

**STATE RESPONSE TO MASS REFUGEE FLOWS: THE
CASES OF BULGARIAN TURKS, IRAQI KURDS AND
SYRIANS IN TURKEY**

**By
Ayşe Gökçek**

**A Thesis Submitted to the
Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of**

**Master of Arts
In
International Relations**

**Koç University
May 2017**

Koç University
Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities

This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a master's thesis by

Ayşe Gökçek

and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by the final
examining committee have been made.

Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Reşat Bayer

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Deniz Şenol Sert

Date:

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Ayşe Gökçek



ABSTRACT

This study presents an analysis of state responses to mass refugee movements with the theoretical frameworks of mainstream international relations (IR) theories in a comparative and historical manner, using the case of Turkey and three cases of mass influxes it received in the past three decades. Using data from archive data search of three daily newspapers in the relevant periods of 1989, 1991, and between 2011 and 2016, it makes qualitative content analysis of the discourse of Turkish state officials regarding mass refugee flows from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria. The analysis is complemented by secondary data based on the national immigration and asylum laws and regulations that has developed through the course of refugee flows. Looking into the state discourse on different refugee groups, it investigates the relevance of the main arguments of IR theories in explaining the similarities and differences of the state policies regarding the three cases. The significance of sudden movements of a massive number of people into the state territory on the host county and on its international affairs, as well as the transformative effect of international regimes and organizations on state behavior come into prominence. Hence, it shows the role of the dominant national identity the state bases its sovereignty on and that can change through history, and the identity of the refugee groups constructed in different ways by the host nation-state in explaining the differences in state policies.

Keywords: mass refugee flows, refugee response, Turkey, Bulgarian Turks, Iraqi Kurds, Syrian refugees, refugee policies, international relations theories

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Türkiye örneğini ve son otuz yılda karşılaştığı üç büyük kitlesel mülteci akımı vakasını kullanarak, kitlesel mülteci akımlarına olan devlet tepkilerinin başlıca uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri çerçevesinde analiz edilmesini kapsamaktadır. 1989, 1991 ve 2011 ile 2016 yılları arasındaki ilgili dönemlerin üç günlük gazetesi üzerinden yapılan arşiv araştırmasına dayanan verileri kullanarak, Bulgaristan, Irak ve Suriye'den gelen kitlesel mülteci akımları karşısında Türkiye devlet erkânının söyleminin nitel içerik araştırmasını yapmaktadır. Bu analiz, ülkenin ev sahipliği yaptığı farklı mülteci akımları süresince gelişmiş olan göç ve iltica yasa ve yönetmeliklerine dayanan ikincil veri araştırmasıyla desteklenmiştir. Farklı mülteci grupları üzerine devlet söylemi incelenerek, uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin ana argümanlarının üç vakaya yönelik devlet politikalarındaki benzerlikleri ve farklıları açıklama gücü araştırılmıştır. Devletin hükümler alanına yönelen ani, büyük kitlesel insan hareketlerinin ev sahibi ülkenin kimliği ve uluslararası arenadaki ilişkileri üzerindeki etkisiyle birlikte, uluslararası rejimler ve organizasyonların devlet davranışı üzerindeki değiştirici etkisi öne çıkmaktadır. Böylece, ulus-devletin egemenliğini dayandığı, tarihsel süreçte değişebilen hâkim ulusal kimlikle, mülteci grubun devlet tarafından farklı şekillerde tanımlanan belirleyici kimliğinin devletin tepkisindeki farklılıkları açıklayıcı rolü gösterilmiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: kitlesel mülteci akımları, mülteci politikaları, Türkiye, Bulgar Türkleri, Iraklı Kürtler, Suriyeli mülteciler, uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people I would like to thank, without whom the completion of my thesis would not be possible. First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Ahmet İduygu, who has been supportive since the initial development of ideas for my thesis and throughout its course of progress, with his helpful guidance and encouragement. I would also like to thank Dr. Reşat Bayer and Dr. Deniz Şenol Sert for their detailed reading of my study and their constructive criticisms, whose efforts are greatly appreciated.

I am utterly grateful for the unconditional provision of support from my family, Fazıl Gökçek, Tülay Gökçek, and Mehmet Gökçek. I have also received boundless support and encouragement from my beloved friends, Ceren Akturan, Doğukan Mercan and Nezir Kalkan. I cannot put into words how thankful I am to have all these people who have supported me with love and patience throughout my years of education. Without them by my side, I would not have been able to continue and finish my studies.

Last but not least, I want to thank Najm Aldin Eid, who persistently encouraged me, urged if necessary, in my moments of despair to finish my studies. I am infinitely grateful to have him in my life.

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 1:	Global Forced Displacement (1989-2015).....	22
Figure 2:	Refugees in developing versus developed countries (1989-2015).....	29
Table 1:	Mass Flows to the Turkish Republic (1922-2016).....	56
Table 2:	Mass flows from the Balkans (1923-1945).....	57
Table 3:	Overview of mass refugee flows from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria.....	60
Figure 3:	Number of Syrian refugees in Turkey (2011-2016).....	69



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIL	: Customary International Law
DGMM/GİGM	: Directorate General of Migration Management/Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü
EU	: European Union
EUI	: European University Institute
IDMC	: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center
IHL	: International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	: International Human Rights Law
IGO	: Intergovernmental Organization
INGO	: International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	: International Organization
IR	: International Relations
IRO	: International Refugee Organization
IRR	: International Refugee Regime
LFIP	: Law on Foreigners and International Protection
LNTS	: League of Nations Treaty Series
MONE	: Ministry of National Education
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
OAU	: Organization for African Unity
RSD	: Refugee Status Determination
TBMM	: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
TPR	: Temporary Protection Regulation
UDHR	: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNGA	: United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRRA	: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
UNRWA	: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNTFHS	: United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP	I
ABSTRACT.....	II
ÖZET	III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	IV
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES.....	V
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS	VII
CHAPTER I:	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Subject and Purpose of the Study.....	1
1.2 Theoretical and Analytical Background.....	4
1.3 Research Design and Methodology	9
1.4 Methodological Limitations	13
1.5 Contents of the Chapters.....	14
CHAPTER II:.....	16
THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND: THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME AND THEORIES OF IR.....	16
2.1 The International Refugee Regime and States	16
2.1.1 Development of the IRR and the UNHCR	17
2.1.2 Situating the State in the International Refugee Regime	23
2.1.3 Mass Flows and Shortcomings of the IRR	27
2.2 Theories of International Relations and Refugee Regimes from Different Perspectives	30
2.2.1 Realism and Neorealism	31
2.2.2 Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism	35
2.2.3 Constructivism and the English School	39
CHAPTER III:	43

HISTORICIZING MASS MIGRATION TO TURKEY AND OVERVIEW OF THE CASES.....	43
3.1 Turkey’s Asylum Regime	44
3.2 History of Mass Flows to Turkey	54
3.3 Overview of the Cases: Causes and Scale of the Movements.....	59
3.3.1 Bulgarian Turks (1989).....	61
3.3.2 Iraqi Kurds (1991).....	64
3.3.3 Syrians (2011-).....	67
CHAPTER IV:	73
FINDINGS: TURKEY’S RESPONSE TO MASS REFUGEE FLOWS	73
4.1 “Soydaşlar”: Bulgarian Turks.....	74
4.1.1 The Case from the Perspective of IR Theories	86
4.2 “Peşmergeler”: Iraqi Kurds.....	87
4.2.1 The Case from the Perspective of IR Theories	96
4.3 “Misafirler”: Syrians	98
4.3.1 The Case from the Perspective of IR Theories	109
CHAPTER V:.....	111
CONCLUSION	111
BIBLIOGRAPHY	118

CHAPTER I:

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Subject and Purpose of the Study

Mass refugee flows have gradually moved to the forefront of international migratory movements especially in the past three decades. Although regarded as an exception in the international refugee regime (IRR), mass refugee flows have more and more been the rule of refugee movements. A mass refugee influx is defined as “that which occurs when within a relatively a short period (a few years), large numbers (thousands) of people flee their places of residence for the asylum country” (Jacobsen 1996: 657). In some cases, the time period can be as short as a couple of months and the numbers can be as large as millions. The signals of increasing *en masse* population movements revealed themselves in 1980s and 90s for various reasons such as population growth, famine, political instability, proliferation of arms and increasing militarism, and ethnic conflicts (Loescher 1993: 4), a trend that continued in the 21st century. Inherently, mass influxes of populations embody with their size and urgency overwhelming evidence of human suffering and brutality (Vibeke Eggli 2002: 2). Mass refugee influxes are significant not only because they are results and causes of immense human suffering, but also because they disrupt the general “order” of international relations and can have substantial effects on the countries of asylum. They are also theoretically significant but under-studied, because they constitute a grayer area in refugee studies as they do not fit in the individualistic nature of the refugee regime of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which is based on “well-founded fear of being persecuted” (UNGA 1951) and individual refugee status determination (RSD). They have gained more significance in recent decades however, with mass refugee movements from countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria appearing with full force on the agenda of international affairs.

On the one hand, mass influxes appear to be the new norm of international forced displacement. On the other hand, even a preliminary research reveals the incompetency of the IRR when it comes to mass refugee movements of the current era, which is likely to be one of the highly significant factors for explaining how states behave in the cases examined in this study. That is why the development of the IRR and its shortcomings in the face of mass flows

will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. The term IRR here is used to include the formal or informal rules and norms governing international refugee protection whether or not they are explicit in conventions or treaties. International and supranational institutions, as well as global norms and regulations are also considered likely to be significant factors in shaping state behavior towards refugee flows. In recent years, refugees have become a main subject of debate and discussion in the international arena and the pressure of international institutions, the civil society and changing norms on state behavior are effective in shaping refugee responses of individual states. This being said, even though states are constrained by international norms and actors to a certain extent, they still have the capacity to go around them and act arbitrarily by defining who a refugee is, and who the immigrants they host are, as the Turkish case among others demonstrates. There is a tendency to see refugee crises as temporary and unique, although many of the contemporary issues and dilemmas are timeless and historical comparison can provide opportunities to learn from the past (Betts and Loescher 2014: 2). Providing such comparison of state policies in response to different mass refugee flows, taking into consideration continuity and change in the global arena as well as the individual state's identity, capacity and learning will provide valuable insights to how refugee responses are formulated and what lessons can be learned for future policy-making.

Built on contemporary significance of mass refugee flows and the lack of studies that examine responses to them with historical comparison, this study focuses on Turkish state's response to three cases of mass refugee flows in the last three decades. The major question that is asked is how state policies for mass refugee movements can be situated within the discipline of international relations (IR). In other words, the study is interested in how state response to cases of mass refugee movements, with similar and different characteristics, can be explained using the theoretical framework of IR theories, aiming to provide a historical and comparative analysis of state behavior regarding these refugee movements within persistent and changing realities of the global arena. It aims to investigate the relevance of main IR theories for studying international forced displacements, and the state response to them. It is argued that there is a need of situating refugee studies in IR literature as the refugee movements and responses of the host societies are shaped by IR, and in return shape policies and relations in the international arena as well. This framework includes the mainstream theories that take the state as the most, even only relevant actor in IR, as well as newer theories that are critical of this approach of the state. Constructivist and neoliberal institutionalist literatures may have significant contributions to explaining state behavior in

response to these movements. I predict that the state formulates its refugee response by constructing the identity of groups of refugees it receives and defining them in certain ways rather than others, which serves to fit refugees in its discourse of sovereignty based on a national identity, and even to use them as a restorative element to strengthen this discourse.

The method of analysis of the thesis is case study. Specifically, it looks at the Turkish case and how the Turkish state responded to three major cases of mass refugee flows from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria in 1989, 1991 and 2011 respectively. Turkey is chosen as the focus country for a number of reasons. The country has been at the forefront of international migratory movements since the Ottoman era, being on both ends of movements as well as serving as a main transition country at the intersection of emigration countries of the East and immigration countries of the West (İçduygu 2015a: 279). Although it was considered more as an emigration country in the 20th century especially because of the massive labor migration to Europe, the country has become a net immigration country in recent years (Kaya and Erdoğan 2015: 11). It is going through a rapid transition in terms of the magnitude of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants it receives, as well as its immigration and asylum laws and policies. Turkey is a particularly interesting case study with its evolving immigration and refugee regime, its ongoing geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its current struggle as the host of the biggest refugee population in the world, and its history of receiving mass refugee influxes from different countries with different characteristics. As a host country of asylum-seekers and refugees, as well as a transition point for them and irregular migrants, the country is at the center of the current refugee crisis in the world right now.

The Syrian influx that started in 2011 has made the country the host of the largest refugee population in the world (UNHCR 2016). However, although it is the biggest mass flow the country has ever experienced, it is certainly not the first one. Turkey has been experiencing mass refugee flows especially from the Balkans and the Middle East for a long period of time resulting from its geographical location. These characteristics make the country among the best cases to study state responses to mass flows of refugees in a historical perspective. Three cases, the movement from Bulgaria in 1989, from Iraq in 1991 and Syria since 2011 are chosen not only because they are the biggest mass influxes, but also because they provide a rich comparison to analyze the motives behind the state policies with their similar and different characteristics. While providing a comparison and historical analysis of

state response to those three cases of mass flows, this study aims to do so within the theoretical framework of IR and using IR theories.

1.2 Theoretical and Analytical Background

The main theories of IR as theoretical frameworks for explaining states' immigration/refugee policies will be discussed in this thesis. The focus will be on the three main "-isms" of IR: realism, liberalism and constructivism, and one more contemporary school of each: neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and the English School, respectively. In one sense, mainstream IR theories provide useful tools to understand the politics of forced migration, as the current global regime mirrors the way mainstream IR theories view the world- as how the IRR works, but not as how it should work (Acharya 2008: 1). In this sense, mainstream IR theory can be useful for descriptive and explanatory studies of forced migration such as this one but not for normative studies. On the other sense, I admit that mainstream IR theories provide only limited theoretical frameworks for an issue as multidisciplinary as refugee movements. Nevertheless, IR theory and forced migration studies have a great deal to learn from each other considering the important relationship between world politics and refugee policies. The central concepts and theories of IR provide a framework to analyze the state behavior within their territories as well as their relations with each other and the factors shaping these. Each theory gives valuable insights into why or why not states open their borders to mass flows, and how they formulate policy responses for them. Yet, there has been little effort within IR to explore what it has to offer in studying refugee movements (Betts & Loescher 2011: 11).

It should be mentioned here that although the main arguments of the classical versions of each theory and one newer school of each are taken into consideration, there are many variations within each mainstream theory of IR as well. Classical and structural, offensive and defensive realisms, classical liberalism, interdependence theory, democratic peace theory and the neoliberal institutionalist theory, conventional, critical and postmodern versions of constructivism are some of those variations (Acharya 2008: 3-5). Thus this approach does not represent the depth of thinking in IR theory, but it only constitutes a preliminary study to bridge the study of policies regarding mass forced displacement with the IR literature using the case of Turkey. There is a lack of literature that looks at the causes and consequences of,

and responses to refugee flows from the theoretical standpoint of IR. Thus an attempt to do so in this study started with the very central concepts of IR theory and could not go in its depths, acknowledging the limitations this approach brings on the theoretical framework. There is need for future research that includes frameworks from other approaches to IR theories, as well as variations within each theory.

Realism is considered to be the first theoretical perspective for understanding IR, and it has been the dominant lens through which scholars and political actors have evaluated global affairs (Kaarbo and Ray 2011: 4). The classical realist theory of IR takes the state as the main actor in IR (statist), and as a unitary and rational actor whose actions are shaped by anarchy with limited prospect for cooperation in its relations in the international arena (Meyers 2000; Lee 2006; Snyder 2011). It “depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states” (Walt 1998: 31 quoted in Meyers 2000: 1263). With the focus on national security and military conflict, most realist scholars neglected issues of migration as a subject of study (Meyers 2000: 1264). From the realist perspective, states would not provide for the rights of non-citizens unless it is in their self-interest to do so, interest being defined in terms of power (İçduygu 2014; Goldenziel 2014; Weiner 1993). Transnational issues, including migration and refugees, have mainly remained outside the subject realm of the realist theory (Acharya 2008: 4). Looking at refugee policies of the state, this thesis will examine whether the Turkish state’s response to mass refugee flows was dependent on considerations of self-interest and increasing power. Other main theories are considered as reactions to and criticisms of the realist theory in the IR literature.

Classical liberalism is the main critique of the realist IR theory, adopting a more optimistic view of the world. It is, like realism, a statist and rational theory, but it sees the possibility of cooperation based on economic interdependence and a global value system with the ideal of universal liberal democratic state that has responsibility to protect human rights of citizens as well as non-citizens (Degu 2002; Meyers 2000; Weiner 1993; Hollifield 2008; Gibney 1999). Liberalism focuses on interdependence of states, and according to the liberal theory states do pursue their interests rationally, but they also cooperate for the same reason (Kaarbo and Ray 2011: 10). With international cooperation, states can each pursue their self-interest and increase their gain, not necessarily conflicting with each other. The liberal theory also sees economic interdependence as a tool to avoid conflict and preserve peace between countries. Neoliberal institutional theory adds to classical liberalism the study of international

institutions and regimes, studying their role in overcoming dilemmas and problems of cooperation among states, the IRR being an example of such regimes (Meyers 2000: 1266). From the liberal standpoint, this study will look at the role of cooperation among states and the effect of international institutions on refugee responses of the receiving state.

The constructivist theory of IR represents a different challenge to realist and liberal theories, as it does not take the behaviors, interests, and rationality of various actors as given but argues that they are socially and historically constructed and they change over time (Newman 2001: 247). Hence the structures and agents in them, such as societies and people, “mutually constitute” each other according to the constructivist theory (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 3). The constructivist theory examines how boundaries and identities of the sovereign nation-state, the people and other non-state actors continuously and mutually define and construct each other, affecting their relations and policy-making processes in migration and refugee issues (Degu 2002; İçduygu 2014). The English School approach of the constructivist theory sees the world as an international society of states, and emphasizes the role of norms and ideals in this society (Haddad 2008). Regarding the refugee policies of the states, norms, identity and how the refugee and the host state construct the identity of each other will be discussed, as well the role of the international society in creating and responding to mass refugee flows. IR theories and their plausible frameworks for examination of state policies towards refugee flows will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.

Betts and Loescher conceptualize the relationship between forced migration and IR on three levels: the causes of forced migration, consequences of forced migration and responses to forced migration (2011: 12). This study mainly focuses on the third level, the responses to forced migration movements, and specifically *en masse*, forced international displacement of people, which are called mass refugee flows in the literature. Even though the international response, from institutions like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and regional organizations like the European Union (EU) are important aspects of this level, individual host states are considered to have autonomy and power over the decisions regarding people fleeing into their given territories. The relationship between the state and refugees is complex and deserve special attention in a globalized world. Even though the world system and the role of the state in it are changing, the state is certainly not disappearing (Marfleet 2006: 39), and states hold on to their power over the decisions of who can enter the country as a main feature of territorial sovereignty. The relationship between the

international and national should thus be carefully examined to understand the policies of individual states.

The international law on refugees is far from reflecting the reality of today's displacement, protection and asylum needs in the 21st century. The institution of asylum faces a great threat as many governments perceive asylum seekers and refugees negatively (Newman 2003: 5-7). Besides concerns of national security by states, tensions occur in host nations especially when faced with mass flows of outsiders into traditional social structures. Thus the majority of world's refugees cannot get permanent asylum or integrate into local communities in Third World governments (Loescher 1993: 8). Even though the High Commissioner has the dual mandate of protecting refugees and overseeing relief operations, UNHCR is obliged to operate within the rules and procedures determined by the host governments (ibid.: 137). There is no supranational authority to enforce the rules of the IRR, although intergovernmental organizations can affect the decision of individual states to a certain extent. That is the major reason why governments can adopt arbitrary policies regarding the refugee movements they face and significantly relevant to the policies of Turkish state regarding mass refugee movements. As to the concept of refugee, there needs to be a differentiation between *de facto* refugees and *de jure* refugees. Forcedly displaced populations who cross international borders, even if they are refugees under the international definition, may not be given the status of refugee in the host country as it depends on national legislation.

State policies regarding refugee flows cannot be adequately studied without placing them in a broader theoretical context of IR. The international context has significantly changed from the creation of the IRR to the 21st century. The end of 1980s, beginning of 1990s were the beginning of a new era in which refugee movements assumed increasing political importance. Refugee flows started to be seen as international security problems, and state policies reflected such a view of those migratory movements (Loescher 2001: 13). The IRR has operated within a highly politicized context since the creation of it (ibid.: 26). Both domestic and foreign policy concerns of individual states, as well as interstate relations has played an important role as humanitarian concerns, if not more. Besides the significance of difference in the characteristics of the cases of mass flows from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria, they are chosen from a historical context where the global governance of the refugee regime had a shift with the end of the Cold War. The historical context is significant and the end of the

Cold War matters. It matters because it changed the way refugee populations are perceived in the international arena, significantly affecting the responses of individual refugee-receiving states as well, as will be discussed more from a realist perspective in Section 2.2.1. The period starting late 1980s has been especially important for Turkey as well. The cases that are the subject of this study started in this era and are chosen for being massive in numbers and for revealing different characteristics. Before moving to the cases, the history of mass migration to Turkey and the state's refugee policy throughout the period will be reviewed in Chapter III.

Turkey's unique asylum regime as a major receiving country though maintaining its geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its relations with UNHCR will be discussed as significant factors shaping state policies. None of those forcibly displaced people from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria are officially refugees in Turkey, which will be explained in detail in Section 3.1. Examining the state discourse demonstrated that officials in Turkey have not even used the term "refugee" until very recently, a change that can be attributed to the impact of global discourse and prevailing international norms regarding the issue. In late 1980s and early 1990s Turkey experienced cases of mass asylum in 1988, 1989 and 1991, totaling to approximately 900,000 refugees (Kirişci 2001: 71). This involves 60,000 Kurds from Iraq in August 1988, and 310,000 ethnic Turks from Bulgaria in 1989, mostly between June and August (Kirişci 1991: 510). An even bigger flow of Kurds from Iraq followed in 1991. The third wave of the mass displacement of populations during and after the Gulf War occurred in 1991, as a mass flow of up to two million Iraqi Kurds and Shias towards Turkey and Iran (Van Hear 1993: 64). By mid-April 1991, up to 500,000 Kurds were said to have crossed the border to Turkey (Van Hear 1993: 69). Even those numbers seem low when we look at the current mass inflow of Syrian refugees to the country since 2011. Figures as of the end of 2016 amount to more than 2.8 million registered Syrian refugees in the country, which made Turkey host to the largest number of refugees in the world (UNHCR 2016).

The three cases in this study, namely the mass refugee flows from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria, have similar and different characteristics from each other, which makes them comparable to understand the motives of state response in each case. The historical contexts of the three cases, causes of fleeing as well as defining characteristics of the populations are different. The Iraqi and Syrian influxes were results of wars, while the fleeing from Bulgaria

arose by the repressive policies of the Bulgarian government. The political and socio-economical context in Turkey during the flows from Bulgaria and Iraq were highly similar, yet had significantly changed in 2010s when the Syrian influx began. The refugees from Bulgaria have the dominant identity of being ethnically Turkish, which makes them positively discriminated in Turkish Settlement Law, while the other groups are not ethnically Turkish. The Kurdish refugees belong to an ethnic group Turkish state has had problems with since its foundation, and might have a different image than other groups for the society. While the refugees from Bulgaria went through a process of settlement and integration, only quick repatriation was made possible for the case of Iraqi refugees. Although much later compared to the case of refugees from Bulgaria and with more hardship, the protracted displacement of Syrian refugees in Turkey seems to be proceeding towards integration and naturalization stages as well (İçduygu and Millet 2016: 3), which makes the Bulgarian and Syrian cases comparable on the settlement process. On the other hand, the movement of Bulgarian Turks and Iraqi Kurds were sudden, happened within short periods and were only two years apart, which makes it possible to focus on two-three month periods and compare the initial reaction of the state towards those mass flows. Being able to make a thorough analysis of the state's response to those two cases also makes it possible to draw conclusions about possible directions the country's refugee response to the third case will take, which is still in the process of shaping. The Syrian case is different in the sense that it is in bigger scale and has been continuing for more than five years, thus not a finalized case of mass forced migration as opposed to others.

1.3 Research Design and Methodology

Archival research is conducted to extract data for content and discourse analysis of the state response to the three cases of mass refugee flows. There are two sources of data used to understand the state response in this study: secondary examination of laws and regulations to see the evolvement of Turkish asylum system in the face of the three cases of influxes, and archive research of three newspapers of the relevant time periods to extract the discourse of state officials. Using written record as data for analysis has several advantages for research, such as allowing access to subjects that is not possible to reach directly, being nonreactive, allowing analysis over time, and increasing sample size above what would be possible with interviews or direct observation (Buttolph Johnson and Reynolds 2008: 290-291). Using

written record in the form of rhetoric recorded in daily newspapers provides a relatively representative and historically comparable data for analyzing the state's discourse. Review of evolving immigration and asylum laws and regulations across the periods complement the archival research by telling the official state policies. Based on these forms of data, content and discourse analysis are conducted using the framework of IR theories.

Content analysis is a widely used research method that can be employed either quantitatively or qualitatively, in an inductive or deductive way. Deductive content analysis begins with preexisting theoretical understandings and predefined categories and is a useful method for testing preexisting theories rather than developing new ones (Ezzy 2002: 83-84). While analyzing the content of data in this study, I keep in mind the main concepts and arguments of IR theories as implicit categories, using the three broad categories of theories described in Chapter 2.2. This way, I analyze the content of the secondary data and findings of the archival research with deductive content analysis method using the IR theories as categories. Under each case, state policies and the rhetoric will be examined from the standpoint of different IR theories to conclude which one(s) have more explanatory power with their main arguments. Content analysis method, employed qualitatively, can be used for interpretative discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is fundamentally concerned with the analysis of language, and is a qualitative method of "uncovering some of the ways in which people or groups (or actors and agents as they are often termed in discourse analysis) seek to represent their actions in texts and language" (Jacobs 2006: 138, cited in Vromen 2010: 264). In this sense, the language used by relevant Turkish authorities regarding the three cases of mass refugee flows throughout the years is analyzed with the data found via newspaper archives.

Qualitative analysis relies on quotations, comments, and anecdotes to provide evidence for arguments (Buttolph Johnson and Reynolds 2008: 244). Qualitative use of texts and documentary sources makes meaning from them to "tell the story," or "recreate a historical sequencing of events" (Vromen 2010: 262). The qualitative analysis of the official state policies and news articles of the three periods in this thesis "tells the story" of the Turkish response in the face of mass refugee flows in the past three decades. Thus the interpretation of data is made qualitatively rather than coding and quantitatively analyzing the use of certain terms, a method that has its advantages as well as disadvantages. It mainly relies on quotations and comments made by the Heads of State, the Prime Ministers,

Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other related ministers and political actors regarding the refugee flows of the respective periods. They are qualitatively interpreted and categorized under IR theories. Remarks regarding national self-interest, border security or military power, for example, are regarded as realist sentiments. Emphasis on liberal democratic values, economic cooperation, resort to international institutions to resolve dilemmas of cooperation and their effect on state policies relate to the main arguments of liberal and neoliberal institutionalist theories. The discourse based on identity, norms, and indicators of their historical and social construction are considered under the constructivist and English School theories.

Three newspapers are chosen for the collection of data for analysis: Cumhuriyet, Milliyet and Türkiye. They are selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, because they have been printed in all of the three periods this thesis studies, ensuring continuity of research throughout the decades. Another reason for choosing those three newspapers was to grasp a more representative picture of the state discourse. To have a broader understanding of state discourse regarding the refugee flows three newspapers representing different ideologies are chosen. While Cumhuriyet can be classified as more of a leftist/Kemalist newspaper, Milliyet is a more centrist and popular newspaper appealing to the general public and Türkiye is more rightist, with a religious as well as nationalist language. Although I look at the speeches and declarations of state officials, and not the discourse of the newspaper, the language they use can effectively impact the understanding of what was implied from their words. Thus having such a range provides more objective data to get an unbiased idea of the discourse of the Turkish state regarding refugees during those time periods.

A ten-day span is given before the start of refugee flows and after their end for research. Since the Syrian refugee influx is an ongoing case, data search was made until the end of 2016 for the third case. For the case of Bulgarian Turks, it reviews those three newspapers from mid-May 1989 to the end of August. A total of 236 newspaper articles between the dates of May 10 and August 31 relating to the forced movement of people from Bulgaria to Turkey are scanned and analyzed in terms of the discourse of the Turkish state officials. It comes to an average of 78 articles per newspaper, with the issue being one of the main subjects of news almost every day during the summer of 1989. For the second case of Iraqi refugees, it looks at the news from the beginning of March 1991 to the end of April. A total of 128 newspaper articles between the dates of March 1 and April 30 are found and

reviewed, which makes an average of 43 news articles per newspaper about the issue within a two-month period.

Because both of the influxes in the Bulgarian and Iraqi cases happened as movement of mass numbers in a very short period of time, all relevant data is found within periods of 2-3 months. The case of Syrians is different, however, as it has been going on for more than 5 years now with several periods of mass flows throughout the years. This required a different method of research which was more selective since it was not possible to review all related newspaper articles for five years, and most newspapers have online archives now. Along with archive research for the first months of the refugee flow in 2011 and selected significant periods of each following year, key term search was conducted to find relevant news covering a five-year period from the beginning of the influx in 2011 to the end of 2016. For Cumhuriyet, newspaper articles from March to August 2011; March, April, August, November 2012; March, May, August, December 2013, and September 2014 were reviewed in the archives. Related news in 2015 and 2016 are found online. For Milliyet, March to August 2011 and for Türkiye, September to December 2013 are scanned in the archives and online search is conducted from 2011 to 2016. Around 200 news articles from the same newspapers, found with a combination of archive research and key term search relating to the discourse of Turkish state about the flight of Syrian refugees to the country are reviewed to grasp the main reaction of the state similar to the other cases. The analysis of state response to the Syrian refugee crisis also relied more on secondary examination of laws and regulations, as the Turkish state has moved towards a more comprehensive and formal international protection regime during the period. The third case may also differ from the others as the state discourse might have changed during those five years, and also might differ for different ethnic groups among Syrian refugees. Those issues are taken into account while making the analysis in Section 4.3 and the concluding analysis.

A set of questions is used to analyze the response of the state towards mass refugee flows throughout the course of those movements:

1. What was the discourse of the state before refugees started arriving at Turkish borders regarding the country of origin and the situation in the country causing people to flee?
2. What was the initial reaction of state officials when people started to arrive at/cross the borders claiming asylum in Turkey?

3. Did the state follow an open border policy or restrict entry for the group in question? Did the border policy change in time?
4. Which names did the state officials use when referring to different groups of refugees?
5. Did the state claim responsibility unilaterally to deal with the mass influx or mainly resort to international bodies?
6. Which, if any, laws or regulations were put in place specifically regarding the refugees at the time?
7. Did the state facilitate integration of the refugee population in the country or push for other long-term solutions such as voluntary repatriation and resettlement?
8. What was the discourse regarding the future of refugees in the country?
9. Did the state policy and discourse change over time?
10. What happened to the refugee population in the end?

These questions are asked for the three periods of mass refugee flows to have a thorough and comparable understanding of the state response. In the case of the Syrian refugees, the end is not clear yet as what their future in the country will be is not certain. The first two cases, as well as the response of the state up to this date are used to come up with predictions about the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

1.4 Methodological Limitations

News give the information about what the Prime Ministers, Presidents, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Interior or other relevant state officials of the three eras said and makes it possible to infer the general reaction of the state towards the incoming populations. They are used to find answers for the questions above. Using this data, I analyze the state response by comparing the different discourse used in the face of three refugee flows, and try to explain these differences in the approach of the state using IR theories. It can be argued that the case of mass refugee flow from Syria is not comparable to the other cases because of the lack of a time span after its completion, for it is an ongoing case of refugee influx. However, since the five years the influx from Syria began, there has been an evolving response from the state in terms of laws and regulations as well as policies; and it can be argued that the movement has actually moved into the integration phase. Although it is possible that there will be changes in Turkish government's policies regarding Syrian refugees or research will

tell a different story in retrospective, I reason that the five-year response gives enough information for this research.

