency of emigrants and their descendants. According to an executive member of COJEP, the change within the movement represented the transformations in the overall emigrant population and their perceptions of permanency in France:

> Until yesterday, people were buying second hand cars and furniture. Then they saw that 10-20 years passed, they started to buy houses, establish businesses. Even though it was not their own choice, as a result of the conditions they started to become a part of the permanent life. COJEP is among the earliest associations that saw this in France. It put its position according to it. There are significant differences between the needs of people who are migrants and permanent residents. We decided that our primary issue was democratic participation, equal rights, and representation at every local, regional and national level where we live. We said we wanted justice and equality[54].

COJEP extended its outreach beyond the Turkish community following its transformation to COJEP International in 2000. This was a period that was marked by participation to partnerships around Europe with international organizations and funding opportunities, including Council of Europe, United Nations, UNESCO, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), European Parliament and European Commission. COJEP also participated in the CFAIT, together with organizations of mainly leftist ideology, which aimed to fight against discrimination, exclusion and racism. The transformation of a CIMG youth branch to a multiculturalist association with international outreach has been considered in the early 2000s by many as a change in the communitarian structure of the Turkish community through new generations (Fregosi 1999: 30-31) or as a "new phase of Turkish migration" (Akgönül et al. 2009: 164). Nevertheless, as it will be elaborated more in Chapter 7, the reflections of the political environment in Turkey to France that created new fragmentations resulted in a discussion that began to question this transformation.

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[53] COJEP International. 2015. "Historique". Accessed July 10. http://www.cojep.com/historique/.
[54] Interview with the author, Strasbourg, June 4, 2014.

Another religious organization with wide reach in France is the order of *Süleyman Efendi*. A highly confined community, *Süleyman Efendi* order finds its foundations in the *Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan*'s discipline that emerged in the heyday of Turkish modernization, as a critical opposition against the Kemalist regime's secular perspective. Following limitations against the legitimacy of Quran education around *Süleyman Efendi* order in the 1970s and restrictions against associative life in 1980s have triggered the establishment of *Türk İslam Kültür Merkezleri* (Turkish Islamic Cultural Centers) in Europe. According to Caymaz (2002: 139-141), the first association of *Süleyman Efendi* order was established in 1979 in Metz, followed by another in Aulnay-Sous-Bois in 1981. Caymaz (2002: 174) and Rigoni (2000: 387) argued that the members of this order have been known to tend towards two tendencies in Turkish politics: one on the center right, following Adnan Menderes' *Demokrat Partisi* (Democrat Party) of the 1950s, reaching ANAP or DYP in the 1990s; the other tended towards extreme right represented by the line of MHP, beginning with the 1970s. Nevertheless, continuing their activities with the strategy of "walking on snow without leaving any trace" the *Süleyman Efendi* movement distinguished itself from *Milli Görüş* or *Kaplan* order movement in France in the 1990s, by keeping its position on the role of religion and society and state behind closed doors (Caymaz 2002: 123).

Turkish nationalists

Mainly centered in Germany around the umbrella organization *Avrupa Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu* (a.k.a. *Türk Federasyonu*, Federation of Turkish Idealist Associations in Europe) established in 1977, the Turkish nationalist groups in Europe has been a follower of the consecutive parties establishes by Alparslan Türkeş's *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (Nationalist Action Party, MHP). Analyzing collective movements in France and Germany, Rigoni (2000: 361) argues that the presence of MHP in Europe even reaches to the late 1960, with the establishment of associations of different nominations, including *Kültür Dernekleri* (Cultural Associations), *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Foyers), *Ülkücü Dernekleri* (Idealist Associations). For Rigoni (2000: 361), Turkey's military intervention to Cyprus in 1974 was a crucial event that triggered Turkish nationalism to politicize in the host countries. These organizations' proximity to MHP has been transparent in Germany, as a result of Alparslan Türkeş's several visits to Federal Republic of Germany in the 1970s, bringing together associations from Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland. In the 1990s, the federation was divided into seven organizations in Germany,

France, Austria, North America and Saudi Arabia, bringing together 300 associations with the title of *Türk Ocağı* or *Türk-İslam Derneği*, primarily in German cities (Antakyalı: 1992). The wide outreach of the organization has also been available by its interest in *Dıştürkler* (external Turks, Turkic populations living outside of Turkey) and forming of alliances together with associations established by Azeri, Bosnians or Bulgarian Turks (Rigoni 2000: 364).

A highly politicized organization, *Türk Federasyonu* has been renown by the recurrent conflicts with leftist or Kurdish organizations, which oftentimes resulted in violent street clashes. According to one of the interviewees of this research, the 1990s was also marked by the successive presidencies of *reis* (chief) with underground affiliations, who had arrived from Turkey and hindered the emergence of an autonomous movement from the influence of the home country politics. For Antakyalı (1992: 47), who is among the few that analyzed this organization in Europe, the assassination attempt of Papa Jean-Paul II by Mehmet Ali Ağca in 1981 was one of the first events that brought attention of the public opinion towards Turkish nationalist groups in France, nominated as *Ülkücüler* (Idealists) in Turkey or *Loups Gris* (Greywolves) in France. Despite such situations, Antakyalı (1992: 47) and Rigoni (2000: 364) share the argument that in the overall, the organization chose to remain discrete in the 1990s particularly in France, compared to the leftist or Kurdish organizations that were apparent in the public space via slogans and posters. This discretion has also been apparent in the strategies for meeting, which is often publicized as the concert of a certain singer or a familial event, in order to avoid the public authorities or rival migrant organizations (Antakyalı 1992; Rigoni 2000). As argued by an executive member of *Türk Federasyonu,* the federation had strong commitment and linkages to the MHP party in Turkey, in which it supported MHP during election periods in Turkey:

> The supporters of *Refah Parti* used to rent planes to bring people to Kapıkule during elections. They would organize events, cars, and busses. We sent available friends to Turkey and told them to support MHP candidate in the city and district they found. We did this in every election, but we did not have the significant financial means. Our chairman did not allow us to do that. We would give anything if necessary, that's a different thing. We have a *gönül bağı* (tie of affection)[55].

The quote that was given above illustrates one of the main points of discussion on political transnationalism among the community living in Europe, in relation with the electoral processes and parties in Turkey. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Turkish state had opened up

[55] Interview with the author, Paris, May 5 2014.

very limited channels for emigrants' participation in the elections, which comprised of their ability to voting only in the Turkish customs. Many emigrant communities and associations had strong ties with the political parties from Turkey, despite the state ban against their establishment of branches in the overseas. However, it has been publicized in the media over the 1990s that the parties still incorporated the emigrants living mainly in Europe into the politics by undertaking emigrants' transportation for reaching customs or organizing fundraising activities. Notwithstanding of rejecting the claims on such practices, the interviewee's affirmation on the deep ingrained strong attachments with a political party in Turkey illustrates the existence of transnational links despite the impediments put forth by the home state in the 1980s and 1990s. Although MHP's and *Türk Federasyonu'*s oftentimes violent and covert politics has somehow subsided in the late 1990s following Devlet Bahçeli's chairmanship, the tendency to conceal *Türk Federasyonu*'s activities and executive members of the 1990s seems to continue up to date. This was apparent during the interviews of this research, in the interviewees' reluctance in providing the names of the former presidents (that some of them were mentioned to have returned to Turkey) or explaining the past activities of the association.

Left movements

Following the 1980 coup, there has been a fury of associations in France, especially in Paris, founded mainly by asylum seekers or refugees to continue the political activism that has been hindered in the Turkish political landscape. In her research left-wing political refugees of the 1980s, Chevalier (2009) underscores that some of these associations were founded as a continuation of banned political parties or organizations of the left or extreme left in Turkey such as *Türkiye Komünist Partisi, Dev-Sol, Dev-Yol,* TIKKO (T*ürkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu*), TKP-ML (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist*) in Europe. Similar to the organizations of other ideological tendencies, associations in France very often had links with their European counterparts that were formed around the same time, and were closely attached to the headquarters that were primarily founded in Germany. Often, these organizations of left, extreme left or representing Kurds grouped together against the junta rule and rightist tendencies in Turkey for certain periods as a reaction against certain events. Such alliances included *Dev-Yol* founded in 1982 in Paris and BIRKOM (*Faşizme Karşı Birleşik Direniş,* United Front of Antifascist Resistance Europe) that nevertheless remained ephemeral (Chevalier 2009: 137; Rigoni 2000: 357). The initial objective of the left and

extreme left movement in France was primarily oriented towards participating in the ongoing political conflict in Turkey, as many desired to return to Turkey, rather than staying. The main mechanisms included awareness raising on and pressuring against the junta rule with the help of French political parties or institutions, and collecting money to support the legal or expenses of those who remained in Turkey.

Among the associations that were founded during this period were a group that also introduced the rights of migrants and workers in France to their missions, particularly as a result of the emerging migrants' rights movement in February 1980. An executive member of a left-wing organization founded as a result of this migrants' rights movement described the transformation of the social movement into an institutionalized organization:

> There was a halt of worker migration after 1974, but people continued to come to France as clandestine. In 1980, before the presidential elections, the founders of this association began to involve in the affair of clandestine workers. They organize a hunger strike and many receive papers following this strike. From that hunger strike, street protests, the bottom-up they establish this association. When we arrived, there was a distinction of this place, because many of its populated members had stayed here after the hunger strike. They met at that time and became politicized[56].

The undocumented migrants' movement in Sentier in 1980 marks a crucial period both in the history of left movement among migrants from Turkey and the syndical movement in France[57]. The movement signaled one of the several attempts to politically challenge the French governments' position on migration, and brought about emergence of collective movements around migration issues among migrants of different origin (Turkish, Tunisian, Algerian, Portuguese, Yugoslav etc.). The movement began with the publication of a documentary by Michel Honorin entitled "*French confection ou une nouvelle forme d'esclavage moderne"* (French confection or another form of modern slavery), followed by the hunger strike of 17 workers (including one women) all from Turkey and undocumented, until march, when the regularization is accepted by the French government. During the hunger strike, the Turkish embassy participated to the situation by sending officials to the working group that was formed by the French government; and the Turkish journal Hürriyet

[56] Interview with the author, Paris, May 23, 2014.
[57] Although other strikes by Turkish workers had previously taken place since 1971 (1971 in Vigneux, 1974 in Laval and Aix-en-Provence) the continuation had not been as effective as after Sentier movement (Güzel 1995: 207).

published the address of International Organization for Migration in France so that the undocumented migrants could present their files for regularization[58].

The movement gave birth to the associations who adopted a three-fold approach following the 1980s: (1) becoming a reception place for economic migrants and refugees, supporting them with legal and social needs, and (2) advocating against the repressive regime and violation of human rights in Turkey, (3) supporting both ethnic Turkish and Kurdish migrants' membership by an emphasis on "being from Turkey" (*Türkiyelilik*) rather than Turkishness (*Türklük)*. From this movement was born included *Association des Travailleurs de Turquie* (ATT, Association of Workers from Turkey), founded in 1981, whose members included participants of the hunger strike, and which over time transformed into *L'Assemblee Citoyenne des Originaires de Turquie* (Citizen Assembly of People from Turkey, L'ACORT). It also triggered the foundation of *Association Democratique de Travailleurs de Turquie* (Democratic Association of Workers from Turkey, ADTT), which was founded in 1982 and adopted the name of *Federation des Associations de Travailleurs et de Jeunes* (Federation of Associations of Workers and Youth, DIDF) in 2004; and another association entitled *Association Culturelle des Travailleurs Immigres de Turquie,* (Cultural Association of Migrant Workers from Turkey, ACTIT) that would later be established in 1986.

The "end of the myth of return", as debated by Kastoryano since the mid-1980s, both for labor migrants and refugees and the increased integration of migrants in the social and economic spheres in France resulted in the transformation of objectives within the left movement. While the vivacious political activism around leftist ideology began to secede and leave its place to identity claims based on religion and ethnicity in the mid-1980s, associations such as ATT and ADTT began to prioritize their orientation on supporting migrant and labor rights, rather than continuing their political attempts on Turkey related matters. An executive member of the former ATT, currently named as ACORT, indicated that overarching interest towards homeland politics among the refugee community in France has left its place to immigrant politics over the late 1980s, as a result of the deliberate decisions made by a group that seceded itself from the former agenda:

> We separated ourselves from the revolutionary path in Europe in 1985. It was argued that the association needed to become an autonomous movement primarily based on our immigrant status, not a continuation of the Turkish movement. This discussion went for a while until the

[58] Propos recueillis par Mireille Galano et Alexis Spire. 2002 "French confection": le Sentier (1980). December 2002. www.gisti.org/doc/plein-droit/55/confection.html.

> congress in 1985, when we decided to become an actor of politics in France. Afterwards all formal and informal ties with the Turkish political movements were ruptured[59].

This separation signaled a crucial change in the politicization over the late 1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, it resulted in the associations' increased participation and even spearheading to migrants' collective movements in France, along with other migrant groups originated from the peripheries of Europe. These included the foundation of *Conseil des Associations Immigres en France* (Council of Migrant Associations in France, CAIF) and *Forum des Migrants* (Migrants' Forum), or participation to undocumented migrants' revolts in 1991 and 1997. During this period the associations also began to receive French state's funding opportunities for migrants on integration and fight against discrimination from different ministries. These funds remained a substantial source for associations supporting integration, such as ACORT (former ATT) until Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency in 2007, when subventions for migrant associations were limited drastically.

It should be noted that the decision to prioritize migration-based claims making did not result in a definite apathy to the situation in Turkey. For instance ACORT (former ATT) continued its claims-making on Turkey by participating in advocacy campaigns with other French or international organizations, such as Amnesty International, *Ligue des Droits de L'Homme* or *La Cimade*. On the other hand, ACTIT, DIDF (former ADTT) and extreme left political organizations (such as DHKP-C or TKP-ML) that are less overt – and whose names are still not mentioned overtly due to their illegal status either in France or in Turkey - sustained their politicization mainly through social movements organized often together with political parties or syndicates in France and synchronized with partner organizations in other European countries. An example of this was the mass movement with the participation of 15,000 Kurds and Turks at Place de la Republique in Paris, following PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's arrest in Nairobi in February 1999 by the Turkish secret service (Rigoni 2000: 361). Following the European Court of Human Rights' decision to accept right to individual petition in 1987, many of these social movements –organized by both left and right- were positioned in front of the ECHR building.

On the other hand, the prioritization on political participation in France was an indication of an overarching active citizenship movement among emigrants from Turkey in France, not only among those of leftist orientation but also others who were more religious oriented. Bringing together tendencies, which often conflicted among each other in the 1980s, *Conseil*

[59] Interview with the author, Paris, April 30, 2014.

Français des Associations d'Immigres de Turquie (French Council of Migrant Associations from Turkey, CFAIT) was founded in 1991, to facilitate migrants' participation in the French society. The council published regular magazines, first *Gözlem/L'Observateur* and then *Altyazı/Multitudes* as an attempt to create a common platform on problems related to migration from Turkey. Over the 1990s the emphasis on the acquisition of French citizenship and integration in the French society was evident in the recurrent campaigns of CFAIT, publicized on outlets such as *L'Observateur*:

> With a perspective to define a new and modern concept of citizenship based on residency in a multicultural society where there is a communication and mutual respect among cultures, le CFAIT launches its campaign of "For equality of rights and for a new citizenship/Against all forms of discrimination, exclusion and racism" (L'Observateur 1998: 15).

Until its closure in 2007, CFAIT received many member associations, including ATT, ASSTTu, ADTT, ACTIT, which have been explained above, as well as integrationist associations ELELE and A TA TURQUIE and COJEP, a youth organization which had emerged as an extension of *Milli Görüş*, which will be described below. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the movement that emerged around citizenship-based rights-claims has also supported Turkey's candidacy to the European Union. The federation, *Rassemblement des Associations Citoyennes des Originaires de Turquie* (Assembly of Citizen Associations of Originals from Turkey, RACORT) founded in 2004 created its campaign of "*Une Europe Sociale et Multiculturelle Avec la Turquie*" (One Social and Multicultural Europe Together With Turkey). The campaign highlighted that, as citizens of Europe migrants from Turkey desired its participation to the EU, because "a no to the adhesion of Turkey was equal to a no to equal rights among all residents in Europe and would reinforce the exclusion of this population"[60].

Kurdish movements

The migration of Kurds from Turkey to France began with the labour migration of the 1960s, but intensified in the period of 1970s-1990s as a result of several factors. According to Bozarslan (1995: 116) these factors included the economic crisis of the 1970s that damaged the agricultural sector in the rural regions populated by Kurds, the political conflict between left and right, Sunnis and Alevis in other Kurdish populated regions and in the 1980s, the repressions by the military regime on the one hand and by the PKK on the other. In France,

[60] Oluşum/Genese. 2014 "Une Europe sociale et multiculturelle avec la Turquie." Accessed August 14. http://www.revues-plurielles.org/_uploads/pdf/12_98_8.pdf.

the population of Kurds from Turkey has been considered to reach 20% of all migrants from Turkey. Bozarslan (1995: 117-118) argues that it is difficult to analyze the Kurdish populations in general, due to the pluralities in their identity positions, separated among national lines (Kurds from Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran), ethno linguistic lines (*kurmanjı, soran, zaza*) and ethno religious lines (*Shiites, Sunnis, Alevis*). In Europe the political and organizational outcomes of this multitude has reflected in a wide variety, particularly in the 1980s when the exile became an available space for politics which could not be maintained in the home country (Bozarslan 1995: 121). Although not always forming a united block, the Kurdish movement and the associations have undertaken the most active collective action strategies in France during the 1980s and 1990s, ranging from mobilizations to associative advocacy and lobbying. The social movements during this period included non-violent mobilizations (ranging from petitions, campaigns, protests, walks, occupations and blockages), violent actions (attacks with Molotov cocktails, hostage takings, bombs), protests via self-mutilation (hunger strikes and self-immolations) (Rigoni 2000: 227-246).

In the 1980s and 1990s, there have been two principal Kurdish ethno nationalist tendencies in France, as in entire Europe: the line of *Yekitiya Komelen Kurdistan* (Federation of Associations from Kurdistan, KOMKAR) and the line of PKK, mainly followed by *Federasyona Yekitiya Kakeren Welatparezen-çandiya Kurdistan* (Federation of Cultural and Patriot Workers' Associations of Kurdistan, currently Federation of Kurdish Associations in France, FEYKA) in France. KOMKAR is an exile federation, which follows *Türkiye Kürdistan Sosyalist Partisi* (Kurdistan Socialist Party, TKSP) founded in 1974, and whose president went for exile in Sweden following the party's receiving of illegal status (Başer 2015: 56). Major rival of PKK after mid-1980s, the supporters of TKSP and KOMKAR (founded in Germany in 1979) denounced the use of violence for political aims and aimed for a unified socialist and autonomous Kurdistan (Başer 2015: 56-71). The federation became a transnational political movement with the 1980s, engaging in diaspora activisms by mainly organizing mass protests throughout Europe, documenting human rights violations, organizing conferences, linguistic and cultural events (Başer 2015: 71). Nevertheless, the federation lost its impetus compared to PKK in the 1990s particularly in France, which according to Başer (2015: 72) was due to its members' estrangement from TKSP agenda and also regular attacks by PKK to KOMKAR executives (including the assassination of former chairman of KOMKAR France) and their events.

Hence in France, the initial competition was marked by the eventual control of the community by the PKK beginning with the mid-1980s. In Turkey, *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan* (Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK) was born from the Turkish left and eventually formed an autonomous organization that aimed for a Marxist-Kurdish state in the region (Başer 2015: 57). In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, PKK launched armed struggle against military and civilian targets – both Turks and Kurds, in order to obtain its power in eastern Turkey (Başer 2015: 59). In Europe, the PKK's control was reinforced by its rejection of the Turkish state and the replacement of its own system supported by pro-PKK organizations, by collecting migrant remittances of Kurds as a "source of tax", recruiting adherents and fighters for the guerilla and its institutional settings in eastern Turkey, instruction of Kurdish language and culture (as an alternative to ELCO in France), the construction of Kurdish mosques (including *Şeyh Said* Mosque in Paris) and media channels (Bozarslan 1995: 121-122). According to a survey by Rigoni on social movements organized by pro-PKK organizations in Europe, (1) the situation in Kurdish regions in the Middle East emerged as the primary motivation for protests, followed by (2) the situation of Kurds in Europe (processes, arrests etc.), (2) Newroz festivities, (3) pressuring governments and European institutions and supporting hunger strikers in Turkish prisons (Rigoni 2000: 233-234). The pro-PKK associations, namely FEYKA and *Centre d'Information du Kurdistan a Paris* (Kurdistan Information Center in Paris, which also worked as the forefront of PKK) provided the organizational means to gather the Kurdish community. The arrest of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 marked a new era for the Kurdish movement, due to the emergence of a new discourse of federalism within Turkey that overtook the objective of autonomy (Başer 2015).

The role of the diaspora as a lobbying group in the host country appeared in France first by the efforts of *Institut Kurde a Paris* (Kurdish Institute in Paris, IKP) in the mid-1980s and 1990s. Founded in 1983 by Kurdish intellectuals, lead by nuclear physician Kendal Nezan, with the support of the Socialist government in France and particularly Daniela Mitterand. Oftentimes the Institute acted as an advocacy and lobbying organization, through advocacy campaigns, regular meetings with policy makers of France and the European Union, conferences and seminars. Since the recognition of the Kurdish issue on the agenda of the European Economic Commity in 1988, its role became more crucial in the internationalization of the issue (Bozarslan 1995). In 1989 the Institute organized an international conference in Paris with the delegation of 32 countries and bringing together all Kurdish movements in order to internationalize the Kurdish question. During this period, IKP

even functioned as broker between *Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti* (Social Democratic Populist Party, SHP) and the Kurdish elite in the exile by inviting Kurdish SHP-deputies to attend the Paris Kurdish Conference in 1989 (Bozarslan 2012). Similar conferences would later be held in Washington (1991) and in Moscow[61]. Other Kurdish institutes founded in Brussels, Berlin, Moscow and Washington, and later the Kurdish library opened in Stockholm also benefited from IKP's model (Başer 2013: 20). Since its foundation the institute has received funding from French institutions, including FAS and many ministries. Nevertheless, the inter-state relations between France and Turkey have oftentimes created a challenging environment: as in the case of French state's interruption of subventions to IKP following Turkish President Turgut Özal's visit to France in 1986 (Biraud 1989). Scholars argue that through such institutions the establishment of a Kurdish diaspora was made possible, as a financial, intellectual, political and driving force to Kurdish nationalism (Başer 2013: 20; Argun 2003: 125).

Alevis

The migration of Alevis from Turkey began with the labour migration and it intensified in the 1980s with the coup, and in the 1990s after the Sivas massacre in 1993 and Gazi riots in 1995. Positioned within the left movement in the 1980s, the Alevi members of *Dev-Sol* and *Dev-Genç* participated in the revolutionary movements in France. The Alevi confession is an ethnically heterogeneous population, represented by Turks as well as Kurds, who due to the intersectionality of their religious and ethnic identity have been highly vulnerable to oppression and discrimination. The emergence of an autonomous Alevi movement and associationism in France, as in Europe, is relatively recent compared to other identity-based movements, and has occurred following the Sivas massacre of 1993. In the same year, the first *Alevi Kültür Merkezi* (Paris Alevi Cultural Center) was established in Paris and was later followed by other cultural centers around France. The cultural centers gathered under the umbrella organization of *Federation de l'Union des Alevis en France* (Federation of Union of Alevis in France, FUAF) that was founded in 1998 in Strasbourg and brought together 34 departmental associations, mainly accumulated in Alsace, that defend the values of Alevism. The activities of Alevi organizations in the line of FUAF included cultural activities (*saz* and language courses), religious activities (*sema,* celebration of religious events) as well as

[61] Institut Francois Mitterand. 2013. "Danielle Mitterand et les Kurdes." January 14. http://www.mitterrand.fr/Danielle-Mitterrand-et-les-Kurdes.html.

commemorations (Sivas and Maraş massacres), participation to protests and advocacy activities with direct contacts to policy makers in France[62].

Multiculturalists

In France, a small number of associations emerged beginning with the late 1970s that distinguished from the other associations explained before for their foundation objective of integration in France, without an pronounced orientation towards Turkey and Turkish politics. Although these associations have usually not entered in a discursive sphere on diaspora politics, the role of their executive members matters for our analysis, due to their intervening position between migrants from Turkey, French state and Turkish state over the 1980s and 1990s.

In Paris, *Maison des Travailleurs de Turquie* (House of Migrants from Turkey, ELELE) was founded in 1984 by a group of intellectuals led by Gaye Petek and Pınar Hüküm, as a socio-cultural center to respond to the needs of migrants in their issues with the French state and society. Receiving substantial funding from French state institutions on integration and against discrimination, ELELE became the primary integration association that professionalized over the course of 1990s, with its employees and wide outreach to the community of emigrants from Turkey. ELELE organized many events, fairs and festivals celebrating multiculturalism around France, including among many *Je Turc Ils* festival (Mulhouse, 1992), *La Vie a Petit Paris* exposition (Paris, 1996), *La Turquie au Fil des Pages* book fair (from 1993 to its closure), *Atıf Yılmaz* film festival (Strasbourg, 2009). ELELE received occasional support from the Turkish embassy and the Turkish Ministry of Culture; nevertheless the relationship was not symbiotic, oftentimes resulting in conflicts between diplomats and the executive members of the association. Following the French governments' decision to limit support to migrant organizations, ELELE went into a process of dissolution, which finalized with its closing down in 2010. In Strasbourg, established in 1974 *Association de Solidarite avec les Travailleurs Turcs* (ASSTTu) as a sociocultural association that gathered migrants in collaboration with French citizens. Since the 1980s, ASSTTu participated in initiatives on migrants' rights to support citizenship, such as *la Coordination des Associations de Residents Etrangers a Strasbourg* (Coordination of Associations of Foreign Residents in Strasbourg), and initiated programs on the second-generation particularly in "the difficult districts" of Strasbourg. Over the years, ASSTTu's involvement

[62] Interview with the author, Paris, May 12, 2014.

in Turkey remained limited with organizing support mechanisms following 1999 earthquake in Marmara and supporting Turkey's candidacy to the EU by participating to RACORT[63].

Two other associations, one in Paris and another in Nancy, with clear references to their Kemalist position have worked on integration and multiculturalism issues since the 1980s. In Paris, *Centre Culturel Anatolie* (Anatolian Cultural Center, CCA) was founded in 1984 by Demir Önger, a well-known doctor among the Turkish community. Since its beginning, the self-funded center organized expositions, conferences, panels, as well as language courses in Turkish and in French, both for the migrant community and the enthusiasts of Turkey[64]. Its founder, Önger has been actively involved with the Turkish mission in France during the 1990s, through regular contacts with the ambassadors, his participation in the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad and his advocacy campaigns against the allegations on 1915 events as genocide by the Armenian community in France. Önger also co-founded *Fransa Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* (Atatürkist Though Association, ADD) in 2001 and *Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği* (Union of Turkish Cultural Associations, UACTF) in 2012. In Nancy, founded in 1989 by a committee including instructor Murat Erpuyan and demographer (specialized on Turkish migration) Stephane de Tapia, A TA TURQUIE has the objective of sharing the Turkish culture and supporting emigrants' integration in France. The association organizes seminars, research, consultations on integration, as well as cultural activities (festivals, exhibitions, concerts) and publications (*Oluşum/Genese* published since 1989 and its website, www.ataturquie.fr). Since the late 1990s, A TA TURQUIE took an active position to support Turkey's candidacy negotiations to the EU.

The Landscape of Political Transnationalism in the 1980s and 1990s

Analyzing the movements and associations in France organized by emigrants from Turkey until the 2000s; three main points emerge as critical. *First of all,* there has been the existence of a significant heterogeneity among the emigrant population, which has consolidated, with the overlapping of the host and home state opportunity structures in the 1980s. This heterogeneity has over time fragmented within itself to create new conflicts and rivalries among opposing groups (i.e. leftists vs. rightists, seculars vs. conservatives, Turks vs. Kurds, individualists vs. communitarians). This distinction is critical in analyzing the different integration processes and transnational linkages that were established by these various

[63] Action Citoyennes Interculturelles. 2015. "Historique". Accessed August 15. http://www.astu.fr/historique/.
[64] Centre Culturel Anatolie. 2015. "Anadolu Kültür Merkezi". Accessed August 15. http://www.cca-anatolie.com/hosgeldiniz.htm.

groups, distinctly from, but very often in response to one another. It also clarifies the ambiguities that were experienced in the 1990s, a period when the Turkish state had attempted to create an umbrella proto-diaspora or when emigrant associations struggled to gather under a union founded on a shared status of being migrant.

Second, although the political conditions in France have shaped the movements and organizations in certain periods (particularly in early 1980), the direct reflections of the political environment in Turkey has been very decisive in the creation of certain alliances and hostilities. Nearly all political movements of different positions that were shunned from activism in Turkey during the 1980s found refuge around Europe, including France, which enabled them to stabilize or strengthen (particularly Kurdish and Alevi movements and the religious mobilization around Milli Görüş). From the perspective of state-society relations in a transnational perspective, this situation exemplifies the possibility of non-state actors' bypassing of the state's impediments through activating various transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Adamson 2002). It also illustrates the possibilities of consolidating a spatially dispersed resource base, from the perspective of Adamson (2002), which conflicts with the Turkish state's initial resource project that aimed for developmental-based remittance capturing.

Third point is the attempts to generate an isolated framework from the Turkish political perspective in the 1990s. The primary reasons for this situation have been related to the acceptation of the permanency of emigrants, the beginning of a discussion based on French citizenship rights, and the increased participation to social, political and economic spheres. Several examples have been illustrated above: ATT's estrangement from a refugee-centered rhetoric, COJEP's isolation from CIMG line to enter into interactions with the international platforms, the use of French integration funding opportunities by many associations in the 1990s, and finally RACORT's advocacy on Turkey's EU membership within the context of citizenship rights of emigrants of Turkish origin. While this new line of thought continued to shape the 2000s, it has taken a new form and created new tensions with the re-emergence of a new Turkish reference (see Chapter 8). Following this section, which examined the movements and organizations in France by emigrants from Turkey in the pre-2000 period, in the next section I analyze their relations with the Turkish state, in line with the implementation and outcomes of Turkish state policies in the field.

5.2. Antagonism and Cooperation in Home State-Emigrant Society Relations

In this section I discuss the relations between the state and society, from a perspective of transnationality, therefore looking into the context of emigration state (Turkey) and emigrant society. I analyze this relationship in the pre-2003 period and elaborate on the continuities and ruptures: how the Turkish state's policies on emigrants have been implemented in France and what outcomes have resulted in state-society relations following this phenomenon?

Either a "Vache a lait" or an Anarchist

Two main positions in terms of the symbolic policies of the Turkish state have effected the realization of policies in practice in the period that preceded 2000s: (1) the sharp distinction between desired and undesired citizens and (2) workforce-based structuring of emigration and post-emigration policies. While the first distinction has led to passivity towards emigrants' issues particularly in the early republican period based on their cast in the same ethnic/religious attributes with the majority society in Turkey, it led to reactive policies and relationship-building mechanisms in the 1970s and 1980s, when the primary cleavage was based on their political/ideological antagonism. As argued by Rigoni (2001: 173) this antagonism was considered under threefold deviance in the 1980s: (a) alienation from the principles of Kemalism, (b) positioning to extreme left, and (c) recomposition of exile organizations.

While the political point of reference around Kemalism has shaped the state's policy implementations in the 1980s, another anchor remained as crucial, conditioning the position vis-à-vis those who succeeded to outrun the exclusion. The 1960s' mentality of workforce-based structuring has continued until the late 1990s, creating an often-cited image of *gurbetçi* (guest worker, living away from home), which acted as a "remittance machine" (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Therefore, despite the existence of state institutions and funding opportunities for workers during this period, the non-systematized procession of the labour migration and its follow-up until the 1980s have estranged the relations between the state and the emigration society. A representative of the foreign mission in France maintained that the state's policies have been mainly shaped by a reactive approach, which aimed at responding to the needs and necessities of the day, rather than comprising of a systematically built policy making:

> The state did not have an approach that mounted things but rather responded to according to the period. Until recently it was reactive. There was no social engineering for Turks living abroad until recently. It responded to the expectations of the citizens. In the 1970s the state's position towards citizens, *Alamancı,* was based on foreign currency and bank accounts. The services were imperative services[65].

During my interviews it has been recited in the anecdotes by emigrants the impression of "being left alone by the home country in another country", for the sake of economic development in Turkey. For an executive member of an integrationist association who is also a member of the current Advisory Committee on Citizens Living Abroad, the attainment of remittances was the central point of interest for the Turkish state in its relations with the emigrant society:

> D.A: How do you consider Turkish state's policies towards Turkish citizens living in France?
>
> *Vache à lait.* It means milk cow in French. Abdullah Gül said the exact same thing last year. Turkish Republic considered *gurbetçilerimiz,* us, as a mass that brings money and foreign currency, develops our economy, not living any problems in the rich countries. Until now, the recent five years, we have always been seen by Turks in Turkey as *Alaman,* the logic of the state was "these have money, how can we rob them, how can we rip them off"[66].

The quote illustrates the different nominations that the migrants received in the period following 1960s that often had negative intonations: *gurbetçi* and *Alaman* (Turkish worker living in Germany). Even though the quotation was from a member of the emigrant community in France, the reference to *Alamancı* indicates the position of in-betweenness: between an unfamiliar host society and a home society (and state) that perceives labour migrants under a single category, which denotes their difference from resident citizens. For migrant workers, what started as a collective movement organized by the state and society as a local and national development project, transformed over time to a machinery for collecting remittances, and even being intruded by mass fraud campaigns by sham organizations in the 1990s in the sake of religious and nationalist sentiments.

While symbolically and institutionally the state policies were centralized on the acquisition of remittances in the 1970s and early 1980s, the emergence of labour and migrant rights movements in France during this period led to a competitive environment in the field of organized labour. A former executive member of ELELE, who had been actively involved in the management of relations between the migrant community and the French state, indicated

[65] Interview with the author, Paris, May 7, 2014.
[66] Interview with the author, Paris, May 19, 2014.

that there have been rivalries in the syndical mobilization, between the collectivities established by migrants themselves in relation with the French syndicates and others that were established by the officials arriving from Turkey:

> In the early days there used to be interpreters of the right-wing syndicates from Turkey, in fact they were sent by the Turkish state to play the role of "yellow union", telling workers not to become unionized. These interpreters had a tie with the consulate in France. […] On the other hand CGT and CFDT, which were very active in the 1980s, were manipulated by those who came from the Turkish left. I have a left orientation as well, but I am looking from a distance, the syndicate has to act as a syndicate, and politics need to be done some place else. This was the reason why many workers left the syndicates over time[67].

In parallel with the workforce-based logic of the management of populations living abroad, the period that followed the 1970s witnessed the emergence of limited support to workers in the host countries, outside of the premises of the consulate. As suggested in the quote, in a host society highly subject to unionization particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, the syndical participation of Turkish emigrants was creating tensions for the Turkish state. It should be remembered that the political environment in Turkey during this period was very much affected by a left-right conflict ongoing in the country, as well as rising anti-communism throughout the Cold War period. As a solution, the state had responded by sending interpreters who would try to alienate emigrants from syndicates, or tame their possible politicization. Under such conditions of rivalry, emigrants from Turkey remained as one of the weakest participants to French unions over the following periods.

The surveillance of the population living abroad existed before the 1980s, even though it had not become institutionalized as in the post-coup period. As in the case of migrant workers, the primary reason for the surveillance has been the avoidance of politicization as an opposition to the Turkish state or possible channeling of financial or social resources from host countries towards Turkey. Another instance of surveillance can be followed among relations between the consulate and the student associations, which even became a subject of discussion in the Turkish parliament. As I had discussed in the previous section, one of the earliest unions in France was established by university students with the support of the Turkish Embassy. The interaction between the group and the embassy has several times created tensions, as in the case of a parliamentary question in 1972 proposed by Sinasi Osma, depute from *Adalet Partisi* (Justice Party, AP) on the activities of the union to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Haluk Bayulken:

[67] Interview with the author, Paris, April 21, 2014.

> It has been learned as declared during the last congress of the Turkish Students' Association in Paris, that this association has provided the defeatist organization entitled Turkish People's Liberation Army 50,000 Franks, with the aid channeled to them through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the fees obtained from students every year. Is this story true? Is it true that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has offered every year 12,200 Franks (approximately 37,000 TL) via embassy in Paris to this union? [The answer from the embassy] Our cultural attaché informed with this regard: there is no links with the aforementioned secret organization… 9,000 Franks mentioned as to several organizations and the victims from Turkey have been given to Turkish Cultural Club in Munich, Students-Workers Union in Germany, to the establishment of Workers' Federation in France and to families whose members died before 12 March (TBMM 1972a, Author's translation).

The parliamentary question exemplifies the existence of relations between the state and the civil society abroad before the 1980s period, as well as the problematization of this link among parliamentarians and bureaucrats at a politically sensitive period. Despite the initial opportunities presented by the Turkish state for the establishment and development of a students' movement in Paris in the 1970s, the political concerns of the junta regime shadowed this tie, when the rent support was cut down due to political activities of the members.

The political atmosphere following the 1980 coup in Turkey was very much shaped by the restrictions against citizens' political, social and associational participation. While it had critical repercussions in Turkey, such as the banning of political parties, draconian measures against any kind of collective action and impediments against associationalism, the reflections of the coup could also be felt in the Turkish state's relations with the citizen community living overseas. As I had argued in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, in the post-1980 period the acceptability of the continuation of citizenship status was relative to their passivity in the political sphere, which also reflected to the migration patterns of the people. For one thing, the number of people from Turkey increased sharply in the 1980-1990 period, particularly as a result of the asylum seekers, whose numbers started to increase in the early 1980s and reached 17,400 in 1989 and 11,800 by 1990. As discussed before, the amnesty for irregular migrants in France also increased the number of people from Turkey, including those who had initially migrated to other European countries. An executive member of CHP branch in France, who had founded one of the earlier Alevi associations in Paris described the emigrants from Turkey who had arrived in the 1980s as "fugitives of Evren and pardoned by Mitterand":

> I left Turkey in 1979 due to political reasons and went first to Germany. And then in 1981 came here. You may call that I was a fugitive of Kenan Evren and pardoned by Mitterrand, I

> benefited from the amnesty. Those who came to France were not only from Turkey; even asylum seekers in Germany came here. There were people from everywhere[68].

During this period the "unwanted" migrants who fell into certain categories were revoked out of citizenship: those who obtained another citizenship without informing the foreign mission, those among the sentenced who have not returned to Turkey within the allowed timeframe and men who did not complete the obligatory military service. Therefore the two essential rights that are available to non-resident citizens, the right to return and the protection via consular missions was not available to this population who did not have friendly ties with the state.

Transformations in the Consular Relations and Institutionalized Surveillance

In France, where the management of post-migratory conditions of Turkish citizens has been undertaken by very limited consular support in the pre-1980 period, the impacts of the changing political environment have been ostensible following the coup. According to a former executive member of ELELE, there has been an increased interest of the officials to get into contact with organizations founded by emigrants in the 1980, restricted to those who were registered under the white list of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

> I don't know about Germany, but in France, the Turkish state did not take much interest in Turkish workers until the 1980 coup. Migrants used to go to the consulates to renew their papers, but were often very mistreated, and there were even vulgar disrespectful attitudes. But all of a sudden after the 1980 coup, maybe because there were orders due to the increase in the number of asylum seekers, a new interest emerged. Following that they started to work on labour migration, for instance counselors started to go to associations and make speeches. After that consulates began to start a kind of organization, depending on their own personalities, going often to visit associations, creating an information network, and over the last five years, even communicating via internet. Even some ambassadors tried that, including Sönmez Köksal, who was interested in bringing different associations under one roof[69].

As noted above, for those who complied with the state agenda, this new institutional environment opened up a new sphere: the association leaders emerged as representatives of certain collectivities in front of the Turkish state institutions, their cultural and social events were symbolically or financially supported by the foreign mission. Therefore, beginning with a sharp rupture following the 1980 coup the Turkish state entered into a renewed relation with the citizens living abroad, but as mentioned above, particularly with those who were "not terrorists", "not anarchists", hence politically passive and "loyal to the Turkish state".

[68] Interview with the author, Paris, May 12, 2014.
[69] Interview with the author, Paris, April 21, 2014.

While the memoires of labour counselors (Ünver 2002) illustrate the existence of more dense ties between Turkish labour migrants and the foreign mission in Germany, this has not been the case in the French geography. As it will be described in the next section, the foreign mission underwent a threefold perspective in order to get into closer contacts not with individuals but selectively with certain emigrant communities that have previously formed in France: (1) visiting and inviting emigrant organizations during national holidays, particularly celebrating the republican values of the Turkish state (i.e. 23 April and 19 May); (2) creating a state-led cultural environment around religion and education; (3) attempting to support the establishment of proto diasporic umbrella organization. Despite the expansion of the interactive sphere following the 1980s and being consolidated by the new rights granted to citizens living abroad, the top-down attitudes of the foreign mission vis-à-vis emigrants continued as a distinction between the state and society until the 2000s. An executive member of the UETD branch in France complained that this attitude created tensions between the home state and emigrant communities:

> [Until 2000s] there were cliffs with our consulates and ambassadors. This is the truth and no one can deny it. It was a problem and a real pain in Europe: making people wait in lines in front of the consulates, treating them as third class citizens. Seeing them only as a source of money, this was the problem[70].

The negative attitudes faced during consular relations, which sometimes was the result of the lack of sufficient personnel and infrastructure, emerged in the interviews of this research as one of the one of the primary reasons of emigrants' perception of the state as "interested only in migrants' remittances, but not involved in their problems".

The post-1980 period was also marked by an increased surveillance of the community by the Turkish state, which has institutionalized through the implementation of new procedures for legibility. Similar to what was going on in Turkey, the amendments in the Associations Law in 1983 had introduced a new obligation for associations established by Turkish citizens living abroad, to present "two copies of their mission statements, and a list of members of the executive committee and all members identities, to be sent to the Ministry of Interior" within a period of one month after their establishment. The law also forced associations to present any change on the executive committee or the newly participating members. Following this period, the consulates introduced a new procedure where the associations needed to present themselves and become registered. Particularly the associations who were already in close

[70] Interview with the author, Paris, May 2, 2014.

relation with the Turkish state, hence those who were within the umbrella of DITIB became affiliated with the consular network, while others that did not want to enter into this surveillance contract or that were already non-eligible due to their status that was forbidden by the Associations' Law remained outside of the consular network. As discussed in the previous section on the different trajectories of various emigrant organizations and movements, the law resulted in the exclusion of many groups, leading to a very selective sphere of interaction between the state and society, despite the attempts to expand the state's outreach in France.

Competition over Ideological Apparatus

The Turkish state's policies towards emigrants until the 1980s in France have been restricted with limited consular relations and support for labour migrants. For some of the interviewees, the lack of state provisions was a reason to why there has been the emergence of a plethora of religious, political and ethnic-oriented sub-groups; these organizations filled the gap of public services not offered by the state, and therefore attracted emigrant populations according to their own ideological orientations. From the point of view of many interviewees affiliated with the conservative groups, the main reason behind the advent of *Milli Görüş* in Europe was the loose relations between the Turkish state and emigrant populations, and the near non-existence religious services. Giving the examples of other emigrant communities and their relations with their states, such as the Greek community, an executive member of COJEP argued that the *Milli Görüş*'s sudden expansion was again related to emigrants' feeling of "being left alone":

> In the 1970s there has been an active establishment of *Milli Görüş* organizations. In fact, the most critical issue was this: Greeks are Orthodox and their state has sent reverends even to a Catholic and Protestant world, while sending Orthodox workers. Ours have neither sent guides nor *imams.* A friend of mine once told me that people working in Peugeot in Mobilliard were searching for a place to pray, and a lot later found out that there was a place provided to them underneath the *foyer.* People had a culture shock, had no idea of where they were, what was inside the meat, where to buy it etc. So, there was a trend to establish mosques, which coincides with the arrival of *Milli Görüş,* and it starts to organize people. With the reflexes of the era, the state decides to send *Diyanet,* thinking that Turks in Europe are being drawn into these ways, are being made reactionaries, bigots, and followers of sharia, an enemy to the state. So *Diyanet* was not sent here for a religious service directly, but as a result of this reflex[71].

[71] Interview with the author, Strasbourg, June 4, 2014.

In the 1980s the reactive policies of the Turkish state have reflected predominantly on the laying claims of the religious sphere, which resulted in the establishment of *Diyanet* branches in Europe as an alternative particularly to *Milli Görüş*. Founded under the name of *Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği* (Religious Affairs Turkish Islamic Union, DITIB) in France in 1984, DITIB represented the "official Islam" which had been assimilated in Turkey within the network of *Diyanet,* against the other networks that were considered as "oppositional Islam" (Akgönül 2009: 37). Hence, rather than a respond to an existing demand by the emigrant population, DITIB was the result of a securitarian logic of the Turkish state (Bruce 2012: 134) that attempted to reintroduce an Islam that was somehow tamed under state's command.

The presence of *Diyanet* in France has been supported by several factors to create a stronger link between the emigrant community with Turkey and the Turkish state. *First,* established as an umbrella association that contained many other affiliated associations, DITIB organizations were either under the mandate of 1901 law or 1905 law, which enabled the coordination of both religious and social activities. Therefore these associations did not only conduct religious practices, but also acted as solidarity or emigrants' associations, where the religious officials appeared as temporary community leaders, along with the elected presidents of the association. The current director on external affairs at *Diyanet* who was also a former religious official in Strasbourg described to me the role assumed by religious officials sent abroad, which went beyond the regular tasks of *imam* in Turkey towards becoming community leaders and mediators between the larger community and the state institutions:

> In Turkey, religious officials of very different titles can apply to the exam to be appointed abroad. After being elected, all of them are employed under one title of "overseas religious official" (*yurtdışı din görevlisi*). Only one religious official abroad wears the 5-6 different titles of officials working in Turkey. He needs to assume all these posts. He doesn't only officiate in the mosque, mosque is only an address. We send them to a region. For instance, if a citizen goes to jail, it is the duty of our official to visit him, that's not the case in Turkey. If we have our people in orphanages or nursing homes, our official is responsible of visiting them. (…) Therefore he is in every social, cultural activity; sometimes a citizen talks about his personal problems that he could not talk to his family. I have experienced this many times when I was an official in France. Sometimes there are those who cannot talk to their relatives about their economic problems or their bad habits. We tell our officials to do all of this[72].

As suggested in the quote above the officials were employed to become both moral and spiritual supports, and as representatives of the Turkish state to reach the individual and private matters. In an article on "An associative life with the influence of Turkey" written in

[72] Interview with the author, Ankara, January 24, 2014.

1998, the former president of the umbrella organization CFAIT Ümit Metin argued that many of the earlier emigrant associations that aimed at preserving and cultivating on Turkish culture were actually founded by the initiative of the Turkish language teachers sent for ELCO programs and the religious officials sent by *Diyanet*:

> The consulate, even though it has not yet had its policy of creating a lobby as in today, is the pivot of these associations since the persons who animated them are the officials of the Turkish state (L'Observateur 1998: 8).

Second, the umbrella association, which acted as a national federation, was closely affiliated with the *Diyanet* representation, working together with the foreign mission under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In France, as in every other European country with *Diyanet* presence, the president of the national federation was also the religious counselor at the Turkish Embassy, and the vice president was the religious attaché working under the consulate (Bruce 2012: 136-137). Therefore DITIB constituted a "consular" or "official Islam", which was considered as "apolitical" by some of the believers, in comparison to the other mosques established at an earlier period. Citing Tietze (2000: 267), Bruce (2013) argued that many Turkish Muslims who frequented *Milli Görüş* mosques did not go to DITIB for finding their services too "soft" or many others chose DITIB because of finding CIMG too political. For instance reflecting the officially supported Turkish-Islamic synthesis, DITIB mosques celebrated a mix of Turkish national and religious holidays, including religious days but also the anniversary of *Çanakkale Savaşı* (Battle of Gallipoli) and even held competitions for the best recitation of the Turkish National Anthem (*İstiklal marşı güzel okuma yarışması*) (Bruce 2013). *Third,* the religious officials as well as the counselors and attachés who stayed temporarily abroad (officials for 2-4 years, counselors 3-5 years) were crucial in the continuation of ties between the community and the Turkish-Islamic culture. Analyzing the different religious actors in France, Akgönül (2009: 45) argued that the role of the *imam*, who was brought by the religious organizations, not only by DITIB but also by *Milli Görüş, Süleyman Efendi* order*, Kaplan* order or *Türk Federasyonu,* from Turkey represented a preservation of the "perpetual first generation", therefore a continuation of the ties with Turkey through the mediating role of newcomers.

The arrival of official Turkish Islam to the French geography has resulted in a competitive environment between the previously established religious organizations and DITIB, which in the end resulted with the predominance of the DITIB network over others. This competition has been foremost on appealing the religious community living in France around a certain

vision of religion, but also as discussed above, going beyond a purely spiritual attachment, it accentuated the attempts to community building. Similar to the quote by *Diyanet* representative above, Rigoni argues that these religious-oriented organizations had a role of assembling a community within a shared social (both public and private) life:

> […] in the metropolitan, the real Islamic complexes comprised of a prayer room, Quran school, library and bookstore, *halal* grocery, bakery and sometimes hairdresser, restaurant etc. Such is a project of *Milli Görüş* that bought an ancient factory of 10,000 m2 in the district of la Meinau in Strasbourg. Children, like adults, are concerned with these exchange places: the multiplicity of services and the diversity of actors who participate contribute to make these places social regulators (Rigoni 2001: 163, Author's translation).

