Borders at the Agenda of the Turkish Parliament: An Analysis of Debates on Mass Refugee Flows from Bulgaria (1989), Iraq (1991) and Syria (2011-2013)

by

Eda Kirişçioğlu

A Thesis Submitted to the

Graduate School of Social Sciences

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for

the Degree of Master of Arts in

International Relations

Koç University

October 2018

Koc University

Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities

This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a master's thesis by

Eda Kirişçioğlu

and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by the final
examining committee have been made.

Committee Members:

_____
Asst. Prof. Ayşen Üstübici

_____
Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu

_____
Asst. Prof. İlke Şanlıer Yüksel

Date: 25.10.2018
         _____

ii

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Eda Kirişçioğlu

ABSTRACT

This research examines the Turkish Parliament's border conceptualizations during the mass refugee flows. Analysing the states' border conceptualizations is significant to evaluate on their policies on migration, refugees, asylum-seekers and citizenship. The research aims to contribute to the theoretical, empirical, and policy-oriented discussions on reception of refugees at the borders with the following main research question: How does and in which levels the Turkish state contextualize national borders during mass refugee flows? It provides a comparison between three mass refugee flows to Turkey, namely from Bulgaria in 1989, from Iraq in 1991 and from Syria in 2011-2013. Using the data from parliamentary minutes and in-depth interviews with key-bureaucrats, it makes a qualitative content analysis and creates a conceptual schema which reveals in which levels the state officials discuss borders. Most research analysing state policies in border and migration studies focus on secondary data based on laws and regulations. The novelty of the research is based on focusing on the policy-making processes and discussions on policy-making through analysing the parliamentary minutes.

Key Words: mass refugee flows, border regime of Turkey, border policies, Syrian refugees, parliamentary minutes

ÖZET

Bu araştırma kitlesel göç akımları esnasında Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde (TBMM) sınırların kavramsallaştırılmasını analiz etmektedir. Devletlerin sınır kavramsallaştırmaları onların göç, sığınmacı ve vatandaşlık gibi alanlardaki politikalarını değerlendirmek adına önem teşkil etmektedir. Bu araştırma, sığınmacıların sınırda kabulüne ilişkin kuramsal, ampirik ve politika odaklı tartışmalara katkıda bulunmayı amaçlayarak şu araştırma sorusuna cevap aramaktadır: Kitlesel sığınma akımı esnasında Türk devleti ulusal sınırları nasıl ve hangi boyutlarda kavramsallaştırmaktadır? Araştırma 1989'da Bulgaristan'dan, 1991'de Irak'tan ve 2011-2013 arasında Suriye'den Türkiye'ye yönelen üç kitlesel sığınma akımını karşılaştırmaktadır. Meclis tutanaklarından ve üst düzey bürokratlarla derinlemesine mülakatlardan edinilen verilerle, nitel içerik çözümlemesi analizi yaparak devlet yetkililerinin sınır kavramını hangi boyutlarda tartıştığını ortaya çıkarmak için kavramsal şema oluşturmaktadır. Sınır ve göç çalışmalarındaki araştırmaların çoğu, kanun ve yönetmeliklere dayalı ikincil kaynaklara odaklanmaktadır. Bu araştırmanın katmayı amaçladığı yenilik, meclis tutanaklarını analiz ederek siyasa-üretme süreçlerine ve bu süreçlere dair tartışmalara odaklanmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: kitlesel sığınma akımları, Türkiye sınır yönetimi, sınır politikaları, Suriyeli mülteciler, meclis tutanakları

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP   : Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

ANAP   : Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)

AP   : Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)

BDP   : Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)

CHP   : Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)

DGMM   : Directorate General of Migration Management

DP   : Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)

DSP   : Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)

DYP   : Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)

EU   : European Union

HRIC   : Human Rights Investigation Committee

HRW   : Human Rights Watch

IBM   : Integrated Border Management

IDP   : Internally Displaced Person

IR   : International Relations

IRR   : International Refugee Regime

MHP   : Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)

MP   : Member of Parliament

OPC   : Operation Provide Comfort

PKK   : Kurdistan Workers' Party

PM   : Prime Minister

SHP   : Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party)

TGNA : The Grand National Assembly of Turkey

UN : United Nations

YPG : People's Protection Units

LIST OF TABLES AND APPENDICES

INTRODUCTION

Background and Purpose of the Study

This research examines the Turkish Parliament's conceptualizations of borders during mass refugee flows. Analysing state officials' conceptualizations of borders is significant to evaluate on their policies on migration, refugees, asylum-seekers and citizenship. In a way, borders are precursors of the states' decision on exclusion or inclusion. Recently, there has been various research on states' border perception (J. Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999; Andreas, 2003; Brown, 2011; Donnan, 2001; Fassin, 2011; Vaughan-Williams, 2009b), yet, none of them focuses on the variation of states' border conceptualizations from one mass refugee flow to another. Therefore, this research aims to juxtapose different mass refugee flows with state officials' border conceptualizations through the help of critical border studies. It will provide a comparison between three mass migration movements to Turkey, namely from Bulgaria in 1989, from Iraq in 1991 and from Syria in 2011.

This research aims to juxtapose two literatures: critical border studies and studies on forced migration, in particular, mass refugee flows. It aims to give insights on the interrelated relationship between borders and mass refugee movements which will be analysed under three major titles. Firstly, the research defines the terms "refugee" and "mass refugee flow". In the meantime, it explains why studying mass refugee flows is significant and how the international refugee regime (IRR) matters in analysing the state's response. Moreover, the

research addresses the transformation of IRR through time. This part significantly relies on Bill Frelick's expression of paradigm shifts in IRR since the Second World War (Frelick, 2007). Frelick's (2007) remark on these paradigm shifts constitutes a notable basis for comparing the three mass migration movements to Turkey. The research also elucidates the factors influencing states' responses to mass migration movements (Jacobsen, 1996).

Jacobsen (1996, p. 657) describes "refugee influx" as "that which occurs when within a relatively a short period (a few years), large numbers (thousands) of people flee their places of residence for the asylum country". In line with this definition, only the three refugee movements to Turkey can be regarded as a "mass refugee flow": from Bulgaria in 1989, from Iraq in 1991 and from Syria in 2011. The first mass movement was the largest mass refugee influx to Turkey since the Population Exchange after establishment of the Republic in 1923. The movement consists of the ethnic Turks and Pomaks in Bulgaria who fled from the communist regime under Theodor Zhivkov in 1989. When the Zhivkov regime strictly banned speaking of Turkish in public sphere and criminalized Muslim prayers at the end of 1980s, almost 350.000 Turks and Pomaks sought asylum from Turkish state.

Only two years after the mass movement from Bulgaria, Turkish state has encountered another mass refugee influx from its southern-east border: Iraqi refugees. This second mass movement predominantly consisted of Kurds of Iraq, Iraqi Turkmens and Chaldeans who were fleeing from the Gulf War and Saddam Hussein's oppression. Although Turkey was reluctant to open its borders to Iraqi refugees, the centre-right Motherland Party under the leadership of Turgut Özal faced a significant international pressure and had to accept almost 500.000 Iraqi refugees waiting on the borders of Turkey. Therefore, Özal government made efforts to persuade the United Nations (UN) for creation of a 'safe haven' in North of the 36th parallel of Iraq. By the help of the Security Council's support, Turkey succeeded to keep the refugees in the camps near Turkish-Iraqi frontiers.

The third flow is the Syrians who flee from internal war started in 2011. Compared to the first two mass refugee flows, the refugee flow from Syria was different as the refugees arrived in longer period. Moreover, this last mass movement has become the most significant refugee movement for the Turkish state in terms of its volume reaching of 3.5 million[1]. Since the beginning of the mass refugee movement, the Turkish state declared that she will implement an "open-door policy" for the Syrian refugees. Although the right-wing Justice and Development Party (AKP) government described the refugees from Syria as "Syrian guests" to emphasize their temporary stay, persistence of the war in Syria increased the number of Syrians seeking asylum from Turkey every day. This protracted situation in the case of Syria distinguishes the mass refugee flow from Syria from other two cases which only lasted for a few months.

The Turkish state the mass media entitled these refugees with different definitions. For the case of Bulgaria, the Parliament[2] referred to the refugees as 'ethnic kins'[3] (*soydaş*) because the Turkish state perceived them as descendants of Turks. In the refugee flow from Iraq, the Parliament predominantly defined refugees as "Northern Iraqi asylum-seekers" whereas the media referred to them as "peshmerga". Finally, for the mass refugee flow from Syria, the Parliament referred to refugees as "Syrians" or "Syrian refugees". Besides the variation in the definition of refugees, the State also granted different legal status for each refugee group. To avoid any confusion, this research will be referring to these groups as "refugees" despite the status of each refugee group differs.

Disciplines of IR and political geography have been focusing on border-related studies, yet the studies focusing on Turkey are still less developed. Despite the lack of

---

[1] The data is extracted from the website of Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik. Retrieved October 20, 2018.
[2] This research refers to the Turkish Parliament as the Parliament in the following sections.
[3] The translation of the term *soydaş* belongs to Ayşe Parla and this research using the same translation. See Parla (2009).

literature on Turkey, it has gradually increase since 2000s. While some research focus on the changes and continuities in Turkish border regime (Ataç et al., 2017; Genç, 2014; Ikizoglu Erensu & Kaşlı, 2016), others concentrate on the interactions between bordering neighbours (ie. Turkey-Syria, Turkey-Greece, Turkey-Georgia) (Danış & Parla, 2009; Kaşlı, 2014; Koca, 2015; Okyay, 2017; Parla, 2003; Toktaş & Çelik, 2017; Topak, Ö.E., 2014). However, to my knowledge, the comparison between border conceptualizations of Turkish state during mass refugee flows has not been closely studied.

The research analyses the Parliament's border conceptualizations during mass refugee movements and contribute to the theoretical, empirical, and policy-oriented discussions about conceptualizations of borders with the following main research question and other follow-up questions:

- How does the Turkish Parliament conceptualize the state's borders during three mass refugee flows?
- What are the connections between the state official's discourses on borders and their policy-implementation?
- How do the paradigm shifts in international response to refugees influence the border policing? And how does it infiltrate into the three refugee flows to Turkey?

All these questions intend to gauge the relationship between border conceptualizations and mass refugee flows in Turkey. To do this, the research utilizes from parliamentary minutes of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and in-depth interviews with key actors in policy-making. While doing so, the research uses content analysis as the research method to analyse the parliamentary minutes.

Theoretical and Analytical Framework

The critical border literature argues that states' conceptualization of borders are symbols of states' policies on immigration. In other words, borders are precursors of the states' decision on excluding or including (Brown, 2011; Green, 2012; Muller, 2004; Soja, 1989; Vaughan-Williams, 2009a). Therefore, the ways in which the state officials define borders are significant to uncover the states' decision on reception borders. To establish the theoretical background of the research, theoretical chapter builds on critical border studies. Firstly, border studies contribute the research to categorize different meanings and functions of borders that the state officials promote. In doing so, the research aims to reveal the similarities and differences in the theory and empirical data.

Defining borders and borderlands remains as one of the most equivocal issues in border studies. One of the most prominent political geographers, John Agnew, suggests that borders serve various practical reasons and can be categorized in relation to the purposes they serve (Agnew, 2008). In this regard, defining borders under one single category could remarkably be controversial. Although there is the problem of reducing the definition of borders to static lines dividing the nation-states, various scholars of border studies agree on the complex, socially-constructed, multifaceted and historically contingent characteristics of borders (Agnew, 1999, 2008; J. Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999; Balibar, 2002; Green, 2012; Vaughan-Williams, 2009; Wilson & Donnan, 2012).

Considering the complex characteristics of borders, this research avoids comprehending borders as a single category. Rather, it utilizes from three aspects of borders. Firstly, it aims to unpack the relation between borders and security nexus through analysing border conceptualizations of state officials. Borders were ontologically constructed as security barriers, yet, after the 9/11 attacks, states' attention are predominantly directed towards migrants, or, "undesirable aliens" (Bigo, 2002; Broeders & Hampshire, 2013; Brown, 2011;

Muller, 2004; Walters, 2006). Secondly, the research utilizes from the symbolic definition of borders through making connections between state official's conceptualization of borders while delineating migration flows. Borders are also socio-cultural institutions in which the issues of social cohesion, ethnicity and national integrity are mainly discussed (Paasi, 1999). Thirdly, the research does not only comprehend borders in terms of socially constructed spaces but also politico-legal institutions in which state officials' b/ordering policies (Van Houtum, 2011), regularization of capital and human (M. Anderson, 1997; Balibar, 2002; Green, 2012) take place.

Research Design and Methodology

The scope of this research is limited to understand how Turkish state officials' conceptualizations of borders vary during different mass refugee flows. It seeks to determine the patterns, similarities and differences in Turkish state perceptions, practices and policies on borders during the three major refugee influx periods. By relying on a solid comparative methodological approach, the research gathered qualitative data through (1) secondary literature and data to build up an empirical and theoretical framework (2) content analysis of Turkish Parliamentary Minutes (3) in-depth interviews with key government/bureaucratic officials.

The data used in this research is primarily collected[4] for the TUBITAK[5]-funded research project "Turkey's State Policies during the Mass Refugee Inflows: The Cases of Inflows from Bulgaria (1989), Iraq (1991), and Syria (2011-2015)" (Türkiye'de Kitlesel Sığınma Hareketleri Üzerine Devlet Politikaları: Bulgaristan (1989), Irak (1991) ve Suriye (2011–2015) Örnekleri). This project elaborates changes in the refugee protection regime of Turkey over the last 30 years, focusing on the evaluations of continuities and ruptures

---

[4] Additionally, I have collected the data for the parliamentary minutes in 2011, which is not included in the project.
[5] TUBITAK is the abbreviation for the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey.

observed during this period. This TUBITAK-funded project differs from my research due to its wider scope of various aspects of migration policies of the Turkish state. While the project analysed the ruptures in migration policies of the Turkish state in relation to security, domestic politics, foreign policy, socio-economic factors and ethnicity, my research specifically focused on the border discourses of the MPs. The specialization of my research on borders enabled me to reveal that borders are not only a subject of security but also are reified in multiple aspects in the discourses of the MPs.

For this research, I have selected the time period on the basis of the increase in intensity of the mass refugee flows. Furthermore, as the durations of the refugee flows are different, as the refugee flow from Syria continues for more than seven years whereas the cases of Iraq and Bulgaria lasted only three months, I was only able to cover the three months period for the refugee flows from Iraq and Bulgaria. For the refugee influx from Syria, I have chosen three months from the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 when the number of refugees increased dramatically. To analyse these sources of data, the research conducted content analysis and used conceptual schema to analyse patterns of borders' functions.

The research conducts content analysis, which is a commonly used research method both for qualitative and quantitative analysis, to construct a conceptual schema. Content analysis enabled me to reveal categories and patterns and discover the implicit meaning in the parliamentary minutes and in-depth interviews (Ezzy, 2002, p. 83). Using the method of content analysis qualitatively to construct conceptual schema, the research analyses each political discourse in terms of semantics and argumentative levels (van Dijk, 2000a). By this way, the coded discourses are situated in each theme on Excel spreadsheet and analysed to reveal their implicit meaning in the context of data. Based on these methodological forms, the coding process started with scanning the documents with such keywords as "migration, border, refugee, asylum-seeker". However, after the preliminary analysis, I have realized that

sometimes the Members of the Parliament (MPs) do not use any of these words when they give speeches on the mass refugee flows. Thus, I also searched the documents with such keywords as "Bulgaria, Iraq, Northern Iraqi, and Syrian". In this way, the data set was comprised of the speeches of the MPs which I used for constructing conceptual schema.

The significance of analysing the parliamentary debates in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) is threefold: 1) while most research migration studies focus on policy-outcomes, the parliamentary debates provide the opportunity to analyse state officials' discussions on policy-making processes, 2) it enables this research to comprehend a variety of different views on the aforementioned issues, 3) since the Turkish parliament is perceived as the primary and paramount representative of the Turkish nation, it has a substantial stance in the context of Turkish political history (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995).