As mentioned in Section 1.2, this study only focused on mainstream IR theories as theoretical frameworks to analyze the Turkish state's refugee response, and not numerous variations within each theory or other critical theories of IR, which was not possible within the scope of this thesis. This presents a methodological limitation, and it is only a preliminary study that brings policies for mass forced displacement together with IR theory. One of the other weaknesses of this method is that it looks at the discourse of officials, which may not always reflect the real motives behind the behavior of states. However, although it is not quite possible to know the actual motives behind state behavior, they can be inferred by looking at the action and the discourse. Interviews with state officials from the three periods could provide additional useful data, but they were not possible due to time constraints and inability to reach them. Another weakness related to the issue of generalizability is looking at the case of one country to analyze the explanatory power of IR theories. It does not claim to be generalizable to each case of mass refugee flow throughout history, but it makes a descriptive analysis of state reaction within different contexts in Turkey. The conclusions regarding the relevance of IR theories can be generalizable to motives of state behavior more broadly.

1.5 Contents of the Chapters

The next chapter, *Chapter II*, provides a detailed theoretical and analytical background in two parts. The first part concerns the development and characteristics of the IRR within the broader international human rights regime. It provides a brief history of how the regime has evolved and of its main institution for execution, the UNHCR. It then looks at the relationship between the state and the IRR, as the state is the subject of analysis in this study. It examines the nation-state as the source of refugee flows, looks at the role of the nation-state system for producing *en masse* displacement, and also as the responding actor by itself as well as part of the international state system. The third subsection of the first part assesses the main shortcomings of international refugee protection, especially within the context of mass refugee flows. Since this study focuses on cases of mass influxes of refugees specifically, it explains the concept of mass flows in more detail. The second part of Chapter

II provides a brief account of theories of IR, focusing on how we can explain the response of states to mass refugee flows with the main premises of main IR theories. The first subsection examines realism and neorealism, the second subsection liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism, and the third constructivism and the English school.

Chapter III aims to historicize mass migration to Turkey, examine the immigration and asylum regime of the country, and put three cases into context. The first part of the chapter assesses the laws and regulations concerning asylum and immigration in Turkey. Since the country did not have a comprehensive law regarding international protection until 2013, the evolution of the regime starting with the foundation of the republic and changes throughout the years are explained. It also looks at the main factors behind changes in the immigration and asylum policies of the country. The second part of Chapter III gives a general overview of the history of mass flows into Turkey, starting with the tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and then details the history of three cases. The main reasons and developments behind displacement of Bulgarian Turks, Iraqi Kurds and Syrians, as well as the initial reaction of Turkey to those movements are explained.

Chapter IV analyzes the response of the respective Turkish governments during three eras using the discourse used by state officials. Through review of the data collected from newspapers, it looks at the language and discourse state officials used regarding the influx of refugees. It aims to compare and analyze the discourse in each case using different IR theories with a subsection under each case. *Chapter V* concludes the thesis with a general review of the study and analysis of the findings, as well as discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the thesis and prospects for future research in this area.

CHAPTER II:

THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND: THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME AND THEORIES OF IR

2.1 The International Refugee Regime and States

This section discusses the emergence and development of the international regime on refugee protection, the role of the state within this regime, and main problems of it. International cooperation has immensely increased and several organizations emerged to coordinate a wide range of issues on the global level since the second half of the past century, and those organizations and states have been mutually constituting and impacting each other's behavior in several areas, including refugee protection. Thus, when we try to analyze how states respond to mass refugee flows, it is fundamental to look at the characteristics of the international regime on this regard and the state of the international arena in the relevant periods first. This section examines the features of the IRR, its interaction with individual states, and identifies its merits as well as problems.

Although the existence of refugees as we define them today go long back in the history, formal international recognition and emergence of institutions took place only after, and with the effect of the World Wars. However, whether the principles those institutions were built on, or their mandate still suits the reality of current refugee movements is a point of discussion, which brings us to the problematic features of the IRR. To situate the state in the regime of global refugee protection, the relatively new states system, making nation-state the universal form of political unit and leading to both creation of refugees and the international response to them will be discussed. We define concepts like refugee via constructing a whole set of meanings and assumptions around them. Certain norms, rules and regulations develop from the interaction of individuals, states and international organizations (IOs). First, I discuss the emergence of concepts, definitions, the international cooperation and the development of organizations such as the UNHCR, which was founded to institutionalize and regulate the global response to refugee flows, as well as a few of the other significant intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies of the IRR.

2.1.1 Development of the IRR and the UNHCR

The conception of refuge, as in being forced to exile because of political, religious, or socioeconomic conditions is as old as the history of human existence. The texts from Ancient India and Ancient Jewish traditions, from the history of pre-Islamic Arabs to the flight of Mohammed to Medina, to the Aztecs of the Americas show the prevalence of refuge and asylum in history (Plaut 1995; Marfleet 2006; Loescher 2001a). However, today, refugees are mostly perceived as a phenomenon of the modern world, and of the Third World countries (Loescher 1993). That is because the term was not defined until the modern era, and refugees were not perceived as they are today before the consolidation of the nation-state system. The category of people we now call refugees did not have trouble finding a place to resettle, contrary to the new environment of inhospitality towards non-members in the nation-state in the 20th century (Plaut 1995: 8). We need to understand the peculiarities of the post-World Wars era to rightly assess the developments regulating refugee movements. The notions of sanctuary and asylum are ancient, but the idea of the refugee is modern (Marfleet 2006: 98). The unwanted refugee populations of the international system of nation-states are different from the exiles of previous centuries, who found refuge much more easily. While they were regarded as assets until the 20th century, they have become liabilities in time (Loescher 2001a: 21). Thus one needs to look at the changes in the international states system to understand the changing perception of the refugee. The refugee, today, performs as an “imagined threat to the good order and to the health of Western societies” (Marfleet 2006: 15). The conception of the refugee has been, and continuously is being redefined with the changing structures of global politics.

It will suffice here to state that the creation of refugees and the refugee regime is intimately linked to the spread of the nation-state; the relationship between the state and the IRR will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. The international regime of refugee protection, too, was the result of a new understanding of the global political system, and resulting cooperation between nation-states in the 20th century. The IRR is defined as

...the collection of conventions, treaties, intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies, precedent, and funding which governments have adopted to support to protect and assist those displaced from their country by persecution, or displaced by war in some regions of the world where agreements or practice

have extended protection to persons displaced by the general devastation of war, even if they are not specifically targeted for persecution (Keely 2001: 303).

I use the term regime to include any formal or informal norms and rules governing international refugee protection whether or not they are explicit in conventions or treaties. The establishment of the IRR was closely linked to not only the rise of nation-state as the universal form of the modern state, but also the emergence of the human rights regime after the World Wars. The first intergovernmental arrangements relating to the protection of displaced populations started in 1921, when President of the International Committee of the Red Cross addressed the Council of League of Nations concerning Russians in Europe, who did not have any status or protection, after which a High Commissioner for Russian refugees was appointed (Goodwin-Gil and McAdam 2007: 421). The scope and functions of programs expanded over the next two decades, and two refugee organizations with different mandates were founded: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) and the International Refugee Organization (IRO) (Loescher 2001a: 22). As such, the development of an international regime for refugee protection actually started before the establishment of an international human rights regime; and they came to be closely linked afterwards.

Refugee and asylum law is based on three main bodies of international law: International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Customary International Law (CIL). It is stated in Article 14.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from prosecution” (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] 1948). This article created the legal basis on which the international regime of refugee protection strengthened its roots. The other articles of UDHR, such as non-discrimination (Articles 2 and 7), detention (Articles 3 and 9), torture, inhuman treatment or punishment (Article 5), the right to nationality (Article 15) as well as socioeconomic rights to work, education and an adequate standard of living are closely related to the specific situations of refugees as well (Harvey 2015: 48).

IHRL is non-derogable, which means it applies under all circumstances and cannot be taken away or compromised. UDHR sets out its principles but by itself, it does not obligate the states. Thus more specific treaties and integration of the principles into domestic laws are required. IHL is the law that governs war situations, which makes it highly relevant to

refugee law because it concerns situations that cause the fleeing of refugee populations. CIL covers universal principles that have derived from custom, and it relates to principles such as *non-refoulement*, which protects refugees to be returned to their countries of origin where their lives will be in danger. These several bodies of international human rights law overlap, providing additional space to claim rights. The principle of *non-refoulement* prohibits states to “expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (UNGA 1951: Art. 33(1)). This principle stands out among other protection measures provided for refugees because it has become universally accepted as a CIL.

Thus refugees are not only protected under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, but also within the scope of human rights standards and institutions like all those forcibly displaced (Harvey 2015: 44). Nevertheless, the building bloc of IRR was the establishment of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and subsequent adoption of the Convention after the Second World War. United Nations General Assembly formally adopted the Statute of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on 14 December 1950, defining its work as humanitarian, social and of an entirely non-political character (UNGA 1951). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees [hereinafter, “1951 Refugee Convention”] entered into force on 22 April 1954, and has been the centerpiece of international refugee protection since. The 1951 Refugee Convention was originally created as a reaction to European political developments, and Eurocentric in scope as it only recognized European refugees, and with a time limitation (Plaut 1995; Hathaway 2011; UNGA 1951; Loescher 1993 among others). The original Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention defined refugees as persons who

As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNGA 1951).

Article B (1) of the Convention stated that “the events occurring before 1 January 1951,” could be understood to mean either (a) “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951,” or (b) “events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951,” leaving it to the contracting states to specify their obligations. The original idea behind limiting the geography and time of who falls under the category of refugee was the expectation that refugee flows were going to stop and the protection regime was temporary. However, political considerations, in the context of an intensifying Cold War, and foreign policy priorities of major Western governments were instrumental in the creation of a Eurocentric, specifically targeted refugee regime as well (Loescher 2001a: 7).

As the reality of the world proved those expectations of ending refugee crises entirely wrong, the scope of the Convention has extended, removing the time and geographical limitations with the only amendment that has been made to the 1951 Refugee Convention since. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees omitted the words “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951” from the 1951 Refugee Convention, and declared that it shall be applied without any geographical limitation (UNGA 1967). Nevertheless, some signatory states maintained some of the previous provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention and kept reservations. As of April 2015, Congo, Madagascar, Monaco and Turkey are the states that adopted alternative (a) upon acceding to the 1967 Protocol and preserved the geographical limitation (UNHCR). From the 1960s onwards, the focus of the IRR has shifted away from Europe to the Third World as the geographical origin of refugee movements changed (Loescher 1993: 4). “Well-founded fear of persecution” did not cover the main cause of international displacement especially in those Third World contexts. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa to bridge the formal definition and the reality of refugee movements in the region. In the convention, the definition of refugee was extended to cover every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality (OAU 1969),

in addition to those defined as refugees in Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. This was an important addition to the concept of refugee as the causes of displacement stated

in this article constitute a large part of the causes of fleeing, but it is important to note that the definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention has not changed.

There are two types of definitions of refugee, determined by different concerns (Kirişci 1991: 511). The first one tries to find a balance between interest of refugees and sovereignty of states, while the second one is broader including a wider category of people (ibid: 511-512). Even though NGOs and IOs such as UNHCR tend to interpret the refugee definition rather broadly, states have the ability to use the narrow definition, denying access to rights for large numbers of *de facto* refugees. The definitions and a whole range of meanings surrounding the term refugee have evolved along with transformations in the global political scene, with interaction of various actors in the international regime of refugee protection. The conventions, treaties, definitions, norms, and a wide range of actors including states, the UNHCR, and other intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies comprise the IRR, which has been changing since its formation in the 1950s with changes of the interactions of above mentioned actors. The relationship between the states and intergovernmental organizations is worth the debate within the IR theory framework because although they were created by states, organizations such as the UNHCR has moved beyond what was intended initially by the states on many levels. Like many of its counterparts, it started to exercise power autonomously in ways unintended by the Western governments in its creation (Loescher 2001a: 35).

The UNHCR has extended its mandate, dealing with a broader category of displaced persons, including the internally displaced, returnees, and victims of war besides the refugees. The numbers of refugee flows, as well as their complexity have immensely increased since the establishment of the IRR, creating challenges to UNHCR, which is chronically understaffed and underfunded, to provide protection to those vulnerable populations (Loescher 1993: 5). Figure 1 shows the numbers of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons, which reached historically record numbers by the end of 2015. Although the budget of UNHCR has grown from US \$300,000 in its first year to US \$6.8 billion in 2015, the organization is supposed to respond to a population of concern of 63.9 million people worldwide, including 40.8 million internally displaced people, 16.1 million refugees (excluding Palestinian refugees that are under the mandate of UNRWA), 3.7 million stateless people and more than 3.2 million asylum seekers (UNHCR 2016). In the year of 2015, 24 people on average were displaced from their homes every minute, totaling to 12.4

million newly displaced people due to conflict or persecution (ibid.). These numbers reveal the magnitude and complexity the IRR faces, pointing to the need of a more comprehensive regulation of refugee protection including participation of all states, more secure international institutions and definitions inclusive of all populations that are displaced.




Figure 1: Global forced displacement (1989-2015)

(Source: Internally Displaced Persons: IDMC, Refugees and Asylum Seekers: UNHCR)

Besides the UNHCR, there are other significant IOs such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), numerous national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that serve directly to the specific needs of refugees and other displaced persons, or do advocacy for fulfillment of their rights, affecting policies and behaviors of states. Nevertheless, the states are the main actors providing protection to those whose states of nationality are not able to do so. And the control over their borders and over who gets admitted into a country as an immigrant or refugee is an area where states hold on to their sovereignty firmly, where “states continue to be the gate-keeper” (Kirişci 2000: 14). The IRR is in fact regarded as an exception among international regimes that has been able to affect immigration policies of individual countries, while the European Union (EU) is an exception

in terms of supranational organizations (Meyers 2000: 1266). There is the notable exception of the EU as a regional organization, that has affected immigration and asylum policies of not only the member-states but also candidate countries like Turkey, whose role will be examined in Section 3.1. The role of the state in IRR will be discussed in the following subsection.

2.1.2 Situating the State in the International Refugee Regime

States, whether they are the origin or host of refugee populations, or third parties, are among those various crucial actors of the IRR. The legal occupation of the refugee in the international law is characterized by principles of state sovereignty, territorial supremacy and self-preservation on the one hand, and competing principles of humanitarian law on the other hand (Goodwin-Gil and McAdam 2007: 1). The emergence and development of the refugee regime was explored in the previous section, which can briefly be defined again as the set of rules, norms and decision-making procedures that regulate states' behavior towards refugees (Betts 2011: 56). As attractive as to think that universally accepted human rights are the new norm, international standards require clear and consistent acceptance by individual states to make a real impact (Hathaway 2011: 18). Thus the state is still a crucial actor for forming and sustaining international human rights regimes, one of which being the IRR. The state comes into the picture in two ends of refugee movements: the creation of them, and the response towards populations fleeing to their territories. There are thus two major questions to ask about the relation between the state and the refugee flows. First, how do the nation-state and the international system of states create refugees, while also using them to consolidate this system of nation-states? Second, why did the system of states form an international regime of refugee protection; which factors influence the acceptance, or the lack thereof, of population flows to their territories within that regime, and shape their response to those refugees?

When we start by looking at the source of refugee movements, we inevitably encounter the modern notion of the state, a state with certain territorial boundaries and built upon the idea of a nation, to which only those who have the citizenry bond belong. Reconstruction of the world as comprised of nation-states reshaped almost every dimension of human existence (Hollifield 2008: 140). It reshaped the understandings of human belonging, determining who is under the protection of those political units, and who is the outsider. As the world is imagined to be comprised of mutually exclusive, territorially bounded areas, the

refugee has become only an irregularity, who does not properly belong anywhere (Soguk 1999: 11). This binary of insider-outsider of the nation-state manifests itself to a great extent in conceptualization of the refugee in the modern states system.

Such individuals do not fit into the state-citizen-territory hierarchy, but are forced, instead, into the gaps *between* states. Indeed, it is the somewhat imperfect mixture of sovereignty, borders and territory that makes the states system responsible for the creation of refugees, rather than other systems generated by the complex interactions of human communities under the condition of late modernity (Haddad 2008: 7).

The states, thus, merely by being nation-states, create the refugees of the modern world. The nation-state model of the modern world has inherent contradictions and tensions, leading to three sources of refugee production: multinational realities, ideological disagreement and state failure (Keely 1996: 1052). These are not only exceptionalities, but also rather widespread and inevitable realities of the system. A superficial glance at the world, taking concepts like the nation-state and territorial sovereignty as given, inevitable realities of the global system would see the refugee as an anomaly in this order. However, the refugee is an “inevitable, if unintended” (Haddad 2008: 1) consequence of the global system of nation-states. If the 65.3 million forcibly displaced of the world were a nation, they would make up the 21st largest one in the world (UNHCR 2016: 2). While refugee production is engrained in the geopolitical structure, based on the assumption that countries should be organized as nation-states, it is the key to understand not only the political basis of refugee production but also policies developed towards refugees by governments (Keely 1996: 1046). Thus we look at the modern state as the producer of the refugee, not only because of behavior threatening the life of certain individuals under its authority, but also because it bases its claim to sovereignty on a nation.

Here, we should go beyond the understanding of the refugee as a problem, an abnormal feature of the otherwise functioning nation-state system, but rather as an integral part of the international system based on state sovereignty. In this sense, presence of refugees acted as a paradoxical element of the system of state sovereignty, being both disruptive and restorative of the sovereignty discourse of the state (Soguk 1999: 15). Whether we look at the causes of refugee movements or the states’ response to them, this intimate relationship between the system of state sovereignty and forced migration should be in the back of our

minds. While the unwillingness of states to grant asylum may result from concerns of sovereignty, their behavior towards refugee populations, once they are within the borders, can be seen as attempts to somehow place and use them to strengthen the state discourse.

Moving to the state at the other end of refugee movements, we examine how a state responds to incoming populations, and why so. Is it really a fundamental dilemma between a nation's perceived or real interests, and the needs of refugees (Plaut 1995: 3)? Domestic considerations of refugee-receiving states inevitably play a role in their response to incoming populations. There has hardly ever been a time when states accepted refugees without making political calculations or discriminating on certain aspects while granting asylum (Loescher 2001a: 6). If in the nation-state, the citizens belong, and all others are aliens, (Keely 1996: 1051), the state faces a significant dilemma when faced with flows of those "aliens." The nation-state needs to somehow incorporate the flow of immigrants, who are not a part of the state-citizen relationship to its claim to and discourse of sovereignty. The states, in general, do not simply deny access of anyone who is outside the nation to their borders of sovereignty. They develop a range of policies, depending on various factors such as the characteristics of the incoming populations, domestic concerns and influence of international mechanisms.

The states were the main actors cooperating to formulate the IRR in the first place. The global refugee regime is considered to be a 'statist' regime in the literature of global governance (Betts and Loescher 2014: 5). The signatory countries to the 1951 Refugee Convention accepted certain obligations towards refugees, and imposed some sort of an institutional constraint on themselves by doing so, even if it is only a minimal constraint (Haddad 2008: 95). It is important to understand how the interaction has been between individual states and the IRR, including intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies and organizations like the UNHCR. The IRR is indisputably dependent on cooperation between states, and impossible to sustain without recognition of the need to burden-sharing, preventing successive movements and addressing the human suffering (Stavropoulou 2008: 2). Thus the refugee issue is an issue of global governance, and without looking at the state of the global it would not be possible to adequately assess the response of the state on the national level.

Examining the interaction among the states, the international refugee law, other agencies of the IRR, and the individuals it aims to protect, we come across the issue of

whether there is indeed a right to receive asylum vis-à-vis the state's right to oust non-citizens. For anyone to enjoy the rights granted to refugees, the asylum applications should be accepted by the state. While the right to asylum is granted under UDHR (Art. 14(1)) and the 1951 Refugee Convention, there is no corresponding obligation on the sides of the states to grant asylum. Thus in the international law, the right to asylum is commonly interpreted as the right to apply for asylum, rather than the definite right to asylum (Worster 2014: 477). For the right to receive asylum to *de facto* exist, states need to incorporate it into their domestic law. Thus the existence of the right by itself does not guarantee any protection unless there is general state adherence. The 1951 Refugee Convention leaves considerable room for discretion by the signatory states on deciding the status of refugees and determining their responsibilities (Zetter 1999: 49). Nevertheless, it does not mean that international institutions are powerless vis-à-vis the states.

The UNHCR, along with other IOs, INGOs and NGOs, employ various mechanisms and tactics to ensure states grant asylum and provide the rights to refugees specified in the 1951 Refugee Convention and related treaties, although the asylum decisions have always been, and will be under the discretion of states (Betts and Loescher 2014: 5). As an international humanitarian institution, its mechanisms include persuasion by teaching, cuing, acculturation by various tactics like shaming, and coercion to a lesser extent (Stavropoulou 2008: 5). The UNHCR acts as the leading agency in coordinating refugee assistance in almost every crisis, and greatly affects how a refugee crisis enters the international domain along with other agents such as NGOs and the media (Zetter 1999: 57). Thus it has a profound effect on how the crises are globally perceived in the first place. International institutions, even though they are created by states, evolve to have a life of their own after a certain point. While some level of dependency is always present, it is hard to imagine states claiming authority back from international institutions and regimes once consolidated. After the establishment of the IRR and the UNHCR as the main authority in the field, especially in the late 1950s, two major political events, the Hungarian Revolution and Algerian War of Independence, to which UNHCR had successfully responded, led to its increasing independence and international reputation (Loescher 2001a: 81). However, neither the IRR nor UNHCR and its other agencies are free from major shortcomings. The next section will explore the main flaws of the international protection regime given the characteristics of refugee flows in today's world.

2.1.3 Mass Flows and Shortcomings of the IRR

Even though the scope of the 1951 Geneva Convention extended with the 1967 Protocol lifting the time and geographical limitations, and the definition of the refugee has evolved in practice to include a broader category of reasons of displacement (see Section 2.1.1), the IRR in its current working does not entirely correspond with the current reality of international forced displacement in the world. The UNHCR has been a relatively independent, reputable authority in international refugee protection, but it also has always lagged behind the reality of forced migration in the world. When we look at the mass flows of refugees in recent decades, we see the inadequacy of the individualistic nature of the international regime of refugee protection. Refugee law remains as an incomplete legal protection regime, somewhat covering situations that are supposed to be exceptions (Goodwin-Gil and McAdam 2007: 1). However, those situations have barely been exceptions, and the sources and characteristics of refugee flows have been significantly different than those defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Briefly, the major problems of the international refugee law are that it does not address large numbers of displaced peoples including those who do not fit the persecution standard in the 1951 Refugee Convention and stateless refugees; there are no conventions on the issue of resettlement, and it does not deal with mass expulsions (Plaut 1995: 139). The problems I put most emphasis on here are the issues of resettlement and mass flows. There is an immense lack of burden-sharing in the refugee regime. Refugee populations are concentrated in neighboring countries of the countries of origin, in the Global South. Even when they are supposed be resettled in third countries, it takes place in a very small scale compared to the numbers of those fleeing and staying in neighboring countries. The second one is the individualistic nature of the international refugee law, and the reality of mass flows.

The definition of who is entitled to protection as a refugee is precise under the 1951 Refugee Convention, but it leaves out increasingly large numbers of displaced people who are not categorized as individuals fleeing persecution (Loescher 1993: 6). Given the reality of today's main causes of displacement, namely war, ethnic and civil conflict, and general environment of insecurity caused by policies of the state of origin targeting certain groups of people rather than individuals, it raises questions about the validity of the formal refugee definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The IRR was built on an individualistic base from the start. International conventions define the refugee in individualistic terms and

provide rights implied in the sense of the particular (Goodwin-Gil and McAdam 2007: 427). Thus it is not clear how the regime can deal with massive numbers of people fleeing within a short period of time, not always falling under the definition set out by the 1951 Refugee Convention. Mass flows, which is a central concept of this study, refers to those situations where a sudden displacement of high numbers of people between borders occur in a short period of time, by government persecution or as a result of armed conflict, whether or not they have been specifically targeted for persecution. Mass flows need to be conceptually separated and defined in the international law as it makes a great deal of difference on every dimension of displacement, from the conditions of fleeing to the response of destination countries.

Even though there is a statutory injunction that UNHCR's work can relate to groups and categories of refugees, a major part of its work has been concerned with individual cases. (Goodwin-Gil and McAdam 2007: 427). The first time UNHCR faced with mass refugee flows was as early as the displacement following the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. It was assumed that all fleeing Hungarians were *prima facie* refugees, despite the individual fear of persecution requirement under the 1951 Refugee Convention (Loescher 2001a: 85). It is remarkable how after more than half a century, and despite the fact that refugee movements have increasingly been in mass flows, the international regime has not officially changed to account for them. As the numbers increased, the willingness to help has decreased, and existing laws have not been enough to deal with the challenge (Plaut 1995: 139). Instead of developing a wider vision to confront the new challenges of refugee movements, there has been a general attitude of restriction and strengthening existing laws and institutions (*ibid.*). This leads us to the discrepancy in hosting refugee populations among the countries of the world.

The other significant challenge for refugee protection, especially in cases of mass flows, is the lack of burden-sharing among less and more developed countries of the world. As discussed in above sections, the scene of refugee flows has significantly changed from the immediate post-World War II period to post-1980s. Until the 1980s, arrival of asylum seekers from Africa, Asia and the Middle East in more developed countries of the West in significant numbers was not observed (UNHCR 1997: 189). Beginning in this period, there has been a discourse of having 'asylum crisis' in the West, not taking into account the fact that the real crisis was happening in poorer regions of the world (*ibid.*). Still today, in surge of the

growing numbers of Syrian refugees, there is a perception of “European refugee crisis” in the West, even though their rate of asylum acceptances is not even comparable to those remaining in developing countries of the region.

The overwhelming majority of refugees do not only come from developing countries of the South but also are hosted there, while there is no formal obligation in IRR on developed countries of the North to support and share the burden (Betts 2011: 54). Provision of material assistance forms the core of relief programs by the West, while many argue effective protection has been compromised because of this attitude (Zetter 1999: 57). A clear dichotomy exists between host governments of the North, which are geographically distant and have instruments to limit the flow of refugees, and countries of the South that have been experiencing mass influxes (ibid.: 67). Instead of taking a larger share of the burden, the developed countries of the West have imposed new ways to protect their borders and decrease asylum acceptances in recent decades. Figure 2 shows the rates of refugees hosted in developing and developed countries between the years 1989 and 2015. By the end of 2015, 86 percent of the world’s refugees under UNHCR’s mandate, or 13.9 million people, were hosted by less developed countries of the world while the least developed countries provided asylum to 26 percent of the global total (UNHCR 2016: 2).




Figure 2: Refugees in developing versus developed countries (1989-2015)

(Sources: UNHCR Global Trends 2013, UNHCR Global Trends 2015)

The IRR is as political as it is humanitarian. Political considerations significantly affect how the problem is presented as well as how the states respond to refugee flows. Numbers and figures can be manipulated in line with the interests of powerful actors. Officials in dominant countries might have an interest in showing falling numbers, depicting a more peaceful, prosperous world with neo-liberalism; or using increasing numbers as a justification for intervention underlining repressive regimes (Marfleet 2006: 15). Refugees often become subjects of fierce policy debates in the host countries. Refugee regimes affect and are vastly affected by domestic political considerations as well as relations between countries. The next section aims to place the refugee regime discussed in this section within the IR discipline by looking from different perspectives of the mainstream IR theories.

2.2 Theories of International Relations and Refugee Regimes from Different Perspectives

The beginning theoretical standpoint of this study is that there is a need to situate refugee studies within the IR literature. Even though refugee movements and responses by the host states are shaped by relations among countries to a great extent, and two disciplines have a lot to share, forced migration and particularly refugee movements have rarely been studied within a framework of IR. Political scientists and IR scholars arrived late in the study of international migration in general, not only refugee studies, while migration theory was dominated by economic and sociological explanations for a long time (Hollifield 2008: 137). The little systematic attempt to study what central concepts of IR have to offer to the analysis of forced migration is surprising, considering the important relationship between world politics and refugee movements (Betts and Loescher 2011: 11). Whichever perspective of IR is taken to examine migration and forced displacement, scholars agree that two disciplines should interact more than they have so far.

One reason of this disconnection might have been, as discussed in the previous section, the idea of temporality of the refugee “problem.” Post-World War II, Eurocentric refugee regime was formed as if flow of refugees was a short-term phenomenon in the beginning, which would not require further action after a point. Thus it was not thought to become a permanent, significant factor in IR. However, the reality of the world has showed that forced

migration is here to stay, continuing even on an increasing scale. As long as the current states system persists, it does and will continue to produce refugee flows, and they are an integral part of IR. Refugees are a matter of human rights, but they are also an inherent part of international politics and the study of forced migration is vastly relevant to the discipline of IR (Betts and Loescher 2011). Mainstream IR theories, although limited to study an inherently multidisciplinary issue as refugees, can highlight the workings of international institutions, provide links between concepts of IR such as democratic peace and refugee protection, or help understand the constitutive impact of norms, ideas, and identity on policy responses of governments (Acharya 2008: 11). On the relation between IR and international migration, Weiner offers three propositions: relations between states are often influenced by the actions or inactions of states vis-à-vis international migration, states affect international migration with their exit and entry rules, and that international migrants often become political forces in the destination country (1985: 441-442). All three would equally hold for the relation between IR and the specific case of mass refugee flows as well.

Especially when we bring the state in the picture, as many scholars argue that we should (Hollifield 2008; Betts and Loescher 2011; Soguk 1999), theories of IR offer valuable insights as to how and why states act in certain ways towards refugee movements. However, there has been even less detailed research on the roles and behavior of the host governments than international and non-governmental organizations, yet alone from an IR framework (Zetter 1999: 67). When we ask why states do or do not provide protection to refugee populations, and how they formulate the policies towards refugee flows the way they do, different theories of IR offer various explanations. Do they do it for self-centric reasons such as expanding power and enhancing security? Is it thanks to the development of international cooperation for refugee protection, and if so, why did they cooperate in the first place? Do they try to restore order in the international society, which is supposedly disrupted by the existence of refugees? The following sections try to answer those questions from perspectives of main IR theories, analyzing their respective strengths and weaknesses for explanation.

2.2.1 Realism and Neorealism

The realist theory of IR is based on the notions of anarchy in the international arena and state as the main actor in IR, which pursues its self-interest. Here, state is defined as a unitary

actor, which views the outside world as an integrated unit and always acts rationally towards it (Meyers 2000: 1263). The theory has five main assumptions about the state: it is the major actor, it is unitary and rational, its motives and actions are shaped by anarchy, it is occupied by considerations of power and security, and its prospects for cooperating with other states is limited (Lee 2006: 140). Interest is defined in terms of power, and is the main determinant of state behavior. Hans Morgenthau, who is considered the founder of the modern realist theory, argues that when states claim to be acting for the interest of others, for humanitarian reasons for instance, they are either lying or they are fooling themselves (Snyder 2011: 30). Classical realism takes human nature as the base of the conflictual nature of IR. Neorealism, the more recent version of the realist theory that is theorized by Kenneth Waltz, maintains the main assumptions of classical realism, but departs from it by focusing on structural factors -such as anarchy and distribution of power- that determine state behavior. While offensive realists see states as power-maximizers and thus expansionists, defensive realists argue that they remain content with the balance in IR as long as their security is preserved (Acharya 2008: 3). Although there are many variations within IR theory, their subject matters of study are similar to a great extent and rarely include immigration or refugee matters.

We infer from the main assumptions of the realist perspective that the immigration policies of states, too, are derived from considerations of national self-interest. From such view, they will regulate migration flows to the extent that they satisfy economic and political interests (İçduygu 2014). They will only open their borders to non-citizens when they see it rational to do so, when they see it as a way to increase their power for various reasons or for security concerns. Rational choice theorists and followers of the realist theory argue that states will only follow human rights norms, irrespective of the international law, when it is in their interest to do so (Goldenziel 2014: 459). Thus if and when they comply with the international refugee law, it is for self-centric, rather than humanitarian reasons. As the realist perspective considers issues of national security the most important ones, migration and refugee policies are studied within a security framework as well, given that they are studied at all. Especially in the context of the Cold War from 1945 to 1990, IR scholars tended to divide political issues into categories of high and low, high politics involving issues of national security, foreign policy, war and peace, and low politics concerned with social and economic issues (Hollifield 2008: 152). Issues of migration or refugee policy have been studied by realist scholars of IR only when they were considered to affect issues of international security.