Hence the mosque and the associations built around this common denominator worked as social spheres, which allowed a certain disciplining of the community. The competition over religion therefore signified on the one hand a power struggle to exert control over the population through discipline, but it also reflected a purely political –in the sense of day-to-day politics- struggle between the "oppositional Islam" and the "state Islam" that was ongoing in Turkey during the 1980s and particularly in the mid-1990s.

Contested Attempts to Build "The Turkish Community"

In the 1980s, *Diyanet* supported associationalism in France was one of the core practices of the Turkish state in order to both cultivate and integrate a "diasporic" population. In the period that followed the 1980s, other actions were also taken to involve in emigrants' activities outside the sphere of religion. In this section I discuss two of these initiatives that created new relations between the emigration state and emigrant society: (1) the establishment of a federative structure that brought emigrant associations around France with the support of foreign mission 1992, and (2) the formation of a representative structure of the emigrant community vis-à-vis the Turkish parliament in 1998.

Among the initial attempts of the Turkish state to "cultivate a diaspora" in Gamlen's (2011) terms, was the establishment of *Fransa Türk Dernekleri Birliği* (Union of Turkish Associations in France, UATF) with the support of the consulate in 1992, as a federative umbrella organization to bring together Turkish associations. The association was founded with a vertical structure, bringing four *Comites de Coordination des Associations Turques* (Coordination committees of Turkish Associations) in four French regions determined by the placement of four Turkish consulates. Under these regional committees existed departmental committees and local members, which according to Rigoni included 115 associations around

France. In the late 1990s UATF published bilingual journals of *Bülten* (Bulletin) and *Yeni Yorum* (New Regard), diffused by local associations and consulates (Rigoni 2000; Hüküm 2005). Rigoni's (2000: 344-345) interview with the founding president of the association, who was also the representative of the non-communist syndicate *Force Ouvriere* (Workers' Force, FO) and administrator at *FAS* (Le Fonds d'Action Sociale), illustrates the positioning of the emigrant elite in-between emigrants, host and home states:

> Everything started in 1992 in the department of Yvelines. As I am the representative of a syndicate in the automobile sector [of FO at Peugeot], I saw the difficulties of the [Turkish] community. We established a franco-turkish association that proposed activities to youth, nights, football tournaments etc. […] we had the idea of going to a structure in the Ile-de-France region. Afterwards, we had contacts with the consulates because I knew well the associative sphere in the department of Yvelines but in Ile-de-France it wasn't evident. I had contacts with the consul of the period who got interested a lot to the social and associative sphere. He supported me a lot, we worked together for 6-7 months, and I had many meetings with associations (Rigoni 2000: 345, Author's translation).

For the political entrepreneurs within the emigrant community, the increased interest by the home state served as an outlet for creating an associative sphere that could reach for resources provided by the foreign mission. Rigoni argues that UATF strongly emphasized integration to France, within the perspective of workfare – bringing together syndical organizations (such as Turk-Is with FO) or establishing local links through twin towns and organizing visits to Turkey (as youth exchanges between French and Turkish children). UATF distinguished from DITIB's umbrella, as it was based on a shared identity of Turkish citizenship rather than a shared religion (Turkish Islam). Another difference was UATF's taking of a political position in France on two topics: (1) criticizing the denial of the nomination of 1915 events as genocide, by organizing a protest against the French Senate in 1998[73] and conducting a signature campaign to the presidential candidates before 2002 elections on this topic[74], and (2) supporting Turkey's candidacy to the EU by a mass email campaign to be sent to the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France[75]. These objectives illustrates the repercussions of the initiative for building a community strongly attached to the discursive policies of the home state, which were consolidated in the 1990s over the Turkish-Armenian conflict and the accession to the EU.

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[73] Hürriyet. 1998. "Türkler Paris'te yürüyecek." June 12. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkler-paris-te-yuruyecek-39023455.

[74] Hürriyet Dünya. 2001. "Figaro'nun düğünü." January 18. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=-218002; Tete de Turc. 2002. "Fransız Cumhurbaşkanlık seçimleri". May 2002. http://www.tetedeturc.com/home/spip.php?article1274.

[75] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı. 2002. "Fransa'daki Türklerden AB Kampanyası." November 11. http://www.ab.gov.tr/index.php?p=22955&l=1.

The claims making around these issues are demonstrative of the shift towards extra-territoriality, which as discussed by Varadarajan (2010) went beyond the economic logic of acquiring remittances towards transnationalization of domestic politics.

Following CFAIT's initiative on supporting the acquiring of citizenship among citizens from Turkey in the 1990s, UATF also organized a campaign in late 2003 on the electoral participation for French regional and EU Parliament elections in 2004. This was one of the earliest mass campaigns that supported electoral participation in France. As it will be discussed in Chapter 8, UATF and other organizations' (including CFAIT and COJEP) initiatives on this matter led to an incremental increase in the number of voters and elected representatives in the 2000s. The union was dissolved in the mid-2000s. UATF's presence in the 1990s is significant in understanding the basis of the sphere between Turkish state and emigrant associationalism that started to take shape in the 2000s. It had a federative structure that aimed to bring organizations from around France, therefore not reaching a specific geographical location but acting as a national representation. It worked as a diasporic organization beginning with the late 1990s focusing on political and social affairs related to Turkey and Turkish politics.

It should be noted that despite the existence of an attempt to build a diasporic organization, the perspective of the pre-2003 period distinguished from what is observed in the mid and late 2000s, by a selectivity that excluded the majority of the population living in France. Aside from the state's perspective, this was already widespread among the overall atmosphere in the 1990s, as discussed in the section on associational life, whereas every group belonged to a different sphere, which deliberately did not coincide with the other. An anecdote reported by journalist Muharrem Sarıkaya in 2003 illustrates the state's and its representatives' evaluation of the emigrant population and their approachability by the state:

> [Hüseyin] Çelik narrated a situation that he faced during his former membership to the parliament. […] They were guests to former Ambassador Sönmez Köksal. Ambassador Köksal told them that the number of population living in France was 400-500 thousand. Çelik asked him this question: "If we would want to organize a demonstration on behalf of Turkey tomorrow, how many citizens would participate to the meeting?" Sönmez answered "Not much". "We said, about 10,000 are supporters of PKK, they would not come". It went on that the rest 50,000 are extreme left, 50,000 are extreme nationalist, 50,000 are Islamists, sectarians, clandestine. In the end there was no Turkish population. It is a pain if we cannot mobilize 2.5 million in Germany and 500 thousand in France for a movement for Turkey.

> [...] The problem is the Turkish state's inaptitude to mobilize its citizens living abroad. However there are 2,700 public officials working abroad[76].

The dialogue between the former Member of Parliament and the former ambassador of Turkey to France illustrates the highly selective perception of the Turkish state vis-à-vis the emigrant communities living abroad. This selectivity would exclude federative structures such as *Türk Federasyonu* or *Milli Görüş,* due to their political orientations that was not deemed as compatible with the state ideology, which was very much based on a state Kemalism. For the head of *Türk Federasyonu,* the Turkish state's reluctance to admit an ideological-based federation despite its "Turkishness" (assumed common identity) was a reason for its weakness in creating a larger community with strong allegiance to the homeland in the overseas during the 1990s:

> In the past there used to be tournaments held by consulates, called Mustafa Kemal Atatürk tournament. People participated from DITIB, but when our organization applied to the consulate it says no, you cannot participate if you are *Ülkücü,* we would have to have PKK as well. There used to be people who saw us like that. What I try to say is that, the most important issue is this, the state does not do the necessities of umbrella organizations for the sake of its own political benefit or future[77].

The quote above illustrates that there has been a strong selectivity of the Turkish state to become engaged only with associations that complied with its official ideology, represented by state Kemalism. Despite the innate nationalism harbored within this official ideology, the ideological position of the *Ülkücü* in the 1980s and 1990s remained radical for the state institutions that refrained from getting into regular contacts with the large community established around it. As it will be discussed in Chapter 8, the selectivity has been relaxed in the post-2003 period, for the sake of reaching wider masses. Nevertheless, this relaxation has not been made available for every group, despite the transformations both at Turkey (i.e. the "openings" for ethnic groups) and in Turkey's relations with its citizens living abroad (i.e. availability of extraterritorial voting rights). The selectivity is ongoing for Kurdish associations, as an executive member of the Kurdish federation FEYKA in Paris has emphasized during our interview:

> D. A: What kind of relations do you have with the Turkish state institutions?

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[76] Muharrem Sarıkaya. 2003. "Yurtdışındaki Türkler MGK gündeminde." Sabah Gazetesi. April 30. http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2003/04/30/s1813.html.

[77] Interview with the author, Paris, May 10, 2014.

> There is the situation that our institutions are presented as terrorist organizations. It is told that they are close to PKK and therefore need to be closed down. We do not find this right, Kurds are a community. These people who came here pushed limits, they are doing folklore etc., have no relations with being terrorists, this is a negative approach. A potential that can bring dynamism to Turkey is left outside, that is not reasonable[78].

Although speaking of two different worlds, the answers of the two representatives from *Türk Federasyonu* and FEYKA to my questions share parallels, about the role of ideational and ideological compliance for the relations between certain collectivities and the home state. Following the 1980s logic of securitization, the Kurdish emigrants' mobilization in France and their establishment of a community highly oriented towards homeland politics (may that refer to either Turkish or a Kurdish state) continued to remain as one of the primary antagonists of the Turkish state in France. Hence, the attempts to build a proto diasporic organization in the 1990s and 2000s have laid the foundations of a more institutionalized management in the 2003 period. Nevertheless, the discussion illustrated that the ideological fragmentation that persisted during this period endured in the emigration state-emigrant society relations.

Another early initiative that was reinitiated after certain modifications in the late 2000s was the launching of a representative structure for emigrants to stand in relation with the Turkish state. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Advisory Committee on Citizens Living Abroad was founded in 1998, to bring representatives from all countries with a Turkish emigrant population and hold meetings with government representatives. In France, the first members of the committee were the president of *Centre Culturel Anatolie,* Demir Önger; general coordinator of ELELE, Pınar Hüküm and a law student from Lyon, who was later replaced by historian and political scientist Samim Akgönül. These members, who represented a certain secular republican position and were appointed with the nomination of the Turkish consulate, met with criticism from the emigrant communities in France, as they were deemed as not representing them. In an interview by Aslı Öcal, the former member Pınar Hüküm had described the emergence of tensions among the communities in France, at the time of the election for the Advisory Committee:

> This situation created a scandal in the newspapers. They said, "How could these people our representatives? We did not elect them, the members need to be elected and participate in the council in Turkey". In the first meeting we told them that we were not representatives but that we could be advisors. After this, they replaced the name of the committee to Advisory Committee for Citizens Living Abroad [from Representative Committee]. Serdaroğlu

[78] Interview with the author, Paris, May 30, 2014.

> separated us into groups of two or three to work on women's issues, extraterritorial voting, media etc. to create expert commissions. These commissions were to provide bills to the parliamentarians to resolve certain gaps. But the next governments put this project away. […] [During the meeting in June 2007] This time it was a meeting to report the new governments' new understanding of integration and the overall policy. The new policy is particularly based on the political participation of Turks and people of Turkish origin (Interview with Pınar Hüküm by Aslı Öcal in Danış and İrtiş 2011, Author's translation).

During my interviews for this research, the majority of the current executive members of the civil society organizations in France, except for only those who participated in the committee, reported that they did not have much knowledge about the committee that existed beginning with the late 1990s and did not know the representatives who had participated to it. In fact, the committee had not been publicized in the larger community as the selection process received many criticisms. Hüküm's comments on the committee illustrate the schisms within the emigrant community in France, which could very easily become tightened due to home state's selective approach. It also underscores the transformations from the committee established in 1998 to the new one launched in 2012: while the former committee has been formed and acted as the continuation of a republican selectivity to react to the existing emigrants' problems within a logic of encompassing citizenship, the latter mainly focused on the ethnic character of the target population that was expected to integrate socially and politically. According to the interviews with the former representatives at the committee both in France and the United States, the main focus of the committee meetings was the most populated emigrant community, which was in Germany, therefore leaving a very narrow room for other countries representatives to participate in talks.

The establishment of the consultative committee, although it did not function properly, was crucial as a first attempt to form a representative body, which would be institutionally recognized in Turkey. In the preceding period the representation of the emigration state in relation with the emigrant society would be managed under the heading of the embassy and consulate, later to be reinforced by ministerial representatives (from the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labour or *Diyanet*) and the officials sent from Turkey (language instructors and religious officials). Along with the attempts to build an all-encompassing umbrella organization, the consultative committee signifies an expectation to form a representative institution, which was expected to assume "causes supported by the Turkish state" as a mass that is still attached to it through citizenship. However, as discussed before, the implementation of this policy had still met with the securitarian/reactive logic of the 1980s, causing a high selectivity of the potential mediators.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the pre-2003 era can be separated under three periods, representing the three modalities that existed in emigration state and emigrant society relations in France. The *first one* covers the pre-1965 period, when very limited relations existed between the foreign mission and the citizens, based on day-to-day needs, as a result of the territorially defined citizenship policies and a lack of political interest on emigrants. A very sporadic transnational mobilization towards homeland had formed in this period, which had later laid the foundations of a Parisian based political environment criticizing the coups or human rights violations in Turkey. The *1965-1980 period* is signified by the emerging labour migration and workforce-based relations between the state and the society. The continuation of a territorially defined citizenship conception caused the persistence of limited relations during this period. The chapter has illustrated that for many emigrants, the lack of state provisions to emigrants (either in the form of support on workers' rights or other social and cultural rights) were a crucial cause for the advent of alternative and oppositional movements (left movement*, Milli Görüş, Türk Federasyonu* and later Kurdish movement) that had "filled this gap of public services" and attracted emigrants towards their own ideological perspective.

The consolidation of oppositional transnational movements was reinforced after the 1980 coup, when a massive refugee migration both from Turkey and from other European countries arrived to France. In this *final period*, the state's emigrant policy was marked by transition towards extra-territorialism that signified new symbolic, institutional and citizenship-related policies that aimed at tightening the relations between the state and society. This tightening was retained by the direct supervision of the state officials over the communitarian environment, as evident in the case of foreign mission's collection of associative data and the *Diyanet* supported DITIB's functioning under the presence of religious counselor and attaches appointed by the central government in Turkey. For political entrepreneurs who complied with the agenda of the post-coup regime and the Kemalist secular republicanism, the new policies opened up new resources and opportunities for assembling under umbrella organizations. The example of UATF in the mid-1990s demonstrates the availability of sources by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' institutional framework and the absorption of the state agenda by these entrepreneurs for building a community structure around Turkish identity and homeland-related claims making.

The post-1980 environment can be summarized as an "action-reaction" phase, when both the civil society/collective movements and the home country's reactions to them flourished.

Despite the transition towards an extraterritorial understanding of citizenship and an emigrant policy that supported emigrants' diasporic participation, the continuation of the securitization logic remaining from the post-coup environment over the 1990s continued to create tensions between the state and emigrant society. Together with the official state ideology constructed around secular republicanism, the availability of an interactive sphere with the state was highly limited to specific groups, excluding a wide range of actors within the emigrant community from Turkey, from Turkish and Kurdish nationalist groups to Islamists. Following this chapter, which analyzed the reflections of Turkish state's policies on emigrants and citizens living abroad on the home state-emigrant relations in France, Part II of this dissertation continues with the next chapter where I investigate their reflections in the United States.

CHAPTER 6

From "Children of Republic" to "Germanification": Politics of Emigrants from Turkey in the U.S. before 2003

In the first two chapters of Part II, I have examined the Turkish state's emigrant policies and the interactions of how they were implemented with the emigrants' transnational practices in France for the period before 2000s. The inquiries in the two chapters had illustrated that there has been a shift in the state's policies towards emigrants beginning with the 1980s, which started to incorporate the emigrants within the imagery of nation by acknowledging their permanency in the host countries. However, the repercussions of the junta regime following the 1980 coup and the official state ideology marked by secular republican state Kemalism had retained the deep cleavages between the state and the already fragmented societal actors in the case of France. Following the two chapters on Turkish state policies and emigrants' politics in France, in this chapter I analyze the situation of emigrant communities from Turkey in the United States, and focus on their relations with the Turkish state in the pre-2003 period. The case of the U.S. provides clear comparisons with France as discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation: in terms of the immigration histories, migrant incorporation, citizenship and political participation policies the U.S. emerged as a comparatively more open system than in France for the accessibility of immigrants in the state and society. Moreover, while the emigrant populations in France was marked by the merging of deeply engrained community structures around ideologically fragmented identities, the population in the U.S. was represented by strong individualism and weak ties among the majority of the community complying in terms of their ideological position. These two comparative differences provide a fertile ground for analyzing the differences and more importantly similarities that emerge in the implementation of home state policies in practice and the resulting implications on home state-emigrant society relations.

The next sections will benefit from the existing literature described in Chapter 3 and further it with the empirical research conducted in September-December 2014. While the research focuses primarily on the nation-wide collectivities, rather than individuals, it is limited geographically, and therefore represents the results of an investigation which took place in the New York metropolitan area and Washington D.C. The localities were strategically chosen since the headquarters of the federative structures functioning as roof to certain groups are positioned in these two regions. Moreover, according to the data obtained from the Turkish embassy, the consular area of New York, which predominantly includes the N.Y. metropolitan area is the most populous in terms of citizens of Turkey.

6.1. From Geographical Dispersal to Communitarianism in the U.S.

In Chapter 5, I discussed that since the beginning of emigration from Turkey to France, the emigrant community was marked by a geographical clustering between the Parisian center and the periphery, based on the social, cultural and economic capital of emigrants, their migration motives and mode of arrival. This physical clustering had led to the creation of emigrant communities, which were ideologically and politically distinctive from one another, reflecting as the parts of a fragmented population originated from a same geography. These two factors (geographical clustering and ideological fragmentation) were critical in understanding how the Turkish state's policies towards citizens in France in the pre-2003 period were implemented: attempting to reach wider populations through support for communitarianism, while at the same time aiming to reinforce state-led alternatives to the existing political oppositions compatible with the policy of securitization.

In the case of United States, the emigration history from Anatolia has begun with the flow of unskilled populations in the early 20th century and was later followed by the mobility of the forcibly displaced. Nevertheless in terms of citizenship ties, the majority of these groups have not remained within the sovereignty claim of the home country in the succeeding years due to their ethnic and religious "incompatibility" with the homogeneous construction of the new nation state. For these emigrants, particularly of Greek and Armenian origin, the Lausanne Treaty which determined the status of minorities in Turkey and the settlement of the republic have resulted in the decision of permanency and the social and political alienation from the homeland over time (Bakalian 2001). An ethno musical analysis by Avcı (Avcı 2015) on Armenian, Greek, Turkish and Kurdish folk songs from Ottoman originated emigrant groups in the New York illustrates that a shared identity based on Anatolian culture had in fact

persisted in the Manhattan music scene until the 1970s, but nevertheless subsided in the most recent decades. The mobility, which had begun in the late 19th century, slowed down in the 1920s as a result of the U.S. immigration law of 1924, reducing migration from Anatolia significantly (Bakalian 2001: 2). According to Karpat (2004: 618), the establishment of communities among some of the emigrants from the Ottoman Empire around ethno-religious identity took place in relation with their clustering around specific churches, such as the Greek Archdiocese of America, which congregated the Greek emigrants under an institutional framework. The Armenians on the other hand became embedded among the Armenian-American community, which itself was split along many groups based on origin country, socioeconomic status and political orientation (Bakalian 1993). The historical accounts on the early migration note that those who remained compatible with the Turkish Republic through Turkishness and Islam either returned back with the support of the newly founded regime in the early 1920s or became assimilated in the American society, therefore not establishing communitarian structures in the United States (Karpat 2004: 618).

As a result, the current outlook of emigrants from Turkey in the U.S. is acknowledged to begin with the post-1950s migration pattern of "brain drain". This notion has been designated to describe the mobility of university level students and professionals following the developments in the inter-governmental relations in the 1950s (Akçapar 2009). Dispersing around the vast American geography, the members of this migration pattern underwent a highly individualistic mobility, only some congregating in small numbers around metropolitan areas such as New York, Los Angeles or Chicago. In comparison to the solidarity-based communitarian assemblies in France, the American case has been represented by early student or professional associationalism and short-ranged cultural associations which had become localities for the infrequent meetings. Educated in the Turkish national curriculum, which inculcated the secular and republican values of Kemalism, this emigrant population was ideologically and politically attuned around "Turkishness". Easily adaptable to the American professional life and society, this group would identify themselves as "Turkish-Americans" in their country of residence. Different from the case of France, there have not been contestations against the use of "Turkishness" as the common denominator by Kurdish populations, either because of the rarity of ethnic Kurds within this migration pattern or due to the lack of a mobilization based on ethnic identity until the 2000s.

Aside from this main group represented by geographical dispersal and individualism, there have been small and sporadic communities formed out of spontaneous networking of the Turkish lower-class in the 1960s. The arrival of lower-class migrants from Turkey can be found in the narrations of ethnographic studies, which usually describe it as a coincidental situation and the result of loosely related network migration patterns. One such narration takes place in the studies of DiCarlo (2008) where she describes the emigration from Giresun to Connecticut as a result of the meeting of three Turkish men who met with an ethnic Greek of Turkish citizenship and had decided follow his path in the United States. A second story is of tailors' migration in Rochester, New York, which took place following a Turkish academic's initiation to publish an advertisement on a Turkish newspaper, describing the need for skilled tailors in the American clothing industry (Orhaner 2013: 14). The two stories represent the exceptional cases of migration from Turkey to the United States in the pre-1980 period, which have led to the chain migration of lower-educated individuals and to the establishment of communitarian structures.

The 1980s changed and diversified the outlook of the emigrant populations from Turkey in the United States. While this period was marked by the mobility of political migrants for the European geography, asylum migration has been very rare towards the United States. Rather, the new mobility from Turkey has transformed the urban, high-class elite outlook in the United States towards diversification with the arrival of low-skilled emigrants and entrepreneurs (Kaya 2003; Karpat 2008). This phenomenon has received greater attention among the emigrant community and the academia, when a member of American Turkish Association of Washington D.C. (ATA-DC) associated the new mobility with migration from Turkey to Germany, in an article he entitled "'Germanification' of Turkish Americans". According to the article, the new group differed from those who had arrived in earlier periods, as they "display(ed) a great deal of social cohesion and solidarity centering on the locality where they originated from – known within the Turkish context as the 'hemşerilik' phenomenon.[79]" This situation signified the diversification of the population that had previously been recognized by their individualism and strong commitment to the values of Kemalism, towards stronger representation of Turkish ethnic identity coalesced with a traditionalist Islamic identity. This new population that distinguished from the early-comers has brought about a new communitarianism, strongly tied with local or regional ties in the

[79] Uğur Akıncı. 2002. "'Germanification' of Turkish-Americans." Turkish Torque. May 14. http://www.tacsne.org/Germanification.htm.

homeland described. Arguing that the Turkish-Americans were not capable of creating communities in the past, Karpat (2008: 182) advocated that the newly arriving populations who had internal cohesion and solidarity had an immigrant's consciousness, based on sharing a common grassroots culture, language, history and national ethos. Reflecting on the transnationalism of homeland related matters and relations with the home state, the impact of these newly arrived populations has become ostensible mainly in the post-2000s, as I will elaborate more in Chapter 9.

It should be noted that despite the occasional communication between the individualistic and communitarian groups in the following decades, the class and religious practice created divergences between these two populations. For instance, in her ethnographic research on lower-class Muslim Turkish migrants in Massachusetts, Erman (2013) argued that that the community of tailors of rural origin who arrived to the United States beginning with the 1960s distinguished from the general migrant population from Turkey. This group, more similar to the guest workers in Germany, aimed to make money quickly and then return to home country. The story of the establishment of a mosque by this group of people in 1996 represented their distinction from the other existing collectivities in the United States as "undesirables" due to their lower-class status or conservatism:

> We first became members of the Turkish-American Cultural Association and suggested that a small mosque could be opened within the association. But the Association strongly rejected this idea. Then we decided to set up our own mosque. We were twenty-eight families. […] When a customer of mine (he was a tailor) told me about an old church that was for sale, we thought of it as a good opportunity. We bought it for $150,000; the people made payments to us after they got bank loans. We wanted it to be a part of the *Nurcu tarikatı* (Fethullah Gülen's "Islamist" community), but they rejected our offer. So I had to go to the American Muslim Association in New York, and after bargaining until 3 in the morning, we reached an agreement. We finally opened this mosque as a branch of the American Muslim Association (Interview with the founding president of the mosque in Erman 2013: 101).

As argued by Erman (2013: 101), the group's rejection both from secular upper-middle class Turkish-American Cultural Association and from the *Hizmet* movement mainly consisting of higher-educated migrants, pushed them to become roofed under the United American Muslim Association of the *Süleyman Efendi* order, which emerged as the only available outlet. In his analysis on the shifting Turkish American identity, Kaya (2003: 108) also underscores this social distinction, by quoting one of his interviewees:

> People see that cold face of the government offices when they go to the Consulate. Like other ethnic groups such as Chinese, we need to provide help to people who need it so they can find

> jobs, get driver licenses, and many other things. Much of the help is received through informal contacts and from fellows from particular towns or cities in Turkey. He goes where fellow Corumians or Yagliderians go. They go to the coffee shops and play cards all day. That is really bad. It is horrible. There is no place where he could go. He has no choice, no alternative. We need a formal institution that people could trust (Interview with Yılmaz in Kaya 2003: 108-109).

Kaya (2003: 109) argues that the polarization exists between the early comers and newly arrived populations: "[…] first generation Turkish Americans as the elitist approaches (including the Turkish state) and ordinary Turkish life styles do not mesh together." What Kaya (2003) and his interviewee remark as the social distinction, is also critical for our research in terms of the relations between the home state institutions and the emigrant communities. As I will discuss in the following sections, while some of the elite Turkish-Americans and particularly the executive members of the umbrella organizations have established regular contacts with the Turkish consulate or the embassy in the 1980s, the "cold face of the government offices" endured for the newly arrived emigrants in the period preceding the 2000s as in the case of France. As it will be argued in Chapter 9, the overall transformation of the Turkish state's emigrant policies in the most recent age had an impact on the reformulation of this distance between the Turkish state (and the elite) and the newly arrived populations.

Associationalism in the United States

The transnational ties between the emigrants from Anatolia and the home country existed even in the early 20th century, surfacing as sporadic communications, remittances sent home and relations with the state representatives. Such an account is narrated to take place during the foundation of the republic, when the visit of a representative of the nationalist movement in the home country was resulted with the raising of money for orphanages among the working class (Grabowski 2013: 1344). This initiative was also supported by some of the 25 associations that existed during this period, including *Türk Teavün Cemiyeti* (Turkish Aid Society) and *Hilali Amber* (Red Crescent) founded by the Kurds, which collected money for funeral services and sent remittances for the national war (Karpat 2004: 616; Sertel 1969). Among the organizations established during this period were also those by Jewish migrants from Turkey, such as American Association of Jewish Friends of Turkey in New York, *Mahazike Tora* program supported by the International Sephardic Leadership Council or the Association of Constantinople (Anıl 2010: 106; Alfassa 2008).

The role or support of the Turkish state representatives in the establishment of associations in the United States has often taken place in the history of migration. While these connections were commonly disguised or not officially publicized when they took place in France, the presence of such ties find their place clearly in the scholarly research and the anecdotes of the emigrants living in the host country. This resonates well with Çağlar's (2006) discussion on the transnational ties between emigrants and the home countries, long term perceived as a threat in Europe and as natural consequence of migration in the United States. It also illustrates the juxtaposition of at least some parts of the associational life in the United States with higher politics since the earlier times. According to Türkmen (2009: 110) one of the early instances of this situation was Ambassador Münir Ertegün's attempts to enhance bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States in the 1930s and 1940s, and his support for the friendship associations, which were established during his tenure. The associations of the period included *Türk Hars Birliği* (Turkish Culture Alliance), which was the continuation of Turkish Aid Society, *Türk Kıbrıs Yardım Cemiyeti* (Turkish Cyprus Aid Society of New York), *Talebe Cemiyeti* (Students' Society) and *Doktorlar Birliği* (Doctors' Union). Following the improvements in Turkish-American relations and the increase in the mobility of doctors and engineers for professional training in the 1950s, new associations began to be founded around the United States. Some of these early associations included Turkish-American Club in Southern California (1953), Turkish American Cultural Society of New England in Boston (1964), Turkish American Friendship Society of US in Philadelphia (1966), Turkish American Cultural Alliance in Chicago (1968), Turkish American Cultural Association of Michigan (1972) and *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish American Association of New Jersey, 1981) [80].

As I will elaborate more in the organizations' distinct histories in relation with the home and host country political environment, one of the primary reasons for assembly for the Turkish-Americans under the roof of federations has been to respond to the rival communities' politicization in the United States. Together with the American political system, which allows for ethnic lobbying in local and national governance, this situation has pushed for a discussion around the theme of lobbying by Turkish-Americans since the 1980s. Nevertheless, as I had previously discussed in Chapter 3, there is a legal difference between the status of nonprofit immigrant organizations, under the tax-exempt status of 501(c)(3) and

[80] Cemil Özyurt. 2013. "Amerika'daki Türk dernek sayısı 400'ü geçti." Turk Avenue. March 25. http://www.turkavenue.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4202:amerikadaki-turk-dernek-sayisi-250yi-gecti&catid=196:turk-amerikan-dernekleri-federasyonu&Itemid=819.

other organizations, which are capable of lobbying as long as it is related to the organization's exempt purpose. In an analysis of the distribution of non-profit statuses among Turkish-American organizations in the New York metropolitan area, Anıl (2010: 173) asserted that 87% of the organizations were positioned under the 501(c)(3) category, therefore having limited capability to engage in legislative advocacy. Akçapar's (2013: 51) analysis also illustrates that the predominant part of organizations in the United States have been under the 501(c)(3) category, with the exception of high-level business association American Turkish Council (ATC) founded in 1988 and a few organizations which have been founded in the 2000s. The primary forms of political action available to the associations founded by Turkish Americans have been thus limited with a number of tools, including:

> […] advocacy with the executive and judicial branches; non-partisan analysis, or research; responses to written requests for technical advice from any government body; invitations to testify before any government body; challenges to or support for legislative proposals that affects organizations' rights and tax-exempt status and meetings where nonprofit organizations talk with stakeholders about broad social, economic, and political problems (de Graauw 2007: 13 in Anıl 2010: 171).

As an alternative to lobbying, "educating" has been the concept and approach used by the associations since the 1980s, aiming on the one hand the education of the Turkish-American community on grassroots advocacy and civic leadership (without endorsing any specific candidate) and on the other hand the general public and policymakers on Turkey and U.S-Turkey relations.

In the United States, the politicization of emigrant populations from Turkey in the 1980s has been the result of clashes with the pre-existing populations of Anatolia, particularly Greek and Armenians who had arrived in the early 20th century. The conflict-based encounters have been reinforced by high-level politics and inter-governmental relations, directly influencing the associative environment in the host country. Among the citizens of Turkey, the primary distinction until the arrival of new groups in the 2000s has been along the class lines and secularism/Islamism divide which had not created significant clashes as in the case of France. This situation enabled the creation of associative federations, representing the general population since the 1980s around two clusters: the Federation of Turkish American Associations and the Assembly of Turkish American Associations. In an attempt to portray the trajectories taken by these two principle organizations and others, in the next part of this chapter, I present the continuities and ruptures in their political endeavors. Who represents whom? What have been their trajectories of integration in the United States? What have been

their unique positions vis-à-vis the Turkish state and its policies on citizens living abroad? By providing this exploratory part, I seek to identify the collectivities and movements in their specificities and to deliver a backdrop for the discussion on home state-emigrant relations at the succeeding sections of this chapter (pre-2003 period) and in Chapter 9 (post-2003 period).

American Turkish Society

Founded in 1949 by a small group of power elite including three Turkish representatives, the American Turkish Society (ATS) had the initial focus of economic and political relations between the U.S. and Turkey. A 501(c)(3) charitable organization, ATS distinguishes from the typical emigrants' associations with its objectives aiming to take a position in the international affairs and its member community comprised of the highly mobile global elite. The society obtains funding from its individual and corporate members, which include the largest conglomerates of Turkey. Among its past leaders were Turkish or American ambassadors, some of the well-known figures among the Turkish-American community such as music executives Ahmet Ertegün and Arif Mardin, or individuals who held executive positions in the state departments such as State Planning Institution or State Partnership Administration upon their return to Turkey. The undertakings of ATS in the pre-2000 period included projects related to Turkey, such as the launching of Center of Turkish Studies at Columbia University (1950s), holding benefit for 1966 Varto Earthquake, funding of graduate business scholarships with the Turkish Education Foundation (1970s), launching aid fund to benefit Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul (1980s) and raising over four million dollars in support of schools after 1999 earthquake. ATS has been renown to host Turkish politicians, high-level bureaucrats and entrepreneurs during its annual American-Turkish business conferences, luncheons and events since its foundation[81]. It started to collaborate in the 2000s with the Moon and Stars Project, a non-profit organization that aims at promoting greater cultural interaction between the two countries. Beginning with 1999, Moon and Stars Project organized MayFest as a month long annual arts and culture festival of American-Turkish community. ATS also collaborated with the Turkish Women's League of America (TWLA) and Turkish American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TACCI). Aside from economic and political affairs, arts & culture programs, philanthropy towards Turkey is a crucial part of the ATS activities[82].

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[81] One of these early incidents was President Celal Bayar's visit to ATS, where he discussed Turkish economic recovery and the support of the American Marshall Plan (Kaskeline 1954: 20-21).

[82] The American Turkish Society Program Report 2009/2010. 2010.

As one of the oldest and stable associations of Turkish-Americans in the United States, ATS represents a group of upper middle-class and upper class cosmopolitans, who have the resources to negotiate and exploit a certain flexibility to embed in the global economy, similar to Ong's (1993) depictions of the Overseas Chinese. On the one hand, the proximity of its members to the Turkish state and its representatives, oftentimes due to its president's former post and sometimes through familial ties or shared networks, has enabled their easier accessibility to some citizenship rights related to mobility and in the post-migratory processes even before the Turkish liberalization in the 1980s. Following Turkey's economic liberalization, the ATS established a stronger position in opening Turkish business to the American markets. On the other hand since its foundation the assembly has been accessible to the American political and economic elite, therefore able to create a bridge between these two countries. Different from the traditional emigrant associations, the ATS has become a benchmark in the 2000s for others who were involved in high-level lobbying.

Federation of Turkish American Associations

The Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA) is the oldest grassroots federation in the United States, established in 1956 with the convergence of Turkish Culture Alliance and *Kıbrıs Yardım Cemiyeti* (Cypriot Aid Society) in New York. Although FTAA was founded as a federation, it did not have a populous membership during its foundation, as the number of emigrants from Turkey, which continued to have their ties with the home country, was estimated to be around 2000-3000 by the president of the period[83]. Until recently the FTAA was located in the Turkish House, which was bought by the Turkish government in 1977 as the main office of the consulate but also served as a center for cultural activities (Akçapar 2009). Particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, FTAA distinguished itself from ATS and ATAA by denouncing elitism and pronouncing its receptiveness to a broader community of emigrants from Turkey and other Turkic societies (Akçapar 2009: 175). The associative members of the FTAA include the cultural and educational associations in the United States, as well as alumni associations (i.e. Istanbul Technical University Alumni, Middle East Technical University Alumni), professional associations (i.e. Society of Turkish American Architects, Engineers and Scientists), Turkish sports fan associations, mosque associations and associations established by other Turkic communities (i.e. Azerbaijan Society of America, American Association of Crimean Turks).

[83] Interview with the author, New York, November 15, 2014.

The most outspoken activity of FTAA has been the Turkish Day Parades, which take place every year in New York since 1980. The parade started as an informal event in 23 April 1980 as a protest of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia's (ASALA)[84] attacks targeting Turkish citizens and diplomats in Turkey and in the overseas. The march was made official with the support from the Turkish government in 1982 and was shifted to the weekend that is closest to May 19th, the Youth Day of Turkey. Beginning as a platform to draw attention on Turkey-related international conflicts, the parade established into a cultural festival to represent Turkey and Turkish emigrants in the United States[85]. Still, homeland related matters occupied a greater place in the agenda of the FTAA in the period that followed the 1980s, especially for some of its members. A former executive member of the federation described their annual program in the 1980s as such: *fight* from January to April, *relax* from May to August and *have fun* from September to December[86].

The federation and its member associations have often witnessed disagreements over Turkish politics in the past, which have reflected oftentimes to conflicts among the federation's executive members or dissolutions in the member associations. An example of politicization has occurred in one of its oldest members, Turkish Society of Rochester (TSOR), which was founded by a group of tailors and their families in 1969 (Anıl 2010: 112; Orhaner 2013). Represented as a traditional conservative population, the members of TSOR established a community house and created a community representing Turkish migrants in the area, attracting many other incoming migrants. According to Orhaner (2013: 30-31), the association underwent conflict in the 1990s as a result of political schisms around Turkish politics, eventually being divided under five different groups including: secular and left-oriented TSOR representing Turkish republican values; followers of *Süleyman Efendi* order who later established *Rochester İslam Kültür Merkezi* (Islamic Culture Center of Rochester) and Hamidiye mosque; supporters of Necmettin Erbakan; followers of *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* establishing *Rochester Türk İslam Ocakları* (Rochester Turkish-Islamic Center); those who identified themselves with their city of origin, Maraş; and later Turkish Cultural Center of Rochester, mainly associated with *Hizmet* movement (Orhaner 2013: 34). While the religious and political identification had led to the dissolution of the greater association,

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[84] In the United States, ASALA's attacks included the assassination of Los Angeles Turkish Consuls Generals in 1973 and 1982, the assassination of Turkish Honorary Consul Orhan Gündüz in 1982, the bombing of the Turkish Center in New York in 1980 and the attempted murder of the Philadelphia Honorary Turkish Consul General in 1982. Assembly of Turkish American

[85] Elif Özmenek. 2007. "American-Turks parade in New York." Hurriyet Daily News. May 21.

[86] Interview with the author, New York, November 21, 2014.

TSOR established ties with Turkish *Diyanet* in 2000 and adopted Turkish state Islam as its main reference, despite the initial disapprovals by its Alevi members.

Assembly of Turkish American Associations

The foundation of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA) happened during a politically dynamic period for emigrants from Turkey on homeland matters, which according to its current executive members has triggered the founding members to organize a political entity to act as a collectivity[87]. A number of incidents, related to the foreign affairs of Turkey, are cited as the main triggers of its foundation including: the ethnic conflict in Cyprus (1970s), the production of the movie Midnight Express which portrayed a negative image of Turkey related to human rights violations (1978) and the series of attacks by ASALA. In 1979, led by the Turkish Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ, ATAA was co-founded by the American Turkish Association of Washington and the Maryland American Turkish Association, "in an effort to create a national organization representing the Turkish American community" in Washington D.C. Beginning with 26 organizations around the United States, ATAA undertook a series of activities including educational seminars for Turkish American communities on grassroots advocacy and civic leadership; conferences on contemporary political, social and economic issues related to Turkey and US Turkish relations; and cultural events to promote Turkish traditions, art and heritage[88]. ATAA's component associations include Turkish American Associations as well as alumni, professional, sports fan and women's associations from around the United States from 21 states, ethnic kin associations (Azerbaijan Society of America and Ahıska Turkish American Community Center) and Turkish American Business Association from Turkey[89].

A 501(c)(3) non-profit organization, the assembly was funded since the mid-1980s by the Turkish Promotion Fund's project supports, activity incomes and membership fees. In an attempt for self-dependence from state funding, the board of trustees of the assembly established an endowment fund in the late 1980s, in order to create an autonomous income. The issue of financial autonomy has created tensions particularly in the 2000s, causing

[87] Interviews with the author, Washington D.C., November 20, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/american-turks-parade-in-new-york.aspx?pageID=438&n=american-turks-parade-in-new-york-2007-05-21.

[88] Assembly of Turkish American Associations. 2016. "About Us." Accessed January 13. http://www.ataa.org/about/index.html.

[89] Assembly of Turkish American Associations. 2016. "Component associations." Accessed January 18. http://www.ataa.org/component/.

tensions among the executive committee for several years[90]. Beginning with 1989, the assembly published the bi-weekly newspaper, *The Turkish Times,* reaching the circulation of over eight thousand readers in the 1990s. Angın's (2003: 157) analysis illustrated that in the pre-2000 period the newspaper's contents included a specific attention on ATAA's advocacy efforts related to the Armenian and/or Greek lobbies in the United States or articles about Turkish, Greek and Armenian relations. *Turkish Times*' Culture and Art section has been designed as a promotional page for Turkish tourism. A section entitled "Helping Hands" contained practical information for Turkish immigrants, on issues about buying and selling real estate and making long-term investment plans (Angın 2003: 157). In the early 2000s, ATAA has worked on the retraction of the Armenian genocide bill in the American congress, sending a support of 1.5 million dollars following the Marmara Earthquake of 1999 and establishing Turkey-United States Inter-parliamentary Friendship Group at the U.S. congress in 2001[91]. As it will be discussed in Chapter 9, ATAA's activities in relation with the homeland-related matters continued in the 2000s, with new strategies to reach a broader population among the Turkish-Americans.

Süleyman Efendi order

Gathering under the umbrella association of United American Muslim Association (UAMA) since its foundation in 1980 in New York, the followers of *Süleyman Efendi* order has been the only Islamist community among migrants of Turkey until the 2000s, except for *Diyanet*-supported congregation. Established to provide religious needs of the emigrant community, teach and disseminate Islam, UAMA is a non-profit religious organization with its headquarters at *Fatih Cami* in Brooklyn. Following its policy of non-participation to politics, UAMA kept its secluded position in the United States, without having any disputes with the Turkish state. This situation has been evident in the occasional visits by the Turkish state officials in the 1990s, including the President of *Diyanet*'s visit in 1990, when he stated that he congratulated the "institution and its executives who have come all the way here, thousands of kilometers far from the homeland, and provided services to all citizens, kin and all Muslims ten years before the arrival of the [Turkish] state.[92]" As of 2016, UAMA holds

[90] MezunUsa.com. 2009. "ATAA'nın kurucularından Dr. Ülkü Ülgür röportajı." December 10. http://site.mezun.com/ozeldosyalar/index.jsp?durum=detay&id=1907; Serpil Yılmaz. 2004. "Washington'da Türk lobisi karıştı." Milliyet. September 25. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2004/09/25/yazar/yilmaz.html.

[91] Serpil Yılmaz. 2004. "Washington'da Türk lobisi karıştı." Milliyet. September 25. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2004/09/25/yazar/yilmaz.html.

[92] Amerika Müslümanlar Birliği. 2016. "İslam'a, Kuran'a ve Ehl-i İman'a hizmette 32. yılında Amerika Müslümanlar Birliği." Accessed January 13. http://www.unitedamericanmuslim.org/30yil.php.

18 mosques and three student residents around the United States mainly in New York and New Jersey, many of which are renamed after Ottoman sultans or well-known mosques in Turkey[93], and employs its own *imam*s who are appointed from Turkey.

Blending with the "External Turks"

The historical studies that investigated the early migration from late Ottoman Empire or early Turkish Republic to the United States in general mention the existence of a multiplicity of ethnic and religious backgrounds among the emigrant groups. It is interesting to note that these researches usually continue on their discussions on the more recent numbers and status of emigrants of their research based on the ethnic character, therefore eradicating the "other" groups including the non-Muslims and non-Turks of Anatolia, and blending non-Anatolian ethnic Turks. This choice denotes the long established rivalries between these ethnic and religious groups and also the newly founded alliances in the host country, amongst groups from different geographies assumed to share the same ethnic background. Some of these groups in fact had historical ties as formerly being under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and later having been "stranded" (Laitin 1998) following the dissolution of the empire. These include Karaçay Turks, who had a long history of deportations from the Caucasus and to the Central Asia. While only a small group of Karaçay Turks in the United States had actually resided in or had familial ties with those living in Turkey, they continued to maintain their ties with other ethnic Turks from Turkey. This has been particularly the situation in Paterson, New Jersey, where Karaçay Turks were blended, while at the same time identifying themselves culturally different from the rest (Tokatlı 1991: 81-83). Another alliance had emerged between the Turkish Cypriots and the migrants from Turkey in the United States, following the ethnic conflict and inter-communal violence in Cyprus in the second half of the 20th century, reinforced by the Turkish and Greek states. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, other rapprochements have occurred between the Turkic populations under its rule, including the Azerbaijanis and Ahıska Turks (Meskhetians). Citing the former president of FTAA Egemen Bağış, Kaya (2003: 96) discussed that this blending was based on an assumed shared ethnicity tie:

> Most of these people had lived or have relatives in Turkey. They were member before the collapse of Former Soviet Union. This is a language unity. We all speak the same language. Most leaders of these organizations go to Turkey, lived in Turkey and like Turkey. It is a

[93] Amerika Müslümanlar Birliği. 2016. "Şubelerimiz." Accessed January 13. http://www.unitedamericanmuslim.org/subeler.php.

> solidarity and mutual support issue for them, too. We all become stronger by uniting. There are not that many Azerbaijanis or Crimeans but when they unite, they become more effective and influential. An Azeri is related to Azerbaijan as we Turks from Turkey are related to Turkey. We come together for mutual interests. We have a lot of commonalities such as language and culture. We support each other for each other's activities (Interview with Egemen Bağış in Kaya 2003: 96).

As discussed in the quote, the coalition building along the ethnic identity served as a tool to assemble under a more numerous population, to react against the common "other". This pattern has also been related to the structural conditions in the host country: while the restrictive immigration policies and political incorporation regime of France triggered leftist migrants' grassroots politicization around labour and migrant rights together with the Maghrebi migrants of France in the 1980s, the pre-existing communitarianism among Anatolia originated populations, the U.S. foreign policy and the political system in the United States seems to have enabled Turkish migrants' alliance with other ethnic Turks to create a united and more populated block since the 1990s. The creation of a coalition around shared ethnicity was compatible with the state ideology in Turkey accentuating Turkishness, which had emerged with the Kemalist nation building and was reinforced following the 1980 coup.

The Landscape of Political Transnationalism in the 1980s and 1990s

The analysis of the associations in the United States established by migrants from Turkey until the 2000s reveals three critical points related to political transnationalism and relations with the home state institutions. *First,* the common migration pattern of "brain drain" for the majority of emigrants in the early decades has led to the existence of an individualistic and cosmopolitan population. The predominance of secular Kemalism has reflected on cognitive and performative spheres of these elite networks that created close ties with the state representatives. The sporadic communitarian structures, which emerged beginning with the 1960, have not entered into competition with the elite networks, but continued to coexist despite of the evident social distinction.

Second, the political claims making by Turkish-Americans in the United States has been primarily related to homeland related matters in the pre-2000 period. According to an analysis by Anıl (2010: 218) on the political claims making practices of Turkish organizations in the New York metropolitan area, the majority of the claims was of transnational nature and particularly on homeland matters from the 1970s to 2000s, rather than related to immigration/integration policies of the United States. Anıl's study exposed that the transnational matters were mainly associated with seven issues:

> (1) Turkish-Greek relations (disputes over the Aegean), (2) the Cyprus issue following the Turkish intervention to the island in 1974, (3) the Armenian genocide claims and any political decisions taken by the American congress, (4) the Kurdish conflict within Turkey and protests over the PKK, (5) the Azeri-Armenian conflict in Central Asia and support for their claims over disputed land between the two parties, (6) the war in Iraq, (7) the Arab-Israeli conflict (violent confrontations in Lebanon, the Palestinian issue and events in Gaza) (Anıl 2010: 223-224).

Aiming for the American policy makers, rather than the public opinion, the political claims were organized as what Anıl (2010: 222-223) describes as "proclaiming activities", such as speech acts, written reports, sending letters to authorities and visiting public officials, rather than "protesting activities", including protests, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions and confrontational activities.

Third, in the 1980s the associative sphere coalesced around homeland related matters, with the reinforcement of the home state. Different from the case of France, these matters have not been the direct reflections of the situation in Turkey during the post-coup era. In the case of the United States, the homeland related conflicts were related to the ethnic lobbying of other emigrant groups, who had underwent forced migration from Anatolia following the homogenization processes during the late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish nation building. Even though the Turkish-American side of the conflict comprised of the first generation that had practiced the act of migration to the United States, the homeland matters had become a domestic contention in the host country, with the reconstruction of what Başer (2015: 46) describes as the "inherited conflict" over generations by Greek and Armenian-Americans.

Still, the conflict remained largely in the high-level political environment of lobbying, where ATAA positioned itself as an opposition to other established lobbies, including *Dashnak* Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA, which finds its origin in the early 20th century), *non-Dashnak* Armenian Assembly of America (AAA, founded in 1972), American Hellenic Institute (AHI, founded in 1974). As I will discuss in more detail in the next section, over the 1980s the conflict has become a shared cause for the Turkish-Americans and the Turkish state representation in the United States, in which the emigrants designated themselves as allies in Turkey's foreign policy problems. The American political system that allowed and promoted ethnic lobbying accelerated the coalition building around shared ethnicity with Turkic groups of other countries as well. This situation has resulted in advocating on other transnationalized matters, such as the Azeri-Armenian conflict. Following this section, which examined the organizations in the United States by migrants from Turkey in the pre-2000 period, in the next section I analyze their relations with the

Turkish state, in line with the implementation and outcomes of Turkish state policies in practice.