By the help of the first aspect, this research aims to fulfil the gap in migration studies through analysing the discussions on policies rather than solely focusing on the migration policies. The discussions in the Parliament enabled this research to unpack discrepancies between the discourses and policies. For instance, the Turkish state's giving rights to refugees from Syria could be interpreted as the State's welcoming policies on refugees. However, analysing the debates in the Parliament enabled me to understand how the MPs from the opposition introduced refugees' access to right as a threat to economy and social cohesion of the State.

The second aspect also poses a special significance because some views on the issues of migration and border policies are neither voiced in mass media nor in the secondary literature. Thus, by analysing the parliamentary debates, this research covers the standpoints on the issues of asylum, border practices and policy-making processes which remained tacit. Besides these standpoints, the parliamentary minutes reveal many other aspects that this research do not focus on such as the economic relations between Turkey and the source

country. For instance, especially during the mass refugee flow from Syria, the Parliament discuss bilateral trade and custom agreements between Turkey and Syria. However, since the research aims to analyse the discourse on borders in relation to migration flows and policies, the other aspects are intentionally excluded from the research.

Finally, the third aspect is also important for analysing the Turkish parliamentary debates considering the Turkish politico-historical context. Since the Turkish Parliament is not perceived as an institution solely for enacting law and regulations, it is frequently referred as a representing institution for the sovereignty of the Turkish nation (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995). Moreover, as Loizides (2009) asserts, because parliaments are accountable to people, access to parliamentary minutes and commission reports is easy and available online with electronic copies in Turkey. In sum, examining the parliamentary minutes serves suitably the purposes of this research.

The final source of data is the in-depth interviews with six[6] different state officials who were at the office with different positions. Through conducting in-depth interviews with policy-makers, this research will be able to overreach the mere examination of parliamentary debates. I have reached the informants through the network of the TUBITAK-funded project and received their approval to use the data in the research. The informants' occupations, the date and the place of the conducted interviews is listed (*see* Appendix 1). Yet, the exact occupations of the informants which could reveal their identity are excluded from the list due to the principle of confidentiality.

In the in-depth interviews, the informants are asked to delineate their own experiences and perceptions rather than the official views of the institutions they are affiliated with.

---

[6] The number of informants was fifteen in the TUBITAK-funded project. However, only the six of them delineated the first-entry of refugees. The other informants only talk about the post-entry status of refugees. Therefore, I have selected only the ones who narrate the policies at reception.

Finally, the informants are asked to delineate migration flows, rather than being asked to share their views on borders directly. By doing so, this research aims to overcome the possibility of manipulating the informants' answer through drawing attention to main purpose of the questions which is to reveal the informants' conceptualization of borders during mass refugee flows. Thus, this action enabled this research to reveal how borders are overemphasized during mass refugee flows.

The content of in-depth interviews is also analysed under the conceptual schema. A similar research is conducted by Genç (2015) who focuses on the speeches of Ministers. However, she analyses the parliamentary minutes in the period between 1990 and 2010 by solely focusing on the speeches of Minister of Interior and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, this period does not involve the two significant mass refugee flows to Turkey: from Bulgaria in 1989 and from Syria in 2011. Therefore, this research aims to extend her methodology and focus through analysing the periods of mass refugee flows including all parliament members.

Contents of the Chapters

To reveal the relationship between the state's border conceptualizations and reception policies at the border, this research analyses various meanings and functions of borders. In this regard, the first part of Chapter I focuses on the borders under three different sub-headings; i) definition and conceptualization of states' borders, ii) transformation of the conceptualization of borders in different periods in international refugee regime (IRR), and iii) functions of borders during policy-making. The third section constructs the main analytical themes for this research: borders as security barriers, as socio-cultural spaces and as politico-legal institutions. The second part of Chapter I aims to examine the paradigm shifts in IRR. The research compares the Turkish state's responses to mass refugee flows with the paradigm shifts in IRR. Hereby, this research will be analysing changes and

continuities in Turkish states' responses to refugee flows both at the international and national levels.

The Chapter II builds the analytical framework of the research. Firstly, it focuses on the border and migration studies in Turkey. Through reviewing the secondary data, it intends to reveal the gaps in the literature. In this way, the first part of this chapter introduces the novelty of this research. Secondly, the Chapter II focuses on historical backgrounds of the three mass refugee flows to Turkey. It gathers the secondary data on the reasons of refugee flows as well as examining the bordering processes of Turkey with the source countries. Examining the demarcation of the borders during the establishment of the Republic of Turkey contributes to analysing the MPs' discourses on borders.

The Chapter III analyses the empirical data and reveals the findings on the conceptualization of borders. The research benefits from the parliamentary minutes, commission reports, and in-depth interviews with key policy-makers during mass refugee flows. The chapter analyses discourses of the MPs in the parliament and in the in-depth interviews under three analytical themes which have three different sub-headings. Borders are conceptualized as manageable spaces in which the MPs redefine the meaning of borders, securitize the border management, and reconstruct the border management via biometrics and surveillance. Secondly, the MPs conceptualized the borders as a space to include/exclude the desirables/aliens. In this regard, the second part of this chapter examines the Turkish state's decision to close the border, the MPs' bordering processes and discrimination against undesirables through the borders. Finally, borders are conceptualized as politico-legal institutions in which the discourses of the MPs focus on the arrival of refugees, on their access to rights and on the legal arrangements. In conclusion, Chapter IV summarizes the main issues in the research and it explains aims and contribution of the research.

CHAPTER I

Theoretical and Analytical Background: Critical Border Studies and Mass Migration Flows

To analyse the state's policies on reception at the border, one should comprehend the various meanings of the borders and their functions through tracing the historical background of conceptualizing the borders. In this regard, the first part of this chapter analyses the borders under three different sections; i) definition of borders, ii) changes in the conceptualization of the borders in different periods and iii) roles and functions of the borders in policy-making. The third section pose a special significance for this research because the data will be analysed in respect to the roles and functions of the borders.

1.1. What is a border? Static Dividing Lines or Multifaceted Spaces

Defining borders and borderlands remains as one of the most equivocal issues in border studies. One of the most prominent political geographers, John Agnew, suggests that borders serve various practical reasons and can be categorized in relation to the purposes they serve (Agnew, 2008). In this regard, defining borders under one single category could remarkably be controversial. Although there is the problem of reducing the definition of borders to static lines dividing the nation-states, various scholars of border studies agree on the complex, socially-constructed, multifaceted and historically contingent characteristics of borders (Agnew, 1999, 2008; J. Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999; Balibar, 2002; Green, 2012; Vaughan-Williams, 2009a; Wilson & Donnan, 2012).

Borders politically charged, complex human creations in which the practices of such dichotomies as exclusion/inclusion, contact/conflict and opportunity/insecurity take action (Agnew, 2008; J. Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999; Vaughan-Williams, 2009a). Here, the "human creations" implies that the meanings of the borders are constructed and re-constructed by the states through time and political developments. As Houtum (2005) reminds, borders are also classically distinguished as being natural and non-natural. The former refers to the distinction by nature "in terms of its physiographic variation (seas, mountains, deserts)" whereas the latter implies that some borders are human-made and artificial (Houtum, 2005). Yet, this research does not refer to the creation of state borders by natural or artificial means when referring to socially-constructed characteristic of borders. Rather, it focuses on the, in Van Houtum's (2005) terms, b/ordering and othering practices of states at the state borders. By this way, it aims not to take the existence of the borders for granted.

Besides the socially constructed definition of borders, the dichotomies at the borders provide us with another definition that is in a way oxymoronic. While the borders can be highly permeable for some, - especially for the rich and highly-skilled immigrants- at the same time, they are increasingly impermeable for some others. This dichotomy can also be found in Anderson's (2001, p.11) reflection on the "selective permeability of borders and differential filtering effects" in which the borders play a significant role in including or excluding people. This oxymoronic essence of borders ascertains the symbolic definition of borders where the borders go beyond being fixed separation lines between states. They transform into a space for distinction between national/alien, high-skilled/low-skilled or poor/rich. In a way, as Salter (2011) points out, they turn into a filter for people, goods and ideas under the practical performativity of the border. This research specifically focuses on the symbolic definition of borders where they function as filters for refugees.

1.1.1. Critical Shifts in the Definition of Borders: the Cold War and the War on Terror

Although the borders of nation-states can be explained by various ways, their meaning is not permanent. As J. Anderson and O'Dowd (1999) asserts, every state border is unique and its meaning can change over space and time. In this regard, the second section of this chapter analyzes the historicity that borders contain and its change over time. The transformation in the conceptualization of borders may be divided into three periods where the notion of borders has dramatically changed: i) the Cold War period, ii) the Globalization period, and iii) Aftermath of the 9/11. As van Houtum (2005) suggests, two classic works on boundary studies shaped the border studies of today in 1960s. The first one is the Julian Minghi's overview of boundary studies in political geography of 1963 and the second is the Victor Prescott's work on the geography of frontiers and boundaries in 1965 (Houtum, 2005). In this period, borders were defined as mere markers of states' territorial limits especially in the discipline of political geography. They were conceived as fixed and hard features of the international system (Migdal, 2004; Newman, 2003). Migdal (2004) explains this era by the creation of a border perception in which borders were seen as dividing lines situated permanently in the landscape. This perception is very similar to Van Houtum's (2005) reminder of the distinction between natural and non-natural border definitions. As Migdal (2005) suggests, although the decolonization process in 1960s and the memories of the dissolution of empires after the World War II, borders were perceived as permanent, static, fixed and natural dividers between states. Yet, this perception has come to an end in the early 1990s by the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The second period marked the change in defining the borders. The collapse of the Soviet Union unveiled fifteen new states which opened the road for demolishing the perception of fixed territorial lines. In the same period, the European Union emerged out of the European Community, the flow of capitals and goods across borders has dramatically increased and the studies of transnationalism, globalization and sovereignty gained

significant importance (Migdal, 2004). In this post-Cold War period, it is acknowledged that "borders shift; they leak; and they hold varying sorts of meaning for different people" (Migdal, 2004, p. 5). The latter is primarily significant since claiming that every person living in the same state shares the same primary identity became obsolete and irrelevant. These changes in the conceptualization of borders have caused the rise of a new phenomenon in the scholarly articles that points out the decreasing relevance of state borders (Kolossov, 2005; Newman, 2006; Wilson & Donnan, 2012). They came to be obsolete and porous. Thus, many scholars suggest that nation-state borders do not function as barriers and both their meanings and functions became irrelevant (Ohmae, 1994). However, contrary to the arguments on the retreat of the national state borders due to the globalization, the socio-political shifts in the international life aftermath of the 9/11 proved the opposite.

In the third period, the societal and physical boundaries became more evident due to the effects of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Brunet-Jailly, 2007a; Ohmae, 1994). Indeed, their meaning and function became more contradictory and paradoxical than ever before (J. Anderson, 2012). While globalization evoked the permeability of state borders in terms of the flows of capital, goods and information, it also increased the impermeability of state borders for international migrants. This paradoxical substance of borders precedes the arguments for a "borderless" world where borders do not perform their functions as barriers. However, on the contrary, the borders transformed into a security concern. In this period, borders are conceptualized as a space where b/ordering practices of states take a leading part (Houtum, 2005). The multifaceted characteristic of border came to light as states' practices of closing, filtering, preclusion and exclusion for the movement of aliens (J. Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999). Furthermore, bordering became so vital for states that they are reproduced by discourse and practice for the maintenance of the 'other' (J. Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999). Therefore, as Newman (2003) asserts, the contemporary study of borders is centered upon

the process of bordering in which people became the target of filtering processes at the borders by the states.

The conceptualization of borders in aftermath of the 9/11 has sparked off a series of drama at the borders where the undesirable aliens come across every day due to the states' policies on migrants. This process is called as "border spectacle" by Nicholas De Genova through which border policing and immigration law put migrants into *mise en scène* enacting a scene of 'exclusion' (Genova, 2015). Similarly, Wilson and Donnan (2012, p. 19) suggest that if the world is a stage, borders are its scenery where the actors strive for making the border manageable and intelligible in order to maintain the drama at the border. In this way, states became the major performers in border studies (Wilson & Donnan, 2012, p. 19). Moreover, through the border regimes, states infiltrate into the zones of social, economic, political and cultural conditions of nations (Wilson & Donnan, 2012). So, the borders and their meanings are reproduced and reshaped by states at this spectacle at various levels. In other words, as Green (2012) suggests, borders are "the outcomes of ongoing activity" even though there is not so much activity going on at the border. The outcomes of this activity could be observed in today or in the future, but they are built as long-term institutions whose effects might be visible in various aspects. To put differently, the borders are built for eternity even though the eternity of the borders are not proven, the purpose is this (van Houtum, 2010 as cited in Green 2012, p.576).

1.1.2. Functions of Borders: Borders as Security Barriers, as Socio-Cultural Spaces, and as Politico-legal Institutions

If the borders are the outcomes of an ongoing activity, what are these activities and in which levels they play a role? The third section comprehends the roles and functions of the borders in three different areas: as security barriers for migrants, as socio-cultural spaces, and as politico-legal institutions. Through the institution of borders, states do not only regulate

16

and control the issues of immigration. It conceptualize the immigration control as a feature of governance that is enforceable everywhere and at every level, not just at the border itself (Coleman, 2012; De Genova, 2012; Wilson & Donnan, 2012). Thus, states recently and dramatically relied on borders in order to regulate, control and restrict the movement of undesirable aliens (de Wenden, 2007). So, if the borders are institutional zones that are subject to state regulations on movements of people, what is the primary focus of these regulations when it comes to the movements of "undesirable aliens"? Especially, due to the period corresponds to the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks, the issues regarding immigration are approached as a security threat. Therefore, the function of the borders relies on the security concerns of the states. In a way, borders function as barriers for these undesirable foreigners.

Many scholars of border and security studies draw attention the border control techniques, surveillance technologies, biometrics, visa regimes, and databases on undesired foreigners (Bigo, 2002; Broeders & Hampshire, 2013; Brown, 2011; Muller, 2004; Walters, 2006). Although building of walls and fences are attributed to protecting the state from the hostile armies and keeping them out of the national territories, as Brown (2011) suggests, in reality, the walls are constructed to make migrants stop at the border. In other words, walls as barriers at the borders function to prevent human mobility and create an exclusion zone for these undesirable mobile people.

Yet, the walls do not only aim to stop mobile people but, at the same time, they are stalling them at the border, are making them wait for an undeterminate amount of time. Sarah Green suggests that border controls generate an endless waiting as well as creating a sense of waiting for the asylum-seeker, refugees in camps and undocumented migrants (Green, 2012). Moreover, this sense of waiting can also generate another feeling for the ones involved as if the everyday life itself has stopped and it would not continue till the issues is resolved

(Green, 2012). Obviously, the logic of making the refugees wait at the borders is outstandingly related to the definition of borders. This logic based on the static definition of borders creates an illusion as if the people living in the same territory share the same primary identity. According to Malkki (1992), this fixed definition of borders also justifies the logic of building refugee camps at the border where the 'national order of things' takes the scenery. As Wilson and Donnan (2012) asserts, the drama at the border can only be maintained by controlling and managing the borders in this way.

One of the foreground policies on borders is to present migration as a 'social threat' to cultural values of the society (Heisler & Layton-Henry, 1993). In this regard, borders are inherent to the discourses of existing socio-cultural dynamics of the state. As the third function of borders, the socio-cultural dimension implies the logics of inside and outside and the practices of inclusion/exclusion on the basis of fixed and clearly demarcated definition of borders. In a way, borders are precursors of the states' decision on exclusion or inclusion. As Kemal Kirisci asserts, in which he contemplates the relationship between Turkish citizenship and immigration policies, whom a state includes in its territory tells a lot about that country because the state conceptualizes the refugees or asylum-seekers as potential citizens in the future (Kirişci, 2000). As a consequence, examining the states' policies on migration could be revealing in terms of finding the gaps between the formal definitions of citizenship and actual substance (Kirişci, 2000). Therefore, although the scope of this research does not include the citizenship policies of the states, debates on citizenship may explain the differences between three mass migration movements to the Turkish state.