The realist theory is powerful to explain the refugee regimes and state responses in the 1950s, in the context of the Cold War. During that era, refugee issues were seen within the framework of national security and refugees were indeed instruments of power relations between the Western and Eastern blocs. They became instruments of the Cold War, playing a significant role as sources of information and assets of ideological rivalry between the opposing blocs (Loescher 2001b: 35). Welcoming refugees escaping the communist regime of the Soviet Union in the United States could be used as a tool displaying political power and proof of ideological supremacy. Many other Western governments also privileged refugees from the communist countries as a demonstration of their commitment to the anti-communist and anti-Soviet ideology (Meyers 2000: 1264). What Keely (2001: 308) calls the “Northern refugee regime,” served to create support for opposing and weakening the communist governments.

In the post-Cold War era as well, neorealist scholars tended to see migration and refugee policy as a matter of security. Thus refugee movements and responses of the host state are, or should be studied within a security/stability framework, since concerns over internal stability and international security shape the state behavior, realist scholars argue (Weiner 1993: 3). Since it employs a security framework, the realist perspective views refugee flows more as an independent variable than a dependent variable, looking at the ways in which population movements cause conflict within and between states (ibid.). Their policies and interventions serve to prevent those consequences of refugee flows. When governments of the North engage in intervention and prevention strategies to address the root causes of refugee flows such as intrastate war, they do so mainly because of self-interest in preventing future flows, spillover effects and perceived security threats (Weiner and Münz 1997: 26).

From a realist perspective, states would not provide protection and use their resources for people who are not under their sovereignty unless there is self-interest involved in doing so. The *realpolitik* of the state challenges the basic rights of human beings when they are the outsiders and not part of the citizenry (Plaut 1995: 3). States are reluctant to open their borders because of not only economic but also political considerations such as fear of xenophobic sentiments, conflicts with the local population and rise of extreme right-wing parties (Weiner 1993: 2). It could be argued that the Eurocentric refugee regime in the

aftermath of the Second World War developed to serve the interests of the governments of the West. Indeed, many argue that the refugee regime during the Cold War, which was designed for political purposes, was significantly different than the post-Cold War regime (Keely 2001: 306). The end of the Cold War changed the refugee policies and Western governments started to restrict the flows because they were not matters of international security any more (Weiner and Münz 1997: 25). After the end of the Cold War, it became much more widespread especially for Western governments to close their borders to prevent mass refugee flows, one example being refugees of the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 (Loescher 2001b: 46). Realism has a powerful argument in explaining the changes in refugee policies of the West with the end of Cold War.

To the question of why the international refugee protection regime has continued to exist despite the challenges of restrictionist policies of the West, and broadened its scope both geographically and covering a wider range of displaced people, there are not compelling answers from a realist perspective. The IRR, with increasing role of non-state actors and UNHCR has continued to try to provide protection and relief, and have powerful mechanisms to persuade states to grant asylum despite their resistance. Realism is a statist theory, which maintains states are the most and even only relevant actors in international relations. A statist perspective, which is still dominant in the IR literature on refugees, sees the UNHCR, and any other international organization, merely as mechanisms through which states act (Loescher 2001b: 34). Although it is true that many IOs, INGOs and NGOs are dependent on states to a degree, for funding or permission to operate in their borders, seeing them only as mechanisms of state action does not capture the reality.

The main critics of the realist theory in terms of refugee studies challenge its statist assumption, which does not recognize the independent role of other actors, and its tendency to take concepts such as national interest as given. It is true that states are reluctant to allow refugee flows or grant asylum, and provide for the rights of non-citizens. However, states do provide protection to non-citizens, sometimes despite the existence of political and socio-economic conditions that would suggest they do not (Haddad 2008:15-16). And states have cooperated for founding and sustaining an IRR; and even if it was for self-centric reasons, they cannot simply disregard it because it does not serve their interests any more. Another critique of the realist theory, which holds for other mainstream IR theories as well, is its culture bias- ethnocentrism (Acharya 2008: 7). When we talk about the Cold War refugee

regime and increasing restrictionist policies of states with the end of it, these statements are mainly based on the examples of the Western countries, to give an example. Moreover, realist accounts would not recognize the individual and its place in IR, having an agency and rights, since states are the only significant actors in the international system (Haddad 2008: 13). Realism cannot account for the individuality of the concept of refugee, and its detention from the space of sovereignty of the state.

Political, security and power concerns of states, and considerations of self-interest still inevitably have an impact on how they formulate refugee regimes and act towards refugee populations, more at certain times than others. However, realist theory cannot explain why states have accepted refugee flows and granted asylum when it seemed quite contrary to their interests. It does not account for the role of the international regime of refugee protection, international and non-governmental organizations, regulations, norms and other factors that might affect the state behavior. The realist emphasis on state security and national self-interest is at odds with the liberal emphasis on humanitarianism and the international cooperation for refugee protection (Lee 2006: 141). The liberal theory, on the other hand, although it is a statist theory as well, looks at the merits of cooperation among states, their interdependence, and the role of international institutions.

2.2.2 Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism

The liberal theory of IR assumes a self-evident value system, with commitments to international harmony and cooperation (Degu 2002). Contrary to the pessimism of realism, liberals see relations of states in the international arena with a more optimistic point of view. It sees possibility of cooperation and peace resulting from economic independence, transnational ties, international institutions and spread of democracy (Meyers 2000: 1265). Rationality is a key variable in liberalism just like in realism; but cooperation, rather than conflict among states is regarded as the rational behavior. The international political economy framework to study international migration cues how liberal scholars interpret refugee movements and state response to refugee movements. It explains international migration by focusing on economic inequalities among countries, economic linkages and the role of transnational institutions (Weiner 1993: 3). In terms of the responses to refugees, they see the

role of non-state actors such as IOs and international regimes for solving cooperation problems.

The liberal theory is similar to the realist theory in the sense that it pays close attention to the behavior of states and importance of borders, although it assumes a much weaker significance of the state power (ibid.). The moral value system in the international arena, and the ideal of the universal liberal democratic state put responsibilities on states to provide basic human rights. Hollifield (2008) argues for a theory of “rights-based” liberalism, seeing international migration as a function of rights in addition to economic and sociological factors that were explored by previous scholars. Liberal democracies have developed a powerful human rights framework, and even though which citizenship you have affects to which degree you can actually enjoy those rights, they cannot simply constraint human rights to their citizens. While they have commitments to provide rights and welfare to their citizens, egalitarian values delegitimize privileging the rights of their citizens to those of “outsiders” (Gibney 1999: 173). Thus global values and ideals political liberals argue for requires extending rights to those people whose governments denied them of.

However, looking at the critiques, those normative values of the liberal theory have rarely translated into policy responses by liberal democracies (Acharya 2008: 4). Although the ideal of the liberal democratic state aim at universal human rights for all, liberal democracies have not necessarily provided better protection to asylum-seekers and migrants, more and more embracing closure of borders from 1990s onto the 21st century to keep unwanted asylum-seekers and economic migrants outside.

...the response of liberal democracies has thus far been unimpressive. In the face of citizen anxiety about the economic, cultural and political costs of admitting needy strangers... many states have done little more than fulfill their international law duty not to return to a dangerous state or territory (*refouler*) the seekers of asylum who make it to their borders. There is no doubt that the principle of non-*refoulement* is an important constraint on state sovereignty. But as the primary basis for how states should respond to rising numbers of people forced from homeland, it has proven hopelessly inadequate (Gibney 1999: 169).

Notwithstanding the importance of ideals and liberal democratic values have played in development the of the IRR and several agencies for the protection of the forcibly displaced, there is no clear supremacy of liberal democratic states in terms of extending rights and protection to non-citizens. Although economic liberals advocate freedom of trade and free flow of capital, they do not advocate for free movement of peoples (Weiner 1985: 442). There are also no signs of universalism where those values apply to all humans and human rights regimes gain global validity.

Some contributions of the liberal IR theory that are especially significant for the study of forced migration are the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, human security, and the role of international institutions (Acharya 2008: 4). Human security notion entered the global arena in 1990s, and means "...to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment" (UNTFHS 2009: 5). Its main feature is being human-centric, since it puts the individual, not the state, as the object matter of security. The UNHCR embraced the human security doctrine, which led to expansion of its mandate and some shift in its operations, one being the concept of "safe havens" (Acharya 2008: 9). Humanitarian interventions, another new, liberal doctrine, also gained more legitimacy after the end of the Cold War, compared to higher importance placed on sovereignty in the earlier period, where domestic affairs of states can be subject of international concern (Loescher 2001b: 51). This relates to tackling the roots of refugee flows, rather than responding after the cross-border movements occur, but also to containment with the "safe havens" within the borders of the refugee producing state, rather than protection at the destination.

Contrary to the realist view that international institutions are marginal factors in IR, the liberal theory emphasizes their growing and significant role. The neoliberal institutionalist theory focuses on the role of international institutions and regimes in overcoming dilemmas of common interests and problems of cooperation among states (Meyers 2000: 1266). Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, two prominent scholars of the neoliberal institutionalist theory, took international institutions as the key to explain conflict and cooperation in the global arena, especially in the post-hegemonic era, where economic interdependence has altered the ways states behave (Hollifield 2008: 159). Several scholars argue that the institutionalist model is not in general very applicable to explain immigration policies of individual countries, but the refugee regime is an exception (Meyers 2000: 1266). If there is an

international regime to regulate flows of migrants and refugees, and to solve collective action and free-rider problems, states are more willing to cooperate and open their borders (Hollifield 2008: 161). Values and ideals of liberal democracies, combined with the role of the international regime, make it possible to coordinate the global refugee response. When faced with population flows to their territories, states resort to international institutions and mechanisms of cooperation outside the refugee regime as well, not only for refugee response but also to intervene in the root causes of flows.

The institution of the IRR with 1951 Refugee Convention and cooperation under UNHCR is considered one of the notable exceptions to the undisputed principle of state control over entry and exit to their territories (Hollifield 2008: 141). Even though states still employ extensive border controls, they are willing to accept refugee populations to a certain extent even when it does not seem in their interest to do so, contrary to the arguments of realist accounts. The significant impact of international institutions is undeniable in this regard. When looking at the international regime of refugee protection, identifying the state as the only relevant actor is misleading at best and a conscious effort to disregard the role of other actors at worst. The transition of UNHCR from the Cold War period to today exemplifies how international institutions gain a degree of autonomy and independence from the state power, refuting the notion that states are the only relevant actors of international relations (Loescher 2001b: 36). The main actors include IOs such as UNHCR, NGOs and INGOs, host governments and the refugees themselves (Zetter 1999: 56). Since the 1960s, UNHCR has become an agency that operated in developing countries, as the leading actor of refugee protection with increasing capacity despite overwhelming numbers (Keely 2001: 309).

While the UNHCR is constrained by states, the claim that it is only a passive mechanism dependent on the states' agenda and through which they pursue their interests, does not coincide with the empirical evidence of the past decades (Loescher 2001b: 34). In interaction with other non-state actors such as NGOs and the media, the institution employs autonomous power that is not wholly dependent on states. Even if the IRR and the UNHCR was created to serve the policy goals of Western governments, which can be seen through realist perspective of state power, it began to exercise its power more autonomously (ibid: 35). The neoliberal institutionalist theory is powerful to account for the role of international institutions and regimes, which are of great importance in the global refugee response. The

main drawback of the liberal theory is that it takes the international order, norms and ideas, the nation-state and non-state actors, and most significantly their rationality as given similar to the realist theory, and does not look at the process of how those actors and ideas have been formed. Policy outputs are heavily dependent on ideational, cultural and institutional factors, resulting in groups pursuing policies that might seem irrational (Hollifield 2008: 145). While the liberal theories depend on the assumed rationality of actors similar to realists, though accommodating the rationality of cooperation, newer and more critical theories of IR incorporate those ideational, normative factors into their studies.

2.2.3 Constructivism and the English School

Constructivism has been the most influential theory of IR after the conventional theories of realism and liberalism. Although it is debatable whether constructivism is in the same category with realism and liberalism as a mainstream IR theory, I consider it so in this study. Even though the constructivist IR theory is too diverse and even more non-unified than the other two to explore all its variations here, its fundamental idea is that behavior, interests and relations of various actors in the international arena are socially constructed, thus they change over time (Newman 2001: 247). In the traditional approaches like realism and liberalism, boundaries and identity of the sovereign nation-state are taken to be established and given (Degu 2002). The constructivist paradigm, on the other hand, focuses on how those have been constructed and how they continuously and mutually constitute each other. When looking at migration and refugee policies, unlike realism and liberalism, it takes people and their relations to institutions at the core of its definitions and in explaining policy-making processes (İçduygu 2014). The constructivist theory examines various actors in IR, their relations with each other, the discourse, ideas and norms that govern those relations and argues that those have been historically and socially constructed rather than a consequence of given, inevitable factors.

The structure of the international system in constructivism is not only material but also ideational, where norms and ideas matter, fundamental transformation in the international system is possible, and international institutions and regimes can significantly transform state behavior (Acharya 2008: 6). Beyond the cooperative role of international institutions in liberalism, constructivism allows to see a deeper impact they have by diffusion

of norms and ideals. The significance of identity in the constructivist paradigm of IR is especially valuable for studying responses to forced migration. Besides material calculations, national security, rationality, or universal ideals of human rights, the interaction of the identities of the refugee and the state can determine the state response to refugee flows. Affinities based on ethnicity, for example, can override perceived economic interests in entry decisions (Gibney 1999: 176). These considerations are not easily justified from the realist or liberal perspectives, but do make sense when identity notion of constructivism is taken into account.

The English School regards the modern international system as an international society consisting of a number of states, made up of values, rules and institutions (Haddad 2008: 11). This society of states operates with rules and norms; thus IR is not as anarchic as it is thought to be. The English School scholars emphasize the role of norms and ideas besides material calculations, as well as common interests of the states of the international society that make them establish cooperative rules and institutions in the international arena. There are two different versions of the international society within the English school. Pluralists argue that members of the society of states can agree on only the minimum requirements such as respect for sovereignty and non-intervention, and may not be able to act when it comes to actual enforcement (ibid: 76). The solidarist conception, on the other hand, assumes solidarity among states for the enforcement of law and sees humanitarian intervention in sovereignty of states necessary (ibid: 77). When we look at the refugee regime, we see a mix of those approaches as the society of states formed an international regime of refugee protection, while maintaining the right to decide who can and who cannot enter their territory (ibid: 79).

Haddad accepts the weakness of the English school approach resulting from its assumption of a given, static international society (2008: 13). The constructivist theory fills in this gap by conceptualizing the world politics as socially and historically constructed in which states and other actors interact with structures and global norms, mutually constituting each other (Checkel 1998: 324 in Haddad 2008: 15). Thus the constructivist and international society theories work best when they are employed together to analyze the refugee regimes and state responses to mass refugee flows. Section 2.1.2 looked at the close relationship between the creation of nation-state and the creation of refugees, the relationship most scholars of refugee studies have consensus on. This mutually constituent relationship can be best explained by the constructivist theory of IR, since realism and liberalism take the nation-

state as a given, static concept. The nation-state, however, was constructed mainly by defining the insiders and outsiders of the state sovereignty, a process which inevitably left some outside this state-citizen relationship.

While the English school definition of the concept of refugee as an “inevitable if unintended consequence of the international states system” (Haddad 2008: 1) provides us with a useful tool of analysis, the constructivist understanding of the international states system makes it stronger. As long as there are nation-states, to which only their citizens belong and the others do not, there will be refugees in the world. The post-World War II understanding that regarded the refugee “problem” only as a temporary phenomenon is inherently incorrect from such definition of the refugee; and has proven wrong with history. However, this system of the modern nation-states, the constructivist challenge reminds us, was imagined and constructed within a certain ideological context and is not static (Peterson 2015: 441). The nation-state is constructed, and it continuously constructs the identity of not only its citizens but those of “outsiders” too, including the refugees. Migration can be constructed as an existential threat to the national identity (Czajka 2014: 157), but it can also be constructed in a way to strengthen the national identity and contribute to the daily nation-making process of the nation-state. Identity and construction of identities are among the main concepts of the constructivist theory, and are highly relevant to understand refugee responses of states. How the state defines its own identity, and the identity of those arriving at its territories is a main determinant of the refugee policies.

Looking at the refugee and the nation-state not as given but as constructed concepts makes it possible to see the link between states and refugees, and helps understand the state response to refugee flows to their territories. As explained in Section 2.1.1., who falls under the category of refugees has dramatically changed over time as the IRR has to a certain extent adapted to the reality of the world. The states, the international regime and refugees themselves have mutually constituted each other and continue to do so every day. Hurrell emphasizes the importance of constitutive rules, norms and practices that defines and labels the refugee, determining how they are treated (2011: 87). The constructivist perspective tells us that refugee is not a static, objectively defined term. The concept of refugee cannot be adequately understood if it is seen as a given, uncontested, static figure (Haddad 2008: 8). It is changing and evolving with time, and assumes different meanings in different contexts.

In line with the constructivist thought, the notion of a refugee is not, strictly speaking, a definition (Shacknove 1985: 275). We accept the definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention as universal, but in fact, every state redefines the concept when they integrate the principles of the Convention into their domestic law. Politicians prefer a narrow definition of refugee because a wide definition of who falls under the category may increase the potential burden of the host state. The narrow definition, however, leads to inadequate protection and assistance to those who are *de facto* refugees (Haddad 2008: 25). Besides practical implications of recognizing refugees for the host states, they define them in ways to somehow incorporate the “outsiders” into their national identity. While doing so, the state develops a certain discourse of the refugee in its territory, and reestablishes its claim to sovereignty.

To the questions of why states act towards refugee flows and how, one answer from the English School perspective is that they are trying to restore order in the international society. Policies to re-construct the identity of the refugee by policies like repatriation, resettlement or naturalization are solutions to redefine the refugee’s relationship to a “space of sovereignty” (Haddad 2008: 60). The nation-state needs to align or separate its identity from those of the refugee when acting in welcoming or refusing ways towards her. Political, economical and domestic factors, as well as the international regime and institutions affect this process to a great extent, but I find this ongoing identity definition crucial to understanding refugee response of individual states. In constructivist terms, refugees and the host nations mutually constitute each other and affect each other’s identity.

CHAPTER III:

HISTORICIZING MASS MIGRATION TO TURKEY AND OVERVIEW OF THE CASES

This chapter aims to provide an overview of the case of Turkey in terms of its migration and international protection regime as well as the history of mass migration to the country. The first section will outline the immigration and asylum regime of Turkey since the foundation of the republic, examining the main laws, regulations, and major factors that has resulted in changes in the Turkish regime. The second section will give an historical overview of mass refugee flows to the country, before moving on to the discussion of the three cases of this study in more detail. In three subsections, it gives an overview of the causes and magnitude of mass refugee influxes from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria, the state's responses to which are going to be examined in the following chapter. This overview will highlight the similarities and differences in the characteristics of the three cases of refugee flows.

We can identify two main, at times conflicting forces that have driven the Turkish policies on immigration and asylum since the foundation of the republic. The first one is the goal of establishing an ethnically and culturally homogeneous society based on a national identity, which was institutionalized in the early years of the republic (Sert 2014: 160). The second one is the role of international and intergovernmental institutions, namely the UNHCR and the EU, both of which have been instrumental in development of an asylum regime in the country. As not only policy determines the acts of the state but also actual events determine policies, immigration and asylum laws of the Turkish state reflected changes in the characteristics of movements towards the country's borders as well. The long history of Turkey as a receiving country of mass flows of migrants and refugees since the Ottoman Empire will provide the context in which the state's response to the biggest cases of mass refugee influxes it faced in the past three decades can be better understood and analyzed.

3.1 Turkey's Asylum Regime

Turkey was widely viewed as an emigration country until 2000s, but it has also been a destination for several mass influxes of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers since the Ottoman era. Yet, the first comprehensive law on foreigners and international protection in the country came about only in 2013. Turkish domestic law had nothing to say about the status of asylum seekers from outside of Europe, meaning they were bound by general laws on foreigners, which are not designed to account for the specific situation of refugees (Kirişci 1991: 522). Policies regarding refugees and asylum seekers were derived from general laws on immigration and foreigners. The main sources of national immigration and asylum law in Turkey are:

1. The 2510 Settlement Law of 1934 (Law No 5543 as of 2006),
2. Regulation No. 1994/6119 on the Procedures and Principles Related to the Possible Population Movements and Aliens Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups Wishing to Seek Asylum either from Turkey or Requesting Residence Permission in order to Seek Asylum from another Country [hereinafter, “1994 Asylum Regulation”],
3. National Action Plan of Turkey for the Adoption of the European Union *Acquis* in the field of Asylum and Migration of 2005 [hereinafter, “2005 National Action Plan”],
4. The 6458 Law on Foreigners and International Protection of 2013.

In addition to those, 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (See Subsection 2.1.1) to which Turkey is a signatory to are international sources of refugee law in the country. The Turkish immigration and citizenship laws and regulations throughout its history give us the general framework of how the state aimed to integrate different incoming as well as existing groups into its discourse of sovereignty based on a national identity. The new republican regime founded in 1923 catered immigration and citizenship policies towards its goal of creating a homogeneous nation. Those policies drastically changed the outlook of the previously ethnically and religiously diverse society, as they encouraged immigration from the old Ottoman Muslim communities and other ethnically Turkish populations, and emigration of non-Muslim and non-Turkish groups. The Turkish state denied the existence of ethnic and religious diversity, with the exception of religious minorities recognized in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 (Kirişci 2000: 1). In line with this policy, the state encouraged immigration of

individuals who are ethnically Turkish, who speaks Turkish and who are Sunni Muslim, and emigration of remaining non-Turkish and non-Muslim populations from the Ottoman Empire.

On October 13, 1923, during the debate on the establishment of a new ministry on Population Exchange, Development and Settlement, Tunalı Hilmi, a member of the parliament, addressed the main aims of the Turkish immigration policy:

I don't need ostentatiousness but people. Let more than a hundred Turkish families come from Adakale (Ada Kaleh) in Tuna: let them build Anatolian villages on the shores of Sakarya –Tuna of Anatolia- or in any other islet! We should remember: we have a countless number of [my] Turks not only right besides us, in Aleppo and Damascus, but also as far away as Basra, Mecca, Yemen, and not only in Egypt, but in Sudan and Morocco [...] They should all come [...] They should be brought if they don't come [...] (İçduygu 2014: 3).

Legalizing this goal of Turkey's immigration policy, the 2510 Law on Settlement (İskân Kanunu) came to force in 1934, and it remains the main source of immigration law in the country. It is not specifically an immigration law; it is a broader legislation that was used as a tool for the construction of the 'new Turk' (Kirişci 2000: 4). The law divided the population in Turkey as well as immigrants according to their relative "Turkishness," and aimed to resettle them in such a way that they are homogenized into one national identity. Settlement Law divided the people of the Republic into three groups and its territory into three zones. Territory of Turkey was divided into three geographical zones (mintika). The first group of zones were those largely inhabited by a population belonging to the "Turkish culture." The second group concerned the geographical zones to which people whose Turkishness should be improved, according to the state, were to be resettled. The third group of zones were closed to any settlement for reasons of "space, health, economy, culture, politics, military and orderliness" (Official Gazette, 21 June 1934: Art. 14). Determining who belongs to the Turkish culture was left to the authority of the Council of Ministers.

Settlement Law included articles that detailed who can and who cannot migrate to and settle in Turkey as immigrants or refugees. Those who are of Turkish ethnicity or who belong to the Turkish culture could come and settle in the country as immigrants and they were called *muhacir*. They were also immediately deemed entitled to Turkish citizenship. Article 4

of the Settlement Law explicitly forbids immigration of anyone who is not affiliated with the Turkish culture, as well as “anarchists, spies, nomadic Gypsies, and those who were expelled from Turkey” (ibid.). While ethnically Turkish immigrants were free to settle anywhere given they do not demand financial settlement assistance from the government, non-Turks had to settle wherever the government pointed them to, whether or not they get the assistance. First group of zones were closed to settlement of any immigrant, or resettlement of anyone not affiliated with the Turkish culture, even though they were locals of that area. Those who come from tribes or villages that are “ethnically Turkish but forgot their language or neglected it,” clearly mainly meaning the Kurdish population in the country, were to be resettled in areas that are ‘more Turkish’ so that they assimilate and start using the Turkish language (ibid: Art. 12). People who are not of Turkish descent were to be distributed to villages and neighborhoods in a way they did not concentrate in any locality. Thus the Settlement Law is an obvious manifestation of the goal of the Turkish state to reorganize the society as a homogeneous population who speaks the same language and feels the same ethnic/national belonging.

To this day, Settlement Law of 1934 remains a legal basis for asylum and immigration in Turkey. Although many articles of the law, especially the ones concerning resettlement of people or division of the territory into zones, have been amended or revoked, those concerning immigrants and refugees persisted (Kirişci 2000: 6). It was replaced by Law 5543 in 2006, but maintained the basic features of immigration policy and categorization of immigrants as belonging to Turkish descent and culture or otherwise. Article 3 of the Settlement Law defined immigrants (göçmen) as people “of Turkish descent and who adheres to the Turkish culture, and comes to Turkey for settlement as an individual or group and accepted according to this law” (Official Gazette, 26 September 2006). Foreigners who do not come from Turkish descent and do not adhere to the Turkish culture were explicitly denied immigrant status in the law (ibid: Art. 4). The Turkish state thus has continued its immigration policy based on the notion of Turkishness.

In line with its policy of Turkification, the state also made population exchange agreements to exchange the non-Turkish population in the country with ethnic Turks in other countries. The most prominent of those was the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations and Protocol, which was signed on 30 January 1923.

However, the agreement was worded on the basis of religion rather than ethnicity. Article I of the agreement stated that

As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorization of the Turkish Government” (LNTS, 30 January 1923).

As it was clearly the case in the population exchange agreement, Turkish immigration and refugee policies have continued to be biased towards accepting not only people of Turkish ‘descent and culture,’ but only if they are also of a Sunni-Halefi background (Kirişçi 2000: 4). Greek Muslims, even though they were not of Turkish descent and did not speak Turkish, had to leave for Turkey while ethnically Turkish Christians were forced to migrate to Greece even though they spoke little or no Greek. Sunni Muslim religion was part of the homogeneous Turkish national identity the state aimed to create, even though it claimed separation of religion from the state. Karamanlis, for example, Turkish speaking and ethnically Turkish Christians of Cappadocia, were sent to Greece while Greek-speaking Muslims of Crete were sent to Turkey. This policy was followed in later years as well, classifying Balkan Muslims, Albanians, Bosnians, Macedonians, Pomaks and others as part of national refugees and allowing them to settle in Turkey and then become Turkish citizens.

Turkey has long been a country of immigration as well as asylum, in both the Ottoman and Republic eras. While the state practice dramatically changed after the foundation of the Republic, Turkey was also one of the drafters and first signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which carried a time and geographical limitation (See Section 2.2.1). While its 1967 Protocol removed those limitations on the definition of the refugee, Turkey was one of the very few countries that maintained the geographical limitation to this day, excluding non-Europeans from its refugee definition. Accordingly, non-Europeans are not entitled to official refugee status in the country and Turkey maintains the geographical limitation to this day despite widespread domestic and international criticism. It is possible to say that Turkey abided by its duties as a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and fulfilled its duties within the geographical limitation (Kirişçi 1991: 519), but insisted on not removing it. The main reason behind keeping the geographical reservation was to eliminate

potential social, economic and political problems if refugees would be accepted from the Middle East and Asia, which are considered to be prone to refugee movements because of economic and political instability especially in the country's neighbors, as well as the belief that Turkey did not have enough economical resources to provide support to those refugees (Latif 2002: 21).

Refugees to whom provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention are applied are mostly from East European countries, whose numbers traditionally did not exceed a few hundred a year, and mostly resettled in other countries with the help of International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and UNHCR (Kirişci 1991: 513). Thus the Turkish state has a two-tiered refugee policy, concerning Convention and Non-Convention refugees (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 194). Non-Convention, or non-European refugees are only granted temporary protection if they are not of Turkish descent and culture, or regarded as immigrants who will stay and be integrated into the Turkish society if they are considered of Turkish descent and culture. This group might be regarded as a third group as well even though they are never called refugees by the state, called National refugees (Kirişci 1994: 14). They are those who are deemed appropriate to assimilate to the Turkish national identity, coming from a Turkish descent and culture, and mostly consist of immigrants from the Balkans. As stated earlier, national refugees include not only those ethnically Turkish, but also Muslims who are not Turkish but were associated with the Ottoman Empire and deemed appropriate for assimilation such as Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks and Tatars (ibid: 6).

With the geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention and lack of a comprehensive asylum law until very recently, the Turkish asylum system has been quite informal. Even though the formal laws do not meet the needs and rights of asylum seekers, the actual Turkish policies have provided a degree of flexibility in cases of non-European population movements (Kirişci 1991: 522). They have almost always been given temporary protection and flexibility has allowed basic protection; but it has also meant the state could follow arbitrary policies based on various concerns of national sovereignty and identity. Nevertheless, UNHCR has been an integral part of the asylum system of the country. The organization has worked with the Turkish government as well as third country governments to resettle the refugees, as they are only under temporary protection in Turkey. In practice, Turkey provided temporary asylum while the cases are reviewed by UNHCR. However, the informality of the asylum system meant that protection of such populations in Turkey was

based solely on good will, without a national legal ground. UNHCR has significantly affected the refugee regime in Turkey as a norm entrepreneur as well, playing a crucial role in introducing the refugee concept to the public and pressuring the government to formalize its policies, especially in the 1990s when Turkey started to experience large influxes of refugees. Still, the lack of formal laws and regulations regarding the status of asylum seekers allowed the government to act arbitrarily when faced with more challenging movements such as the Kurds from Northern Iraq.

The working relationship between the Turkish government and UNHCR had a turmoil in 1994, with the introduction of the Asylum Regulation. It was made without any consultation to UNHCR, other organizations or academics. Until 1994, UNHCR was the agency responsible for receiving asylum applications, conducting status determination as well as managing resettlement (Manap Kırmızıgül 2013: 39). In July 1994, Turkish authorities introduced their own status determination instead of UNHCR's, which constituted a major break from the past practice, and was effectively formulated in November 1994 with the introduction of the Asylum Regulation (Kirişci 1994: 293). Article 6 of the 1994 Asylum Regulation held that "decisions on the applications of individual aliens who either seek asylum from Turkey or request residence permission in order to seek asylum from another country shall be concluded by the Ministry of Interior..." (Official Gazette, 30 Nov 1994). The provision that was most widely criticized was the requirement that asylum seekers make their applications within 5 days of their arrival (*ibid.*, Art. 4). This short period of time created problems for asylum seekers and they did not have the possibility to register as an asylum seeker if they fail to do so within the first five days. It gave the authorities the possibility to reject anyone who failed to meet the time limit, without looking at the substance of the application (Kirişci 2002: 21).

The new measures aiming at increasing the state control over asylum meant to replace the previous practice, which came to be seen as too liberal and threatening by the state (Kirişci 1996: 294). The 1994 Asylum Regulation emphasized the need to stop population movements at the border and that effective measures shall be taken for this matter (Art. 8). It was mainly a response to the flows of Kurdish populations from Iraq in 1988 and 1991. From the early years of republic, Turkish state considered the Kurdish identity a threat to its construction of a homogeneous society and its security. Especially after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, the state relocated Kurdish tribes many times to assimilate them into the

Turkish national identity (Kirişci 2000: 2). The fact that inflowing group of people had Kurdish identity made the Turkish state reluctant to accept them into the country. Moreover, restrictive policies of the European countries turned the country into a buffer zone where asylum seekers who aim to reach the West but cannot do it became stranded (Mannaert 2003: 7). This was a role the Turkish state was not willing to accept, especially not in the case of the Kurds, and resulted in changing policies towards refugees and asylum seekers. Many Iraqis and Iranians were sent back to their countries, which violated the *non-refoulement* principle of the 1951 Refugee Convention and intensified the divergence between UNHCR and the state. It led to disputes with UNHCR as well as harsh criticisms from NGOs such as the Amnesty International (Kirişci 2002: 19).

Despite the increasingly challenging environment, UNHCR stayed and continued its work in Turkey, focusing its efforts on creating norms and public awareness, as well as training government officials. A climate of cooperation evolved where UNHCR started seminars and training sessions for various relevant actors such as the Turkish police, judges, prosecutors and gendarmerie with funding from the Western governments (ibid: 21). Starting in 1997, The Ministry of Interior supported “The Project on Developing an Asylum System in Turkey” with a series of seminars and workshops in collaboration with UNHCR (DGMM, 2005 National Action Plan Art. 3.1.5.1). Training programs supported by UNHCR and European Court of Human Rights were influential in evolvement of Turkey’s asylum regime to one that is better defined, more considerate of human rights and less vague (Kirişci 2007: 170). One of the positive results was amendment of the 1994 Asylum regulation in 1999, increasing the number of days within which one had to apply for asylum from five to ten. The efforts of UNHCR as well as the role of international pressure have made Turkish officials more sensitive towards the international law and norms, especially on the issue of *non-refoulement*.