6.2. Getting Along with the Paternal State

In this section I discuss the relations between the state and society, from a perspective of transnationality, therefore looking into the context of emigration state (Turkey) and emigrant society. I analyze this relationship in the pre-2003 period and elaborate on the continuities and ruptures: how the Turkish state's policies on emigrants have been implemented in the United States and what outcomes have resulted in state-society relations following this phenomenon? In the case of France, two main positions of the Turkish state had effected the realization of policies: (1) the distinction between the desired and undesired citizens, *and* (2) workforce-based structuring of emigrant policies to support local and national development in Turkey. In the case of the United States, the *first position* on the distinction between the desired and undesired has not been problematized around the issue of citizenship, as the "undesired" populations have been outside the citizenship regime of Turkey. Compatible with the overall policy particularly of the 1980s, the reactive policies and securitization existed in the Turkish state's policy implementation in the United States as well. However, the motivation and the way in which these policies were implemented diverged in the United States, related to the host country political environment and the characteristics of emigrant populations. I had argued in Chapter 5 that in France the political/ideological antagonism was considered under threefold deviance related to domestic conflicts in Turkey (alienation from the principles of Kemalism, positioning to extreme left, recomposition of exile organizations) as described by Rigoni (2001: 173). In the case of the United States, the antagonism was based on twofold deviance for the Turkish state: (a) frailty vis-à-vis rival groups acting as ethnic lobbies against Turkey's foreign/domestic policy matters and (b) possible assimilation of emigrants into the host society. In terms of the *second position* of workforce-based structuring, there have not been specific policy implementations related to workers' rights or social security as in the case of Europe, where the labour migration was the result of bilateral agreements between states. Nevertheless, the majority of the emigrant population in the United States until the 1980s comprised of highly skilled or highly educated individuals, who were considered "to use the resources and know-how they obtained in Turkey for the development of other countries (TBMM 1974)." As a result, the causes and consequences of "brain drain" were problematized by policy makers in an attempt to halt the mobility of high

skilled individuals or to regain their social and economic capital by establishing long-distance ties.

Trailing the Brain Drain

In Chapter 4, I argued that the Turkish state's policies for governing citizenry living abroad in the pre-1980 period was based on a modality of territorial integrity and national development, therefore aiming for accumulation of remittances during emigrants' stay and guiding their importation of economic and social capital upon their return. Designated in line with the Turkish-European migration system, this policy had resulted in a perception vis-à-vis the home state that approached its citizens only as "remittance machines". In fact, this overall economic mentality dominated the state's perspective towards Turkish citizens in the United States as well, as the permanency of high skilled emigrants in the host countries was taken into account as the misappropriation of the state resources. In January 1974, a parliamentary investigation was planned on the topic of "brain drain", in order to seek solutions against the mobility and permanency of highly skilled individuals in the overseas. During the proceedings, the members of the parliament from different political parties were in agreement that brain drain was creating a significant economic and social loss for the Turkish state:

> It was learned that there are Turks including more than 500 doctors and over 20 thousand non-workers in the United States. In fact it is also known that among these, nearly 30 are dollar millionaires based on informal numbers. These Turks want to establish ties with Turkey. In terms of economic aspects, since it is the place where they will eventually return or due to other reasons, they had formal and informal applications to the government; nevertheless it can be seen that it has not been possible to embrace it until today. Calculating that a doctor, engineer or chemist costs hundreds of thousands to the state, our friends in the United States and in Europe should approach this situation at least in relation with the economy (TBMM 1974, Author's translation).

As discussed in the quote by a parliamentarian of *Demokrat Partisi* (Democrat Party, DP) the problematization of the issue was based on an economic perspective. The cause behind the brain drain was associated with Turkish state's incapability of responding to the needs of the highly skilled groups, in terms of both remuneration and of employment compatible with their professional standing. Brain drain was not only related to the migration towards the United States, but also included mobility to other countries such as Germany, where Turkish doctors preferred to become underemployed as a result of the incompatibilities of salary. Several programs were introduced in the late 1970s for brain gain, with the support of

international institutions such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP), including Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals Program (TOKTEN). According to Kurtuluş (1999: 119) the program aimed for the consultancy of high skilled experts in Turkish universities for a temporary period, therefore not the full return of emigrants, and that the majority of experts were from the United States. While other programs have been established for return migration, it has not been achieved in a wider scale until the 2000s. For emigrants who preferred leaving Turkey for higher education or professional training, the United States provided greater opportunities in terms of education, scholarship funding and employment, as one of the interviewees, who is currently an executive member of ATAA described to me:

> There was brain drain from Turkey to here. Those who were the most successful in their schools came here with full scholarship. In those days [university] education was free of charge in Turkey. Despite of that, me staying in Turkey would cost more to my father than coming to the United States. They gave very good grants to Robert College alumni, including accommodation, tuition fee, and our pocket money… they paid all with scholarships[94].

According to the interviewee, the resources that were available as a result of the bilateral education agreements between the Turkish and American states were a primary reason for the choice of emigrants' mobility towards the U.S.

During my interviews in France with emigrants of the early periods, the creation of solidarity networks were narrated as the result of the lack of home state involvement in emigrants' social needs, despite its initial role in sending them. In the case of the United States, the emergence of sporadic networks are described as spaces for gathering, rather than aiming for solidarity. The relations with the home state are recited within a relation of formal institutional ties, whereas the foreign mission is considered as the continuation of the centralized, paternal state in Turkey. The quote below by another executive member of ATAA who has lived in the United States since the 1960s, illustrates that strong attachment to the paternal management of the home state had been influential for the emigrants, on their abstinence from associative participation in the host country.

> The Turkish society in the 1960s was scattered, people did not believe that individuals could achieve something. The culture that we grew up in Turkey was based on a strong belief in the state, so a central power, where individuals and groups did not play a role. In the 1960s all of us had this attitude of "bowing to the inevitable". Some people would be shamed of their

[94] Interview with the author, Washington D.C., November 20, 2014.

> Turkishness and some others would give the message of “please do not implicate me”. We would always ask what the Turkish government, embassy is doing[95].

Even though the Turkish state’s involvement in the United States has become systematized in the 1980s, the surveillance of the population living abroad existed before this period, through the intervening role of the foreign mission. An example of the surveillance can be found in a parliamentary debate of 1972, about the visit of a well-known Turkish singer, Ajda Pekkan, to the United States, with the invitation of Turkish American Mediterranean Association (New York). In his parliamentary question, depute from *Adalet Partisi* (AP), Şinasi Osma, problematized Pekkan’s declarations on local television about “not being a Turkish, not being interested in marrying a Turkish person, denying her Turkishness and assuming an attitude undermining Turkishness” and demanded more information about the association which invited her to Washington D.C. As a response, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Haluk Bayulken declared that the association was working for the benefit of Turkish culture in the United States:

> The mentioned Turkish-American association has the address “70 Fifth Avenue, Newyork, N.Y. 10011”. This association deals with cultural and social affairs, serves the Turkish culture by establishing acquaintances between Turkish citizens and Turks who acquired American citizenship, organizing trips and inviting Turkish artists to the United States. Moreover, it also undertakes commercial activities such as channeling the savings of our citizens and kin living in America and organizing touristic trips to Turkey (TBMM 1972b, Author’s translation).

The parliamentary question exemplified the monitoring of the Turkish state on the associative environment in the United States, through the channel of foreign mission. It also illustrates the national development-based approach towards emigrants, who are considered as potential supporters to the Turkish economy through remittances or tourism.

Awakening “Voice After Exit”

The Turkish state’s involvement in the United States began in the 1980s, overlapping with its overall policy change towards emigrants during this period. A former diplomat of Turkey to the United States underscored that the Turkish state rotated its policies on citizens living abroad “by 180 degrees” in the 1980s. According to him, this transformation meant that the state began to acknowledge emigrants’ permanency in the host countries, not as a sign of

[95] TurkishNY, 2014. “Kongre’deki temsilcilerimizi Türkiye ve Türkler hakkında eğitelim.” Accessed March 11. http://www.turkishny.com/interview/40-interview/135790-kongredeki-temsilcilerimizi-turkiye-ve-turkler-hakkinda-egitelim/.

letting go of membership to the Turkish nation and society, but as multiple belonging, which could become beneficial for the home state as well:

> The Turkish policy has rotated 180 degrees and a policy, by which we said until then that it was treason [to leave the country], you should not forget Turkey, Turkish passport is crucial has changed entirely. In many countries there is no dual citizenship, so you should leave Turkish citizenship if necessary. This does not mean that your ties with Turkey are being cut down, but become an American and help Turkey that way. This was the 180-degree change[96].

Together with the amendments in the citizenship law allowing for dual citizenship and later for more flexible forms of citizenship, this cognitive change has transformed the institutional and administrative setting related to the emigrants from Turkey.

As I discussed above on the relations between different collectivities and the home state, the relationship with the citizens in the United States has differed from the European cases, primarily due to the different social, economic and cultural capital of the emigrant groups as well as the political environment and incorporation policies of the United States. The main objective has been to benefit from the community support from emigrants on matters related to the home country domestic and foreign affairs, and the American case acted as the first example for this new approach. One of the decisive incidents that triggered the Turkish state representatives' interest in organizing an ethnic lobby in the United States has been the Greek lobby's influence over the U.S. Congress in the 1970s, which has become a seminal example of ethnic lobbying in the literature. According to Kitroeff (2013: 144), the Greek-American lobby had emerged in Washington in the summer of 1974, as a response to the Turkey's intervention in Cyprus. An alliance of Washington based lobbying groups and grassroots organizations were able to succeed in persuading the Congress in a period of one year to impose Turkish Arms Embargo, which had lasted until 1978 (Kitroeff 2013: 144).

The same former diplomat, who had worked actively during the establishment of ATAA described in detail how the interactions Turkish state representation in Washington D.C. and the political entrepreneurs among the emigrant community has resulted in the changes in the associative sphere over the 1980s:

> [The interest in lobbying] began first in the 1980s in the United States, because the American political system is very open to lobbies and Turkey has suffered drastically from lobbies during that era, as in the example of embargo following 1974. The efforts to balance against these began mainly in the United States and later it leapt to Germany and to Europe. The principle was this: similar to what the Prime Minister said recently, integration was okay but

[96] Interview with the author, Ankara, February 26, 2014.

> there should not be assimilation. Serious funding and support was given for the establishment of a nation-wide organization in the United States. Until then, there was a very fractured organization, nearly 30 as far as I remember, including Cyprus Turks, Crimean Turks, Turkmens, Kyrgyz, therefore including all Turks from the world. Usually they did not get along well and were fragmented. An umbrella organization was founded in Washington. With funding, it was encouraged that they support American politicians in their campaigns. In every opportunity we told them that the American Turks have a special characteristic, they are doctors, engineers etc. and there is a very few worker population. You have both the income and the intellectual level to organize fundraising dinners, events and support the congressmen and senators in your country. This is a part of the game. You cannot get their attention if you don't do that. […] This went further over time and the parades begun in New York. Until then, this would have been unthinkable. There was a slight inferiority complex, most attempted to hide their identity, change their names, thinking that I am an engineer and if I tell that I am Turkish, I will be left behind. Over time this changed: it is not bad at all to be Turkish. There have been attempts to show Turkey's "punch lines" such as the Korean War. For instance, an exhibition of [*Kanuni Sultan*] *Süleyman* was held in New York for the first time, they brought Turkish *mehter* to the parades. Some parliamentarians came from Turkey to walk together with them. America is perfectly open to these. […] Over time being Turkish started to become something to be proud of[97].

This lengthy quote illustrates that the creation of an umbrella organization in Washington D.C. was largely triggered by the symbolic and material opportunities that were presented by the foreign mission. The participants of this process were professionals from Turkey who were already individually integrated within the American professional life and society, therefore retained the social and cultural capital that enabled them to become active members of the "American political game", which allowed for ethnic lobbying. The quote also highlights the crucial place given to symbolic policies in order to integrate the existing emigrant population in the national imagery, by sublimating their cultural and social backdrop within the American society.

As discussed in the quote above, the bringing of the associative network among Turkish-Americans under an umbrella has been the result of Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ's work, who got into direct contact with the emigrants in the host country, which in general has been under the work definition of the consulates. During this period, funding was provided by the Turkish state to the federations through the channel of Turkish Promotion Fund that had the primary objective of presenting Turkish culture in the overseas. Similar to the *Süleyman* exhibition in New York, the Turkish Day Parades were structured to represent the Turkish culture and community to the American society. The event, which had started with a small group of people, was magnified during Turgut Özal's prime ministry and presidency in Turkey with the support coming from Turkey. Nevertheless, rather than attempting to reach a wider American mass, Turkish Day Parade remained over time as a spectacle for the Turkish

[97] Interview with the author, Ankara, February 26, 2014.

populations in the United States, to publicize their long distance nationalism and an act for reconstructing Turkishness (Şanlıer Yüksel 2008), as something not to disguise but "to be proud of". In an article entitled "Turkish-Americans March Today in a Demonstration of New Found Pride" on the Turkish-American parade in 1984 in the New York Times, Marvine Howe described this reconstruction of Turkish identity by bringing together an ethnic community, compatible with the American system of integration and politicization:

> The longstanding hostilities help explain why Turkish-Americans have traditionally displayed their ethnic heritage less enthusiastically than some other groups. They are proud of being of Turkish heritage, fervent nationalists and disciples of the reformer and founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk, community leaders say. The leaders say Turkish-Americans have had an identity problem. They are Moslems, but they are strongly secular and find it difficult to identify with the rest of the Islamic groups here […] The federation president [The Federation of Turkish-American Societies], Erol Gürün, represents new generation who believe Turks must increase their role in American role. 'Our community is awaking slowly' said Mr. Gürün, who is the supervisor of nuclear engineering in an international contracting company. […] 'The lesson was brought home to me when I visited a U.S. Congressman in 1977', Mr. Gürün said, 'and he asked me straightforward, 'How many Turks can vote for me?'[98].

The topic of lobbying was also debated in the Turkish parliament in the 1980s, as an addition to the Turkish state institutions' attempts to develop relations overseas. During a discussion on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget, a parliamentarian of *Anavatan Partisi* (Mainland Party, ANAP) emphasized that the state needed to support the work undertaken by citizens living abroad, in order to strengthen its hand against the pre-existing "other" ethnic lobbying groups, particularly in the United States:

> In addition to presenting ourselves with brochures, developing our relations abroad, we need to organize the Turks living abroad enter into a lobbying operation. The example that I will give now is recited from my colleague Mustafa Tınaz Titiz's research. In the United States, there are only eight Turkish-American associations, in comparison to nearly 100 Greek, 25 Armenian and 200 Jewish organizations and these are working in every field of social, cultural, economic, political, industrial arenas in the United States. My friends, this is not our failing. We went to the international arena after the 1970s. These are all things established in the last 10-15 years; they are definitely not to be undermined. These mentioned nations and organizations have dispersed 1-1.5 centuries ago to the international arena and established their organizations. In the last 10-15 years we have put forward the core of organizations in our country and in the west, in the United States and Australia, with the work made by Turks themselves. My friends, these activities will definitely work forward, as long as us, as the homeland, look out for the efforts by these precious citizens abroad (TBMM 1984, Author's translation).

[98] Marvine Howe. 1984. "Turkish-Americans March Today in a Demonstration of New Found Pride." The New York Times. April 21. http://www.nytimes.com/1984/04/21/nyregion/turkish-americans-march-today-in-a-demonstration-ofnew-found-pride.html.

The two umbrella federations, ATAA and FTAA have been thus supported beginning with the 1980s as the gatekeepers with the overall society, representing the two different objectives. With its strategic position in Washington D.C., ATAA assumed the role of lobbying in relation with the high level American and Turkish officials, while at the same time maintaining a public base with the support of its component associations. FTAA on the other hand emerged as the grassroots organization, which had a broader reach among emigrant populations of different socioeconomic backgrounds and associations with diverse missions. The transformation in the state's approach was practiced with the establishment of closer ties between the elite emigrants and the state and government officials outside the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as in the case of parliamentarians' participation to the Turkish Day Parades in New York. In 1991, President Özal declared and then renounced his participation to the event following a phone call with President George Bush, as described on an article on *Milliyet*, either because of security reasons or due to unease about another country president's appearance in a sovereign nation[99]. For the members of the elite emigrant group, accessibility to home state was therefore possible, if they participated under or went along with the established relationship framework. Nevertheless, as it was discussed in the previous section, the situation has not been the same for the lower skilled emigrants, who were faced with a united block of state officials and the elite, representing the "cold face" of the Turkish state.

Despite the initial impetus in the 1980s, the following decades were marked by internal struggles (Akçapar 2009: 175): on the one hand between those who demanded greater contribution from the part of the Turkish state and others who aspired autonomy, and on the other hand between those who deemed it necessary to orient towards home country politics and others who distanced themselves from politicization as they were more concerned on integration issues. For those who demanded greater contribution from the home state, the Turkish-Americans resembled to the emigrants in Europe, from whom the state expected developmental gains without putting into practice the necessary infrastructures to support their wellbeing. An executive member of FTAA, who has been living in the United States for the past 30 years, despite the differences in their backgrounds and capital, the emigrants in the U.S. received a similar attention from the Turkish state and society with those living in Europe, which was based on the acquisition of economic (as well as political) benefits:

[99] Milliyet. 1991. "Özal'ı Bush vazgeçirdi." May 12.

> They approached us as *gurbetçi,* considered us as remittance machines. It was deemed equivalent when a person in Germany earned 10 dollars and another in the United States earned 100 dollars. The Turks living abroad were expected to defend their country without any education or any experience. [As the state] you need to respect and support. And it is based on education; ambassadors, consul generals have to educate the executive members of the civil society organizations. This has not been done[100].

For the others who supported autonomy, the Turkish state's involvement in emigrants' affairs was creating schisms within the community, between those who remained inside the state framework and others who became alienated:

> Another key factor that has impeded the emergence of a true Turkish American community is the paternalistic role played by the Turkish government in the United States. It exerts a high degree of influence over the American Turks and, perhaps unwittingly, becomes involved in their affairs. Nevertheless, the government has provided the minimum necessary means to create and maintain some form of Turkish communal activity, for the Türk Evi (House of the Turks) in New York, owned by the Turkish government, is the center of key Turkish activities in the United States. In the end, a Turk either accepts to work within the existing organizational framework and obey its unwritten rules or is bound to remain outside the establishment, partly at least, ostracized, ignored, and alienated from the rest (Karpat 2004: 638).

As discussed by Karpat in the quote above, the home state's involvement in the affairs of emigrants was considered to create a challenging environment for the creation of autonomous entities in the host country. Moreover, the umbrella of ATAA and FTAA, as well as *Türk Evi* in New York were positioned as the three localities for gathering a Turkish community in the United States. In comparison to the French case where the center of gravity has been constructed around the federative structure of DITIB and therefore a religious framework (despite the attempts to build secular federations), the implementation of state policies in the U.S. remained within the secular perspective until the 2000s, in relation with the general characteristics of the emigrant populations.

In line with the Turkish state's policy for non-resident citizens, a group of representatives were appointed to the Advisory Committee on Citizens Living Abroad, which was established in 1998. Taking the second place in terms of its members after Germany (with 35 representatives), the United States was represented by 10 members for the Advisory Committee. The committee appointed in 1998 included former president of FTAA and member of executive council of Turkish-American Business Association (TABA/AmCham) Erhan Atay, former vice president of FTAA Ramazan Onur Erim, *and* former vice consul and

[100] Interview with the author, New York, November 14, 2014.

executive director of ATAA, Güler Köknar[101]. Over the years, other members were incorporated to the committee, once again appointed within the similar network of FTAA and ATAA: former presidents of FTAA; Ali Çınar, Egemen Bağış, Kaya Boztepe and members who had executive post histories in both FTAA and ATAA; Ergun Kırlıkovalı and Şaduman Gürbüz. Among the interviewees from the U.S., those who participated in the committee before 2012 and after 2012, declared that the former committee had the particular focus on Germany, leaving very small room for discussing specific matters related to their own community:

> I was a member of the former advisory committee and it was based on the old state approach. I participated once to the meeting in Germany and once in Çeşme. They would give messages and tell us to speak about something. It wasn't very 21th century. We were 5-6 people, including the former presidents of the Federation, ATAA and other associations. Germany used to come very populated; the most of the meetings were focused on Germany and the Netherlands[102].

Whereas in France the representatives of the committee were not recognized by the overall associative environment, the representatives' active position in the main umbrella organizations in the United States has enabled the publicization of their status in relation with the Turkish state institutions. Looking at the *curriculum vitae* of the members from the U.S., it is possible to find mentioning of the individuals' participation the Advisory Committee, as appointed by the home state. As the representatives of their own local chapters in the federative associations, these individuals embodied both the local and national associative environment in the United States. They also symbolized the secular republican position, which would be broadened up in the Advisory Committee launched in 2012, as it will be discussed in Chapter 9.

Disseminating the Ideological Apparatus

In the pre-2000 period, the Turkish state's educational policy for emigrants in the United States distinguished sharply from that of citizens in Europe. At the center of its policy implementations were supporting the sending and monitoring of university level education, as well as developing Turkish Studies departments in American higher education, rather than providing Turkish language and culture education for the descendants of the emigrant populations. In fact, the education policy was related within a broader relation of public

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[101] Yalçın Bayer. 1998. "Yeter! Söz milletin." Hürriyet. June 20. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=-24833.

[102] Interview with the author, New York, November 25, 2014.

diplomacy between Turkey and the United States, which primarily took place in Turkey, but also reflected on the mobility towards the U.S. In her analysis on the development of Turkish study programs in the 1950s, Örnek (2012) argues that the monitoring of the American aid programs and the role prescribed to Turkey as a model country in the Middle East was entailed with the gathering of comprehensive information on the country, as well as the establishment of better relations. In the U.S, this situation was coupled with the training of Turkish studies under the Middle Eastern studies in the American academic centers, where young Turkish scholars earned their degrees and helped the development of social sciences at Turkish universities. It was also followed by the execution of the Fulbright agreement in 1949 and of student, instructor and specialist exchange programs between the two countries (Örnek 2012: 945-957). Fulbright and other programs supported by the Turkish Ministry of National Education (and Council of Higher Education after the 1980s) have been essential for the growth of student mobility for higher education. Beginning with the 1980s, Turkish Studies institutes started to be established in the American universities, some of them with the grant of the Turkish government (Otçu-Grillman 2014: 214). Although targeting a wider population, these institutions also attracted students from Turkey. An outlet for bringing university-level students in the United States has been the Turkish Students Associations, positioned in the campuses of American universities. In 1997, Intercollegiate Turkish Students Society (ITTS) was founded to increase communication and cooperation among Turkish students in the U.S. and in Canada. ITTS follows the premises of Turkish state Kemalism, with its definition of aims: "to provide an exchange of information, experience and resources; support students before-during-after their schools; better implement lobbyist activities; better promote peaceful relations among societies and strengthen 'Peace at home, Peace on the world'"[103].

One of the exceptional cases of elementary level education was Atatürk School in New York, which was founded by the Turkish Women's League of America (TWLA) established in 1958, and later opened the school in 1971. Since its foundation Atatürk School provides elementary level education with republican and secular values, on Saturdays, outside of the regular school curriculum. Until recently, the school operated on the second floor of the Turkish Consulate building, yet following the reconstruction of the building it was moved to another building, with no clear account on whether it will move back once the consulate is

[103] Intercollegiate Turkish Students Society. 2016. "About us." Accessed 15 January. http://turkishstudents.blogspot.com.tr/.

rebuilt. While the school has not been founded nor funded by the Turkish government, it has been receiving support in terms of instructional space and grade-level elementary school textbooks imported from Turkey[104]. Otçu-Grillman (2014: 223-224) argues that the educational practices, routines and rituals of the school activities, including the celebration of Turkish national and religious holidays, reciting of *Andımız* (Our Pledge) every Saturday, singing of traditional nationalist songs and folk dance groups, aim at teaching young generations ways of being Turkish. In a way, Atatürk School was a more systematically built version of ELCO courses provided by the Ministry of Education in France, organized not by the state but by private and voluntary initiatives.

In relation with the religious affairs, an early initiative of the Turkish state has been the establishment of the mosque named as Islamic Center in 1957 in the ambassadorial district of Washington D.C, which was later given to the management under Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Yavuzer 2010: 173-174). Aside from the Islamic Center, there have not been any other recorded Turkish mosques in the United States in the early periods, and it has been noted that those who were practicing Islam frequented the mosques of other Muslim communities. The presence of *Diyanet* in the United States first took place in 1988, when a religious counselor was appointed to the Turkish embassy in Washington D.C. In the same year a social worker was appointed to the consulate in New York to undertake religious affairs, which would later be replaced by the post of religious attaché in 1993. According to Yavuzer (2010: 164), while religious officials were assigned in New York after 1989, the state has not undertaken the role to establish religious constructions, due to the lack of a communitarian structure. As described before, the pre-existing religious community around *Süleyman Efendi* order in the United States was not deemed under the framework of "oppositional Islam"; therefore it did not attract rapid reaction from the home state similar to the case of France where DITIB was established as the embodiment of "state Islam".

In 1993, the Turkish state established Turkish American Islamic Foundation (TAIF) in Washington together with a mosque complex. The foundation was institutionalized in a similar pattern with the other *Diyanet* related foundations in Europe, with the presidency of an appointed council from Turkey (Yavuzer 2010: 170). In a period of ten years TAIF attempted to gather a community around this structure by making regular contacts through calls and letter invitations for religious events, getting into touch with associations in Washington D.C. in order to receive their support for its organizations. Following the 9/11

[104] Interview with the author, New York, November 15, 2014.

attacks, the emerging Islamaphobia triggered adjustments at TAIF, which was replaced with Turkish American Community Center (TACC) without any mentioning of Islam in its founding mission (Yavuzer 2010: 170). Over the 1990s mosques and associations established by Turkish emigrants started to append themselves under *Diyanet* framework, including those established by external Turks such as Crimean Turks and Karaçay Turks, mainly in the northern regions of the country (Yavuzer 2010: 175). *Eyüp Sultan Cami* in New York, which was established in 1992 received its first religious official from Turkey in 1999 and was later reconstructed as a greater mosque structure[105]. Despite the existence of TAIF in the 1990s, the mosque and the associative environment built around religion did not serve as a glue to congregate the populations from Turkey living in the United States, at least until the 2000s, when it entered as a new objective of the Turkish state. The greater role given to *Eyüp Sultan* and the religious community illustrates the increased attempts of the Turkish state in developing the role of *Diyanet* and the communitarian lifestyle in the United States, as it will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 9.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the pre-2003 period can be separated under two periods, representing the reflections of two modalities that existed in the emigration state and migrant society relations in the United States. The *first one* covers the pre-1980 period, when limited relations existed between the foreign mission and the citizens, except for the high-level network built around ATS, which itself comprised mainly of active or former diplomats from Turkey. The period from 1950s to 1980s witnessed the flourishing of an associative environment in the United States, although as a result of the individualistic character of emigrant populations, the network remained highly loose. The *second period,* beginning with the 1980s has transformed sharply the existing interactive sphere between the Turkish state representation and the emigrant population. Centralized around the initiatives of the ambassadors, the issue of ethnic lobbying occupied a crucial position in this relational framework. Acting as a glue to coalesce emigrant communities from around the United States, ethnic lobbying triggered the appropriation of strong nationalism to the already existing secular republican undertones. The transformations in the 1980s have been compatible with the Turkish state's overall reactive policy approach related to its management of the affairs of populations in the

[105] Ergülen Toprak. 2014. "Sponsorlarımız adına her gün 300-400 kişiye iftar veriyoruz." Turkishny.com. Accessed March 11. http://www.turkishny.com/interview/40-interview/96134-sponsorlarimiz-adina-her-gun-300-400-kisiye-iftar-veriyoruz.

overseas. In this case, the epicenter of reaction has not been addressed towards its own citizens and the emigrant elite has become an ally to the state.

As compatible with our overall discussion, the post-1980 period was marked by a transition toward an extra-territorial understanding of the management of citizenry. In the case of United States, this situation was ostensible in the acknowledgment of emigrants' permanency, not as brains that drained the resources of the country, but rather as potential mediators between Turkey and the American state and society. In addition to this symbolic transformation, there have been shifts in terms of the institution-building and citizenship-related policies, which were evident in their implementation. The stronger relations between the foreign mission and the newly emerging centralized civil society, as well as the support for dual citizenship were the indications of this situation. Compared to France, where the strong fragmentation around ideological lines had resulted in a competitive environment between the state and many of the societal actors, the relations have emerged as cooperative in the case of the United States, where the political entrepreneurs who heralded the collective sphere complied with the home state's official ideology. For these groups, the political opportunities provided by the home state were easily translated into resources for mobilization and institutionalization, as in the case of the advancement of activities by the umbrella organizations. However, the overarching role of this resources were also discussed to have impeded the advent of an isolated collective sphere; despite the loose links that connected the umbrella organizations with the regional and local chapters, the emigrant society in the United States did not form into strongly built community structures as in France.

With this chapter, I conclude my discussion on the changes in the Turkish state's policies towards emigrants and non-resident citizens in the pre-2003 period and its reflections on state-society relations in the cases of France and the United States. In the Part III, I explore the new emigrant regime in the period that followed 2003, and use a similar framework by analyzing *first* the modifications in the state's policies, *second* its implementation and outcomes in France and *finally* the reflections on the case of United States.

PART III
POLICIES AND POLITICS AFTER 2003

CHAPTER 7

Expanding Beyond Material Boundaries: Policies for "Citizens Abroad" in the Post-2003 Period

> **T.C. Yurtdışı Türkler** @yurtdisiturkler • 26 Dec 2015
> #YTB desteğiyle @COJEP_inter tarafından 5 ülkeden Türkiye'ye gelen Avrupalı gençlere Bşk. @kudretbulbul hitap etti.
>
> **T.C. Yurtdışı Türkler** @yurtdisiturkler • 26 Dec 2015
> @kudretbulbul: Yurtdışındaki vatandaşlarımız sayesinde Türkiye'nin medeniyet sınırları siyasal sınırlarından çok daha geniştir.[106]

With this chapter I begin Part III of this dissertation, where I focus on home state policies, emigrants' homeland politics and the interactions between the two in the post-2003 period. The post-2003 period represents t_{+1} of this study, hence looks into the time that follows the critical rupture of 2003 (t_0) in the changing emigrant policies of the Turkish state. This chapter and the two following chapters analyze the continuities and changes of the Turkish state's emigrant engagement policies and their implications on home state-emigrant society relations, by comparing with the inquiry of the pre-2003 period. In this first chapter, I look into the changes of Turkish state's policies on citizens living outside of Turkey's territories in the most recent era, following the AKP's single party rule and the 2003 Parliamentary Report. This chapter focuses *first* on the changes in the symbolic practices of the Turkish state towards the emigrant populations; therefore how the Turkish state discursively attempts to produce a national diasporic population, which has close ties of allegiance to itself. *Second,* it analyzes re-configuration of institutional ties between the state and the society living abroad -through reformation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the establishment

[106] T.C. Yurtdışı Türkler @yurtdisiturkler - 26 Dec 2015 Pres. @kudretbulbul addressed to European youth coming to Turkey from five countries by @COJEP_inter with the support of #YTB. T.C. Yurtdışı Türkler @yurtdisiturkler - 26 Dec 2015 @kudretbulbul: By the courtesy of our citizens abroad Turkey's boundaries of civilization are much broader than its political boundaries.

of a new governance model incorporating a specialized presidency. The transformations in the institutional and administrative structures are a part of the overarching policy of the new government, in line with the ongoing global and regional mechanisms, attempted to re-configure the relations between the Turkish state and society. *Third*, this chapter builds on a discussion concentrating on the re-definition of citizenship to desegregate increased allegiance with non-resident citizens. While the institutional setting has determined the available opportunity structures and outlets for accessibility and control over the non-resident population, the re-interpretation of rights and duties outside of the borders has been mainly shaped by an expanded citizenship regime that demarcated the contractual relationship between the state and society living abroad.

Turkey's transformation of its emigration policy regime in the early 2000s is punctuated with critical junctures and abrupt shifts in its republican governance model. To begin with, these shifts were spearheaded by the effects of neo-liberal globalization and the streamlining of the economic and social arena towards market liberalism. Following the 2001 economic crisis, the coalition government adopted the IMF-led "regulatory neo-liberalism" thrusting reforms in many aspects of governance, rapidly buttressed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) following the elections of 2002 (Öniş 2012). Increasingly forging the Turkish economy to the global markets, the neo-liberal turn accentuated the role of emigrants living abroad as potential representatives and bridges across states and communities.

Furthermore, following the official candidacy to the European Union in 1999 and the beginning of Accession Negotiations in 2004, the EU harmonization infiltrated the Turkish policy-making agenda. The process of Europeanization in the early 2000s became an anchor for political and democratic reforms, primarily acting as a pattern for institutional and administrative changes (Tocci 2005). Deepening relations and the legislative changes transforming Turkish citizenship into a more liberal and participatory regime, assisted many non-state actors from Turkey (i.e. Kurds, women, non-Muslim minorities and the youth) to enact European citizenship through acts and practices in the European atmosphere (Rumelili et al. 2011; Rumelili and Keyman 2013). In the case of non-resident Turkish citizens particularly in Europe, this situation impelled an inclination towards active citizenship and participatory politics, re-defining the relations between the society with both Turkey and the countries where they resided, not only among those who were the minority in Turkey.

Finally, AKP's rule in three consecutive terms (following the elections of 2002, 2007 and 2011) has been marked by incremental estrangement from the traditional state-centric

republican model led by a western-oriented secular elite. The neo-populist communitarian approach adopted by the new government paved the way for an emerging bourgeoisie and a new power elite, while at the same time underscoring the social base of its support via Anatolian traditions and conservative values (Öniş 2014). This societal transformation has also penetrated the old state institutions, primarily those deep-rooted with Kemalist program of modernity, and the newly established ones. On the one hand, in the early 2000s the ongoing change in the formal state institutions obviously led to a broadening of state-society relations with the increased interaction of civil society and citizens (Keyman and İçduygu 2013). On the other hand, the new program functions with selective practices of cooperation and negotiation, and creates new fragilities and conflict between within state and societal actors, as well as across them. Appending to the European harmonization, the current foreign policy approach is marked by a tendency towards "Asian rule" (Öniş 2014: 3), attempting to "highlight Turkey's growing regional and global role" (Öniş 2012: 4). However, in the third term of AKP's government, the alienation from the old republican Western-centric agenda and liberal values raise serious questions about rising authoritarianism in Turkey. As argued by Öniş (2014: 15), AKP's "conservative globalism" brings together both the globalizing forces of neo-liberalism and the diffusing religious and nationalist discourses:

> integration into global markets and building co-operative links at the regional and global level could bring about significant benefits, which would clearly be consistent with a broader understanding of "national interest".

Hence, the adoption of liberal market values and their transmission in the state and society have been bounded by the cognitive limitations of a controversial "national interest". This stance is meaningful for grasping the policy choices adopted by the governments in general and also particularly related to the management of emigrants and non-resident citizens. It is also suggestive of the turn of events during the third term of the AKP's rule, towards the glorification of the national interest at the expense of a narrowed inclusion based on political identity (Öniş 2014).

In this dissertation, I pinpoint the critical juncture in the governance of citizens living abroad as 2003, when an extensive report was published by the Parliamentary Investigation Commission to Scrutinize the Problems of Citizens Living Abroad. Following the parliamentary report of 2003, major institutional, administrative and legal changes have been introduced by the Turkish state encapsulating a new emigration regime (See Table 4).

Table 4: Selected policies for citizens living abroad since 2003

Date	Laws, Regulations and Programs
2003	Establishment of a Parliamentary Investigation Commission to Scrutinize the Problems of Citizens Living Abroad
2004	Law No. 5203 on changes related to the Turkish Citizenship Law
2004	Ministerial Directive at MFA regulating the relations between foreign missions and non-resident citizens
2004	Law No. 5253 on Associations amending cooperation and funding allocation between associations in Turkey and overseas
2006	International Islamic Theology Program begins under *Diyanet*
2007	Establishment of Yunus Emre Institute
2008	The beginning of the yearly Ambassadors Conference at MFA
2008	Establishment of World Turkish Business Council (DTİK) under the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB)
2008	Law No. 5749 on the key provision on elections and electoral registry
2009	Establishment of the online portal *e-konsolosluk*, under MFA
2009	Law No. 5901 on Turkish Citizenship Law amending citizenship rights
2010	Establishment of Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (YTB)
2011	Beginning of *Imece* funding program to civil society organizations under YTB
2012	Establishment of Advisory Committee on Turkish Citizens Abroad under YTB
2012	Law No. 6304 on changes related to the key provision on elections and electoral registry and first consular voting during 2014 Presidential Elections
2014	Law No. 633 amending Ministry of Family and Social Policies, and appointment of “family attachés”

An earlier Investigation Commission on the same issue had also been established in 1996, but the changes in the policy making had been rather limited and short-lived (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 110). The report addressed problems faced and proposed solutions by all ministries and institutions that were involved in Turkey's emigrant policy through consultations with the non-state actors living overseas[107]. Several main problem areas were tackled as ex-post evaluation: (1) military service, (2) services provided by embassies and consulates, (3) work and social security issues, (4) religious services, (5) education, (6) customs, (7) issues faced by businessmen, (8) culture and tourism, (9) finance and banking, (10) TRT overseas broadcasts, (11) citizenship, identity and passports, (12) issues faced by contractors and (13) issues related to High Council of Education. As final remarks, the report suggested a number of implications, which reflected the policy-orientation of the government in the succeeding period:

a) Keeping in mind of their permanency abroad at present, our citizens abroad should be promoted to acquire host country citizenship,

b) Ties with our citizens and the next generations should be protected and improved,

c) Our citizens should become bridges of good relations and friendship between host countries and our country,

d) Especially citizens living in the EU countries should realize their rights acquired by the EU and other international jurisprudence, defend them in every platform and be informed about them. Initiatives should be made so that the EU entitles same rights that it provides other candidate state citizens to our citizens,

e) Citizens should be protected against xenophobia, discrimination and acts of violence,

f) Every individual who is tied to the Turkish Republic by citizenship and has not participated in terrorism is very important and valuable regardless of their settlement country to our state. State of the Turkish Republic should stand by them with all means. Our citizens should be informed about this issue by embassies, consulates, all related entities and media, via brochures, booklets, documents. This issue should be addressed on the internet websites of these institutions and announced on their websites,

g) It should be among the privileges of our country for our citizens abroad to benefit at the highest level from the rights that will protect their cultural identities,

[107] Ministries and institutions that participated in the commission were: Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defense, Undersecretary of Foreign Trade, Undersecretary of Customs, Undersecretary of Treasury, Presidency of Religious Affairs, Central Bank, Council of High Education, Turkish Constructors Association, Union of Chambers and Exchange Communities, and Association of Tour Operators.

h) Policies about citizens living abroad should be planned in a multidimensional, long-term, dynamic and efficient manner. There is the need of a new division, which will produce the necessary strategy and implement it, coordinate all institutions providing services to overseas. This new division has to support resolve our citizens' problems, monitor their rights resultant of EU and international jurisprudence and search for solutions, and perform efficient exercises for the evaluation of our citizens' economic, political and other potential for the benefit of our country. This division should execute the necessary coordination with related civil society organizations for EU citizenship and the creation of an effective Turkish lobby (TBMM 2003.12, Author's translation).

The parliamentary report drew the lines of an anticipated emigration regime, which determined emigrants' relationship with both Turkey and the countries where they resided. As active citizens in both geographies, the citizens of Turkey were expected to become intervening actors or "bridges of good relations" between the overseas societies/states and Turkish state/society. The report codified the nature of relationship between the society differently with the Turkish state and the host states. It put emphasis on citizens' appeal to social, political and cultural rights in the host countries and the international arena. Yet the relations with the Turkish state remained within the bounds of a tie of allegiance, where the state assured the protection of the citizens' rights not related to its own jurisprudence, but in terms of the legal and societal setting outside of its borders. Even though the ensuing transformation in the policymaking on emigrants has been embedded in the changing citizenship regime, this dual designation – Turkish state watching out for the citizens and citizens demanding their rights in the overseas – endured. As Turkish states' institutional and administrative presence abroad consolidated, emigrants were provided with new rights as they were considered as settled populations with transnational linkages to the homeland. Although the groups living overseas were described as active in their new communities, the Turkish state adopted an approach based on the proactive involvement to determine forms of allegiance and responsibilities that will be oriented towards various circles of solidarity.

7.1. Changes in the Symbolic Portrayal of Emigrants

Home states' engagement with their emigrants is not a new phenomenon; however their adoption of systematic policies that could be referred to as a new emigrant regime and the new perspective to consider them within an extra-territorial understanding of membership is novel. I have demonstrated in Part II of this dissertation that the Turkish state had adopted certain policy objectives over the past, such as assisting the accumulation social and economic remittances, facilitating emigrants' return and contribution to national

development, supporting their social rights in the countries of residence through bilateral agreements. I also discussed that in the post-1980 period, an increased interest by the Turkish state has emerged towards emigrants who were acknowledged in their permanency. Symbolically, the period that preceded 2003 was marked by various practices of naming for identifying groups of emigrants that transformed over time, from *muhacir/mübadil* (refugee/exchanged), to *gurbetçi/yurtdışı işçi* (guest worker/worker abroad) and finally to *yurtdışı vatandaşlar* (citizens living abroad). This early shift was also critical in the implementation of policies that were specifically built for these populations living abroad.

The shift that has begun in the 1980s and consolidated following the early 2000s distinguishes from the shifts in the earlier periods, as it harbors a state-driven reimagination of the nation, and an attempt "to extend the boundaries of the nation beyond the territorial limits of the state" (Varadarajan 2010: 39). As it involves the transformations in the national narratives, it comprises of symbolic and discursive practices that are diffused by policy actors, which are absorbed or rejected by societal actors in practice. The employment of the concept of *yurtdışı vatandaşlar* is the main instance where the state has begun to put a stress on the continuation of citizenship status of emigrants, despite their permanency as residents or even citizens of another country. This change of identification was coupled with the use of *yurtdışı vatandaşlar* in the institutional language, such as its appending to the advisory committees.

Over the last few years, the concept of *diyaspora* (diaspora) has appeared in the policy making discourse as a notion that was "tried to be diffused" in the words of an official from the Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities[108], marking the adoption of a new perspective towards emigrants. For most Turkish people, it is rather controversial to juxtapose the word "Turkish" with the concept of "diaspora". The concept has been previously used and overused in the public discourse to signify any other ethnic group, than Turks, that has emigrated from Anatolia, including Armenians, Greek, Jews, Kurdish and Alevis. Moreover, the classical global usages of the term, which attributed a victimized character of the migrant populations, included Greeks and Armenians. These populations are narrated to have been forced to leave their homelands due to historical events which are also engrained in the national Turkish history: the conquest of Constantinople by the early Ottoman Empire for the former, and did not nationalist policies of the late Empire in 1915 for the latter. All these groups that are attributed with the concept of diaspora received implicit or

[108] Interview with the author, Ankara, January 1, 2014.

explicit inquiries of suspicion. As such, diaspora never received wide usage together with "Turkish" outside of the academic literature, to denote a person living abroad of Turkey's territories, either with the Turkish citizenship or the Turkish ethnicity.

Despite this reluctance to use diaspora, certain state institutions have been very actively pursuing an emigrant engagement policy over the last five years. This turn in the policymaking explains the increasing number of mentions in the media and the academia of the concept of diaspora, as attributed to Turkish citizens (whatever their ethnic and/or religious affiliation may be). In two interrelated settings, the concept is used by a small number of policy makers and opinion leaders to redefine the Turkish emigrant population and the conception of diaspora in Turkey. These settings are: (a) the foreign affairs platform, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, *and* (b) the economic platform, including the state institutions (i.e. the Ministry of Economy) as well as the interest groups with corporatist links to the state (i.e. Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey- TOBB and Economic Development Foundation- İKV).

The discourse adopted in these political and economic platforms share the common goal pulling a diasporic population out of an existing population via supporting their developing status and transnational linkages. According to this understanding, the current emigrants distinguished from the emigrants of the 1960s or 1970s based on their socio-economic status and position within the host countries. Rather than described as passive workers, the non-resident citizens are attributed with characteristics of entrepreneurship, as well as social and political participation in the host countries. Former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's discourses are critical in reflecting the changing perception of the state, regarding emigrants abroad *and* the concept of diaspora. In a meeting of Advisory Committee on Citizens Living Abroad on June 17, 2013, Davutoğlu accentuated the differentiation of the new emigrant population from the early *gasterbeiter*:

> From now on, there is no Turkish diaspora seeking labor, but there is a large entrepreneur group, which even recruits the people of the countries where they live[109].

As evident in this quote, the newly imagined diaspora was therefore expected to have very strong connection to Turkey in terms of social, political, economic and cultural aspects, be

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[109] "Dışişleri Bakanı Davutoğlu Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu Toplantısına katıldı." T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. 17 June 2013. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-davutoglu-yurtdisi-vatandaslar-danisma-kurulu-toplantisina-katildi.tr.mfa.

active and effective both economically and politically and become a representative of Turkey. In a previous address in 2012, Davutoğlu had also re-defined his conception of diaspora, by mentioning "not only Turks, but anyone (including Armenians, Jews, Rum, El Turco in Latin America and Arabs in Argentina) who migrated from these lands (was) a diaspora (for us)"[110]. Although this attempt to expand the frontiers of membership to the diasporic population within the narrative of neo-Ottomanism did not get much traction, it signaled the symbolic transformations in the Turkish state to reach out to communities, with which it assumed to have historical ties beyond the status of citizenship.

In a similar vein, the economic circles have attempted to put the concept, in order to emphasize both the entrepreneurial character and the ties of allegiance of emigrants living abroad. For instance, in a booklet entitled "Global Diaspora Strategies: Suggestions for the Turkish Diaspora" the President of TOBB, the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEİK) and World Turkish Business Council (DTİK) published in 2013, Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu mentioned that the Turkish diaspora was "among the most crucial values for becoming a global actor and attaining the goal of entering the top 10 economies of the world". Publicized as the representative figure of the entrepreneurial diasporas, Muhtar Kent, the CEO of The Coca Cola Company and the honorary member of Advisor Committee on Turkish Citizens Living Abroad, had emphasized the state's role for building a "sustainable diaspora strategy":

> We should expand Turkish lobbying to wide masses abroad. We should attach importance to efforts for making the Turkish diaspora one of the most effective diasporas in the world by conducting a sustainable diaspora strategy[111].

As emphasized by Kent in this quote, the strategy for building or integrating a community of Turkish citizens living abroad that were effective and closely affiliated with the home country and state was coupled with the interest of creating a Turkish lobby. While the recurrent emphasis on the concept of diaspora symbolized the aspiration for community, which could be assumed by communalized characteristics, lobbying represented the higher level practices by the members of this emigrant community that could actively perform in the social, political and economic spheres of the host society.

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[110] "Diaspora tanımını genişletti", Vatan Gündem, 7 July 2012, http://haber.gazetevatan.com/diaspora-tanimini-genisletti/462930/1/gundem.

[111] See, Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, "Başkan'ın Mesajı", DEİK Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu Dünyada Diaspora Stratejileri. Türk Diasporası için Öneriler, Kasım 2011; and "Turkish diaspora should be stronger", Hürriyet Daily News, 15 January 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nid=39085.

These attempts to build a diasporic community were in conformity with the image that the AKP governments have attempted to create since the early 2000s of Turkey as a "strong country" that could perform as a bridge between "civilizations" in the international platform (Iğsız 2014: 697). This neoliberal "national branding" (Iğsız 2014) was epitomized by a number of overlapping framings by the AKP representatives from the early 2000s to early 2010s, which alienated from the Kemalist "western" orientation to a more assertively "eastern" and "southern" (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012). It was represented by new frames of reference, such as the Turkish state's undertaking of a central position in the Middle East as an illustration of "moderate Islam", its assuming of a coalescing role between the countries who held the heritage of the Ottoman Empire or emphasis on its ability to respond to the pressures and demands of the "western world". According to Şahin-Mencütek and Erdoğan (2015), the framing of "strong country" was used in the institution-building and citizenship-related policies under the new emigrant engagement regime, as in the case of AKP representatives' adoption of the bill that changed the voting rights for non-resident citizens. Quoting a parliamentary discourse of an elected representative, Şahin-Mencütek and Erdoğan (2015: 7) argued that this framing was employed within a comparative perspective with the 1980s and 1990s, where the government officials emphasized the Turkish state's present-day ability to respond to the host countries that had formerly rejected the demands on the basis of security and other concerns.

The emphasis over community, grassroots mobilization and social upgrading in its policies of overseas were also in conformity with the AKP governments' populism in the domestic area. In fact, the attention for engaging directly with the public and its publicization has been a major part of the party's strategy and it was coupled with what Kaya (2015: 54-55) describes as a political discourse that underlined the so-called "conservative democracy". For Kaya (2015: 54), this discursive change by the denouncement of the Kemalist project took place very early in 2004, in which the party elites strongly criticized the former regime for its top-down model of modernization by using the adjectives such as *buyurgan* (despotic), *dayatmacı* (imposing), *tepeden inmeci* (proclamation from above) and *toplum mühendisliği* (social engineering). To replace this model, new symbols have been created to represent the image of AKP's new project of governance, such as accessibility, social justice and equal distribution, preservation of moral values, support for civil society and good governance (Kaya 2015: 53). The reframing of the state's relations with the society in the domestic arena had a direct impact on how the nation beyond the territories was reimagined. In Chapters 8

and 9, these symbolic processes will be discussed in relation with how the policies have been implemented, by looking into the cases of France and the United States.