Although the citizenship policies are in reciprocal relationship with immigration policies of the states, there is the new rising phenomenon in these policies: identity management. Muller (2004) asserts that there is a transformation from citizenship to identity management through biometric surveaillance technologies at the borders. In his terms, the

state aims at authenticate/discriminate between qualified and disqualified bodies through identity management where the human body functions as a password enabling inclusion or exclusion (Muller, 2004). By this way, filtering feature of the border functions as a discriminator mechanism for some identities. Indeed, some identities are extremely affected by the identity management strategies of the states. The "Beyond the Border (Perimeter Security)" agreement between the United States and Canada is an example of these strategies. The agreement reveals how the presumption of identity management endangers rights of border crossers and discriminate against those from disadvantaged race and class backgrounds (Özgün E. Topak, Bracken-Roche, Saulnier, & Lyon, 2015).

Similary, French anthropologist Didier Fassin draws attention to production of racialized borders during the governance of migration (Fassin, 2011). He emphasizes the role of governing bureaucrats in the creation of laws of exception that dramatically affects the everyday experiences of immigrants (Fassin, 2011). Needless to say, the production of laws of exception is remarkably related to racialized boundaries where the unwanted aliens are subjected to states' "discretionary humanitarianism" (Fassin, 2011, p. 221). As a result, identity management at the borders create spaces of inclusion/exclusion as well as creating identities as authentic/inauthentic and qualified/disqualified.

Finally, borders function as politico-legal institutions in which the state regularize the mobility of goods, capital and human. As Balibar (2002) suggests, border as an institution functions in a double-edged nature: while it functions as in the form of a state regulation, it also constitutes an institution, a liminal one, only rarely subject to democratic control. Yet, the regularization of border is commonly due to the movements of population. When it comes to trade of goods and capitals, borders are demilitarized and open (Gavrilis, 2008). From this perspective, borders could never be defined as merely seperation lines between the states, they are politico-legal institutions in which the mobile people experience every day (M.

Anderson, 1997; Balibar, 2002; Green, 2012). Indeed, as Salter (2011) puts forward, borders became known as the primary institutions of contemporary state.

As Broeders and Hampshire (2013) put, borders are reitarated as institutions of contemporary nation states through border control techniques as surveillance, biometrics and databases on immigrants. These control techniques pose a special significance when the issue of asylum-seeking is conceptualized as a security concern rather than as a matter of rescuing refugees. Akkerman (2016) shows, in his report on how the European Union frames refugees as security threat, the ways in which the governing bodies builds on their 'alarmist language'. They add on this alarmist language and their military-style rhetoric to call for a "fight against irregular migration" (Akkerman, 2016).

The military-style rhetoric is promoted by biometrics, identification systems and surveillance techniques at the borders where the refugees are perceived as only the subjects of the filters at these borders. This is why Eyal Weizman, in his book called *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*, conceptualizes borders as "elastic territories" where the walls, checkpoints and barriers are located. These elastic terrirotories have remarkable impacts on determining the status of "unwanted foreigners" (Weizman, 2007). Unfortunately, the elastic borders are one of the most dangerous and deadly spaces on earth for aliens than the static and rigid ones (ibid.). The reason is the volatile structure of the elastic borders in which the function of these spaces are highly unsteady. They can be spaces for identity control today but, on the other hand, they might be 'special security zones' or 'killing zones' tomorrow (ibid.). By this way, the lives of the undesirable aliens can be paused and be left in the limbo by the creation of spaces for control and management.

1.2. Mass Refugee Flows and Nation-States

The state's conceptualization of borders and its response to refugees are interwoven issues that IR should pay more attention. The basic understanding in IR relies on the

normative basis of the state system. According to this understanding, all people living in a shared territory is under the responsibility of the state for protection of their rights (Carr, 1946; Hobbes, 1996; Morgenthau, 1948). This assumption has a resemblance to the static definition of borders in which the people ostensibly shares the same identity. The understanding that the state is responsible for the people's rights living in the same territories sparked off the state's neglect for "aliens" rights.

These aliens, who are referred as refugees in this research, are not in the zone of state's responsibility because they are the people beyond the state's territories. Especially when these aliens move across the borders *en masse*, the state's unwillingness or inability for taking the responsibility reaches its highest levels (Betts & Loescher, 2011; Jacobsen, 1996; Loescher, 1993). When these aliens arrive at the borders to seek asylum, the state perceives them as an 'issue' that needs to be dealt with rather than the 'people in need'. This section comprehends the interrelated relationship between borders and mass refugee movements under three major titles. Firstly, it aims at defining the terms refugee and mass refugee flows. In the meantime, the first title strives for explaining why studying mass refugee flows is significant and how the IRR matters in analyzing the state's response. The second part addresses the transformation of IRR through time. This part significantly relies on Bill Frelick's expression of paradigm shifts in IRR since the Second World War (Frelick, 2007). Frelick's (2007) remark on these paradigm shifts constitutes a notable basis for comparing the three mass migration movements to Turkey. The third part elucidates the factors influencing the state's response to mass migration movements. This final section constructs the building blocks of the thesis of the research.

1.2.1. Defining the terms: Refugees and Mass Refugee Flows

Mass refugee flows and the emergence of refugees are not solely the issues of contemporary world politics. From the formation of nation-state system through the Peace of

Westphalia in 1648 to the post-September 11 era, where the mobility of people is linked to the terrorism and security issues, refugees have been a central focus of world politics (Betts & Loescher, 2011). By the creation of the Westphalian state system, the issues of state sovereignty and its territorial integrity raised the importance of protecting the state's national borders. Consequently, anything beyond the national borders of the state, including the refugees, has been characterized as a threat to sovereignty of the state. Thus, the definition of the term refugee is associated with being inside or outside the national borders. This is why Betts and Loescher (2011) defines refugees as "people who cross international borders in order to flee human rights abuses and conflict". Whenever the term refugee is defined, the act of crossing the borders has been the central focus of this definition besides the acts of human rights violations and vulnerability. Therefore, Loescher (1993) asserts that the issue of refugees cannot be neglected. As the incidents of massive human rights violations, wars and military coups occur, the existence of refugees will continue (Loescher, 1993).

Following the definition of refugee, Jacobsen (1996, p. 657) describes "refugee influx" as "that which occurs when within a relatively a short period (a few years), large numbers (thousands) of people flee their places of residence for the asylum country". The essential parts of the mass refugee influxes are their volume and time periods. Although mass refugee flows are not the issues of contemporary world politics, they became more of an issue after the World War II. As Loescher (1993, p. 19) elucidates, we are now living in a world where political, economic and social changes in the international system produce mass movements of people. At the same time, these movements have outstanding impacts on the developments of political and economic spheres of international politics (Loescher, 1993, p. 19). To be clearer, he gives the example of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The movement of refugees from East to West Germany at the end of the year 1989 was one of the triggering factors of brought down of the Wall and also unification of the two as well as creating the

most significant change in international relations since the World War II (Loescher, 1993, p. 20).

Only two years after the interplay between refugee influx and the unification of the Germany, the movement of Iraqi Kurds to the Turkish and Iranian borders has been the first major post-Cold War refugee "crisis". This so-called refugee crisis led to the United Nations (UN) Security Council to authorize an international intervention and create a "safe haven" for the first time in the history of the UN. As these examples illustrate, the mass refugee movements are never solely about the mobility of people, they have socio-political impacts on the international relations. Indeed, as Loescher (1993, p. 182) notes, they challenge the sanctity of borders and the sovereignty of nations. Herein, how the states react to these movements became an issue of protecting the state sovereignty and its national borders vis-à-vis the influx of refugees.

1.2.2. Paradigm Shifts in International Refugee Regime (IRR)

States' responses to the mass refugee influxes vary significantly in different time periods in which the structure of the international system differs. Bill Frelick, in his book chapter *Paradigm shifts in the International Responses to Refugees*, delineates these variations in the states' responses to refugees through associating them with the paradigm shifts in international structure. IRR encounters three paradigm shifts since the World War II (*see* Table 1). The first paradigm begins with the Cold War period in which the IRR became

Table 1 The Paradigm Shifts in the IRR

	Exilic Model	Source Country Model	Security Model
1945 End of the World War II	**1989 End of Cold War**	**2001 The War on Terror**	
	1989 Mass Refugee flow from Bulgaria	1991 Mass Refugee Flow From Iraq	2011 Mass Refugee Flow from Syria

an instrument of East-West rivalry within the bipolar structure of the international system (Betts & Loescher, 2011; Frelick, 2007). The second paradigm corresponds to the post-Cold War period when the bipolar structure of the international system collapsed and new complex humanitarian crises causing to the mass refugee influxes. The third paradigm correlates with the time period after September 11 that has led to the increasing concern for generating a new security agenda. Frelick (2007) suggests that in each paradigm shift, different models of refugee regimes identified the international responses to the refugees. In the following sections, this research will be delineating the prevailing international responses to refugees that mark the paradigm shifts.

Refugee: The Permeant Exile

The IRR after the Second World War was primarily based on the rationale to protect the displaced persons in Europe by the War. The major elements in the IRR was framed by a treaty and an international organization (Betts & Loescher, 2011). The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees defined a refugee as someone who outside of his/her country of origin due to the fear of persecution. The core triggering factor in defining the refugees in the Convention was the bipolar structure in world politics. As Betts and Loescher (2011) asserts, the United States, as well as many other non-Communist countries, mainly desired offering sanctuary and protection to those fleeing from a Communist world with intent to discredit

the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the USSR selectively supported different groups in exile as a strategic move vis-à-vis the US. At the end, refugees became the pawns between the Communist and non-Communist world (Betts & Loescher, 2011; Chimni, 1998; Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989). This is also why Frelick (2007) calls the first paradigm as the 'exilic model' in which the IRR was identified with political and religious exiles from Communist countries.

The exilic model refers to inexistence of any hope for repatriation of displaced people from approximately 1948 to 1991 (Frelick, 2007). Refugees perceived the possibility of repatriation as either unrealistic or illusionary in a foreseeable future. Therefore, the IRR primarily was concerned with establishing the refugees right in and finding durable solutions outside their country of origin. This is why, as Coles (1989) puts it, refugeehood meant "permanent exile". Besides the concern of finding permanent solutions, the IRR was also based on the idea of burden sharing (Frelick, 2007). The burden sharing principle intended to relieve the first asylum countries' responsibilities through finding distant countries with great sources and politically stable atmosphere (Chimni, 1998; Frelick, 2007). As a result, the major paradigm in this period was to give refugees a chance to open a new page in their lives as well as balancing the financial and socio-cultural pressures on first asylum countries through third-country resettlement.

Refugees as the Instruments of Warfare and Military Strategy

The first paradigm in IRR came to an end with the brought down of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This incident created large-scale refugee movements not only from East to West Germany but also from South to North movements. Similar to the first paradigm in which the rivalry between Communist and non-Communist world led to the use of refugees as pawns; in the second paradigm, refugees have become "the instruments of warfare and military strategy" (Loescher, 1993). Therefore, refugees have been at the risk of being

physically attacked by the armed forces of the countries of origin and by the actors of the host countries (Loescher, 1993). As Frelick (2007) asserts, the second paradigm has, thus, been a shift from exilic model to "a model of solutions-oriented humanitarian intervention within the source country".

The source-country paradigm has been characterized by refugees' slightly possible or impossible access to the permeant asylum outside their home countries (Frelick, 2007). The first incident in this paradigm, which in fact initiated the source-country model, was the mass refugee flow from Iraq. In this refugee flow, for the first time in the IRR, refugees were kept at their national borders which could normally be perceived as subverting non-refoulment principle. However, the Western alliance suggested that keeping the refugees inside their borders, in the spaces referred as 'safe havens', is providing them a protective shield inside Iraq (ibid.). In other words, rather than the permanent asylum, the refugees were provided with temporary protection near the border or "safe havens" inside the country of origin (ibid.).

Basically, the purpose was to provide protection without asylum and to motivate refugees for quick repatriation. Indeed, the core motivation was to prevent and contain the refugee influxes (Betts & Loescher, 2011; Chimni, 1998; Frelick, 2007). Although the rhetoric was about the significance of humanitarian response, the real concern was to avoid refugee flows (Frelick, 2007). The possible ways to keep refugees out of the national borders were to open humanitarian corridors, generate safe havens or operationalize military interventions. The largest refugee flows in this period were the nearly 2 to 3 million Kurds from Iraq to the borders of Turkey and Iran in 1991; the 2.5 million people fleeing ethnic cleansing after the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1992; and coerced repatriation of Rwandan people in 1994 (Frelick, 2007; Loescher, 1993). Responses to these refugee influxes were characterized as a "decade of experimentation" in IRR (Newland, 1999 as cited in Frelick, 2007).

Two types of responses to mass refugee flows became prominent in the second paradigm. The first response was to prevent possible refugee flows through humanitarian or military intervention (Dowty & Loescher, 1996; Frelick, 2007; Loescher, 2001). As Chimni (1998) indicates, the major tendency was to prefer prevention to cure. In other words, rather than to provide refugees with rights in the host country, the main conviction was to prevent the refugee flows completely. In both the aftermath of the first Gulf War and break-up of the Yugoslavia, refugee flows were identified as a 'threat to international peace and security' under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Loescher, 2001). Nevertheless, they were not only threats to international peace. Some governments perceive refugees as threats to their national security (Loescher, 1993). For that reasons, states remained reluctant to offer asylum to refugees for the risks of harming political relation, encouraging mass refugee flows and accepting ideologically undesirable groups of people (Loescher, 1993). All of these risks came to existence as a legitimation for keeping the refugees out of the national borders.

The second international response to mass refugee flows in this period has shifted the attention towards internally displaces persons (IDPs). Preference to keep refugees inside their home countries increased the significance of protecting the IDPs (Loescher, 1993). In a way, desire to contain potential refugees caused to the establishment of a new normative and institutional framework (Dowty & Loescher, 1996; Loescher, 1993). Although the IDP's might be a significant cause of possible mass refugee flows, the scope of this research will not be focusing on the IDPs.

Refugees as Potential Terrorists and Human Traffickers

The second paradigm has come to an end by one of the most epochal incidents in 21st century being the September 11 in 2001. The attacks of 9/11 initiated the "War on Terrorism" that has dominated international relations in the first decade of 21st century. Frelick (2007) asserts that the 9/11 shifted the direction of the IRR and eroded the principle of refugee

protection. Although the second paradigm has already moved away from non-refoulment principle, the War on Terrorism, to a considerable extent, diminished the interest in finding solution to refugee flows (Frelick, 2007). The third paradigm is characterized by the influence of fear of terrorism on closing the borders to refugees and denying asylum from persecution. Hence, Frelick (2007) describes the paradigm as the security model in which the rights of asylum and non-refoulment have been outstandingly undermined by the states. However, Adamson (2006) opposes to the idea that the paradigm shift towards security areas is contemporary. He argues that the relationship between migration and security existed before the 9/11 (Adamson, 2006). The only effect of the 9/11 and following incidents of Madrid bombings in 2004 and London in 2005 reiterated the existing linkages between migration and terrorism (Adamson, 2006).

By their concern over the threat of transnational terrorism, states developed strict border policies and gave weight to control and manage international migration (Betts & Loescher, 2011). All these precautions limited refugees' flexibility to move across international borders. This inflexibility is why the scholars of the forced migration have primarily shifted their attention to borders where the "border spectacle" takes place almost every day and everywhere in the world (Genova, 2015; Wilson & Donnan, 2012). One of the precautions that the states take at the borders became evident in the formation of refugee camps. Fixed and static definition of the borders justified the building of camps where seen as breeding grounds for terrorists by the states (Frelick, 2007; Malkki, 1992). Thus, not only the refugees are problematized but also the camps came into existence as a security issue. Another precaution in the third paradigm is to build walls between two or more border regions. As Frelick (2007) indicates, the security paradigm of 21st century fortified the physical barriers at the borders. These strict border policies and containment strategy for mass migration have rigorously influenced the perception of the refugee.