As of 2000s, new actors started to become more influential on Turkish migration and asylum policies. Besides UNHCR, European Union is the other institution that had a crucial influence on the Turkish asylum system. The process of EU membership instituted one of the main dynamics of change in immigration and asylum policies of Turkey (Seyhan 2014: 190). Indeed, Turkish policies and practices cannot be adequately understood outside the larger framework of international migration to the West (Frantz 2003: 3). The stance of Turkey and European countries regarding immigrants and refugees have not been very compatible. Since

the Turkish territory has come to be seen as a gateway to Europe by many illegal migrants and asylum seekers, European countries blamed the country's negligent border and immigration policies for encouraging this trend (Mannaert 2003: 9). Moreover, as Turkey economically developed, its preferred policy of resettlement and repatriation for refugees was criticized (ibid.). Thus immigration has been one of the most important areas of discussion for Turkey's accession process to the European Union. If the country ever becomes a full EU member, it means extending the borders of the Union to the east, making countries like Syria, Iraq and Iran neighbors of the EU. As these countries have been a major source of political instability and thus refugee movements, EU has prioritized immigration and asylum policies of Turkey in its accession process.

The accession process of Turkey to the EU has had significant effects on its immigration policies starting in 1999, when the country was recognized as a candidate. Starting in 2000s, Turkey has worked towards aligning its asylum policies to EU standards. After Turkey was declared a candidate country at the Helsinki summit of December 1999, Accession Partnership Document was issued by EU in December 2000, and the National Programme by the Turkish government was adopted in April 2001, to determine the issues to be addressed for Turkey's accession process (Kirişçi 2002: 7). After the EU adopted the revised version of the Accession Partnership in April 2003, it made funds available for "twinning projects," allowing exchange of experiences and capacity building programs, one of which was assisting Turkey to develop an action plan and prepare an asylum law (Kirişçi 2007: 181). National Action Plan of Turkey for the Adoption of the European Union *Acquis* in the field of Asylum and Migration was approved by the prime ministry and came to force in 25 March 2005 (DGMM 2014: 13). The 2005 National Action Plan laid forth steps for harmonization of law domestically and internationally, which was necessary to continue the EU accession process. It included provisions for the preparation of the new law in a holistic and flexible manner to adapt to international developments, in cooperation with national and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations and academics, as well as steps to strengthen the institutional capacity in the country (DGMM, 2005 National Action Plan Art. 4.5).

2000s were a period where many reforms and legislative changes were initiated in Turkey as part of the EU accession process, including the developments in immigration and asylum, showing the significant effect of intergovernmental institutions on the policies of

individual states. The 2005 National Action Plan eventually led to Law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection, which is the first comprehensive immigration and asylum law of the Turkish Republic. Even though the EU accession process more or less lost its significance in Turkish policy-making as the process has been stagnant in the past few years, it has had a more permanent effect of establishing certain democratic norms in the country. According to the Directorate General of Migration Management, the law was required for two main reasons: legal factors and the EU harmonization process (DGMM 2014: 13). The legal reason was the difficulty created by the lack of a comprehensive law on foreigners and international protection to fulfill the constitutional and international obligations of the country, while the EU harmonization process also required development of a comprehensive legislation on international protection as well.

Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) was published in the official gazette on 11 April 2013. Part Five, which concerns the establishment and mandate of the new Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), went into force immediately while the remaining provisions became effective one year after (Official Gazette, 11 April 2013). For the first time in the country's history, a comprehensive law as well as a government body to implement the new immigration and asylum policies were established in Turkey. Besides general provisions regulating the entry, stay and exit of foreigners, LFIP defines in detail different forms of international protection, the procedures to be applied and rights and obligations of applicants of international protection in Turkey. It also formulates immediate temporary protection for cases of large influxes in which incoming populations cannot return to the countries they were forced to leave (*ibid.*, Art. 2). The new law guarantees *non-refoulement* (Art. 4), the rights of stateless persons (Art. 51), and international protection for refugees in cases of persons fleeing as a result of events occurring in European countries, or conditional refugees in cases from non-European countries (Arts. 61-62). The development was welcomed by international and non-governmental organizations, although criticisms persist on keeping the geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Conditional refugees are allowed to reside in Turkey only until they are resettled in a third country according to LFIP.

Specifically, for the cases of mass influxes, based on the Article 91 of the LFIP, Temporary Protection Regulation was formulated and came into force on October 22, 2014. Mass influxes are defined as “situations where a high number of people come from the same

country or a geographic region and procedures related to international protection status cannot be individually followed because of the high number of people,” (Official Gazette, 22 October 2014, Art. 3). Also the subject of this study, mass influxes constitute the main part of refugees fleeing to Turkey, and it is important that they are recognized separately in the law. Those under temporary protection are entitled to similar rights and social services such as health and education and cannot be forced to return to the countries of origin so long as conditions for fleeing persist, but the temporary status itself causes a situation of obscurity and they are not entitled to apply for permanent residence or citizenship in the country. With the Temporary Protection Regulation coming into force, the 1994 Asylum Regulation was repealed (ibid., Art. 61). While refugee protection in Turkey was regulated only by secondary legislation before, adoption of a law is seen as sign of progress and a benchmark for simply being the first law of its kind and filling several legal gaps (Soykan 2012: 42). Hence the country has been going through a process of legislative consolidation and enhancement of its asylum system recently, starting with its recognition as an EU candidate.

It is possible to talk about a change in the “mindset” of the Turkish state, from a practice restricting the possibility of settlement and integration to people of Turkish descent and culture, to one more considerate of international norms and democratic principles (Kirişçi 2002: 27). Yet keeping the geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention in the new law shows it is not an easy process, and Turkey still avoids accepting non-European asylum-seekers as refugees and defines them under other categories for various reasons, even though positive steps towards official protection have been made. The 2005 National Action Plan mentioned the intention to remove the geographical limitation, emphasizing that Turkey genuinely wanted to remove it, but tying it to the fulfillment of two conditions in the process of EU accession: changes in institutional and structural conditions so that refugee flows from the east are not encouraged, and burden-sharing provisions from the EU countries (Art. 4.13). The state emphasized the geographical condition of the country as prone to mass refugee movements, and the current flow from Syria, coupled with the lack of enough burden-sharing efforts from the European countries mean the geographical limitation will not be removed in the near future.

As the norms on international protection and democratic standards have become more embedded, the securitizing view has started to evolve to one that is more secular and focused on problem-solving (Seyhan 2014: 190). Nevertheless, Turkish government, faced with large

inflows of non-European asylum-seekers, has been restraining from applying the 1951 Refugee Convention provisions and granted temporary protection in most of the cases. Depending on whether the immigrants were thought to be suitable for the Turkish national identity, they were either regarded as immigrants eligible for Turkish citizenship, or to be resettled in third countries instead of granted official refugee protection in Turkey. The review of the Turkish asylum regime shows it was intimately related to the process of nation building, and still is to the nation-state's discourse of sovereignty based on a national identity. The main sources of immigration and asylum law in Turkey, including the Settlement Law of 1934 and 2006, the 1994 Asylum Regulation, the 2005 National Action Plan and the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection are examined in this chapter, as well as the effects of UNHCR and EU in altering the Turkish asylum regime. The next section gives a general picture of the mass flows to the Turkish Republic and then discusses the cases of Bulgarian Turks, Iraqi Kurds and Syrians in more detail.

3.2 History of Mass Flows to Turkey

Turkey, with its history and geography, has been at the center of refugee movements since its pre-republic history. Both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey have a tradition of receiving immigrants and refugees, but followed very different policies (Kirişci 2000: 3). The country's unique geographical position between the Middle East and Europe makes it a magnet for refugees who either seek asylum in Turkey or, in many cases, see it as a transition point to the West. Being a transit zone between the East and the West, especially with the 'Fortress Europe' policies as Western countries have been applying more and more restrictive admission procedures, the country has become a major destination for refugees as well as illegal immigrants (İçduygu 2000: 358). A clear typology between refugees and other immigrants is not very meaningful as *de jure* refugee protection is granted to very few individuals in Turkey, who come as a result of events occurring in Europe. When we look at immigrants who came in mass influxes, they are all *de facto* refugees because they are running away from government pressure and fear of persecution, civil war or other conflict-driven motives. Even if Turkey had accepted asylum-seekers from non-European countries, it is not always easy to make the distinction. Even though there is clear difference between an illegal immigrant and asylum seeker in legal terms, analysis of motivations for leaving the home countries, especially in a region like the Middle East, uncover a multifaceted mixture

of factors, including political, social, cultural and economic motives (Mannaert 2003: 1). Turkey has a history of being a destination country for mass flows, whether the arriving populations have fled persecution, oppression and civil war, or been driven by other social and economic factors.

Turkey has inherited the tradition of receiving asylum seekers from the Ottoman Empire. The arrival of large number of Jewish refugees from the Spanish Inquisition, Hungarians and Poles fleeing the revolts of the mid-1800s are some examples of mass flows to the Empire (Kirişci 1994: 1). The number of Jews who were exiled from Spain is disputed but estimated to be around 120,000, around 90,000 of which sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire (Güteryüz 2015: 56-64). In 1709, the Swedish King sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire along with two thousand people (GİGM 2013: 8). Between 1858-1864, around 493,000 Caucasian Muslims fled to the Empire according to the Russian sources, as well as around one million Circassians fleeing the Russian army in 1864 (ibid.). Even though the concept of refugee did not exist in that era, the Ottoman Empire was a major destination for mass influxes and had mostly welcoming policies towards the incoming flows. The events of late 19th century/early 20th century, including the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78, Balkan Wars and the First World War have immensely affected the lives of populations of the Ottoman Empire, causing a flow of immigration from the Balkans to Anatolia (İçduygu and Sirkeci 1999: 259). It is estimated that around 440,000 people fled to the Ottoman territories from Balkans between the years of 1912 and 1923 (ibid.). Also, after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Vrangel and approximately 135 thousand people with him sought asylum in the late Ottoman Empire (GİGM 2013: 9). The flow of Muslims from the territories the Ottoman Empire lost in the process leading to its collapse, turned the multi-ethnic and multi-religious country into one that is largely Muslim (Karpas 2015: xxxii).

The pattern of immigration and asylum flows continued after the foundation of the Republic in 1923, but within a framework of nation building. Turkey encouraged immigration of ethnically Turkish and Muslim populations, but has restrained from accepting large numbers from other backgrounds especially in the early years of the Republic. Table 1 shows the figures of influxes since the foundation of the republic.

Country of Origin	Dates	Numbers
Greece	1922-1938	384,000
Balkan region	1923-1945	800,000
Germany	1933-1945	800
Iraq	1988	51,542
Bulgaria	1989	345,000
Iraq	1991	467,489
Bosnia	1992-1998	20,000
Kosovo	1999	17,746
Macedonia	2001	10,500
Syria	April 2011- present	2,834,441*

Table 1: Mass Flows to the Turkish Republic (1922-2016)

(Source: Directorate General of Migration Management, 2013)

*Latest DGMM figure as of December 31, 2016

As can be seen, the main groups were the remaining ethnic Turkish communities in the Balkans after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The first refugee movement was the result of the painful population exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1922, and the movements from the former Ottoman territories continued until the Second World War (Latif 2002: 6). Between 1923 and 1945, more than 800,000 people from the Balkan region came to settle in Turkey. When we look more specifically at the Balkan region, the major source of population flows to the Turkish Republic in its early years, we see the numbers presented in Table 2. While Greece was the biggest source of the population flows in that era with the population exchange agreement, almost 200,000 people from Bulgaria, and more than 110,000 from Romania and Yugoslavia each fled to Turkey as well.

Country of Origin	1923-1939	1940-1945
Greece	384,000	-
Bulgaria	198,688	15,744
Romania	117,095	4,201
Yugoslavia	115,427	1,671
Others	7,998	1,005
Total	823,208	22,621

Table 2: Mass flows from the Balkans (1923-1945)

(Source: Kirişci 1994)

The status of immigrants from Yugoslavia after 1934 was determined by the Settlement Law, on the condition of being “of Turkish descent or adherent to the Turkish culture (Özgür Baklacioğlu 2015: 195). While the Turkish state officially accepted ethnically Turkish Muslims from the Balkans, the incoming populations were more multiethnic. Another mass movement occurred in the 1950s of Albanians, in disputed numbers ranging from 170,000 to 450,000 (ibid: 201). The main motive behind the population movements from Yugoslavia was the establishment of the Communist regime after the Second World War, which was not welcomed by Turks and Muslims living there (Latif 2002: 7). During the Second World War, Turkey became a major transit and destination zone for Jews escaping the Nazi regime, with Jewish Agency for Palestine established and operating in İstanbul (Gülyüz 2015: 63). The country received around 800 German and Austrian refugees escaping the Nazi regime, including university professors, scientists, artists and philosophers (Latif 2002: 6). They were encouraged to integrate into the Turkish society mainly because of their skills, and left a major impact on development of arts and sciences in the country (Kirişci 1994: 3).

Another mass movement, whose numbers are not as certain, and not included in the DGMM report, was the arrival of Iranians after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and during the Iran-Iraq War. It is estimated that around 1,5 million Iranians sought temporary refuge in Turkey between 1980 and 1991 (Mannaert 2003: 2). Since they did not need visas to go to Turkey, they were allowed to come and stay as tourists, with their own resources. They were permitted to leave and enter the country as long as they had valid passports and had the means to sustain themselves without assistance from the state (Kirişci 1994: 10). Only a

small number of them applied to UNHCR, and those who did were resettled in third countries (ibid: 22). The Turkish state was flexible with the entry and exit of Iranians who are seeking refuge, but did not want to jeopardize its relations with the Iranian government by encouraging arrival and stay of large numbers, thus only a few were able to get residence permits to stay in the country (Latif 2002: 9). The war breaking out in former Yugoslavia in 1992 caused another wave of refugee flows from the Balkan region to Turkey. Around 20,000 Bosnian Muslims from former Yugoslavia sought asylum in Turkey between 1992 and 1998, and 3,355 of them became Turkish citizens (Kirişçi 2002: 16). They were granted temporary protection; the provisions of 1951 Refugee Convention were not applied and majority of them returned to their countries after the Dayton Peace Agreement (ibid.).

Geographically, we see two major sources of mass influxes to Turkey: The Balkans and the Middle East. At the end of the 1980s, the country experienced two large population flows from Bulgaria and Iraq. While the mass influx of Bulgarian Turks in 1989 was the biggest flow from Bulgaria, it was not the first of such movements. In periods of 1950-1951 and 1969-1978, there were two other population flows from Bulgaria, amounting to around 270,000 people (İçduygu and Sirkeci 2000: 264). The establishment of the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1944 significantly and adversely altered the situation of the Turkish population as a minority in Bulgaria (Kirişçi 1994: 43). The Bulgarian state took increasingly oppressive measures towards the Muslim Turkish minority in the country. With the unification of the education system, restriction of religious practices, introduction of mandatory military system, and finally the demand of the Bulgarian government to the Turkish government to take 250,000 ethnic Turks, a total of 154,393 people fled to Turkey between 1950 and 1951 (Kirişçi 1994: 44). Another mass movement occurred after 1968 on the grounds of family reunification, and the latest mass flow from the Balkans followed in 1989.

Besides the developments in the Balkans, the recent political history of the Middle East has had a tremendous impact on refugee movements to Turkey. The Iranian Revolution, the war between Iran and Iraq, Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the Gulf War, Iraq's occupation by the United States, the Arab Spring and the consequent civil war in Syria led millions of people to flee to neighboring Turkey (Kartal and Başçı 2014: 284). As the country received non-European refugees from the Middle East only in small numbers until the end of 1980s, those new movements disrupted the pattern and caused significant changes in the Turkish policy and practice (Kirişçi 1994: 9). Between 1995 and 2010, more than 70,000 people

sought asylum in Turkey, the majority of which came from Iran (47%) and Iraq (40%) (İçduygu 2015a: 286). The first of such movements one was the arrival of Kurds from Iraq in 1988. Following the Iran-Iraq War between September 1980 and August 1988, Iraqi forces forced around 70,000 Kurds to Turkish and Iranian borders, resulting in 51,542 people entering into Turkey (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 195). Out of those, around 25,675 Kurdish refugees are known to have stayed in Turkey until 1991 (ibid: 196). The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 led to displacement of between four and five million people in the Middle East (Van Hear 1993: 64), resulting in another mass influx of Kurds to Turkey in April 1991.

After the years of mass influxes, between when the 1994 Asylum Regulation came into force and 2010, 58,804 non-European refugees sought temporary protection Turkey of which 30,627 were from Iran, 21,781 from Iraq, 2,746 from Afghanistan and 1,835 from Somali (TBMM İHİK 2010: 42). In April 2011, the flow of Syrians escaping from the devastating civil war in the country began. Syrian refugees have been seeking protection in Turkey in numbers exceeding two million by 2015, making the country the host of the largest refugee population in the world for the first time (UNHCR 2015). The country has had positive net migration over the past few years, and has been transitioning from an emigration country in a large magnitude to an immigration country (Kaya and Erdoğan 2015: 11). The numbers show the extent of unprecedented flows of refugees and asylum seekers, happening in mass fluxes, Turkey has experienced in the last three decades. The mass flows from Iraq in 1988 and 1991, from Bulgaria in 1989 and from Syria since 2011 are the biggest of those movements. The next section examines the causes, magnitude and various characteristics of these three cases in more detail.

3.3 Overview of the Cases: Causes and Scale of the Movements

The three cases of mass refugee influxes into Turkey, to which I am going to examine how the state responded, are the flows of Bulgarian Turks in 1989, Iraqi Kurds in 1991 and Syrians since 2011. The overview of the three refugee flows with their different characteristics is provided in Table 3. In the following section, I am going to provide a general overview of the background leading to mass displacement of people beyond their borders, the scale and characteristics of those refugee movements to better analyze the state response in the next chapter.

	~Number and Dates of Arrival	Cause of Movement	Returnees	In power	Legal Base in Turkey	Settlement Places
Bulgarian Turks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May-August 1989: 310,000 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repressive measures of the Bulgarian government 	Almost half of them returned within few months, remaining became Turkish citizens.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motherland Party (Anavatan) • PM: Turgut Özal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1934 Law on Settlement • UNHCR Convention (1951) and Protocol (1967) 	Bursa, İzmir, İstanbul, Çorlu, Edirne, Ankara.
Iraqi Kurds	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • August 1988: 60,000 • March-April 1991: 500,000 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Post-Gulf War civil conflict 	Almost all were moved to the security zones by May 1991 after UN Security Council Resolution 688.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motherland Party (Anavatan) • PM: Yıldırım Akbulut (1991) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1934 Settlement Law • UNHCR Convention (1951) and Protocol (1967) • 1994 Regulation on Asylum 	Temporary camps at the border until transfer to the security zones within Iraq. The ones still in Turkey are predominantly in İstanbul.
Syrians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May 2011-present: 2,830,000* 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil war 	Periods of return, but predominant stay.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Justice and Development Party (AKP) • PMs: R.T. Erdoğan, A. Davutoğlu, B. Yıldırım 	(In addition to above) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Action Plan in Migration and Asylum (2005)- EU accession process and its effects • Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2013) 	Less than 10% in 25 refugee camps in 10 provinces, remaining mainly in İstanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, but also almost every other province in Turkey.

Table 3: Overview of mass refugee flows from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria

*As of the end of 2016

3.3.1 Bulgarian Turks (1989)

Bulgaria got independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1908, around which time many emigration waves of Turks occurred; but a large Turkish and Muslim minority stayed in the country (Çelik 2009: 3). Since there has always been a sizable Turkish minority in Bulgaria, they have been an important element of Turkish-Bulgarian relations, causing several waves of migration to Turkey (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 196). The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, exclusion of the minorities from the nation-building process, and the establishment of a 'kin state,' being Turkey, brought the Turkish minority to the center of bilateral relations (Çelik 2009: 4). Before 1989, other significant emigration waves included around 100,000 Turks who immigrated after a voluntary settlement agreement was signed between the Turkish and Bulgarian governments in 1925, around 155,000 between 1950-51, soon after the establishment of communism in Bulgaria, and between 50,000 and 130,000 after 1968, as part of the family unification treaty (Parla 2003: 562). Already in the 1950s, resulting from the newly established communist regime in Bulgaria that had decided to unify the educational system, restrict religious practices, and centralize agricultural production, almost 155,000 Bulgarian Turks had fled to Turkey (İçduygu and Sert 2015: 96-97). My focus here is on the biggest influx of Bulgarian Turkish refugees in 1989. It was not only the most considerable migratory movement of Turks from Bulgaria, but it was also the most massive emigration in such a short period of time from a socialist East European country to a non-socialist one in the post-War period (Vasileva 1992: 342).

The emigration of Turks from Bulgaria was the result of repressive government policies, which considered the existence of a large Turkish minority in Bulgaria a source of insecurity (Kirişçi 1994: 27). With the establishment of the communist regime in Bulgaria, and Turkey being on the other side of the Cold War, their loyalty was suspected and repressive policies showed themselves in the form of banning Turkish schools, closing mosques, forced migration and forcibly changing Turkish names to Slavic ones (ibid.). Another concern of the Bulgarian regime was that the population of the Turkish minority was increasing on a more rapid rate than the Bulgarian majority (Kirişçi and Karaca 2015: 301). Not only the Turks but also other minorities in Bulgaria faced an aggressive policy of assimilation by the Communist regime. After its establishment in 1944, national and religious values of the Turkish population were targeted, starting with integrating the Turkish schools into the state educational system in 1947-48, thus prohibiting religious education (Çetin

2009: 243). In 1959-60, Turkish schools were united with Bulgarian schools, and education in Turkish was prohibited as well (ibid.).

The fear that an intense Turkish minority existed in the country intensified during the Cold War as Turkey and Bulgaria were members of two opposing blocs –NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Çelik 2009: 5). The Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 increased the perceived threat by the Bulgarian leaders (ibid). Harsh measures to suppress the identity of Turkish as well as other minorities increased during 1970s. The number of Turks who were subject to beating, torture, imprisonment, exile and rape in Bulgaria until the beginning of March 1989 was estimated between 800 and 2500 (Çakar Mengü 2008: 107). Other Muslim minorities faced similar assimilation policies, such as Bulgarization of Pomaks between 1972 and 1974, by forced changing of their names, a policy the Turkish minority was subject to in 1984-85 as names of places, mothers, fathers and even grandmothers were forcibly changed (Çetin 2009: 243). Name is a substantial part of one's identity, with implications of belonging to a certain ethnic group, culture, religion etc.

The ultimate assimilation campaign started in 1984, eventually causing the major exodus of the Turkish population from Bulgaria in 1989 (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 196). The forced assimilation campaign, called “National Revival/Regenerative Process” was implemented with help from the military in the biggest military operation of the army since World War II, resulting in the death of estimated around 1,000 people, arrest of several thousands and many being sent to the Belene Camp for forced labor (Çelik 2009: 5). The national revival process aimed to integrate the ethnic Turkish population into the “developed socialist society” (Vasileva 1992: 346); but it used extremely harsh measures to make them abandon Turkish and Muslim traditions. Even Turkish folk dances, wedding traditions, songs, listening to the Turkish radio, wearing traditional baggy trousers were prohibited (Çakar Mengü 2008: 108). These are everyday manifestations of one's identity and belonging. It was accompanied by a wave of literature, aimed at proving that the Muslim minority in Bulgaria was actually descendants of ethnic Bulgarians, assimilated and converted under the Ottoman rule (Çelik 2009: 5-6).

This campaign caused international isolation of Bulgaria and was one of the main obstacles for acknowledgement of its democratization internationally (Vasileva 1992: 347). As the assimilation campaign did not prove to be successful, the government decided to get

the minority out of the country. In 1989, the Bulgarian government decided it was better to dispose the Turkish population all together and gave them the right to leave. At the end of May 1989, state and Communist Party leader Todor Zhivkov declared that Turkey should open its borders to Bulgarian citizens, marking the official start of the refugee influx (ibid). The movement started around middle of May and continued through the summer of 1989. Although the Turkish government tried to negotiate an orderly migration agreement with the Bulgarian government, when its efforts failed, it opened the borders on June 2, 1989 (Kirişci 1994: 47). By the beginning of July, the number of refugees from Bulgaria had passed 100,000. Within only a few months, more than 300,000 people fled to the Turkish border, mostly leaving their houses and jobs, selling their real estate and transporting the belongings they were allowed to take with them. Many were carried to the border by trains (Ciğerci 2012: 115), while lines of cars reaching 20 kilometers into the Bulgarian border were formed as well (Kirişci and Karaca 2015: 302). The Turkish government, under the leadership of Turgut Özal, declared that it opened its borders to all the Turks, designated as ‘racial kin,’ although it later decided to close the border when the numbers exceeded 300,000 (Parla 2003: 563). Initially, many of them were settled in two tent cities in Edirne and Kırklareli, others in schools in and around Thrace, while those who had relatives in other cities moved further in Turkey (Kirişci 1994: 47).

Policies towards the Bulgarian refugees were closely related with the relations between the two countries as well. The tensions between the Bulgarian and Turkish governments had been increasing with the oppression of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The Turkish government welcomed the Turks from Bulgaria into its borders and accused the Bulgarian government with genocide, and even threatened with intervention (Kirişci 2015: 302). They resorted to international and regional organizations on various occasions, and repeatedly called the Bulgarian government for a migration deal, which failed. With the collapse of the communist regime soon afterwards, reforms were made that made it possible for them return to Bulgaria, and the relations between two countries returned to normal (Kirişci and Karaca 2015: 298). Out of more than 300,000 refugees, 154,937 returned home, while 245,000 people were granted Turkish citizenship and stayed in the country (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 196). Especially those who could not settle and start working preferred to go back, while more than half of them stayed in Turkey (Ciğerci 2012: 116). Still, a sizable Turkish minority has continued to exist in Bulgaria, constituting 9.4% of the population according to the 2001 census (Çelik 2009: 3).

The main characteristic of the refugee movement from Bulgaria distinguishing it from other cases is the fact that incoming population was ethnically Turkish. As it will be explored in Chapter IV, their identity was defined by their Turkishness, not their refugee status and determined the state response to them. The state called them as *soydaşlar*, mostly undertook the financial responsibility without resorting to international support, and the legislative arrangements were quickly made for them to be able to settle permanently and become Turkish citizens (Kirişci and Karaca 2015: 298). The response of the Turkish government was, by defining the incoming population with its kinship and not as refugees, to foster their integration into the Turkish society quickly. Turkey passed the Law 3583 in 1989, adding two articles to the 1934 Settlement Law to define the Bulgarian refugees as immigrants of Turkish descent and culture, built 23,495 houses with state funding for the settlement of Turks from Bulgaria, and in five years 245,000 of them were granted citizenship (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 196). Mobilization of massive humanitarian assistance, along with legal provisions to make it easy to convert Bulgarian currency into Turkish liras, to import their cars and become Turkish citizens was provided (Kirişci 2000: 13). Although the integration process was not devoid of any problems, the state made great effort for settlement and integration of such large numbers in a short period of time. The response to the mass flows from Iraq around the same time period, however, was strikingly different, even opposite of the policies regarding the flow of Turks from Bulgaria.

3.3.2 Iraqi Kurds (1991)

Although the mass influx of refugees from Iraq to Turkey happened in two separate waves, in 1988 and 1991, my main focus here will be on the 1991 movement because it was much bigger on scale and provides a better understanding of the state response. In August of 1988, following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, operations of the Iraqi forces forced around 70,000 Kurds to the border of neighboring countries. Although the Turkish government was reluctant to open its border, domestic and international pressure made the country accept giving them temporary protection, without granting refugee status (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 195). At a time when the European Community was considering Turkey's application for membership, the state could not ignore the international pressure to open its borders, but Iraqi refugees were put into three camps strictly monitored by the Turkish authorities (Kirişci

1991: 517). The government sought international financial support, but did not collaborate with UNHCR, which defined the Iraqi Kurdish population in Turkey as refugees, a term the Turkish government was not willing to use. As of 1991, around 25,675 Iraqi refugees who had come during the 1988 wave had remained in the country (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 196).

To put it in the context, the flow of Iraqi Kurds to Turkey in 1991 was part of a massive population displacement during and following the Gulf War. Gulf War started on August 2, 1990 with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and ended in February 1991 with the cease-fire declared by US-led coalition forces. The Iraqi army was defeated with the “Desert Storm” operation, and it accepted the UN Security Council Resolutions on 27 February 1991 (Latif 2002: 12). However, hostilities in the country did not end with the cease-fire. The cease-fire after the Gulf War was followed by a Kurdish rebellion and its harsh suppression in Northern Iraq. The Kurdish rebellion against the regime of Saddam Hussein seemed to be successful at first. By 20 March 1991, all the Kurdish parts of Iraq were under the control of the rebels (Galbraith 2003: 4). The alliance called the Kurdish Front made quick advances and gained control over Suleymaniyah, Arbil, Dohuk and Kirkuk, but could not resist against the counter-attack by the Republican Guard (Malanczuk 1991: 118). On March 26, Iraqi state began its offensive against the rebellion, with permission to use helicopters against the Kurds given by the Bush administration three days earlier (Galbraith 2003: 4). Although the U.S. President Bush had encouraged Iraqis to rebel against the Saddam regime before, they did nothing to stop the harsh crush of the Kurdish rebellion by the Iraqi forces in the north or the Shiite rebellion in the south (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 197).

The mass fleeing of Kurds from Iraq started at the end of March 1991 and continued through April, happening as a very sudden movement of massive number of people. By mid-April 1991, up to two million Kurds had fled the Iraqi military and arrived at the borders of Turkey and Iran; and around 500,000 of them crossed the Turkish border (Van Hear 1993: 69). The Turkish National Security Council met after reports that the number of refugees at the border had passed 200,000. It was declared that “Iraqi refugees (were) forcibly directed toward the Turkish border and constituted a threat to our security,” (Turkish Daily News 6/7 April 1991, quoted in Latif 2002: 12). Turkey chose to close its border and declared it would prevent refugee flows by military action if necessary, if the United Nations Security Council did not act on the issue (Latif 2002: 12). In this case, Turkey made effort to mobilize the international community as such rather than taking responsibility itself.

UN Security Council Resolution 688 passed on 5 April 1991, condemning “the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including in most recently Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security.” It was the first time the Council interpreted Article 39 of the UN Charter for a humanitarian crisis, authorizing intervention in a state’s domestic jurisdiction for violation of human rights of its own nationals for threatening international peace (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 197). Turkey actively mobilized the international community for creation of ‘safe zones’ in Northern Iraq so that refugees could quickly leave the country and return to the borders of Iraq. Turgut Özal, the Head of the Republic at the time, advocated the idea of a safe zone for the Iraqi refugees. The idea was quickly endorsed by Austria, Turkey and European leaders in the summit meeting of the European Communities on 8 April 1991 (Malanczuk 1991: 119).

‘Operation Provide Comfort’ was launched by the US, British and other European countries to provide relief on the Turkish border (Van Hear 1993: 69). On 17 April 1991, United States’ and other countries’ armed forces began the move into Northern Iraq to set up camps for securing the safety of Kurdish refugees (Malanczuk 1991: 120). Eventually, in mid-April, ‘Operation Haven’ was launched to establish an enclave within the Iraqi borders partly as a result of the pressure of the Turkish government, resulting in mass return of Iraqi refugees (Van Hear 1993: 70). The idea of “safe zones,” which was unprecedented then, was “invented” during that crisis, a practice that has become common for Western countries faced with refugee flows despite criticisms of human rights organizations (Danış and B. Aksel 2014: 78-79). It was also the first time mass refugee crises were directly associated with international peace and security, a continuing pattern during the 90s (Danış 2009: 17). On April 18, the Iraqi government agreed to grant UN access to displaced Iraqis on the borders (UNHCR 2003). After the multi-national forces of the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany, UN took over the control of the temporary settlement places for Kurds in Northern Iraq. The occupation of around 10,000 square km of Iraqi territory by soldiers from various countries lasted around three months (Malanczuk 1991: 122).

The quick return of the Iraqi refugees was a consequence of several factors including the establishment of the safe haven, restriction of the Iraqi military activity in Northern Iraq by international forces, the understanding reached between the Iraqi government and the UN,

as well as the inhospitable environment in Turkey and Iran (Van Hear 1993: 72). The Turkish government successfully persuaded major Western governments that the preferred solution was to place the Iraqi refugees in internationally secured camps on the plains of Northern Iraq (Kirişci 1991: 518). This reaction was very unlike the state's attitude towards refugees from Bulgaria, in which case the government claimed responsibility, resorted to the international community to solve the root causes of displacement of the Turkish minority, and facilitated their integration in Turkey rather than their return.