Hence the Turkish state's symbolic policies under the new emigrant engagement policies embody the reimagination of the nation state, which is compatible with the widespread neoliberal restructuring of the states, as discussed in the literature chapter of this dissertation. In its exclusivity, the shift towards a new discursive sphere in Turkey follows the alienation from Kemalism following the AKP's gaining of power: it represents the move from an official state ideology consolidated around Jacobin secular republicanism and western-oriented modernization, towards conservative democracy with strong globalist undertones. In the following sections I will build on this discussion on the symbolic and discursive transformations that are a key part of the Turkish state's emigrant engagement regime, and examine the continuities and changes in terms of institution-building and citizenship-related policies.

7.2. Re-configuration of the Institutional Ties

In this section I focus on how the institutional ties between the Turkish state and the non-resident populations have been re-configured in the post-2003 period. In Chapter 4, I had discussed that in the 1960-2000 period the institutional ties between the Turkish state and the citizen community living abroad were established via three main functions, coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

a) Regulation of the mobility of labour, social security and retirement by Ministry of Labour and related institutions, including State Planning Organization, Turkish Employment Service, investment and development banks,

b) Management of legal and administrative arrangements, as well as overall monitoring by embassy/consulate,

c) Governance of social and cultural sphere (including education of language, religion, communication and broadcasting and associational participation) by ministerial representations organized under the Interministerial Common Culture Commission. The Commission comprised of the representatives from Ministry of Finance, Education, Culture and Tourism, *Diyanet*, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Enhancing Turkey's presence and visibility abroad has entered among the top priorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the AKP's gaining of power in 2002. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu emphasized in his address in the Turkish Grand National

Assembly in June 2012, this objective is pursued through three mechanisms: increasing the number of foreign missions abroad, lifting the visa restrictions for facilitating the movement of Turkish citizens across borders and maintaining the security of Turkish citizens living abroad[112]. The change in the Turkish state's approach towards non-resident citizens in the post-2003 period involved the restructuring of the previous management around the MFA, but also the emergence of a new governance model that introduced new institutions and spheres of interaction between state institutions and society. As this period was also marked by the early administrative and legal reforms within the framework of EU candidacy negotiations, many direct and indirect changes on rules, regulations and institutional settings affected the state's policies on emigrants and their descendants.

Restructuring at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The conventional practice adopted by the states for representation outside of the borders relies on the twofold institutional setting working under the mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a given country. As the representative of one head of state to another, the *ambassador and his mandate* have originally been designed to organize diplomatic (political, economic, social) relations between the two countries. *The consul and the consulate* on the other hand are delegated to assist or protect/advocate the citizens of the consul's own country, as well as facilitating the interactions between the peoples of the two countries. Consular workload generally comprises of matters related passports and civil status (registering marriages, births, deaths, etc.). Therefore the consulates undertake the management of legal and administrative arrangements between the home state and the citizens (Brand 2006: 7). These arrangements may be supported by the counselors and attachés, which are representative bodies to certain ministries (i.e. labour, trade, culture) juxtaposed to the institutional umbrella of the MFA. Besides those functions embassies and consulates of many countries are also known to monitor the communities of nationals abroad, in an attempt to counter the political opposition or to mobilize its supporters (Brand 2006: 8).

In Turkey the traditional intermediary organ to assist the citizens were consulates and the counselors/attachés appointed by the ministries. Over the last ten years the consular services have transformed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Along with this change, the embassies were also appointed with new tasks to become more active in terms of their relations with the

[112] Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Genel Kurul Tutanağı 24. Dönem 2. Yasama Yılı 116. Birleşim 06/Haziran/2012 Çarşamba http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil2/ham/b11601h.htm

citizen communities living abroad. These changes have been introduced within the framework of a closer dialogue with the non-resident populations. However the changes at the MFA are also meaningful in reflecting the changing institutional settings on the policymaking and implementation in Turkey, shifting from a centralized Kemalist state tradition.

As indicated before, the parliamentary commissions investigating the problems of Turkish citizens living abroad established in 1998 and 2003 both underlined the distant relations between the state institutions and the population living abroad. The initial response of the late 1990s by the Turkish state has been establishing representative committees formed of members of the emigrant community that would be coordinated by a state minister. However due to various reasons that will be elaborated in the next section, these committees have not been efficient to strengthen the ties as expected (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 110). Following the parliamentary report of 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to ameliorate this distance by circularizing directives at the foreign missions especially in countries with large Turkish populations. Although directives have not publically announced, the analysis of the interviews of this research and the speeches of the Ministers, as well as the reflections of the issue to the media illustrate that there has been a twofold approach with these directives: (1) enhancing the consular services provided to the individual citizens living abroad, especially regarding attitudes by the officials, and (2) broadening up of the dialogue between the state and the associations founded by people of Turkish origin.

The first approach by the state to reach individual citizens was a response to the mounting criticisms by emigrant populations especially in the European countries about the inadequacy of the consular services and the patronizing attitudes of the state officials. Hence, the MFA began a reform campaign to increase the number and enhance the quality of services provided by the foreign missions, and especially by the consulates. The number of Turkish foreign mission increased from 163 in 2002 to 228 as of 2014, incorporating 134 embassies and 81 consulates (See Figure 1). The consular officials were ordered to enhance their services to the citizens living abroad, and particularly to control their attitudes. According to an interviewee, the tracking in the provision of services was systematically coordinated: "Public officials working overseas are compelled to provide the best available services. Sometimes this works with a stick. The citizens can now send petitions to every public authority and have a follow up on their issues with them." The new setting gave citizens

alternative channels through which they could institutionally interact with the state's representative bodies, not limiting their ties with the foreign missions.

Figure 1: Turkish emigrants and diplomatic missions (2014)



Shades represent the Turkish emigrant population in each country according to Ministry of Labour and Social Security; dots represent the number of Turkish diplomatic missions (embassies plus consulates), gathered by the author from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website[113].

The second approach on the relations between the foreign missions and the society was concentrated on broadening up of the dialogue with the civil society. This issue received media exposure as two controversial directives instructing embassies and consulates to establish better contacts and cooperation with the Islamist *Milli Görüş* and *Gülen* inspired schools were publicized[114]. By a declaration verifying these directives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted in 2003 that "the government established equal distance with citizen associations and companies that operated abroad and under the domestic law of their residence countries" and that "in the case that such associations and organizations were found

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[113] This map was prepared by using StatSilk (2013). StatPlanet: Interactive Data Visualization and Mapping Software. http://www.statsilk.com

[114] Directive No. 3846 demanded from the embassies in Europe to make contact and cooperate with *Milli Görüş* Organization and Directive No. 3847 emphasized the close cooperation between the *Gülen* inspired schools by the Ministry of Education and ordered ambassadors to participate in the ministerial visits to the schools established by the followers of Fethullah Gülen. Cumhuriyet Gazetesi. 2014. "Büyükelçiler sıkıntılı." January 14. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/30437/Buyukelciler_sikintili.html.

in criminal behavior, their prosecution would be held by the related authorities"[115]. The two main results of this approach were (1) the organizing of events that would bring broader networks of emigrant associations and state representation via meetings, conferences and events held under the roof of the consulate and (2) the regularization of participation by the consul and the consular staff to the celebrations, seminars and other events arranged by a broader range of associations founded by Turkish citizens. The change in the state's approach vis-à-vis associations founded by the people of Turkish origin following 2004 has been remarked during the interviews of this research by various groups (not only the two cited above), except certain Kurdish and left-wing organizations which are accredited as "working against the unity of the Turkish state". The changing aspects on the cooperation and conflict between the state and the different migrant groups will be elaborated in the following sections.

The structural reformation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not been limited with the re-configuration of the consular services and the dialogue established by the consular staff. As explained above, the traditional arrangements related to the workload of embassies are categorically centered on top-level relations between states, which have also been the case in the Turkish system. This is not to say that the ambassadors have previously not had contacts with members of the emigrant community. However, these interactions have rather been sporadic and limited in a narrow circle of linkages established mainly with the members of the power elite or the influential community leaders who were apprised as having good relations with the Turkish state. The changes in the Turkish state's approach towards citizens have increased the role attributed to the embassies and ambassadors, clearly demarcated during the yearly "Ambassadors Conference" series organized by the MFA since July 2008. This event brings together ambassadors with members of the government on regional and thematic aspects of the Turkish foreign policy, including the agenda setting on the management of citizens living abroad. Emphasizing the transformations in the global understandings of diplomacy, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan declared in the first conference that the ambassadors had new assignments of becoming "catalyzers" and "facilitators" between the non-governmental organizations, academic circles, media and companies abroad, which included those founded by the Turkish citizens and their counterparts in Turkey. The changing perception vis-à-vis the emigrants and the intervening

[115] NTV. 2013. "Gül Milli Görüş genelgesi'ni doğruladı." April 19. http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/211646.asp#BODY.

role of the MFA have been announced during the conference by the Babacan, with a speech that resumes the Turkish state's approach of the last decade:

> We view our citizens living abroad as the robust guarantees of the political relations between Turkey and the countries where our citizens are living abroad, as natural bridges of friendship in the cultural arena, and also as actors deepening the cooperation in the economic arena. […] With this, as Turkey, we give great importance for our citizens and ethnic kin to successfully adapt to the countries where they obtain citizenship, play an active role in every aspect of social life with a participatory perspective. It is of great importance for our citizens and kin in Europe to show their compatibility with the European culture in every occasion, as individuals who speak the language of the society where they live, work, produce, create jobs, pay taxes and are respectful to laws. It is definitely their natural right to protect the core values that are an integral part of their own identities whilst doing this (Author's translation) [116].

Hence, the government constantly reminded its foreign representation of the transforming image of the citizen living abroad, from a passive migrant to a "natural bridge of friendship" or in other words an active member of the inter-state relations. Different from the previous epochs, the management of citizen-state relations have become extended to incorporate a more intervening role of the embassy, proving the escalated position of the emigrants in their threesome relation with the host and home states. As I will elaborate in the succeeding sections, this is in line with the Turkish state's increased engagement to encourage emigrants to assume the role of "informal lobbyists" or spokespeople in the countries of residence.

In this section I focused on the changes in the institutional ties between the citizens living abroad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the traditional central authority on the management. Beginning with late 2000s, a new mode of governance has been introduced in the Turkish regime on non-resident citizens, with the emergence of a new authority that shared some of the mandate of the MFA. During this period new ministries have been appended to the management of emigrants. In the next section I elaborate on the transformation of the system of governance, which is still on going in Turkey.

New Modalities of Diaspora Governance

As I discussed in the Chapter 2, there is an extensive literature on how different home states re-draw social boundaries with the populations that are under their legal mandates, despite of being outside of the physical borders. Scholars working on emigration countries argue that

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116 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı. 2008. "Dışişleri Bakanı Ali Babacan'ın Büyükelçiler Konferansı Açış Konuşması." July 15. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-ali-babacan_in-buyukelciler-konferansi-acis-konusmasi.tr.mfa.

recently many states are opting for more systematized institutional settings to support and coordinate specifically the relationship between the state and the emigrants and their descendants. What Gamlen (2014: 182) names as "diaspora institutions" range from full ministries, shared ministries, departments to parliamentary standing committees and councils formally appointed to advise on legislation affecting emigrant groups. While in 1980 only a handful of such institutions existed, around 40% member states participating to the United Nations currently has one institution that specifically deals with the state's diaspora populations (Gamlen 2014: 182-184). The institutional transformation has also taken place in the Turkish context in the late 2000s.

Following 2010, the centralized governance related to the non-resident citizens has been shifted from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a shared command with a distinct presidency under the Prime Ministry. Currently there is a two-fold coordination mechanism shared between MFA and *Yurtdışı Türkler Başkanlığı* (Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, YTB), which predominantly assumes the former's role to the outside of the borders through representative bodies and the latter taking on the management within Turkey's borders. The Presidency has become the coordinating member of the Interministerial Common Culture Commission and undertook the harmonization of the increasing number of ministries involved in the affairs related to citizens living abroad. As elaborated before, limited numbers of ministries and institutions (dealing either on labour and social security rights or cultural issues) were active on this topic in the pre-2003 period. Following the 2003 Parliamentary Report legal amendments have been made regarding all ministries' work definitions to include clauses related to the citizens living abroad. With this change, new institutions including Directorate General of Press and Information (BYEGM), Ministry of Family and Social Policies, and the YTB have been embedded to the management of emigrants' affairs.

With the motto of "Wherever there is our citizen and kin, we are there", YTB is placed at the heart of Turkey's policy of its extra-territorial members, as a coordinator of different institutions' engagements with citizens and civil society organizations abroad, as well as with kin communities and international students living in Turkey[117]. The Presidency's mission statement signaled the AKP governments' vision about creating extra-territorial spheres of influence demarcated by varying degrees of connection based on shared civic or ethnic

[117] As this study only focuses on YTB's functions and activities related to the citizens living outside of Turkey, it does not build on the issue of Turkey's kin policy. Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı. 2013. "Hakkımızda." Accessed March 10. http://www.ytb.gov.tr/index.php/hakkimizda.html.

identity (Aksel 2014). The idea of a separate institution focusing on this issue already existed in the 1990s, however it was reduced to the role of a state minister responsible of non-resident citizens, without a clear institutional, administrative and financial structure to support the minister's activities. In the January 2013 issue of Artı 90 (Plus 90) magazine published by the Presidency its former Head, Kemal Yurtnaç marked that the Turkish state lagged 50 years in the arena for building an administrative structure to reinforce ties between the state and emigrants, by giving examples from the institutional mechanisms in other countries on diaspora affairs (İçduygu and Aksel 2014). In the same issue, state officials referred to the establishment of the Presidency as a step towards a more comprehensive governing of citizens and ex-citizens who are living outside of Turkey's territories[118].

The co-ordination of citizen affairs in YTB is organized under four geographical regions, based on the concentration of Turkish citizen population and distance[119]:

> 1st region: German-speaking communities. Includes Germany, Austria and Sweden.
>
> 2nd region: European Union countries that are not included in the 1st region.
>
> 3rd region: English-speaking overseas countries. Includes United States, Canada and Australia.
>
> 4th region: Other remaining countries.

In theory, from 2011 to 2015, the four regional coordination mechanisms worked together with the yearly consultation of an advisory committee, operating on policy areas that are exclusive to the countries or regions. However, since Germany holds more than 1.5 million Turkish citizens, there has been superior attention given by the institution to the citizens living in this country. Germany-based approach in the overall governance has been criticized by many interviewees on YTB's policy advocacy and implementation initiatives, due to the unsuitability of certain policy areas as a result of country-based differences, such as in the case of dual citizenship. The Presidency underwent restructuring in 2015 and three main issue areas were developed under affairs related to citizens living abroad[120]:

> (1) Citizenship issues: Fight against discrimination, active citizenship and participation, legal support, extra-territorial voting and blue card procedures

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[118] Artı 90. 2013. "Başkan'dan: Üçüncü yıl biterken…" Accessed August 20. http://www.arti90dergi.com/dergiler/sayi5ocak2013/files/assets/basic-html/page3.html.
[119] Interview with the author, Ankara, January 24, 2014.
[120] Yurtdışı Türkler Başkanlığı. 2015. "Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar." Accessed July 31. www.ytb.gov.tr.

(2) Education: Diaspora scholarships, young leaders, bilingualism, legal education programs, and education support.

(3) Cultural and social programs: Cultural programs, family and youth, youth bridges, 50th year anniversary events, meetings with citizens.

Based on the above-mentioned issue areas the Presidency uses three mechanisms to implement its strategies: coordination, advocacy and state-society dialogue. As argued before, YTB currently coordinates the state of affairs between the citizens living abroad and the ministries in Turkey, while at the same time cooperating with MFA's foreign missions regarding the activities and programs organized abroad. The Presidency designates and advocates on certain policy areas to the policy-makers, such as in the case of amendments related to the extra-territorial voting rights, which allowed emigrants to vote from abroad. The state-society dialogue takes a substantial portion of YTB's activities and strategies, which is undertaken through two main mechanisms that will be elaborated in the next sub-sections: civil society dialogue and consultative participation.

Civil Society Dialogue and Allocation of Resources

As I argued in Chapter 4, in the 1980s the flourishing civil society in Europe, which had links with Turkey, had at large an uneasy relationship with the Turkish state. This situation was mainly due to a rattle between the post-coup tendencies that attempted to overhaul on the general society and forming transnational non-state environment that was able to bypass the state authority. Within the environment of sweeping identity politics, a highly fragmented civil society with former or existing citizenship ties to Turkey was formed, making claims ranging from left to right politics, self-autonomous rule to nationalist conservatism. In an effort to monitor and control over the associative life, the former Law on Associations dated 1983 (No. 2908) predicated the legitimacy of the civil society organizations on a framework based on constant informing, which has also been conveyed to the overseas.

While the prohibition impeded against the establishment and running of countless associations in Turkey, many associations outside of Turkey continued their activities without establishing any ties with the Turkish state authorities. Moreover, for some groups that were harshly suppressed, the availability of the civil society environment especially in Europe became a reliable alternative. Within the process of harmonization to the European Union in the 2000s such clauses hampering against the existence of a strong civil society were relaxed. Despite the changes, the process of notification within a certain period after the

establishment for the recognition by Turkish state institutions still exists. According to the regulation dated 2002 on the management of Department on Associations working under the Ministry of Interior, the follow-up of information on the covenants, members, coordination and the operations related to the prohibited associations were given to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Another ongoing application since the 1980s was the assembly of scattered associations under the roof of umbrella organizations. In response to a parliamentary question on the development of civil society organizations founded abroad, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem had revealed the involvement of the state:

> There is a great deal of associations founded by our citizens living abroad. In an attempt to resolve this mess and to ensure them to become serious civil society organizations, they have been encouraged since 1980 to gather under umbrella organizations. In this context comprehensive umbrella organizations were established in Europe under the title of Turkish Associations Coordination Committees. This constituted Federation of Turkish Associations and Assembly in Europe and Canada, and Turkish Association Council in Australia. In doing so, attention is given to the associations' unifying character and ensuring that no association respecting the republican values and the territorial integrity of the country has been excluded. The last attempt has been revised during the meeting with Consul Generals held on 14-15 February 2000 (Author's translation) [121].

As argued before, the state's approach towards civil society organizations founded abroad has altered in the early 2000s. This overlapped with Turkey's candidacy to the European Union and the amendments in the Law on Association (No. 5253) that expanded the opportunities available to associations established by Turkish citizens both in and outside of the territories. For the associations in Turkey, this amendment meant primarily the possibility of external funding, while for the other outside of the borders; it resulted in increased interactions with the state and non-state actors in Turkey. Different from the preceding endeavor to rule through coercion, the project-based funding established a new form of relationship in which the consent was given by the civil society, congruent with the Gramscian perspective of hegemony (Varadarajan 2010: 45).

Following the establishment of YTB, new opportunities were made available to civil society organizations founded by Turkish citizens abroad via project grants and civil society capacity building programs. Beginning with *İmece* (collective work) program in 2011 and the

[121] T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü. 2000. "Yazılı soru önergesi." February 29. http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d21/7/7-1373c.pdf.

"Financial Assistance Program" after 2015, YTB provided grants to civil society organizations. Civil society organizations and individuals could obtain direct project by applying to the Presidency at any time, by a project related to the pre-determined priorities. In the period of 2011-2013, more than 11.8 million TL was granted to 161 civil society organizations founded abroad, mainly in Germany, Austria, the United States, Australia, France and the Netherlands (See Table 5).

Table 5: Program Priorities of YTB's Civil Society Funding and Financial Assistance

2011 & 2013 *Imece* Priorities	2015 Financial Assistance Programs
• Strengthening Turkish family structure and awareness raising on Youth Offices • Improving work and employment opportunities of citizens • Organizing activities for elderly, disabled and convicted groups • Publishing academic and scientific work and collecting data • Organizing exchange and cultural cooperation programs with all target populations • Supporting the circulation of Turkish language • Establishing and supporting Turkish alumni associations in overseas	• Fight against discrimination • Active citizenship and equal participation program • Justice for all program • Bilingual education support program • Program for education assistance and academic development • Family and social work • Cultural work support program

Source: T.C. Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı, İMECE Sivil Toplum Destekleri Gerçekleştirilen ve Desteklenen Faaliyetler Broşürü, 2011-2013 and ytb.gov.tr.

From 2013 to 2015 there has been a change in the language used in the definition of priorities from a traditional one (i.e. "improving work and employment", "strengthening family structure", "organizing cultural cooperation and exchange") towards a new discourse focusing on more specific policy areas, such as "fight against discrimination" or "active citizenship". The current financial assistance program allows civil society organizations, universities, international organizations, think tanks and research centers to apply for grants, from Turkey and beyond (See Table 6). As can be followed from Table 6, the financial support provided by YTB extends beyond the host countries of Turkish emigrants, in relation with the state's assuming of the image of a "strong country" that could act as a bridge of "civilizations". The embracing of the non-resident community living overseas complies with the efforts of rapprochement with different extra-territorial membership clusters, based on shared ethnicity, history or religion (Aksel 2014).

Table 6: Top-10 Countries for YTB Financial Support (2011-2013)

Country	Total Financial Assistance (TL)
Germany	4,371,024
Somalia	1,922,655
Austria	1,800,045
Bulgaria	1,634,552
USA	1,336,280
Australia	1,115,579
France	1,072,430
Bosnia and Herzegovina	854,082
Netherlands	839,904
Georgia	685,901
Total support for the 10 countries	15,632,452

Source: T.C. Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı, İMECE Sivil Toplum Destekleri Gerçekleştirilen ve Desteklenen Faaliyetler Broşürü, 2011-2013.

In addition to the financial assistance, the Presidency organizes other programs and events targeting civil society organizations. Such events include the anniversary programs for the 50th year from Turkey to European countries held since 2011, thematic training programs (oriented for youth, women, professionals, cultural cooperation) for the wider public. Specifically targeting civil society dialogue and capacity building YTB organizes events together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within and outside of Turkey to bring civil society and state representatives in the same room.

Consultative Participation

Until the late 1990s, the relations between the state and the society living abroad has been managed by the intervening role of the consular staff (including the counselors and attachés) and certain community leaders – usually the heads of associations, intellectuals or professionals- deemed as convenient with the republican state ideology. The advisory committee founded in 1998 under the management of a State Minister responsible for citizens living abroad was a first step of bringing together the state and society representatives; however it received criticisms for not being effective. One of the main reasons was the nomination process, which, according to the civil society organizations resulted in the participation of individuals who did not represent the overall society living overseas. A second reason suggested during some of the interviews was the lack of a systematized system involving an administrative structure specifically working on the management of citizens

living abroad. In addition to the nomination process, the general structure and members of the committee were not transparent. According to the emigrant representatives of the consultative committee, yearly meetings were held in Turkey or in Germany. The meetings were held with a didactical tone where the state officials introduced Kemalist state values to the members, and emigrants' issues and problems were discussed centralized around the case of Germany.

In 2012 the Advisory Committee on Turkish Citizens Abroad (*Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma* Kurulu) was founded under YTB, to assist in creating the agenda on policies for emigrants living abroad. Through consular circulation in 2011, Turkish citizens were asked to present their own portfolio to the consulates, with the terms of application:

1. Having participated in the country of application to the social responsibility projects, social integration, education and similar activities that would be for the benefit of Turkish citizens,
2. Having legally resided in the country of application more than five years, except for period spent for education and tourism,
3. Not benefiting from unemployment insurance or social aid,
4. Advanced knowledge of the primary language of the country of application, or at least one in the case of multilingual societies,
5. Possessing the interest and responsibility to education and representation ability needed for committee membership,
6. Being at least high school graduate, aged 25 years old or more, having served in the military, postponed or exempted[122].

Committee's 80 members were selected by the state as representatives of Turkish citizens from 19 countries. A comparison between committees elected in 1998 and 2012 to coordinate and monitor Turkish citizens living abroad also illustrates the change in the state's attitude. In 1998, the High Committee on Turkish Citizens Living Abroad was formed of parliamentarians, country representatives from mainly Germany (26 members), USA, France and Holland (3 members from each) as well as other European countries, Australia and

[122] Hamburg Başkonsolosluğu. 2015. "Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kuruluna Yurtdışından Seçilecek Üyelere İlişkin İlan." Accessed March 12. http://www.hamburg.bk.mfa.gov.tr/images/localCache/12/0gpcxw3uuh4fom55524z1x45BaTempDoc0bb713bc-ee7f-41e0-a6b2-91cd3a0adf5eYurtd%C4%B1%C5%9F%C4%B1%20Vatanda%C5%9Flar%20Dan%C4%B1%C5%9Fma%20kuruluna%20se%C3%A7ilecek%20%C3%BCyelere%20ili%C5%9Fkin%20ilan.pdf.

Canada and six state ministries. The Advisory Committee on Turkish Citizens Abroad, which was elected in 2012, does not include parliamentarians, but a higher number of state institutions and ministries. While the number of members representing the most populous host country has decreased, the geography has expanded to include new members among co-ethnic populations. In the 2012 committee, the highest number of members were again from Germany (18 members), followed by USA (8 members), France (6 members) and Holland (4 members), as well as from the Balkans, Central Asia, Middle East and Africa and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In addition, 10 honorary members were elected, representing Turkish citizens in eight western countries[123] (See Appendix 8). The advisory committee, its yearly meetings and the circumstantial meetings between its members and state officials appeared in the media and public opinion in the first two years of its foundation. Nevertheless, the committee entered institutional inertia following the encounter between the AKP government and the supporters of the Fethullah Gülen movement after 2013, as some of the members of the committee were also representatives of *Hizmet* associations. A detailed analysis will be provided in Chapters 8 and 9 about the activities and members of the advisory committee in France and the United States.

Supporting Institutions

Although not involved directly, two other institutions were established in the late 2000s in order to undertake the economic and cultural issues related to the citizens. In the domain of economy, World Turkish Business Council (DTİK) was established in 2008 under the Foreign Economic Relations Board of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) "to bring successful Turkish entrepreneurs who have organized in a scattered way and endeavor to make effective Turkish lobbying abroad, and Turkish professionals heading the decision-making mechanisms of internationally powerful companies under one roof"[124]. The council's operations included regional committee meetings, communication with state institutions about lobbying activities, meetings with entrepreneurs residing abroad and World Turkish Entrepreneurs Convention. Beginning with 2009, DTİK organized the convention bringing together more than 2,000 entrepreneurs and professionals from six regions (Africa, Middle East-Gulf, Americas, Asia Pacific, Eurasia, Europe and the Balkans)

[123] Yurtdışı Türkler Başkanlığı. 2013. "Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu." Accessed March 12. http://www.ytb.gov.tr/Files/Document/Yurtdisi-Vatandaslar-Danisma-Kurulu-Uyeleri.pdf.
[124] Dünya Türk İş Konseyi (DTİK) İletişim Platformu, Presentation.

with the participation of the President or the Prime Minister[125]. Furthermore, in 2009 DTİK created a portal (www.dtik.org.tr) for twinning and sharing of information among Turkish entrepreneurs living overseas. Despite the rapid start, the institution entered into inertia following the omnibus bill of 2014 and was later relocated with its higher authority from under TOBB to the Ministry of Economy[126].

Regarding culture, Yunus Emre Institute, which entered into service in 2009, was oriented towards bringing together cultural and social activities offered to emigrants and "Turkey-enthusiasts", similar to the Goethe Institute or the British Council (Kaya and Tecmen 2011)[127]. The institute holds more than 30 cultural centers abroad to promote Turkish language, culture and art and works in collaboration with the Ministry of Culture, municipalities and universities. Cultural diplomacy is introduced as the new paradigm in promoting the Turkish culture: it is defined by the President of the Institute as "presenting a society to others through cultural relations, adopting a respectable position among world societies through a unique image". The institute aims at constructing a new image of Turkey, as described by its president, by synthesizing cultural heritage and modernity as the former image is asserted as confined "to barbarism due to the historical Ottoman-Turkish image and to subculture since the emigration in the 1960s"[128]. Despite the initial aim of reaching both citizens and kin communities living abroad, Yunus Emre Institute's work on citizens remained relatively limited, reasoned by its President as due to the difficulties experienced with the host states.

Ideological Instruments

One of the key elements of the Turkish state's emigrant policies in the 1980s was concentrated on the exportation of culture and ideology in order to strengthen emigrants' sense of belonging towards Turkey. In Chapter 4, I argued that there have been two main instruments with this regard, namely religion and education, around which the institutional configurations were made, through the intervening role of *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* (Presidency of Religious Affairs), Ministry of Education and the coordinative mechanism

[125] The convention is organized with the command of the Prime Minister Erdoğan. Interview with the author, Istanbul, November 25, 2013.
[126] Hürriyet. 2014. "Bir gecede bakana bağlandılar." September 11. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/27289234.asp.
[127] Yunus Emre Foundation was established in 2007 (Law No. 5653 dated 5 May 2007) by founding board of trustees including the President, former Minister of Culture and Tourism, former MoE, former MoF and the President of TOBB.
[128] Interview with the author, Istanbul, December 26, 2013.

under *Bakanlıklararası Ortak Kültür Komisyonu* (Interministerial Common Culture Commission). Under the reactive emigrant regime that characterized the policy making of the 1980s and 1990s, the establishment of these instruments were the result of the many inquiries among the members of the emigrant community settled since the 1960s, but more importantly due to the rising oppositional ideological factors in the overseas that did not comply with the official state ideology, including "oppositional Islam" (Akgönül 2005).

In the post-2003 period the Turkish state's activities in the area of religion continued, and according to Bruce (2012: 137), *Diyanet* even increased its presence in the international scenery beginning with this date. One of the earlier initiatives of the recent epoch has been the third *Din Şurası* (Religious Council), which was organized by the institution to bring together theologists, politicians and intellectuals who were actively involved with religious services for Turkish citizens living overseas (Bruce 2012: 137). Bruce (2012) argues that the resolutions of this council has been reflected on the activities of *Diyanet* over the years to come, including the increase in the number of religious personnel, foundation of a bureau to represent *Diyanet* in relation with the European Union and initiatives for positioning *Diyanet* federations and foundations in the overseas as official interlocutors with the national authorities, particularly in Europe. As of 2013, there were counselors offices in 21 countries and 24 attaches offices distributed to eight countries around the world, with the majority being positioned in Germany[129]. In addition to these initiatives, *Diyanet* initiated new programs to integrate the new generations among the emigrant community from Turkey in Europe to its own programs. The new programs comprised of *Uluslararası İlahiyat Programı* (International Theology Program) that aimed to educate young Turkish emigrants in Turkey with the aim of employing them later in the overseas and the foundation of the faculty of theology in Strasbourg, which would become a center of attention of the high level education of theology in the overseas (Bruce 2012: 137). In 2014, International Theology Program held a total of undergraduate students, mainly from Germany (312), followed by France (78), Belgium (49), Netherlands (24) and the United States (16)[130].

Since the initiation of the overseas programs under *Diyanet,* the objective of the Turkish state has been beyond providing religious services to citizens living abroad. In Turkey, *Diyanet* symbolized the Kemalist state's objective for protecting the principle of *laicite,* which did not

[129] In 2013, Germany held 13 religious attaches, followed by two in France, Netherlands, Australia, one for each in Austria, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Romania and Azerbaijan. "Ataşelikler." 2013. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Dış İlişkiler Genel Müdürlüğü. Accessed November 20. http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DisIliskilerGenelMudurlugu/Sayfalar/Ateselikler.

[130] Uluslararası İlahiyat Programı Tanıtım Kılavuzu. 2014. T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı.

refer to the separation between religion and state as compatible with its definition, but rather the institutionalization of Islam within the state for its stricter control (Bruce 2012: 135-136). In the overseas, the role of *Diyanet* and its affiliated institutions contributed to the paternal governance of the Turkish state, to prevent radicalization of Islamic positions under the supervision of institutions affiliated to the central management (Akgönül 2005: 42). For Şenay and Houston (2015: 240) who analyzed the extra-territorial activities of the Turkish state in Australia, the *Diyanet*'s role even went beyond the enactment of state Islam, as it nationalized and mobilized the emigrants by incorporating nationalism in the daily practices of the communitarian structures built around religion.

The increasing presence of *Diyanet* in the Turkish state's emigrant engagement policy after 2003 corresponded with the shifts from the Kemalist laicite towards the reinforcement of rising Islamisation during the AKP era. According to Yeşilada and Noordijk's (2013) examination of religiosity, tolerance and changing social values in Turkey based on the analysis of the World Values Survey results for 1981-2007, while there has been intensification toward conservatism since mid-1990s in the Turkish society, it has become more apparent and visible during the AKP's rule. For Kaya (2014: 63), Islamisation of the Turkish society and politics in Turkey were coupled with the discourses, strategies and social provisioning policies by the AKP in order to maintain the state's central position in the regulation of religious affairs. Therefore *Diyanet*'s role as the institutional embodiment of monopolizing religion by the state in Turkey and abroad endured in the post-2003 period. It also continued to act as a way to create closer ties between the state and the emigrant communities around the daily practices of religion (Bruce 2012: 146). However, *Diyanet*'s presence in the last era shifted from the reactive perspective of controlling oppositional Islam in the overseas, towards the replication of Turkey as a model of moderate Islam in the international scene with its instruments for engaging its non-resident citizens compliant with its official ideology.

In the area of education, beginning with the late-1970s the Turkish state had started sending teachers on Turkish language and culture from Turkey, to provide extra curriculum education after school hours. These educative activities were a part of the state's concern for "ameliorating the Turkish language proficiency and the maintaining the ties with the Turkish culture"[131] for citizens living in the overseas. As an extension of the national education, the voluntary schooling on Turkish language and culture served as an outlet for inculcating on

[131] T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yurtdışı Eğitim Öğretim Genel Müdürlüğü. 1994. 1992-1993 Faaliyetleri.

nationalism around "Turkishness", which harbored in itself the sublimating values such as national identity, Kemalism, the position of paternal state and dignification of the army. During the last period, this appropriation of education around nationalism endured. In addition, the participation of second generation non-resident Turkish citizens to the education programs were also announced as a part of the greater scheme for social upgrading, as the education in mother language was promoted as a factor influencing the overall success of students in their formal training. A brochure disseminated by the education attaché in Karlsruhe, Germany, campaigned for increased participation to Turkish language and culture courses by citing its benefits[132]:

- Turkish (language) for not breaking the ties of our children with Turkish Language and Turkish Culture,
- Turkish so that our children will not live identity crises,
- Turkish to learn better German,
- Turkish for increased school success of our children,
- Turkish to benefit from the opportunities of Turkey and Turkish language,
- Turkish for increasing the employment opportunities of our children in the future,
- Turkish to benefit from growing up as bilingual bicultural people,
- Turkish to contribute to the cultural and social development of our children,
- Turkish to raise our children with Turkish identity.

Repeated all through the brochure the instruction of *Türkçe* (Turkish languge), was represented both as a solution against the "potential problems" that were assumed to emerge due to physical isolation, such as the loss of cultural or ideational ties as well as a facilitator for the non-resident citizens' participation in the social and professional life in the host countries.

While the instruction of language and culture was managed by a centralized program of the Ministry of Education since the late 1970s, its systematization and standardization took place in the post-2003 period. Since 1986, the Turkish state published four education programs on

[132] "Haydi Türkçe Dersine." T.C. Karlsruhe Başkonsolosluğu Eğitim Ataşeliği. Brochure.

education for non-resident citizens, two of which were published in 2006 and 2009 (Şen 2010). The program introduced in 2009 under the project entitled *Uzaktaki Yakınlarımız* (Our Distant Relatives) integrated and updated the education plan, without distinguishing the curriculum based on the specific characteristics of the host countries. The new curriculum incorporated courses on Turkish language, history of Turks, history of Turkish Republic and Atatürk's principles, and geography, together with the education of religion and moral knowledge. Due to the French state's ban over religious education in public schools, the sections on religion have not been introduced for the books that were going to be used in France (Kartal Güngör 2015). As of 2014, the Ministry of Education employed more than 1700 teachers and instructors in the overseas, primarily settled in Germany (495 teachers) and France (190 teachers)[133].

The standardized curriculum follows traces of the overall state ideology of the post-2003 period, with the inculcation of Turkish-Islam synthesis, Turkey's position as a stronger country in its region and in the international arena as well as the safeguard of national culture and values. As such, the most recent textbook for the grades eight through ten includes five chapters: (1) demography and economy in Turkey, (2) travel to Turkish history, (3) traces from our culture, (4) opening out from Turkey to the world, (5) religion, culture and civilization; followed by a final page where the map of "Turkic world" has been printed. In addition, the textbook delves into the issues related to the emigrant status of the students, in the chapter on "opening out from Turkey to the world" that specifically focuses on the issues that may be faced by students in their host countries. The chapter comprises of sections briefly analyzing citizenship rights and obligations; problems faced abroad and integration process; the contributions of Turks in the countries where they reside; the bilateral relations between the country of residence and Turkey; as well as Turkey in the pathway for Europe. It also includes examples of the Turkish state's activities abroad (such as the employment of Ministry of Education of instructors) and the emigrants' "good practices" (such as the contributions of associations in the integration and dialogue, Turkish entrepreneurs' employment of other Turkish citizens or Turkish politicians participation to the elections in Germany and France)[134].

This section on institution-building processes analyzed the continuity and changes in the institutional ties between the Turkish state and the society living abroad in the 2000s. The

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[133] Interview with the author, Ankara, February 26, 2014.

[134] "İlköğretim Türkçe ve Türk kültürü, 8-10. Sınıflar ders öğretim materyali." 2010. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Devlet Kitapları.

period has witnessed the re-structuring of the already existing and deep-rooted state institutions and ministries, and the creation of new ones, which would address to the coordinative, economic and social necessities. The reform processes have been convenient to the effects of global and regional factors – mainly the EU harmonization process – and the ongoing transformation in the Turkish state and society during the AKP rule. Hence, the changes were engrained in the administrative, institutional and cognitive shift related to the regulatory neo-liberal restructuring of the state and at the same time the deviation from the republican state tradition. The following section furthers the discussion on the changes in the Turkish state's policies on citizens living abroad, concentrating on the re-definition of citizenship rights and duties.

7.2. Re-defining Rights and Duties at "Home and Abroad"

Conventionally, once leavening their home countries, citizens inevitably lose many of the rights they had a hold of before. Two essential rights continue to exist for non-resident citizens, related to their mobility in and out of the country, which distinguish them from non-citizens: (1) undisputable right to return to the state, and (2) protection via consular missions. In addition to these basic rights, increasingly states are providing more rights ranging from financial support to culturalxs rights and even allowing expatriates to vote, while at the same time ushering in new obligations (Gamlen 2008: 843; Collyer 2014: 55-56). As emphasized in the literature chapter, the changing dynamics of relationships between the states and their citizens living abroad signal a "re-invention of the their roles outside of the territorial borders" (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003: 606). The new roles adopted by the states are a form of sovereignty claim over citizen (Gamlen 2008: 837), one that goes beyond this two-fold relationship due to its physical and structural existence in the premises of another sovereignty. In Turkey, the changes in the emigration regime were consolidated by new policies related to the citizenship ties and practices between the state and the society. Analyzing on the top-down allocation of status, rights and duties by the Turkish state in the post-2003 period, this section focuses on three topics: (a) civil and social rights, (b) political rights, (c) duties and anticipated commitments.

Civil and Social Rights

From a traditional understanding of state, which is defined within the limits of an assumed territorial unity, bordering practices and the emigration policy are the initial practices for the

social and physical separation of the state. These practices include foremost the control of physical borders and the mobility of persons across the borders, which, in the case of citizens are mainly formulated around the means and possibility for exit and re-entry (Brand 2006: 5). Since the legal availability of mobility rights for the individuals is increasingly determined as a result of the bilateral agreements between both states, the physical bordering process is the initial sphere available to analyze the triangular relationship between the home state, host state and the migrant. Chapter 4 illustrated that in the case of Turkey, two crucial arrangements have been made since the 1960s related to the management of mobility: (1) the easing through workforce participation in 1960-1973 by bilateral labour agreements, and (2) the restriction of mobility (both entries and exits) through ideological inconveniency from 1980 to mid-1990s. The emerging visa regimes introduced especially by the EU countries also stimulated the hampering of mobility for the citizens of non-member states, including Turkish citizens and third country nationals who used the Turkish soil as transit. Despite the ongoing negotiations between the Turkish state and the EU since 2010, Turkey continues to be classified under Schengen Area's black list of countries whose nationals do require visas (İçduygu and Aksel 2015).

Still, there has been a relative easing of mobility mechanisms by the Turkish state, for citizens who are currently living in or outside of Turkey. Some recent decisions include the reducing of passport fees, increasing the available period for foreign registered vehicles or cellular phones owned by citizens living abroad. The easing of mobility and taking a central position in the rising interconnectedness has also entered the agenda of national flag carrier Turkish Airlines' marketing policy, which supported by the state, increased its number of destinations from 42 in 1987 to 247 in 2014[135]. In addition to the increase in the number of institutions abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased the number of its personnel sent abroad and systematized the registration process through computer-automated system. In 2009, an online portal was created for all Turkish citizens overseas and foreigners who desired to process an interactive visa application. For Turkish citizens, the *e-Konsolosluk* (e-consulate, http://v1.konsolosluk.gov.tr/) enables citizens to complete certain procedures on line, including birth and ID registrations, passport renewals and extensions, visa applications and all procedures pertaining to citizenship and a host of others[136]. To become a member of

[135] Turk Havayolları. 2015. Yıllık Rapor 2012. Accessed May 12. http://www.turkishairlines.com/download/investor_relations/annual_reports/yillik_rapor_2012.pdf.

[136] The portal also provides information about customs, the law, consular issues and the economy, as well as Turkish societies abroad, Turkish workplaces, festivals, associations, speech texts and e-library.

e-Konsolosluk, the citizens need to enter identification information, which is compared with the Ministry of Interior Central Civil Registration System (MERNIS). An amendment made on Law No. 6304 on Key Provisions on Elections and Electoral Register in May 2012 allowed for ex-citizens and their children to be recorded to Blue Card Register at MERNIS. Blue-card receivers will neither have the obligation to serve in the military, nor the rights to be elect or elected, and export vehicle or household goods. They will however be able to work in state institutions as workers, temporary or contract employees[137]. Another technological novelty has been YTB's "Pocket Guide" application for smart phones and tablets, put into practice in 2015. Pocket Guide provides most recent information on rights and duties, i.e. passports, customs, traffic, health and social security, retirement, education, military service, taxes, registration and justice, as well as on blue card system, petitions to prime ministry and e-*Devlet (*e-state) applications.

Table 7 compares and classifies rights and duties that are currently available in theory to resident and non-resident Turkish citizens, although in practice some of the rights are not granted equally in the society. Some of the basic rights and duties are equally present in the two categories, such as "right to liberty and security of person" and "loyalty to the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation", which have also been found in emigration regime of the 1980s. Protections of workfare regime through recruitment and deployment, as well as the ability to guarantee fundamental social security rights have also been a substantial part of the state's services since the 1960s, and ensured by the bilateral agreements signed with 29 countries. For many countries, the social security protection also includes the transfer of pension rights of Turkish citizens to Turkey. Some of the clauses listed in the table do not apply due to the primacy of territorial jurisdiction (Baubock 2009: 488). Some other clauses are available, although with exceptions: for instance "right to social service" and "right and duty of training and education" are conditional on the bilateral agreements between states, "right to retain an external citizenship" applies under the condition of notifying the diplomatic mission, "right to be elected" is currently available for home district representation.

[137] Radikal. 2013. "Mavi kartlılar için yeni dönem!" May 3. http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/mavi_kartlilar_icin_yeni_donem-1132066.

Table 7: Rights and duties of resident and non-resident Turkish citizens

Rights

R	N	Right
✓	✓	Right to life and to protect and develop his material and spiritual entity
✓	✓	Right to liberty and security of person
✓	✓	Right to demand respect for his private and family life
✓	✓	Right to freedom of communication, publish, use mass media
✓	✓	Right to freedom of residence and movement
✓	✓	Right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction
✓	✓	Right to freedom of thought and opinion
✓	✓	Right to study and teach freely
✓	✓	Right to form associations without prior permission
✓	✓	Right to hold meetings and demonstration marches
✓	✓	Right to own and inherit property
✓	✓	Right to litigation, prove an allegation and request prompt access to competent authorities; petition
✓	✓	Protection of the family by the state
✓	✓	Right and duty of training and education
✓	✓	Right and duty to work, rest and leisure
✓		Right to organize labour unions, collective bargaining, strike and lockout
✓		Right to housing, live in a healthy, balanced environment
✓	✓*	Right to social security
✓	✓*	Right to vote, to be elected and to engage in political activity; form political parties, and to join and withdraw from them
✓	✓	Right to enter the public service
✓	✓*	National (military) service
✓	✓*	Right to retain external citizenship

Duties

R	N	Duty
✓	✓	Loyalty to the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation
✓	✓	Support and defend the constitution
✓	✓	Respect and obey the laws
✓	✓*	National (military) service
✓	✓*	Obligation to pay taxes
✓	✓*	Right and duty of training and education
✓	✓	Right and duty to work
✓	✓	Notifying the consular offices in the adoption of a new citizenship

Table created by author, based on the definition of citizenship in the Turkish Constitution.

R: Resident citizens, N: Non-resident citizens, ✓* rights/duties exist with exceptions.

The topic of securing civil rights of citizens in the overseas is a controversial issue, due to the historical legacies of Turkish migration as well as the sovereignty encounters between Turkey and the host states. As I described in Chapter 5 substantial numbers of citizens had quit Turkey in the 1980s due to their ideological, political claims or human rights violations they faced in the country. Although some of these populations were granted asylum and left Turkish citizenship, many others either sustained their citizenship status, or received them back as a result of the amnesties in the 1990s. As discussed before, issues such as the education of culture and language as well as the provision of religious rights has been receiving the attention of the Turkish state, especially in an attempt to control the assuming of such issues by the civil society organizations. In the recent years, these issues are gradually being merged with the discourse on the protection of citizenship rights in the host countries, and of the desired active citizenship in two geographies, emerging from the availability of dual citizenship. The inculcation about the search for citizenship rights in the country of residence has been voiced out by the newly appointed ambassador of Turkey in France, at a meeting with more than 150 Turkish associations in April 2014:

> (During my post) in the 1980s I used to say that becoming a French citizen is very important, when you go to a municipality they see you as potential votes and approach you that way. Your fathers would become sensitive saying 'are we going to become French'. I told them that they needed to have the same rights with others if you are living here. I hope there are going to be those who become candidates, enter politics as mayors. The active participation of the youth is beneficial for you – should I say Turkish-origin French or Franco-Turks. You would have a say in this country's state if you become taxpayers. Search your rights. You should have a life nested in the French society. […] There is not a monolithic society against you. You also represent France as citizens. Do not consider yourselves as marginal group or an outsider (Author's translation).

Scholars including Yurdakul (2006: 438) had previously argued that Turkish immigrant associations were actively involved in the political-decision making processes in their residence countries, especially in terms of negotiating rights and memberships. The Turkish state's intervening role clearly complements the practices of some citizenship communities. The final section of this chapter will expand on the binding of the citizenship rights with the anticipated commitments of political participation.

Political Rights

Allowing citizens living outside the territories to vote is a practice that has increasingly become common for many electoral democratic states over the last decades. According to a survey conducted in 2009, 129 out of 198 states were known to allow their emigrants to vote

for national elections, although with a range of different forms, giving out different implications for the nature of relationship between emigrants and the states (Collyer 2014: 68). Currently three common patterns are adopted by the states regarding extra-territorial voting, based on exercise and use of the voting process: (a) vote in home district, (b) vote abroad for home district and (c) vote abroad for direct representation (Collyer 2014). While many states opt for allowing emigrants to vote in polling stations abroad or by post, rather than returning to the country of origin in order to vote, only a few permit emigrants to elect their own representation with an exclusive constituency.

Table 8: Territorial significance of the three systems of voting

		Casting of vote/candidacy	
		Turkey	**Host country**
Counting of vote/candidacy	**Turkey**	• Vote in home district	• Vote abroad for home district • Run from abroad for home district
	Host country	x	• Vote/run from abroad for direct representation

Table adapted from Collyer and Vathi 2007; Collyer 2014.

In the Turkish case, from 1987 onwards voting was allowed to be exercised by emigrants only in the customs, until the amendments in the Law No. 5749 on Basic Provisions on Elections in 2008. Therefore until the two latest elections emigrants were expected to return to the country of origin for voting (Abadan-Unat et al. 2014). Moreover, not all customs had ballots providing voting for emigrants, and it was limited with more populous entry gates, limited to the land customs in Edirne, and air customs of Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Antalya and Adana[138]. The changes in the system resulted in the registration and collection of data on the available extra-territorial voters, which in the past would be determined by the number of voters who used their votes in the customs.

Following the first amendment, another bill was passed in May 2012 that determined the conditions of consular voting: (a) citizens would be able to vote in national elections and

[138] T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu. 2015. "Karar." Accessed September 10. http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/Kararlar/2002Pdf/2002-481.pdf.

referenda simultaneously with elections in Turkey, (b) customs voting would continue to be practiced, (c) citizens would be able to vote at a pre-designated time slot for them, (d) citizens would also be able to vote during their stay in Turkey[139]. Beginning with the Presidential elections in August 2014 consular voting started to be practiced. During the first elections, electoral turnout remained very low at 18.9% at both customs and consular ballots combined, mainly as a result of the system which allowed citizens to vote only at the appointment time that they obtained through registering on the internet, as well as the lack of clear notification by the government and the consulates. In the parliamentary elections held in May 2015, nearly 37% of the extra-territorial voters participated in the elections with the majority using their votes in the consulates placed in the designated areas (See Table 8). Considering that the Turkish electoral system is based on d'Hondt method with 10% electoral threshold, the extra-territorial voters comprising of 5% of the total number of voters has significant implications for the results of the elections. The current system works through a complex set of calculations, which divides the votes cast overseas to the number of seats a political party already secured a place in the 85 constituencies in Turkey based on its ratio to the total number of votes by Turkish citizens. It has been argued in the media that parties, which were at the limits of the electoral threshold, benefited the most from this system in the last two elections, and was disadvantageous for independent candidates[140].