The strict border policies have severely affected the refugee perception. Contrary to the first paradigm in which the refugees were seen as "freedom fighters", they are perceived as illegal border crossers in the security paradigm (Frelick, 2007). In order to evade the strict control at the borders, refugees turned growingly to smugglers and traffickers (Frelick, 2007). This turn generated a feeling about refugees as if they are a cohort in criminal expertise (Frelick, 2007). Hence, the states began to refer refugees as aliens who are culturally incompatible with the host community. For states, most refugees involve in criminal activities and harm the social cohesion in the society. These perceptions resulted in a xenophobic backlash in the host country (Frelick, 2007). Furthermore, they played a role in the increasing mistrust and prejudice between the refugees and the host community (Frelick, 2007). As a result, rigid border controls contributed to the perception of refugees being terrorists, smugglers, human traffickers or criminals.

States' Responses to Mass Migration Flows

The paradigm shifts in international responses to refugees revealed the existing relationships between forced migration and border policies. Understanding how the states respond to forced migration is necessary before explaining the reasons or consequences of it in world politics (Betts & Loescher, 2011). Betts and Loescher (2011) propose that the way in which the states respond to mass refugee influx is highly political. It requires a decision on "how to weigh the rights of citizens an non-citizens" (Betts & Loescher, 2011). GECIS So, besides the paradigms in different eras of the world politics, Jacobsen (1996) draws attention to the factors influencing the policy responses of host countries to mass refugee flows. He argues that three sources of pressure on the host government prevails in policy-making: institutions and individuals which are concerned with the refugees' welfare, the local community and refugees themselves (Jacobsen, 1996). Therefore, although this is not the

major focus of this research, this research aims at analysing the responses to refugees in relation to these three sources of pressures.

Jacobsen (1996) illustrates some factors influencing the states' responses to mass refugee flows as the following: the costs and benefits of admitting international assistance, relations with the source-country, political calculations on host community's absorption capacity and national security concerns. Furthermore, bureaucratic politics, the plight of refugees in domestic politics, power relations between ministries and decisionmakers, and insufficiency of information are the other factors that must be clarified (Jacobsen, 1996). Considering the effects of all these factors, this question raised by Jacobsen (1996) remains as notable: Why some host governments respond mass refugee influxes in relatively generous ways and other times not? Why are some refugee groups admitted entering national territories and some others not?

Although explaining the reasons for the variation and fluctuation in states' responses to mass refugee influx, scholars of forced migration identify some reasons for the refugee policy choices of states. For instance, Jacobsen (1996) comprehends policy-making for refugees in relation to three choices: doing nothing, responding negatively to refugee flows or responding positively. In the first policy choice, the state would choose to do nothing when it lacks to capacity to control and manage the influx (Gorgender, 1987, as cited in Jacobsen, 1996). When the states do not take action, it creates the image that it cannot control its border (Jacobsen, 1996). Thus, mass refugee influx challenges and undermines the state's sovereign right to determine who enters its national territories (ibid.). Furthermore, the state would also be unwilling to act or wouldn't consider the issue as a significant matter for its policy agenda (ibid.).

The second and third policy choice imply the states' willingness to act, yet in the opposite directions. Firstly, the states' negative response is significantly related to the volume

and the intensity of the mass refugee flows. When the numbers of refugees exceed the expected levels or the intensity is remarkably high, then the states' became more willing to close the national borders or deny asylum requests of refugees (Jacobsen, 1996). This is why Weiner (1996) argues that the IRR works best when the numbers are small. Besides the volume of the mass inflows, Jacobsen (1996) maintains that the state probably reacts negatively when the refugees threaten to overwhelm local capacities. In other words, if the numbers of refugees will be higher than the population of the local community, the states' reluctance to accept refugees decreases. Secondly, Jacobsen (1996) distinguished the positive reactions of the states in relation to the UN's protocols and recommendations. According to this yardstick, positive policies are determined by the "perfect" compliance with international recommendations (Jacobsen, 1996).

Finally, the state's flexibility to choose its response to mass refugee movements is contingent upon its ability to control its borders (Jacobsen, 1996). Most of the refugee receiving countries have porous and slightly policed borders (ibid.). Therefore, the states seldom choose their response to these mass refugee movements. Moreover, they rarely prevent the crossings of thousands or millions of people when their national borders are porous prior to the influx (ibid.). in a way, when the numbers are extremely high, and the borders are notably porous and vaguely policed, the state usually have nothing to do but to act for refugees. However, one should also notice that, the states predominantly hold their right to determine the direction of their response. They can choose to generate a "safe heaven", to establish refugee camps near the border, to strive for finding a durable solution or to give them permanent asylum, mostly depending on the current paradigm in IRR. It is significant that the scholars of IR try to understand all kinds of responses to the mass refugee influxes.

The following chapter aims to examine the border studies and mass migration literature in Turkey. The first section intends to present border studies in Turkey as well as introducing the gaps in the literature. The second section aims to examine the mass migration studies in Turkey which reveals the Turkish migration regime since the establishment of the Republic and examines the shifts in the national migration regime. Furthermore, it strives for understanding how the shifts in Turkish migration regime are overlapping with the paradigm shifts in IRR. Finally, the third section presents the historical backgrounds of three mass refugee flows to Turkey: from Bulgaria in 1989, Iraq in 1991 and Syria between 2011-2013. This section does not only explain the historical background of these movements but also comprehends three cases in relation to the state's policies on border control and management.

CHAPTER II

Border and Mass Migration Studies in Turkey

Disciplines of IR and political geography frequently focus on border-related studies, yet the studies focusing on Turkey are still insufficient. Despite their deficiencies, border studies in Turkey has gradually increase since 2000s and this chapter aims to elaborate on these studies. Firstly, the first part of this chapter presents the research on Turkish border regime. While some research focus on the change and continuities in Turkish border regime (Ataç et al., 2017; Genç, 2014; Ikizoglu Erensu & Kaşlı, 2016), less research concentrate on the interactions between bordering neighbours (i.e. Turkey-Syria, Turkey-Greece, Turkey-Georgia) (Danış & Parla, 2009; Kaşlı, 2014; Koca, 2015; Okyay, 2017; Parla, 2003; Toktaş & Çelik, 2017; Özgün E Topak, 2014). However, to my knowledge, the comparison between three mass refugee flows to Turkey in relation to border regime of Turkish state has not been closely studied.[7] This research aims to fill this gap in border studies in Turkey.

The first section also seeks to examine border studies in such different disciplines as sociology and anthropology. The ethnographic research on borders aims to analyze how borders are contemplated by the people living in border towns and how their identity is constructed and reconstructed by their conceptualization of borders (Özgen, 2005, 2007;

---

[7] There are two master theses written by (Gökçek, 2017) and (Ayaşlı, 2018) on the Turkish State's responses to mass refugee flows. Moreover, Kirişci and Karaca (2015) compare the three mass refugee movements to Turkey. However, none of this research is built on border studies.

Şenoğuz, 2017; Yıldırım, 2013). Although these ethnographic border studies are significant in border studies in Turkey, they mostly focus on the perceptions of agents rather than the state authorities.[8] The second section of this chapter aims to introduce the research related to border regime of Turkey regarding EU-accession process. On the contrary to limited research in Turkish state's border regime, most research centered upon Turkey-EU border in relation to migration policy (Kirişci, 2007; Ozcurumez & Şenses, 2011; Sert, 2013). Besides acknowledging the impact of Turkey's EU accession process on its border policies, this research does not build its premises on the assumption that Turkey's border regime is an outcome of its relations with the EU.

2.1. Border Studies in Turkey

The studies on Turkish state's policies, discourses and practices on borders remain in the background of studies on states' migration policies. Scholars of migration studies research the concept of border as an auxiliary tool to explain the migration policies of the state. Yet, as in the studies of IR and political geography, the Turkish state's definitions of border should be embraced to reveal its policies during mass refugee flows. Most of the pioneering and far-reaching studies in Turkey are in the book *Border and Deportation: Foreigners, Migration and Interdisciplinary Approaches to State in Turkey*[9] (Sınır ve Sınırdışı: Türkiye'de Yabancılar, Göç ve Devlete Disiplinlerarası Bakışlar*)* (Danış & Soysüren, 2014). This book aims to agglomerate the interdisciplinary research on borders conducted in Turkey. While it involves the permeability levels for different ethnic groups coming to the borders of the State, it also includes the il/legality of deportation acts of Turkish state. The book reveals how

---

[8] Therefore, this second section does not introduce these research in detail due to its focus on state's conceptualization of borders.
[9] The book title is translated by the author.

border studies can be studied from a multi-disciplinary perspective through including the academics and researchers from various disciplines.

Another comprehensive study analysing the Turkey's border policy and its filtering practices against foreigners belongs to Genç (2015). In her article titled as "An Analysis of Turkey's Bordering Processes: Why and Against Whom?", Genç (2015) explores the justifications for Turkey's filtering policies at the borders. She concludes that the main concern of the Turkish state at its borders is to protect the territorial integrity of the State, its political regime, public morality and familial structure (ibid.). Furthermore, the Turkish state predominantly control and manage its borders against suspects of PKK[10], smugglers, poor women from non-Muslim and non-Turkic origin and Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian nationals with Kurdish origin (ibid.).

The border studies in Turkey predominantly concentrate on the EU's effect on Turkish border regime. In fact, most studies refer to Turkish border regime only to analyse Turkey's importance for the EU's external frontiers and its migration policies (İçduygu, 2012; Ozcurumez & Şenses, 2011; Ozcurumez & Yetkin, 2014). While some of these studies analyse the factors influencing irregular migration policy and how this policy converges with the EU acquis (İçduygu & Kaygusuz, 2004; Ozcurumez & Şenses, 2011; Ozcurumez & Yetkin, 2014), the others concentrate on securitization (İçduygu & Sert, 2010) and politicization of Turkey-EU borders (İçduygu & Üstübici, 2014). Moreover, Kirişci (2007) contributes to the border studies through analysing Turkey's state of affairs in relation to different aspects of border management. However, his work comprehends the changes and continuities in border management of Turkish state only during Turkey-EU harmonization process. Furthermore, Aksel and Danış (2014) remark Turkey's border management

---

[10] PKK is an abbreviation of The Kurdistan Workers' Party and acknowledged as a terrorist organization by the Turkish state.

strategies in the Iraqi border through tracing the effects of Europeanization. Although their work significantly relies on border studies literature, it mainly comprehends the securitizing moves of Turkish state in respect to Turkey-EU relations. However, Ataç et al. (2017) suggest that Turkey's current practices on border cannot be analysed solely within the EU framework due to other factors influencing the changes in Turkish migration and border regime. While the effect of Europeanization on Turkey's border and migration regime could not be rejected, Europeanization perspective downplays historicity of borders in Turkey. In this regard, this research aims to fill the gap in the literature through interpolating the critical border studies to parliamentary politics. By this way, while the research contributes to critical border studies in Turkey, it also builds on political science literature under the scope of migration studies.

2.2. Migration Studies in Turkey: From the Law of Settlement to Establishment of the Directorate General of Migration Management

During the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the primary concern of the Turkish state regarding its borders was to protect and control the National Pact (*Misak-i Milli*). The Ottoman Parliament created this six-point document in 28th January 1920 as a political manifest for the Independence War. The document exerts efforts for determining the borders of Turkey. As Aydın (2001) suggests, the National Pact was significantly deterministic of Turkish state's priorities in relation to protecting its territorial integrity. The National Pact was not only deterministic of border-related issues but also the indicator of Turkishness (Çağaptay, 2003). In a way, while the National Pact draws the territorial limits of the state, it also draws the limits of Turkish citizenship. Therefore, since the establishment of the Republic, the State's primary attitude towards non-citizens has been mistrust and restrictions (İçduygu, Erder, & Gençkaya, 2014). The National Pact is a significant example of "static definition of borders" in which the national territories divide people into the

categories of desirable/non-desirable or secure/insecure. This understanding constitutes the building stones of both Turkish migration and citizenship regime.

The establishment of Turkish state has not terminated the discussions over borders or the limits of Turkish citizenship. Indeed, after the establishment of the Republic, the State did not focus on these issues for decades. Similar to the National Pact, the Law of Settlement adopted in 1934 has drawn the limits of Turkish citizenship. As Kirişci and Karaca (2015) argue, the Law predominantly relied on prioritizing the people from Turkish descent and culture. In other words, the law created an opportunity for people from Turkish descent and culture to be accepted as a refugee (Kirişci, 2000). Yet, there was neither a clear definition of "Turkish descent and culture" nor a consensus over what is implied by the term. The authority for giving citizenship to people from Turkish descent and culture decision was the Council of Ministers (Kirişci, 1996a).

The emphasis on descent and culture has three implications that categorize people under different entitlement. Kirişci (2000) states that these three groups were "those who spoke Turkish and were of Turkish ethnicity, those who did not speak Turkish but were considered to be of Turkish culture, and finally those who neither spoke Turkish nor belonged to the Turkish culture". People in the third group were non-Muslim minorities comprised of Kurds and Arabs who were considered as a security threat to the homogenized national identity of the state (Kirişci, 2000). In a way, the Law delimited the symbolic borders of the state through distinguishing between culturally acceptable and non-acceptable refugees.

The Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees was another document which shaped and still shapes the Turkish migration regime. The Convention primarily aimed to protect European refugees who suffered from the World War II. Therefore, the version of the Geneva Convention, that the United Nations General Assembly signed on 28 July 1951, was limited to protecting and establishing the rights of European refugees. Ten years later in 1967,

the UN decided to remove the limitation with the Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees. However, Turkey has acceded the 1951 Geneva Convention in 1967 Protocol providing that Turkey only accepts 'the people fleeing from the events occurred in Europe' as a refugee, and only accepts asylum applications of those who are from European countries. Since 1967, Turkey became one of the countries which did not remove geographical limitation. This limitation not only makes the Turkey's asylum regime unfeasible for non-European asylum seekers, but also disqualifies a great number of people who seek asylum due to the events occurring in the Eastern neighbours of Turkey (İçduygu & Aksel, 2012). Hence, the geographical limitation of the Geneva Convention not only poses a significance for the variation in Turkish state's conceptualization of refugees, but also of its national borders. In other words, the limitation reproduced dichotomy of acceptable/non-acceptable refugees.

In 1960s and 1970s, Turkish migration regime has entered a new phase. Turkey has signed bilateral labour agreements with industrially developed countries. In this period, the increase in the number of Turkish emigrants caused to characterization of Turkey as an "emigration country" (İçduygu, 2012). However İçduygu (2012) suggests that from 1980s to today, Turkey encountered a great number of refugee flows which surpassed the "emigration country" argument. On the contrary to the early republican period, starting from the end of 1980s, Turkey decided to discourage migration flows from other countries during this period due to the increasing population (İçduygu & Sert, 2015). The characteristics of this period complies with Bill Frelick's (2007) exilic model in which the IRR was about establishing the rights of refugees, especially the ones from Communist countries, in exile. In parallel with this model, Turkey witnessed a significant refugee flow from Bulgaria in 1989. For refugees from Bulgaria, Turkish state made efforts for establishing the rights of Turkish descent people living in Bulgaria (Parla, 2003; Vasileva, 1992). Although Kirişci (1996a) argues that the policies Turkish state was contingent upon the Turkishness of these refugees, the Cold War

period and IRR's impact on accepting refugees from Communist-bloc cannot be disregarded. Therefore, the period between 1960s and 1990 in Turkey can also be defined as a paradigm for Turkish migration regime.

As Frelick (2007) remarks, the exilic model paradigm came to an end with the fall of the Berlin War in 1989 which paved the way for the collapse of the Soviet Union. During this period, Turkish state confronted the second mass refugee flow in its republican history: the Iraqi refugees in 1991. Contrary to the Turkish descent refugees from Bulgaria, Iraqi Kurds and Turkomans were not accepted as refugees in Turkey. They were placed in the refugee camps near the border. The government made efforts to convince the UN to create a 'safe haven' in Turkish-Iraqi borders (Danış, 2011; Kirişci, 1996b). The creation of 'safe haven' was a new phenomenon which shifted a paradigm in IRR (Frelick, 2007).