Both the fleeing and the return were sudden in the Iraqi case. By July 1991, almost all of those who had fled to Turkey had returned to Iraqi borders, even though not necessarily to their homes, many staying as internally displaced persons (Van Hear 1993: 64). By the beginning of June, the camps in Turkey were mostly emptied (ibid: 70). By early September, only around 5,000 refugees were remaining in Turkey in a camp near Silopi (UNHCR 2003). The efforts of the Turkish state for the international response and creation of safe havens outside its territory were operational for rapid return of Kurds to northern Iraq. Compared to the flow of 1988, the government was much more successful in mobilizing international community for repatriation of the refugees quickly (Kirişci 2000: 13). The ethnic characteristic of the refugees largely determined the Turkish response in this case as well, but in an adverse way this time. Both security and identity concerns made the Turkish state reluctant to accept the Kurdish flows, which made great effort to prevent their permanent settlement within the Turkish territory. The flow of half a million Iraqis, most of them Kurdish, was perceived as a threat to national identity and security by the Turkish state (Kirişci and Karaca 2015: 298). The 1994 Asylum Regulation (See Section 3.1) was also a direct response to the Iraqi Kurdish flows. When we look at the most recent and biggest refugee influx to Turkey, of Syrians, we see a response from the state similar to neither the welcoming approach towards the Turks from Bulgaria nor the hesitance towards the Kurds from Iraq.

3.3.3 Syrians (2011-)

The biggest refugee flow Turkey has ever experienced started in April 2011 with the outbreak of the civil war in The Syrian Arab Republic, and has become one of the most significant migration movements in the world history by 2015 (Kaya and Erdoğan 2015: 11).

It did not only make Turkey the host of the largest refugee population in the world, but also has started causing a global upsurge questioning the international refugee protection regime and burden-sharing of developed countries. Turkey being a transit country for many of the Syrians trying to reach Europe, and an unprecedented number of lives being lost in the Mediterranean Sea trying to make the journey, the movement has become the source of the big “European refugee crisis” by the summer of 2015. The crisis in Syria, that entered into its 6th year in 2016, is a complex civil war that involves multiple actors and has turned into a protracted crisis. Although it will not be possible to give a complete account of the 6-year conflict in the country here, this section will provide a general overview of the causes and magnitude of the Syrian refugee flow to Turkey as a framework for the analysis of the state response in the next chapter.

Bashar El-Assad became the president of Syrian Arab Republic in 2000, succeeding his father Hafez Al-Assad. He visited Turkey in January 2004, becoming the first Syrian leader to do so and ending decades of bitter relations between the two countries.¹ The relations deteriorated again a while after the uprising started in 2011 and Turkey declared its side with the opposition. The conflict in Syria started as part of a wave of uprisings started in 2010 in the Middle East and North Africa region, named the Arab Spring, mostly against authoritarian regimes and demanding democratization. The Syrian conflict started during protests demanding release of some political prisoners in March 2011. On 18 March 2011, security forces opened fire and killed four protestors in Daraa, demanding release of political prisoners, which is regarded as the first deaths of the uprising by activists.² It turned into a full scale civil war during the summer of 2011, with large defections from the Syrian army forming opposition forces and formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in July 2011.

Starting from April 2011, small groups of Syrians started fleeing to the borders of neighboring countries. In April 2011, up to 5000 refugees flew to Lebanon, while the influx to Turkey intensified by June 2011 (EUI Timeline). The first mass movement to the Turkey happened on April 29 with a group of 252 Syrian refugees crossing the Cilvegözü border gate in the Hatay province (Erdoğan 2015: 317). During the initial months of the conflict, many of

¹ BBC News, 20 September 2016. “Syria Profile: Timeline.” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995>

² Independent, 13 March 2016. “Syrian civil war timeline: Tracking five years of conflict.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrian-civil-war-timeline-tracking-five-years-of-conflict-a6929411.html>

around 20,000 Syrians who had fled to Turkey went back and forth to Syria. By the end of 2011, there were around 8000 Syrian refugees in Turkey (see Figure 3) and the country had set up refugee camps in the border cities to host the refugees, whom it called our “guests.” By November 2011, the Turkish govern”ment had assumed a large role and spent \$15 million setting up and maintaining refugee camps, while officials said that they were not refugees but “guests,” who will return home once the uprising in Syria is settled (Stack 2011). The “guest” status granted no legal right and implicitly assumed a short stay (İçduygu and Millet 2016: 4).




Figure 3: Number of Syrian refugees in Turkey (2011-2016)
(Data gathered from UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response)

When the influx started in April 2011, the relations between the Turkish and Syrian governments had not broken off yet. The Turkish government made efforts to convince Bashar El-Assad, with whom they had close relations then, to retrain from using harsh measures against the opposition (Kirişci 2015: 307). However, when Assad increased his use of force and oppression, Turkey declared its side with the opposition. In 2012, the tension between the two governments rose after Syria shot down a Turkish plane in June and a Syrian mortar fire killed five civilians in a border-town of Turkey in October 2012³. While its relations with the Syrian government got stranded shortly, Turkey followed an open border

³ http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/akcakaleye-yine-top-mermisi-5-olu,VkJ4mOJWY0WOJGpaOzA0_Q?_ref=infinite

policy for Syrians escaping the regime. In the case of Syrian refugees, Turkey found itself in a position of responsibility, although indirectly, by allying with one of the sides of the conflict (Kirişci 2015: 307).

In parallel with the international community, the state's expectation was that the conflict would end in a short period of time with removal of Assad from power, and Turkey would have had good relations with the new government to be established in the country (ibid.). Contrary to those expectations, Syria got dragged into a violent civil war that has entered its sixth year with no end in close sight, and Turkey has continued hosting the major part of Syrian refugees since, with a dramatic increase of numbers between 2013 and 2015. Figure 3 shows the registered number of Syrian refugees in Turkey from the end of 2011 to the end of 2016, which increased from half a million at the end of 2013 to more than two and a half million by the end of 2015, and have been more stable since.

In July 2012, fighting intensified in Aleppo and caused 200,000 to flee, thousands of which crossed over the Turkish border (EUI Timeline). In November 2012, National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces –excluding Islamist militias- was formed in Qatar, which was recognized as the legitimate representative of Syrian people by the U.S., Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf States in December 2012⁴. On September 11, 2012, a massive flow of up to 11,00 Syrian people were reported to have fled to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon within 24 hours because of the escalation of violence in the country (EUI Timeline).

2013 was marked by the rise of Islamist extremists, adding another layer of complexity to the Syrian conflict. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) increased its power in the region by taking advantage of the power gap, causing more bloodshed and fleeing. By March 2013, the total number of Syrian refugees had reached 1 million (EUI Timeline). The Syrian Arab Republic had transformed from being the host of the second largest refugee population to being the second largest refugee-producing country in the world by the end of 2013, within a span of only five years (UNHCR 2014b), and it was the biggest source country of refugees in the world in 2015 (UNHCR 2016: 16). Only during the summer of 2013, an average 6,000 people per day were fleeing the country according to UNHCR, a rate

⁴ BBC News, 20 September 2016. "Syria Profile: Timeline."

that was not seen since the 1990s. These numbers and statistics on Syrian refugees reveal the scale of human displacement, which made it an issue under global highlight and on the forefront of IR, yet without and adequate global response.

While in the beginning of the crisis it was mostly Sunni Arabs fleeing the Assad regime, more recently Kurds, Yazidis, and Nusayris have been fleeing ISIS and seeking asylum in Turkey (Erdoğan 2015: 317). This is contrary to the more homogeneous population flows from Bulgaria and Iraq (except a small number of Turkmens with the Kurdish flow in 1991). Another line of inquiry thus is whether there has been any difference in the state response towards different ethnic groups fleeing from Syria to Turkey.

In June 2015, UNHCR announced that the number of Syrian refugees crossed the four million mark, while an additional 7.6 million were displaced inside Syria.⁵ The then UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres called it “the biggest refugee population from a single conflict in a generation.” The summer of 2015 also marked another milestone in the fleeing of Syrian refugees as many of them chose the unsafe, irregular path to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea (İçduygu and Millet 2016: 3). Loss of human life every day made headlines on the media and a global spurge of interest has arisen over the refugee issue. The death of Alan Kurdi, a 3-year Syrian boy of Kurdish origin whose body was found by Turkish authorities on the shores of Bodrum in 2 September 2015 caused international outrage and drew attention to thousands who are losing their lives trying to reach safety in Europe. In the year of 2015, more than one million had reached Europe across the Mediterranean, while almost 4000 people lost their lives on the journey according to UNHCR (Clayton and Holland 2015). In 2016, there were 357,832 arrivals by sea and 4899 dead or missing persons, Syrian Arab Republic representing the top nationality of Mediterranean Sea arrivals (UNCHR 2017).

The temporary protection regime (See Section 3.1), created as a response to the Syrian refugee flows, is implemented by the Turkish state through DGMM single-handedly, and UNHCR in Turkey does not carry out registration or refugee status determination for Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2013). Syrian refugees in Turkey have the right to register and stay

⁵ AlJazeera. 9 June 2015. “UNHCR: Syrian refugees cross four million mark.” <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/unhcr-syrian-refugees-4-million-150709033023489.html>

in the country under the provisions of the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR), yet it is unknown how long the “temporary” will be and whether or when they will gain a permanent status in the country. More details and the implications of the TPR as a policy response from the Turkish state as the host country of Syrian refugees will be discussed in the next chapter.

The case of Syrians is distinctive even only for its magnitude, as the Turkish republic has received around two million immigrants and refugees in 88 years between 1923 and 2010, while the flow of Syrians in the past five years has exceeded this number (Kaya and Erdoğan 2015: 12). The number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey had passed 2.8 million as of the end of 2016 according to DGMM statistics. With the estimates for unregistered refugees, this figure well passes 3 million. Turkey has established 25 refugee camps in 10 border cities, hosting a total of 267,243 Syrian refugees.⁶ This makes up 9.6% of the total registered Syrian refugees in the country, a rate which has been constantly decreasing as refugees move to urban settings to find employment. The remaining majority of Syrian refugees live in urban centers, distributed around Turkey with İstanbul, Şanlıurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep being the host of largest refugee populations.

The Syrian crisis has evolved to a complex civil war, involving several actors, and does not look likely to be resolved anytime soon. The conflict continues to cause displacement of people both internally and across the borders every day. Syria’s neighboring countries Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq host 4.2 million of the global total of 4.9 million Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2016: 21), while the international response has been slow and inadequate to provide enough assistance and burden-sharing. Contrary to the initial expectations of the Turkish government, the understanding now is that most of the Syrian population in Turkey are going to stay in the long-term, and policies towards integration are important more than ever. It is not possible to talk about a single form of response from the Turkish state to the mass flow of Syrian refugees like the other two cases as there has been changes over the course of years and the fate of them in the country is not clear yet. It is possible to say that the discourse of the Turkish state in the first years of the crisis, calling them our “guests” and claiming that they will go back to Syria with the end of the conflict is changing towards one that is more accepting of permanent stay and integration.

⁶ DGMM statistics. Retrieved on December 30, 2016 from http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713

CHAPTER IV:

FINDINGS: TURKEY'S RESPONSE TO MASS REFUGEE FLOWS

By analyzing the state discourse from the language used by the highest state officials of the three eras, this chapter examines the evolution of Turkish response to mass refugee flows in alignment with changing characteristics of the incoming populations. The Turkish names that were used to define the refugees, instead of calling them refugees, are chosen for the section titles because they give the first clue as to what the state's policy approach would be towards them. "Soydaş" means cognate, or "of the same kin" in Turkish, emphasizing the Turkish ethnicity of the refugees coming from Bulgaria. Although I use the term refugee in this thesis and they were indeed refugees according to the international definition, this term was never used in Turkey in that period. "Peşmerge" or Peshmerga means fighter in Kurdish and is the term used for armed Kurdish fighters. In this case, even if many of them were not peshmergas, this character and Kurdishness of the people who came to Turkish borders were emphasized by the state who saw them as a threat to national security. They were called as asylum-seekers, and rarely refugees as well. Common usage of the term refugee in Turkey started only in recent years and now used for Syrian refugees, but again the state officials defined the population with a different term initially: misafir, meaning "guest," especially during the first years of refugee flows from Syria.

The following sections will try to provide answers to the set of ten questions asked in Section 1.3 to analyze the state discourse from the perspectives of different IR theories and to conclude about the relevance of each theory for different refugee policies of the state. The content analysis includes the content of relevant national laws and regulations, the use of labels and language by the state authorities regarding refugees, as well as their positive or negative remarks regarding the existence and possibility of stay of the refugee populations in the country. Under each case, a subsection reviews the state response from the perspective of the three categories of IR theories as explained in Section 1.3. The rhetoric emphasizing national interests, security, or military power are regarded realist, while the discourses based on liberal democratic values, economic cooperation, and the effect of international institutions on state policies are evaluated as liberal sentiments. The emphasis on identity, norms, and their historical and social construction are considered under the constructivist and English School theories.

4.1 “Soydaşlar”: Bulgarian Turks

The exodus of the Turkish Muslim minority from Bulgaria resulting from the harsh assimilation campaign called the “National Revival/Regenerative Process” starting in 1984 turned into *en masse* refugee flow to Turkey in mid-May 1989 (See Section 3.3.1). On May 14, three Turks sought asylum at the Turkish Embassy in Vienna on the grounds of cruelty and oppression from the Bulgarian government, which marked the beginning of a mass population flow.⁷ Starting from mid-May, around 310,000 Bulgarian Turks sought refuge in Turkey with the country following an open border policy until the border was restricted again with visas on August 21.

In the summer of 1989, Motherland (Anavatan) Party was in power in Turkey and Turgut Özal was the prime minister of the country, while Kenan Evren was the Head of the Republic and Mesut Yılmaz was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Even before the start of the flight of the Turkish minority from Bulgaria to Turkey, the Turkish government took interest in the situation of their human rights and brought up the issue in bilateral relations as well as in the international arena, playing the role of protector of Turks in the world as the corresponding mainland of the ethnicity. The recurring discourse of the state officials before and during the fleeing of the Turkish minority from Bulgaria was focused on shaming the Bulgarian government for its actions, mobilizing regional and intergovernmental organizations, blaming international actors for the lack of action against the forced displacement, and welcoming the refugees from Bulgaria with an emphasis on the racial kin and Turkishness.

By the end of May 1989, the policies of the Bulgarian government against the Turkish minority were getting harsher and the Turkish government was becoming vocal against it. On May 22, Mesut Yılmaz, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a public statement condemning the police violence against protestors which resulted with the death of at least 20 people, emphasizing that besides minority rights, the basic right to life of “our cognates” was being violated by the Bulgarian government and that they “will not let go of this problem.”⁸ The initial reaction of the state was to try to protect Turks, by bringing them into the country if necessary. 167 people who were deported from Bulgaria were brought to Turkey by private

⁷ Cumhuriyet, 14 May 1989, p. 10. “Bulgaristan’dan Kaçan 3 Türk.”

⁸ Cumhuriyet, 24 May 1989, p. 15. “Bulgar ateşine sert tepki.”

planes from Vienna and Belgrade, and were welcomed by the Prime Minister Özal himself, who repeated that they were not going to let Bulgarian government get away with what they did.⁹

Turkey resorted to international bodies to a certain extent, especially to draw attention to the human rights violations of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and to shame the international community for the lack of response. However, it should be stated that the role of IOs was minimal and UNHCR was not involved in Turkish state's response to the refugee crisis. Different that the refugee crises of today, within the historical context of the Cold War, the issue was seen as domestic affairs of Bulgaria and Turkey, or an issue of bilateral relations at most, not be intervened from outside. The Turkish government gave eight notes to Bulgaria in one week, right before the "Humanitarian Dimension Conference" on May 30, within the European Security and Cooperation Conference (ESCC) process, and was planning to send one of the vice counselors from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Sofia to discuss the issue of minority rights of Turks in Bulgaria, which was cancelled after the events of 20-21 May.¹⁰ Mesut Yılmaz took the issue to the international conference and expressed Turkey's dissatisfaction with the international support given to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.¹¹ Meanwhile, it was on the media that Bulgaria was allying with Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds for support at the ESCC¹², the groups which had traditionally been "enemies" of the Turkish state and its nationalist discourse. On May 28, during the North Atlantic Assembly in Antalya, Özal asked for help from the Western governments against the oppression and violence of the Bulgarian government against the Turkish minority, saying that they expected from friends and allies to continue their support for the righteous case of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria.¹³

Especially during the initial phase of forced displacements and oppression from the Bulgarian government, liberal democratic values of human rights were emphasized and the Turkish government resorted to international institutions with hopes of stopping the violence and the fleeing. Özal addressed the heads of 15 governments during the NATO summit and accused his allies for not showing their usual sensitivity against the human rights violations

⁹ Türkiye, 27 May 1989, p. 9. "Hürriyet Sevinci."

¹⁰ Cumhuriyet, 22 May 1989, p. 15. "Sofya'ya bir haftada sekiz nota."

¹¹ Milliyet, 2 June 1989, p. 13. "Yılmaz, vahşeti anlattı."

¹² Milliyet, 26 May 1989, p. 13. "Dörtlü ittifak tehdidi."

¹³ Cumhuriyet, 28 May 1989, p. 16. "Özal, Batı'dan yardım istedi."

and applying double standards.¹⁴ Intergovernmental organizations were resorted to facilitate cooperation of the Bulgarian government to stop the forced displacement or to make a deal with Turkey for an orderly migration. Prime Minister Özal, Head of the Republic Evren, as well as various ministers repeatedly called the Bulgarian government “to the table,” to discuss the minority rights of Turks in Bulgaria in the beginning and to make an official migration deal further into the crisis.¹⁵ When the Bulgarian PM Georgi Atanasov accepted negotiations but only without any pre-conditions, Özal refused to meet without the pre-condition of making a migration deal.¹⁶

After it was clear that the oppression was not going to end via diplomacy, the state focused more on the racial kinship and bringing the Turkish minority “back to the homeland.” The Turkish government quickly declared that the borders of Turkey are open to them, and called the Bulgarian government into negotiations for an extensive migration agreement, in response to Bulgarian Head of State Todor Jivkov’s demand that Turkey should open its borders to Muslim Bulgarians who want to migrate.¹⁷ Prime Minister Özal declared that “Even if Bulgaria sends 1 million cognates, we will take them.”¹⁸ The issue of forced displacement and oppression of minority in fact turned into a power struggle between the Turkish and Bulgarian governments, one which as the Minister of Foreign Affairs Yılmaz said “the one that is more determined, resistant, and patient would win.”¹⁹

It can be argued that the Turkish state wanted to show with this discourse that it was politically and socio-economically powerful enough to deal with an issue of such magnitude, as Özal said during his statement to BBC on June 20: “Turkey is a powerful enough country to handle this issue. It is not the Turkey of 1950s, it is the Turkey of 1990s,” adding that the borders are always open. He even put forward possible positive consequences of this migratory movement for Turkey, stating that

what might seem harmful now will be beneficial on the contrary. I am warning the Bulgarian authorities again. One day they will be called to account for this. Turkey is a country that is getting more powerful. Our population is 56 million now, they are sending 2 million, we will be 58 million. We are already

¹⁴ Cumhuriyet, 30 May 1989, p. 12. “Özal Sofya’ya karşı destek istedi.”

¹⁵ Milliyet, 16 June 1989, p. 14. “Özal’ın “sıkıştırma” taktiği.”

¹⁶ Türkiye, 19 June 1989, p. 9. “Bulgar hizaya geliyor.”

¹⁷ Türkiye, 31 May 1989, p. 9. “Sınırlarımız daima açık.”

¹⁸ Cumhuriyet, 3 June 1989, p. 1. “Yine zorunlu göç.”

¹⁹ Cumhuriyet, 2 July 1989, p. 17. “Sofya’yla sinir savaşı.”

growing 2 million every year. At the end of the century, we will be 75 million, not 70 million.²⁰

By early June, the Council of Ministers decided to open reception centers in Edirne, Kapıkule and Kırklareli, Dereköy border gates, as well as to form a Coordination Council for assessment and provision of the needs of Bulgarian Turks.²¹ The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Turks deported from Bulgaria could stay in Turkey as long as they wanted.²² At the same time, the Minister of Interior Abdülkadir Aksu declared that they would give citizenship and housing to Bulgarian Turks, and that the Coordination Council would examine the existing legal framework and see if there would be need for any changes for their permanent settlement.²³

The legal framework in Turkey, based on the 1934 Settlement Law, was positively discriminatory for immigrants of “Turkish descent and culture” (See Section 3.1). Settlement Law defined immigrants as those people of Turkish descent and culture, who come to Turkey individually or as groups and accepted within this law, while the decision over Turkish descent and adherence to Turkish culture was given to the authority of the Council of Ministers. Accordingly, refugees from Bulgaria fit in this definition and were accepted as immigrants with possibility of permanent settlement, while other groups did not. On June 16, 1989, a new article was added to the Settlement Law, stating that those people of Turkish descent who were forced to migrate from Bulgaria and came to Turkey after 01.01.1984 would be considered as free or settled immigrants who belong to the Turkish culture (Official Gazette 1989). For those who are considered as settled immigrants, the state would provide housing and employment.²⁴

Ministry of Interior initially declared 16 provinces in the west of Turkey, including the big cities of İstanbul, İzmir, and Bursa, as ‘temporary settlement areas’ for Bulgarian Turks.²⁵ Minister Ercüment Konukman, who was the head of the Coordination Council formed to deal with the issues of the immigrants, said that they started the process for them to get Turkish citizenship by the end of June, which was only one month after the start of the

²⁰ Cumhuriyet, 14 June 1989, p. 15. “Göç çığ gibi.”

²¹ Türkiye, 9 June 1989, p. 9. “Soydaşlarımız perişan olmayacak.”

²² Cumhuriyet, 8 June 1989, p. 8. “Bulgar sınırına göçmen kampı.”

²³ Cumhuriyet, 9 June 1989, p. 8. “Sürgün göçmenlere ev verilecek.”

²⁴ Cumhuriyet, 16 June 1989, p. 12. “Sofya’ya atak.”

²⁵ Cumhuriyet, 22 June 1989, p. 19. “16 il iskan bölgesi ilan edildi.”

mass refugee flow.²⁶ In response to the news that Bulgaria would send a total of 250,000 people, he called it a bluff, but that they were ready and made all the organization to welcome them. PM Özal as well called out to Jivkov that he saw his bluff, and added: “Send them all.”²⁷ There were recurrent claims by Turkish officials that Bulgaria’s economy would experience a huge crisis because of the departure of the Turkish minority.²⁸

The Turkish state claimed the protector role to its cognates on every level of the government, with the use of a possessive language. During the initial fleeing of small groups in May 1989, stories of individuals and how they found protection and reunited with their motherland were told. Eminönü Kaymakam, for instance, was photographed handing financial assistance to a refugee and it was publicized precisely as “The state protected,” “financial assistance was given to our cognate,” while their story of separation from their daughter because of the Bulgarian cruelty was told in detail.²⁹ Edirne’s Vice Governor welcomed a big group of refugees on June 5 and stated that they were closely attending the matters of their cognates following the orders of the government, and that none of them would stay hungry or in the open.³⁰ The Minister of Interior Aksu and Minister of Health Şıvgın visited the first baby who was born among the refugees from Bulgaria, and gave her a gold as a present.³¹ The welcoming attitude towards refugees was encouraged from various public leaders, including religious leaders. While the Presidency of Religious Affairs called the public to welcome and embrace their Muslim “brothers and sisters,” call for help for them was told in 60 thousand mosques all around Turkey during khutba on Friday prayer.³²

Concerns of domestic politics always play a significant role in shaping the state’s response as mentioned in previous chapters. In the case of the mass flow of Bulgarian Turks, it was not only the government but also other political parties, representing different constituencies, as well the media, who mainly supported opening the doors to them especially in the beginning of the refugee flow.³³ Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP)’s leader Erdal İnönü said on May 31st that if their cognates would not be able to live in Bulgaria according

²⁶ Cumhuriyet, 24 June 1989, p. 14. “Göçmenlere geçici kimlik.”

²⁷ Milliyet, 18 June 1989, p. 15. “Jivkov, blöfünü gördüm.”

²⁸ Milliyet, 11 June 1989, p. 15. “Göç krizi: Bulgar ekonomisi felce uğruyor.”

²⁹ Türkiye, 17 May 1989, “Ayşe’imizi istiyoruz.”

³⁰ Türkiye, 5 June 1989, p.9. “202 soydaşımız daha geldi.”

³¹ Türkiye, 17 June 1989, p. 9. “Bulgar’a ambargo.”

³² Türkiye, 1 July 1989, p. 9. “Hutbelerde Bulgar zulmü kınandı.”

³³ Milliyet, 14 June 1989, p. 1. “Hepsi gelsin.”

to basic human rights principles, they should be brought to Turkey.³⁴ Süleyman Demirel, leader of the True Path Party (DYP), condemned the oppression of Turks in Bulgaria and stated that their duty was to open themselves to their cognates, and that the Turkish people would “embrace their cognates, by eating two slices of bread instead of three slices if necessary.”³⁵ As mentioned in Section 3.2, there were already several waves of immigration of the Muslim populations from the Balkans with the loss of the Ottoman power over the territories, encouraged by the policies of the early Turkish Republic in the process of nation-building. Thus there was an existing public force and also civil society organizations founded by immigrants, which reinforced the new wave of flows from Bulgaria.

Nevertheless, expectedly, forced migration of Bulgarian Turks quickly became an issue of domestic politics and point of argument between the opposition and the government. Demirel blamed the government for not paying enough attention to the oppression in Bulgaria beforehand, and argued for a more serious stand on the issue.³⁶ Demirel also criticized the government for increasing controls on the border to see if there are “spies” among the people seeking asylum, stating that they cannot be treated as regular “tourists” coming from other countries.³⁷ Similarly, Alparslan Türkeş, leader of Nationalist Task Party was blaming the Özal government for not taking precautions on time.³⁸ The government was not criticized for taking in massive numbers of people to the country, but even for not making enough effort to guarantee their safe passage into the Turkish territory.

The Turkish state was quickly taking steps for bringing and welcoming the refugee group, while also calling for international attention to the situation. Head of the Republic Kenan Evren called it “not only Turkey’s issue, but an issue of all humanity,” and also stated that it had become a national case for Turkey, requiring consensus away from political interests,³⁹ similar to Mesut Yılmaz’s remarks on May 31st at the ESCC, saying human rights violations against Turks in Bulgaria was not only Turkey’s, but the whole world’s problem.⁴⁰ All the political parties in the parliament made a joint appeal calling people to the massive

³⁴ Cumhuriyet, 31 May 1989, p. 15. “İnönü: Sofya ile sorun çözülmeli.”

³⁵ Türkiye, 7 June 1989, p. 9. “Utaç Sürünü.”

³⁶ Türkiye, 12 June 1989, p. 9. “Soykırma dur denmeli.”

³⁷ Cumhuriyet, 14 June 1989, p. 15. “Hükümet şaşkın.”

³⁸ ibid.

³⁹ Türkiye, 14 June 1989, p. 9. “Evren’den Jivkov’a çağrı: ‘Masaya oturalım.’”

⁴⁰ Cumhuriyet, 1 June, p. 1. “AGİK’te söz düellosu.”

‘non-political’ protest against the forced displacement of Bulgarian Turks at Taksim Square on June 24. All businesses were closed that day, busses carried people to the square for free, and tens of thousands of people attended the rally which was dominated by a nationalistic tone of Turkishness and call of military action against Bulgaria.⁴¹⁴²

Public opinion, with the effect of the discourse by the state as well as the mass media, mostly united around the idea of responsibility for welcoming and protecting Turkey’s kin, Turkish people’s “brothers and sisters.” There were several catalyzers of the public opinion, initiated by the state and mainly with the usage of mass media. An old television series consisting of four episodes, “Belene,” telling about the oppression of the Bulgarian government against the Turkish minority was aired on national TV after agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and TRT, the national TV channel, which was announced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself.⁴³⁴⁴ With the “State-Society Cooperation Campaign” initiated by the State Ministry, one billion liras were collected in less than one month to be used for the Bulgarian Turks.⁴⁵ Refugees from Bulgaria were accepted to Turkey openly and officially because they were of Turkish origin. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the era Mesut Yılmaz mentioned the possibility of some of the refugees not being Turkish, saying that they took and were going to continue taking some precautions against this issue.⁴⁶ They started harsher ID controls on the border gates in response to the information that there were people of not Turkish descent among the refugees crossing the Turkish border.^{47 48} Minister Konukman stated it was even wrong to call the cognates immigrants or foreigners as they were Turks who migrated from Anatolia centuries ago and they were only going back to their homelands.⁴⁹

If the test of a “good and bad foreigner” is her contribution to the restoration of the national discourse (Czajka 2014: 158), Bulgarian Turks were the good foreigners in Turkey. They contributed to the nation-state’s discourse and its everyday reconstruction of the

⁴¹ Milliyet, 25 June 1989, p. 1. “Bulgar’a milli ihtar.”

⁴² Cumhuriyet, 25 June 1989, p. 12. “Sofya’ya ulusal tepki.”

⁴³ Türkiye, 8 June 1989, p. 9. “Belene Cumartesi günü televizyonda.”

⁴⁴ Milliyet, 10 June 1989, p. 15. “‘Belene’ özel kararlar bu gece ekrana: İşte Bulgar zulmü.”

⁴⁵ Cumhuriyet, 30 June 1989, p. 1. “Göçmene kira yardımı.”

⁴⁶ Türkiye, 10 June 1989, p. 9. “Bulgar’dan hesap soracağız.”

⁴⁷ Cumhuriyet, 10 June 1989, p. 7. “Göçmenlere kimlik denetimi.”

⁴⁸ Milliyet, 10 June 1989, p. 3. “‘Göç’ten casus çıktı.’”

⁴⁹ Cumhuriyet, 20 August 1989, p. 8. “Göçmenler için genel müdürlük.”

national identity based on an ethnically homogeneous society. Readily acceptance of the mass refugee flow from Bulgaria by the Turkish state can be understood as in the interest of the state in this sense, but not interest defined in terms of power as the realist IR theory suggests. The interest in this case was contribution to the nation state's nationalistic discourse based on ethnicity and common national identity of being Turkish. While the state's treatment of a mass refugee flow of Kurds from Iraq one-year prior was substantially different, state officials also compared the international response to those two cases and argued that they were applying double standards against Turks. Minister Ercüment Konukman called on Western human rights advocates and said that they were even going to the camps for investigation during "the Peshmerga incident," while they were being silent against the oppression Bulgarian Turks were facing.⁵⁰

Being the "good foreigners," the nationalistic discourse based on the notion of Turkishness and common kinship was utilized by the migrating people themselves, who sought refuge in Turkey. The refugees who came from Bulgaria emphasized their Turkishness, the part of their identity that was understandably brought out because of its oppression, and protested against the Bulgarian government along with other immigrants. They were "kissing the soil," as it was mentioned several times on the media⁵¹, celebrating with Turkish flags to be reunited with the homeland, and telling the stories of cruelty they faced in Bulgaria for any representation of Turkish ethnicity and culture. A pregnant woman who said "I won't give birth on the Bulgarian soil" was carried across the border and gave birth in Edirne to a daughter whom she named Özgür (Free), and who would "grow up freely in the Turkish mainland."⁵² When telling his story from the Belene camp for a series in the Türkiye newspaper, one refugee said while he was being interrogated, all he had in mind was "to protect the Turkish being and to exist like a Turk."⁵³ According to Cumhuriyet's observation, when Bulgarian Turks were picking new last names in Turkey, seven out of ten included "Türk" in them.⁵⁴

There were also referrals to the past in the discourse of the Turkish officials, reminiscing the Ottoman rule over Bulgaria. Prime Minister Özal repeated on different

⁵⁰ Türkiye, 13 June 1989, p. 9. "Soydaşlarımız için hesap açıldı."

⁵¹ Milliyet, 1 June 1989, p. 13. "Anavatan mutluluğu."

⁵² Milliyet, 17 June 1989, p. 14. "Bulgar aşısı incelemede."

⁵³ Türkiye, 12 June 1989, p. 9. "Belene Günlüğü 2: Hücre kanla kaplıydı."