[139] T.C. Yurtdışı Türkler Başkanlığı. 2015. "Yurtdışında oy kullanma." Accessed September 10. http://www.ytb.gov.tr/tr/yurtdisinda-oy-kullanma/760-yurtdisinda-oy-kullanma.

[140] Milliyet. 2015. "Kritik 1 milyon oy partilere nasıl dağılacak?" June 3. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/kritik-1-milyon-oy-partilere-nasil/siyaset/detay/2068675/default.htm.

Table 9: Voting in the last four national elections and 2010 referendum

	2007 Parliamentary	2010 Referendum	June 2011 Parliamentary	August 2014 Presidential	May 2015 Parliamentary
Total number of voters	42,799,303	52,051,828	52,806,322	55,692,841	56,605,085
Total participation rate	%84.25	%73.71	%83.16	%74.13	%83.93
Voters outside of Turkey	228,019	2,556,335	2,568,977	2,798,726	2,863,247
Votes used in customs	228,019	196,299	129,283	297,340	124,432
Votes used in consulates	-	-	-	232,795	931,646
Extra-territorial participation rate	-	7.68%	5.03%	18.9%	36.88%

Source: YSK website, www.ysk.gov.tr.

Although in the media and the academia the stress has been given on the ability to vote for emigrants, the changes in the Turkish election law and political parties law had other significant implications, related to two issues: (1) discussions on overseas constituency and the enfranchisement of extra-territorial candidacy for home district and (2) the allowing of overseas branch of mainland Turkish political parties. *First,* the issue of direct representation of extra-territorial constituencies has become a matter of discussion in the Turkish parliament since 2013, following Republican People's Party's (CHP) suggestion for the creation of overseas constituency and representation. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) introduced the same bill to the parliament in 2014 by Istanbul parliamentarian Metin Külünk, who declared during a press conference that Turkish citizens living abroad were particularly interested in Turkish politics and therefore had to receive their "democratic rights":

> This is not only an issue about electing and being elected. Our citizens have properties, partnerships, families, and these are all at the center of events in Turkey. But they do not have rights to be elected. I have seen that this is a gap. We need to change, and I am aware that it is going to create tensions in certain places in Europe in terms of sovereignty rights. […] We are

> not involving in the sovereignty rights of these states, but we are going beyond the barriers against our citizens' civil right to vote as citizens of our country (Author's translation)[141].

Külünk's declaration made it clear that it was recognized by the government that the establishment of overseas constituency, which would increase the number of deputies in the Turkish parliament by 10, could challenge the already existing settlements of authority with the country of residence. Although overseas constituency has not been amended in the jurisdiction, in practice emigrants were given the choice of participation as candidates in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Rather than direct representation of the citizens living abroad, expatriate candidates were allowed to become representatives of home districts (in Turkey) appointed to them by the central executive committee of their party.

The *second* topic has been related to the founding of overseas branches of Turkish political parties. Until 1999 political parties were prohibited from overseas representation, which created tensions between state institutions pseudo-parties formally enrolled abroad as associations but performed in parallel with Turkish political parties. With an amendment in the Law on Political Parties, parties were allowed to establish youth and women's branches as well as overseas representations. However, this has not been put into practice formally until 2010, when the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) party opened up its first overseas branch in Washington D.C. Following the amendment on extra-territorial voting, several political parties inaugurated overseas representations either in cities highly populated by Turkish citizens or near political environments such as Washington D.C. or Brussels to influence through lobbying practices.

Duties and Anticipated Commitments

In his political theoretical discussion on "external citizenship", Baubock (2009: 488) reminds that there are fundamental differences between the rights and duties of non-resident citizens that can be enforced by governments. Citizenship rights available to non-resident populations, such as diplomatic protection, to return or to external voting are generally exerted in a voluntary basis, which is apparent from the relatively small number of their actual beneficiaries. Baubock (2009: 488) argues that the discrepancies caused due to this situation helps alleviate the problem of over-inclusiveness of these rights as well as their interference with the territorial sovereignty of the state of residence. Legal citizenship duties

[141] Anadolu Ajansı. 2014. "Yurtdışı milletvekilliği önerisi." April 26. http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/318418--quot-yurtdisi-milletvekiligi-quot-onerisi.

on the other hand pave the way for controversies. *First,* as in the case of military service, duties may not be enforced equally for citizens living in and outside of the country, which may create privileged positions among different citizen groups. *Second,* urging duties in another state's territory may create tensions between interstate relations. According to Baubock (2009: 488), in the absence of a coercive apparatus, states either opt for cooperation with the other states' authorities or link duties with the right to return, through imposing penalties upon return or by revoking citizenship. In line with this challenging situation, many scholars focusing on diaspora policies discuss obligations extracted by home states not based on the legal citizenship duties, but rather on anticipated commitments from emigrants, such as investment policies or lobby promotion (Gamlen 2006). This section will discuss this issue in the Turkish case, by distinguishing citizens' duties vis-à-vis the home state from the anticipated commitments.

As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the primary instruments of the Turkish state in enforcing the legal duties to its citizens abroad has been linking them with right to return, practiced solidly as revoking citizenship under three main conditions: "loyalty to the state and nation", "notifying consular offices while adopting another (or second) citizenship" and "fulfilling the military obligations". The *first* condition has been an indisputable one in the 1980s, which has been relaxed over time with the changes in Turkish politics and the emergence of more democratic channels of dialogue between the state and the opposing view to the state. Those who were deemed as non-loyal to the Turkish state and nation were categorized as "anarchists" or "terrorists" since the 1980s, and more recently with new nominations including "members of a pro-coup mindset", therefore distinguishing the *persona non grata* in the state vision. In the *second* condition, which has been discussed in the section on consular relations, emigrants who left the country were demanded to notify the state on their current status in the countries of residence, and were revoked of citizenship in the lack thereof. This duty, specific to non-resident citizens still endures, although granted to applications allowing for more flexible forms of citizenship – such as blue card system- emigrants are allowed to leave Turkish citizenship and still continue to keep their legal and symbolic ties. The *third* condition of military service has underwent changes in the post-2003 period as a result of the ongoing negotiations between civil society organizations abroad and the Turkish state. Currently it is possible to be exempted through payment of 6,000 Euro without any obligation to exercise the prior 21 days of obligatory service in Turkey. In order to be eligible for paid military service, citizens need to have worked three years in another

country. In some countries such as the US, two other duties – taxation and voting- exist for non-resident citizens (Baubock 2009), which do not fully apply for Turkish citizens. As discussed before, voting is categorized as a right and not clearly as a duty in the Turkish legal system; therefore absentee voting is not imposed on individuals. The second issue of taxation is resolved as a result of the tax treaties between the Turkish state and the host states, which allows taxpayer citizens to receive a compensation for the tax they have already paid in another country. Currently, citizens are able to pay their income tax in the country of residence, and only the taxation for profited private property in Turkey is compulsory.

Without classifying them as legal duties of citizens, many home states extract economic and political benefits from non-resident citizens, usually in a reciprocal fashion with the provision of benefits or expanded rights (Gamlen 2006: 13). For the Turkish case, what I call as the "anticipated commitments" have been until the last epoch restricted –for the majority of emigrant populations- to financial remittances. As discussed by Bettin et al. (2012: 133) migrant remittances have been a fundamental external source of capital for the Turkish economy, covering up as much as 80% of the Turkish trade deficit in 1960-1981. The domination of remittance transfers in the policy making on emigrants had received harsh criticisms by both emigrants and the public opinion, which referred to the state's perception of emigrant workers as "remittance machines". However, remittances have began to decline sharply since the 1990s, as a result of emigrants' weaker ties with Turkey and the financial crises in the Turkish economy playing a negative influence on their attitudes (Bettin et al. 2012: 157). The Turkish state's deteriorating interest in the remittances has been manifested clearly in its closing down of Central Bank remittance accounts in 2014[142]. Rather than targeting remittances, the current economic commitment is based on channeling emigrants' earnings into investments, such as expatriate-seeded venture capital funds (Faist 2004) or through local development projects supported via philanthropy. The establishment of network platforms such as DTIK –discussed in the previous section- and the foundation of external branches of national business associations, supported by the state, are a part of the new trend aiming to expedite international trade or to attract investment interests of companies established by Turkish citizens.

The second set of anticipated commitments is of political nature, where the home states aim to contain the impact of their emigrants' diaspora politics or mobilize their support as

[142] Seçil Paçacı Elitok. 2014. "Özgüven ve kibir arasındaki ince çizgi: Merkez Bankası'nın işçi dövizi hesaplarını kapatışı." March 7. http://t24.com.tr/haber/ozguven-ve-kibir-arasindaki-ince-cizgi-merkez-bankasinin-isci-dovizi-hesaplarini-kapatisi,252856.

lobbyists within their host countries (Itzigsohn 2000; Gamlen 2006). The expectation and extraction of political commitments are recent for many home states, which bind them with incentives and rights in a discourse of loyalty and belongingness. However, similar to the discussion on rights, these anticipated commitments have been offered to the voluntariness of emigrants, and therefore creating diverging accounts of relationship between the state and society. In the Turkish case, there has been an ongoing attempt in the post-2003 period to use the political venue available to emigrants, in order to stimulate both bilateral relations as well as the reflections of domestic issues in the international arena. As discussed in the previous sections, the containment of the political activities and rhetoric has been available through increased dialogue between the state institutions and the society representatives. The recurrent suggestion by the state officials has been increased participation of emigrants in the social, cultural, economic and political spheres in their country of residence, solidified with the adoption of the citizenship rights of that country. The notions imported from the United States, such as "lobbying" or "public diplomacy" entered in the state discourse as new instruments and methods that could be used to establish a dialogue designed to inform and influence through people, in addition to the official diplomacy or through state-funded professional lobbyists. In 2010, the Office of Public Diplomacy was established to be carried by General Directorate of Press and Information, under the Prime Ministry, in order to "provide cooperation and coordination between public agencies and non-governmental organizations in their activities related to public diplomacy" as a tool of "Turkey's soft power"[143]. Although the Office was not founded directly to work on the matters related to emigrants, the support for non-state organizations in the overseas has become a crucial part of its agenda.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the Turkish state's policies on citizens living outside of its territories has entered a new phase in the post-2003 era, which diverged from the previous approaches adopted in the three previous periods. The new phase corresponds with the ongoing discussions in the literature on home state emigrant engagement policies, which aim at re-configuring the allocation of status, rights and duties to citizens, with the aid of existing or newly established institutions. In this chapter, I elaborated three main areas, which have been re-codified to create a new emigration policy-making in Turkey: changes in symbolic

[143] Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy. 2015. "A Glance at Public Diplomacy." Accessed August 25. http://kdk.gov.tr//en//sag/kamu-diplomasisine-bakis/21.

portrayal of emigrants, the re-configuration of the institutional ties and the re-definition of citizenship.

I have argued that *symbolically,* while there has been an ongoing shift in the language used by the Turkish state to designate the emigrants living in other countries since the 1980s, the critical rupture in the early 2000s was coupled with the reimagination of the Turkish nation, aiming to extend its boundaries beyond the territorial limits of the state. In the discursive area, this situation has surfaced with the adoption of a new language to describe these populations, including the notions such as *yurtdışı vatandaşlar, diyaspora* or *Türk lobisi* that emphasized the continuation of citizenship, allegiance to the homeland and the embodiment of an autonomous and entrepreneurial character of emigrants in the social, political and economic spheres of the host countries. For Turkey, the 2000s were marked by the shifts in the state's official ideology and its governance model, which was altered from the Kemalist project towards the emphasis on conservative democracy with strongly globalist undertones. The overlap of the changing emigrant regime with the changes in the official state ideology were critical in how these policies have been created, and as it will be argued in more detail in Chapters 8 and 9, how they are put into practice.

The second part of this chapter focused on the re-configuration of the *institutional* arena, with the changes in the already existing and deep-rooted state institutions and ministries, particularly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the creation of the new ones, centralized in the coordinative umbrella of Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (YTB). As the traditional central figure in the management of non-resident citizens, the structuration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs underwent through change beginning with the early 2000s, mainly in two areas: (1) enhancing consular services provided to the individual citizens living abroad, especially regarding the attitudes by the officials and (2) broadening up of the dialogue between the state and the associations founded by Turkish citizens. These changes complemented with the discursive policies of the AKP governments, which were built on the fervent critique of the Jacobin modernization and the top-down institutionalization under the Kemalist project and the publicization of its own populist perspective. These policies were also accompanied with the transformations within the institutional framework of *Diyanet* and Ministry of Education that continued to perform as the extensions of Turkish state's ideological mechanisms in the overseas. Beginning with 2010, new institutional mechanisms have been introduced, particularly with the establishment of YTB. The institution that was built as directly affiliated to the Prime Ministry incorporated

the functions of what is described as diaspora governance in the literature, centralizing the coordination in parallel with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, undertaking the civil society dialogue and allocation of resources as well as managing the consultative participation of emigrants as representatives of their communities.

In the last part of this chapter, I examined the re-definition of *citizenship* policies, based on the changes in the territorial limits on rights (civil, social and political rights) and duties (and anticipated commitments). In addition to the two essential rights that are available for non-resident citizens (right to return to the state and protection via consular missions), there have been expansions on paper regarding the civil and social rights that were allocated by the Turkish state to emigrant populations. These mechanisms have been related to mobility rights, social security, retirement, education, military service, taxes, registration and justice. Moreover, during this period certain issues such as the right to education and culture and the provision of religious rights have been gradually merged with the protection of citizenship rights in the host countries. More critical transformations have taken place in relation with the supporting of political participation and the propagation of active citizenship both in the country of residence and in the context of citizens' relations with Turkey. In terms of the political rights related to Turkey, the issue of extra-territorial voting has been positioned as a central issue especially following the amendment of this right after 2012. Functioning as an "anticipated commitment", Turkish citizens' increased involvement in the social, economic, and more importantly in the political spheres of their countries of residence gained traction as the leading cause in the Turkish state's new regime on emigrant engagement.

As a result, in this chapter I have looked into the agenda setting, the formulation of the principles and policies on emigrants and citizens living abroad by the Turkish state. In the next two chapters of Part III, I will analyze the cases of emigrants from Turkey in France and the United States, in order to discuss how these policies have been implemented, and what have been the outcomes of these decisions in terms of the relations between the state and different societal groups.

CHAPTER 8

Straddling Two Worlds: Politics of Emigrants from Turkey in France after 2003

In the April of 2014, I participated in a celebration of the Turkish National Sovereignty and Children's Day in Goussainville, a commune in the metropolitan area of Paris, which can be reached via RER train line in less than one hour. The event was organized by *Goussainville Türk Okul Aile Birliği* (Turkish Parent-Teacher's Association) and *Hanımeller Derneği* (*Hanımeller* Women's Association): two active organizations of the periphery with close ties with the Turkish consulate and the newly established *Fransa Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği* (Union of Turkish Cultural Associations in France), headed by the president of *Centre Culturel Anatolie*. Despite the physical distance, the celebration was very similar to the events that used are still held in Turkey, with the Turkish flags and Atatürk posters hang around the sports center, the standing for one minute's silence, the reciting of the national hymn, the performing of Atatürk's address to youth, of dance and song performances by the Turkish students participating in Goussainville elementary schools. There were nevertheless several differences that reminded me of my presence in France: the Turkish national hymn was followed by *La Marseillaise* (although sung by very few only among the very young); the speeches of the Turkish President of Rouen University and by the Consul General of Turkey in Paris in Turkish and the discourse of the Deputy Mayor of Goussainville in French. One of the most cathartic moments during the event was the gathering of students to form the map of Turkey in the presence of their language and culture teacher appointed from the homeland, holding the names of cities where they or their parents had migrated from, singing an exceptionally obscure and nationalist song entitled *Ölürüm Türkiyem* (I die for you my Turkey). This song activated the huge hall, causing many people to come forward to take the pictures of their children, or to stand to chant together in a ritualistic harmony. Inside the sports hall spectators were handed out leaflets of the upcoming celebration of the Holy Birth Week of Prophet Mohammed by Goussainville *Ulu Cami* (Grand Mosque). The program was

announced to include the reading of Koran, followed by chants, *namaz sure ve duaları* (prayer suras), 40 *Hadis-i Şerif* (hadith), poetry and compositions by students, with the participation of the religious attaché of Turkey in Paris.

Aside from the traits of a “long-distance” version of “banal nationalism” and of an imported Turkish-Islam synthesis from Turkey that can be read directly, this April 23rd celebration is demonstrative of the current state of affairs related to Turkish emigrants in France, as well as their relations with the Turkish state and its new statecraft on non-resident citizens. Organized on a Sunday afternoon, the celebration has hosted representatives from both the Turkish state and from the local municipality, who embodied the presence of two states that aimed at keeping their ties with their citizens. Earlier in the same week of the celebration, an official in the diplomatic mission had explained to me her and other officials’ plans for the upcoming weekends in April and May, which she said was going to be spent with visiting associations around Paris. Since the period overlapped with April 23rd and May 19th, two of the main republican Turkish holidays when emigrants’ associations organize celebratory events, primary consular officials would be dispersing around the consular region to be able to have state representation to all the events in which the consulate has been invited to. From the Turkish side, the celebration signaled the home state’s increased involvement in its non-resident citizens’ affairs, which had not included regular interactions with the general community in the preceding periods. From the French side, it indicated the local governments’ interest to reach out to a particular citizen population, which had a presence in the region for more than 30 years.

More important than their interest to be involved in their citizens’ affairs, the speeches of the representatives from two countries shed light on their states’ objective to encourage political participation of the spectators in France. On the one hand, the Deputy Mayor of Goussainville’s presentation of the recent local election results and the newly elected Turkish members of the municipal council underscored the local government’s perception of the Turkish community both as constituency and a participant of the political environment in France. Increased civic and political participation had been desired and advocated increasingly by some of the emigrant associations since the early 2000s, and investing in the social upgrading of citizens had become a primary objective in the Turkish state’s discourse in the recent years. This objective was also reminded during the speech of the Dean of Rouen University, who remarked that the educational failure of the Turkish students in France resembled to the situation in Germany that was 25 years ago and that the parents needed to be

cautious about their children's education in both languages for their success in participating in the social and political life in the future. The talk by the Consul General on the other hand pointed the way to another type of relationship, the one that existed between the home country and its non-resident citizens. The Consul General strongly urged the registration of all citizens to the Supreme Electoral Council for the upcoming elections in Turkey. The upcoming election was going to be a novelty for the audience and the state representatives for two reasons: it would become the first presidential election held in Turkey, and also the first election made available for extra-territorial voting. The Consul General emphasized that "The reflection of the national sovereignty into existence happened through elections", therefore making the non-resident population as a part of the national sovereignty, one that existed outside of the traditional nation-state territories.

In Chapter 7, I argued that the transformation in the Turkish state's policies vis-à-vis emigrant populations is compatible with a global trend, in which the home states are increasingly "re-inventing their roles outside of the territorial boundaries" (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003: 606). This new sovereignty claim over citizens (Gamlen 2008: 837) is often announced by political entrepreneurs as an attempt to create or integrate a "diaspora", a population or a community that maintained strong ties with its homeland. I have argued in Chapter 5 that in the Turkish case, attempts to bring certain groups of emigrants in France into closer relations with the state has begun in the 1980s particularly through policies, which aimed at consolidating state-society relations through exporting "native" culture and religion. Despite the efforts to establish a unified community bourgeoned in the 1990s through supporting umbrella organizations, Chapter 5 illustrated that it has not created the expected mobilization around home state objectives. While the state officials have reasoned this situation as the result of the non-existence of a "reliable emigrant community", from the perspective of emigrants it was considered as the outcome of the lack of state's long-term provisions to its citizens and its selectivity in supporting certain groups. The transformations in the statecraft in the 2000s marked a change from the previous approaches as it reconfigured symbolic, institutional and citizenship ties by introducing new processes and resources.

In this chapter, I use the analysis of the empirical research conducted in April-June 2014 in France and discuss how these new configurations have been implemented into practice, and what have been their outcomes in terms of home state-emigration society relations. The chapter begins with the analysis of how the implementation of symbolic and institution-

building mechanisms has taken place in the post-2003 period. In the second part, I concentrate on the interactions between the home state policies and emigrant politics, specifically in the area of active citizenship and political participation.

8.1. New Repertoires, New Relations

In my analysis on emigrants from Turkey in France in Chapter 5, I argued that despite the geographical clustering, a sharp disintegration existed among different populations during the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of several factors, including migration motives, political orientations and politicizations. This situation has been considered as a significant problem both by the Turkish state and the emigrant elite. From the state perspective, it created challenges for the home state to make the populations "legible" and to approach the citizens at large, among whom still existed those who were deemed as disloyal. In the post-1980 mindset, this fragmentation was creating tensions for the Turkish state on issues solely related to its own sovereignty. For the emigrant elite, the fragmentation based on ethnic, religious or ideological identity was impeding the compounding of solidarity, which they reckoned was necessary to resolve integration and social policy issues related to their migrant and citizen status in the host country. In the 1990s there have been separate attempts by the Turkish state and the emigrant elite to reconcile different groups under umbrella settings, one that relied on communitarianism while the other on civic integration, both of which nevertheless could not be sustained for long periods.

This multiplicity continued to exist in the post-2003 period, embodying new alliances and rivalries. Following up on the discussion in Chapter 5, many of the associations and movements with some outreach in France endured in the 2000s, vesting with the pre-existing identity conflicts of the 1980s, which have now become less tense. The distancing from the home country political agenda and the emergence of a new rhetoric on citizenship rights, integration and participation in France, with a European Union anchor influenced the transformations during the 1990s. These were ushered in by the permanency of emigrants from Turkey in France and their descendants' increased integration in the European sphere, within a process of adopting multiple hyphenated identities (Kaya and Kentel 2005). While the European framework has triggered possibilities for bridging their identities in a transnational context, a number of structural ruptures by the French government on integration policies have shaped the outlook on emigrants' participation in the social, cultural and political life in France over the recent decades. One of these changes has been the

establishment of *Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman* (French Council of the Muslim Faith, CFCM) in 2002 to include Muslim community leaders within state-church relations. According to Kaya (2009: 76) the establishment of CFCM heralded the modification in the classic French model of integration from one, which viewed individuals primarily as citizens to another one that conceived them within ethnic, racial or religious membership ties. The participation of the Turkish Islamic associations to CFCM framework has created new tensions and representation issues within the community, which will be discussed in the next sections. Another critical rupture has occurred as a result of the French government's decision to limit available resources to the integration of foreigners who arrived in the last five years and to fund associations based on project tenders rather than establishing long term conventions. This change has critically affected professionalized organizations such as ELELE and ACORT that primarily worked on integration issues, weakening their position in relation to the community-oriented organizations.

"Multiplicity of Emigrant Associations is Enriching"

In terms of the relations between the Turkish state and the non-resident citizens, a noteworthy change in the rhetoric has taken place beginning with the early 2000s, replacing the former perception of the fragmentation as a critical problem to a new discourse that argued that the multiplicity of associations, organizations and institutions was empowering both for the community and its relations with the Turkish state. In Chapter 5, I had argued that in the past, the interactions between the state and the emigrant society were deeply engrained in a selectivity based on state Kemalism that excluded the majority of the populations. In theory, the new attitude aimed at reaching a broader range of populations. This situation in turn was coupled with the acknowledgment and acceptation of memberships to the religious or ideological communities, as attachments to the national identity, as compatible with the Turkish state's transforming official ideology. The new state rhetoric has been pronounced during Ambassador Hakkı Akil's speech to the associations in the Parisian region in April 2014:

> Every person has a different worldview; people of similar opinions establish associations under a common roof. Other shared values are reproduced in the associations. The multiplicity of associations is a wealth; they should not lose their respect and love to one another; if there's a situation they should have the respect to be able to come together. The existence of many associations is not a problem it's richness. In case of need, you have to be able to come together and share among each other. […] In the past the work of the ambassador was political – to manage cultural relations - not even economic relations were

> prioritized. The conjecture has changed now; issues related to the citizens living here are among my prior responsibilities (Author's translation).

The statement has a broader take on the emigrant populations in terms of their possibility of engagement with the home state, compared with the former approach that excluded those who were not within the narrow framework of state ideology.

Compatible with the overall policy change on emigrants, two arenas have been affected in France since 2003. The first arena has been related to the institutional relations between the citizens and the foreign mission and the adoption of what Delano (2014) calls as "service-oriented diaspora policies". In his analysis of the Latin American diaspora engagement policies in the United States, Delano (2014: 91) argued that for many country consulates a practical and easy way to expand their activities to engage with their nationals has been via diffusing programs towards promoting citizens' well-being through the diffusion of services. For the Turkish case, the transformations in the consular services in the post-2003 period have been announced nearly during all of the interviews of this research. The developments in the consular services included the improvements in the infrastructures, such as the increase in the number of working personnel, the enlargement of the consular building, the expansion of consular branches around France and the implementation of online services. For the interviewees who still held their citizenship ties with the Turkish state, the most important change has been regarding the attitudes of the diplomatic staff towards citizens, from a perspective that had a top-down perspective, to a new one that welcomed them as the citizens of a same state[144].

The second arena has taken place in relation with the civil society dialogue. Following the ministerial directives in 2004 within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the foreign mission entered into either a new or more regular dialogue with the pre-existing associations. Although this new practice essentially pertained to those under the *Milli Görüş* or *Hizmet* umbrella[145], two Islamist communitarian segments that had strong ties to the AKP government in the early 2000s, it also encompassed dialogue with other groups, such as Alevis, who were excluded before. As discussed in Chapter 7, the primary authority that mediated between the state and the society living abroad continued to be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' foreign missions, which have been reminded constantly by the government in the 2000s about their role to transform the image of citizens abroad. While in the past,

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[144] Interviews with the author, Paris, April 21, 2014; Paris, April 28, 2014; Paris, May 7, 2014; Paris, May 10, 2014.

[145] Interviews with the author, Paris, April 25, 2014; Paris, May 20, 2014.

limited relations existed between a certain elite and the state representation via the embassy or consulate, new spheres of relationship emerged between a wider range of community leaders. As it will be discussed in the next sections, the active membership in the France, including in the economic, political, social and cultural spheres aimed at creating spokespeople in the countries of residence, by people who had longer and deeper ties with the host country and state than the public officials.

Reading from a perspective that relies on the normative principles of liberal democracy compatible with Baubock's (2007) discussions, this broadening could represent the transformations in the citizenship regime, which would link the rights of non-resident citizens into an "expansive" view of citizenship. Therefore rather than a purely interest-based based strategic decision in order to capture the social, economic and political benefits from populations that are outside of the state's physical sovereignty, it could be conceived as a normative transformation determining a nation-state's relations with its society (Collyer 2013: 6). As I had discussed previously (in Chapter 7), the transformations in the emigration policies have in fact been coupled by a re-configuration in the Turkish citizenship regime, which introduced new rights and obligations (and anticipated commitments) available for non-resident citizens. In fact, as one of the representatives of the foreign mission stated during our interview[146], one of the main differences in terms of the state's approach towards emigrants from the 1980s has been related to the basic relation between the state and the individuals based on the status of citizenship. While in the period that followed the 1980 coup the renunciation of citizenship enabled the state not to serve or grant rights to those who were deemed as not loyal to the state, in the current period the complicity of taking away fundamental citizenship rights permits individuals to ostensibly criticize the state and keep their citizenship status. The same interviewee gave the example of a protester in Germany, who could both contest the political environment in the home state, while at the same time use the available legal sphere in order to maintain its institutional ties in the individual level: "A person who cried 'the murderer state will be accounted for' outside of the consulate could go inside after a while to have his passport procedures. This wasn't the case before and it did not have any logic. Now services are provided as they are."[147] Therefore, the legal and official ties on the individual level have become separated from the dialogue at the

[146] Interview with the author, Paris, May 7, 2014.
[147] Interview with the author, Paris, May 7, 2014.

organizational level, as also announced by an executive member of the Kurdish federation FEYKA in Paris:

> Some of our members are refugees and others are citizens of Turkey. They have individual relations with the consulate. We never received an invitation to any meeting as the federation and did not participate. We see the existing system as antidemocratic. There is a situation of Kurdish problem, there is an ongoing resolution, moderation, we are content of it but we do not have formal relations. You are meeting with Mr. Ocalan but also force people to come here. These are all people who overstrained their opportunities, everyone does folklore etc., there is nothing to do with terrorism. A significant potential that will bring dynamism to Turkey is being left out, it is not logical[148].

The distinction of relations between the state and individuals or collectivities has not existed in the post-1980 period, when the individuals' participation in the associations or movements could harm their citizenship ties with the state if they could be monitored. The quotations suggest that in the current age this situation does not have direct consequences. The non-existence of institutional ties between FEYKA and the state representation from Turkey illustrates the different spheres of interaction between the collective organizations of citizens and the home state. In the post-2003 period, the spheres of interaction have widened to include many organizations, which have been excluded in the past.

Nevertheless, there is a need to put a cautious note in discussing the expansion of citizenship rights. In the Turkish case, various degrees of relationship continue to exist between the associations and the home state, which prioritizes those close to its own political agenda, followed by ideologically compatible, non-political and finally with those that are outside of the nomination of "terrorist organizations". These include particularly some of the long-established associations in the Strasbourg-St. Denis District, which remain as a legacy of the 1980s and 1990s, and are affiliated with the organizations or political parties banned in Turkey, including the PKK, DHKP-C or TKP-ML. Moreover, despite the transformations in the engagement in emigrants' affairs and the adoption of a new perspective on citizenship, which allowed for increased dialogue between the home state representation and the collectivities, the interactions between the state and society continue to be directly associated with the political and social environment in Turkey, as one interviewee from the Alevi federation FUAF has argued:

> We have better relations since the last 5-6 years. In the past Alevis had revolutionary associations and speaking to the state was a taboo for them. But the situation has changed

[148] Interview with the author, Paris, May 4, 2014.

> now, because it is our homeland, the situations happening there are also affecting us. We maintain dialogue with our diplomatic branch. We have the understanding of not excluding a person. […] The president of the federation had been to a meeting where Abdullah Gül came before. When it's our turn, we say how we feel. Our president was attacked that day, so we cannot have cocktails with everyone. But we invited the consulate to our events, for instance we have one next week[149].

As discussed in the statements above, the repercussions of the general political environment in Turkey create challenges in the Turkish case, distinguishing it from liberal readings on countries' changing emigrant policies. The period that followed AKP's gaining of power in 2002 was marked by an estrangement from the traditional state-republican model to a new neo-populist communitarian approach that reinforced the Turkish-Islam synthesis, inherited from the period that followed the 1980 coup. Following its second term in the government, the AKP began to undertake a broader policy of "democratic opening" and systematic effort to deal with identity-based claims of minority groups in Turkey, particularly of Kurds and Alevis. However, the institutionalization of these processes have not taken full force up to date and even the developments have regressed over the last several years, due to the recurrent conflicts which emerged between these minority groups and the AKP governments, as well as the rising authoritarianism after 2011 (Öniş 2014). Moreover, in its last two terms, the increased dominance of the ruling party has prompted certain favoritism in the implementation of state policies, which has created new polarizations (Öniş 2013).

In France, AKP's stronghold on communitarianism reflected particularly on the broadening of state-society network towards greater recognition of religious segments of the society and to their claims on religious rights in a non-Muslim society. While the attempts to approximate with previously excluded communities, such as Kurds, Alevis or non-Muslims of Turkey entered the state rhetoric in the late 2000s signaling the possibilities of a wider recognition, their reflections into practice remained within a limited acknowledgment of expressions of identity as before. Despite the changes related to a citizenship regime, which opens up a greater room of interaction between the state and the non-resident society, the ambiguities in the internal politics of Turkey regarding minorities and opposition creates new uncertainties and tensions outside of Turkey's borders. The outcomes of the dichotomy related to the Turkish state's engagement with the non-resident citizens, on the one hand expanding both the individual and collective relations with the emigrant populations, but on the other sustaining and even deepening the polarizations have been revealed recurrently during my fieldwork in France during the spring of 2014, not only by organizations that are excluded or

[149] Interview with the author, Paris, June 2, 2014.

are at the edge of being excluded from state dialogue. According to the results of the field, the pre-existing selectivity of the pre-2003 era in terms of the relations between the state institutions and the emigrant populations continued at a different form in the second and third terms of the AKP government, which started to be shaped by compatibility with the governments' political agenda. In the words of an executive member of *Türk Federasyonu,* the distance between the citizens and the state has been eliminated, however leading to a new situation where the dominance of the ruling party in the state affairs has reflected on the activities organized by the consulate:

> Now if I look sincerely, they removed the distance with citizens. This is true, but I believe that there are different intentions under the removal of this distance. I have seen bad examples. An AKP depute comes to organize seminars abroad and they publish posters with the consulate. Consulate belongs to the Turkish Republic, not the AKP depute. This has hurt me. In the past, there were many who were *mon cher* type with a distance to the citizen. [...] It is a good thing that the distance was elevated but it is necessary to keep the state authority without politicization[150].

This perception of the new state of affairs, shared by a significant part of the executive members of the associations that I interviewed, correlates the transformations in the emigrant policies with strategies of the state for resource mobilization. During the interviews, this position was generally followed by the contemplation on the past: while in the past, the state had supported the labour migration to attract economic resources, in the current age it maintained its ties in order to draw social and political gains.

Dialogue with the New Diaspora Institution

In Chapter 7, I had described the Turkish state's diaspora institution established in 2010, namely Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (YTB), and its mechanisms of engagement with the emigrant populations living abroad. Created outside of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' institutional framework and directly attached to the Prime Ministry, the Presidency was placed at the heart of Turkey's extra-territorial policy. On the topic of citizens living abroad, the Presidency had three mechanisms to implement its strategies: in Turkey - coordination among different state institutions, advocacy vis-à-vis policy makers on emigrants' affairs and in the overseas - establishing state-society dialogue, primarily through civil society development programs, project funding and consultative dialogue.

[150] Interview with the author, Paris, May 10, 2014.

To engage with the citizens and civil society organizations in France, YTB began its activities by inviting associations to civil society capacity development programs that were held in Turkey, Belgium, Germany and Netherlands. In the period of 2011-2013, more than 1.1 million TL was funded by YTB, in the areas of education, cultural events, lobbying (also entitled as "active participation"), family consultation symposiums and publications. The funding continued at a high pace over 2014, when 1 million TL was granted to 13 projects, mainly in the area of cultural events, family consultations and education. The Presidency participated in the celebratory events such as *Festival d'Anatolie* held in Paris in 2013, *Festiculture* held in Lyon in 2015, and organized others including joint seminars with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies for women, joint workshops with civil society representatives in France and in Turkey during 2014[151]. In 2014 and 2015, YTB has actively worked on informing citizens before elections in Turkey, by organizing campaigns, announcements and distributing leaflets on the topic. The new funding and civil society development programs of the YTB have engendered a new discourse among the civil society organizations in France, which were in contact with the Turkish state. It also made official the state funding towards the civil society organizations established abroad, which had existed in the past as discussed in Chapter 5.

Another significant mechanism of the YTB has been considered as the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Turkish Citizens Abroad in 2012, which aimed at assisting in the creation of agenda on policies for emigrants living abroad. Different from the previous committees that had been activated in late 1990s, the members of the committee were not appointed but elected among the candidates who presented their own portfolio to the consulates. In Chapter 5, I had argued that the members of the former committee in France were particularly selected among the republican elite by the consulate and their appointment had met with criticism by the Turkish community living in France, as they were deemed as not representative. The new members of the Advisory Committee distinguished from the former one by not representing the classical republican elite, but rather the executive members of the populated and long established associations predominantly embodying the ideological orientation to Turkish-Islam synthesis. Moreover the members either represented a certain ideological position related to Turkey, and/or were active participants to the political parties and their local political environment in France.

[151] Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı. 2013. "İMECE. Sivil Toplum Destekleri." Broşür.

The committee members included Şaban Kiper from Strasbourg, a former member of COJEP and municipal councilor from French Socialist Party who currently works as project coordinator at DITIB; Bilal Dinç, from Lyon, who presided *Union des Entrepreneurs Franco-Turcs* (Union of Franco-Turkish Entrepreneurs, UNEFT) close to Turkish entrepreneurs federation MUSIAD; Cumhur Güneşlik, from Paris, who heads *Bosphore* Association and has acted as a member of the municipal committee in Clichy-sous-Bois for two terms; Emine Çetin Bozkurt, from Paris, a member of *Türk Federasyonu*, recognized for her lobbying activities on the Armenian-Turkish problem in France; Fatih Sarıkır, from Paris, the president of *Milli Görüş* France and a former syndicalist from *Force Ouvriere*; and finally Sait Tahan, from Bordeaux, who was the representative of Turkey for the Diversity department under the Municipality of Bordeaux[152]. The honorary member of the Advisory Committee was elected as Cafer Özkul, recognized as the first Turkish origin president of a European university (University of Rouen).

Different from the former committee of the early 2000s, the Advisory Committee and its members were publicized as a crucial step of the Turkish state in engaging with the community leaders of the citizens living abroad. As of 2014, the committee has been still active, although with internal issues due to emerging political conflicts between certain members. While the members from France had not gathered separately to discuss the critical issues of the emigrant community living in the country, they were often invited to events where representatives from the Turkish state visited France for different occasions, related to the bilateral political affairs or issues related to emigrants. As I had discussed in Chapter 7, one of the fundamental approaches of the state has been to bring forward the social upgrading of the dual citizens both in the host country and the home country affairs. The new committee included those who had lived in France for long periods and had participated actively in the social and political life in their country of residence. The publicization of the representative status of the committee members, who were already executive members of the associations in France, provided them with opportunities to emerge as community leaders that have been backed up by the resources available by a solid institution.

Through the committee, a new kind of epistemic community was created, which enabled the co-transfer of a new language created and used between the Turkish state and the community leaders and later transferred to the members of the communities that they could reach to. The

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[152] T.C. Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı. 2015. "Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu." Accessed August 25. http://yvdk.gov.tr/uyeler.

cohesion of the discourse used by the state rhetoric, based on citizenship, participation and lobbying could be followed during the interviews of this research, especially via the members of this committee. According to an executive member of *Bosphore Association Franco Turc* and has served as a member of the municipal council in Clichy-sous-Bois for more than ten years, the emigrant community was supported by the various institutions of the home country for empowerment:

> Now we are an electorate, we have a power too. The politics have changed. If you have to have a voice in the international market you need to have a strong lobby. How can we show the image of Turks or change it? It started slowly with funds. Now the state is giving funds, there was nothing before. We never got any funding but we have friends that benefit from it. The Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Tourism allocated funds, Yunus Emre Foundation as well… It is necessary to perform lobbying; it does not with the state lobby. It [the state] has realized that[153].

The above quote by the interviewee illustrated that there already is a group of political entrepreneurs who have adopted the position that the emigrant community had a new role of becoming the non-professional lobbyists on behalf of home country affairs. This upgraded image on the community distinguished from the former image where they have been referred to from a reactive perspective. In a similar vein, an executive member of DITIB in Strasbourg, who has also been serving as a member of the municipal council emphasized the significance of political participation in France and in Europe, to support the undertakings by the Turkish state:

> I believe that in the next ten years the Turks in Europe are going to have a strong motor power. The way that Turkey had a transformative power in the Balkans and the Caucasus outside of an ambassadorial role, the same influence will be made by YTB in Europe. They are distant from the cold face of the state, and reach localities by getting in direct contact. The modifications in the military service or elections were thanks to YTB. […] As the Turks in Europe we cannot demand for our rights unless we achieve an established political participation. For the moment we do not have a plan, program or position based on rights. I was elected in the municipal council, others were elected too, but we do not share a common language. The associational life has its limits, you can have opinions as advice but the most crucial transformative thing is political will[154].

The two statements have been made by the new emerging elite among the Turkish emigrant population, the descendants of the guest workers of the 1970s who have established their position in their country of residence different from their parents' former social status in Turkey. It should be noted that the adoption of the new rhetoric on active citizenship and

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[153] Interview with the author, Paris, May 19, 2014.
[154] Interview with the author, Strasbourg, June 3, 2014.

participation is not only related with their relations with the Turkish state institutions, but is an incorporation of the claims on citizenship rights of the 1990s in France (as it was argued in Chapter 5). Still, the role of the Turkish state's new policies on non-resident citizens is crucial as a determinant of the language that is used. In the two quotes provided above, the new emigrant elite makes the distinction between the "cold face of the state" that should remain in a certain distance to the affairs in the overseas and a society, which is assumed to transform itself and its environment in line with home state perspective. The quotes are also reflective of the AKP's rhetoric on becoming a strong country in its close region and in the international sphere. By creating stronger loyalty through representation, the government has been able to append active members of the community to its own language.

The funding and symbolic support programs of the YTB has provided new political opportunity structures at the transnational level for political entrepreneurs who were interested in engaging with the community in which they lived, while at the same time establishing cultural, social, economic or political ties with the homeland. Nevertheless, the YTB funding has provided only a limited transparency regarding the state funding, as it announced only the total sum of funding without indicating which organizations received the indicated sums. The lack of transparency and the YTB's selectivity in inviting certain groups among the emigrant organizations for its events, which were particularly close with the AKP agenda, had met with criticisms as announced during the interviews of this research. For associations, which had entered into a new contact with the Turkish state in the post-2003 period, this selectivity had caused a reason for questioning and distancing itself in the recent years. For those that continued to have conflict-based relations with the state, the new funding and support opportunities were considered as a strategy of the home state for lobbying on its behalf. One of such criticisms appeared on the pages of journal *Fransa'da Yaşam* (Life in France, April 2014, Issue 38) published by the leftist DIDF:

> The support, which had been provided mainly via DITIB as financial funding in the past is being broadened now to include more associations and institutions. This illustrates that the governing party uses the state opportunities to strengthen by supporting associations that are close to itself financially. By this, it aims to increase the influence of the state and AKP on emigrants from Turkey living in the European countries by the mediation of associations and institutions (Author's translation).

The journal article by DIDF members illustrated the negative perceptions among the members of the emigrant populations on the home state's engagement, which is considered as a strategy of the home government to increase its position in the overseas, with the support of

the communities that it had citizenship ties with. Therefore despite the expansion in the provided opportunities, not all members of the community have absorbed the engagement interest of the home state. In addition to the deep engrained political conflicts between some of the emigrant populations and the Turkish state, new rivalries have emerged as a result of the new selectivity during the allocation of resources or new statuses.

"Faire le Va-et-Vient[155]" with Ideological Apparatus

In the period that followed the 1980s, the primary source of engagement between the Turkish state representation and the emigrant society, aside from the consular relations, has been based on cultural alignment. I had argued in Chapter 5 that this situation has been particularly evident in the religious and educational spheres, whereas the state's attempts to exert a certain control over populations had entered into competition with other pre-existing communitarian structures. Over the 1990s the state's predominance in the religious sphere has become more announced with higher numbers of associations and mosques became embedded under DITIB. Today the Turkish state still maintains this part of its cultural agenda. In the period of 2013-2014, the Interministerial Common Culture Commission appointed a total of 186 Turkish language and culture teachers throughout France for a total of 20,283 children and 151 religious officials only for the Ile-de-France region. In all France, *Diyanet* controls more than 260 associations and 88 mosques of a total of around 450 mosque associations, followed by *Milli Görüş* organization (more than 60 associations), *Süleyman Efendi* order mosques (30 associations) and others including mosques of *Türk Federasyonu, Semerkant* and *Topbaş* sects (YTB Fransa Bilgi Notu 2014). In the Parisian region, 98 out of 163 organizations affiliated to the consulate were affiliated with the DITIB's umbrella in 2014. As described in the introduction of this chapter, the Turkish language and culture teachers continue to have a mediating role between the Turkish state institutions and the emigrants, by reaching children during courses and their parents via parents-teachers associations, such as in the case of *Goussainville Okul Aile Birliği.*

While the state's interest in transferring the homegrown traits of culture endures, the role of these ideological apparatus as a tool for community representing has become more pronounced over the recent years. As argued before, the transformations in the French immigration and minority policies that began to emphasize the ethnic, religious or racial membership of immigrants have furthered this situation. A new area of competition over

[155] Toing and froing.

representation has emerged following the establishment of *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM) in 2003. Founded as a national elected body, CFCM aimed at becoming the official interlocutor between the French state and the Muslim religious activities in the country. As DITIB has not been accepted as a member, due to its affiliation with the Turkish state institution *Diyanet,* a new organization entitled *Comite de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France* (Comity of Coordination for Turkish Muslims in France, CCMTF) in 2003, to represent Turkish Muslims in France of Sunni belief. Founded from the DITIB network, CCMTF was initially headed by a religious official appointed from Turkey. Following the criticisms concerning the Turkish state's authority in this federation, Ahmet Oğraş, the former president of the French branch of Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) was elected as the president of CCMTF in 2013 for a period of three years. The membership to CFCM under the umbrella of CCMTF has created tensions among the Turkish Islamist community, particularly between DITIB and *Milli Görüş*. Despite the handing over of CCMTF's management to a person who was not a state official, CCMTF's position vis-à-vis *Diyanet* was considered as a an attempt of the home state to maintain its control over religion, similar to the post-1980 period, but this time in a representative sphere under a host country institution. An executive member from *Milli Görüş* stated that the CCMTF did not represent the diversity among different groups: "*Diyanet* […] attempted to bring all other institutions under its own roof. It becomes a problem when there is an interest to devour each other, all sides need to accept one another's distinctiveness"[156]. The competition over religion endured and *Milli Görüş* entered into the CFCM umbrella as a separate organization, rather than under a collective network of Turkish Islam.

The theories on home states' new policies that rely on a discussion of the Foucauldian governmentality discuss that autonomization and responsibilization of the individuals are the subtle means that are used by states in order to control populations through consent rather than through coercion (Gamlen 2011). In an attempt to maintain their control beyond the premises of their territories, the home states empower non-resident with dual loyalties, supporting their integration as knowledge-bearing subjects (Larner 2007; Gamlen 2011). In the Turkish case, an interesting arena for contestation on autonomization over the recent years has been religious education and the support for young people of Turkish origin in France to become representatives of the Turkish state's religious expansion in the overseas, and to replace in the long-term the procedure of sending religious officials from Turkey.

[156] Interview with the author, Paris, May 20, 2014.

While this situation complies with the overall Islamisation of state and society in the home country, as I have discussed in Chapter 7, it creates tensions in France, the republican *laicité* strictly limits the position of religion in public life. As a solution, the new initiatives take place in the region of Alsace-Moselle, where the relationship between the state and the church has a special status due to its local law. As it was a part of the German Empire from 1871 to 1918, Alsace-Moselle maintains its local legislation of pre-1905, established by the Concordat of 1801, providing public subsidy to religious faiths and the University of Strasbourg delivering courses in theology.

As of 2011, the Faculty of Islamic Theology began its courses in Strasbourg, in a joint program with the Theology Faculty under Istanbul University. The program only allowed for students under the age of 25 who had previously received French baccalaureate, who passed the entrance exams on Islamic belief. With this program, the Turkish state aimed reaching those who already were integrated with the French society and to train them on the official Turkish Islam. Similarly to the situation in Turkey, where religious education in the high school level has first become politicized and then dispersed under a standardized program, the Turkish state's emigrant policy included the establishment of religious high schools for the members of the emigrant community. In 2015, the Muslim high school *Lycée Yunus Emre* was established in affiliation with DITIB Strasbourg[157]. The creation of the high school demonstrates the Turkish state's engagement beyond autonomization of the Turkish youth in France, and extending the reach of religion outside of the premises of the mosque, to the area of education.

These new initiatives by the Turkish state also signify the ongoing ideological competition between the home state and emigrant populations, as a result of the state's not-so-subtle attempts at centralizing its predominance in this area. In fact, the area of religious education through private schools had already entered the agenda of the Turkish conservative community living in France, when *College Educ'Active* was founded by *Hizmet* movement in the Parisian *banlieue* of *Villeneuve Saint-Georges* in 2008, followed by the establishment of the after-school tutoring center, *Fédération Etude Plus* in 2010 with more than 15 branches around France. Although the schools are not announced to provide religious education, their affiliation with the Islamist political movement of *Hizmet* drew attention by the wider public, as it did in Turkey and in other countries with *Hizmet*'s presence (this movement which has

[157] Ouest France. 2015. "Strasbourg. Un premier lycee confessionnel turc pour un Islam de France." October 19. http://www.ouest-france.fr/education/strasbourg-un-premier-lycee-confessionnel-turc-pour-un-islam-de-france-3779397.

emerged in the 2000s in France will be elaborated more in the next section). Even though these initiatives were supported following their foundation, the sudden rupture between the AKP government and *Hizmet* movement in 2013 had led to a process of discrediting by the either side, causing the Turkish state to denounce the religious activities of the movement as well. In 2014, another private elementary school *Bellevue Muhammed Hamidullah* was founded by Fatih Sarıkır, the head of *Milli Görüş France* in the Parisian *banlieue* of Clichy-sous-Bois. While the school was opened as a private initiative of Sarıkır, it received support from the President of YTB Kudret Bülbül who participated in the opening ceremony of the school during his visit to France. Together with the foundation of *Yunus Emre* high school in Strasbourg, this new tendency illustrates the interest towards raising a religious youth through education in France, not only via the premises of mosque associations but in the everyday life. It also illustrates the ambiguity in the Turkish state's engagements with the citizens living abroad, on the one hand supporting private initiatives, while on the other creating its own institutional agenda as a reactive mechanism towards possible oppositions.