Between 1989 and 1991, Turkey has consecutively confronted the two most significant mass flows of refugees in the Republican history. Yet, until the 1994, there were no regulation considering the entry, exit, stay, residence, and labour rights of these people fleeing from their home to Turkey (İçduygu, 2015). The 1994 Asylum Regulation defined the conditions for applying asylum, and under which conditions Turkish state is required to open its borders to asylum-seekers. The Article 8 at the third chapter of the Regulation is specifically significant because it relies on the rules and regulations related to mass migration flows. The article declares precautions to be taken for aliens who come to borders of the State *en masse*:

> "As long as there are no political decisions taken to the contrary, and provided that Turkey's obligations under international law are maintained, and taking into account its territorial interests, it is essential that population movements be stopped at the border, and that asylum seekers be prevented from crossing over into Turkey. Necessary and effective measures shall be taken by the relevant bodies on this matter."

The Article explicitly remarks that primary response of the State to mass refugees is to avoid their movements at the border. The following articles note that once mass refugees are accepted to the country, they are guided by the police and gendarmerie to be sent to refugee camps. This article has been one of the major issues between Turkey-EU relations due to the EU's request on civilian authorities' responsibilities for refugees.

The very end of 1990s not only marked a significant change in the European Union's immigration and border management policies, but also in Turkish migration and border regime due to the Turkish state's candidacy for the EU. Although the scope of this research does not include the European Union's external border management policies, it aims to delineate the Turkish state's efforts for the compliance with the acquis. The Amsterdam Treaty's coming into force in 1999 was one of the first steps towards a change in the EU's border management related issues. The main target of these policies was better management of the EU's internal and external borders. Similarly, integrated border management (IBM) strategies of the EU aimed to merge control mechanism within the Union.

Turkey's immigration and border management mechanisms became a significant issue for the EU. The purpose of protecting the borders of EU turned migration management issue into a significant political discussion between Turkey and the EU (İçduygu & Üstübici, 2014; Kirişci, 2007; Sert, 2013). As İçduygu and Üstübici (2014) assert, border and migration-related issues are central to Turkey-EU relations because the discourses on these issues have multiple implications for economic, social, political, and demographic structures in the EU. In a way, borders' multidimensional meanings are also existing in the relations between Turkey and the EU. Furthermore, Kirişci (2007) suggests that there are two significant reasons for the EU's efforts for implementing a common migration policy with Turkey. Firstly, Turkey's critical geographical location provides an opportunity for refugees from east of the country to use Turkey as a transit passage for seeking asylum from the EU.

Especially the instability and terrorism-related issues in the Middle East make the movement of asylum seekers from the regions more sensitive (Kirişci, 2007). Secondly, Turkey's long borders that are difficult to manage and control cause Turkey to prioritize defense of these borders, especially the ones in Iraq. In these borders, Turkey's concern over the infiltrations of the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) militants directs Turkish state to authorize military officials in the borders rather than a civilian authority that the EU demands. Whilst all these reasons raised the importance of Turkey's migration and border management policies for the EU, they also caused a discrepancy between Turkey and the EU due to the mutually unsatisfied expectations.

The period between 2004 and 2005, Turkey's EU-accession process was accelerated. Hence, Turkey was in an urgent need for overhauling its national identity-based policies on borders and immigration to converge to the EU's requirements. The harmonization measures, which consist of transferring policies from the EU to Turkey, initiated the changes in the legal and institutional framework about migration and border regime of Turkey (De Bel-Air, 2016). These changes include the implementation of the National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration after 2005, establishing of the Development and Implementation Office on Asylum and Migration Legislation and Asylum Capacity under the Ministry of Interior in 2008 and the conclusion of readmission agreements with several countries (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013). In 2006, the European Council decided to suspend Turkey's candidacy for the EU membership. This decision has caused an end in the arguments for the effect of the EU's border management requirements on Turkey.

Within the EU-Turkish accession talks under the *Action Plan on Asylum and Migration* adopted by the government in March of 2005, Turkey is asked to remove the geographical limitation in the Geneva Convention. Although Turkey intended to lift the limitation, uncertainty over its accession process discouraged the state officials from lifting

the limitation (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013). Moreover, the *Action Plan* also prompted the Turkish state to review its national laws with regards to migration and asylum. In this regard, the Bureau for the Development and Implementation of Asylum and Migration Legislation and Strengthening the Administrative Capacity founded in 2008 under the Ministry of Interior to draft a new law (Soykan, 2012). The drafting process started in 2010 and the Council of Ministers accepted the new law on Foreigners and International Protection in 2012 (ibid.). The law overhauls the residence and work permits of foreigners living in Turkey.

One of the most significant institutional changes was the establishment of General Directorate for Migration Management (DGMM) in 2013 which enabled the centralization of migration-policy making. The mission of this institution, claimed by the institution itself, is to develop humanitarian focused policies on migration. However, although the transformations in the border regime intend to open or bend the 'impermeable' and 'fixed' borders of the state for humanitarian purposes, Turkish border regime is volatile due to the priority given to national security and national identity. This volatile structure of Turkish border regime can be observed in the example of Syrian refugees between 2011 and 2016.

2.3. Historical Background of the Three Mass Refugee Flows to Turkey: Bulgaria (1989), Iraq (1991), and Syria (2011)

This research focuses on Turkish state officials' discourses on borders during three mass refugee flows to Turkey. Jacobsen (1996, p. 657) suggests that mobility of people can only be defined as "mass refugee flow" when thousands of people seek asylum from another country within a short period of time (a few months). According to Jacobsen's definition of mass refugee flows, this research aims to discuss the three migration movements in detail: from Bulgaria in 1989, from Iraq in 1991, and from Syria in 2011. Although the numbers are significantly high in these refugee flows, they are not the only largest irregular migration flows to Turkey.

42

As İçduygu (2000) asserts, Turkey has been a suitable transit zone for refugees for decades. Asylum seekers from Middle East and from some distant parts of Asia and Africa enter the country since 1980s. Thousands of Iranians, as the first non-Convention refugees, fleeing from the Islamic Revolution in 1979 sought refuge from Turkey (İçduygu, 2000). From 1980 to 1991, almost 1.5 million Iranians sought refuge from Turkey and majority of them are resettled in a third country in Europe and North America (Mannaert, 2003). Despite the large numbers of Iranians refugees, their entry into Turkey extended which prevents describing the Iranian refugee movement as a mass refugee flow. Hence, this research intentionally excludes Iranian refugees.

During 1990s Turkey has witnessed other refugee movements from Southeast Europe aside from Turks and Pomaks from Bulgaria. Almost 25,000 Bosnian Muslims sought refuge from Turkey due to the hostilities in former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995 (Kirişci, 2003; Mannaert, 2003). While some of them are settled in refugee camps near the Bulgaria border, some other are settled in their relatives in Istanbul and Bursa. Another refugee movement was from Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. Almost 18,000 Kosovars sought refuge from Turkey, yet, majority of them returned their home country (Kirişci, 2003). However, as in Iranian refugees' case, these movements do not fulfil Jacobssen's (2006) criteria to be defined as mass refugee movements. In this regard, this research analyses three mass refugee movements to Turkey and strives for filling the gap in the literature through benefiting from parliamentary speeches of state officials to reveal their conceptualization of borders.

2.3.1. From Kapıkule to Turkey: Ethnic Kins from Bulgaria

On the May of 1989, Turkey has witnessed its largest migration flow in its more than a half-century long republican history. The ethnic-Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria have forcefully migrated to Turkey to flee from Zhivkov regime's oppressions. In return, Turkish state decided to open its borders to these refugees, or in state official's own words: ethnic

kins. From the year 1908 when Bulgaria declared its independence from Ottoman Empire to the year 1989, the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey have experienced fluctuations mainly due to the Turkish minorities living in Bulgaria. However, exodus in 1989 had almost caused the severance of relations between the two countries.

On the 22nd of September 1908, when Bulgaria declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire, Turkish and Muslim minorities in the country decided to stay in their homeland (Çelik, 2009). Five years after Bulgaria's declaration of independence, on 29th of September 1913, the Istanbul Treaty has signed between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. The treaty has aimed to determine the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey. The third article of this treaty accepts the Maritsa River as the border between the two countries. This border predominantly remains its shape today, excepts a few changes constituted by the Treaty of Lausanne. The border between Bulgaria and Turkey is 269 km which is the third longest international border of Turkey after the ones with Syria and Iran. Along the border, three checkpoints, as being Kapikule, Hamzabeyli and Derekoy, serve for visa entries and customs operations. The Kapikule border gate, which is the busiest custom gate among the three checkpoints, provides Turkey to reach Thrace and Western Europe.

The Turkish and Muslim minorities in Bulgaria have mainly used the railroad which crosses over the Kapikule border gate. Before the mass migration flow in 1989, Turkey encountered five other migration movements. The first significant confrontation between Turkey and Bulgaria was in the years 1950 and 1951 when Theodor Zhivkov declared that 250.000 people would be sent to Turkey within three months. Almost half of this number has emigrated to Turkey within two months (Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2001; Konukman, 1990). One year after this migration movement, Turkey became a NATO member in 1952. In this period, the relations between two country were significantly shaped by structure of the Cold War (Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2001). While Turkey became a NATO member in 1952, Bulgaria was

one of the most loyal allies of the USSR. Despite fleeting cooperation between the two countries, the bipolar structure of the Cold War period shadowed their relations and they approach each other with apprehension (Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2001).

The apprehension in relations between the two-country revealed itself with Zhivkov's policies on Turkish and Muslim minorities in Bulgaria who are perceived as a threat to communist regime (Kirişci & Karaca, 2015). Communist leader Zhivkov named his assimilationist policies as "National Revival" which aimed to integrate ethnic-Turks into "developed socialist society" (Hacısalihoğlu, 2012; Vasileva, 1992). In this regard, Zhivkov regime decided to illegalize Turkish language, close down Muslim sanctuaries, and change Turkish names into Bulgarian ones (Çelik, 2009; Konukman, 1990, p. 53; Poulton, 1993, p. 139). As a result of these assimilationist policies, minorities are obliged to flee from Bulgaria to Turkey.

On the 2nd of June 1989, Turkish President Turgut Özal decided to open borders of Turkey to refugees from Bulgaria through stating that Turkey is prepared to accept all 1.5 million "ethnic kins". Although the President initially hesitated to open state's borders to these refugees, he had to accept them when his efforts for raising awareness in international community have failed (Kirişci & Karaca, 2015). From the end of May till August, nearly 350.000 refugees fled Turkey by trains. On 21st of August, Turkish government abruptly decided to close the borders of Turkish state to refugees. Parla (2003) argues that the reason for Turkish government to close its borders to refugees was unexpected rise in the number of refugees. However, another reason for closing borders might be the state's priority to keep Turkish descent people in their homeland to protect its authority over the country.[11]

---

[11] As will be discussed in Chapter III, in-depth interviews supports this argument.

The collapse of the Communist Zhivkov regime in November 1989 has transformed the situation in Bulgaria. The new regime made provisions for facilitating the livelihood conditions of Turkish and Muslim minorities in Bulgaria (Vasileva, 1992). Alongside of these new measurements, marginalization of refugees in Turkey as "Bulgarians" encouraged them to return their homeland (Parla, 2003). In this regard, almost half of refugees in Turkey returned Bulgaria (Konukman, 1990). However, this research does not focus on post-entry status of refugees in Turkey. It specifically addresses state officials' discourses during reception at borders. Although most of the research in Bulgaria case concentrate on post-entry status of refugees (Kirişci & Karaca, 2015; Parla, 2003, 2009; Vasileva, 1992), this research intentionally aims to limit itself through underemphasizing post-entry conditions of refugees.

2.3.2. From the Mountainous Turkey-Iraq Borderland to the Refugee Camps: Refugees from Iraq

Two years after the mass migration movement from Bulgaria, in March of 1991 another mass migration movement has influenced Turkey. For the first time, Turkey experienced a mass migration flow consisting of different backgrounds of ethnicity and religion other than Turks and Muslims: Iraqi Kurds, Turkmens, and Christians fleeing from Saddam government. This migration movement marked the origins of changing nature of Turkey's title from emigration country to immigration country (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013).

The border between Iraq and Turkey became an issue for a long time because of disputes on Mosul. Almost two weeks after the establishment of the Grand National Assembly in 1920, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk stated that Mosul, Sulaymaniyah, and Iskenderun is in Turkey's national borders under the National Pact. However, Great Britain have claimed that the majority of population in Mosul is Arabs and they are reluctant to become a part of Turkey (Aydın, 2001). In this regard, the 3rd article of the Treaty of Lausanne issued that the

border between Turkey and Iraq should be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain in nine months.[12] Negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey to designate the border have launched in May of 1924. However, neither Great Britain nor Turkey could arrive at a consensus on the issue of Mosul.

The League of Nations issued its report "Question of the Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq" to end the disputes on Mosul.[13] The report involves ethnographic maps of Turkey-Iraq border zone and intents to end the controversies. Finally, the Ankara Treaty between Great Britain and Turkey determined the border as Mosul being in Iraqi borders, and Habur River as natural frontier. When Iraq declared its independence in 1932, the Treaty is re-approved by Turkey and Iraq. The length of the border is 378 km and four checkpoints are located along the border. Except the Ibrahim Khalil (Habur) border gate, other gates are occasionally opened and closed by the Turkish government.

Turkey-Iraq border is mountainous and rough which frequently impede human mobility unlike the border with Bulgaria. Despite this arduous terrain, refugees fleeing from persecution in Iraq at the end of 1980s had to come to the borders of Turkey on foot. The first time Turkey experienced a non-Turkish origin mass refugee flow was at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1987. The chemical attacks in Halabja caused 5.000 deaths and almost 100.000 Iraqi Kurds afraid of another massacre in Halabja fled to Turkey (Danış, 2009).[14] At first, Turkish government was reluctant to accept these refugees due to its concerns over PKK militant's entry into its territories (Danış, Perouse, & Taragh, 2006; Ihlamur-Öner, 2013).

---

[12] "The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months from the coming into force of the present Treaty."
[13] See: https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilMSD/C-400-M-147-1925-VII_BI.pdf. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
[14] Some other resources claim that the numbers were around 50.000, see Ihlamur-Öner, 2013.

However, when the number of refugees increased, Turkey decided to accept these refugees temporarily on humanitarian grounds.

Many of the refugees turned back to Iraq within two years and only around 25,000 refugees were remained in Turkey in 1991. International community deeply criticized Turkey for its biased treatment to refugees from Bulgaria and Iraq. In this regard, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe released its "Recommendation 1151 (1991) on the reception and settlement of refugees in Turkey".[15] The document underscored unequal living conditions between two refugee groups and criticized Turkey for not removing the geographical limitation in the Geneva Convention.

A much bigger flow of Iraqi Kurdish refugees to Turkey came when the Gulf War ended in March 1991. The efforts of Iraqi regime to end the Kurdish rebellion caused 500.000 Iraqi Kurds as well as smaller numbers of Iraqi Turkmen and Christians to be pushed to Turkish and Iranian borders (Danış, 2011). Again, Turkey was reluctant to open its borders to Iraqi refugees, for several reasons. Firstly, Ihlamur-Öner (2013) asserts that Turkey was afraid of another criticism from the West about its migration policies. Secondly, Turkey was suspicious about Iraqi Kurds due to the "Kurdish issue" in its internal affairs (Altunişik, 2006; Kirişci, 1993, 1995). Hence, the concern over Kurdish population in Turkey might have prompted Turkey to not to accept the Iraqi Kurds into its territory. Thirdly, another drawback for Turkey was the concern that Turkey could become a 'buffer zone' between Europe and refugee-sending countries (Ihlamur-Öner, 2013). Despite all these drawbacks, Turkey could not resist to close its borders to 500,000 people waiting in the mountains.

---

[15] See: http://semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbncveG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHIuYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0xNTE4NSZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJlZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTE1MTg1. Retrieved July 10, 2018.