⁵⁴ Cumhuriyet, 11 July 1989, p. 1. "Göçmenler kendilerine soyadı seçiyor."

occasions claiming that Turks ruled in Bulgaria for 500 years, respecting human rights, and that if Ottoman Empire did what Bulgaria was doing there would not be any Bulgarians left in the country.⁵⁵ The nationalistic discourse by the state thus was prevalent using various elements of history, ethnicity, as well as religion. The Turkish state repeatedly blamed European governments for being silent against the cruelty of Bulgarian government and forced deportation of the Turkish minority, basing the silence on the fact that the forcedly displaced minority group was Turkish and Muslim.^{56,57}

As the refugee movement continued in an escalating manner and showed no signs of stopping though, there were signs of less welcoming attitudes from the state officials. By mid-June, when three thousand people were crossing the border within 24-hour periods, Mesut Yılmaz implied for the first time that unless they reach a deal with the Bulgarian government, they could close the border adding that he hoped there would not be such need.⁵⁸ Although the Prime Minister repeatedly said that the borders were open and they were not concerned about the numbers, willing to take in even two million Bulgarian Turks, claiming that Bulgaria was afraid of Turkey's growing power and even arguing that Bulgarians themselves would come to Turkey if they opened the doors⁵⁹; the open door policy ended after three months when the number of refugees passed 300,000. By August 20, there were declarations that crossing of refugees as mass flows was "causing some inconveniences" and that they "would need to take some precautions" about letting everyone in.⁶⁰

The Council of Ministers eventually took the decision that the border gates would be closed to visa-free crossing at 02.00 on August 22, claiming that the decision aimed to take the control in hand and push the Bulgarian government for an orderly migration deal.⁶¹ The decision to employ visas again was criticized by the opposition leaders who blamed the government for failing to make a migration deal until that point⁶², and caused harsh discussions in the parliament regarding closing the borders and breaking the promise of

⁵⁵ Cumhuriyet, 11 June 1989, p. 10. "Liderlerden Sofya'ya tepki."

⁵⁶ Cumhuriyet, 28 May 1989, p. 16. "Batı, Bulgar zulmüne karşı suskun."

⁵⁷ Türkiye, 14 June 1989, p.1 "Avrupa zulme hala seyirci."

⁵⁸ Cumhuriyet, 13 June 1989, p. 1. "Zorunlu göç kışkacı."

⁵⁹ Cumhuriyet, 18 June 1989, p. 14. "Sınırdaki gövde gösterisi."

⁶⁰ Cumhuriyet, 20 August 1989, p. 8. "Ankara'da önlem hazırlığı."

⁶¹ Türkiye, 22 August 1989, p. 1. "Bulgar sınırını kapattık."

⁶² Milliyet, 22 August 1989, p. 13. "Karar kaygı verici."

taking everyone and decreasing Turkey's credibility⁶³. The governor of Bursa, which was one of the provinces hosting the biggest number of refugees, restricted entry of Bulgarian Turks to the province.⁶⁴ At the same time, the number of returnees substantially increased.

Looking at the significant role of international institutions for solving dilemmas of and facilitating cooperation among states as the neoliberal institutionalist theory of IR suggests (see Section 2.2.2), the state resorted to regional and international institutions, especially to intervene in the root causes of the fleeing. Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz explained the state's main policy as to ensure that Bulgaria was punished for its actions by the Western governments, mainly by the European Economic Community (ECC).⁶⁵ Yılmaz also sent a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, asking him to take the issue to the Security Council, while the Minister of Health wrote to World Health Organization, UNICEF and the Red Cross.⁶⁶ Prime Minister Özal called for negotiations with the Bulgarian government and frequently touched upon "international norms" and preservation of peace.⁶⁷ He and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs determined their main policy through the summer as mobilizing as many international mechanisms as possible including the ECC, NATO, UN Security Council, UNHCR, and The Islamic Conference.⁶⁸ Main opposition leader İnönü as well, emphasized that they should use all the international pressure mechanisms possible. He argued these kind of incidents would cause war between states in the past, but that international protection mechanisms were preventing them now and cooperative relations between two neighbors would be beneficial for everyone in the long run, repeating the need for a bilateral migration agreement.⁶⁹ This is one of the main arguments of the liberal and neoliberal institutionalist IR theories, the idea that cooperation is more beneficial than conflict and international institutions can play a significant role for overcoming dilemmas of common interests and preserving peace. Other opposition leaders such as Türkeş called the government to implement economic sanctions against Bulgaria⁷⁰, and a member of parliament from ANAP even called for closing the Bosphorus and land

⁶³ Cumhuriyet, 25 August 1989, p. 1. "İnönü: Hükümet gitmeli."

⁶⁴ Milliyet, 23 August 1989, p. 13. "Soydaşa Bursa'ya giriş yasak."

⁶⁵ Türkiye, 17 June 1989, p. 9. "Bulgar'a ambargo."

⁶⁶ Milliyet, 21 June 1989. "Mektup diplomasisi."

⁶⁷ Cumhuriyet, 19 June 1989, p. 10. "Sofya zor durumda."

⁶⁸ Cumhuriyet, 26 June 1989, p. 1. "Sofya için yaz atağı."

⁶⁹ Cumhuriyet, 12 June 1989, p. 15. "Zorunlu göçte rekor gün."

⁷⁰ Türkiye, 29 June 1989, p. 9. "Türkeş: "Ambargo uygulayalım.""

borders to trade, although it was not supported,⁷¹ which also falls well within the economic interdependence argument of the liberal theory.

The forced displacement of the Turkish minority from Bulgaria ended within a course of three months without causing physical conflict between the two countries. The number of daily border crossings started declining by the beginning of August and the mass refugee flow ended with the decision to end the open border policy on August 21. The majority of the refugees (around 250,00 of 310,000) had settled in Thrace and the Marmara Region; Bursa and İstanbul being the provinces hosting the largest numbers.⁷² The communist regime in Bulgaria collapsed at the end of 1989 and as of the end of May 1990, 154,937 of the refugees in Turkey had returned to Bulgaria (Çetin 2009: 259). The remaining stayed and permanently settled in Turkey. By March 1994, 245,000 of immigrants from Bulgaria were granted Turkish citizenship (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 196). Granting citizenship to such a large group within a period of five years is an indicator of Turkey's favoring approach based on the ethnic identity of refugees, as it would be quite unthinkable for it to have followed a similar course of action if they were not of Turkish origin. Bulgarian Turks can be labeled as "national refugees" and under the Settlement Law of 1934, they were entitled to rights only granted to immigrants of Turkish ethnic origin (See Section 3.1). 23,495 houses for the settlement of Bulgarian Turks were built and delivered to owners by the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ) (Çetin 2009: 257).

Although there were incidents of conflict between the immigrants from Bulgaria and the local population, mostly for economic reasons of employment and cheap labor, policies for integration and the focus on ethnic bond resulted in a quick fusion of societies. The Ministry of Education opened "integration courses" in several schools for children and adults, to improve Turkish literacy among the refugees.⁷³ One month after the start of the mass flow, 5,000 of them were provided employment according to Minister Konukman.⁷⁴ Even in sectors that require more proficiency and skills such as the health sector, they were quickly employed,⁷⁵ and big companies gave priority to Bulgarian Turks in recruitment.⁷⁶ Extra

⁷¹ Milliyet, 27 June 1989, p. 13. "Taşar'ın önerisine destek yok."

⁷² Cumhuriyet, 25 August 1989, p. 10. "Marmara, göçmenin gözdesi."

⁷³ Türkiye, 12 July 1989, p. 11. "Gelenlerin sayısı 135 bin."

⁷⁴ Milliyet, 29 June 1989, p. 13. "Soydaşlarımıza iş ve yardım kampanyası."

⁷⁵ Milliyet, 13 July 1989, p. 3. "Çapa Tıp'ta 60 soydaşımız görevde: Hemşireye iş çok."

⁷⁶ Milliyet, 20 July 1989, p. 5. "Göçmene iş kapısı açık."

quotas were opened in state boarding schools and universities to accommodate the education of refugees from Bulgaria quickly.⁷⁷ Thus it is not surprising that integration of the majority of the refugees from Bulgaria was quick and relatively smooth even in international standards for refugee integration. According to the findings of Çakar Mengü's research conducted as a questionnaire with 70 members of the Balkan Migrants Society who migrated from Bulgaria to Turkey between 1989 and 1992, 100% of them felt belonging to the Turkish society culturally and historically (2008: 110).

In none of the 236 newspaper articles I reviewed in three newspapers about the mass flow from Bulgaria, the term 'refugee' was used neither by state officials nor by the media itself. They were always referred as *soydaşlarımız*, meaning our cognates, or just as Turks, and sometimes as exiles and immigrants but never as refugees. Even when it is mentioned that people coming from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Bulgaria are escaping from occupation, civil war, violence, and so on they are called immigrants, not refugees.⁷⁸ There are two possible, not mutually exclusive explanations for this use of language. Firstly, "refugee" was not a widely used and globally known term or norm then as it is in the 21st century. The second reason specific for the Turkish state is more deliberative. The state defined the identity of the refugee group by their ethnic bond to Turkey rather than the identity of a refugee escaping persecution. The language used to describe the mass flow of Bulgarian Turks focused on "retrieving freedom," "reuniting with the homeland," "happiness of freedom for the victims of forced migration,⁷⁹" and such discourses. A national norm was constructed around protecting ethnic Turks, and *because* they are ethnic Turks. The state determined its national goal as to preserve and increase the Turkish presence in the Balkans and empower the "whole Turkish world."⁸⁰ The language used by the state officials regarding the mass refugee movement from Bulgaria, as well as the course of actions they took for their settlement and integration, based on the immigration laws in the country that privileges Turkish ethnic origin, show us the reconstruction of their identity in Turkey emphasizing the ethnicity dimension rather than the state of being a refugee. The following subsection will briefly evaluate the response of the Turkish state to the case from perspectives of specified IR theories.

⁷⁷ Cumhuriyet, 7 July 1989, p. 13. "Büyük göç Sofya'yı sarsıyor."

⁷⁸ Milliyet, 9 July 1989, p. 1. "Göçmen cenneti olduk."

⁷⁹ Milliyet, 17 June 1989, p. 3. "Özgürlük rüzgarı."

⁸⁰ Cumhuriyet, 27 July 1989, p. 9. "Çerçişev: Çare diyalog."

4.1.1 The Case from the Perspective of IR Theories

From a realist perspective, it can be argued that the Turkish government used the refugees from Bulgaria to increase its real or perceived power in the international arena, politically and economically, showing that it has the ability to deal with an issue of such magnitude by itself. It turned into a power struggle between the Turkish and Bulgarian governments, even coming to a point where there were debates on military action against the Bulgarian government for the violations against the Turkish minority. The relations of the two countries, states being prone to conflict and prioritizing expansion of their power, deteriorated quickly. It was argued by Turkish state officials, as exemplified in the previous section, that the movement of Bulgarian Turks to the country was in the interest of Turkey, increasing its population and economical power in the long run, and that the Bulgarian state was going to regret its actions. Furthermore, the closure of the border after the numbers exceeded a certain point can be evaluated from the realist framework as preservation of state's self-interest, although it promised to take in and protect all the cognates.

Initially, faced with the exodus of the Turkish community from Bulgaria to the country, the Turkish government resorted to shaming the Bulgarian government. Shaming of the Bulgarian government using the rhetoric of human rights and democracy was the dominant reaction of the Turkish state, aiming to mobilize the international community to intervene in the cause of fleeing from Bulgaria. Many of the statements of the Turkish officials exemplified in Section 4.1 emphasized human rights and minority rights, the unacceptability of their violation and need for action by the international community. International and regional organizations were resorted to solve the problem of cooperation between the two states, to initiate an orderly bilateral migration deal. Even though these efforts did not succeed in a substantial manner, the power struggle did not result in military conflict between the countries, and cooperation to make a migration agreement was considered more beneficial on the side of the Turkish state. There were also calls from the state to the international community to impose economic sanctions on Bulgaria, which is a liberal tool of solving cooperation problems in IR. However, as mentioned in the above section, this case of mass refugee flow from Bulgaria to Turkey was considered more as a matter of domestic affairs by the international community within the global context of 1989, and IOs like the UNHCR did not get involved in the refugee response.

The main finding of the discourse analysis was that refugees from Bulgaria were never named refugees by Turkish officials, and their ethnically Turkish identity was uttermost emphasized by the state, as well as and relatedly, by the society and the media. In a mutually constitutive manner, the state, the civil society and the public enforced welcoming and protecting Bulgarian Turks, and because they are Turks. Although state officials made several references to universal human rights, minority rights and liberal and democratic values to criticize the Bulgarian government for their rights violations in the international arena, they used a different rhetoric about opening the borders to the refugees fleeing that oppression. They openly accepted them for their Turkishness, as evident by the controls on border gates in suspicion of some of them not being ethnically Turkish as explained in the previous section. The focus on identity was not only around the ethnicity of the refugees but also representation of the Bulgarian state as an ally of Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds on the media, constructing its identity as an enemy of the Turkish state, reminding the “insiders” and “outsiders” of the nation.

Readily acceptance of the mass refugee flow from Bulgaria by the Turkish state can be evaluated as in the interest of the state, but not interest defined in terms of power as the realist IR theory suggests. The interest in this case was contribution to the nation state’s nationalistic discourse based on ethnicity and common national identity of being Turkish. The emphasis on identity in the constructivist thought comes in the front when we look at Turkey’s response to the refugees from Bulgaria. The state, faced by the forced displacement of a population belonging to an ethnic identity that forms the core of its national identity, defined the refugees not as refugees but as cognates, which arguably served to strengthen this national identity as a restorative element. When we look back at the main arguments of the English School, the international society constructed of nation-states basing their sovereignty on their discourse of a national identity, the move of the ethnically Turkish population to the Turkish state can be seen as part of its ways of restoring order in this society of states.

4.2 “Peşmergeler”: Iraqi Kurds

The mass flow of refugees from Iraq happened in two waves following the Iran-Iraq War on 1988 and the Gulf War on 1991 (See Section 3.3.2). In 1988, around 70,000 Kurds were forced to the borders of neighboring countries. Turkey sought international support, US \$300 million, but it did not want to collaborate with UNHCR because it defined the Iraqi Kurds as

refugees, a term which Turkey was not willing to use (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 196). Even though refugees who came from Iraq during the mass flow in 1988 asked for the refugee status in Turkey,⁸¹ they were not given any status. After one year of the flow, nearly 35 thousand refugees who remained from the initial number of 67 thousand were still staying in the camps, without any clear status or identification, and without any attempt from the state for their participation in the work force or for children's education.⁸² The issue became more striking when integration policies for providing employment and participation of children in state education, as well as initiation of the process of granting citizenship were quickly implemented for refugees who came from Bulgaria in 1989. While Minister Ercüment Konukman was saying that they would help Bulgarian Turks find employment and pay their rent, he stated that the refugees who came from Iraq in 1988 would be sent back to their countries eventually when he was asked about them.⁸³ The terms that were used for different group of refugees were different as well. Even when there was news on Turkish newspapers about Iraqi refugees who came in 1988 and Turks coming from Bulgaria on the same page, Iraqis were referred as asylum-seekers while Bulgarians were always called cognates or immigrants.⁸⁴

The difference in treatment of two mass refugee flows in very close periods caused criticism from intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued "Recommendation 1151 (1991) on the reception and settlement of refugees in Turkey," comparing the treatment of Bulgarian and Iraqi refugees, and criticizing the discriminatory Turkish policies towards the refugees based on ethnic identity. Following the flow of Iraqi Kurds in 1988, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had taken a similar stand asking Turkey to lift its geographical limitation to Geneva Convention.⁸⁵ A report by Human Rights Watch said there was "a striking contrast in the treatment of refugees," by Turkey and that "to the Iraqi Kurds, their inferior status was graphically demonstrated by the arrival in Turkey of another large influx," pointing to the acceptance of Bulgarian Turks in recent times (HRW 1991). On the other hand, lack of burden sharing by the international community and the fact that a large number of Iraqi

⁸¹ Milliyet, 9 July 1989, p. 9. "Peşmergeler: "İlle de mültecilik.""

⁸² Cumhuriyet, 6 August 1989, p. 6, p. 17. "Kimlikleri bile yok."

⁸³ Cumhuriyet, 27 July 1989, p. 9. "Çerçişev: Çare diyalog."

⁸⁴ Cumhuriyet, 12 July 1989, p. 1. "2 bin sığınmacı İran'a yollandı."

⁸⁵ Cumhuriyet, 10 May 1989, p.8. "İraklı Kürtlerle ilgili karar tasarısı."

Kurds from the 1988 flow had remained in Turkey made the country more cautious to open its borders when faced with another mass influx in 1991.

As of 1991, 25,675 Iraqis from the 1988 wave had remained in Turkey (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 196). In March 1991, the new wave of mass refugee influx started after the harsh reprisal of the Iraqi government against the Kurdish rebellion in Northern Iraq and resulted with forced displacement of almost 2 million people in a very short time span. Large-scale uprisings against the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq had started among the Shi'a in the south and among the Kurds in the north (HRW 2004: 13). The Kurdish forces had advanced in Northern Iraq and had gained control on historically Kurdish cities, including Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, and Erbil, before the counter-attack by the Republican Guard suppressed them amid the lack of anticipated U.S. support for the rebellion. By the end of March, Iraqi government had regained control in Northern Iraq and people in mass numbers started fleeing to the borders of neighboring countries, mainly Turkey and Iran.

In that period in 1991, Turgut Özal, who was the Prime Minister during the flow from Bulgaria in 1989, was the Head of the Republic of Turkey, Motherland (Anavatan) Party was in the government, Yıldırım Akbulut was the Prime Minister, and Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was also a period when the fight between the Turkish state and the armed groups of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was ongoing in Southeast Turkey, and Turkey was considering some reforms such as removing the ban on the use Kurdish language and recognizing the cultural rights of Kurds in the country.⁸⁶ However, the government was also insistent that Kurds were not a minority group in Turkey and enjoyed their rights same as other citizens.⁸⁷ The Turkish government was concerned about the possibility of the foundation of an independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq as a result of the uprising. President Özal made statements that they would not let a Kurdish state,⁸⁸ and he unfolded that he had made contact with the Kurdish leader Celal Talabani and Mesut Barzani's representative in Ankara to discuss the situation in Iraq.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Milliyet, 3 March 1991, p. 9. "Kürtler, kültürel haklara sahip olacak."

⁸⁷ Türkiye, 28 March 1991, p. 11. "Özal: Kürtler vatandaşımız."

⁸⁸ Milliyet, 10 March 1991, p. 18. "Kürdistan tedirginliği."

⁸⁹ Türkiye, 12 March 1991, p. 1. "Ankara'da Kürt liderlerle görüşme."

Talabani asked support from Turkey while the uprising against the Iraqi government was going on, asking not to oppose to autonomy of Kurds in Iraq within a federation, and to send back the Kurdish asylum-seekers remaining in Turkey back to Iraq.⁹⁰ The Turkish government, however, instead imposed a ban in the camp in Diyarbakır where the Kurdish asylum-seekers were staying, prohibiting them from leaving the camp completely.⁹¹ Turkey did not accept sending the Kurdish asylum-seekers back to fight in Northern Iraq or give military assistance to the rebellion, and government officials repeated that they would not let a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.⁹²

At the beginning of April 1991, hundreds of thousands of displaced Kurdish, Turkmen and Arabs were at the borders of Turkey and Iran as a very abrupt, massive population movement when Iraqi government regained control in Northern cities and started reprisal in the area against the rebellious, without discriminating civilians. People were scared of a “Second Halabja Massacre,”⁹³ and fled with the fear of usage of chemical weapons by the Saddam regime again.⁹⁴ There were reports from the fleeing people that the government forces in Iraq were using mustard gas and Napalm bombs against them.⁹⁵ By April 3, more than 7500 people were seeking asylum in Turkey, mostly Kurdish “peshmergas,” as they were called, but also including Turkmen and Arabs, as well as journalists from different countries who were covering the fighting in Northern Iraq.⁹⁶ The first reaction of the Turkish state with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis in its borders was to ask for help from the United Nations.

National Security Council (NSC) of Turkey convened in extraordinary and called for help from the UN Security Council.⁹⁷ With the decision taken by the Council, they informed the ambassadors of the permanent members of the UN Security Council regarding the situation and asked them to take necessary precautions.⁹⁸ It immediately became an issue of border protection and national security for Turkey. Among the decisions taken by the

⁹⁰ Cumhuriyet, 14 March 1991, p. 4. “Talabani sığınmacıları istedi.”

⁹¹ Cumhuriyet, 16 March 1991, p. 4. “Kamp dışı yasak.”

⁹² Türkiye, 1 April 1991, p. 1. “İraklı Kürt liderlere 3 uyarı.”

⁹³ On March 16, 1988, Iraqi forces used chemical weapons in Halabja which killed around 5,000 civilians.

⁹⁴ Cumhuriyet, 3 April 1991, p. 14. “Yüzbinler sınırda sıkıştı.”

⁹⁵ Türkiye, 3 April 1991, p. 11. “200 bin Peşmerge sınırımızda.”

⁹⁶ Milliyet, 3 April 1991, p. 12. “Türkiye’ye peşmerge akını.”

⁹⁷ Milliyet, 3 April 1991, p.1. “Kapımızda 200 bin mülteci.”

⁹⁸ Türkiye, 3 April 1991, p. 11. “BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nin derhal toplanmasını istedik.”

National Security Council, they stated “the NSC and the government would continue to follow the developments closely, in terms of humanitarian dimensions but especially in terms of border security. All necessary precautions have been taken for our border security.”⁹⁹ The Turkish authorities in 1991 were not prepared for such a sudden mass movement and reluctant to open borders, both due to limited capacity and Turkey’s internal problem with the Kurdish population (Danış 2011: 199). The Minister of Foreign Affairs Alptemoçin expressed grave concern about Turkey’s southeast border, the army was on high alert and the statements from the government were interpreted as considerations for a military response, as howitzers and bullets were hitting within the Turkish borders as well.¹⁰⁰ He was in favor of creating a buffer zone between the two countries and stated that they expected the UN to provide security for those people.¹⁰¹ There were also accusations that Turkey was letting Turkmens cross the border but not the Kurds, which was denied by Turkey’s Ambassador to the UN.¹⁰²

Turkish authorities provided emergency humanitarian aid to the people at the border and said they were ready to continue humanitarian assistance; while there were reports of children freezing to death and hundreds of wounded.¹⁰³ As Turkey was not willing to open its border to a mass influx of Iraqis, there was mounting pressure on the Turkish government to open the border to the hundreds of thousands of people waiting in harsh conditions at the border. Some Western countries including the U.S., Britain, and other European countries were pressuring Turkey to open the border while the state increased security to prevent crossing of people waiting in numbers amounting to 300,000.¹⁰⁴ President Özal was asking for guarantees from the Western governments, as he blamed them for not providing Turkey with necessary assistance and for resettlement of refugees after the similar influx from Iraq in 1988.¹⁰⁵ He challenged European countries as “take in half of them, and we will take the other half.”¹⁰⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked OECD countries for quotas for resettlement of Iraqi refugees and to start the process immediately, blaming them for the lack

⁹⁹ Cumhuriyet, 3 April 1991, p. 14. “Ankara, BM’yi acil toplantıya çağırdı.”

¹⁰⁰ Milliyet, 4 April 1991, p. 18. “Askeri müdahale gündemde.”

¹⁰¹ Cumhuriyet, 5 April 1991, p.11. “Özal Batı’dan güvence istiyor.”

¹⁰² Milliyet, 5 April 1991, p. 18. “BM Büyükelçimiz Akşin, CNN’de konuştu.”

¹⁰³ Cumhuriyet, 4 April 1991, p. 17. “Irak sınırı cehennem.”

¹⁰⁴ Cumhuriyet, 5 April 1991, p. 11. “Batı’dan sınır açılma baskısı.”

¹⁰⁵ Cumhuriyet, 5 April 1991, p.11. “Özal Batı’dan güvence istiyor.”

¹⁰⁶ Milliyet, 5 April 1991, p. 19. “Kaçanları ülkemize yerleştiremeyiz.”

of burden sharing in every refugee crises.¹⁰⁷ The Turkish state was not willing to take up the responsibility of half a million people at the time, for economic and social reasons, yet alone to risk permanent settlement of refugees of Kurdish identity in such numbers. The responsibility was assigned to an intergovernmental organization, the United Nations, in the discourse of Turkish state officials, who repeatedly said Turkey alone cannot be deemed responsible for people on its borders, whose numbers could reach up to millions. U.N. Secretary General Sadako Ogata, meantime, wrote a letter to President Özal saying they would provide international support to the country if Turkey opened its borders to Iraqi refugees.¹⁰⁸

As discussed in the previous section, domestic politics and the public opinion always play a significant role in determining the refugee response of the state, while the state's position and discourse regarding the refugees also shapes the public opinion in a mutually constitutive manner. As opposed to the case of Bulgarian Turks, there were not similar voices from different political parties around acceptance and protection of refugees. There were harsh arguments in the parliament regarding Turkey's role and actions to be taken for the people waiting at the borders.¹⁰⁹ Representatives of some political parties called the government to open the border, and platforms and committees were being formed by the civil society for solidarity with Kurdish people and prevention of genocide.¹¹⁰ President of DYP Süleyman Demirel, for instance, criticized the government for making the border like a wall and reasoned his case for opening the doors on the grounds that they are "our brothers and sisters in religion, people whom we have been together with for years, half of whom lives there and half here, people who speak Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic," putting the emphasis on identity and commonalities between the societies.¹¹¹ The Vice President of ANAP, the governing party, on the other hand, stated half a million Iraqis on the borders of Turkey constituted a big threat to the country's future.¹¹² This is one of the examples of many references from Turkish officials to national security, can be understood in terms of border safety and territorial security from a realist perspective, or threat to the nation-state's claim to sovereignty based on a national identity and homogeneity from a constructivist perspective.

¹⁰⁷ Cumhuriyet, 9 April 1991, p. 17. "Ankara'dan Batı'ya sert çıkış."

¹⁰⁸ Türkiye, 5 April 1991, p. 11. "Batı sınırı açmamız için ısrarlı."

¹⁰⁹ Milliyet, 4 April 1991, p. 19. "Mülteciler, Meclis'i karıştırdı."

¹¹⁰ Cumhuriyet, 5 April 1991, p. 4. "Kürt halkına yardım."

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Milliyet, 9 April 1991, p. 17. "Başkent'te müdahale tartışması."

Some organizations, municipalities, as well as the Presidency of Religious Affairs started campaigns to collect funds for the Iraqi refugee population as they did for refugees from Bulgaria. The emphasis this time was more on their misery and Turkey's culture of hospitality. However, from the analysis of the news, it is not possible to conclude a general attitude of support and mass mobilization from the public as it was the case for Bulgarian Turks. Immediately, there were calculations on how much the extra cost of hosting them would be to the Turkish economy, estimated between 300 to 500 billion Turkish liras for the year then.¹¹³¹¹⁴ Many such references to the cost of asylum-seekers to Turkey are found during the short stay of Iraqi refugees.¹¹⁵

Despite Turkey's resistance to open the borders, and while they were legally still closed, people were crossing the border initially reaching numbers between 150,000 and 250,000 by April 6 thus the border being physically open.¹¹⁶ Since the area is mountainous and there is not a definite border, displaced people were in fact distributed among the Turkish and Iraqi borders and it was not clear how many were inside Turkey, numbers changing in different sources. Turkish officials were continuing diplomacy with the members of the UN Security Council for sanctions against the Iraqi government and to stop the mass flow towards Turkey.¹¹⁷ Turkey and France submitted draft resolutions together, calling the oppression in Northern Iraq a threat to international peace and security and asking the Iraqi government to stop the aggression against the civilian population and cooperate with the UN Secretary-General.¹¹⁸ Resolution 688¹¹⁹ passed by the UN Security Council on April 5. For the first time in history, the UN Security Council interpreted Article 39 of the UN Charter, which concerns restoring international peace and security, for humanitarian intervention in a state's domestic jurisdiction for human rights violations against its own nationals, partly due to Turkish government's efforts (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 197). President Özal stated he believed

¹¹³ Cumhuriyet, 6 April 1991, p. 11. "Sığınmacının yükü 350 milyar lira."

¹¹⁴ Milliyet, 6 April 1991, p. 17. "Mültecinin aylık faturası 390 bin."

¹¹⁵ For instance; Milliyet, 16 April 1991, p. 15. "Saddam zulmünden sınırımıza kaçan Kuzey Iraklıların aylık maliyeti 180 milyar lirayı buluyor. Sığınmacıların günlük faturası GAP'a [Southeast Anatolia Project] eşit."

¹¹⁶ Cumhuriyet, 6 April 1991, p. 1. "250 bin Kürt sınırı geçti."

¹¹⁷ Cumhuriyet, 6 April 1991, p. 19. "Askeri müdahale ısıyor."

¹¹⁸ Milliyet, 6 April 1991, p. 17. "Türkiye'nin BM'ye sunduğu Kürt karar tasarısı."

¹¹⁹ Resolution 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, adopted at the 2882nd meeting by 10 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions. Available at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement>

that Saddam Hussein would be overthrown and argued that without intervention, the tragedy in Iraq would continue.¹²⁰

The idea of “safe zones,” it can be argued, was “invented” during this crisis, proposed by Turkish President Özal and supported eventually by the United States, Britain and the UN Secretary General although they approached the idea with caution initially.¹²¹ In the Summit of European Communities on April 8, Turkey’s proposition to create safe havens within Iraqi borders was endorsed by European leaders as well.¹²² This unprecedented response to a refugee crisis became a pattern in the new post-Cold War refugee regime, where refugees lost their ideological value and containment rather than protection became prevalent (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 199). The interpretation of a mass refugee flow as a threat to international peace and security, justifying intervention in a state’s jurisdiction and creation of ‘safe zones’ became a continuing pattern in the 1990s, implemented in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti (Danış 2009: 17). The decision was criticized by the opposition in Turkey, however. Ecevit, the leader of Democratic Left Party (DSP), argued the so-called safe haven would mean U.S. domination on Iraqi and Turkish territory, and create an ‘alternative state’ in the area.¹²³ The sacredness of the territory for the nation-state was challenged with this novel idea of safe havens, putting the country of origin rather than receiving countries as the main responsible party and with an emerging international norm allowing intervention. With the decision for safe zones taken, and number of refugees reaching half a million, Turkey started preventing people crossing onto the Turkish side.¹²⁴

By mid-April, the safe haven on the Turkish-Iraqi border was operational. American troops started the operation, named “Operation Provide Comfort,” with the logistical support of Turkey for the creation of the safe haven for emergency relief and temporary settlement of Iraqi Kurds, despite UN’s warnings that Iraq’s permission was required for operation inside its borders.¹²⁵ Around 8500 U.S. soldiers initiated the operation through Turkey, for the creation of the safe zone between the Turkish border and the 36th parallel, which were later

¹²⁰ Cumhuriyet, 8 April 1991, p. 19. “Özal: Müdahale olmazsa trajedi olur.”

¹²¹ Milliyet, 9 April 1991, p. 16. “Güvenlik kuşağına’ ABD sıcak bakıyor.”

¹²² Cumhuriyet, 10 April 1991, p. 19. “Tampon bölgeye sıcak bakış.”

¹²³ Milliyet, 15 April 1991, p. 10. “Karşı-devlet anlamına gelir.”

¹²⁴ Milliyet, 11 April 1991, p. 15. “Sığınmacılar geri kaydırılıyor.”

¹²⁵ Milliyet, 13 April 1991, p. 15. “Sınırda 8500 ABD askeri.”

joined by forces of allied countries.¹²⁶ Turkey thus had gladly handed over the main responsibility for the asylum-seekers on its borders to international actors. Prime Minister Akbulut, after the decision for the operation, emphasized that they were only contributing to help with the humanitarian operation, Turkish soldiers would never go in Iraq, and that all the help they were providing for Iraqi refugees was temporary.¹²⁷

It is estimated that nearly 500,000 Iraqis entered Turkey, but stayed for a very brief amount of time until they were transferred to the safe zones within Northern Iraq. The numbers were estimated to have passed one million on the Iranian borders. From 24 April, 460,000 refugees on the Turkish-Iraqi border were moved to the safe zone in Dohuk (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 198). Soon, the 1970 agreement which granted autonomy to the Kurdish population was decided to be reinstated after agreement between the Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders, who called on the displaced people to return to their homes.¹²⁸ By Mid-June, only 13,400 refugees were remaining in Turkey according to UNHCR figures (UNHCR 2003). It is notable that many of the Iraqis who were allowed to stay in Turkey were Turkmens from Kirkuk and Mosul who were part of the 1991 influx (Kirişci 2000: 14). It was a massive operation and mobilization led partly by the Turkish state to make sure of the repatriation of the displaced Iraqis return to the country, although not necessarily to their homes.