In this section, I have discussed the changing rhetoric and the institutional mechanisms of the Turkish state to bring together a group of non-resident citizens under the assumption of a community or a diasporic entity. The analysis of the fieldwork in France has illustrated that the new emigrant engagement policies have resulted in an overall broadening of the Turkish state's relations with the individual and collective members of the society. The repercussions of new policies also expanded the available opportunities and resources for the emigrants to sustain their community projects and representation in relation with the home country. For political entrepreneurs who complied with the state agenda, these new processes brought possibilities for obtaining a stronger position within the community. However, the implications of these new policies also created new tensions and polarizations, as a result of the patterns of selectivity of the home state, first for the advantage of the religious and nationalist groups, and later for the advantage of the groups that complied with the AKP's political agenda.

8.2. Rules of Engagement for Non-Resident Citizens of Turkey

The Turkish state is increasingly interested in the responsibilization of its citizens in an attempt to continue their control over the populations beyond the limits of their physical borders, with a practice that would appear as the state had retreated. As I have discussed in Chapter 7, a crucial strategy of the Turkish state in its engagement with the citizens living

abroad in the post-2003 has been based on empowering their status as dual citizens, not only to solidify their citizenship ties with Turkey, but also to advance their position in relation with the state and society in the country of residence. While the strategy of maintaining the loyalty of the citizens has emerged in the 1980s when the policies on dual citizenship were implemented, the adoption of a policy that supported a more participant perspective of citizenship in the country of residence emerged in the last epoch of Turkey's emigration regime. In terms of political affairs, this situation was coupled with the promotion of political participation in both localities, which surfaced in the form of electoral participation and candidacy. In this section, I concentrate on this political aspect; and I aim to find answers to the inquiry on how the home state policies and emigrant politics interact in the area of political participation.

Active Citizenship and Participation

During my fieldwork in France, I had the chance to participate at a meeting organized by the newly appointed ambassador of Turkey to France, to address and get to know the representatives of the emigrants' associations in the Parisian region. In the questions and answers section of the meeting, a young man aged under 18 years, who announced that he was the president of *Türk Fransız Futbol Kulübü* (Turkish French Soccer Club) in the department of Val-de-Marne, asked for the ambassador's support in their sportive activities aiming for young populations of Turkish origin. Glad to hear the initiative, ambassador stated that participation to sportive activities was as important as the regular curriculum for education overseas and added "You should have a product to put on showcase like artist, sportsman or politician. Encourage your youth, individual achievements are very important. We will give you all the support." Several days later, during my talk with a representative of the mission, I was told that in the past the ambassador of Turkey would have probably said that soccer was a waste of time and would have tried to promote young people to play tennis as a part of becoming a westerner, without providing any real support. This short instance was actually an illustration of the change in the Turkish state's approach, on the one hand vis-à-vis the empowerment for participation, and on the other shifting from a Jacobin interest to westernize the population to a new orientation that was based on accepting and using the existing conditions under which the Turkish communities lived and endured.

Since 2015, "active citizenship and equal participation program" is one of the priority areas of the Presidency on Turks Abroad, which is oriented towards "promoting active and

productive participation of individuals in all areas including the political, economic, academic, cultural, artistic, literary, sportive fields"[158]. Once used by scholars to describe citizens' and non-citizens' practices and enactments of citizenship (Isin 2002), the notion of "active citizenship" is now being used by policy-makers and implementers of Turkey, in order to promote both the pre-defined citizenship status, as well as acts and practice that aim at expanding it. In France, where dual citizenship is allowed and the acquisition of French nationality is fairly easy compared to many European countries, emigrants can easily gain citizenship status or keep their legal ties with their origin country. Despite this ease, as of 2014, among the 610,000 Turkish citizens living throughout France, an estimated number of nearly 230,000 people had dual citizenship; therefore the two thirds of the population had not become the citizen of their country of residence. In Chapter 5, I had argued that adoption of citizenship had become one of the primary issues of debate in the 1990s among the emigrant community from Turkey in France. During this period a special emphasis was made on the topic of voting, which aimed for demanding for increased rights in the public arena by becoming constituents. In the current age, the promotion of naturalization is both in the agenda of the associations and the Turkish foreign mission; but the topic of citizenship has a wider scope, which is not limited with the acquisition of status but also enactment of citizenship in every available field.

In the field of cultural and artistic participation, one of the earlier initiatives to encourage and present Turkish citizens in France has been through their inclusion in the framework of *La Saison de la Turquie en France* (Turkish Season in France) which has taken place in 2009-2010. This event organized by the ministries of foreign affairs and of culture by the two countries has taken place in a period of nine months around France, in the interest of presenting Turkey in France through cultural events, educational cooperation projects and economic activities[159]. While the program was not directly aimed at the presentation of the emigrants from Turkey in France, associations had a chance to participate and demonstrate their own projects and activities. These activities included: ELELE's activities together with *Cite National de l'Histoire de l'Immigration* and ACORT's Turkish cinema festival in emblematic Strasbourg- St. Denis district in Paris; expositions, conferences and workshops in Belfort by *Association de Culture et d'Amitie,* in Canteleu by *Association Turque de*

[158] T.C. Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı. 2015. "Aktif Yurttaşlık." Accessed August 25. http://ytb.gov.tr/aktif_yurtdaslik.php.
[159] İstanbul Kültür Sanat Vakfı. 2015. "Yurtdışı Projeler. Fransa'da Türkiye Mevsimi." Accessed August 20. http://www.iksv.org/tr/fransadaturkmevsimi.

Canteleu, in Bourganeuf by *Association Turque de Bourganeuf,* in Limoges by *Union Culturelle Franco-Turque en Limousin* (Petek 2009). Although the event with its high level arrangements and financial opportunities was a possibility to create bridges with the broad French society, the low participation to the season by emigrants' associations has re-triggered the discussion on Turkish emigrants' "voluntary isolationism" from the broader population (Petek 2009). Over the last years, the adoption of the new language on participation and active citizenship seems to have pushed for new initiatives, such as UETD's *Festival d'Anatolie* (Anatolia Festival) in 2012 and 2013 supported by the Municipality of Istanbul, Turkish Airlines and Presidency on Turks Abroad. Nevertheless, different from the programs within *Saison de la Turquie,* this festival aimed to represent not contemporary but the traditional arts and culture from Anatolia, and particularly of the Ottoman Empire, to the French society, by incorporating janissary band displays, the presentation of Ottoman clothing and traditional folklore shows[160]. This last festival illustrated that this new interest to reach broader populations has been coupled in practice with the articulation of new communitarian values, which have been imported from the neo-Ottoman tendencies of the current government in Turkey.

In the field of political participation, the appeals in the 1990s by emigrants' associations have resulted in an increase of candidacy and membership to local municipalities in the 2000s. In 2001, four citizens of Turkish origin had been elected as members of the municipal council around France, increasing to 41 in 2008 and 58 in 2014 local elections. Their participation in the local politics in France puts into perspective the integration of the population both within the broader society and also increased opportunities to advocate needs resulting in their migrant status in the country. From the viewpoint of the home state, the increased participation to the local politics is both an opportunity for representing the Turkish community, but also a step on the way to reaching national politics, where emigrants can become spokespeople of domestic politics in the transnational sphere. As a consequence, currently the participation of dual citizens is not only in the agenda of emigrants' associations but also in the agenda of the foreign mission, which closely monitors the candidates and the list of deputy mayors and members of the municipal council.

A stimulating debate was witnessed during the local elections in 2014, when new initiatives have emerged in order to support the candidacy of Turkish emigrants. One of these initiatives has been made by COJEP in Strasbourg, in order to support candidates' participation through

[160] Festival d'Anatolie. 2015. Accessed August 10. http://www.festivaldanatolie.com/.

independent lists. As discussed in Chapter 5, as the former youth branch of *Milli Görüş* in Strasbourg, COJEP had extended its agenda in the 1990s in order to reach beyond the communitarian perspective and adopt a new discourse on multiculturalism and equal citizenship rights in France. COJEP had been supporting active participation of Turkish emigrants and particularly of the youth since 2001, when it first initiated the campaign entitled "pedaling for democracy". A resilient supporter of political participation, COJEP continued its campaigns over the next elections, particularly in the Alsace region. In the elections for 2014, the association promoted candidacy through independent lists, as in the case of Tuncer Sağlamer's *Mouvement Citoyen de Strasbourg* (Citizen Movement of Strasbourg) in order to proliferate the participation of Turkish emigrants in the local politics. According the president of COJEP, the introduction of independent lists was one of the strategies undertaken by the association:

> Today for the first time our friends have presented independent candidates in many places. […] We told them that there should be more depute mayors. Friends, these parties are providing you one or two places in their lists, however looking at the overall population, we should have at least seven or eight members of municipal council. So it is your right to have an independent list. There is no impediment against that. If this will give negotiation prospect in the second round, if it will create more members, deputes, then be it. Can't Franco-Turks develop this idea, this strategy by themselves without the support of someone from Turkey? Thinking otherwise is an insult to the 50-year-old accumulation in here[161].

Although the initiative backfired in Strasbourg, it did create tensions among the community of emigrants from Turkey in France on the question of *entrisme* (entryism), even reflecting on the French media. The critics of the incentive claimed that rather than an undertaking of citizenship; the strategy represented communitarism as the majority of the candidates presented in the list were either of Turkish origin or were converted to Islam. COJEP was appraised for its members' tendency to partake in local elections by strategically entering from parties of different orientations[162]. While in theory, the Turkish state's emigrant engagement policy encompassed the autonomization and empowering of subjects, its implementation and reflections on practice took place under very blunt strategies that used parochial communitarianism.

The participation of emigrants from Turkey in different French political parties both from left and right, except for those of extreme right such as *Front National* with a counter-migration

[161] Interview with the author, Strasbourg, June 4, 2014.
[162] Ariane Bonzon. 2014. "Municipales: les Franco-Turks de Strasbourg font-ils de l'entrisme electoral?". May 23. http://www.slate.fr/france/84909/municipales-strasbourg-liste-turcs.

stance, had in fact been ongoing in the 2000s. One of the reasons for this distribution has been the divergence in the ideological orientations of emigrants related to Turkish politics and the increase in the participation of people in diverse positions to political life in France. Another important reason was the electoral behavior among emigrants of Turkish origin in France, which oriented towards pro-immigrant left-wing parties, despite of their electoral preference towards right parties in Turkey. However, incentives to promote strategically participation from different positions have been a novel practice, which took place in the elections of 2008 and 2014.

Another such initiative was undertaken by *Objectif 21* in Clichy-sous-Bois, a commune densely populated by emigrants from Turkey in the outskirts of Paris. The association was founded in 2013 by a former executive member of *Türk Federasyonu,* on the premises of *Gagny Clichy Montfermeil Ülkü Ocağı* (*Association d'Amitie Franco-Turc de Gagny*, Idealist Foyer) and its mosque. Announced its objective as to "promote active citizenship of least represented classes in politics"[163], the association began its work to reach young descendants of Turkish emigrants and encourage them to become candidates in the local elections around France. In an attempt to increase broader participation of Turkish emigrants in French politics, the association supported candidates' participation throughout the ideological spectrum of political parties in France. During our interview with the founder and current president of *Objectif 21,* I was interested in learning how the members of an association whose political objectives were founded upon the ideological premises of Turkish nationalism were able to integrate with the other ideologies, mainly of the left-wing parties:

> D.A: Can your association comply ideologically with the Greens for instance?
>
> We even have candidates from Front Gauche, because they were elected first in that district. We do not care for the ideologies in France; it does not matter if the party on the left or right has such or such ideology. Our priority is the interests of the *Türk milleti* (Turkish nation/society). They call this *communautarisme* here, they may do so. We established this mechanism. You may be from a leftist thought, you have the freedom to do so, but the priorities of the *Türk milleti* are before your ideals[164].

The answer given by the interviewee illustrated that the political agenda aiming for representing the home state matters in the overseas, or what could be described as "long distance nationalism", could mount the integrationist practices. Recurrently used in the

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[163] Objectif 21. 2015. "Objectif 21, c'est quoi?" Accessed August 10. http://www.objectif21.fr/objectif-21-cest-quoi.html.
[164] Interview with the author, Paris, May 14, 2014.

founding texts of the Turkish Republic and later adopted by nationalist jargon in Turkey, the term *Türk milleti* denotes both Turkishness and the supremacy of a nation. The use of language by the founder of *Objectif 21*, mainly the notion of *Türk milleti* is crucial in grasping the extra-territorial imagination of a nation beyond the premises of a certain state, by this nationalist group. This case shows that similar to Brand's (2014) discussion on the employment of the language of citizenship by the home state for its own political aspirations in the domestic arena, the emigrants could also use the language of citizenship to become a part of the political sphere in the home country, despite of being physically remote from it.

Whatever COJEP and Objectif 21's positions may be, the interest of the governing party AKP, in engaging with the political participation of Turkish emigrants in France is apparent, reflecting on the activities of Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) in Europe, with its close affiliations to AKP party. Established in 2006, the French branch of UETD is a part of a wider network in the 12 countries of Europe founded in 2004 with its headquarters in Cologne. Although the Union announces that it has no ties with any government, its affiliation to the AKP is explicitly publicized, as in the case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's participation in the UETD's celebratory events to its 10th year anniversary in Cologne. This tie was also mentioned by the president of UETD France during our interview: "Every association has a tendency that it has *gönül bağı* (ties of affection). We are not AKP, but we have a *gönül bağı*"[165]. UETD France declares its aims as "increasing the efficiency of European Turks in their country of residence by promoting political, social and cultural development" and pronounces its two main objectives as "(1) increasing the social status of European Turks and (2) organizing political lobbying activities"[166]. Its current office, on the first floor of a luxurious shared office environment in one of the Champs Elysees residences distinguishes itself from other emigrants' associations in the Parisian center, transforming the image of typical guest worker/migrant with social branding. On the issue of political participation in French elections in 2014, UETD took active position to bring together mayors and Turkish candidates; publicizing the Turkish candidates on social media and the association network; and organized politics academy with the presence of the chief supervisor to the Prime Minister of Turkey, Yiğit Bulut and member of Turkish parliament from Istanbul, Metin Külünk.

[165] Interview with the author, Paris, May 2, 2014.
[166] Union of European Turkish Democrats. 2015. "UETD Nedir?" Accessed September 10. http://www.uetd.fr/uetd-nedir/.

While I have given the examples of participation of emigrants from Turkey in social, cultural, academic, political or economic fields in France, in relation with the Turkish state's emigrant engagement policies, I have no intension of suggesting that the home state policies are the main and only reason for increased participation, nor argue that the three associations cited above have been the sole actors in this process. As discussed before, the issue of integration and participation had been on the agenda of associations and movements particularly since the 1990s, when the emigrant population was deemed as permanent in the country of residence. Other actors have also dealt individually or collectively with the issue of participation in various ways; for instance over the last years DIDF has been supporting young Turkish and Kurdish descendants from Turkey to actively participate in local politics, FEYKA has been backing Kurdish emigrants' participation in French parties and politics. The three associations were cited above in order to illustrate the role of the relationship with the home country, the diffusion of certain norms and strategies and the consequences of their implementation in the wider population.

Voting from "Abroad"

Home state's enfranchisement of citizens living abroad may be the most discussed topic in the current literature that deals with the relations between the home state and the non-resident citizens. Its attraction of interest is related to the novelty of this practice and its quick diffusion across many countries. In Chapters 5 and 7, I elucidated that voting was allowed to be exercised by emigrants only in the Turkish customs since 1987, and only recently in 2012 extra-territorial voting has become available for non-resident citizens. In France, as in other European countries, the customs voting had created tensions among the emigrant communities from Turkey, as a result of certain political parties' practices of facilitating the transportation of electorates from their countries of residence to the Turkish border gates.

Following the amendments in the electoral law, the first national election available to non-resident Turkish citizens has been the presidential elections of August 2014. This would be a first also due to the unprecedented status of presidential elections in Turkey. During my fieldwork in France, I had the opportunity to follow the preparations for this election both by the consular services and the various actors involved in this issue. It was already announced that another parliamentary election would take place in the spring of 2015, and therefore the August elections were considered as a preparation phase for the more important elections of the succeeding year. Two distinct positions have been manifested by the executive members

of the associations on the topic of extra-territorial voting. One camp argued that participation to elections in Turkey was a right that was belated and some even argued that it needed to be extended to include direct representation for citizens living abroad. The other camp claimed that those who had migrated from Turkey to France, or were descendants of these people had to concentrate now on integration and their citizenship status in France. For this group, participation in the Turkish elections were sharpening the political cleavages among these populations, and pushing the discussions on migrants' rights and racism to the background even though they were of primary importance for their daily lives.

In the presidential elections of 2014, of the 298,839 registered voters, only 24,960 voters (8.35%) cast their votes. AKP's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received the first place in France with 66.01% of the votes, followed by HDP's Selahattin Demirtaş (18.73%), and CHP and MHP's joint candidates Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (15.26%)[167]. While the presidential elections had a low turnout rate in Turkey as well, the problems regarding the system of registry and scheduling of appointments, and the weak dissemination of the new processes were argued as a reason for low participation. During the parliamentary elections in June 2015, the voter turnout increased significantly: among the 311,802 registered voters, 113,542 people (36%) used their votes, mainly in the consular regions in Paris (40%), Strasbourg (26%) and Lyon (18%). While the majority of the votes were obtained by AKP (50.6% with 50,594 votes), it was followed by HDP (29.6% with 33,087 votes), CHP (9.6% with 10,724 votes) and MHP (7% with 7,841 votes)[168]. The strong position of HDP in Paris taking the lead with 41.49%, followed by AKP (38.82%) illustrated the citizens' distinct sociopolitical characteristic from the other regions and that the fragmentation between the Parisian center and the other regions examined in Chapter 5 continued until today.

Analyzing the impacts of extra-territorial voting on New Zealander politics, Gamlen (2015: 3) argues that at times, the importance of the overseas votes prompt political parties to vote-chase overseas, resulting in an increased aggregate impact of expatriate voters on the elections. Beginning with spring 2014, the overseas votes started to be regarded as critical both by the political parties in Turkey and the citizens living in France. Even though the turnout remained limited during the first elections, many associations with affiliations to the political parties in Turkey had begun to organize registration and voting campaigns and

[167] Yüksek Seçim Kurulu. 2016. "Dış temsilciliklerde aldıkları oy sayıları." Accessed January 27. http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Resources/img/xls.png.

[168] Zaman Fransa. 2015. "Fransa'da hangi parti kaç oy aldı?" June 8. http://www.zamanfransa.com/article/fransada-hangi-parti-kac-oy-aldi-15716.html.

establishing technical infrastructure for online registration. For the political parties, the pre-existing ties with the citizens of Turkey living abroad critically played a role during their vote chasing before the elections. As such, political parties with clear affiliations to certain associations have used the already existing channels, as in the case of the representation of nationalist MHP by *Türk Federasyonu,* pro-Kurdish HDP by FEYKA and the governing AKP by UETD. The republican CHP, which did not have an associational backing, has used its newly founded overseas branch in order to bring together the new voters with its parliamentarians. The distribution of votes across parties illustrated their and the associations' capabilities of mobilizing populations in certain regions. Moreover, leading politicians employed these resources in order to reach wider masses by organizing rallies before the elections, usually in Germany where the citizens of Turkey were mostly populated, but also in France: in June 2014, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made an appeal to the citizens in Lyon at UETD's 10th year anniversary celebrations and in April 2015 Selahattin Demirtaş appeared at a rally in Place de la Republique in Paris.

Parallel to the expansion of consular services and to increased dialogue with the civil society, the extra-territorial voting has the effect of broadening up the relations between the Turkish state and the emigrant society. As a citizenship right, extra-territorial voting applies to all persons who maintain their citizenship ties with Turkey, not depending on their rivalries or tensions with the home state. This is particularly a crucial issue for the political migrants who maintained or regained their legal status of citizenship from Turkey. The high turnout rates for the HDP in the Parisian region illustrated the emerging interest of the populations that have been alienated from the political environment in Turkey due to their ideological positions or ethnic backgrounds, mainly after the 1980s. The partaking of the pro-Kurdish HDP over the last three national elections in Turkey had a significant role on this matter, inciting a significant mass living abroad to involve with greater interest in the elections. In my interviews with the executive members of associations such as FEYKA and ACTIT, which have institutionally never engaged with the foreign mission and were still acknowledged by the Turkish state under the framing of "anarchists and terrorists", I witnessed that electoral participation had become a new tool to participate in Turkish politics from abroad, outside the form of dissident movements which had been the main tool for politicization over the last decades. According to an executive member of ACTIT, the changing political environment in Turkey in 2014 had direct repercussions on their interest for participation in Turkish elections:

> In the March 30 elections, we supported HDP. We told our relatives to make calls and participate in the election preparations in Turkey. In the presidential elections, we will continue with the same direction if HDP introduces a candidate. We would not give any support to any hard-boiled bourgeois party. […] We know that making politics in the parliament is not very easy[169].

With a similar position, an executive member of FEYKA indicated that the associations under its federative umbrella would actively work in the electoral process, by following the agenda set by the HDP party:

> D.A: How is your position on participating in the elections in Turkey?
>
> On the elections in Turkey, we make calls. Those who are citizens have to cast their votes. Just as BDP enters elections, its followers should vote. […] For the elections, we will learn what needs to be done from HDP. Then we will establish a relation with the consulate through this way. An electoral commission will be formed; voting in Europe is a good thing.
>
> D.A: What if the bill on direct representation passes in the parliament?
>
> That would be very good. Then I would become a parliamentarian[170].

As described in the statements, the elections were also opening up a new channel for institutional dialogue between the emigrants' associations and the Turkish state, via the roof of a political party in Turkey. The new opportunities were also becoming available to those who were formerly excluded from the state's narrative on "the good citizens", such as in the case of direct representation. At this point, HDP's co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş's rally in Paris had symbolic undertones: as a candidate to presidency in Turkey, Demirtaş had visited first *Centre d'Information du Kurdistan*, the building where a senior member and two other female Kurdish activists were killed in 2013 and later *Kürdistan Demokratik Toplum Akademisi* (Kurdistan Democratic Society Academy, formerly Ahmet Kaya Culture-Arts Academy)[171]. For those in the exile, the extra-territorial voting and its possible extensions was making it possible to directly use the transnational resources, which had up to date were used to by-pass the state's impediments.

It should be noted that, a crucial part of Turkish state's new regime on managing non-resident citizens, the broadening up of relations was also coupled with new technologies of

[169] Interview with the author, Paris, April 30, 2014.
[170] Interview with the author, Paris, May 30, 2014.
[171] Nerinaazad. 2014. "Demirtaş, Paris'te 3 Kürt kadın devrimcinin suikast yerine çiçek bıraktı." July 18. http://www.nerinaazad.com/news/life/people/demirtas-pariste-3-kurt-kadin-devrimcinin-suikast-yerine-cicek-birakti.

knowledge, allowing for new channels of monitoring the populations living abroad. Citizens who were interested in voting in the elections in Turkey were required to register in the Overseas Electoral Register and the Address Registration System in Turkey by applying to the foreign mission and the online platform. The implementation of the extra-territorial voting system has taken place together with a massive campaign of registration for citizens. These new "fields of documentation", including the new knowledge on electoral behavior and more detailed and renewed information on non-resident citizens, provide novel opportunities for control of the knowledge-bearers.

Transnationalization of Homeland Domestic Matters

Koslowski (2005: 15) argues that the political participation of emigrants on home country matters is a transnational phenomenon whose importance was pointed long ago, but has not received much attention regarding its impact on the top-level international relations phenomena. The two issues, top-down state-to-state relations and grassroots transnationalization of homeland domestic matters have in fact traditionally been understood separately. For Koslowski (2005), this boundary started to evaporate, when the actions of emigrants began to influence the foreign policy-making of their host and home states. Therefore the proliferation of emigrants' political participation in the host countries, by using the tools and strategies available to them, which had not existed in the home country, has faded this distance. However, in this research I also argue that this evaporation has not only been the consequence of the impact by emigrants. The participation of emigrants in the affairs related to their homeland domestic matters is oftentimes being buttressed and facilitated by home states and their emigration regimes, which may re-configure their institutional ties with citizens living abroad in order to demand for their support on the transnationalization of domestic matters.

In Chapter 5, I have argued that politicization on homeland matters was a crucial aspect of the associational and collective life in France, in the period that followed the 1980 coup. Political opposition against the junta regime in Turkey was one of the aspects that had led to the abundance of migrants' movements not only in the French geography, but creating transnational networks particularly across Europe. Some of the transnational networks, which emerged during this period, such as the Kurdish movement or *Milli Görüş*, engendered over time into *sui generis* collectivities, creating or reinforcing the ones in Turkey. For the French case, during the 1980s and 1990s the Turkish state's responses to these oppositional groups

included: (a) addressing their presence as a top-level issue, attempting to isolate them of their opportunity structures, advocating and negotiating their nomination as terrorist organizations; and (b) creating or integrating alternative communitarian structures by encouraging them materially or symbolically. In the post-2003 period, new tools and strategies have been suggested and promoted in a more systematized fashion by the Turkish state, to benefit from the available human resources of the grassroots. Here, I focus on the transnationalization of domestic issues in France, by analyzing three cases: (1) the adoption of the concept of "lobbying" by certain associations, supported by the Turkish state; (2) the responses to the Armenian genocide bills, especially in 2012; (3) and the emerging political environment after *Gezi* movement in 2013.

In France, lobbying of ethnic minorities is measured as unacceptable, since they are considered to call into question the belief in a "France One and Indivisible". However, as I have discussed in Chapter 3, Safran's (2004) works on the Jewish and Muslim ethno-religious politics in France illustrated that the presence of lobbying could no longer be denied. In the case of emigrants from Turkey in France, acts attempting to influence decision makers at different levels on relations between France and Turkey, as well as the ongoing social and political events in Turkey by emigrant groups have been taking place since the mid-2000s. This strategy has been undertaken foremost by *Hizmet* movement, whose activities abroad were encouraged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by a directive in 2004 demanding ambassadors' visits to its activities. In France, *Hizmet* materialized in four main arenas during the 2000s, including media (*Zaman* bilingual newspaper active since 2007), education (two Gülen-inspired schools in Ile de France region), culture (*Plateforme de Paris,* particularly attracting academics and intelligentsia) and business (*Federation des Entrepreneurs et Dirigeants de France*, FEDIF, formerly FATIAD, bringing together Turkish business associations in France). Similar to the activities of the *Hizmet* movement in the United States where it has become the most consolidated, the movement adopted the rhetoric of interfaith dialogue and attempted to reach French community leaders and intelligentsia, including politicians, businessmen, academics and journalists. One of the most critical activities of the movement has been to import the American tradition of lobbying to the Franco-Turkish sphere, by using the methods of getting into direct contacts with decision makers and community gatekeepers, organizing friendship dinners (i.e. FATIAD's yearly

dinners at the French National Assembly since 2008) and flying lawmakers and intellectuals to Turkey[172].

Similar to the situation in Turkey, different organizations under *Hizmet* and the Turkish state representations were in close contact until 2013, with the ambassador and state officials' occasional visits to business dinners by FATIAD, meetings by *Plateforme de Paris* bringing French and Turkish intellectuals at the National Assembly[173], and the support of the Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities towards *Hizmet* movement. Coming at odds in Turkey in 2013, the relations deteriorated drastically in the recent years, leading up to a total non-recognition and denigration of both sides vis-à-vis the other. Currently placed in the black list by Turkish state, *Hizmet* activities are being critically discredited by the Turkish foreign mission, and movement has been using the same resources its has used before in order to confront and condemn the AKP government. Over the recent years, several institutions under the Turkish state has been assuming the role of alternatives to the *Hizmet* movement associations, such as *Yunus Emre Enstitüsü,* which undertook cultural affairs. In France, UETD has been openly assuming the role of lobbying for the Turkish state, in order to change "the image of Turkey": getting into regular contacts with national level politicians, parliamentarians and senators in France and planning for flying French parliamentarians to Turkey in order to introduce them to the AKP group parties[174]. Whether or not the lobbying practices imported by *Hizmet* movement from the United States to France had a role on the adoption of the concept of lobbying by other associations, its propagation is unprecedented, supported by the previously explained practices of state-society dialogue.

In France, two recent incidents have triggered mass politicization around issues related to home country matters. The *first of these incidents* took place in 2012, when a law punishing the negation of the events that took place in Anatolia in 1915 as Armenian genocide has been introduced to the French parliament. The Armenian population living in France is considered as the second populous group of the Armenian diaspora after the United States with an

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[172] Interviews with the author, Paris, May 9, 2014 and May 13, 2014. Widely used by lobbying organizations in the US, the invitations for on-sight visits is foreign for the French intelligentsia. In an analysis on *Hizmet* movement in France in 2014, Ariane Bonzon wrote about the discovery of some well-known French intellectuals, including Jean-Pierre Azéma, Philippe Roger and Olivier Wieviorka and Olivier Roy, of the Gülen movement's presence behind the *Abant Platform* that had invited them to Istanbul for a debate on "The Republic, cultural diversity and Europe". Ariane Bonzon. 2014. "Slate. Municipales: les Franco-Turcs de Strasbourg font-ils de l'entrisme electoral?" March 23. http://www.slate.fr/france/84909/municipales-strasbourg-liste-turcs.

[173] Guillaume Perrier. 2009. "Le Monde. Une confrerie turque ouvre un college republicain en France." December 29. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/12/29/les-eclaireurs-de-l-islam-suscitent-la-controverse_1285751_3224.html.

[174] Interview with the author, Paris, May 2, 2014.

estimated number of 300,000-500,000 people. Some 50,000-60,000 of this population is considered to have arrived following the massacres that took place in the early 20th century in Anatolia, particularly in the cities of Marseille, Lyon and Paris. In France, as in many other countries, the encounters between Armenians and Turks have been dominated by the relationship of what Kasbarian and Oktem (2014) call as "high politics", based on recognition and denial of the Armenian genocide, leaving very small room of opportunity for sociability between Turks and Armenians[175].

In January 2012, more than 15,000 people protested near the French senate, with signs indicating, "Franco-Turks are not political objects, but citizens", "I love the France of liberties" [176]. The initial response to the bill came from associations of both left and right, as the condemning of negation was considered as against right to speech. Over time, some of these groups left the movement, as it transformed and was adopted by *Fransız Türk Dernekleri Koordinasyon Birliği* (Coordination Committee of Franco-Turkish Associations in France), formed by three associative federations: DITIB, *Milli Görüş* and *Türk Federasyonu.* The committee also published an advertisement on the national journals of France, demanding French senators to oppose the bill. The bill, which was annulled in February 2012, has been symbolic for the Turkish emigrants and for the home state, beyond its main motive of counter-acting against the Armenian population in France. For the organizers of the mobilization and the committee, it was the first time a mass mobilization was organized, bringing together emigrant groups of different ideological orientations:

> We are thankful to Sarkozy who came up with this bill. Sarkozy did not realize anything in France in the past five years but at least he was able to bring together Turks with this bill.

[175] The alienation has reached its peak point in the 1970s and 1980s when Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) conducted a series of attacks aiming at Turkish diplomats and citizens, including the 1981 Turkish consulate attack in Paris, the 1983 bombing of a Turkish Airlines check-in counter at Orly Airport in Paris. These attacks have led to the association of campaigns on recognition with violence against Turkey, exploited by Turkish political actors (Kasbarian and Oktem 2014) and resulting in close supervision by the Turkish foreign mission on this particular subject. Along with the "high-level" political struggle, the conflict between Turks and Armenians in France has been ongoing in the 2000s, generally through non-violent campaigns, protests, public speeches and petitions to local and national politicians.

[176] Le Monde. 2012. "Des milliers de manifestants a Paris contre le texte sur le genocide armenien." January 21. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/01/21/des-milliers-de-manifestants-a-paris-contre-le-texte-sur-le-genocide-armenien_1632896_3224.html.

> I have been in France for the past 50 years. I have never seen so many Turks together. For the first time in history Turks had the chance to protest loudly and broadly an injustice to them[177].

In fact, the movement has not only received participants from France, but it was the result of a systematic organization, supported by the foreign mission and the Turkish state institutions. Among the participants of the protest were Turkish citizens from other European countries as well, mainly from Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and the United Kingdom, who arrived with more than 500 busses only for this event[178]. Although the committee did not form into a stable institution, the mass mobilization with the presence of the fragmented community was considered by some of the participant associations as a potential to creating a "Turkish diaspora", which acted to support the Turkish state's policies in the overseas. Together with the ongoing projects around the time, such as YTB's consultative committee with representatives from different federative associations, the incident signaled the possibilities of alliance building among groups mainly of right orientation in France as a response to triggering events.

The *second incident* causing mass mobilization around homeland matters has taken place following the large-scale social movement of *Gezi* in Turkey, which began as an environmental protest in Istanbul in May 2013 and later grew into a nation-wide civil unrest against the increased authoritarian rule in Turkey. In Turkey, the mobilization was exceptional with the heterogeneity of its participants, ranging in terms of class, age, gender, ethnicity, religion or ideological orientation. The resistance in Turkey has met with the support in the international arena as well, where solidarity protests from the US to Netherlands, Iraq to Russia have taken place (Baser 2014). In Paris, *Gezi* movement and the following events were supported by a wide range of associations, the traditional leftist emigrant associations, Alevi and Kurdish federations, the newly founded collectives of *Paris Taksim Dayanışma Platformu* (Taksim Solidarity Platform) and *Collectif de Taksim* (Taksim Collective), but also others including Kemalist *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* (Ataturkist Thought Association) and *Türkiye Gençlik Birliği* (Youth Union of Turkey). Although the initial mobilizations were practiced in the presence of these different movements, the Kemalist associations alienated over time from the others who continued the protests during

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[177] Zaman Dünya. 212. "Fransa'da Ermeni teklifi protestosu." January 21. http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_fransada-ermeni-teklifi-protestosu_1233024.html.

[178] T24. 2012. "Türkler yürüyüş öncesi Denfert Rochereau meydanında." January 21. http://t24.com.tr/haber/turkler-yuruyus-oncesi-denfert-rochereaumeydaninda-paris-aa,193115.

subsequent events, including the commemorations after those who died during the events in Turkey, Soma mine disaster or the siege of the Iraqi canton of Kobane.

During the solidarity movements in France, the leftist and refugee associations have been very active, different from the solidarity movements in some other countries such as Sweden. Among the main blocks of solidarity that were created in the early days, *Paris Taksim Dayanışma Platformu* was formed of traditional leftist associations (including ATİK, FUAF, ACTİT, *Halk Cephesi* and ODAK[179]); *Collective de Taksim* was supported by ACORT, DIDF, ACTIT and *Academie Ahmet Kaya*[180]; and support of French left-wing political parties (including *Parti Socialiste* and *Parti Communiste Français*) and Maghrebi associations were rendered since the early days by the movements from Turkey which had ties to them[181]. While the mobilizations around the Armenian genocide bill were assumed to bring together the associations of right orientation for the first time, the *Gezi* solidarity protests were considered by its many participants as creating a new possibility of alliance building and solidarity among people from Turkey in France, lying beyond the initial objective.

The incidents, the mobilizations around the bill on negation to Armenian genocide and the solidarity movement for *Gezi* resistance are critical to understanding the re-politicization of the emigrant populations from Turkey in France and the emergence of new alliances and rivalries. During my interviews in France with executive members of various emigrant associations, the two events were both presented as catalysts to coalescing groups, which could not come together before. These two events have created two distinct camps: one, which could align with the home state's political agenda at the current age and the other, strongly opposing against it. Two events that occurred in the aftermath of these incidents are illustrative of the potential rivalries between the two camps. The first of these happened following the *Gezi* movement in Turkey and its solidarity protests in France. In early June 2013, COJEP and a group of Turkish municipal councilors published press releases and letters to the attention of the mayor of Strasbourg, indicating that *Gezi* movement did not aim for democratization in Turkey and that was against an elected government (Communique de Presse, COJEP International). The protests and the reactions against them created tensions in Strasbourg among the municipal councilors of Turkish origin, between those who participated in the demonstrations and others who wrote directly to the municipality, arguing

[179] Özgür Gelecek. 2014. "Fransa'da Gezi'nin Yıldönümü Eylemleri." June 3. http://ozgurgelecek.net/duenya/9983-fransada-gezinin-yldoenuemue-eylemleri.html.

[180] Interview with the author, Paris, April 25, 2014.

[181] Ligue des droits de l'Homme. 2013. "Solidarite avec la resistance en Turquie. Halte aux violences policieres." June 20. http://www.ldh-france.org/Solidarite-avec-la-resistance-en/.

that the affairs of Turkey were being introduced to French politics[182]. The second happened in April 2015, when a group of participant associations to *Gezi* solidarity movements in France organized the new movement of "Ortak Bir Rüyamız Var" (Our common dream), in support for the commemoration of 24 April 2015 for the first time in Paris[183]. This initiative illustrated that the emigrants and their descendants of Turkish and Armenian ethnic origin were not homogeneous groups, that it was not possible to overgeneralize them into two conflicting populations of "Turkish diaspora" and "Armenian diaspora". The incidents on Armenian-Turkish conflict and *Gezi* movement illustrated that homeland related matters are able to trigger politicization among emigrants and their descendants. Nevertheless, despite the attempts by political entrepreneurs and home states in order to attract the support and loyalty of these populations through institutional or legal channels, the reactions are taken not by passive subjects but active individuals and collectivities, who respond to them in relation with their own identities and interests.

Concluding Remarks

In the post-2003 period, the transformations in the Turkish state's policies towards non-resident citizens has emerged as a new regime, taking place with new laws and institutions in the policy making and with new approaches of implementation. This chapter has discussed how these new policies have been put into practice in France and what have been the outcomes of these policies in terms of the relations between the emigrant populations and the home state.

First, the change in the approach has reflected on the broadening of the range of populations that the state institutions have aimed at reaching, both in terms of individual-level relations and with the collectivities. While this broadening has been effective on the states' relations with all its citizens as individuals, despite of their ties with unwelcomed associations and movements, its reflections on state-civil society relations have particularly effected the relations with those of Islamist and nationalist tradition, as compatible with the AKP government's own political orientation. The similar situation has taken place regarding the new diaspora institutions' activities as well, whereas emigrant groups that had a parallel

[182] Ariane Bonzon. 2014. "Slate. Municipales: les Franco-Turcs de Strasbourg font-ils de l'entrisme electoral?" March 23. http://www.slate.fr/france/84909/municipales-strasbourg-liste-turcs.

[183] Arzu Çakır. 2015. "Amerika'nın Sesi. Türk Dernekleri Paris'teki törene katılacak." April 18. http://www.amerikaninsesi.com/content/turk-dernekleri-paris-teki-anma-torenine-katilacak/2725126.html.

agenda with the Turkish government established closer dialogue and benefits from the new available resources and opportunities.

Second, the new emigration regime aimed for non-resident Turkish citizens to become active citizens both in the host country and related to the home country matters. In terms of their position in France, the recurrent emphasis on “active citizenship” in all platforms has supported the emigrants’ already existing tendency to become integrated. In the field of local politics, the 2000s have seen the increase in the emigrants’ participation both as electorate and as political candidates. Nevertheless, the ostensible support by the home country institutions and the participation in the politics for the benefit of the Turkish community, rather than the general population, has met with criticisms on communitarianism. As discussed in Chapter 5, the cultural affairs based on education of language and religion had become an area of contestation among various emigrant groups and the Turkish state in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 2000s, this competition continued in different forms, such as in the case of membership to the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* or the establishment of private high schools providing religious education.

Third, the Turkish state entered into new rules of engagement for non-resident citizens, by opting for enfranchisement and anticipating commitments on transnationalization of domestic politics. The issue of enfranchisement opened up new channels of institutional dialogue between the state and the emigrants’ associations, via the roof of the political parties from Turkey. Although the implementation of this citizenship right has been met with support from a significant part of the emigrant populations, it did not result in full commitment vis-à-vis the political party that implemented it. In the post-2003 period, the notion of “lobbying” has entered the agenda of the state institutions and of some emigrant associations, reflecting on an increased interest to transnationalize homeland matters in France. However, despite the attempts by political entrepreneurs and the home state to attract the support and loyalty of these populations through institutional and legal channels, the existence of compatibility or lack thereof have resulted in new rivalries and alliances, rather than creating a one and only “Turkish diaspora”.

CHAPTER 9

High Politics, Low Politics: Politics of Emigrants from Turkey in the U.S. after 2003

On a particularly snowy November evening in 2014, I was invited to follow a seminar entitled "Being non-Muslim in the Ottoman Empire, being Muslim in America" in Bergen, New Jersey. I had spent many hours before the event in the county, in order to find more about this neighborhood populated with Turkish Americans and in the meanwhile, trying to catch a breath from the cold weather at the famous Turkish *baklava* shop called *Güllüoğlu,* where many Turkish speaking families arrived ordering their deserts for the weekend of Thanksgiving. Arriving at the venue some thirty minutes prior to the seminar, I came across the irregular mosque building where the event would take place. With its brownstone structure, it was a former Masonic lodge, transformed in 2011 with the support of its own congregation living nearby and the Turkish *Diyanet.* In front of the building was a banner in red neon lights signposting that this was Turkish American Religious Foundation Bergen *Diyanet* Mosque and Cultural Center, replaced frequently with the Islamic hadith*,* "Paradise lies under the feet of mothers".

I was encouraged to participate to the meeting several days ago, during my interview with the president of Turkish American Cultural Society (TACS), who was also a former executive member of FTAA and the current North America Regional Manager of the Turkish official press agency, Anadolu Agency. "The mosque holds a very unique group of people, much different from *hacı amca* (haji uncles) that you may meet when visiting *Eyüp Sultan Cami* in Brooklyn", he told me, stressing that it was going to be interesting for observation. I started to grasp what he meant upon my entry: the door of the mosque opened to a meeting room, where seminars and weekend children's schools were organized and the prayer rooms were positioned upstairs, secluded from the primary entry. Inside were the members of the congregation, middle-aged men and women discussing their daily lives, nibbling on the food

prepared for the event. I was later explained that five of the nine executive members of the mosque foundation were women.

The event, organized by TACS and Turkish American Religious Foundation (TARF) attached to Turkish *Diyanet*, brought the congregation of the mosque together with the representatives of the Turkish consulate in New York and more interestingly with two speakers who had recently arrived from Turkey for several visits in the U.S.: the vice president of Department of Museum and Promotion under Turkish Grand National Assembly, *and* a historian who also served as consultant to Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). Before the beginning of the seminar, the religious attaché of New York area announced that such events were very precious for the foreign mission, as they "facilitated the continuation of the societal life among Turkish Americans". The speeches by the two speakers celebrated the multicultural life in the Ottoman Empire, by sharing examples of the Armenian, Greek and Jew artists, intellectuals and administrators. The audience was told that the Turkish American community was faced with many accusations, ranging from the 1915 events to Islamic fundamentalism, which needed to be addressed by informed individuals who "actively participated in the social life" with the support of Turkish state institutions: "Children who grow here are going to become ambassadors and attachés, we should show our great culture", the second speaker said. The presentations were finalized when the members of the mosque chorus group performed *meşk* (traditional music performed through observation of a master), composed by non-Muslim artists from the Ottoman era.

The seminar at the Bergen mosque was stimulating to think about the Turkish state's new institutional configuration built around the management of non-resident citizens in relation with its interest to reach a global society. In Chapter 6, I had discussed that since the 1940s there have been elite networks between Turkey and the United States, first built around inter-governmental diplomacy and trade partnerships, and later established by a small group among the members of the "brain drain" in relation with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the 2000s, there is an expanded institutional outreach by the Turkish state in the overseas, involving new or restructured institutions in addition to the framework of Ministry of Foreign Affairs or YTB, such as Anadolu Agency, TIKA, Turkish Airlines or other institutions related to the Prime Ministry and the TGNA. The Turkish state's anticipated commitment from its non-resident citizens on lobbying is being supported since 2003 by this wide array of available institutions, making it vital to establish new links between the emigrant society and the state institutions, complementary to the network of Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and its foreign mission. The seminar illustrated the new role attributed to the non-resident citizens, who were expected to become official or symbolic ambassadors of Turkey in the overseas and to represent Turkey by participating actively in the social, political and economic life in the United States.

Moreover, as I will elaborate more in this chapter, today, the construction of community around religion and grassroots mobilization emerge as a part of the new tools used by the Turkish state in order to engage with citizens living in the United States. It enables the state institutions' and other non-state actors' accessibility to a broader range of populations in an environment, which has been previously constructed around elite networks and high-level politics. Thus the support to the mosque and grassroots associations enable the shattering of the image of the "cold face" of the Turkish state, while at the same time making it possible to discuss concepts such as multiculturalism, grassroots lobbying or active citizenship. It also enables the Turkish government to disseminate its policy priorities to larger crowds of citizens living overseas. In this chapter, I analyze how the transformations in the Turkish state's policies for the non-resident citizens in the post-2003 have been implemented in the United States and what have been the outcomes of this situation in terms of home state-emigration society relations. The chapter benefits from the empirical research conducted in September-December 2014 in the United States.

9.1. New Repertoires, New Relations

In Chapter 6, where I discussed emigrants from Turkey in the United States in the pre-2000 period and their relations with the Turkish state, I argued that there were two groups distinguished by their societal structure: the first group, represented by "brain drain" migration, geographically dispersed around the United States and embodied by individualism; and the second group, consisting of network migrants, who had emerged in the 1960s but grew significantly in numbers over the 1980s and created a new communitarianism. This distinction had not created a sharp disintegration as in the case of France, but to isolation between the two groups in the presence of available outlets which enabled gathering together in rare circumstances. From the perspective of the home state, the first group dominated the relational processes particularly following the post-1980 period when attempts were made to organize an ethnic lobbying under umbrella settings.

While the deep-rooted federative structures endured in the post-2003 period, new and ideologically distinctive groups began to emerge in the United States, with the arrival of new emigrant groups from Turkey. One of these groups has been the new conservatives, who began to arrive following a number of events in the late 1990s, including the military memorandum of 28 February 1997 and the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen's exile to the United States following legal processes against him. Other emerging groups included the Kurds and Alevis of Turkey, who had remained silent in the associative framework in the pre-2000s period, and began to establish individual associations to assemble under these certain identities and to advocate their positions on political events ongoing in the home country. Hence, the new emigration patterns and easier accessibility to the home country through the development of communication and transportation technologies triggered for the materialization of new collectivities in the United States.

A number of structural changes by the American state on incorporation, particularly for the Muslim populations, have also shaped the outlook on migrants' participation in the social, cultural and political life in the United States over the recent decades. Following the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, there has been an overall development of migration-security nexus in the world, reinforced particularly in the United States, where the institutional responses have been the most far-reaching. According to Faist (2005: 4) the largest modification of the U.S. federal bureaucracy since the founding of the Pentagon took place with the establishment of U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2003. Attached to this securitization framework, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) created Heritage Council in the period that followed 9/11, in order to reach out to heritage Americans, who are defined as first and second-generation citizens to serve intelligent communities due to their advanced language skills and cultural knowledge of the communities they represent[184].

Another result has been the positioning of Muslim organizations and communities in the spotlight of politics and mass media in the United States. Faist (2005: 13) argued that the repercussion of this hard and frequent look by the American mass media on Islam and Muslims has led to the creation of a new discursive area on sensitive and contentious issues, such as the hiring of local religious leaders, political accommodation or gender relations. For instance, one of the oldest Muslim umbrella organizations in the United States, the Islamic

[184] Worde. 2016. "Heritage Council Colloquium." Accessed February 1. http://www.worde.org/programs/1013-2/office-of-the-director-of-national-intelligence-heritage-council/.

Circle of North America (ICNA) has taken a stronger position in responding to Islamophobia by supporting political participation and civil society organizing among American Muslims[185]. These new processes that have prompted new communitarian representations have overlapped with the transformations in the collective practices by the populations from Turkey in the United States. As such, representatives of ATAA became embedded under the framework of Heritage Council as person-to-person diplomats between the states and societies of Turkey and U.S., and the representation of *Diyanet* began its collaboration with the ICNA as the representative of Turkish Islam.

"Tabana inmek"[186]

In terms of the relations between the Turkish state and the non-resident citizens, noteworthy changes in the rhetoric have taken place beginning with the early 2000s. In Chapter 8 where I discussed the state-emigrant society relations in France, I had noted that there had been an overall broadening of state-society dialogue, which had initially reflected on welcoming the multiplicity of non-state actors, replacing the former perception about the possible threats about their fragmentation. Moreover, the French case had illustrated that the home state had expanded its area of service provision through what Delano (2014) called as "service-oriented diaspora policies", to promote citizens' well-being and at the same time redefine its sovereignty through institutional processes of citizenship, beyond the political boundaries. In the case of the United States, the post-2003 period was marked by similar transformations, both in the individual affairs between the state and the citizens, and also between the state and civil society.

As I had discussed in Chapter 6, beginning with the 1980s there have been networks between the members of the emigrant elite and the home state, which had come together in a shared cause of responding to the rival ethnic lobbies. Despite facilitating the political entrepreneurs' accessibility to the consular and ambassadorial platforms, this situation had also resulted to the creation of the image of a "cold face" of the Turkish state among who were excluded from this sphere. This situation differed from the case of France, where the consular services were argued to be based on a top-down bureaucratic perspective. During my interviews, I have been told that the primary orientation of the Turkish foreign mission in the United States, which continued to be bilateral relations and the resolution of Turkey's foreign policy

[185] Interview with the author, Washington D.C., December 9, 2014.
[186] Reaching out to grassroots.

issues through the support of ethnic lobbying, had created a remoteness between the citizens and the state institutions, in other affairs related to citizenry and welfare. According to a representative of the foreign mission, despite the changes in the practices in the recent years, the long-term remoteness continued to exist in the United States and that it still occupied their agenda:

> In the United States we [Turkish state] had dealt too much with the bilateral relations, without focusing too much on the citizens. […] There have been distances built for years and this has created remoteness. The culture here does not create societal tensions; there is nothing that pushes people to get close with the embassy. […] We are sincere about bringing services to the citizens but the cliff is already established, therefore we need to attract them. In Germany, when it is announced that the Consul General will arrive, you can fill a room in two days. Here, even the 1915 events do not suffice to clamp people together. Our new ambassador is talking about this with the consulates. There is a meeting today with Consuls General from around the United States and three panels are allocated to this topic[187].