Turgut Özal's government faced a significant international pressure about the movement of Iraqi refugees. Yet, this pressure was not sufficient to accommodate nearly half million Iraqi refugees in Turkey. Therefore, Özal government made efforts to persuade the United Nations for creation of a 'safe haven' in North of the 36th parallel of Iraq (Kirişci & Karaca, 2015). In the 2nd of April, Turkey called the United Nations to a meeting and in the 5th of April, and the UN Security Council issued its Resolution 688. By the help of the Security Council's support, Turkey succeeded to keep the refugees in the camps established in the North of the 36th parallel near Turkish-Iraqi frontiers. As Frelick (2007) argues, while the Resolution rescued refugees from staying on the mountains, it also subverted the Geneva Convention through neglecting refugees' right to seek asylum outside their country. Hence, less than three months, Iraqi refugees returned their home country from Turkey where they stayed in "safe havens".

2.3.3 Border or Landmine: The 'guests' from Syria

Characteristics of the border between Turkey and Syria mirror the colonial engineering of borders after the First World War (Okyay, 2017). French and Turkish governments initiated the demarcation of the southeast border of Turkey through the Ankara Treaty in 1921. Similar to the question of Mosul during demarcation of the border between Iraq and Turkey, the predominantly Turkish-speaking province Alexandretta (Hatay) had become an issue. Mustafa Kemal stated that Hatay is in National Pact and should not be excluded from Turkey's national borders (Zürcher, 1993, p. 203). When Turkey annexed Hatay in 1939, Hatay was an independent state since September 1938 and the border between Turkey and Syria has drawn through an agreement with France despite the complaints of Syrian authorities (Lundgren-Jorum, 2013, as cited in Okyay, 2017). Therefore, since declaring independence in 1946 Syria challenges the legitimacy of this 820 kilometer-long border (Micallef, 2006).

Today, the border between Turkey and Syria is still contradictive due to the allegations of borders' division of communities. As Wilson and Donnan (2012) reminds, borderlands are multi-cultural and shared by different ethnic categories. The border between Turkey and Syria is too multi-ethnic and multi-confessional and bordering process was not in parallel with the dynamics of the region (Micallef, 2006; Okyay, 2017). Şenoğuz (2017) asserts that this discrepancy between demarcation of borders and multi-ethnic characteristic of the region influenced perceptions among the local populations at the border. The discourses on national borders shaped and constructed the definition of society "over the question who belong and who does not" (Şenoğuz, 2017). Consequently, understanding the construction of the border between Turkey and Syria is essential for interpreting the discourses of state officials on refugees' reception at borders.

The management and conceptualization of borders by state authorities have continuities and ruptures (Ataç et al., 2017). Firstly, the most evident continuity is securitization of the border between Turkey and Syria. Despite economic, social and political relations between the two sides of the border, Turkish government reinforced the border through land mines (HRW, 2014) since 1950s due to the disputes over Hatay (Koca, 2015). This fortification process has been maintained over the years as conflicts between the Turkish army and the PKK are escalated in 1980s. Furthermore, during the Cold War period, barbed wire and watchtowers were also constructed on the border (Koca, 2015). However, these continuities obscure the dynamics of borders. As J. Anderson and O'Dowd (1999) asserts, borders are multi-functional and only their functions could reveal states' practices of closing, filtering, preclusion, and exclusion for the movement of aliens. Therefore, the ruptures are always significant to understand the management of borders.

Ruptures at the border between Syria and Turkey has mainly been conditioned by Turkey's foreign policy ambitions, and its priority over protecting state's territorial integrity

(Genç, 2015; Okyay, 2017). As Okyay (2017) asserts, especially the relations between Ankara and Damascus have always been a dominating factor in border management process of Turkey. Relations between Turkey and Syria during the AKP era in Turkey have been improved and normalized though "zero-problem" foreign policy goal adopted by the former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. In 2009, two countries reciprocally lifted the visa requirement. However, a short time after the Syrian Civil War in 2011, the relations between the two countries exacerbated and Turkey's border management experienced multiple ruptures during this period. Okyay (2017) suggests that Turkey's border management in post-2011 approach to Syria has three breaking points: toleration of high porosity, gradual and partial hardening between 2013 and 2014, and full-fledged securitization since mid-2015. Since this research specifically focuses on the reception at borders, it intentionally pays less attention to the period after 2013. Yet, for understanding the continuities and ruptures in Turkey's border management of Turkey, this research remarks the period after 2013 as well.

In April 2011, the first group of Syrian refugees arrived at Turkey's borders to seek for asylum. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that Turkey will stand against the 'barbarity' of Syria and implement an "open door policy" for these asylum seekers.[16] Okyay's (2017) first pattern "toleration of high porosity" corresponds to this period where Turkish government declares an open-door policy for Syrian refugees. The year 2012 was an important remark for the course of events in Turkish border regime. The Turkish government decided to suspend its open-door policy. The former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that Turkey could accept no more than 100,000 refugees (HRW, 2012). Similar to the case of Bulgaria, when the numbers increase Turkish state closed its border gates to refugees. Another motivation for closing the borders was burning out of Turkish

---

[16] See: https://www.dw.com/tr/t%C3%BCrkiye-suriyeli-s%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1nmac%C4%B1lara-kap%C4%B1m%C4%B1z-a%C3%A7%C4%B1k/a-15155526. Retrieved October 10, 2018.

tractor-trailers during a conflict on the border[17], Turkish state declared that it has changed the engagement rules and closed it borders unilaterally.

At the end of the 2012, the PM stated that the borders are open to the Turkish state's Syrian friends and brothers-sisters. Although the year 2012 was volatile in terms of closing and opening the borders, the year which determined the future of the Turkish border regime was 2014. This year, the northern part of Syria which is called Kobane and was under the Kurdish control since 2012 was sieged by ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). This siege caused to 100.000 people from Kobane to arrive at Turkish borders in search for asylum. During their entry into the border, some refugees are either killed or injured by antipersonnel mines placed by Turkish army for decades ago (HRW, 2014). For the Turkish state, the asylum of Kurdish Syrians created a fear because of the alleged ties between PKK and YPG.

Although refugees fleeing from Syria continued to enter Turkish state's borders with or without required documents, Turkey enacted a new law on regulating the Syrians entry into its borders only with the required documents. Following from this regulation, approximately 900 km long Turkish south-east borders reduced the number of its open border gates from fourteen to two. Yet, this reduction did not satisfy the Turkish state's border regime priorities and it decided to close the two open border gates claiming that it will allow the refugees who are in need for urgent help. This ambivalent and floating term of 'urgent help' demonstrated that the Turkish border regime will be functioned as a filter in terms of the state's exclusionary acts.

In 2016, Human Rights Watch (HRW) declared that Turkey closed almost all of its borders to Syrian refugees and is sending back the ones who seek asylum (HRW, 2016). The

---

[17] See: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/turk-tirlari-yakildi-21035642. Retrieved September 18, 2018.

same year, European Union (EU) and Turkey came to a readmission agreement on Turkey's sheltering Syrian refugees in its territories and readmitting refugees that entered the EU for Turkey in exchange for three billion euros from EU to support Turkish border security. On the top of that, Turkish state initiated to construct a wall to its southeast borders which separates between Syria and Turkey while introducing its new security policy centred upon surveillance and technologies of biometrics and fingerprints on the border gates. In this way, securitization of Turkish borders is associated with the "myth of controllability of migration" (Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010). Especially, in July 2016, with the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's statement on the possibility of giving citizenship to Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, the issues around security became the focus of the discussions on immigrants in Turkey.[18]

This chapter examined the historical background of three mass refugee flows to Turkey. It specifically focused on historical background of border demarcation processes between Turkey and the source countries, rather than mere examination of mass refugee flows to Turkey. Considering the similarities and differences between the three cases, the Chapter III will analyse the parliamentary debates during the three mass refugee flows. To do so, the chapter elaborates on the genesis and the changes in the structure of the Turkish Parliament.

---

[18] See: https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/07/160703_erdogan_suriyeliler. Retrieved October 25, 2018.

CHAPTER III

Analysis of Parliamentary Minutes in Turkey during Mass Refugee Flows

"What are the functions of the State? One of the functions of the State is to maintain the order of the society. The second one is to provide security. The third is to keep order and the fourth is to dispense justice. The fifth is to protect the borders of the State against external powers and to maintain the border security" (CHP İstanbul MP Mahmut Tanal, 10 October 2012)[19]

In the Human Rights Investigation Commission's session on refugees, CHP MP Mahmut Tanal stated that protecting the national borders is one of the most significant duties of the State. His discourse poses a special significance because it reveals the general framework regarding the issues of migration and border. As discussed in Chapter I and Chapter II, the three refugee flows occurred in three different paradigms in IRR. Despite the differences in the time of their occurrence, as in the example of Tanal's discourse, the State's primary reaction to the mass refugee flows was to control the border passages. However, in each refugee flow, the prominent function of the border has been different. While the refugee flows from Iraq and Syria became prominent with conceptualization of border as a security issue, in the refugee flow from Bulgaria the border is discussed in terms of access to rights. To reveal these differences and similarities, this chapter comprehends the MPs speeches on

---

[19] İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, (10 October 2012), p. 48.

the mass refugee flows at the first entry period of refugees from the borders. As discussed in Introduction chapter, these categories being security, socio-cultural spaces and politico-legal institutions are constituted by creating a conceptual schema. Yet, these dimensions are not mutually exclusive, they are interrelated and mostly cross-cutting dimensions. However, these uni-dimensional categories could help us to better understand the ruptures and continuities.

The following sections will be focusing on the speeches of MPs on border dimensions extracted from the conceptual schema. Under each dimension, the discourses of MPs are gathered around interrelated themes. Firstly, border security is examined under the arrival of refugees to borders, conceptualization of borders, and management of borders. After analysing the relation between borders and security, the second dimension reveals how MPs conceptualize borders as socio-cultural spaces. This section aims to explore how borders are subjected to issues of ethnicity, discrimination and management of people. Thirdly, politico-legal dimension of border examines discourses on borders in terms of access to rights and laws. Before unpacking these dimensions, the chapter starts with explaining the changing structure of the Turkish Parliament to infer the discourses of MPs with different party-affiliations.

3.1. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: Towards a Dominant Party System

The unicameral Grand National Assembly of Turkey is an institution representing both the legitimate political order and the political agenda of the political parties in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Loizides, 2009). It was founded by the nationalist elites of Turkey on 23 April 1920 as one of the younger legislative bodies in the world (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995). In theory, the TGNA is the omnipotent representative of the will of the Turkish nation (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995). In other words, the ideologies and the speeches of MPs mirror the nation's will. However, structure of the Parliament has been volatile and fragmented at

different periods. To better understand the MPs discourses on borders and migration, the changes and the continuities in the structure of the Parliament will be explained with a specific focus on the periods in which the mass refugee flows to Turkey are experienced.

The structure of the Parliament has undergone a significant shift with the critical regime change between 1946 and 1950 (Karpat, 1959, p. 453). Since the establishment of the Republic, Turkey experienced multi-party politics for the first time though the center-right Democratic Party (DP) and the center-left Republican People's Party (CHP) dominated the seats in the Parliament. The domination of the DP and the CHP came to an end with the 1960 coup d'état in which the DP was outlawed by military. During this period, the highly fragmented and polarized structure of the Parliament was reflected in the country's political and economic crisis as well as in the growing militancy (Sayari, 2002). As a result, Turkey encountered another coup d'état in September 1980 and in which parliamentary politics was disrupted by the military.

The 1980 coup d'etat caused dramatic changes in the electoral and parliamentary politics in Turkey. The junta regime, which remained until the November 1983 elections, outlawed all preexisting political parties and set a national threshold of 10 percent of the vote for the parties to claim parliamentary seats (Tachau, 2000). Banning of preexisting parties engendered new political parties. Establishment of the Motherland Party (ANAP) as a major party remarked a significant change after the 1980 coup detat. The ANAP succeeded to precede the dominance of the CHP and the DP between 1950 and 1960 as a center-right party governing alone for a relatively long duration (Sayari, 2002).

In the 1987 elections, the ANAP lost substantial electoral support with 36.3 percent of the votes, yet, it maintained majority of the parliamentary seats due to a change in the electoral law. Tachau (2000) suggests that a major factor for the electoral loss of the ANAP was the return of Suleyman Demirel, who was outlawed by the military regime, with his

newly established party the True Path Party (DYP) which took the 19.1 of the votes. The DYP's leadership and cadres were descendant of the liberal conservative party Justice Party (AP) which was prominent in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, as Sayari (2002) asserts, the breakup of CHP into two political party prevented a continuity in the center-left. The former supporters of the CHP were divided under two parties: the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). The SHP under the leadership of Erdal İnönü won 24.7 percent of the votes. As a result, more than half of the seats in the Parliament were taken by the members of center-right parties after the 1987 elections.

Turgut Özal was at the office as the Prime Minister (PM) until the presidential election on November 9, 1989 in which Özal elected as the President. The chair-person of the Parliament and the ANAP MP Yıldırım Akbulut is appointed as the Prime Minister by Özal until 23rd of June 1991 when the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz took the office. Until the Yilmaz's government, the influence of Özal in Turkish politics was notable. As Heper and Cinar (1996) asserts, during this presidency Özal continued to be the authority who receive regular briefings and give instructions to the government. However, after the elections in 1991, in 1990s, the Turkish Parliament has experienced political fragmentation, volatility, and polarization more than ever (Sayari, 2002; Tachau, 2000). Even if two mostly voted parties were agree to a coalition, they could not hold the majority of the parliamentary seats. As the reason for this fragmentation, Sayari (2002) remarks the weakening of centrist parties.

The highly volatile and fragmented characteristics of the Turkish Parliament has significantly shifted with the entry of the Justice and Development Party into the elections in 2002 (Çarkoğlu, 2011). On 12nd of June 2011, AKP won majority of the votes with about 50 percent for a third time in a row since 2012. Hence, Çarkoğlu (2011) suggests that AKP's electoral victory for the past three consecutive elections has shifted the Turkish party system

towards a dominant party system. However, what makes the system a dominant party system is not the lack of competition. Rather, Çarkoğlu (2011) asserts, the AKP's consolidation of power outdistanced any other possibilities and the electoral victory is considered as a formality. Thus, the structure of the Parliament during the AKP era differs from other periods with the dominance of a major party.

The AKP government consolidated its power in the parliament after the 2011 elections and smaller right-wing parties, except the pro-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), have vanished from the electoral scene (Çarkoğlu, 2011). Whilst the CHP maintained its position as the main opposition party, the pro-Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) increased its parliamentary seats in the 2011 elections. Moreover, this period has been marked with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu's "zero-problems with neighboring countries" policy which coincides with the period of the mass refugee flow from Syria. Since the scope of this research solely relies on the period in which the mass flow increases dramatically, it will not be examining the Parliament after the 2015 elections.

As a result, although the structure of the Parliament has been fragmented and volatile during the refugee flows from Bulgaria and Iraq, the structure has been shifted towards a dominant party system during the refugee flow from Syria. Furthermore, although both the ANAP and the AKP governments could be considered as center-right parties, the leaders' use of language was different from each other. As Kaya (2015) remarks, the AKP differs from any other political parties in terms of its efforts to use daily language used by the masses, especially by the subordinate people.

Despite the scope of this research does not include comparing the changes in parliamentary politics, understanding the structure of the Parliament would unearth the reasons behind the ruptures or continuities in the discourses of the MPs during mass refugee flows. Gasping the changes in the Turkish political party system could enable this research

to better evaluate the governments' discourses on borders and migration. Considering the changes and continuities in the structure of the Turkish Parliament, this chapter categorizes the parliamentary debates in relation to their contents under specific themes. In this regard, the MPs refers to border in relation to the following three aspects of borders: borders as security barriers, borders as socio-cultural spaces, and borders as politico-legal institutions. Under each theme, the research comprehends three other aspects that the debates are gathered around (*see* Table 2).