In the end, it was not even considered by the Turkish authorities a possibility for refugee status and permanent settlement of Iraqi Kurds, who concentrated on mobilizing international actors to take the crisis off Turkey's hands. Refugees from Iraq were called Kurdish peshmergas, asylum-seekers, and rarely refugees by state officials and the media this time. Although they were mostly referred with their ethnic identity, Kurds, or Peshmerga, the terms "asylum-seeker" and "refugee" started to be used for Iraqi refugees in 1991, which was not the case for Bulgarian Turks. However, the hesitance to use the term refugees stamped from the fact that it could entail obligations for Turkey under the 1951 Geneva Convention thus "peshmergas" and "temporary guests" were preferred (Kirişci 2000: 12). Since the mass refugee flows from Bulgaria and Iraq were very close timewise, the same political party was in charge of the government, and many politicians in charge as state officials were the same,

¹²⁶ Cumhuriyet, 13 April 1991, p. 13. "ABD'den yardım operasyonu."

¹²⁷ Türkiye, 13 April 1991, p. 11. "Irak içinde tampon bölge."

¹²⁸ Cumhuriyet, 25 April 1991, p. 14. "Bağdat'ta öpüştüler."

it made it possible to make a striking comparison of the state's response, taking the ethnic identity of the refugee population as the independent variable. Kurdish refugees would not be compatible with the nation state's identity and its claim for a homogeneous nation.

The 1994 Asylum Regulation (See Section 3.1) is also seen as a direct result of the two mass refugee influxes Turkey faced a few years prior. National security concerns, with a combination of flows of Kurdish refugees and intensive fighting between the Turkish state and PKK fighters led the country to increase state control and prioritize realist concerns of security over liberal values of refugee rights and international human rights law. 1994 Asylum Regulation introduced very strict procedures for asylum applications, and gave the status determination right to the state from UNHCR.

1991 influx from Iraq was the first major refugee crisis in the post-Cold War era. The cases of the mass refugee flows of Iraqi Kurds and Syrians are significant not only for their magnitude but also for they reflect the changing nature of refugee crises and relief efforts in the post-Cold War era (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 192). As mass refugee flows became the norm rather than the exception, refugees lost their ideological value after the Cold War, most countries became increasingly restrictionist, and containment rather than protection took prevalence in refugee responses.

4.2.1 The Case from the Perspective of IR Theories

The realist discourse by the Turkish state during the mass refugee crisis from Iraq emphasized national security and border safety. Many references to Turkey's sovereignty over its territory, the danger to its borders, and threats to national security are found in the discourses of state official. The Turkish state was concerned about its national security and the common rhetoric opposing a possible independent Kurdish state in the borders of the country, that could conflict with the Turkish interests and undermine the state power are realist sentiments. The mass flow of refugees from Iraq was viewed more from the point of border security than its humanitarian dimension. The Turkish army was on high alert at the southeast borders, and the statements from the government even gave hints for a military response, in case the mass movement did not stop.

The state discourse from a liberal perspective mentioned human rights violations and pressured Western countries for not holding up those values they praise and whose violation they blame Turkey for. Turkish officials, from the District Governors in Southeast Turkey to the Head of the Republic, blamed Western countries for not cooperating enough to provide for the humanitarian needs of Iraqi refugees and prevent human rights violations, frequently emphasizing the need for international cooperation.¹²⁹ From the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the dominant role of the United Nations and intergovernmental cooperation for intervening in the mass refugee flow and setting up safe zones for refugees is prevalent. Indeed, there is foremost resort to the highest international institutions in this case and cooperation through UN Security Council was able to find a sort of a solution with the effect of Turkey's pressure to prevent further flow and settlement of refugees in its territory.

Similar to the case of mass refugee flow from Bulgaria, we see appeal to international institutions by the Turkish state. However, although the state mainly wanted to point out to the human rights violations of the Bulgarian state and called for an agreement for an orderly migration of Turks in the Bulgarian case, it resorted to international institutions to prevent long stay of the mass flow of Iraqi Kurds in this case. As opposed to the case of Bulgarian case, the Turkish government successfully mobilized the international community for action and refused to take responsibility single-handedly for the displaced Iraqis. The state immediately took the issue to international bodies, to the UN Security Council. The then novel ideas of "safe zones" and "humanitarian intervention" in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state show the increasing prominence of liberal interventions in IR, compared to the earlier years of the Cold War era when state sovereignty was rather sacred. Becoming a continuing pattern of responding to such crises in 1990s, this reflected the changes in the international arena where the understanding of state sovereignty changed and lost ground to a certain extent to a new understanding of international peace and security.

However, what was distinct about the case of mass displacement of Iraqis that made it inconsiderable for the Turkish state that they could settle in the country, although the state capacity was not that different from two years prior? The focus on identity from the constructivist framework offers the explanation that the ethnic identity of the refugees in this case would not fit in the state's discourse of an ethnically homogeneous nation, that has been

¹²⁹ Milliyet, 12 April 1991, p. 15. "Türkiye'ye hediye ettikleri trajediye kulak tıkadılar."

denying the existence of ethnic minorities. From the constructivist perspective, the role of identity and definition of the refugees with the Kurdish “Peshmerga” identity tells us why quick repatriation of the mass influx from Iraq was the preferred policy of the Turkish state. The fact that the refugee group carried an ethnic identity that the state struggled to appropriate since the formation of the nation-state challenged its discourse. This perspective on the ethnic identity of refugees explains the considerable difference of attitude towards two mass refugee flows that happened only two years apart.

4.3 “Misafirler”: Syrians

Finding itself at the forefront of the biggest refugee crisis in the world since the World War II, Turkey has become the country hosting the biggest refugee population in the world in 2015. The Syrian crisis claimed the lives of around 450,000 individuals (SOHR 2016), and substantially changed the landscape of the region by producing more than seven million internally displaced persons as well as around five million refugees, most of whom sought refuge in Turkey (UNHCR 2016). It has profoundly challenged and changed the immigration scene in the country, and pushed for the realization of a late coming comprehensive immigration and international protection regime. It is not possible to talk about a single ‘response’ of the Turkish state towards Syrian refugees like the other two cases because there have been many changes within the past few years. Thus this section will not only be an analysis of the state reaction towards the mass flow of Syrian refugees vis-à-vis the Bulgarian and Iraqi cases but also an analysis of the changes in the Turkish state’s response between 2011 and 2016 from the perspectives of IR theories, including predictions on the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey as it is an ongoing case.

The fleeing from Syria to Turkey started in April 2011 (See Section 3.3.3). Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been in power in Turkey. In 2011, Ahmet Davutoğlu was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who then served as the Prime Minister from August 2014 to May 2016. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the Prime Minister until August 2014, who has been serving as the Head of the Republic since, while Binali Yıldırım has been the Prime Minister and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu has been the Minister of Foreign Minister except a brief period between August 2015 and November 2015. Different from the neoliberal governments of the previous cases in 1989 and 1991, AKP government has had an identity that is both economically neoliberal and religiously conservative, putting

forward the Muslim identity of the Turkish society more than its ethnically Turkish identity. The socio-economic landscape of the country and the state capacity are also different than the previously examined periods. Turkish economy, started liberalizing in the 1980s, suffered from recurrent crises with a turmoil in 2001, then grew remarkably in mid-2000s. Thus the state's economic ability in 2011 to host a large refugee population was higher than those of the previous decades.

Since September 2009, Turkey and Syria had mutually been following visa-free travel agreement for their citizens when the crisis started (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 202). When the fleeing started from Syria in 2011, Turkey followed an open border policy to Syrians who had initially been named "our guests," with an understanding that their stay was temporary and they would go back once the conflict in Syria was resolved, which was expected to happen in a short time. Turkey's relations with the Assad government had not been broken yet during initial phase of conflict, and Erdoğan and Davutoğlu made efforts for reforms from the Syrian government (Kirişci 2015: 307). Davutoğlu advised "shock therapy" for Assad to gain the trust of the Syrian population back, emphasizing the close relations they had established with Syria over the past eight years.¹³⁰ Erdoğan made statements that they were following the developments in Syria with concern and were hoping that reforms would be made in a manner that convinces civilians in the country, adding that the doors of Turkey were open to Syrians.¹³¹

Initially tent-cities were established near the border cities for temporary settlement of Syrians.¹³² One of the significant differences of the mass refugee flow from Syria is that it occurred in a much longer time span as opposed to the sudden flows from Bulgaria and Iraq. Within the first two months, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey was only 450,¹³³ but thousands were reported to be on the way escaping the advance of Syrian army on the town of Jisr al-Shughur.¹³⁴ Turkish government claimed responsibility single-handedly and initially did not let anyone, including the media, in the camps managed by the Turkish Red Crescent.¹³⁵ Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) was

¹³⁰ Milliyet, 27 May 2011, p. 26. "Türkiye'den Esad'a şok terapi tavsiyesi."

¹³¹ Cumhuriyet, 9 June 2011, p. 12. "Türkiye'nin kapıları açık."

¹³² Cumhuriyet, 1 May 2011, p. 11. "Suriyeliler için çadır kent."

¹³³ Milliyet, 9 June 2011, p. 22. "Suriyeliler Türkiye'ye akın ediyor."

¹³⁴ Milliyet, 10 June 2011, p. 21. "Binlerce kişi yolda."

¹³⁵ Milliyet, 12 June, p. 20. "Karantina gibi."

given the responsibility of coordinating the emergency response to the Syrian refugee crisis. During the initial phase of refugee flows from Syria, there were also returns and many Syrians went back and forth to the country of origin, until the situation got worse.¹³⁶

In the discourse of the Turkish state, “Syria was not like any other foreign affairs issue.” Davutoğlu said it was not a subject of discussion to close the border to “our Syrian brothers and sisters,” and falsified the claims that they would close the border when numbers pass 10 thousand.¹³⁷ Erdoğan made a strong statement about how closely they were involved with the events in Syria when he said “Syrian issue is one of our domestic affairs.”¹³⁸ Davutoğlu visited Syria in August 2011, for “one last call” to the Syrian government to stop the civilian massacres and warned that they would cut any help and relations if they continued.¹³⁹ As the warnings did not result in any changes in the policies of the Syrian government, by the end of 2011, Turkish state, who had clearly envisioned an Assad-free Syria in the near future, had sided with the opposition (Kirişci and Karaca 2015: 307). After this point, the only viable solution for the crisis in Syria was removal of Assad from power as far as the Turkish state was concerned. The then Head of the Republic Abdullah Gül suggested the “Yemen model” for Syria, which meant removal of the Head of State from power in return of a guarantee of juridical immunity.¹⁴⁰

Even though Turkey’s, as well as other international actors’ response to the refugee crises of Iraqi Kurds and Syrians differed on significant aspects, Turkey suggested the same solution for both of them: creating no-fly zones and safe havens outside the Turkish borders, within the territories of the countries of origin for refugees (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 192). In the case of the latter though, the Turkish state had not been able to mobilize the same international action for the creation of those safe zones for Syrians. By the end of May 2011, there were reports that Turkey was planning to push for the creation of safe zones within Syria to prevent a mass influx of refugees from Syria.¹⁴¹ Unlike the case of Iraqi refugees, however, this idea did not materialize for Syria; yet Turkish authorities kept on various

¹³⁶ Cumhuriyet, 23 June, p. 12. “2 bin kişi döndü.”

¹³⁷ Cumhuriyet, 16 June 2011, p. 9. “Davutoğlu: Kapımızı kapatmamız söz konusu değil.”

¹³⁸ Milliyet, 7 August 2011, p. 16. “Suriye’ye baskı seçim sözü verdirdi.”

¹³⁹ Milliyet, 16 August 2011, p. 16. “Sözün bittiği yer.”

¹⁴⁰ Cumhuriyet, 3 March 2012, p. 11. “Cumhurbaşkanı Gül, Suriye için ‘Yemen modeli’ önererek dönüşümün vakit alacağını söyledi.”

¹⁴¹ Cumhuriyet, 31 May 2011, p. 13. “Güvenli bölge planı.”

occasions pushing for the creation of buffer zones throughout the years of crisis. In August 2012, Turkish government was discussing to set up five safe zones into 20 km of the border, which was harshly criticized by the opposition.¹⁴² When the effects of the Syrian war started to spread into Turkey, the criticisms from the opposition for the Syrian policy of the government came much bitterly. In Hatay's Reyhanlı district, at least 50 Turkish citizens were killed and more than 100 was wounded when two cars full of explosives blasted that was associated with the intelligence agency of the Syrian government, which also caused tension between the local population and Syrian refugees in Hatay.¹⁴³

The UN Security Council could not easily take decisions to endorse any intervention in the case of Syrian crisis as two of the permanent member states, Russia and China repeatedly vetoed decisions against the Assad government. In 2012, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis.¹⁴⁴ He visited Turkey and consulted with PM Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu for his peace plan for Syria, as Vice Prime Minister Beşir Atalay stated buffer zones could be considered.¹⁴⁵ In 14 April 2012, UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2042, authorizing advance team to monitor ceasefire in Syria and endorsed implementation of Annan's six-point plan for restoring peace¹⁴⁶, followed by Resolution 2043 that established a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS).¹⁴⁷ However, by June 2012, the Annan Plan was deemed to have failed as ceasefire could not be delivered in the country,¹⁴⁸ and Annan resigned from his post when his six-point plan failed to bring peace to the Syrian conflict.

Turkey's response to the Syrian refugee crisis does not resemble its policies in the past; neither repatriation as in the case of Iraqis nor rapid settlement as in the case of Bulgarian refugees has been a dominant policy in Turkey's response to Syrian refugees. The Syrian crisis posed a big challenge for policy-makers in Turkey from many aspects. A significant peculiarity of the Syrian refugee crisis for Turkey that is different from the other

¹⁴² Cumhuriyet, 10 August 2012, p. 1. "İşte Ankara'nın planı."

¹⁴³ Cumhuriyet, 12 May 2013, p. 1. "Katiller."

¹⁴⁴ <http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sgsm14124.doc.htm>

¹⁴⁵ Cumhuriyet, 16 March 2012, p. 13. "Tampon bölge hazırlıkları: Bir günde bin Suriyeli sığındı."

¹⁴⁶ <http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10609.doc.htm>

¹⁴⁷ <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20SRES%202043.pdf>

¹⁴⁸ Milliyet, 17 June 2012. "Suriye'de Annan Planı fiilen devredışı."

two cases is that it found itself in a position of partial responsibility for displacement of Syrians by siding itself with one of the parties of the conflict (Kirişci and Karaca 2015: 307). When UN efforts failed to bring ceasefire and peace to the conflict, and to the opposite it intensified, Turkey faced substantially growing number of refugees from Syria. In 2013 there was a new milestone in the Syrian conflict with the use of chemical weapons against civilians on 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta region of suburban Damascus that killed 1429 people (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 203). Especially after the use chemical weapons, Turkish authorities strongly called for intervention and blamed the UN, that was looking to prove the use of chemical weapons and make sure whether the regime or the opposition used them,¹⁴⁹ while the Turkish opposition blamed the government for taking the country to a war.

Prime Minister Erdoğan said it was going to be a “black stain in history” that the UN was only standing by against the massacre happening in Syria, criticizing the permanent member veto power structure of the Security Council and providing the only solution as removal of Assad from power.¹⁵⁰ While pushing for removal of Assad from power, and in response to the growing number of refugees it was receiving, the Turkish state, striving to incorporate the presence of Syrian refugees into its national identity, emphasized an ambiguous characteristic the Turkish society is known for: hospitality. Hence it initially named the Syrian refugees “our guests,” as meaningless as this term is in international refugee law. Not ethnic, but the religious identity of the vast majority of Syrians was highlighted, as well as Turkey’s welcoming of its “Muslim brothers and sisters,” although Turkish authorities emphasized they were not discriminating against asylum-seekers based on any identity in their open door policy. The identity of the “new Turkey” the Turkish government has been constructing was a predominantly Muslim identity. Thus the relationship of “ansar” (a religious term for helper) and “muhacir” (immigrant) were put forward in the discourse of the state.

Following the use of chemical attacks in 2013, the number of Syrian refugees, which had passed half a million by then, was expected to rise. Syria Coordination Council meeting was held with the lead of the Vice Prime Minister Atalay, who declared that they were not discriminating based on language, sect, color or any other feature, and intriguingly that they

¹⁴⁹ Cumhuriyet, 24 August 2013, p. 5. “Suriye için adım atma zamanı.”

¹⁵⁰ Türkiye, 2 September 2013, p. 13. “Başbakan Erdoğan’dan Suriye formülü: Esad ülkeyi terk etsin.”

did not distinguish between the asylum-seekers from Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Northern Iraq.¹⁵¹ The use of the language of non-discrimination, as well as the term “asylum-seeker” for Bulgarian Turks is telling because the term was never used in 1989 as discussed in Section 4.1 and the treatment of refugees from Bulgaria and Northern Iraq was in fact significantly different from each other. It is an indicator of the prevailing international norms in the 21st century and better understanding of the concept of asylum-seeker and refugee, as well as Turkey’s growing adherence to build an asylum regime that is competent with the global norms. On the other hand, during the G-20 Summit, Erdoğan, with signs of support from the U.S. President Obama, was pushing for a multilateral intervention in Syria, even without the involvement the UN because of Russia’s permanent membership in the Security Council, which has been supporting the Assad regime in Syria.¹⁵² Similar to its discourse during the Iraqi crisis, Turkish authorities called the Syrian crisis a threat to international peace and security, repeating the call for buffer zones and humanitarian corridors.¹⁵³

The refugee camps for Syrians in Turkey are found relatively successful in terms of world standards and Turkish authorities proudly took credit for single-handedly managing the camps for a long while. NGOs and IOs were not permitted in the camp for almost one year, and UNHCR was only able to access the camps after February 2012 when it arrayed an advisors team to the Turkish authorities (Ihlamur-Öner 2013: 203). Even a representative from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) was not permitted into the Apaydın Camp, which raised questions about transparency and possibility of military training of opposition parties in the camps.¹⁵⁴ Turkish officials asserted reasons such as spying, missionary, and disorganization for not allowing national and international NGOs in the camps it managed single-handedly.¹⁵⁵

In February 2014, the Öncüpınar Refugee Camp in Kilis managed by AFAD was featured in The New York Times as “How to Build a Perfect Refugee Camp.”¹⁵⁶ With containers instead of tents, striking cleanness, power lines, playgrounds and schools educating 2225 refugee children as explained in the article, the camp did not resemble any

¹⁵¹ Türkiye, 4 September 2013, p. 4. “Bütün riskler düşünöldü.”

¹⁵² Türkiye, 7 September 2013, pp. 12-13. “Ya Seninle Ya Sensiz.”

¹⁵³ Milliyet, 14 November 2012. “Davutođlu’ndan Suriyeli sığınmacılarla ilgili açıklama.”

¹⁵⁴ Cumhuriyet, 26 August 2012, p. 7. “CHP heyetine tehdit.”

¹⁵⁵ Aydıntaşbaş, Aslı. 29 October 2012. *Milliyet*, “Yardım kuruluşları neden yasaklı?”

¹⁵⁶ https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/magazine/how-to-build-a-perfect-refugee-camp.html?_r=1

refugee camp in the world. The management of high standard camps for Turkey, who has taken proud in how well it takes care of its “guests,” has been very costly for the state though. As mentioned above, the Turkish government’s initial expectation was that Assad would be quickly overthrown and the stay of the Syrian guests would not be prolonged, who then would go back and tell how well they were taken care of in Turkey. When time proved these expectations wrong, the Turkish state started accepting international assistance. In November 2012, Davutoğlu stated that although they were providing for the needs of Syrian refugees using national resources up to that point, as the numbers increased, they decided to take up on the offers from the international society for burden-sharing.¹⁵⁷

As the Syrian crisis and the flow of its population out of the country continued in an intensifying manner, and the expectations of them going back to Syria started to fade, the “guest” status did not work anymore. As the exile prolonged, the Turkish government extended the guest status to temporary protection (İçduygu and Millet 2016: 4). The rate of urban refugees compared to the ones staying in the camps have gradually increased as well, as they moved to cities and started participating in the Turkish economy, although mostly in the informal sector. As of 2016, less than 10% of the Syrian refugees were located in the 25 camps in border cities and İstanbul became the host of the largest refugee population, surpassing border cities of Hatay, Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep.¹⁵⁸ When Turkey adopted its first comprehensive immigration law, Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) of April 2013, it also established a temporary protection regime based on Article 91 of the LFIP, to regulate the case of mass influx of Syrian refugees.

Also with the LFIP, Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was founded under the Ministry of Interior, which became operational in 2014, and took over the responsibility of managing Turkey’s refugee response as well as other affairs of immigration and international protection. According to DGMM’s info graphic introduction video, Turkey “has established a civil migration management that makes a delicate balance between human rights and public security,” and that they “opened the doors to 2.8 million Syrian brothers and sisters.” DGMM has continued the discourse of Turkish hospitality, along with adherence to global standards on international protection and human rights. Although late, the LFIP and

¹⁵⁷ Milliyet, 14 November 2012. “Davutoğlu’ndan Suriyeli sığınmacılarla ilgili açıklama.”

¹⁵⁸ DGMM statistics. Retrieved on December 30, 2016 from http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713

foundation of a separate Directorate for immigration and international protection has improved Turkey's refugee regime, which was formerly based on general laws on foreigners and regulations, to a great extent and was welcomed by other countries and IOs.

The Temporary Protection Regulation based on Article 91 of the LFIP came into force in April 2014, regulating the cases of mass influxes (defined in Section 3.1), and gave a distinct status to the Syrian refugee population in Turkey. Based on the temporary protection status under the TPR, the legal status of Syrian refugees in Turkey is different from refugees from other nationalities. While non-Syrian refugees who come from non-European countries are individually registered by UNHCR to be resettled in third countries and are allowed to stay in Turkey as conditional refugees based on Art. 62 of the LFIP, registration of Syrian refugees is done only by DGMM. The temporary status of Syrian refugees is thus different from around 300,000 non-Syrian, or conventional refugees in Turkey who are waiting to be resettled although the high numbers compared to quotas determined by third countries makes it practically impossible for most of them. The Temporary Protection Regulation guarantees *non-refoulement*, gives the right to health, education, access to labor market services, social assistance and services, and interpretation services (Arts. 26-32). Accordingly, DGMM started the process of registration of Syrian refugees and giving temporary protection identification documents with foreigner's ID numbers, which gives them the right to stay in the country and access to the services in the provinces they are registered. Although the process of registration was handed to Provincial Directorates of Migration Management, district police stations have continued to handle it big cities with a high number of Syrian refugees such as İstanbul, which caused discrepancies in practice.

In 2014, the number of refugees coming from Syria substantially increased especially between September and December (See Figure 3), after the Kobane incident in September. With the ISIS increasing its power taking advantage of the power gap in Syria it added more layers to the complexity of the conflict and caused fleeing. It started a massive assault on the Kurdish population in the border town of Kobane, causing fleeing of thousands of Kurds from Northern Syria into Turkey with fear of massacre.¹⁵⁹ Thus although it was mostly Sunni Arabs fleeing the Assad regime in the beginning of the conflict, after 2014 Kurds, Yazidis and Nusayris have been fleeing from ISIS to Turkey as well (Erdoğan 2015: 317). The

¹⁵⁹ Cumhuriyet, 19 September 2014, p. 13. "Katliam korkusu."

archival research did not reveal indications of discrimination in Turkish state's response to different groups of Syrian refugees based on their ethnic identity. And although the LFIP and TPR gave an official status to the Syrian refugees in the country based on international standards, the discourse based on compassion and religious brotherhood endured in the state. In February 2016, Prime Minister Davutoğlu asked: "If The Turkish Republic did not stand by these brothers as a compassionate hand, an open heart to everyone and a mighty country, where would they go?"¹⁶⁰

As of the end of 2014, the Turkish state gave signals of a shift in its Syrian refugee response towards integration. The regulation of refugee children's education is a significant indicator of state's attitude towards the integration of the population and its intent about their future in the country. During the first years of the crisis, integration of Syrian children in the Turkish education system was not given priority as per the understanding that they were not to stay for long-term and go back to Syria. In October 2012, the Education Minister of the era, Ömer Dinçer said "We did not make the effort to teach Turkish to Syrian children. They are educated as guest students. We think for them not to have integration problems to their country's education in case they go back to their country."¹⁶¹ This speech is only one example of many indicators showing Turkish state's initial perception and identification of Syrian refugees as guests who were expected to return to Syria in a short span of time.

Temporary Education Centers (TECs) were established by private actors and NGOs for education of the minors by Syrian teachers, using an adapted version of the Syrian curriculum. For approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the curriculum, Assad-related sections were removed from the schoolbooks.¹⁶² As of 2014, however, the Ministry of National Education (MONE) started developing strategies to integrate Syrian children into the Turkish public education system, increase enrollment and gradually end the two-tiered education regime. Circular on the Education of Foreigners¹⁶³ was published in September 2014 to regulate the education of foreigners in Turkey including special provisions of those under temporary protection. MONE focused on registration of Syrian in Turkish public

¹⁶⁰ Cumhuriyet, 9 February 2016. "Davutoğlu'ndan Erdoğan'a gönderme: Herkes rakamlardan bahsetti..."

¹⁶¹ Cumhuriyet, 22 October 2012, p. 5. "Türkçe öğretme çabasına girmedik."

¹⁶² Evin, Mehveş, 29 January 2014. *Milliyet*, "Suriyeli Misafirler – Türkiye'deki Suriyelilere özel okullar."

¹⁶³ T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Temel Eğitim Genel Müdürlüğü, 2014/21 Circular No: 10230228/235/4145933 of 23 September 2014.

schools instead of the Temporary Education Centers, and developed in the beginning of the 2016-2017 school year a strategy to gradually close all TECs within a course of 3 years and enroll all Syrian minors in Turkish state schools. Thus Syrian children who are starting the first grade now cannot register in TECs and have to attend Turkish state schools. According to UNICEF, for the first time in 2016, the number of Syrian children who attend school surpassed the numbers who are out of school.

Not only on education but on every aspect of the refugee response towards Syrians, the Turkish government showed signs of moving from an understanding of temporality of their stay to acceptance of permanency and started emphasizing policies for integration. Access to labor market is another significant indicator of refugee integration policies. On September 22, 2015, during the press conference after the meeting of the Council of Ministers, Deputy Prime Minister and Spokesman of the government Numan Kurtulmuş expressed their intent to include skilled Syrian refugees in the workforce. He said “It seems predestined that the majority of the populace who were thought as ‘they came and they will leave’ is going to stay here. Up to 2 million 200 thousand asylum-seekers might stay in Turkey for many years.”¹⁶⁴ 2015 was the year when the Turkish government started predominantly using a discourse of permanency and integration for the Syrian refugees. In January 2016, Regulation on Work Permits for Foreigners under Temporary Protection¹⁶⁵ came into force, which made the formal job market available for Syrian refugees, although not devoid of problems in practice.

The future of Syrian refugees in Turkey is yet unknown, although showing signs of permanent settlement. Turkish citizenship law of 2009 (Law 5901) allows naturalization for people who have resided in Turkey consecutively for five years and who have income or profession; and Turkey can have significant benefits from a large, integrated Syrian diaspora in the country who will have influence in a post-war Syria (Sert 2014: 164). However, Article 25 of the TPR states that the duration of temporary protection IDs will not be taken into consideration when calculating the total term of residence permit duration and that it does not entitle the holder to apply for citizenship. Head of the Republic Erdoğan made the strongest statement for integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey in July 2016 during the iftar dinner in Kilis when he stated to everyone’s surprise that they were working on granting citizenship to

¹⁶⁴ Cumhuriyet, 22 September 2015, “Hükümet’ten çarpıcı Suriyeli açıklaması”

¹⁶⁵ Official Gazette, 15 January 2016, Law No 2016/8375.

Syrian “brothers and sisters.”¹⁶⁶ Although there have not been concrete developments in this regard, it indicates the ultimate acceptance by Turkish authorities that the protracted displacement of Syrians might turn into permanent settlement, and that it actually proceeds through admission, settlement, integration and naturalization stages of international migratory movements (İçduygu and Millet 2016: 3).

Turkey has started taking steps to keep the high-skilled Syrian population in the country, by denying exit permits to those who have university diplomas. As of 2017, DGMM is starting a process of registration renewal in cooperation with UNHCR to have better data on the Syrian refugee population in the country, which includes registering their education status and occupation.¹⁶⁷ Syrians can now apply to the Employment Agency of Turkey (İŞKUR) for taking vocational training and to be matched with employers, which are all indicators of Turkey’s intention for their settlement and participation in the formal Turkish economy. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Our Syrian brothers residing in Turkey have an invaluable chance to enrich the human capital in Turkey” (Çavuşoğlu 2016: 23). The “Ensar Community Center,” in Gaziantep is an example of many initiatives by local governments to facilitate the integration of Syrian “guests” in the country, where counselling is provided on health, education, accommodation and marriage, and refugees and the local population are brought together for cultural exchange.¹⁶⁸

Although the strategy of the Turkish state for integration of Syrian refugees in the Turkish society is far from comprehensive, we can conclude that Turkey has been moving in the direction of permanent settlement and integration in its response to the case of mass refugee flow from Syria. The Turkish state and almost three million Syrian refugees it has been hosting have mutually reshaped each other’s identity in a course of five years. The Turkish state, although it was not the initial intention, fit its acceptance of the mass flow of refugees from Syria into its construction of national identity. Despite the fact that the role of intergovernmental organizations, especially in the formulation of the LFIP was significant, Turkey’s construction of itself as an active party of the Syrian conflict and its focus on the host identity as a nation, along with prevailing global norms on international protection and

¹⁶⁶ Milliyet, 2 July 2016. “Erdoğan’dan Suriyelilere vatandaşlık açıklaması.”

¹⁶⁷ http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/icisleri-bakani-sayin-suleyman-soylu-kayit-guncelleme-projesini-baslatti_350_361_10179_icerik

¹⁶⁸ Milliyet, 14 January 2017. “Suriyeli Misafirlerin Adaptasyonu Bu Merkezde Sağlanıyor.”

its enthusiasm to increase its soft power in international relations shaped its ongoing response to one of the biggest refugee crises in world history.

4.3.1 The Case from the Perspective of IR Theories

Evaluating the case of mass refugee influx from Syria within a realist framework, it can be argued that the Turkish state, presuming a short stay of refugees from Syria, aimed to expand its power and influence in the region. It initially allied with one of the sides of the conflict, and possibly foresaw increased influence over a changed Syrian government in a near future resulting from its acceptance of refugees. The Turkish state in 2010s placed more importance on being a regional power in the Middle East, turning its course from the West to the East. If the conflict would be short lived as anticipated, and the Syrian population who sought refuge in Turkey would have gone back to the country with stories of a mighty neighbor that welcomed and hosted them in good conditions, the influence of the Turkish state among the countries of the region could have substantially increased. However, even when it became evident that this would not be the case and the mass influx of the refugee population did not seem in the interest of the state, it continued to admit them into its territory.

The rhetoric of state officials presented the case of Syria as one that is not different than domestic affairs of Turkey, signaling an alleged regional presence rather than focusing on the security of the boundaries of the nation-state. As mentioned in the previous section, the identity the Turkish state has been building in the 21st century is one more based on religion than on ethnicity and nationality. There is reminiscence of the Ottoman Era, and a national identity based on the notions of religious compassion and hospitality. Thus the intersection of the identity of the state and the refugee was found in this host-guest relationship rather than ethnic kinship. In constructivist terms, the state redefined the identity of Syrian refugees as Muslim brothers and sisters, as unexpected guests of God, and incorporated it in its changing discourse of the insider. It also used the rhetoric of hosting such large number of refugees for showing the “outsiders,” mostly developed countries of the West, many of whom are following more and more restrictionist policies for refugees, its new identity. The constructivist concept of diffusion of norms and ideas should be taken into consideration as well. The prevailing norms on international forced displacement and the

dominance of the refugee issue on the agenda of IOs and NGOs make it quite impossible to not regard them as refugees, even though they do not have the official refugee status in Turkey. Compared to 1990s where issues of national security and state sovereignty triumphed liberal democratic values, human rights norms have gained more ground, at least in the language of the state, as well as the impact of a rapidly expanding civil society and more informed public.