Still, some of the reformations related to the institutional structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have reflected on the area of service provision over the recent years in the United States. These changes were based primarily on the facilitation of accessibility, through the medium of internet technologies and the organization of more flexible institutional settings, in order to reach citizens dispersed in the vast American geography. Some of the new practices included the increase in the number of consular missions in the United States; the development of *e-konsolosluk* (e-consulate) and *e-pasaport* (e-passport) procedures, which resolved the necessity to visit a consular service; the arranging of *gezici konsolosluk* (mobile consulate) to reach out to the Turkish community; and the easing of communications through direct emailing and the use of social media.

In the area of civil society dialogue, there has been an initial broadening of the relational setup, particularly with the newly emerging *Hizmet* movement in the United States, but also towards reaching the grassroots, comprising of mosque associations and *hemşeri* (hometown) associations. As I had discussed in the previous chapters, the ministerial directives in 2004 had required from the foreign mission to support *Hizmet* movement. Established around Islamist preacher Fethullah Gülen, *Hizmet* movement is a transnational Islamist political movement, which has consolidated its presence in Turkey in the aftermath of 1980 military coup, particularly in the arena of education. The movement was founded on the readings of Said Nursi (1873-1960) who had challenged Kemalist secularization in the early days of the republic. However it gained impetus over the 1990s through Fethullah Gülen's close relations

[187] Interview with the author, Washington D.C., December 5, 2014.

with the Turkish governments and ministries of the era, and adopted a transnational outlook by supporting the foundation of Gülen-inspired Turkish schools in the post-Soviet countries particularly in the Middle Asia. Following Gülen's exile to the United States in 1999 following allegations against him for criticizing Turkish *laicité* and demanding for sharia, his followers began to disseminate around the developed world as well. In the 2000s the movement rapidly developed into "a kind of statist stance" (Seufert 2014 in Kaya 2015: 52), aligning with the AKP governments, establishing schools, media outlets, business and industrialist organizations, civil society and launching charity-support networks both in Turkey and elsewhere. Until the termination of their alliance in 2013, *Hizmet* movement and the AKP consolidated a unified power in state affairs and public offices. In the political affairs, the incremental rupture was resulted by an intense clash in order to maintain their power in various state offices (Kaya 2015).

As discussed in the case of France, *Hizmet* movement organizes in a different fashion than the other Islamist community organizations, congregating its members, followers or sympathizers around secular establishments rather than the religious structures. The schools established by the members of the *Hizmet* movement dispersed around the United States in a very short time, attracting many emigrants and non-emigrants as students. Among the first established are the Science Academy of Chicago (1997), Brooklyn Amity School (1999) and the Pioneer Academy of Science in Clifton (1999) and Putnam Science Academy in Connecticut (2000). The movement widened its outreach in other areas, mainly in lobbying with Rumi Forum founded in Washington D.C. in 1999, and later through the umbrella Assembly of Turkic American Federations (ATAF) founded in 2010[188], business and trade with Turkish American Business Improvement and Development Councils (TABID) and the area of culture with Turkish Cultural Centers (TCC) (Hendrick 2014: 217). Hendrick (2014: 210) argued that in addition to dialogue with the U.S. politicians, academics, journalists and community leaders, *Hizmet* movement entered into a "war of position" for domestic hegemony in Turkey that also touched the U.S. According to the scholar, the institutions constituted long-term projects with the goal of redefining the Turkish narrative for U.S. audiences and the cultivate client patron relationships between market actors in the U.S. and its affiliated businessmen. During a pilot interview for this dissertation in April 2013, I was

[188] ATAF was later renamed as Turkic American Alliance (TAA) following ATAA's appeals about its concerns on infringement.

able to talk to an executive member of the Turkish Cultural Center in New York, who had also contended that the show of force was a significant part of their work in the United States:

> The building [of the center] was in Lexington 51 before. The reason for us to move to 5th avenue was strategic: it is the most expensive street in the world. This is related to our slogan, it is a show of force. We came here to make ourselves heard from a strong position. […] For our activities we are getting into dialogue with prestigious people and institutions, in terms of partnerships and invitations. […] We organize friendship dinners with politicians and businessmen, in places such as Waldorf Astoria Hotel, a very prestigious place. We organize Turkish Days in State Councils; we are aiming to present the Turkish name to policy makers, so that it will not become associated with a bad thing. […] In the past there used to be activities for Turkishness with the support of the state, these used to be with alcohol and belly dancers. [Turkish Americans] were perceived as a community that did one march a year[189].

From 2004 until the termination of the alliance between the Turkish state institutions and *Hizmet* movement in 2013, the activities of the two sides complemented each other in the United States, particularly in the area of ethnic lobbying and the propagation of Islam and Turkish culture. Emerging as an alternative and a possible substitute to the already existing Kemalist civil society pillar previously assumed by ATS and ATAA, *Hizmet* movement grew its outreach immensely in a very short period of time, under the support of embassy, as well as Turkish parliamentarians, ministers, governors who paid regular visits to its institutions. As of 2013, the ongoing clash in Turkey is also reproduced in the United States: while *Hizmet* movement continues its lobbying practices, this time encountering Turkish state and government, the AKP government attempts to isolate the movement from its resources and grassroots base by advocating for the closure of its institutions.

While the mounting and receding of relations between the Turkish state and *Hizmet* movement occupied much of the relational sphere between home state and civil society in the last 15 years, the interactions with the traditional federations continued. In parallel with the Turkish state's overall perspective of broadening the civil society dialogue and organizing diasporic settings, there have been attempts by the federations in the United States to consolidate in their day-to-day activities, momentous events or the advocating for/against *causes celebres*. Beginning with 2012, ATAA started to expand the co-organizers committee of its Annual National Turkish American Convention, to include deep-seated FTAA as well as Turkish American Community Center (TACC), whose presence in the United States has been reinforced by the Turkish state over the post-2000 period. In his message to before ATAA's 32nd Annual National Turkish American Convention, former President of Turkey

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189 Interview with the author, New York, April 18, 2013.

Abdullah Gül reminded the role of associations in complementing the inter-governmental politics and the expectation of solidarity in diversity:

> The exceptional roles of the Turkish Community and Turkish American Associations in fostering relations between the United States and Turkey are highly important. We closely follow your activities aiming to promote the ties between the Turkish American peoples, and appreciate your efforts to enhance the profile and effectiveness of the Turkish American Community. The Turkish American organizations and Turkish citizens living in the United States are obliged to share responsibility to take appropriate actions to voice our key priorities in foreign policy to the U.S. Administration, the Congress and the American public. I deeply trust that the Turkish American community will fulfill this task successfully, excelling in all aspects of American social life including politics, and engaging and cultivating successful Turkish American leaders. The noteworthy cooperation and collaboration within the Turkish-American community is a clear indicator of the spirit of the unity and solidarity Turkish Americans passed down through generations to our own time. Our country and the Turkish Americans in the United States have lofty visions and ideals and living up to these visions and ideals require not only hard work but also acts of altruism on the part of the individual for the welfare of our nation[190].

Following its success in bringing the three federations together in the 32nd Annual Convention, ATAA had enlarged its framework with the support of the Turkish state to include other co-organizers to create what it entitled as a "Davos-like" organization, except for the associations under the *Hizmet* movement that planned alternative events. The convention in 2013 brought together 12 federations, including Turkic federations, lobbying organizations, business and scientist associations[191]. Similar to Abdulla Gül's notes for the 32nd Annual Convention, former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a message for the event, emphasizing their expectation of Turkish Americans' integration in the American society:

> As the Turkish Government, we have always considered and will continue to consider the Non-Governmental Organizations as among the main actors in the realization of our foreign policy goals in line with our national interests. This is, at the same time, a requisite of our modern, peaceful, visionary and proactive foreign policy understanding. In this regard, witnessing the activities that you undertake with a common understanding, in unity and solidarity further strengthens our optimism for the future. I would like to particularly underline the pioneering role of Turkish community in the U.S. in this regard. I would also like to underscore that I attach importance to the efforts of new generation Turkish-

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[190] 32rd Annual Conference, Think Globally, Act Locally, Leadership for Heritage Community Empowerment. Brochure. 2012. "Turkish President's Message."

[191] The list of participants in 2013 included: ATAA, FTAA, TACC, Azerbaijani-American Council (AAC), American Friends of Turkey (AFOT), Azerbaijan Society of America (ASA), Ahıska Turkish American Community Center (ATACC), American Turkish Council (ATC), Turkish American Business Association (TABA/AmCham), Turkish American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TACCI), Turkish American Scientists and Scholars Association (TASSA), Turkish Coalition of America (TCA).

> Americans to integrate themselves with American society and to play a more efficient role in both social and political life, while preserving their ties with their own culture[192].

The messages by the former President and the Prime Minister comply with the Turkish state's policy on non-resident citizens that has been developed in the post-2003, as I had discussed in Chapter 7. The speeches include references to certain key notions, which have been recurrently used in a variety settings by different policy actors: social upgrading and active citizenship ("enhancing the profile and effectiveness of the community", "excelling in all aspects of social life", "integrating in the American society and playing a more efficient role"), responsibilization ("sharing responsibility to take appropriate actions", "altruism"), state-civil society dialogue ("the non-governmental organizations as among the main actors… in line with our national interests"), maintenance of the "indigenous" culture ("preserving ties with their own culture"). In addition, the two messages highlight the role of creating a diasporic community ("unity and solidarity", "common understanding") in which existing diversities are quieted for the sake of advocating for national interest.

There has been another yet subtler shift in relation with the home state's non-resident citizen agenda in the United States over the most recent years. As I had previously discussed in Chapter 6 by citing Karpat (2008), beginning with the 1980s there has been a diversification of the emigrant populations from Turkey in the U.S., and the emergence of new communitarian structures congregated around grassroots organizations. In the past, the accessibility of the consular service or the federations to the individuals at the grassroots level was managed by the mediation of the executive members of the associations in which they participated[193]. For instance, in the 1990s one of the main topics of debate between FTAA and ATAA was the support of FTAA over grassroots movement while the continuation of ATAA's elitist agenda that could did not reach out to the community in the wider sense. Over the recent years, there have been direct relations established both by the representatives from the foreign mission (ranging from the ambassador at the top to the religious, cultural or education attachés on the lower levels) and the executive members of the federations and organizations with agendas at the national scale. These new practices of relationship are established through participating at the specific events organized by the associations; inviting them to the national celebrations, seminars or significant events; organizing new events specifically designed for certain groups (i.e. entrepreneurs, students,

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[192] 33rd Annual Conference and 2013 Turkish American National Convention. Brochure. 2012. "Turkish Prime Minister's Message."

[193] Interview with the author, New York, November 7, 2014.

etc.). It also entails easing of accessibility to organized events, such as reducing the price of gala dinners, which could reach over hundreds of dollars in the past[194]. According to one of the executive members of ATAA, the new interest in reaching out to grassroots has developed isolated from the home state agenda, but over time it complemented its new policies:

> In 1999 and 2000 I set up two soccer clubs, Maryland FC and Anatolia FC Soccer Club, it was pretty elaborate. We were connected and concerned about bringing everybody together, doctors, engineers, plumbers, you name it, everyone together for soccer practice. After the games we would drink beer and chat. I found polarizations back then very dangerous and stereotypic among Turks. This idea about solidarity within diversity – this was how it was manifested [with the soccer clubs]. In 2007, I started taking it to civil society level, I had heard that ATAA and Istanbul people were elitists; they had no dialogue with Anatolian Turk and looked down at them. […] We made things affordable, to share our knowledge and benefit from their manpower and population and passion, and become like an American heritage group. We had our soccer game and civil society organizations. We can't force everyone to go or not go to mosque. […] This was not an AKP inspiration but a commonsense logical approach. Later as I matured understanding AKP policy better, I noticed how easy it was to walk into AKP headquarters. Going to the other political parties was through a major security clearance. That got my interest: the user friendliness. I also talked with American diplomats and states people who tried to understand Turkey. […] I got to see that grassroots outreach was substantial and heartfelt. I had never seen that in my own community: it was, everyone on their own. […] Tremendously weak community engagement. [But] tremendous passion in the word sense, in parliamentary system and western lifestyle. Just take, take and take, never invest. *Hazıra dağ dayanmaz*[195]. People were withdrawing funds from Atatürk fund but not investing in it. […] Going to grassroots, to *Sultan Eyüp*, I don't know the proper names of the mosques, it is totally about recruiting people in an American dream of solidarity in our diversity, Turkish American empowerment, giving them moral support and tools. […] That was the point of going to the mosque. I was received very well, so hospitable and kind. All the women made a sound like *la la la*, *ötüyor gibi*, sound like birds. Many of them clapped, these were elderly, their heads were covered, and I could tell that they were from Anatolia but not the metropolis of Turkey. It was still divided; men were divided on side and women on the other side. It was very respectful and down to earth. I felt very welcomed[196].

The quote above illustrates the new objective of reaching out to wider masses through direct involvement. The conference that was mentioned in the statement had taken place in *Eyüp Sultan Cami* in Brooklyn, New York, in November 2014, with the title of "Defense of our national and moral values and the role of youth", with the presence of Consul of New York, Turkey's religious counselor in Washington, religious attaché of New York, the executive

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[194] Interviews with the author, Washington D.C., November 20, 2014; Washington D.C., December 5, 2014.
[195] Mountains won't endure on what lies ready.
[196] Interview with the author, Washington D.C., December 4, 2014.

members of a number of associations and the congregation of the mosque[197]. The event was a part of ATAA's Turkish American Broad Advocacy Network (TABAN, grassroots) project, which had been introduced to the former Prime Minister and the top members of the second cabinet of Erdoğan during their visit to the ATAA in 2009[198]. Aiming to leave behind the elitist appearance of the traditional federations and of the Turkish state, the new relationship pattern also reflects the general agenda of building a strong diasporic community or an ethnic lobby, which translate into two main aspects in relation with the American politics: (1) sustaining block voting, and (2) ability to fundraise for the political campaigns.

Another outlet to reach wider masses emerges as the *hemşeri* (hometown) associations, such as the ones founded by the emigrants who had arrived from the city of Giresun in Turkey. In her analysis of hometown associations from Turkey in Germany, Çağlar (2006: 11-12) argues that the rapid growth of homeland associations and their new entanglements with the home state institutions, through municipalities or local governments, illustrates the sub-national forms of political activity, that goes beyond the traditional hierarchies of global-national-regional-local. Hence, Çağlar (2006: 16) discusses that hometown associations are also becoming a part of the new geographies of state intervention and of rescaling processes in line with the neoliberal globalization. In the case of the United States, the linkages maintained across the homeland associations and the local representations of the home state have become a part of the post-2000 transformation, positioning the sub-national entities in the transnational politicization. As such, during our interview an executive member of one of the *Giresunlu* hometown associations, *Türk Amerikan Giresunlular Derneği* (Turkish American Giresuns Organization, TAGD) explained to me that the association was founded in 2007, following the visit of the governor of Giresun, who stressed that the locals from the region had to establish an association in order to "swing the flag of *Giresunlu* during marches"[199]. The contacts between the hometown associations founded by regionals of Giresun and the local governors continued over the years, with the governors' visits to the United States.

The altering role of the sub-national entities for the home state does not remain only at the level of local-local network building, but as discussed by Çağlar (2006) goes beyond the

[197] TurkishNY. 2014. "New York'ta 'Milli ve manevi değerlerimizin savunulması' konferansı." November 10. http://www.turkishny.com/special-news/56-special-news/165714-new-yorkta-milli-ve-manevi-degerlerimizin-savunulmasi-konferansi#.VrHzgVKvUt8.

[198] ATAA. 2009. "Turkish PM Erdoğan meets with ATAA leadership." December 16. http://www.ataa.org/press/prl_1216109.html.

[199] Interview with the author, New York, November 11, 2014.

typical hierarchies of geographical scale. Hometown communitarianism permits accessibility to wider masses at the local scale for the reinforcement of building ethnic blocks in the grander scales in the host country. In the recent years local associations have another connotation for the political entrepreneurs in the U.S., one that aims at taking a stronger position in the localities. For instance, in January 2013, Lydia Borland, a lobbyist contractor representing Turkey, spoke at a number of seminars entitled "Our role in Turkish American relations", organized by FTAA in Paterson, in the headquarters of *Paterson Türk Amerikan Toplumu* (Paterson Turkish American Society), *Karaçay Türk Cami ve Kültür Derneği* (Karaçay Turks Mosque and Culture Inc.), *Türk Amerikan Giresunlular Derneği*. According to an article by *Gurbetçi Giresun Gazetesi* (Emigrant Giresun Newspaper), the seminar questioned how Turkish community could get stronger in the United States. During the event, Borland emphasized that the local activities were crucial for the lobbying activities managed at Capitol Hill, and that local associations could aid through getting establishing links with the congressmen and senators[200]. Similar to the mosques and the associative structures built around them, the local and hometown associations create specific forms of identification in a community, and complement the political initiatives at the national scale. In the following sections, I will elaborate more on the lobbying aspect of home state-emigrant relations.

Dialogue with the New Diaspora Institution

In Chapters 7 and 8, I had examined the foundation of Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (YTB) as what is in the literature called as the "new diaspora institution", specifically for engaging with the emigrant populations living abroad. In the United States, the activities of YTB has begun by supports to civil society organizations through funding of the recurrent events by traditional associations and then extended to support new initiatives. In the period of 2011-2013, the YTB funding to the civil society organizations in the United States reached 1.3 million TL. During this period, the Presidency supported ATAA's 33rd Annual Convention and Turkish American National Leadership Conference in Washington D.C., which included the broadest representation of Turkish Americans, with over 10 Turkish and Turkic American national organizations. The Presidency funded Turkish Day Parade in New York organized by FTAA in 2013 and managed the creation of Turkey's promotion in the Grand Central Terminal, on Turkish arts, culture and cuisine. In the period of 2012-2013, the Presidency also supported the educational

[200] Gurbetçi Giresun Gazetesi. 2013. "Aktivist Lydia Borland Giresunlulara hitap etti." January 29. http://www.gurbetcigiresun.eu/aktivist-lydia-borland-giresunlulara-hitap-etti-11549-haberi.

projects of Atatürk School in New York and of Turkish Cultural Center in the eastern states of the United States[201]. In 2014, YTB funding to the United States was recorded as 415.200 TL[202], including the funding of 1st Turkish American Lawyers Conference.

In the United States, the members of the Advisory Committee on Turkish Citizens Abroad established in 2012 included some of the former members of the previous advisory committee, such as Ali Çınar and Ergun Kırlıkovalı, as well as new representatives from the ATAA and FTAA framework, Mehmet Çelebi (from Chicago, representing ATAA) and Mehmet Durmuş (representing FTAA). In addition to these members who characterized certain continuity to the previous structure, new members were added in 2012 as the representatives of the newly established federations. These new members included Adem Büyükacar (Turkish American Community Center, TACC), Faruk Taban (Turkic American Alliance, TAA), Haluk Ünal (Turkish American Scientists and Scholars Association, TASSA) and Sevil Özışık (Turkish American Chamber of Commerce and Industry, TACCI and American Regional Committee of the World Turkish Business Council, DTIK). The honorary members of the Advisory were elected as Muhtar Kent and Merve Kavakçı İslam, two noteworthy figures related to Turkish politics and the state policies on emigrants. The Chairman and CEO of Coca-Cola International, Muhtar Kent has been an active political entrepreneur in the early 2010s in the dissemination of the concepts of "Turkish diaspora" and "lobbying" under his advisory position to YTB as well as DTIK. Upon its establishment, the advisory council was publicized in Turkey with the image of Muhtar Kent, as the representative of the wider diaspora that aimed to be constructed by the Turkish state:

> I thank our Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for handing me over this role. As always, civil society and the state have to work in cooperation in the scope of bringing Turkey to higher positions that it deserves and to answer the questions of Turkish citizens who live abroad. […] We have to spread Turkish lobby abroad. We have to pay high attention to make Turkish diaspora to become one of the most affective diaspora in the world with continuous diaspora strategies. We need to give a helping hand to Turkish entrepreneurs who are all over the world[203].

Kent approached the issue mainly from the perspective of development and entrepreneurship in the political arenas, which would translate to the creation of a strong Turkish lobby in the overseas, in the collaboration of civil society and the state. Nevertheless, over a period of one

[201] Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı. 2013. "İMECE. Sivil Toplum Destekleri." Broşür.
[202] Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı. 2014. "YTB Sivil Toplum Destekleri. 2014 Proje Seçkileri." Broşür.
[203] Anadolu Ajansı. 2013. "Muhtar Kent has a new role for Turkish diaspora." January 14. http://aa.com.tr/en/turkey/muhtar-kent-has-a-new-role-for-turkish-diaspora/285896.

year this publicization campaign has seceded, as a result of the emerging conflicts between various civil society actors and the home state. The second honorary member embodied a symbolic transformation in the state ideology, from the traditional republican Kemalism to the new conservatism in the post-AKP period. A former politician of Islamist *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party), Merve Kavakçı İslam had been precluded in 1999 from taking her oath in the parliamentary swear-in ceremony due to her headscarf and later followed by her losing her seat in the parliament for failing to disclose her American citizenship. Following her winning of the related case in the European Court of Human Rights, Kavakçı İslam had become an outspoken critic of Turkey's secular system, as well as a consultant for U.S. Congress on the Muslim world[204]. Kavakçı İslam's participation in the advisory committee as an honorary member was recognized in the media as a restoration of honor[205], reflecting the transformations in the state ideology during the AKP era.

In the United States, where the relations between the home state and the civil society subsisted since the 1980s through regular contacts, material and symbolic supports to the projects, the perception towards the new diaspora institution has differed from the French case where the committee had created a kind of epistemic community. During my interviews with the current members of the advisory committee, I was reminded that YTB was a new institution that needed to develop and that the committee was in its early days, not yet able to create a synergy between the involved actors[206]. Moreover, the ongoing tensions between the *Hizmet* movement and the AKP government in Turkey has also impeded the sustainability of a sound advisory committee, since one of its members has been a representative from *Gülenist* Turkic American Alliance. Therefore, the implementation of the newly generated regime for the non-resident citizens has not been isolated from the day-to-day politics.

Laying Claims over the Ideological Apparatus

As I had discussed in Chapter 6, the arrival of *Diyanet* to the United States in the mid-1990s has been relatively late compared to its establishment in the European geography, which had happened as a response to the emerging "threat of oppositional Islam". This had been related to the highly secular characteristic of the emigrant population of the pre-1980 period, their dispersal around the wide American lands without creating strong communitarian structures

[204] Aljazeera. 2015. "16 yıl sonra Kavakçı ismi yeniden." May 2. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/16-yil-sonra-kavakci-ismi-yeniden.
[205] Gazetevatan. 2012. "Kavakçı'ya onur üyeliği!" December 29. http://www.gazetevatan.com/kavakci-ya-onur-uyeligi--502828-gundem/.
[206] Interviews with the author, New York, November 7, 2014; New York, November 25.

in the country. Despite the influx of new groups of Turkish citizens in the 1980s, who differed from the typical "brain drain" migrants, the arrival of *Diyanet* in the 1990s remained as a first and not-so-effective attempt of the Turkish state to relate with at least some of its non-resident citizens under Islam. In the 2000s, the Turkish state expanded *Diyanet*'s presence in the United States, by increasing the number of religious officials and supporting the establishment of new mosques under *Türk Amerikan Diyanet Vakfı* (Turkish American Religious Foundation, TARF). As of 2014, *Diyanet*'s institutional outreach took place through one religious counselor, one attaché, and 20 religious officials, primarily positioned in the Northeastern States. Together with the mosques established by the Turkish citizens and members of other Turkic communities, 15 mosques and cultural centers were appended under the institutional framework of *Diyanet.* The majority of the new *Diyanet* mosques that belonged to Turkish citizens were either established or reconstructed since 2009, with the support of Turkish *Diyanet.* The mosque established by *Diyanet* in 1993 in Maryland, which also shelters Turkish American Community Center (TACC) is currently under construction as a grand community project and is projected to include a mosque, cultural center, fellowship hall, traditional Turkish bath and indoor sport facilities, convent monastry, museum of Islamic artifacts and traditional Turkish houses[207].

Today, *Diyanet* and the extension of its mosque program have a new meaning, compatible with the Turkish state's new proactive policy towards its citizens living in other countries. The mosque does not only serve to reach *hacı amca,* those who already are devout adherents of Islam, but also others who are interested in becoming affiliated under its umbrella, not only to practice religion but also to become a part of an ethnic community in the United States. Mosque and the cultural center built around it emerge as new venues sheltering cultural associations, some of which did not have a physical locale to maintain stability. Similar to the situation in France during the 1980s, the exportation of "state Islam" under the roof of *Diyanet* also acts as a response to the alternative community structures, which have emerged in the 2000s in the United States under the roof of *Hizmet* movement. Hence, the mosque and its institutions do not only provide religious services (worship, education of religion and ethics, and Quran courses) but also engage in counseling in the daily lives of the individuals or under unpredicted situations, such as death, sickness or divorce. Enlarging

[207] Interview with the author, Washington D.C., December 9, 2014.

Diyanet's primary goal of reaching citizens in the overseas, the centers also target the ethnic kin communities and Muslims of other origin countries[208].

In the area of education, there has been emerging area of contestation both over following and managing incoming students from Turkey to the United States, and over the education of second-generation. The first issue has been related to the steady increase in the student mobility from Turkey to the United States: from nearly 2,500 students in the mid-1980s to around 6,500 around mid-1990s and to more than 10,000 in the period that followed 2000. In 2014 and 2015, nearly 11,000 students from Turkey went for education in the United States, mainly for graduate studies[209]. During my fieldwork in the United States, two newly initiated foundations for students, which had undertaken the support Turkish state through regular contacts with ministers and representatives of the foreign mission, were aiming to occupy a strong position in this field. Founded by two youth foundations of Turkey affiliated with the AKP government, Ensar Foundation and *Türkiye Gençlik ve Eğitime Hizmet Vakfı* (The Foundation of Youth and Education in Turkey, TURGEV), Turken Foundation was established in 2014, providing low-price apartments for the Turkish students, and offering "a muslim community, networking events and conferences to tenants during their stay"[210]. The foundation extended its reach over a period of one year to second-generation high school students by cooperating in the establishment of Turkish theology schools, similar to *imam hatip* schools in Turkey, beginning with New Jersey and Brooklyn[211]. According to my interviews with the executive members of Turken Foundation and Turkish American Youth and Education Foundation (TAYEF), different from the students' associations founded in the earlier periods, the main target group of these associations were determined as students of lower socioeconomic profiles who were also employed in the irregular labor market. Both associations were engaged with the higher political agenda on ethnic lobbying ongoing in the U.S., and were aiming to expand the reach of Turkish Americans by consolidating the support of the incoming students. Finally, similar to the field of religion, the two associations

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[208] Interview with the author, Washington D.C., December 9, 2014.

[209] Institute of International Education. 2016. "Open Doors Data." Accessed February 4. "International students: All places of origin." http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/All-Places-of-Origin/2013-15; "International students: Academic level and place of origin." http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/By-Academic-Level-and-Place-of-Origin/2013-14.

[210] Turken Foundation. 2016. "Main." Accessed February 4. http://www.turkenfoundation.org/.

[211] TurkishNY. 2014. "Türken Vakfı'ndan Türk okulları projesi." October 18. http://www.turkishny.com/usa-life/87-usa-life/163945-turken-vakfindan-turk-okullari-projesi#.VrMaJVKvUt8.

were aiming to take a position against the oppositional politicization of *Hizmet* movement in the field of education, concentrating particularly on religious education[212].

In this section I looked into the symbolic practices and the institution-building mechanisms of the Turkish state's emigrant engagement regime and how these have taken place in the United States, in relation with the interactions with the emigrant communities. Different from the previous epoch, the post-2003 period was marked by a broadening in the interactive arena between the state institutions and the emigrant communities; from a Kemalist compliance on high-level political affairs to reaching out to the grassroots –including emigrant who have both arrived before and after the 1980s. This change in the state's approach towards the emigrant communities was also absorbed by the members of the emigrant elite who have maintained their pro-statist position despite their potential inconsistencies in terms of the ideological aspect with the home country government. This period has also seen the increasing role of the religious agenda in the practices of engagement with the emigrants, primarily coordinated under the newly expanding *Diyanet* framework.

9.2. Rules of Engagement for Non-Resident Citizens of Turkey

In Chapter 6, I had argued that ethnic lobbying occupied a central place in the relations between the Turkish state and the emigrant elites in the United States since the 1980s. In the post-2003 period, the political participation and lobbying remained as critical for the home state and its agenda of social uplifting emigrant communities, who are now expected to act as a larger community, with closer ties to one another, as well as with a stronger association with the home country. In this section, I examine how the propagation on active citizenship and political participation has taken place in practice, and what have been the outcomes of this approach on the interactions between the state and societal actors.

Active Citizenship and Participation

In the United States, where dual citizenship is not *de jure* recognized or encouraged but tolerated, migrants can easily gain citizenship status or keep their legal ties with their origin country. According to the officials from the Turkish embassy, there are no official data on people who hold dual citizenship, however it is estimated that about one third of the Turkish citizens are also citizens of the United States. It has been also declared that in addition to the

[212] Interviews with the author, New York, November 14, 2014; New York, November 25, 2014.

nearly 195,000 Turkish citizens who were registered to the embassy in 2014, there were 30-40% of more citizens from Turkey who were unregistered and had left behind their institutional affairs with the Turkish state[213]. In the 2010s, there has been a novel interest to survey the existing population in the United States. One of the initiatives has been ATAA's national campaign in partnership with the U.S. Census Bureau entitled *Say Türk* (Count Turk), to count people of Turkish and Turkic heritage throughout America. With the project, which began in 2009, the individuals who filled in the American census were requested to reply to the question on race as "white" and writing "Turk" in the area where the person also held some other race[214]. In line with the overall lobbying approach that is implemented by some Turkish Americans, which targets at blending Turkish citizens with ethnic Turks of other origin countries, this initiative aimed at surveying an ethnically defined community. Another registration campaign has taken place over the electoral period for Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015. The electoral registration involved the citizens' individual declaration about their current residency in the United States and their place of residence that needed to be confirmed by the presentation of their identity cards from Turkey. These new practices of data accumulation, at times organized by the support of civil society, are a part of the home state's new citizenry regime, which attempts to control over the populations that are living remote from its own territories. The statistics on ethnicity or nationality do not simply measure the existing status or the progress; they also serve for the production of identity and the comparison of scale in contrast to other rival groups.

As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, the empowerment of the dual citizen status of emigrants in the host countries in the post-2000 period comprised of solidifying their citizenship ties between Turkey, as well as advancing their position in the host society. Although the advocacy for acquisition to host country citizenship had incrementally begun in the mid-1980s, its espousing by the citizens of Turkey had taken place at later periods in the French case, despite the availability of dual citizenship. In the case of the United States, there has been a similar temporal lag, as stated by one of the interviewees of this dissertation:

> I didn't become an American citizen for a long time. Nüzhet Kandemir [Ambassador of Turkey in 1989-1998] had told us to become citizens. Elekdağ had also told us to become

[213] Interview with the author, Washington D.C., December 5, 2014.
[214] ATAA. 2010. "ATAA SayTurk Kampanyası. 2010 Nüfus Sayımı'nda kendini saydır 'Türk'üm' de ne mutlu 'Türk'üm diyene." March 19. http://www.ataa.org/press/prl_0311901.html.

> citizens but, there was this romantic approach of not betraying the country, we were still Turkish citizens[215].

The feeling of "betraying the home country" was compatible with the still existing approach of the Turkish state of the 1980s, about permanent emigrants' alienation from the home state and society. In the post-2000 period, naturalization in the host country is deemed as a part of becoming a potent and active member of both home and host societies. An executive member of *Türk Amerikan Giresunlular Derneği* (TAGD) in Edgewater, New Jersey argued that the acquisition of American citizenship was a novel interest among the Turkish citizens, which was encouraged by their association:

> We gave citizenship courses to the elderly in 100 questions. They do not speak English but they learned them by heart and passed. The first generation that came to the U.S. did not want to become American citizens. He thought about working and going back to the country. He imprisoned himself to the petrol stations or by becoming pizza boy. When I came here in the end of 1995, there was a person who had lived here for the past 7 years and never learned the name of his street. Now his wife came, the new generation began going to school, so they say now let's be citizens, let's enter politics. It would have been better if they had done it in the 1980 or 1985[216].

The promotion of citizens from Turkey that are deemed as successful in political, economic, academic, social and cultural arenas is a part of the reproduction of Turkish identity in the United States. As I had discussed in Chapter 6, the encouragement for representation of the Turkish identity was a part of the Turkish embassy's project of reconstructing Turkishness in the 1980s, to replace the common practice of hiding it during integration in the American society. Initially, this reconstruction was coupled with the exposition of "Turkey's punch lines" such as the Korean War or Süleyman the Magnificent, followed later by the thrusting forward successful figures among the community, such as Ahmet Ertegün or Arif Mardin. In the recent years, these campaigns continue with the promotion of Turkish Americans successful in different arenas, through ATAA's annual Turkish American National Conventions, Turkish Coalition of America and Turkish Coalition USA PACs' listings of Turkish Americans who are running or were elected to political offices[217], or the lists by

[215] Interview with the author, Washington D.C., November 20, 2014.
[216] Interview with the author, New York, November 22, 2014.
[217] Turkish Coalition of America. 2016. "Turkish Americans elected to political office." Accessed January 28. http://www.tc-america.org/turkish-american-community/turkish-americans-elected-to-political-office-176.htm; TC-USA PAC. 2016. "Turkish Americans running for public offices in 2012." Accessed February 4. http://www.tenthousandturks.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=66&Itemid=69.

Turkish American media platforms of the prominent figures with themes such as "The 50 most influential Turkish Americans"[218].

In the field of political participation, there has been an emerging interest among emigrants from Turkey in the 2000s to actively involve in the American local and national political settings. This new appeal differs from practices of participation in the political offices, which take place in localities not populated by Turkish Americans and therefore do not aim to attract the support of a community (Karpat 2008). For instance, Osman Bengur, a second generation Turkish American and the first candidate to run for congress from Democratic Party in 2005, organized fundraising activities and sought for support during his candidacy through the network made available by the associative federations (Akçapar 2005: 86; Kaya 2003). The same year Jak Karako ran for New York Municipal Council membership and his campaign was supported by the policy entrepreneurs who emphasized his Turkish identity (Şanlıer Yüksel 2008: 123). The list has expanded over the last years to include new candidates who are using the available community outlets in the areas populated by emigrants from Turkey, including Derya Taşkın, former president of Paterson Turkish American Society, who has been named deputy mayor of Paterson in early 2016.

As I had discussed in Chapter 6, the formation of ethnic lobbying among the members of the Turkish-American conflict had occupied a central position in the Turkish state's relations with the members of the civil society actors since the early 1980s. A main objective has been to counter-act against the rival ethnic groups with migration histories from Anatolia, namely the Greek and the Armenian, particularly during periods of high political stress related to Turkey's domestic or foreign policy issues, such as the intervention to Cyprus or the entering of bills related to the naming of the 1915 events as genocide at the U.S. Congress. These high-level political issues continued to have greatly challenging results for the possibility of establishing sociability of the ethnic Turks with the Greek or the Armenian populations that lived in the United States, mainly in the regions where one of the two communities dominated the population, such as in California. Since the establishment of the Congressional Caucus on Turkey and Turkish Americans in 2001, as a bi-partisan platform to focus on US-Turkey relations and issues concerning Turkish Americans, there have been attempts by the federations to raise the support of congress members to participate in the caucus. During the mid-2000s, the increased inclination towards lobbying in the U.S. has been related to the

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[218] Turk of America. 2014. "The 50 most influential Turkish Americans." April 23. http://www.turkofamerica.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1591&Itemid=172.

establishment of the Congressional Caucus and of the continuity of ATAA's grassroots lobbying practices; however, the main force triggering the rapid bolstering of lobbying has been the result of the professionalization of the issue of lobbying by *Hizmet* movement and Turkish Coalition of America.

Beginning with Rumi Forum (established in 1999) and later assumed by Turkic American Alliance (TAA) and its component organizations, *Hizmet* movement has undertaken initiatives to reach out to policy makers and gatekeepers in support of the Turkish state until 2013. The movement's practices of reaching out have been recognized as unprecedented during my interviews, both by civil society actors and the diplomats. It has also bolstered the overall performance on lobbying of the Turkish state (in terms of professional institutional lobbying) and of the grassroots lobbying practices of other existing groups. The Annual Turkic American Conventions and Gala organized by TAA since 2010 where key political figures from the U.S. politics and Turkey took turn in speaking in welcoming the work of the organization are illustrative of its sudden outreach[219]. As discussed before, the sudden rupture between the *Hizmet* movement and the Turkish government has resulted to a shift of movement's lobbying efforts in the U.S. towards criticizing the AKP government as well as concentrating on other Turkic countries and their concerns on energy and security.

Since 2007, the efforts on lobbying were also bolstered with the establishment of two organizational platforms focusing primarily on this issue: Turkish Coalition of America and Turkish American Political Action Committees. Founded in 2007 by Turkish American businesspersons Yalçın and Serpil Ayaslı, Turkish Coalition of America is a 501(3)(c) organization, which has the mission of helping educate general American public about Turkey and Turkish Americans, as well as engaging Turkish Americans to cultivate politicians. The organization carries out civic consciousness seminars on issues affecting Turkish Americans; scholarship and internship programs on political science, public administration and communication; news dissemination on critical issues and activities of the population; organizing educational and cultural tours as well as establishing sister city relationships between Turkey and the U.S. TCA occupies a new position in the area of lobbying, differing from the ATAA with its non-membership institutional framework and professionalized staff[220].

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[219] Youtube. 2014. "1st Annual Turkic American Convention." January 22. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTMmp-Pcv30.

[220] Interviews with the author, Washington D.C., December 9, 2014.

In parallel with the foundation of TCA, the first Turkish American Political Action Committee (PAC)[221] was founded in 2007, as a separate lobbying entity, in relation but with a “firewall” to the TCA. As of 2016, there are five Turkish American PACs: Turkish Coalition USA PAC, TC-New Jersey PAC, TC-California PAC, TC-Midwest PAC and TurkishPAC in Texas. According to TCA, the personal outreach to members of congress and the donations of the Turkish PACs help the growth of the Congressional Turkey Caucus, impacting the legislation concerning Turkey. This situation has also reflected on the numbers, whereas the number of caucus members increased from 62 at the 109th Congress in 2006 to 152 in the 114th Congress in 2015-2016[222]. An active executive member in Turkish Coalition New Jersey PAC, who was a former executive member of FTAA and a member of YTB’s advisory committee argued that the efforts at the Capitol Hill had become a significant part of Turkish Americans’ political endeavors in the U.S.:

> We have efforts to reach congress members and senators. We organize fundraising activities, because the American political life is organized through money. They listen to you based on how much you support their campaigns. We are lobbying for the development of Turkish American relations. We make regular visits if there are bills against Turkey, or support the ones that are in our favor. From time to time American congress members and senators go to Turkey; they ask us how they should approach the members of the parliament or the president. In the past, we used to follow them, now they are trying to reach us. […] Through PACs we have the possibility to say that as the Turkish lobby we fundraised this much. This year [2014] we reached record high with 325 thousand dollars of fundraising. The Turkish state uses 1.8 million dollars per year for two lobbying firms. The Turkish diaspora is very crucial, there is a difference between an ambassador or a consul, meeting with the representatives, and me going to the members as an electorate and saying that I am a citizen of your district[223].

In a similar vein, Oya Bain, an executive member at ATAA wrote for the internet news outlet TurkishNY.com in 2014, that they were aiming to reach one representative at every congressional district, in order to increase the political force of the Turkish Americans in the future:

[221] A key part of American political system since 1944, PACs have the purpose of raising and distributing campaign funds to candidates seeking political office. Different from the nonprofit organizations that cannot provide direct funding to candidates, PACs enable fundraising to political candidates in the name of certain interest groups.

[222] Turkish Coalition of America. 2016. “Turkish American political activism.” Accessed February 4. http://www.tc-america.org/issues-information/turkish-american-community/turkish-american-political-activism-786.htm; Turkish Coalition of America. 2016. “Members of the Caucus on U.S.- Turkey relations & Turkish Americans.” Accessed February 4. http://www.tc-america.org/in-congress/caucus.htm.

[223] Interview with the author, New York, November 7, 2014.

> There are activities that can be results beyond the good intentions talks that we have been doing for years. The most successful result is the existence of 148 members in the Turkish Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives today. These 48 members are representing 42 of the 50 states of America. […] Two months ago the presidents of World Turkish Business Council came to Washington came to Washington. They told about their efforts to unite the society, and particularly the businessmen in many countries populated by Turks. […] They asked what kind of a system they should use in America. ATAA stressed that the best way to strengthen the voice of the society in America was to determine conscious and enterprising Turks and Turkish businessmen who can become leaders in the every one of 435 congressional districts. Determining the Turkish businessmen in America's every district will increase the political force of Turks, since the representatives take the foreground in the economic development of their region[224].

During my interviews in the United States, I was reminded many times of the Turkish state's perception about the emigrant society as an exemplar to the other emigrant groups in the overseas, that was created based on their performance on lobbying. The performance of the civil society activists is being promoted in Turkey and in the overseas via meetings bringing experts and activists together with the lobbying enthusiasts. One of such meetings took place in 2011, when the former Minister of EU Affairs Egemen Bağış, who was himself a former president of FTAA presented his speech on "Lobbying and civil society organizations based on the case of United States" in a meeting organized by YTB[225]. In another event organized in Melbourne, Australian Turkish Advocacy Alliance invited former president of ATAA to share expertise on lobbying in the U.S., with the support of Consul General of Turkey in Melbourne. While the Turkish state's financial and symbolic support towards the emigrant communities expanded their opportunities to become empowered in the issue of ethnic lobbying in the United States, the emigrants' own practices have also served the Turkish state to diffuse the prevailing practices on lobbying in the domestic arena, as well as among the members of the emigrant political entrepreneurs in other geographies. The sharing of experience through a variety of networks corresponds with the interest of creating an epistemic community that can have accessibility to know-how and resources through transnational spaces.

Voting and Monitoring from Overseas

In the area of political participation, the availability of extra-territorial enfranchisement is a crucial mechanism for the maintenance of institutional and citizenship ties between the home

[224] Oya Bain. 2014. "435 Türk aranıyor." TurkishNY. September 22. http://www.turkishny.com/oya-bain/28-oya-bain/161765-435-turk-araniyor#.VqtStVKvUt8.

[225] AK Parti. 2011. "Lobicilik ve STK'lar toplantısında konuştu." October 18. https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/lobicilik-ve-stklar-toplantisinda-konustu/14553#1.

state and the emigrant community. As I had discussed in the previous chapter, the first national election available to non-resident Turkish citizens was in 2014, following the amendments in the electoral law in 2012. During my fieldwork in the United States, I was able to follow two elections related to Turkey: the repercussions after August 2014 presidential elections and the preparations for the parliamentary elections that were going to be held in June 2015. Similar to the situation in France, the first elections in summer were considered as a disappointment both by the diplomats and the citizens, due to low turnout rates and the difficulties that were faced related to the appointment system. In the United States, among a total of 88,555 registered voters in 36 ballots, only 10,450 voters (11.8%) had cast their votes. With their overall secular republican position close to CHP, the majority of the community voters among the emigrants from Turkey to the United States voted for the joint candidate of CHP and MHP, with a strong 77.9% of the votes, followed by 15.9% for AKP's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and 6.2% for HDP's Selahattin Demirtaş. During the parliamentary elections in June 2015, the voter turnout increased significantly to 19.6% for a total of 90,747 voters, mainly in the consular area of New York (39%), Los Angeles (24%) and Washington (13%). While the majority of the votes were obtained by CHP (44.3%), they were followed by HDP (24%) and AKP (16.4%), showing similar results in all consular areas[226]. The results illustrated that the voting behavior was in the overall related to the ideological orientation of the voters, rather than a calculation based on rewarding the incumbent for putting into practice enfranchisement of non-resident citizens.

The establishment of party representations has occurred in parallel with the changes in the Turkish electoral law, except for the pro-Kurdish HDP (previously, BDP) that had its first representation abroad in the United States since 2012. The traditional umbrella organizations established by the Turkish Americans did not assume the role of party representatives, in an attempt to emphasize their non-partisan position in Turkish politics different from the case of France. Still, some of the other organizations were recognized for their proximity to the Turkish political parties; such as the Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research (SETA, Washington D.C.), Turkish American Businessman Association (MUSIAD, Washington D.C.), Turkish American Cultural Society's (formerly, *Herşey Türkiye İçin Platformu* – Everything for Turkey Platform, NJ) and New York *Giresunlular Derneği*'s (Giresun Association) close ties with the AKP, *Amerika Ülkü Ocakları*'s (America Idealist Foyer, Clifton, NJ) ties with the nationalist MHP and Kurdish American Association's ties

[226] Milliyet. 2016. "7 Haziran genel seçim." Accessed January 27. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/secim/2015/abd/.

with the HDP. The membership-based organizations among these cited ones differed from the deep-rooted associations in France, as they were established in the recent years or did not have strong grassroots mobilization. In relation with the low number of voters in the United States and their dispersal around the country, there have not been any rallies before the elections. Rather, small-scale meetings were organized by the party representatives or the affiliated associations, sometimes with the online participation by the party leaders in Turkey.

In her analysis on the expansion of expatriate voting rights towards extra-territorial voting in the Middle East and North Africa, Brand (2014) argues that the states in certain regime types may introduce or expand expatriate voting for political gains or easing their accessibility to the population for monitoring. Brand (2014: 62) maintains that despite the possibility of a strategic reasoning behind the expansion of rights, the process should be understood as an ongoing negotiation (or contestation) between the state regime and the members of the civil society, *if only* there is a civil society to support or guard the rights of the citizen population. The cases of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya illustrate that the civil society practices may extend the rights obtained through extraterritorial voting, such as reappropriating the public spaces (i.e. embassies and consulates) which have at worst been considered as centers coordinating surveillance, through helping to register voters or overseeing the ballot (2014: 62). The negotiation of the right and its implementation between the state and the society has also taken place during the election periods in the United States, as a result of the voters' lack of confidence in the reliability of electoral processes. One of the organizations that undertook voter monitoring was the American representation of the international movement *Gurbetin Oyları* (Votes of Emigrants), which was supported by a group of activists who participated to the support protests to *Gezi* movement in the U.S. during 2013. The voter monitoring campaign with *Gurbetin Oyları* began with the election of August 2014 as the overseas continuation of a massive campaign in Turkey aiming for higher voter turnout, transparency around individual candidates and independent electoral monitoring (Çelebi 2015: 73). In Washington D.C., Turkish Policy Center, established by a group of experts working on rule of law, sustainable economic development and human rights organized seminars and awareness raising activities before and after Turkish elections. *Gurbetin Oyları* and Turkish Policy Center's practices went beyond the traditional voting behavior, organizing surveillance towards state institutions, while at the same time maintaining their ties with these institutions. During their activism, both associations got in touch with the representatives of the foreign mission, as well as of the political parties' domestic and

international representatives, used the consulates or embassies to guard their citizenship rights, convenient with Brand's discussion of the reappropriating of public spaces[227]. These two cases also represented the institutionalization of emerging criticisms against the AKP government in its third term in the United States and the politicization of the secular republican emigrants around the topic of Turkish politics. The next section elaborates more on the rising political opposition in the U.S. against the Turkish government and the state institutions.

Transnationalization of Homeland Domestic Matters

The discussion on home state-emigrant society relations in this chapter distinguished up to this section from the French case for generally concentrating on on the "good relations", as well as a particular focus on "Turkish Americans" rather than "emigrants from Turkey in the United States", a term that would emphasize the ethnic diversity among the emigrant groups. As I had argued in Chapter 6 and some sections of this chapter, the overall characteristic of the emigrants from Turkey in the United States during modern Turkey and the nature of their transnational practices have been a crucial reason for this situation. The transnational practices within associative life in the United States, which had emerged already in the 1940s but grew significant over the 1980s, had aimed primarily at complementing the bilateral state relations, for both the side of the emigrants and of the Turkish state. The creation of the congressional caucus in 2001 with the title of "Congressional Caucus on Turkey and Turkish Americans" is a representation of this juxtaposition of the home state with the emigrant society, treated in relation to one another.

In this chapter, I also discussed the changes that took place during the post-2003 era, with the emergence of new tools and mechanisms for the home state to support its non-resident citizens to take position between home and host state affairs. From the policy perspective, these changes have been complementary with the global tendency towards home state's increased involvement towards their emigrants' affairs. From the perspective of politics, their implementation had taken place within the framework of AKP's new conservative and populist agenda, replacing the traditional Kemalist statecraft. In the United States, this reflected as an incompatibility between the AKP government's conservative nationalist agenda and the ideological position of the federations that were established with a strong Kemalist and secular perspective. According to the interviewees, this situation has been

[227] Interview with the author, New York, October 31, 2014; Washinton D.C., November 20, 2014.

attempted to be resolved by becoming involved in Turkey's foreign affairs, and particularly to the bills that had been presented at the U.S. Senate, without entangling in the domestic affairs, in order to avoid conflict within the federations and with the Turkish state. Nevertheless, some of the policy issues presented at the U.S. Senate as bills that held Turkey accountable, such as the reopening of Halki Seminary, accountability on Christian properties, recognition of the 1915 events as genocide, the freedom of press and internet have been very much related to Turkey's domestic affairs. In addition, two political episodes in Turkey; *Gezi* movement and the sudden rupture between *Hizmet* movement and the AKP government have led to the emergence of new politicizations around home country politics, and created a challenging environment to the pre-existing relationships, causing tensions among the members of the federations. During my fieldwork in 2014, these controversies, which were related to the new polarizations and the ambiguities in Turkey's domestic politics were reproducing uncertainties and tensions in the new relational sphere between the home state and the emigrant organizations.