3.2. Borders as Security Barriers

The issue of borders' management has been explicitly argued by the MPs during the Syrian mass refugee flow. Compared to the other two flows, the MPs underscored significance of borders' management during this period. Considering Frelick's (2007) third paradigm, the emphasis on border management pertains to the paradigm shift in the IRR. However, the MPs had also emphasized the importance of border management during the refugee flow from Iraq which falls under the second paradigm. Moreover, border management has also been an issue during the mass refugee flow Bulgaria due to the government's decision on closing the borders. In this regard, the parliamentary minutes displays the significance of border management during mass refugee flows in Turkey regardless of the IRR.

3.2.1. Border Opening

On the 6th of June 1989, the Özal government decided to open the borders of the State to refugees from Bulgaria through contemplating on the expected number of refugees. In this regard, Özal made a phone call to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz and asked the expected number of refugees from Bulgaria.[20] When Yılmaz reported that the expected

---

[20] Journalist, In-depth interview, 23 March 2018; Minister-1, In-depth interview, 5 April 2018.

number is less than 100,000[21], Özal considered the migration flow as surmountable. However, when borders of the State were opened to Turkish nation's ethnic kins, the number of refugees were much higher than Yılmaz's estimation. Almost 350,000 Turks from Bulgaria arrived in Turkey within three months. Despite the government's miscalculation, the MPs supported the decision to open the state borders to ethnic kins from Bulgaria.

The MPs, regardless of their political lineage, were mostly producing welcoming and inclusionary discourses for the refugees from Bulgaria. As Conservative ANAP MP Ömer Okan Çağlar argued 'Turkey's borders are always opened to its ethnic kins'.[22] At the same time, leftist SHP MP Tevfik Koçak suggested that Turkey is ready to embrace to its ethnic kins coming to the country with mass flows and ready to any self-sacrifice for these ethnic kins.[23] Whilst these examples indicate that MPs arrived at a consensus on the need for accepting all refugees, some MPs were not satisfied with the government's current reception policies.

[21] Minister-1, In-depth interview, 5 April 2018.
[22] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 103, 16 June 1989, p. 307-308.
[23] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 103, 16 June 1989, p. 316.

Table 2 Main Findings on Border Debates in the Turkish Parliament

		Discussions on borders at discursive level	Bulgaria	Iraq	Syria	compatible with the IRR
						not compatible with the IRR
Security		Border opening	open-door (obligation)	repatriation	open-door (alarmist language)	
		Conceptualization of borders' meaning	x	"difficult to control"	"evaporated"	
		Management of borders	x	safe haven and "lost of security"	"keeping refugees out"	
Socio-cultural		Closing borders	protecting demographic structure	protecting demographic structure	protecting demographic structure	
		Borders as "scenery"	redrawing borders	redrawing borders	redrawing borders	
		Borders as discriminative tools	x	against Kurdish refugees	against Kurdish, Alawite, Turkmen refugees	
Politico-legal		Access to rights	obligation	x	alarmist language	
		Laws	amendment	x	"exclusionary protection regime"	
		New phenomenon in border management	x	x	biometrics	

In this regard, rightist MPs charged the government with not to take necessary measures for millions of ethnic kins living in Bulgaria.[24] Furthermore, he suggested that Turkey should not only open its borders to ethnic kins who are exposed to forced migration but to all ethnic Turks and Muslims living in Bulgaria. Consequently, the government's decision on opening borders of the State to refugees was supported by the MPs.

Only two years after this refugee flow, on the 3th of April 1991, the Turkish state encountered another mass refugee flow, this time from Iraq. The refugee flow from Iraq coincided with the second paradigm shift in the IRR in which the states endeavour ensuring repatriation of refugees (Frelick, 2007). As soon as the President[25] Turgut Özal was informed that a mass refugee flow is coming from the South-eastern borders of the state, as in the case of Bulgaria, he had a desire to know the number of the refugees.[26] The President Özal called one of the Ministers in the Cabinet to appoint him as the minister responsible for migration. Özal was informed that almost 500,000 Iraqi refugees were waiting on the mountains in the borderland. He considered that the numbers are too high that the Turkish state cannot "absorb" this mass refugee flow.[27] However, the government did not want to risk its already bad reputation caused by the Kurdish question in the international arena through closing the borders of the state to Iraqi Kurds.[28] Thus, the President Özal needed a solution which would neither risk the state's reputation nor the state's absorption capacity. This solution was to create a "safe haven" which was the triggering factor of the second paradigm shift in the IRR.

The Iraqi refugees' arrival at the Turkey's borders is discussed in the Parliament in line with the government's major policy: repatriation. Although the MPs did not oppose to

---

[24] DYP Hatay MP Mustafa Murat Sökmenoğlu, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 100, 13 June 1989, p. 43.; DYP Sakarya MP Ahmet Neidim, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 102, 15 June 1989, p. 214.
[25] Turgut Özal became the President on 9th of November 1989.
[26] Journalist, In-depth interview, 23 March 2018.
[27] Minister-1, In-depth interview, 5 April 2018.
[28] Journalist, In-depth interview, 23 March 2018.

opening borders to Iraqi refugees, they did not give 'welcoming' speeches in the Parliament. In other words, the MPs did not present the decision of border opening as a 'duty' as in the case of Bulgaria (see. *3.3.3 Construction of Borders as a Discriminative Tool*). Rather, they have suggested that opening the borders to Iraqi refugees is related to 'generosity' of the State.[29] Besides the government's repatriation policy, the MPs from opposition discuss the refugee flow through charging the government with not taking necessary precautions for the reception of the refugees. The leftist SHP MP Kamer Genç submitted a parliamentary question to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin about the reception of the refugees before the Özal's decision on granting authorization to the Minister[30]. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Alptemoçin replied Genç through stating that the government appealed to international organizations for humanitarian assistance and made a 3-steps plan for the Iraqi refugees[31]. The first two steps of the plan included providing humanitarian aid to refugees and temporarily settling them into the safe zones within the Turkey-Iraq borderland. The third step implied the government major policy on the refugee flow from Iraq: repatriation[32]. The repatriation policy of the government overlaps with Frelick's (2007) second paradigm shift in the IRR in which the refugees were provided with temporary protection near the border or "safe havens" inside the country of origin.

The mass refugee flow from Syria has started 20 years after the refugee flow from Iraq. Although the IRR has shifted towards the third paradigm and the structure of the Parliament has changed, the AKP government's first reaction to the refugee flow was similar to the cases of Bulgaria and Iraq. During this period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoğlu also made efforts for calculating the state's 'absorption

---

[29] ANAP Ankara MP Hüseyin Barlas Doğu, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 119, 21 May 1991, p. 47.
[30] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 119, 21 May 1991, p. 92.
[31] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 119, 21 May 1991, p. 93-94.
[32] Minister-2 also stated that the government's major policy on Iraqi mass refugee flow was to ensure repatriation.

capacity' and for setting boundaries to the number of refugees[33]. Some of the MPs from opposition submitted parliamentary questions to the government about the expected number of refugees as well as the number of refugees who have access to rights in Turkey.[34] This emphasis on the numbers imply a perception of 'threat' in the discursive level (van Dijk, 2000b). In this regard, the case of Syria differs from the other cases in terms of the 'alarmist language' (Malkki, 1992) used in the Parliament against the rising numbers of refugees.

Moreover, as in the case of Iraq, the possibility of creating a buffer zone in the Turkey-Syria border was discussed in the Parliament. In this regard, the rightist MHP MP Alim Işık asked the government whether they have any attempt for creating a buffer zone[35]. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu explicitly replied this parliamentary question through stating that "Turkey is ready to take any measures for its security on the Syrian border".[36].Although the government had initiatives to generate a buffer zone on the Syrian border, as AKP MP Ahmet Salih Dal asserted in commission reports that the government could not convince the UN to create a no-fly zone on the border to keep the refugees outside the Turkey's national borders.[37] However, considering the protracted conflict in Syria and rising numbers of refugees, the buffer-zone would not be a solution for the Turkish state. The efforts for creating a buffer-zone could be considered as the government's perception of the refugee flow as a temporary movement. Yet, the protracted characteristics of the refugee flow would not let the government to establish a buffer zone as a solution.

---

[33] Journalist, In-depth interview, 23 March 2018.
[34] MHP Ankara MP Özcan Yeniçeri, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 1 November 2013, pp. 610-611, 685, 868-869.; MHP Kocaeli MP Lütfü Türkkan, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 1 November 2013, pp. 686-687; CHP Hatay MP Mehmet Ali Ediboğlu, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 1 November 2013, p. 125.; CHP Bursa MP Sena Kaleli, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 1 November 2013, p. 150.
[35] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 1 October 2013, pp. 3283-3285.
[36] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 1 October 2013, p. 3286.
[37] İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi, (12 November 2013), p. 11.

Despite the governments differ in their major policies during three mass refugee flows in three different periods, their priority is to calculate the State's absorption capacity in all flows. Nevertheless, the absorption capacity was not the only determinant of decision on opening the borders. First, as in the case of Iraq, the government can open the borders even though the numbers exceed intended absorption capacity. Then, the decision could rely on protecting the reputation of the state in international arena or building a reputation by helping people in need. Second, the Parliament problematized the rising number of refugees only in the case of Syria. This could be the reflection of the third paradigm shift in the IRR on Turkey in which the refugees are perceived as 'terrorists' or 'illegal border-crossers'.

3.2.2. The Conceptualization of the Meaning of Borders

The meaning of borders is constructed by the re-constructed by the states through time and political developments (J. Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999). In this regard, this section analyses how the Turkish state officials constructed the meaning of borders and how their conceptualization of borders varies over time. Comparing the three mass refugee movements, the state officials attributed different meanings to the borders of Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria. While the state's borders with Iraq and Syria are mostly conceptualized as a space to be managed and controlled, the border with Bulgaria is mostly conceptualized in terms of the identity. Since conceptualization of borders in terms of identity is related to socio-cultural dimension of borders, it will be analysed in the following section. This section will be analysing the changes in the meaning of borders over time in terms of security.

When the MPs delineate the mass refugee movements, they referred to classical distinction between borders' naturalness and non-naturalness (Houtum, 2005) and its unbundling effects on nations. A Minister serving during the mass refugee flow from Iraq described the geographical characteristics of Turkey-Iraq border when he was asked to

delineate the Iraqi mass refugee flow.[38] He suggested that the United Kingdom decided to draw the Iraqi boundary line based on the highlights of the mountains. Minister added that the Iraqi border is non-natural and, compared to Syrian borders, is difficult to control and manage due to the mountainous geographical characteristics. In a similar vein, when the Syrian mass refugee flow was asked, a Minister in the office during Syrian mass refugee flow stated that the most important characteristic of Turkey's borders with Syria and Iraq is their non-naturalness[39]. These examples illustrate that the management of migration is linked to the geographical characteristics of border the state officials. Moreover, the absence of this kind of emphasis in state officials' discourses on Bulgarian border's geographical characteristics might be related to turmoil in the source country. Although Turkey-Bulgaria border was also securitized during the mass migration flow, the borders with Iraq and Syria had become more of an issue of security due to terrorism threat and civil war in the source country. As a result, when the borders are securitized due to a terrorism threat or civil war on the other side of the border, the state officials describe the borders in terms of its geographical characteristics. In other words, when the borders are securitized, they become prominent feature of mass refugee flows.

The borders' permeability was another issue discussed by the MPs during the Syrian mass refugee flow.[40] During this period, borders are conceptualized as a space where many people always come and go.[41] Especially the MPs from opposition described the Syrian border as evaporated and riddled due to ongoing terrorism in Syria and the mass refugee

---

[38] Minister-2, In-depth interview, 5 April 2018. Similarly, a high-ranking officer in the Turkish National Police Department stated that the Syrian border is lowland and easy to control during his briefing in HRIC.
[39] Minister-3, In-depth interview, 9 April 2018.
[40] In the cases of Bulgaria and Iraq, the Parliament discussed the permeability issue in terms of unbundling effects on nations which will be discussed under borders' socio-cultural dimension.
[41] The MPs predominantly describe the Syrian border as *yol geçen hanı* which refers to a place where many people come and go.

flow[42]. For instance, the CHP MP Mahmut Tanal stated the following during his speech on illegal border crossings in the HRIC:

Borders of the Republic of Turkey should not be riddled where anyone can pass by.[43]

The CHP MP Tanal charged the border security officials with malpractice and invited the Commission to denounce this crime. In other words, Tanal suggested that the state is unable to manage and control its national borders. As a result, the borders of Turkey during the mass refugee flow have been characterized as riddled, uncontrolled and evaporated. However, Turkey-Syria border was permeable and porous before the mass flow due to the economic relations and ethnic kinship ties. Whenever the Turkish state encountered the mass refugee flow, the issue of permeability emerged as a security issue which was rarely discussed in the Parliament prior to the refugees.

As discussed in the Chapter I, the concern over borders' permeability could be an outcome of the change in the definition of borders after 9/11 attacks (Brunet-Jailly, 2007b; Ohmae, 1994). However, the case of Iraq indicates that the Turkish state had already securitized the borders before the 9/11. Therefore, the reason for the MPs conceptualization of Syrian border could also be the outcome of the changing structure of the Parliament. Escalating fragmentation in the Parliament generated an atmosphere in which the MPs from the opposition frequently conflict with the government and cannot reach a consensus on every issue.

3.2.3. Management of Borders

"What are the functions of the State? One of the functions of the State is to maintain the order of the society. The second one is to provide security. The third is to keep order and

---

[42] CHP Yalova MP Muharrem İnce, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 10, 30 October 2013, p. 888; CHP Adana MP Osman Faruk Loğoglu, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 3, 3 October 2013, p. 228.
[43] İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, (10 October 2012), p. 48.

the fourth is to dispense justice. The fifth is to protect the borders of the State against external powers and to maintain the border security."[44]

As CHP MP Mahmut Tanal indicates during the meeting of the HRIC, in which he charged border security officials with malpractice, the issue of border management became prominent during the Syrian mass refugee movement. When Tanal sorts the functions of the State, he predominantly refers to 'security' issue in which he specifically underscores border management. Considering Frelick's (2007) third paradigm, the emphasis on border management could be pertain to the paradigm shift in the IRR. However, the MPs had also emphasized the importance of border management during the Iraqi refugee flow which falls under the second paradigm. In fact, border management has also been an issue during the mass refugee flow from Bulgaria due to the government's suspiciousness on border-crossers.[45] However, this suspiciousness of the State has not been revealed neither in the parliamentary minutes nor in the in-depth interviews. In this regard, this section heavily relies on border management during Iraqi and Syrian mass refugee flows.

Considering the case of Syria, the issue of border management during the Iraqi mass refugee flow has been argued less in the Parliament. As explained in Chapter II, the Özal government decided to keep the refugees inside the 'safe haven'. Thus, the Parliament's emphasis on border security during the Iraqi mass flow was not as revitalized as in the case of Syria in which the refugees were mostly perceived as a threat to national order[46]. During the Iraqi mass refugee flow, the government's main priority was to repatriate Iraqi refugees as soon as possible. In this regard, a Minister stated that all their policies were based on repatriation:

---

[44] İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, (10 October 2012), p. 48.
[45] For more information about 'spies', see. "Göçmenlerin Arasında 20 Ajan Yakalandı", Sabah, 16 June 1989, p. 13; "Ajanlar Cirit Atıyor", Cumhuriyet, 24 July 1989, p. 14.
[46] The reason for this could be the protracted feature of mass refugee flow from Syria. As the duration of the mass flow is extended, the MPs could be focusing more on border security.

Our major policy was to send these people back to their home. We did not want to keep them inside the country with a status in which the international law would authorize or not. I had a statement 'everybody should go back to their home![47,48]

Minister added that the government aimed to keep the refugees in the borderland to ease repatriation process. Similarly, another Minister during the Iraqi mass refugee flow suggested that the government had to find solutions within the borderland because the closest lowland where the refugees can settle was almost 200 km. distance.[49] Thus, the refugee camps were established in the borderland. The government's repatriation policy could be a proper example of Betts and Loescher's (2011) argument on the 'state's unwillingness for taking responsibility' during mass refugee movements. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter I, the government's repatriation policy accords with Frelick's (2007) second paradigm in which the policies shifted towards "a model of solutions-oriented humanitarian intervention within the source country". As Frelick (2007) suggests, this second paradigm started just after the fall of the Berlin Wall and perpetuated until the War on Terror.