The response to the Syrian refugee crises reflects changes in IRR and in the international arena in the 21st century compared to the period of 1980s and 1990s as well. The decline of asylum vis-à-vis the temporary protection in the IRR seems irreversible (Acharya 2008: 12). Although containment of Syrian refugees in safe zones created by the international community within Syrian borders as Turkish officials suggested in early years of the crisis did not become a reality, temporary protection rather than official refugee protection can be seen as another way of containment. Nevertheless, in a global environment of hostility and non-acceptance by many states towards the forcibly displaced, even the temporary protection Turkish state has provided to around three million refugees has been applauded by other states and IOs. Regional and international organizations, namely the EU and the UNHCR were prominently influential in the evolution of the Turkish asylum regime and entrance of the norms on international protection into the public sphere. Although the EU accession process lost its significance on Turkish politics, and the Union itself has been struggling to keep its identity built on cooperation, democracy and human rights, the process leading to the LFIP in Turkey was mainly a result of its adaptation to EU norms after becoming a candidate country. UNHCR, as explained in Section 3.1 was operational in fostering state learning and creating awareness among the public about refugee issues and teaching norms on international protection in 1990s and 2000s. These, from the neoliberal institutionalist IR perspective, are indicators that international institutions are not only marginal factors in IR but can have substantial impact on changing state policies regarding refugees.

CHAPTER V:

CONCLUSION

This thesis presented a comparative study of state response to mass influxes of refugees with varying characteristics using the theoretical framework of IR theories, based on the case of Turkey in the past three decades. It focused on mass refugee inflows as its main subject, a phenomenon that is increasingly prevalent but not studied as much. Mass flows are the new norm of refugee flows, although they are still conceptualized as exceptions in the regime of international protection and within the wider framework of refugee studies. Fleeing of massive numbers of people resulting from wars and civil conflicts from countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria have been significant forces in international affairs in recent decades, along with the immense human suffering caused by them and their substantial effect on the host countries of refugees, mainly the neighboring countries of the conflict zones. The “Arab Spring” that started in 2010 has changed the landscape of the region, and affected neighboring countries like Turkey to a great extent. The consequent civil war in Syria has produced the largest number of refugees since the Second World War, and Turkey has been the country most affected by the mass flow of refugees from the country. Turkey thus was chosen as the case study, with its long history of receiving mass influxes, its new title as the host of the largest refugee population in the world, its geographical location as a transition point between the East and the West, and its transforming asylum laws and policies.

Historical comparison of state policies, taking into consideration continuity and change in the international arena, the changes in state’s capacity, its identity, and learning through different experiences provided information on how it formulates its refugee response, and what lessons can be learned for future policy-making. This thesis examined Turkish state’s response to three cases of the largest mass refugee influxes it faced in the past three decades. The displacement of the Turkish minority from Bulgaria in 1989, the flow of Iraqi Kurdish population following the post-Gulf War civil conflict in 1991, and the mass fleeing from Syria since 2011 as a result of the civil war were chosen for comparison with their similar and different characteristics.

These three cases provided rich bases for comparison with the differences in the historical contexts they occurred, reasons of fleeing, and the defining characteristics of the

refugee populations. They were not the first of their kind of movements as the Turkish Republic has been a destination of refugees from the Balkans and the Middle East on various occasions. However, they were the movements that had the biggest impact on the country with their scale and urgency. The case of Bulgarian Turks represented the flow of a minority group, as a result of not war as the other two cases but oppression and group-based prosecution by the Bulgarian government, and that shares ethnic kinship with the majority of the Turkish population on which the nation-state identity was built. The Iraqi case was a mass fleeing as a result of the civil conflict following the Gulf War, representing an ethnic identity with whom the Turkish state has had problems with since the foundation of the Republic. The Syrian case represents the biggest refugee influx Turkey has received, a multiethnic population, continuing for more than five years and a case that has not been finalized yet.

The argument made in the beginning of the thesis was that responses of states to forced displacement into their territories cannot be adequately analyzed without putting them into the context of international affairs. In Chapter II, I gave an overview of the regime of international refugee protection with its evolvement since the 1951 Refugee Convention, its merits and shortcomings in the contexts of the forced displacement of the current era. The main institutions of the IRR, and the role of the state on both ends of mass refugee movements were discussed. As this study attempted to study state response within the IR framework using mainstream IR theories, the main arguments of the three “-isms” of IR, realism, liberalism, and constructivism were outlined, including discussions of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and the English School.

To put the specific cases of this thesis into the historical context of Turkey, the evolution of the asylum regime of the country and its history of mass immigration and asylum as a nation-state were detailed in Chapter III. I debated the notion of nation-state and process of nation-building as significant factors in both ends of refugee movements. For the Turkish state as well, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and during the nation-building process of the Turkish Republic, immigration and asylum policies played important roles and are indicators of how the nation-state formulated its identity. For the Republican elite in the early years of the Turkish nation-state, immigration and refugee policies were seen as convenient tools for nation-building to consolidate the security of the state, who saw the potential of integrating Muslim immigrants from the Balkans into the Turkish national identity they set out to construct (Kirişçi 2000: 18). More than 60 years after the foundation

of the Republic, the same mind-set found the mass refugee influx of Bulgarian Turks as fitting to the identity of the nation-state, while the Iraqi Kurds were constructed as a threat to national security.

The findings of this study were mainly based on archival data, qualitatively examining the discourse of state officials found in three daily newspapers, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, and Türkiye in the relevant time periods. Complemented by the analysis of secondary data based on different laws and regulations the Turkish state has developed over the course of the cases of refugee flows, the newspaper articles in 1989, 1991 and between 2011 and 2016 provided the content to analyze from the perspectives of different IR theories in Chapter IV. There is a number of concluding remarks to be made based on the findings of this study on macro, meso and micro levels using the framework of IR theories.

The first conclusion, with a meso-level analysis, relates to inter-state relations and the realist theory of IR offers explanations of state behavior in this regard. It is that the state's relations with other states affect its response to mass forced displacement, and its response to mass refugee influxes affect its relations with other states in return. Understanding access rules of countries, including those for refugees, are important because they do not only affect patterns of international migration, but also international relations, while the rules are also shaped by the relations between states (Weiner 1985: 447-448). Turkey's response to all three cases examined here were largely affected by its relations with Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria, and the flow of refugees from these countries largely affected its relations with these countries as well, which came to the point of discussions of war at certain times. IR theories, consequently, had great relevance for explaining the state's response to three cases of forced displacement. Hence the stand I made in the beginning regarding the importance of bridging study of forced displacement with the IR literature was reinforced by the research findings.

The second finding, on the macro level, concerns the global and relates more to the main arguments of the liberal IR theory and neoliberal institutionalism: that although the individual host state continues to be the major decision-maker over admittance of refugee flows, there are other actors that can significantly transform state policies either directly or indirectly. This is significant because the sovereignty of the nation-state is largely defined by the sacredness of territory and borders, and control over the decisions of who is accepted into these territories. "At a time when state sovereignty is fast eroding, one area where states have

jealously struggled to guard their sovereignty is precisely in the question of who gets admitted into a country as immigrant and refugee” (Kirişci 2000: 14). For a period in the 1990s, Turkish refugee policy very much reflected realist notions of national security and state sovereignty over human rights and liberal values. Efforts to quickly repatriate the Kurdish refugee population back to the Iraqi territory and introduction of the 1994 Asylum Regulation in the following years showed Turkish state’s concerns of national security and threat to its conception of national identity intensified by its internal conflict with PKK. This reflects the global environment in 1990s as well, the changing attitude towards refugees with the loss of their ideological significance after the end of the Cold War.

However, this period did not last long largely due to the effect of two international actors as discussed in this study: the UNHCR and the EU. The changes in the Turkish asylum regime and improvement in terms of moving to a more comprehensive immigration and refugee regime respectful of international human rights principles were mainly a result of the process of EU accession of the country and the effect of the UNHCR as well as other IOs and NGOs to diffuse the norms on international protection in the country. Kirişci argues that a significant proportion of improvements in late 90s and early 2000s occurred as a consequence of successful strategies of UNHCR for gaining the trust and goodwill of Turkish officials (2001: 73). Neoliberal institutionalist theory of IR in this regard was found to account for the important role of liberal international institutions in refugee responses of individual states, compared to the realist argument that states are the only significant actors in IR, while intergovernmental and non-governmental organization can only play a marginal role.

The final conclusion I will make is based on micro-level analysis of the case study of the Turkish state in this thesis, and understood better using the main arguments and tools of the constructivist theory of IR. Borrowing from neoliberal institutionalism and the English School, constructivist theory of IR can largely account for the changing response of the Turkish state to the three cases of mass refugee flows studied in this thesis. That is due to its study of identity as a subject matter, and the mutual construction of the identity of the refugee and the host state I have found to dominate the policies of the Turkish state. The main variable that changed through the three cases of mass refugee influxes in the discourse of the Turkish state officials was the dominant identity of the refugee group the state defined them as, instead of defining them as refugees fleeing from persecution, oppression, and war. As a nation-state basing its discourse of sovereignty on a national identity, with its insiders and

outsiders, the Turkish state constructed the identity of the refugee groups in ways to reinforce this discourse. Looking at the wider international states system, the presence of refugees acted as a paradoxical element of the system of state sovereignty, being both disruptive and restorative of the sovereignty discourse of the state (Soguk 1999: 15). The irregularity of the refugee under the current nation-state system, I find, is tried to be compensated by the policies and the discourse of the host state that aims to fit them in its national identity.

The labels used by the state officials for the refugees from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria were one manifestation of its construction of the identity of the refugees, who were never recognized officially as refugees in Turkey. Besides practical implications of recognizing refugees for the host states that required provision of certain rights under the international law, they define them in ways to somehow incorporate the “outsiders” into their national identity. While doing so, the state develops a certain discourse of the refugee in its territory, and reestablishes its claim to sovereignty. To redefine the refugee’s relationship to a “space of sovereignty,” state policies such as repatriation, resettlement or naturalization are solutions that re-construct their identity and re-situate them in the international society of states (Haddad 2008: 60).

The nation-state needs to align or separate its identity from those of the refugee when acting in welcoming or refusing ways towards her. It is a concern of policymakers and their citizens to preserve a particular national identity and shared values, thus countries often privilege entry to those their populations share a close ethnic affinity (Weiner 1985: 443). The case of Bulgarian Turks was an example of the use of ethnic affinity to integrate the refugee population in the nation-state’s identity. “Some outsiders are seen by political communities not as potential competitors for resources but as part of what might be called the state’s “extended family”” (Gibney 1999: 176). The public, the civil society and the state reinforcing one another, emphasized the kinship of the refugees. Bulgarian Turks were the “good foreigners” (Czajka 2014: 158) in Turkey, with their contribution to the restoration of the national discourse. They contributed to the nation-state’s discourse and its everyday reconstruction of the national identity based on an ethnically homogeneous society.

On the case of the Iraqi Kurds, the Turkish state separated its identity from those of the refugees and declared the impossibility of their settlement in Turkey, delivering the issue to the authority of international actors and inventing solutions such as safe zones for their

rapid repatriation. The cases of mass influxes from Bulgaria and Iraq were comparable in the sense that they happened very close timewise, thus the domestic factors in the country that could affect the refugee response of the state were very similar. The same political party was in the government, and the Prime Minister of 1989 was the Head of the State in 1991, who remained the main decision-making power and the public figure making most of the statements found in the newspaper articles. The country was socio-economically in similar state and the numbers of the influxes were relatively similar as well. The reaction of the Turkish state, however, was strikingly different as discussed in Chapter IV.

It is not only the ethnic or religious identity of the refugees but also its interaction with the identity of the host state, or the part of the national identity it wants to emphasize, that affected the refugee response of the Turkish state. Undoubtedly, the Turkish state had gone through several changes from the end of 1980s/beginning of 1990s to 2010s when the Syrian flows began. The AKP government that has been in power since 2002 has valued religion as part of the national identity more than the governments of 1980s and 1990s, and focused on the Muslim identity of the Syrian refugees as a commonality between them and the host society, as well as bringing forward the charity and hospitality notions as part of the Turkish national identity. Also, archive research did not reveal considerable difference in the state's reaction to Syrian refugees based on their ethnic identity. They are often labeled only as "Syrians," not as Syrian Arabs, Syrian Kurds, or Syrian Turkmens, in contrast to the focus on the ethnicity of refugees coming from Bulgaria and Iraq.

The cases of mass refugee flows from Bulgaria and Syria were comparable on the process of settlement and integration, since in the Iraqi case the mass flow of refugees were repatriated rapidly to the safe zones created within the borders of the country of origin and there was no such process. However, comparing the response to the case of Bulgarian Turks to the case of Syrians on the process of settlement and integration, it took years on the latter for the integration stage to start while it was evident from the first two months of the movement in the Bulgarian case. The Turkish state accepted the refugees escaping from the oppression of Bulgarian government to stay, basing it on their Turkishness and using the language of "bringing them back to the homeland." The process of granting the refugees Turkish citizenship was initiated only one month after the start of mass influx, while it is still debated and did not go beyond speculations for the case of Syrian refugees after five years. On the case of Syrians, the state initially based its response on the mainly religious notions of

charity and hospitality to the “guests”, whom it presumed to go back home quickly. The mass movement from Syria has arguably entered the phase of integration, but the process was significantly longer and much rougher than those of Bulgarian Turks.

This thesis presented one of the few attempts of studying responses to forced population displacements from an IR framework. It offered analysis based on a comprehensive archive data search of a representative selection of newspapers, as well as laws and regulations. The use of the theoretical framework of mainstream IR theories provided a strength as well as a weakness as they are limiting for study of multidisciplinary issues of immigration and refuge. The case study of Turkey was fitting for the purposes of this study, although for generalizability of findings comparative studies of the refugee responses of different states would be a valuable avenue for added research. It should be noted that as one the cases of this thesis, the situation of the mass influx of Syrian refugees to Turkey, is an ongoing case, future research could reveal additional, and slightly possibly different findings for the case. It could be fruitful to look back in retrospective after a number of years to reassess the state response to the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Finally, further research on the intersection of IR and study of forced displacement could look into what more critical IR theories such as post-modernism and peace studies have to offer to the study of forced displacement and state responses to them, as well as variations within mainstream IR theories.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acharya, Amitav. 2008. "The Limitations of Mainstream International Relations Theories for Understanding the Politics of Forced Migration." *Lecture at Centre for International Studies, Oxford University* (October 27, 2008).
- Betts, Alexander. 2011. "International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime." Alexander Betts and Loescher Gil (eds.), *Refugees in International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 53-84.
- Betts, Alexander and Loescher, Gil. 2014. "Introduction: Continuity and Change in Global Refugee Policy." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 33(1): 1-7.
- Betts, Alexander and Loescher, Gil (Eds.). 2011. *Refugees in International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buttolph Johnson, Janet and Reynolds, H.T. 2008 (6th edition). *Political Science Research Methods*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Çiğerci, Nihan. 2012. "Bursa-Kırcaali Hattı: 1989'da Gelen Bulgaristan Göçmenleri Örneği." S. Gülfer İhlamur-Öner and N. Aslı Şirin Öner (eds.), *Küreselleşme Çağında Göç: Kavramlar, Tartışmalar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 107-134.
- Clayton, Jonathan and Holland, Hereward. 30 December 2015. "Over one million sea arrivals reach Europe in 2015." Retrieved on December 17, 2016, from <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html>
- Czajka, Agnes. 2014. "Migration in the Age of the Nation-State: Migrants, Refugees, and the National Order of Things." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 39(3): 151-163.
- Çakar Mengü, Seda. 2008. "The Image of Turkey for the Turkish Immigrants from Bulgaria." *İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi* 33: 103-120.
- Çatır, Gül. 2012. "Zorunlu Göç Tecrübesinin Devlet Politikalarındaki Yansıması: Bulgaristan'dan Türkiye'ye Kitleli Göçün Analizi." S. Gülfer İhlamur-Öner and N. Aslı Şirin Öner (eds.), *Küreselleşme Çağında Göç: Kavramlar, Tartışmalar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 217-232.
- Çavuşoğlu, Mevlüt. 2016. "Turkey and the Syrian Refugee Crisis: An Example for Humanity." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 15(3): 17-24.
- Çelik, Nihat. 2009. "The Political Participation of Turkish Minority in Bulgaria and the Public Reaction: The Case of Movements for Rights and Freedoms (1990-1994)." *Karadeniz Araştırmaları* 22: 1-19.

- Çetin, Turhan. 2009. "The Socio-Economic Outcomes of the Last Turkish Migration (1989) from Bulgaria to Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 3(7): 241-270.
- Danış, Didem and B. Aksel, Damla. 2014. "Sınır Yönetiminde Devlet ve Yeni İdare Biçimleri." Didem Danış and İbrahim Soysüren (eds.), *Sınır ve Sınırdışı: Türkiye'de Yabancılar, Göç ve Devlete Disiplinlerarası Bakışlar*. Ankara: Notabene Yayınları, 67-99.
- Danış, Didem. 2011. "Changing fortunes: Iraqi refugees in Turkey." *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies* 5(2): 199-213.
- Danış, Didem. 2009. "İrak'tan Uzağa: 1991 Sonrası Dış Göç." *Ortadoğu Analiz* 1(6), 15-22.
- Degu, W.A. 2002. *The state, the crisis of state institutions, and refugee migration in the Horn of Africa: the cases of Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia*, PhD. Dissertation, Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research.
- DGMM (Directorate General of Migration Management). July 2014. *Yayın No: 18*. Ankara: Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları.
- DGMM, 25 March 2005. *National Action Plan of Turkey for the Adoption of the European Union Acquis in the field of Asylum and Migration*. Retrieved on May 10, 2015, from [http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/turkiye_ulusal_eylem_plani\(1\).pdf](http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/turkiye_ulusal_eylem_plani(1).pdf)
- Erdoğan, M. Murat. 2015. "Türkiye'ye Kitleli Göçlerde Son ve Dev Dalga: Suriyeliler." M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 317-347.
- EUI (European University Institute). "Timeline," *Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot of the Crisis in the Middle East Europe*. Retrieved on October 10, 2015 from http://syrianrefugees.eu/?page_id=163
- Ezzy, Douglas. 2002. *Qualitative Analysis: Practice and Innovation*. London: Routledge.
- Frantz, Elizabeth. 2003. *Report on the Situation of Refugees in Turkey: Findings of a Five-week Exploratory Study December 2002-January 2003*. Retrieved on April 2, 2015, from <http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/reports/Documents/frantz.pdf>
- Galbraith, Peter W. 2003. "Refugees from War in Iraq: What Happened in 1991 and What May Happen in 2003." *Migration Policy Institute Policy Brief No. 2*.
- Gibney, Matthew J. 1999. "Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees." *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 169-181.
- GİGM (T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü). Nisan 2016. *2015 Türkiye Göç Raporu*. Yayın No: 35. Ankara: T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları.

- GiGM. Aralık 2013. *Yayın No: 4*. Ankara: Pozitif Matbaa.
- Goldenziel, Jill I. 2014. "Regulating Human Rights: International Organizations, Flexible Standards, and International Refugee Law." *Chicago Journal of International Law* 14(2): 453-492.
- Goodwin-Gil, Guy S. and McAdam, Jane. 2007. *The Refugee in International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Güleryüz, Naim A. 2015. "Geçmişten Günümüze Anadolu'ya Yahudi Göçü." M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 49-73.
- Haddad, Emma. 2008. *The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Haddad, Emma. 2003. "The Refugee: The Individual between Sovereigns." *Global Society* 17(3): 297-322.
- Harvey, Colin. 2015. "Time for Reform? Refugees, Asylum-seekers, and Protection Under International Human Rights Law." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 34: 43-60.
- Hathaway, James C. 2011. *The Rights of Refugees under International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hollifield, James F. 2008. "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We "Bring the State Back In"?" Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield (eds.), *Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines*. New York: Routledge, 137-185.
- HRW (Human Rights Watch). August 2004. "Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq." *Human Rights Watch* 16(4): 1-78.
- HRW. 11 March 1991. "Whatever Happened to The Iraqi Kurds?" Retrieved on December 24, 2016 from <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1991/IRAQ913.htm#14>
- Hurrell, Andrew. 2011. "Refugees, International Society, and Global Order." Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (eds.), *Refugees in International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 85-104.
- IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre). *Global Figures*. Retrieved on May 11, 2015 from <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures>
- Ihlamur-Öner, Suna Gülfer. 2013. "Turkey's Refugee Regime Stretched to the Limit? The Case of Iraqi and Syrian Refugee Flows." *Perceptions* 18(3): 191-228.
- İçduygu, Ahmet. 2015a. "Türkiye'ye Yönelen Düzensiz Göç Dalgaları İçinde 'Transit Göç'." M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 280-294.

- İçduygu, Ahmet. 2015b. "Turkey's Evolving Migration Policies: A Mediterranean Transit Stop at the Doors of the EU." *Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)*, Working Paper 15.
- İçduygu, Ahmet. 2014. "Turkey's Migration Transition and Its Implications for the Euro-Turkish Transnational Space." *Global Turkey in Europe*, Working Paper 07.
- İçduygu, Ahmet. 2004. "Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 15(4): 88-99.
- İçduygu, Ahmet. 2000. "The Politics of International Migratory Regimes: Transit Migration Flows to Turkey." *International Social Science Journal* 52(165): 357-367.
- İçduygu, Ahmet and Millet, Evin. 2016. "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Insecure Lives in an Environment of Pseudo-Integration." *Global Turkey in Europe*, Working Paper 13.
- İçduygu, Ahmet and Şimşek, Doğuş. 2016. "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Towards Integration Policies." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 15(3): 59-69.
- İçduygu, Ahmet and Sert, Deniz. 2015. "The Changing Waves of Migration from the Balkans to Turkey: A Historical Account." Hans Vermeulen, Martin Baldwin-Edwards & Riki Van Boeschoten (Eds.), *Migration in the Southern Balkans: From Ottoman Territory to Globalized Nation States*, IMISCOE Research, Dordrecht: Springer: 85-104.
- İçduygu, Ahmet and Kirişci, Kemal (eds.). 2009. *Land of diverse migrations: challenges of emigration and immigration in Turkey*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press.
- İçduygu, Ahmet and Sirkeci, İbrahim. 1999. "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye'sinde Göç Hareketleri." Oya Baydar (ed.), *75 Yılda Köyden Şehirlere*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 249-268.
- Jacobsen, Karen. 1996. "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes." *International Migration Review* 30(3): 655-678.
- Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2014. "The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War." *RAND Perspectives* No 114.
- Kaarbo, Juliet and Ray, James Lee. 2011. *Global Politics* (10th edition). Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
- Karpat, Kemal. 2015. "Önsöz." M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, xxiii-xi.
- Kartal, Bilhan and Başçı, Emre. 2014. "Türkiye'ye Yönelik Mülteci ve Sığınmacı Hareketleri." *CBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 12(2): 275-299.
- Kaya, Ayhan and Erdoğan, M. Murat. 2015. "Giriş." M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 3-14.

- Keely, Charles B. 2001. "The International Refugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters." *International Migration Review* 35(1): 303-314.
- Keely, Charles B. 1996. "How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows." *International Migration Review* 30(4): 1046-1066.
- Kirişci, Kemal. 2007. "Turkish Asylum Policy and Human Rights." Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat (ed.), *Human Rights in Turkey*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 170-183.
- Kirişci, Kemal. 2002. *Justice and Home Affairs Issues in Turkish-EU Relations*. Istanbul: TESEV Publications.
- Kirişci, Kemal. 2001. "UNHCR and Turkey: Cooperating for Improved Implementation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees." *International Journal of Refugee Law* 13(1/2): 71-97.
- Kirişci, Kemal. 2000. "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices." *Middle Eastern Studies* 36(3): 1-22.
- Kirişci, Kemal. 1996. "Is Turkey lifting the 'Geographical Limitation'? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey." *International Journal on Refugee Law* 8(3): 293-318.
- Kirişci, Kemal. 1994. "Refugees and Turkey since 1945." *Research Papers ISS/POLS 94-3*, Boğaziçi University Institute of Social Sciences.
- Kirişci, Kemal. 1991. "The Legal Status of Asylum Seekers in Turkey: Problems and Prospects." *International Journal of Refugee Law* 3(3): 510-528.
- Kirişci, Kemal and Karaca, Sema. 2015. "Hoşgörü ve Çelişkiler: 1989, 1991 ve 2011'de Türkiye'ye Yönelen KitleSEL Mülteci Akınları." M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 297-314.
- Klotz, Audie and Lynch, Cecelia. 2007. *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Latif, Dilek. 2002. "Refugee Policy of the Turkish Republic." *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı* 33(1): 1-29.
- Lee, Chen Chen. 2006. "Refugee Policy is a Realist's Nightmare: The Case of Southeast Asia." *Migration Letters* 3(2): 137-149.
- LNTS (League of Nations Treaty Series), No. 807. *Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, and Protocol*, Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923.

Retrieved on May 20, 2015 from

<http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1925/14.pdf>

- Loescher, Gil. 2001a. *The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Loescher, Gil. 2001b. "The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy." *International Migration Review* 35(1): 33-56.
- Loescher, Gil. 1993. *Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Malanczuk, Peter. 1991. "The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War." *European Journal of International Law* 2(2): 114-132.
- Manap Kırmızıgül, Çiğdem. 2013. "Experiences of Asylum Seekers in Turkey." *International Journal of Social Inquiry* 6(2): 39-55.
- Mannaert, Celia. 2003. "Irregular migration and asylum in Turkey." *UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Working Paper No. 89*.
- Marfleet, Philip. 2006. *Refugees in a Global Era*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mayring, Philipp. 2000. "Qualitative Content Analysis." *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 1(2) [28 paragraphs].
- Meyers, Eytan. 2000. "Theories of International Immigration Policy: A Comparative Analysis." *International Migration Review* 34(4): 1245-1282.
- Newman, Edward. 2001. "Human Security and Constructivism." *International Studies Perspectives* 2: 239-251.
- Official Gazette, 22 October 2014. *Temporary Protection Regulation*. No 29153, 2014/6883.
- Official Gazette, 11 April 2013. *Law on Foreigners and International Protection*. No 28615, Law 6458.
- Official Gazette, 26 September 2006. *Settlement Law*. No 26301, Law 5543.
- Official Gazette, 30 November 1994. *Regulation 1994/6119 on the Procedures and Principles Related to the Possible Population Movements and Aliens Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups Wishing to Seek Asylum either from Turkey or Requesting Residence Permission in order to Seek Asylum from another Country*. No 22127, 7-11.
- Official Gazette, 29 June 1989. *14.6.1934 Tarihli ve 2510 sayılı İskan Kanununa Bir Madde Eklenmesine Dair Kanun*. No 20210, Law 3583.
- Official Gazette, 21 June 1934. *Settlement Law*. No 2733, Law 2510.

- Organization of African Unity. *Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa* (“OAU Convention”), (10 September 1969). Available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36018.html>
- Özden, Şenay. 2013. “Syrian Refugees in Turkey.” *Migration Policy Centre Report*, European University Institute.
- Özgür Baklacioğlu, Nurcan. 2015. “Yugoslavya’dan Türkiye’ye Göçlerde Sayılar, Koşullar ve Tartışmalar.” M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (eds.), *Türkiye’nin Göç Tarihi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 193-220.
- Parla, Ayşe. 2003. “Marking Time Along the Bulgarian-Turkish Border.” *Ethnography* 4(4): 561-575.
- Peterson, Glen. 2015. “Sovereignty, International Law, and the Uneven Development of the International Refugee Regime.” *Modern Asian Studies* 49(2): 439-468.
- Plaut, W. Gunther. 1995. *Asylum: A Moral Dilemma*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
- Reisman, Arnold. 2009. *Refugees and Reforms: Turkey’s Journey*. Charleston: BookSurge Publishing.
- Sert, Deniz. 2014. “Elements of Uncertainty in Turkey’s Refugee System.” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 13(1): 159-164.
- Seyhan, Osman. 2014. “Changing the Status Quo of Migration and Asylum Policies in Turkey: A Narrative Inquiry.” *Journal of Organisational Transformation and Social Change* 11(3): 185-206.
- Shacknove, Andrew E. 1985. “Who Is a Refugee?” *Ethics* 95: 274-284.
- Snyder, Jack. 2011. “Realism, Refugees, and Strategies of Humanitarianism.” Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (eds.), *Refugees in International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 29-52.
- Soguk, Nevzat. 1999. *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacement of Statecraft*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), 13 December 2016. “About 450 thousand were killed and more than two millions were injured in 69 months of the start of the Syrian revolution.” Retrieved on February 3, 2017 from <http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=56923>
- Soykan, Cavidan. 2012. “The New Draft Law on Foreigners and International Protection in Turkey.” *Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration* 2(2): 38-47.
- Stack, Liam. 14 November 2011. “For Refugees From Syria, a Visit With No Expiration Date.” *The New York Times*. Retrieved on November 10, 2016 from

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/world/middleeast/refugees-from-syria-settle-in-for-long-wait-in-turkey.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1

Stavropoulou, Maria. 2008. "Influencing state behavior for refugee protection: UNCHR and the design of the refugee protection regime." *New Issues in Refugee Research*, Research Paper No. 154.

TBMM İHİK (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu). 2010. *İnsan Hakları Işığında Türkiye’de Bulunan Mülteciler, Sığınmacılar ve Yasadışı Göçmenlerin Sorunları*. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi.

UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, Resolution 2198 (XXI) (31 January 1967). Available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolStatusOfRefugees.aspx>

UNGA. *1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, Resolution 429 (V) (28 July 28 1951). Available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx>

UNGA. *Statue of the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, Annex to Resolution 428 (V) (14 December 1950). Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/4d944e589.pdf>

UNGA. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, Resolution 217 A (III) (10 December 1948). Available at <http://www.un-documents.net/a3r217a.htm>

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). *Syrian Regional Refugee Response*, updated October 19, 2016. Retrieved on November 9, 2016 from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>

UNHCR. 2017. *Operational Portal: Refugee Situations*. Retrieved on March 31, 2017 from <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php>

UNHCR. June 2016. *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015*. Retrieved on November 10, 2016 from <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html>

UNHCR. June 2015. *World at War: Global Trends 2014*. Retrieved on October 13, 2015 from <http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html>

UNHCR. *States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol*. Retrieved on April 15, 2017, from <http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html>

- UNHCR. *History of UNHCR*. Retrieved on November 13, 2016 from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbc.html>
- UNHCR. June 2014a. *Mid-Year Trends*. Retrieved on November 13, 2016 from <http://unhcr.org/54aa91d89.html>
- UNHCR. June 2014b. *War's Human Cost: Global Trends 2013*. Retrieved on April 15, 2015 from <http://unhcr.org/trends2013/>
- UNHCR. October 2013. Frequently Asked Questions: Syrian Refugees in Turkey. Retrieved on October 16, 2015 from <http://www.unhcr.org.tr/uploads/root/faqenglish.pdf>
- UNHCR. 2005. *Global Report: Turkey*. Retrieved on May 7, 2015 from <http://www.unhcr.org/4492678ae.pdf>
- UNHCR. 2003. *Chronology: 1991 Gulf Crisis*. Retrieved on May 12, 2015 from <http://www.unhcr.org/3e798c2d4.html>
- UNHCR. 1997. *The State of the World's Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- UNHCR. 1995. *The State of the World's Refugees: In Search of Solutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- UNTFHS (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security). 2009. *Human Security in Theory and Practice: An Overview of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security*. Retrieved on April 10, 2017 from http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/human_security_in_theory_and_practice_english.pdf
- Van Hear, Nicholas. 1993. "Mass flight in the Middle East: involuntary migration and the Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991." Richard Black and Vaughan Robinson (eds.), *Geography and Refugees: Patterns and Processes of Change*. London and New York: Belhaven Press and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 64-83.
- Vasileva, Darina. 1992. "Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return." *International Migration Review* 26(2): 342-352.
- Vibeke Egli, Ann. 2002. *Mass Refugee Influx and Limits of Public International Law*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Vromen, Ariadne. 2010. "Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches." David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (3rd edition). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Weiner, Myron. 1993. "Introduction: Security, Stability and International Migration." Myron Weiner (ed.), *International Migration and Security*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1-35.

- Weiner, Myron. 1985. "On International Migration and International Relations." *Population and Development Review* 11(3): 441-455.
- Weiner, Myron and Münz, Rainer. 1997. "Migrants, refugee and foreign policy: prevention and intervention strategies." *Third World Quarterly* 18(1): 25-51.
- Worster, William Thomas. 2014. "The Contemporary International Law Status of the Right to Receive Asylum." *International Journal of Refugee Law* 26(4): 477-499.
- Zetter, Roger. 1999. "International perspectives on refugee assistance." Alastair Ager (ed.), *Refugees: Perspectives on the Experience of Forced Migration*, London: Pinter, 46-83.