In the rest of this section, I will discuss the transnationalization of homeland politics that has taken place following the *Gezi* movement. As I argued in Chapter 8, *Gezi* movement began in Turkey as an environmental protest in May 2013, which grew into a nation-wide civil unrest, getting a wide support from the international arena, particularly from among the members of the emigrant populations living in Europe and elsewhere. In the United States, support protests for *Gezi* movement took place in several major US cities including New York, Washington D.C., Austin, Boston and Chicago. In New York, it began with the gathering of a group of people in Zuccotti Park in early June, mainly with the participation of individuals rather than the strong presence of existing associations as in the case of France. Over time, the movement created its own collectivities. One of these was *Güç Birliği*, founded by a group of entrepreneurs who organized a fundraiser on crowd funding website of Indiegogo and collected over $100,000 in less than two days, to publish an anti-government ad on the New York Times. During the electoral period *Güç Birliği* acted as the American representation of *Gurbetin Oyları,* to monitor the voting process as discussed in the preceding section[228]. A second collectivity was *Gezi Platform NYC* (*Geziniyoruz*)*,* established by a group of mainly graduate students and academics who began organizing conferences, seminars and demonstrations on political incidents in Turkey after the settlement of *Gezi* protests in New York. Alienating itself from the Kemalist groups, *Gezi Platform NYC*

[228] Interview with the author, New York, October 31, 2014.

emerged as a platform following the political ideology of the pro-Kurdish HDP party and putting emphasis on democracy, rule of law and diversity in Turkey[229].

In the United States, the repercussions of social movements around supporting *Gezi* movement have led to the politicization among emigrant populations from Turkey and the emergence of new alliances and rivalries, similar to the case of France. While the main mass in the early days of the protests dissolved into different collectivities, the ones under *Güç Birliği* and *Gezi Platform NYC* persisted, leading into new and more institutionalized forms of mobilization. The platform around *Gezi Platform NYC* has led to the creation of a left movement, with an agenda strongly opposing against the home country government, in solidarity with the newly emerging Kurdish and Alevi groups: American Kurdish Association (and its website kurdslist.com, both established in 2004, in New Jersey) and *Amerika Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği* (Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Associates USA, established in 2010, in New Jersey). In 2014 and 2015, the three groups organized together commemorations and demonstrations on home country related matters in New York's Union Square, arranging meetings with invited politicians, journalists and academics from Turkey and elsewhere[230]. While the conflict with the Armenians predominated the majority of the political history of Turkish Americans since the 1980s, *Gezi Platform NYC* and American Kurdish Association became the first citizen groups from Turkey who supported the Armenian Americans, by participating to the centenarian anniversary of 24 April in 2015[231].

Another crucial repercussion of the demonstrations on *Gezi* movement was the creation of its adversaries, who supported a pro-government agenda in the United States. One week after the *Gezi* support protests, a group of Turkish American organizations[232] many of which were represented under the umbrella of FTAA organized a meeting in New York, criticizing *Gezi* protesters and the international media for reflecting a negative image of Turkey and the AKP government. The main organizers of the movement, which later institutionalized it under the name *Herşey Türkiye için Platformu* (Everything for Turkey) with the support taken from the Turkish Presidency, published a manifest indicating that they would act as a transnational

[229] Interviews with the author, New York, October 23, 2014.
[230] Interviews with the author, New York, November 4, 2014; New Jersey, December 15, 2014.
[231] Rudaw. 2015. "Amerika'daki Kürtler'den Ermeniler'e destek." April 23. http://rudaw.net/turkish/world/230420153.
[232] TurkishNY. 2013. "New York'ta 'Herşey Türkiye İçin' Mitingi Yapıldı." June 13. http://www.turkishny.com/headline-news/2-headline-news/125650-new-yorkta-hersey-turkiye-icin-mitingi-yapildi#.VriRWWR9568.

platform supporting the home country government[233]. The manifest elucidated the civil society reflections of the AKP government's policies towards non-resident citizens:

> As the Turkish American citizens with living in the United States with national and moral values we came together to reach objectives cited below. We are thinking that the state of the Republic of Turkey is under a crucial attack. Defending and transferring to the new generation of national and moral values that kept us together for decades is indispensable for our political association. […] We will do the below mentioned, with the condition of staying in Turkish and American legal boundaries: a- Strengthening dialogue between the Turkish citizens living in America and the AK Party, to organize seminars, conferences, political academies etc. and organizing in social media, b- Organizing nurseries, schools, language schools, Quran courses, traditional handicrafts courses, Turkish music courses and organize these for the children of Turkish citizens in the U.S. Getting into touch with public and private institutions such as TOMER (Turkish Teaching, Application and Research Center), Istanbul University Language Center, *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, *İlim Yayma Cemiyeti* (Society for the Expansion of Knowledge)*, Ensar Vakfı,* TURGEV*,* c- Counseling students who come for higher education to the U.S. and establishing residences for them, d- Organizing events during religious and national festivals and nights, e- Organizing joint events with other ethnic communities, particularly other kin and Muslim societies to strengthen dialogue, f- Managing ties between the Turkish citizens and the Turkish state institutions and to provide legal counseling to resolve problems. Supporting citizens who want to vote from abroad, g- Getting in touch with institutions such as Başbakanlık Tanıtma Fonu (Prime Ministry Promotion Fund), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy, Consulate, Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı (YTB) etc. to organize all sorts (expositions, concerts, demonstrations, conferences) activities, h- Organizing and participating in fairs, publicity meetings etc. to strengthen political and economic ties between the U.S. and Turkey[234] (Author's translation).

The platform's manifest referred to the objectives within the framework of a new management of non-resident citizens of the Turkish state under the rule of AKP government. It complemented with the policy objectives of the state that I have cited in Chapter 7, and of their implementation in the United States in this chapter. *Herşey Türkiye için Platformu* congealed as an organization similar to the Union of European Turkish Democrats in the European geography, participating in the wider network of associations affiliated with the AKP. Different from the pre-existing lobbying networks with a pro-Turkish state agenda in the United States, *Herşey Türkiye için* publicized its strong political position in relation with the home country domestic politics and obtained a rapid place within the state's institutional framework in the overseas. The repercussions of *Gezi* movement in the U.S. illustrated that homeland related matters triggered politicization among migrants and their descendants in the 2010s, different from the 1980s when they did not affect the overall associationalism.

[233] Interviews with the author, New Jersey, November 11, 2014; New York, December 3, 2014.
[234] Herşey Türkiye için Platformu. 2013. "Manifesto." Handout obtained in November 11, 2014.

Moreover, the selectivity by the Turkish state in implementing its non-resident citizen policies have led to new fragmentations around ideological and party lines.

Concluding Remarks

In the post-2003 period, the transformations in the Turkish state's policies towards non-resident citizens has emerged as a new regime, taking place with new laws and institutions in the policy making and with new approaches of implementation. This chapter has discussed how these new policies have been put into practice in the United States and what have been the outcomes of these policies in terms of the relations between the migrant populations and the home state.

First, the changes in the Turkish state's policies on non-resident citizens have been coupled with a broadening of state's dialogue with the citizens and the civil society actors. In Chapter 6, I had argued that since the early days of emigration, there have been continual relations between the members of the emigrant elite and of the representatives of the foreign mission, mainly built on a mutual support for benefiting from U.S-Turkey political and economic affairs. The new dialogue distinguished from the pre-2000 period, both as a result of the emerging communitarian forms among the emigrant groups and due to the grassroots outreach of the home state to have accessibility to these populations. While the high-level political sphere continued and was regenerated, new forms of management of population control took place at the grassroots level, via the adhesive character of hometown and mosque associations, with the support of a variety of state actors, such as Turkish *Diyanet*. Although citizenship ties has been the predominant factor for the broadening, various demarcations of relationship have been founded based on compatibility with the state/government agenda; driving forward the traditional pro-state institutions as well as the newly emerging Islamists and nationalists.

Second, the home state's stress on active citizenship has strengthened on the political aspect in the post-2003 period, encouraging political participation more than cultural or social entrepreneurship as it took place in the pre-2000s. Although ethnic lobbying was a crucial component of state-society relations since the 1980s, the earlier attempts of its implementation were more centralized on the cultural aspect, i.e. representing Turkish and Ottoman history, arts and cultural artifacts. In the post-2003 period, together with a stronger stress on emigrants' success stories in the U.S., the political participation at local and national

levels has become a reiterated anticipation, in the form of an anticipated commitment, for representing and supporting both the Turkish American community and of the Turkish state.

Third, the Turkish state redrew its new rules of engagement in the post-2003 period, by allowing greater social and political rights for the non-resident citizens, while at the same time attempting to strengthen its control over the populations. The enfranchisement has engendered new ties between the foreign mission, individual citizens as well as the civil society organizations, through the repositioning of the locality of the consulate or embassy. One of the crucial results of the new rules of engagement has been related to the modification from state Kemalism to a new conservative and nationalist perspective, creating tensions within the pre-existing associational sphere. Moreover, although the umbrella organizations had somehow maintained an exclusive diasporic community under the entitlement of "Turkish Americans" in the period that followed the 1980s, the ongoing political incidents have prompted ruptures due to the politicization of emigrant groups based on home country domestic politics.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

In this dissertation I answered a crucial question on the politics of state-society relations in the cross-border context: What are the implications of home states' emigrant policies on emigrants' (and their descendants') transnational political practices and home state-emigrant society relations? This question derives from the two interrelated discussions in the literature that look into cross-border relations in the global age. The first of these discussions examines the perspective of origin states, questioning why and how they increasingly engage with the populations living abroad. The second discussion, which has by now become a traditional area of research in the literature on migration, interrogates how emigrants connect with their home countries. By bringing together these two sets of discussions, my aim was to investigate the political aspect of cross-border relations, therefore understand the interactions between state institutions and societal groups in a dynamic framework.

There are two main reasons as to why I focused on the Turkey as the home state: (1) it is a traditional country of origin, which has adopted a certain policy perspective on the permanency of emigrants since the 1980s, and (2) there has been an ongoing transformation in the policy making since the early 2000s that incorporated an extended status to overseas citizens. The Turkish case also provided a rich opportunity to discuss the role of home country political setting on the implementation of emigration policies, as the changes in the emigrant policy overlapped with other structural shifts in Turkey during this period. In order to investigate continuities and changes, the study examined a period of nearly fifty years, from the beginning of mass migration up to date, but specifically focuses on the critical rupture in 2003. To study Turkish state's overall policies on emigrants and its relations with the emigrant society in its generality, I chose two different cases which did not receive specific attention in the adoption of policy making. By studying the dynamics between the Turkish state and emigrants in France and the United States, I was able to grasp the building

blocks of the policy making, without incorporating country-specific policies. In addition, these two cases represent difference both in terms the structural factors that are related to the host countries migrant incorporation and citizenship regimes, *and* due to the socioeconomic and political backgrounds of emigrants from Turkey. Despite the radically different post-migratory processes of a variety of emigrants, both cases are marked by similar transformations and continuities in terms of the implementation and outcomes of home state policies.

This case selection allowed for comparison on two fronts. On the one hand, it provided comparison across time by looking into the policies and politics since the 1960s, although specifically concentrating on the critical rupture in 2003. On the other hand, comparison across different cases served for finding the commonalities in the implications of policy making. In the rest of this conclusion chapter, I first summarize the findings of this research responding to the research questions defined in the introduction. Secondly, I provide a broader discussion of the chief findings, position my contribution in the literature and outline areas for future research.

The Interplay of the Three Actors

In this research, my main ambition was to provide an analysis on the home state-emigrant society relations and to understand the interactions between the policies and politics in their actuality. While focusing specifically on these two actors, my analysis underscored the significance of grasping the interplay of the three actors - migrants, home countries, and of host countries - therefore focus on the structural factors related to states and the sociological conditions related to emigrants. This perspective has been essentially critical in understanding the distinctions in practice, which were related to host country settings or emigrants' acts and practices at the transnational level, and to isolate the commonalities in the implementation and interactions between the home state and emigrant society relations. It also illustrated the reflection of global structural changes on the migratory and post-migratory processes.

The reader of this dissertation may be aware that the empirical analysis on mobility from Turkey to France and the United States began around the 1960s. This choice has been the result of the increased migration from Turkey to the two countries that was related to the changing policies at the era: the bilateral labour recruitment agreements between Turkey and France that had triggered the mobility of blue collar labor, and the relaxations in the

American immigration policies of the mid-1960s, expanding the available quota for new arrivals. This period was also marked by the Turkish state's emerging interest in organizing the movement of emigrants, particularly towards the European geography, but limited within a territorial conception of membership. Both in France and the United States, the immigration policies of the 1980s were shaped by an interest to manage the flow of irregular migration and to re-organize the incorporation policies for the already settled, although the political environment has given result to different policy outcomes. In terms of the migratory and post-migratory processes of emigrants from Turkey in these countries, the post-1980s were a period of diversification from the typical characteristic of emigrants, as well as the acknowledgment of their permanency in the host countries. The Turkish state's responses to the rising issues on emigrants during this period were fashioned by transition towards extra-territoriality. However it did not take place under a systematically built policy regime and rather as a reactive policy-making to respond to the daily needs. While this perspective shaped the Turkish state's overall policy, its implementation into practice has taken place compatible with the interplay of the three actors: giving birth to strong and fragmented communitarianism in the French case, and to the emerging ethnic lobbying in the United States.

For the post-2003 period, I argued in Chapters 8 and 9 that the commitment towards more active participation to society and politics in France and the United States has been strongly related to the host countries' regimes on migrant incorporation and political participation. While the Turkish state's proselytization towards active participation has clearly pushed certain groups to be engaged with the social, economic and political spheres of the host countries, their reflections illustrated differences in the two contexts. In France, the construction of a participatory environment has taken place by Turkish citizens' increased involvement both as voters and as candidates at the level of local governance, as a result of the foundational role of local politics and grassroots activism. In the United States, although grassroots participation through voting has become a clearer area of concern in the post-2000 period, it was coupled with grassroots lobbying and fundraising both at local and national levels, which were referred to as the "rules of game" in politics. The encouragement of active participation was also a matter of clear demarcations between the emigrant communities in France and the United States. In France, lower socioeconomic status of the majority of emigrants created challenges for political entrepreneurs who attempted to invest in ethnic lobbying. In comparison, higher socioeconomic status and education levels in the United

States facilitated accessibility to the American state and society, however making it difficult to organize communitarian structures for reaching masses.

From Territorial Processes of Governing Citizenry to Extra-Territoriality

One of the main questions in this dissertation has been: What are the continuities and changes in the Turkish state's emigrant policy in the post-2003 period? This question began with the premise that there has been a certain change in the policy making in Turkey, with regarding its affairs related to those who have left its territories to reside in other countries. In the literature chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 2), I argued that this change in the Turkish state's policies was not an isolated event, but a part of a global phenomenon. In fact, contrary to the earlier periods when the membership to a community was strictly defined in terms of territoriality, home country governments no longer want their migrants to return but to achieve a secure status where they are (Portes et al. 1999: 467). Obviously, this phenomenon on emigrant engagement policies gives a new impulse to the academia and policy making related to population movement across state boundaries. Chapter 2 argued that the new configurations between the home states and emigrants was not only a symptom of increased linkages across borders, but the result of a fundamental shift, related to neoliberal restructuring of the state (Gamlen 2011; Larner 2007; Ragazzi 2009; Varadarajan 2010). This was part of a new positioning of emigrants, as a part of the expanded, territorially diffused nation. The new relations between the states and emigrants incorporated relations of economic gains to the transnationalization of domestic policies (Varadarajan 2010). The transformations in the policy making involved changes in the institutional settings, as well as the conceptions of membership to the nation state. Compared to the earlier predispositions where the state defined its citizenship regime within a certain territoriality, the emigrant engagement policies took place in an extra-territorial sphere, in which the rights and obligations of citizenship were reconfigured (Collyer 2014).

The transformation in the Turkish state's policy making on emigrants has taken place in the early 2000s. I have pinpointed 2003 as the year of critical rupture, because of the rapid transformation in the emigrant regime following the extensive report that was published by the Parliamentary Investigation Commission to Scrutinize the Problems of Citizens Living Abroad at the Turkish Grand National Assembly. While a part of a global phenomenon, the taking place of the transformation in the Turkish case in the early 2000s was related to its exceptional conditions. Following Keyman and İçduygu (2013) and Öniş (2012; 2014), I

have argued in Chapter 7 that these were related to critical junctures and abrupt shifts in its republican governance model, including (a) the streamlining of the economic and social arena toward market liberalism; (b) the infiltration of the EU harmonization in the Turkish policy-making agenda following 1999; and finally (c) the AKP's rule in three consecutive terms, marked by incremental estrangement from the state-centric republican model led by a western-oriented secular elite towards neo-populist communitarianism.

Even though I discussed the question of "why", my primary interest has been concentrated on the question of "how" the policies were created and implemented. To respond to this question, I presented a threefold typology on how states adopt policies to engage with emigrants or non-resident citizens. Symbolic policies emphasized how the image of emigrants were constructed (Ragazzi 2014; Gamlen 2006); institution-building policies regarded how they were included from a bureaucratic point of view (Ragazzi 2014); and finally citizenship policies illustrated how rights and obligations bounding states and citizens were reconfigured (Gamlen 2008). In my discussion on how policies were implemented and what have been the outcomes in terms of state-emigrant society relations, I benefited from the framework of transnational political opportunity structures. The discussion emphasized that the changing spatiality of home state authority (Collyer 2014) and its influence on home state-emigrant relations corresponded to new home country political opportunities that were no longer bounded with the state's physical impediments. On the one hand, the emigration and citizenship regime of a given state adjusted opportunities and resources for emigrants to participate in the home country and host country related affairs. On the other hand, home country political opportunities were constrained within the limits of the regime type and official state ideology of the home state. These two factors determined how the contestations and negotiations between politically loaded state and society actors took place in reality.

Table 10: Turkish state policy on emigrants, temporal comparison

Period	Symbolic portrayal (naming)	Institution-building policies	Citizenship policies
Until 1960s	Refugee (*muhacir),* exchanged (*mübadil),* non-exchanged (*gayri mübadil*)	Under the supervision of Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Territorial
1960s to1980s	Workers abroad, overseas worker, Turkish-German *(Alamancı),* diaspora	Under the supervision of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Promoting emigration for employment; policy based on remittances and social security via State Planning Institute, Ministry of Labour and Social Security and related institutions	Territorial
1980s to early 2000s	Away from home (*gurbetçi*), worker abroad, citizen (living) abroad, Turk living abroad, traitor *(vatan haini)*, anarchist	Under the supervision of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Exporting culture, education and religion via Interministerial Common Culture Commission; mainly *Diyanet* and Ministry of Education	Transition to extra-territorial conception of citizenship
From early 2000s onwards	Citizen (living) abroad, Turk living abroad, Euro-Turk, diaspora	Under the supervision of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and coordination of YTB (as of 2010) Proactive institutionalization; deepening and broadening of relations with individual citizens and civil society; investing in social capital upgrading	Extra-territorial conception of citizenship

While my initial question was based on the transformation in the Turkish state policies on emigrants in 2003, in this dissertation I went further in tracing the processes of policy making from the 1960s onwards. By looking into a longer period, I was able to grasp beyond this novel trend of adopting emigrant engagement policies and how it worked in practice. My analysis provided the basis of how the Turkish state constructed and attempted to manage its relations with populations outside of its territories. In Chapter 4, I discussed that in the territorial phase, which comprised of the pre-1980 period, the Turkish state's objective was initially shaped by a concern over nation building (pre-1960 period), followed by an interest of incorporation of mainly workers, but also professionals and students, to the Turkish economy and developmental programs upon their returns (1960-1980s). The transitions to extra-territoriality began in the 1980s, with the creation of new institutional ties, putting into practice of dual citizenship and the exportation of state ideology through religion and culture. During this period, those living abroad re-entered the imagination of nation despite of their permanency, but comprising a strong distinction between wanted and unwanted. The attempts to create a loyal community have taken place in a reactive perspective, against the rapidly emerging non-state transnational linkages based on ethnic, religious, political and social identities (See Table 10).

To discuss the changes in the post-2003 period, I focused on three major policy areas in Chapter 7: (1) changes in the symbolic portrayal of emigrants, (2) re-configuration of the institutional ties and, (3) re-definition of rights of duties for non-resident citizens. The home states' policy making on emigrants is not only a matter of institutional mechanisms; it also embodies a symbolic or discursive aspect. In the Turkish case, the previous period was marked by demarcations between those who were deemed as desired and undesired by the home state, not only based on their political-ideological orientations or motives for leaving the country, but more importantly, based on their potential permanency in the host countries and their adoption of their citizenship status. In the lack of extra-territorial embracement of citizens, the long-term departure from the country of origin was considered as an individual act of exit; while temporariness of migration –if it resulted in supporting the national development upon return- was regarded as a selfless deed for the benefit of nation. The transition to extra-territorial conception of membership and citizenship has taken place together with the re-imagination of the nation by the state, in an attempt to "to extend the boundaries of the nation beyond the territorial limits of the state" (Varadarajan 2010: 39). The employment of the concept of *yurtdışı vatandaşlar* (citizens living abroad) has been the

main instance where the state has begun to put a stress on the continuation of citizenship status of emigrants, despite their permanency as residents or even citizens of another country. Over the last few years, this symbolic practice was furthered with the appearance of the concept of *diyaspora* (diaspora) in the policy making, which aimed to mark the incorporation of emigrants in the national narrative, where Turkey was depicted as a "strong country" that could perform as a bridge between civilizations in the international platform (Iğsız 2014).

In terms of the institutional changes, the 2000s were marked by re-structuring of the already exiting and deep-rooted state institutions and ministries, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Compatible with the AKP's populist agenda, the changes in the Ministry were predominantly shaped by an interest to redraw the top-down figure of the diplomacy elite. This complemented new emigrant engagement policies' outreach project towards the grassroots, and therefore to wider masses in the overseas. The strong position of the Ministry was also diverged with the foundation of Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, which emerged as a new coordinative umbrella that acted as a new diaspora institution. The creation of the Presidency brought new forms of institutional relationship, such as the publicized representation of citizens living abroad vis-à-vis state institutions, as well as civil society dialogue that incorporated allocation of new resources. Compatible with the discussion in the literature in Chapter 2, from a politically neutral point of view, the transformation in the Turkish state's emigration regime referred to both a *broadening* and *deepening* of its relations. The broadening and deepening were targeted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' new stance, by the foundation of new foreign branches under other ministries to serve directly, by the creation of Presidency to engage specifically with the populations living abroad. This new institutional setting was also supported by the creation of a new civil society dialogue after 2004, to become engaged with groups that were not deemed within the representation before.

In terms of citizenship affairs, the supervision of the well-being of the population gained a heightened position in the state's position related to the citizens living abroad. In addition to the new dispositions on social rights, new political rights were introduced, providing citizens the opportunity to cast their votes from the overseas. These new rights were coupled with new duties and anticipated commitments, primarily based on engagement in the area of political participation in the overseas, in order to create symbolic ambassadors of the Turkish state. The new extra-territorial regime embodied certain boundedness between the state and society; responsibilizing not only the emigrants regarding their anticipated commitments but

also the state to take position for the implementation of basic rights that are born out of citizenship status. Nevertheless, the implementation of this new policy regime has not been isolated from the politico-ideological biases. In the next section, I delve on my findings on how the state policies were actualized, by providing a comparison across the cases of emigrants in France and the United States.

Juxtaposing Policies and Politics

In this dissertation my primary concern was to illustrate the transformations in the Turkish state's policy making related to emigrant populations. My second concern has been to analyze how the state policies were implemented in the context of two different cases, to illustrate their impact on the transnational political practices of emigrants and to show the negotiations and contestations between state and societal actors during this period. In this section of conclusion, I discuss my findings on this second interest.

Similar patterns of self-positioning took place among the emigrant populations in France and the United States, even though they had sharply distinct socioeconomic and educational backgrounds. On the one hand, in both contexts, naturalization and dual citizenship figures remained low until the transition period, despite the relative ease in the naturalization processes of the two host countries. As argued by emigrants, the adoption of the host country citizenship was paralleled with treason towards the origin country, even though the foreign mission had begun its naturalization campaign in the 1980s. The change of perspective has taken place beginning with the mid-1990s, towards the embracing of dual citizenship rights, and has taken full force in the post-2003 period in the form of active participation as citizens in the affairs of both countries. On the other hand, the coupling of emigrants with the territorial mentality and national development in the lack of clear social and institutional services had resulted in a certain discontent in the pre-2003 period. The publicization of the "extended membership status of the community" in the last period and becoming a part of the national narrative has clearly reflected on the emigrants' self-definition as members of this larger community.

The structuring and re-structuring of the institutional settings reflect on the home states' overall position vis-à-vis communities living abroad. The interactions between the emigrant society and the foreign mission illustrate the basic institutional relationship that applies to everyone who are/who want to become included in the status of membership. I have discussed in Chapters 8 and 9 that the deepening and broadening of state's relations with the

emigrants took place both at the individual level and at the collective (civil society) level in the post-2003 period. The majority of the interviewees of this research argued that there have been overall observable changes towards what Delano (2014: 91) calls as "service-oriented diaspora policies". The materialization of these policy transformations have differed with regarding the host country structures and emigrants' backgrounds: in France, the most crucial changes took place in the form of easier accessibility to foreign mission staff in terms of social relations; while in the United States they were in the form of availability through mobile consulates and the use of technologies for remotely settled citizens.

The establishment of a special institution and a publically proclaimed representational committee have been part of the Turkish state's overall agenda to engage more with the emigrant communities. In theory, what Gamlen (2006) identifies as the "new diaspora institutions" actualize the state with technologies that make it possible to make emigrant populations governable, not through traditional coercive mechanisms based on surveillance, but through establishing the consent of the overall population. The creation of consulting committees or advisory bodies is compatible with the new mentality of governing, in which the individuals are embodied as autonomous, entrepreneurial and responsible. For the emigrants in France and the United States who complied with the state agenda, the establishment of the YTB has been coupled with material and symbolic support to their activities in the host country, to become engaged with a wider community of emigrants and to participate in the host society. The consultative committee on the other hand symbolized recognition of the different emigrant communities and their representatives in front of the Turkish state institutions as well as the society in Turkey, while at the same time providing easier accessibility to the state actors without the mediating role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Another crucial transformation in terms of the institutional sphere has been related to the use of ideological apparatus, namely the religion, culture and language education. This area has been the most ostensible in terms of reflecting the ideological shift in Turkey from the republican secularist Kemalism towards the conservative AKP agenda. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Turkish state's institutional outreach in this area had begun in the 1980s, in an attempt to respond to the rising oppositions in the religious and cultural affairs in the overseas among emigrant populations. This reactive approach of the state in the 1980s and 1990s can be clearly grasped from the history of *Diyanet* institutions in the context of my two cases. In France, *Diyanet* was given full force to reach out to conservative groups and to organize

community around its own mosque associations as an alternative to *Milli Görüş*, while its outreach was left meager in the United States in the lack of a religious community strongly opposing the state Islam. In the post-2003 period, *Diyanet*'s position remained as a representative of state Islam, but this time not from a secular republican perspective but as an embodiment of the AKP's conservatism and its interest to strengthen the religious scaffold in Turkey and abroad. While *Diyanet* continued its central position in the community religious affairs in France, it became activated as a new tool to incorporate religious practice in the community building mechanisms in the United States. In Chapters 8 and 9, I argued that similar transformations have taken place related to the exportation of culture and language education, which have attracted strong criticism among the societal actors that did not comply with the state agenda.

In the empirical chapters, I discussed three areas where the engagement between the Turkish state and the emigrant society were redefined in the political arena: voting in Turkish elections, active citizenship in the country of residence and the transnationalization of domestic politics. Parallel to the expansion of consular services and to increased dialogue with the civil society, the enfranchisement of non-resident citizens has the effect of broadening up the relations between the state and emigrant society. I discussed that as a citizenship right, extra-territorial voting applied to all persons who maintained their citizenship ties with Turkey, not depending on their rivalries or tensions with the home state. This has reflected in the practice of extra-territorial voting as well: in both France and the United States voting and monitoring of the electoral rights have created new institutional relations between the foreign mission and those who were disregarded as agitators against the integrity of the state, positioning the opposition within the electoral process. The substantial increase in the turnout rates during the last three elections illustrated the rising interest in the external community's political participation in home country affairs. The results illustrated that for my two cases, the voting behavior was in the overall related to the ideological orientation of the voters, rather than a calculation based on rewarding the incumbent for putting into practice enfranchisement of non-resident citizens.

To provide temporary comparison, I discussed the different patterns of participation in host country social, economic and political spheres in the pre-2003 period in Chapters 5 and 6. In France, this interest had begun as an isolated issue from the involvement of the home state mainly in the 1990s, heralded by integrationist associations that supported solidarity mechanisms to demand for citizenship and migrant rights. In the United States, the issue of

participation took place at the individual level since the early periods of migration, as a result of the cosmopolitan backgrounds of the main group of emigrants. Its transformation into a collective undertaking had instigated in the 1980s with the push from the Turkish foreign mission, which aimed to create a high level ethnic lobbying group to support the state's position in the United States. Even though this initiative has adopted a central position in the associative environment in the country, the political practices remained in the trial and error phase, without the adoption of a systematic program that was supported by the grassroots. In Chapters 8 and 9, I illustrated that there has been a new prompting effect of the Turkish state in the post-2003 period, which openly encouraged active participation in the country of residence and supported it via symbolic and institutional policies. The result has been the emergence of alternative patterns of participation particularly in the political arena, and of a rising communitarianism for certain groups who paralleled this practice with ethnic lobbying.

Despite this transformation in the imagination of the community, there have been clear continuities in practices between the pre-2000s and the recent period. The construction of the national narrative on the extended members is not isolated from the demarcations between those that are included or excluded within the nation-state, based on the availability of practicing of basic social, civic or political rights. Even though temporary openings have taken place related to the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey during the AKP governments, the construction of the national narrative has continued to be biased around Turkish nationalism and Sunni Islam, excluding in practice the opportunity structures for particularly Kurdish and Alevi groups. The authority of the central government and the inadmissibility of strong opposition continued to create tensions between the state institutions and those who voiced out their concerns in the overseas. In the post-2003 period these issues resulted in the adoption of the Turkish national narrative particularly nationalist, conservative and pro-state groups, while leading to a lack of confidence related to the new institutional settings by those outside of this circle. This situation has mainly created tensions regarding the allocation of available opportunities (i.e. accessibility to foreign mission, funding, other symbolic and material resources), which remained to be provided in selectivity. Compared to the pre-2003 period when the selectivity was based on compliance to Kemalism, in the post-2003 period it shifted towards compatibility with the AKP governments' political agenda. Similarly, from the perspective of emigrants, the interest in accessing to these resources was limited within the periods when the home government's domestic and international policies complied with their own orientations. The rising authoritarianism of the AKP government

following the 2013 civil unrest in Turkey has led to disputes among these included groups as well, causing growing clientelism at YTB and intactness in the performance of the advisory body.

According to Koslowski (2005), the influencing of emigrants' actions on the foreign policy-making of their host and home states evaporates the boundary between the top-down state-to-state relations and grassroots transnationalization of homeland domestic matters. In this research, I argued that this evaporation has not only been the repercussion of emigrants' transnational practices, but also is oftentimes buttressed and facilitated by the home state and its emigration regime, which may re-configure its institutional ties to demand for the community support. The Armenian-Turkish conflict on the denomination of 1915 events has been an example of this situation: while the home state's initiation to gather support against this political issue took place in the United States since the 1980s, its dissemination to other countries as a more systematized project occurred in the post-2003 period. Interestingly, the cases illustrated that the transnationalization of a domestic issue did not only serve to advocate on a certain belief. In creating a common agenda (denouncement of 1915 events as genocide) and a common rival (Armenian populations), this political project served to glue together fragmented populations under a loosely tied identity of Turkishness. Even though the home state's emigrant engagement policies may reinforce taking a positive position related to its domestic matters, the assumption of the political issues by the emigrant groups is based on their self-identifications and positioning. The mass mobilization in support of Gezi movement in 2013 demonstrated the possibility of alternative politicizations on current homeland domestic matters in the country of residence. The repercussions of these movements also illustrate that the emigrants' own activation and the activation supported by a home state political project might lead to (re)politicization around home country politics and the emergence of alternative and rival boundings based on different identity constructions.

Main Findings, Contributions and Directions for Further Research

My chief finding in this dissertation is that Turkish state's policies had an impact on how emigrants fostered transnational political practices. While the nature of the emigration and citizenship regime determined the initial conditions of the exit and motives of emigrants to quit the country, they also adjusted the opportunities and resources available to emigrants for participation in the home country and host country related affairs. The empirical research

illustrated that the two cases represented the shifts from difference towards convergence, in relation with the home state-emigrant society relations. The interplay between the three main actors of the migration process (i.e. home country and host country policies and emigrants' practices) in the pre-2003 period had led to the emergence of two different transnational settings. In France, as in many countries of Europe, the networks built around communitarianism had resulted in a strong self-identification around a certain groupness in relation with emigrants' politico-ideological legacies brought from Turkey. This fragmented communitarianism had shaped the overall relations between the emigrants and the Turkish state in the pre-2003 period. In the United States, beginning with the 1980s, ethnic lobbying had occupied a crucial part of the agenda of home state-emigrant relations, mainly influenced by the social, cultural and economic capitals of emigrants and the American system's openness and even conduciveness to lobbying practices for ethnic groups. The results of this research has shown that the implementation of the Turkish state's emigrant engagement policy in the post-2003 took place mainly around the projection of the two narratives for establishing its relations with the emigrant society: building/integrating a community that would consolidate emigrants at the grassroots level and reinforcing ethnic lobbying aiming for higher-level politicization. The analysis of the two different cases illustrated that in the post-2003 period, these narratives have emerged in both contexts and were even portrayed as the complementary factor of one another. In France, ethnic lobbying entered the language of emigrants' political practices and as a force that would reinforce the consolidation of the existing communities, while in the United States grassroots building/integrating has begun to occupy a central position in both the professional and grassroots lobbying practices. As the policy making of the home state relied heavily on these two objectives, emigrant groups that worked on these particular fields had more access to the available political opportunities by the home state.

The translation of Turkish state's engagement policies into political opportunities was also related to two political questions: how the nature of the system as a whole affected the functioning of political institutions and how the dominant political elite exerted its power over citizens, not only in the public but also in the private domain. This research has shown that the implementation of the state's policy agendas has not been isolated from the messy politics; they contained a set of contestations and negotiations between the state and society actors that are politically loaded. In the post-2003 period, the changes in the policy making on emigrants have been coupled with the transformations of the state's official state ideology

from Kemalist republican secularism to AKP's conservative globalism. The pre-2003 and post-2003 periods were similar in terms of the selectivity of the home state in building up an interactive sphere with the societal actors based on selectivity, according to compliance with the state-led management of ideology. However, the post-2003 period differed from the earlier period due to the changing ideological premises of the ruling party and its overall governance perspective. As such, the attempts of the Turkish state to create a community living abroad which had ties of loyalty to itself were in conformity with the image that the AKP governments have attempted to create since the early 2000s in the international arena. As I have discussed in Chapter 7, the "nation branding" around the images of Turkey's becoming a "strong country" that could act as a bridge of "civilizations" (Iğsız 2014: 697) was epitomized by new frames of reference, such as Turkey's assuming of the role of a model country of moderate Islam or the embodiment of the continuation of the Ottoman Empire. The embracing of the non-resident community living overseas complied with the efforts of rapprochement with different demarcations of extra-territorial membership based on shared ethnicity, history or religion (Aksel 2014). The emphasis over community, grassroots mobilization and social upgrading in its policies of overseas were also in conformity with the AKP governments' populism in the domestic are, with what Kaya (2015: 54-55) described as the discourse of "conservative democracy", that denounced the top-down model of modernization of the Kemalist era.

This research contributes to the literatures on transnationalism and diasporas by attempting to create links between migrant transnationalism and home state emigrant policies, and by discussing how they correlate with each one another. In doing so, my aim was to give greater emphasis on the role of the home state political opportunity structures. My interest was to illustrate that home state's policies towards emigrants do not only impede the available resources and opportunities to citizens as pushing them for leaving the nation-state, but they might also create new ones available in the extra-territorial setting. By looking into the history of Turkish emigration regime and its implementation in practice, I was able to argue that the home state opportunities did not only emerge only in the period when new emigration engagement policies were adopted, but existed in a limited and territorially restricted fashion in the previous periods as well, compatible with the emigration regime of the era. Moreover, they did not involve only emigrant and citizenship policies, but also other policy areas that are related to opening up of citizens to the outside world (i.e. associations law, political

parties law etc.). These different policy areas contribute to the creation of a certain emigration regime.

Even though I stressed on the impact of home state policies, my objective was never to refer to the emigrants' position as passive subjects. Maybe because of its strong theoretical employment of the Foucauldian perspective, the rapidly growing scholarship on emigrant engagement policies over the last few years has built on a very strong and effective image of the state as the governing power, without giving equivalent voice to the societal actors, who had their own agendas. This is similar to the situation in the 1990s when the emerging literature on transnationalism and migrants' transnational practices had given too much stress on migrants' agency. My undertaking of a study on home state-emigrant society relations was related to an interest to look into both the structure and the agency. The study of these different groups has illustrated how certain groups responded (i.e. absorbed or rejected) to the changing policies. There have been different self-positioning practices of emigrants with regarding their relations with the home state and its institutions, as well as the regulations, processes and practices related to extra-territorial citizenship. By looking into the home state's relations with different societal actors in terms of its ideological compatibility over an extended period of time, I was able to grasp the variety of mechanisms of alliance building, negotiations, compromises, rivalries and clashes.

In this rapidly growing field, there are many alternative directions that are available for further research. For one thing, the institutionalist studies on emigrant engagement have already begun to open up the black box of home states, by introducing different policy areas. This might be taken further by looking into the different actors involved in the policy making and implementation processes, their own strategies, political orientations and individual migration histories. At this point, the distinction between the state and society should not be taken for granted. The field research of this dissertation has illustrated that there are frequent crossovers between different actors, i.e. diplomats becoming members of the emigrant society by assuming the role of associative executors; emigrant representatives becoming part of the government or state through participating in elections or being employed in the public sector. Another parallel undertaking might be an analysis on the returnees, i.e. exiles who return upon their grasping of power in the home country; students or professionals who actively involve in politics, diplomacy, academia, media etc. Ethnographic and in-depth analyzes of such interrelations might provide alternative explanations on how they

reconfigure the spatiality of state authority or conceptions of nationhood and how the policies have been created or implemented.

As the processes of migration take place in a multilocal sphere, one of the crucial aspects of transnational politics is its connectivity of intergovernmental relations. How do the changes in the home country emigrant engagement policies affect the relations between the host and home states? What are the mechanisms that are adopted by receiving states on this issue? In this dissertation, I have very concisely exemplified the actions of French and American governments to maintain their control over emigrant groups, in terms of their relations with the host countries. The examples of *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM) in France and Heritage Councils in the United States illustrated that the linkages between the home countries and the emigrants were not taken by granted by the host state policy makers. How are the overlaps on the constructions of national sovereignty resolved in bilateral politics? What does the agency of emigrants who actively become a part of both home state engagement policies and host state integration policies comprise of?

The findings of this dissertation on home state-emigrant society relations reflect the context in which the research has taken place, from 2012 to 2016. Particularly the period in which the empirical research has been conducted (from late 2013 to late 2014) the Turkish society has witnessed the beginning of rupture between some of the earlier alliances established by the AKP government and certain groups (and individuals who are affiliated to these groups). These alliances that were formed in the early and mid-2000s had affected the state-society relations in Turkey and in the overseas, in terms of increased civil society dialogue, democratization and empowerment of individuals. The post-2013 period has been critical to reflect the dissolution of these relations of the AKP government, particularly with left-wing organizations that cut down on their relations with the government following *Gezi* movement in the summer of 2013, *Hizmet* movement that entered into conflictual relations after the corruption scandal of December 2013, and minority groups –particularly Kurds- that were due skirmish as the earlier democratic "openings" entered into inertia. Following the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016, the tensions between different Turkish groups, Turks and Kurds, as well as *Gülen* supporters and the AKP government seem to have replicated to state institutions and officials as well. Under new conditions, there is ample room for new research to analyze the reflections of politically loaded policy shifts on state-society relations and their impact on emigrants' political practices.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Migrants in France by socio-professional category and country of birth

	Portugal	Morocco	Algeria	Turkey	Tunisia
Agriculture	1,350	1,076	285	486	146
Artisans, traders	31,012	24,076	23,497	17,623	13,085
Executives and intellectual professionals	19,240	36,976	33,224	5,111	16,355
Intermediary professions	46,867	56,624	56,648	12,396	18,686
Employees	118,501	108,918	123,183	23,369	34,017
Workers	159,497	150,270	129,965	77,471	51,336
Retired	134,604	92,993	15,015	19,287	89,707
No professional activity	78,476	201,501	212,631	89,707	61,920
TOTAL	589,547	672,433	730,247	245,449	241,859

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE). Recensement de la population. 2010.

Appendix 2: Turkish population in France

Sex	Total population in France (1.1.2013)	Foreigner, based on birth place (2010)	Turkish, based on nationality (2010)	Turkish, based on consulate registry in 2009 (including dual citizens)
Men	31,769,000	2,701,860	117,011	305,813
Women	33,817,000	2,812,140	104,245	271,173
TOTAL	65,586,000	5,514,000	221,256	576,986

Source: Turkish Ministry Labour and Social Security. France Report. 2013.

Appendix 3: Turkish citizens in France, based on regions

Region	Total number of migrants in the region	Total number of Turkish citizens	% of Turkish citizens to all migrants
Alsace	**140,648**	**27,145**	**19.3**
Aquitaine	137,787	4,547	3.3
Auvergne	44,138	3,928	8.9
Bourgogne	64,882	5,450	8.4
Bretagne	64,170	5,775	9.0
Centre	105,795	10,791	10.2
Champagne-Ardenne	50,435	4,035	8.0
Corse	26,332	0	0.0
Franche-Comte	51,859	8,609	16.6
Ile-de-France	**1,479,566**	**56,223**	**3.8**
Languedoc-Roussillon	150,033	4,802	3.2
Limousin	32,532	3,090	9.5
Lorraine	120,955	13,547	11.2
Midi-Pyrenees	132,202	2,776	2.1
Nord-Pas-de-Calais	129,400	3,494	2.7
Basse-Normandie	28,936	2,980	10.3
Haute-Normandie	53,102	4,567	8.6
Pays de la Loire	73,781	5,238	7.1
Picardie	63,029	5,357	8.5
Poitour-Charentes	48,890	1,173	2.4
Pro.Alpes-Cote d’Azur	307,602	8,920	2.9
Rhone-Alpes	**399,087**	**38,711**	**9.7**

Source: Turkish Ministry Labour and Social Security. France Report. 2013.

Appendix 4: Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status in the U.S, 1820-2011

Year	Turkey*	Asia	Europe	Total
1820-1880	677	192,297	8,646,950	9,732,172
1880-1889	2,478	71,797	4,638,684	5,248,568
1890-1899	27,510	61,304	3,576,411	3,694,294
1900-1909	127,999	300,411	7,572,669	8,202,388
1910-1919	**160,717**	269,736	4,985,411	6,347,380
1920-1929	40,374	126,740	2,560,340	4,295,510
1930-1939	1,314	19,292	444,404	699,375
1940-1949	754	34,532	472,524	856,608
1950-1959	2,980	135,844	1,404,973	2,499,268
1960-1969	9,464	258,563	1,133,443	3,213,749
1970-1979	12,209	1,406,018	826,327	4,248,203
1980-1989	19,209	2,391,356	669,694	6,244,379
1990-1999	38,687	2,859,899	1,349,219	9,775,398
2000-2009	**48,394**	3,470,835	1,349,609	10,299,430
2010	7,435	410,209	95,429	1,042,625
2011	9,040	438,580	90,712	1,062,040

* Data for years prior to 1906 refer to country of origin; data from 1906 to 2011 refer to country of last residence. Turkey is listed among the Asian countries in this statistics. From 1886 to 1923, data for Syria included in Turkey. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2011/ois_yb_2011.pdf.

Appendix 5: Turkish citizens registered to the Turkish Embassy in Washington (2014)

Consular area	Number of citizens
New York	97,000
Los Angeles	33,000
Chicago	21,000
Washington D.C.	17,000
Houston	16,000
Boston	11,000
Total	**195,000**

Source: The Embassy of Turkey in Washington, D.C. 2014.

Appendix 6: American Community Survey on the population born in Turkey, 2013

Total population	109,667
Sex	Male 54.9%, Female 45.1%
Age (for 95,638 persons)	Under 18 years 4.8%, 18-24 years 8.0%, 25-34 years 21.5%, 35-44 years 24.9%, 45-54 years 16.3%, 55 years and over 24.5%
Educational attainment (25 years and over)	Less than high school diploma 10.6%, high school graduate 17.1%, some college or associate's degree 14.0%, bachelor's degree 24.8%, graduate or professional degree 33.5%
Industry (16 years and over, for 59,610 persons)	Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting and mining 0.3%; construction 3.5%; manufacturing 10.9%; wholesale trade 2.8%; retail trade 10.7%; transportation and warehousing, and utilities 5.5%; information 1.8%; finance and insurance, and real estate and rental and leasing 7.4%; professional, scientific, and management, and administrative and waste management services 14.9%; educational services, and health care and social assistance 26.5%; arts, entertainment and recreation, and accommodation and food services 8.7%; other services (except public administration) 4.8%; public administration 2.2%.

Source: American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates on the population born in Turkey. U.S. Census Bureau. 2013.

Appendix 7: Associations and foundations supporting Turkish *Diyanet*

Country	Institution	Date founded
Germany (Koln)	Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DITIB)	21.05.1985
Germany (Berlin)	Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DITIB)	12.01.1982
Austria	Avusturya Türk İslam Kültür ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Birliği (ATIB)	18.09.1991
Belgium	Belçika Türk İsam Diyanet Vakfı (BTIDV)	03.09.1992
Denmark	Danimarka Türk Diyanet Vakfı (DTDV)	15.03.1985
Holland	Hollanda Diyanet Vakfı (HDV)	10.12.1982
France (Paris)	Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DITIB)	25.04.1986
France (Lyon)	Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DITIB)	16.08.1995
France (Strasbourg)	Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DITIB)	09.09.1997
Switzerland	İsviçre Türk Diyanet Vakfı (ITDV)	13.01.1987
USA (Washington)	Türk Amerikan İslam Vakfı (TAIF)	18.03.1993
USA (New York)	Türk Amerikan İslam Vakfı (TARF)	11.10.2001
Sweden	İsveç Diyanet Vakfı (IDV)	28.03.1994
Belgium	Avrupa Dini Kurumlar Birliği	07.11.2002
Japan	Türk Diyanet Camii Vakfı	01.04.2003

Source: Yavuzer, Hasan. 2005. "Dini Otorite ve Teşkilatların Sosyolojik Analizi (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Örneği)." PhD dissertation. Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Anabilim Dalı.

Appendix 8: Comparison of the members of High Committee for Turkish Citizens Abroad (1998) and the members of Advisory Committee for Citizens Abroad (2012)

	1998	**2012**
Parliamentarians	ANAP (1), CHP (1), DSP (1), DTP (1), DYP (1), FP (1).	
Country representatives	Germany (26), USA (3), France (3), Holland (3), Australia (2), Austria (1), Belgium (1), Canada (1), Denmark (1), Sweden (1), Switzerland (1), United Kingdom (1).	Germany (18), USA (8), France (6), Holland (4), **Balkans** (4), **Central Asia** (3), **Middle East and Africa** (3), United Kingdom (3), Belgium (3), Australia (3), Austria (3), Canada (2), Sweden (2), Switzerland (2), Denmark (1), **Finland** (1), **Italy** (1), **Norway** (1), **Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus** (1).
Other participating institutions	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Interior.	**Capital Markets Board, DG of Press and Information, Ministry for EU Affairs,** Ministry of Culture and Tourism, **Ministry of Customs and Trade, Ministry of Economy**, Ministry of Education, **Ministry of Family and Social Policies, Ministry of Finance,** Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, **Ministry of Justice,** Ministry of Labor and Social Security, **Ministry of National Defense,** Ministry of Religious Affairs, **Ministry of Transport and Communication, President of YTP, Radio Television Corporation, Social Security Institution, Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges.**
Honorary members		**USA (2), Germany (2), Austria (2), France (1), Holland (1), United Kingdom (1), Canada (1).**

Bold words indicate the additions from 1998 to 2012. Brackets indicate the number of members.
Source: Bayer, Yalçın. 2013. "Vatandaşlar Kurulu seçimle değil tayinle oluşturuldu." Hürriyet. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=-24833, Accessed March 12; Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu. 2013. http://www.ytb.gov.tr/Files/Document/Yurtdisi-Vatandaslar-Danisma-Kurulu-Uyeleri.pdf. Accessed March 12.