The Özal government's management of migration and border has mainly been criticized by MPs from the opposition. Firstly, some MPs charged the government with endangering the border security through accepting asylum seekers. Secondly, they criticize the government for inviting the 'external powers' under cover of the Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). In this regard, the leftist SHP MP Kenan Süzer suggested the following:

We have lost our border security when Iraqi asylum-seekers fleeing Saddam's oppression arrived in our borders on the 2nd of April. Indeed, we had to invite external powers to provide

---

[47] The translation is made by the author. The Minister used an idiom in Turkish to emphasize the repatriation policy of the government: "evli evine, köylü köyüne, çiftçi tarlasına, esnaf dükkanına!".
[48] Minister-1, In-depth interview, 5 April 2018.
[49] Minister-2, In-depth interview, 5 April 2018.

our border security. All of these issues served the purposes of whomever make plans in the region.[50]

Süzer stated that the Iraqi refugees pose a threat to the State's border security. This is why the case of Turkey does not completely correlate with the paradigm shifts in the IRR in terms of conceptualization of Iraqi refugees as a security issue. Secondly, when the US, UK and France sent troops for the OPC to Turkey's borders, the MPs charged the government with damaging the State's sovereignty. In this regard, the SHP MP Ahmet Ersin submitted a parliamentary question to the government to ask whether the OPC troops which are in the State's territories violating the State's sovereignty[51]. In a way, both Iraqi refugees and the OPC troops which were in the borderland to provide humanitarian aid to the refugees were perceived as a security issue by the MPs from opposition.

The State's policies on migration and border management during Iraqi and Syrian mass refugee flows resemble each other in terms of perceiving the refugees as a threat to border security. Security measures on border gates and in the borderland have been prominent discussions in the Parliament during these periods. During the Syrian refugee flow, the MPs in the HRIC invited different responsible government bodies to the Commission to receive information about security measures in the Turkey-Syria border. Contrary to Iraqi mass refugee flow, the MPs regardless of their party background expressed that border security is jeopardized due to refugee flow. In other words, not only the MPs from opposition emphasized threats to border security caused by the Syrian mass refugee flow but also the MPs from the government. In this regard, the PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's statement in the Parliament is remarkable:

---

[50] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 122, 28 May 1991, p. 183.
[51] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 126, 5 May 1991, p. 433.

70

A larger mass migration movement that could generate a pressure on our borders and country is probable at any moment within the scope of Syrian regime's oppressions. Possible consequences of the mass migration movement from Syria pose an indirect threat to our country.[52]

Considering the SHP MP Süzer's speech on Iraqi refugees and the PM Erdogan's speech on Syrian refugee flow, the ways in which the Parliament discusses border security vis-a-vis mass refugee flows persist. Except the case of Bulgaria, the Parliament perceived the mass refugees as a threat to their national security. As Loescher (1993) asserts, states legitimize their decision to keep refugees out of their national borders through conceptualizing refugee movement as a threat to their national security. Although Loescher's (1993) argument on keeping refugees out of national borders could be perceived as not being pertinent to the Syrian refugee flow, the AKP government had struggled to persuade the UN to establish a buffer zone as in the case of Iraq. In other words, the AKP government's 'open-door policy' does not solely rely on opening the borders of the State to the 'people in need'. Both in the Iraqi and Syrian cases, the government's efforts to create a buffer zone to keep the refugees out of the national border should not be disregarded.

To sum up, as this section explains, the management of borders is heavily discussed during the refugee flows from Iraq and Syria. The State's major policies as being repatriation and making efforts to create a buffer zone during different mass refugee flows occurring in 1991 and 2011 resemble each other. However, during the mass refugee flow from Bulgaria, none of the MPs gave a speech on the possibility of repatriation or creating a buffer zone. Although this difference between the political discourses/acts of the MPs is associated with ethnic background of refugees, the difference between the cases cannot be solely based on the ethnicity argument due to different ethnic categories among refugee groups. In other

---

[52] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 3, 1 October 2013, p. 223.

words, if the State open its borders only to its ethnic-kins, as will be discussed in *3.4. Borders as Politico-legal Institutions* section, it should have given the similar rights to Turkmens among the refugee flows from Iraq and Syria.

3.3. Borders as Socio-Cultural Spaces

3.3.1. Closing the Borders: A Matter of Demography?

Border management, migration and security are always comprehended as interlinked issues. Thus, the Turkish state's border and migration management have frequently been discussed as a security issue. However, juxtaposing three mass refugee flows to Turkey revealed another dimension about border and migration management. During all the mass movements, the borders of the Turkish state were either closed or temporarily opened to the refugees. The decision on closing the borders were based on two historical-pragmatic reasons. First, the increase in the number of refugees was determinant of the State's decision on closing the borders. When the State miscalculate the expected number of refugees, its reaction shifts toward closing the borders. Secondly, the decision is strikingly related with Turkey's desire to keep ethnic-Turks in the source country. This section will be focusing on the latter which reveals the socio-cultural dimension of border management.

The Özal government suggested that the borders of Turkey are opened to the ethnic kins living in Bulgaria under oppression. However, on 21st of August 1989, the government decided to close the borders for visa-free passages. Although unexpected rise in the number of refugees affected the government's decision on ceasing visa-free passages, Turkish state's policy on protecting Turkish-descent Muslims people living outside Turkey had also impacted the Özal government's decision. This policy of the Turkish state has not been explicitly argued in the Parliament but the in-depth interviews with the state officials confirmed that Turkey regarded this policy as a foreign policy principal since the

establishment of the Republic. A Minister suggested that this policy is made by the founder of the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Ataturk:

> The main purpose of the state policy determined by Ataturk was the following: When the Republic of Turkey is founded, the State prevented the Turks living abroad from coming into Turkey. When some of them (Turks living abroad) came to Turkey, they were encouraged to repatriate. They were perceived as a power… In this regard, when the numbers increased to 600,000 which was estimated as 30,000 by Mesut Yilmaz the government decided to cease the migration to implement Ataturk's policy and to retaliate against Bulgaria.[53]

As Minister asserts, Turkish state's ambition to hold its power in the region prompted her to close the borders when the numbers rise dramatically. Even though the Turkish state opened its borders to refugees from Bulgaria and provide them with vast opportunities, the State principally aspired to embrace the issue in terms of 'temporariness'. In other words, although the Özal government ostensibly deal with the mass flow in terms of "permanency" through establishing their rights in Turkey, the State was primarily desired to treat refugees in high numbers in terms of temporality.

The Minister's emphasis on Ataturk's policy was not peculiar to the Bulgaria case. In a similar vein, in the case of Syria, MPs from the opposition submitted parliamentary questions to the government to ask the reason for closing the Yayladağı border gate.[54] Although the government did not explain its reasons for closing this border gate, a Minister's argument on protecting the demographic structure of Syria could be linked to closing of the border gate.[55] The Minister suggested that at beginning of the Syrian mass refugee flow, the Turkish state did not entitle Syrians as "migrants" not to make their stay permanent in

---

[53] Minister-2, In-depth interview, 5 April 2018.
[54] CHP Hatay MP Refik Eryılmaz, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 13, 6 November 2013, p. 567.; CHP Hatay MP Hasan Akgöl, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 13, 6 November 2013, p. 527.
İdris Baluken, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 3, 3 October 2013, p. 232.
[55] Minister-3, In-depth interview, 9 April 2018.

Turkey.[56] He gave the example of Bulgaria, in which the government gave refugees the right of settlement, to argue that the Özal government's decision damage the demographic structure of Bulgaria. Thus, the Minister stated that the AKP government entitled the refugees as "guests" not to damage the demographic structure of Syria in line with the State's strategic goals.

Comparing Bulgaria and Syria, the conducted state officials emphasized the State's strategic aims in the region which might be one of the reasons for the State's decision to limit or stop the mass refugee flows. For the case of Iraq, a high-ranking bureaucrat working in the Ministry of Labor and Social Security suggested that the government aimed to implement the Ataturk's policy for Iraqi Turkmens.[57] He stated that although the government did not open the borders to Iraqi refugees, it could have settled the Turkmen refugees in Turkey due to the ethnic kinship ties as in the case of Bulgaria. In this regard, the Ataturk's policy to keep the Turks living abroad outside Turkey might have been a determining factor for the State's reception policies.

3.3.2. Borders as Scenery of the World

As discussed in the Chapter I, Wilson and Donnan (2012, p. 19) assert that if the world is a stage, borders are its scenery, where the actors strive for making the border manageable and intelligible to maintain drama. In other words, statesmen, or the actors, aim to manage borders in line with their interests. In line with allegory of borders as scenery, this section aims to delineate how state officials conceptualize border-demarcations.

Demarcation of borders are questioned by some state officials during mass refugee movements. During the mass refugee flow from Bulgaria, the ANAP MP Mustafa Şahin

---

[56] Minister-3, In-depth interview, 9 April 2018.
[57] High-ranking bureaucrat, In-depth interview, 2 March 2018.

argued that 20 percent of Bulgaria's territories should be assigned to Turks living in Bulgaria in line with their population proportion:

> Considering that 20 percent of people living in Bulgaria are our ethnic kins, 20 percent of Bulgaria's territories belong to our Turkish ethnic kins. This could be a fair act to assign Bulgarian territories near to Turkish border to our Turkish ethnic kins.[58]

Mustafa Şahin's discourse on giving the land to Turkish people living in Bulgaria is peculiar to the case of Bulgaria. In a way, Şahin considered that if these territories could be bestowed to Turkish people in Bulgaria, they could be freed from oppression and their lives could have been improved. However, the speech of Mustafa Şahin is unique and other MPs did not give similar speeches. Therefore, Şahin's speech would not be generalized for the case of Bulgaria. Yet, when MPs asked to delineate the mass refugee flows in the in-depth interviews, they also referred to re-drawing borders. In this regard, a Minister in Özal government expressed that Turkey-Iraq border is erroneous and should be re-drawn:

> We have been discussing with Mr. Özal and the military on making a move on the border to redraw the border from the foothills. We need to initiate border security from the foothills in Iraq. They (refers to people living in Iraqi borderland) wouldn't even care about this. Nobody goes to that zone. If Turkey does not go down the mountains and establish her borders in the lowland, this issue (terrorism and migration) will be ever-lasting because of the kinship ties. By this way, they will be subordinated to us (the Turkish state).[59]

Similarly, another Minister suggested that Turkey-Syria border should be re-drawn in accordance with the ethnic kinship ties between the two nations.[60] The Ministers' discourse correlates with Wilson and Donnan's (2012, p.19) argument in which the state officials strive for making the border manageable in line with their interests. Minister's discourse display how

---

[58] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 107, 22 May 1989, p. 302.
[59] Minister-1, In-depth interview, 5 April 2018.
[60] Minister-3, In-depth interview, 9 April 2018.

'banal' for the statesman to rearrange and redraw the border as if the people living in the borderland could be subordinated to Turkey immediately after re-drawing of the borders. Moreover, in a way, the state officials conceptualize the borders as a static line or a divider between the people. Therefore, they think that they can manage and control the borderland through rearranging these static lines.

Considering these discourses on borders, conceptualization of borders as static lines could cause state officials to assume that they can manage the borders as if they are the performers and borders are the scenery. In this way, state officials build on socio-cultural aspect of border management.

3.3.3. Construction of Borders as Discriminative Tools

The Turkish state officials gave different entitlements to refugees from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria. MPs from the opposition criticized the governments on discriminating against refugees based on their ethno-religious characteristics. The refugees from Bulgaria are defined as ethnic kins due to the ethnic kinship ties and the Parliament predominantly referred to refugees as ethnic kins. The Parliament mostly referred to Iraqi refugees as "Northern Iraqi asylum-seekers". However, during the Syrian mass refugee flow, the Parliament used various definitions for the refugees. The government described Syrian refugees in terms of brotherhood and religious ties whereas MPs from the opposition referred to refugees as 'Syrians' or 'Syrian refugees'. In this regard, while the MPs during the refugee flows from Bulgaria and Iraq had almost an agreement on defining the refugees, the MPs during Syrian mass flow expressed their political dissidence via definitions. In this regard, this section firstly focuses on how the MPs define the refugees in the Parliament. Secondly, it aims to express MPs' from the opposition critiques to government on discriminating against refugees in terms of their ethnic, religious or sectarian characteristics.

The MPs discussed the mass migration flow from Bulgaria not only in terms of the requirement of opening the borders of the State to refugees but also "opening the hearts of the people" to these refugees.[61] The MPs explicitly predicated their call for "embracing all refugees" on ethnic kinship ties between the refugees from Bulgaria and Turkish nation. The MPs from DYP, SHP and ANAP produced similar discourses through stating that opening the borders of the State to ethnic kins is the duty of the Turkish state. However, in the cases of Iraq and Syria, MPs from the opposition charged the government with discriminating against ethnic and religious groups among the refugees.

In the case of Iraq, some MPs charged the government's with neglecting the Iraqi refugees due to their Kurdish identity[62]. In response, the ANAP MP Nurettin Yılmaz criticized all MPs on their ignorance of Iraqi refugees because of their hatred towards Kurdish people.[63] However, compared to the case of Syria, discourses on discrimination was one of the minor issues during this period in the Parliament. Moreover, except Nurettin Yılmaz's speech, non-of the MPs emphasized the "brotherhood" or "religious ties" between Iraqi refugees and Turkish people in the Parliament. Nonetheless, the PM Turgut Özal made a statement to the press on the ethnic ties between Iraqi refugees and Turkish nation which could reveal the government's conceptualization of refugees:

"Those refugees 'coming from Iraq' are ethnic kins of some of our citizens."[64]

Özal's statement conceals the identity of Iraqi refugees and distinguishes them from refugees from Bulgaria who are perceived as ethnic kins of all Turkish nation. Although the

---

[61] DYP Konya MP Vefa Tanır, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 98, 7 June 1989, p. 288.; SHP Ankara MP Tevfik Koçak, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 103, 16 June 1989, p. 316.; ANAP Ankara MP Onural Şeref Bozkurt, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 98, 7 June 1989, p. 290.
[62] SHP Bursa MP Fehmi Işıldar, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 105, 10 April 1991, p. 135.; SHP Malatya MP İbrahim Aksoy, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 91, 7 March 1991, p. 267.
[63] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 102, 3 April 1991, pp. 383-386.
[64] "Kürt", Ortadoğu, 2 May 1991, p. 6.

government remained the same during these two mass flows, the State produced different discourses.

During the mass refugee flow from Syria, the MPs predominantly emphasized the same ethnic and religious ties between Syrian and Turkish nation. Especially MPs from the government justified their decision to implement open-door policy through underlining the kinship ties between two nations.[65] However, the AKP government has been criticized by MPs from the opposition much more than the other mass refugee flows. MPs from the opposition charged the government with neglecting the rights of Turkmen refugees whose rights were also disputed during Iraqi mass refugee flow.[66] Moreover, the government also came under criticism on their policies on Alawite and Kurdish refugees from Syria.[67]

As explained in Chapter II, the Turkish state constructed a wall on its Syria border after the mass refugee flow from Syria. MPs from the opposition discussed the construction of the wall in the Parliament and expressed their allegations on ethno-sectarian policies of the AKP government within the framework of construction of a wall to Syrian border. Although the construction of a border wall is in relation with security dimension of border management, the Parliament discussed the issue in terms of the wall's discriminative effects on nations. The leftist BDP MPs suggested that the wall on the Syrian border resembles the "Wall of Shame" which separates the nations from each other.[68] Similarly, the CHP Hatay MP Hasan Akgöl made a speech in the parliament to criticize the construction of the wall:

---

[65] AKP Bursa MP Bülent Arınç, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 44, 21 December 2011, p. 1131.; AKP İstanbul MP Volkan Bozkır, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 127, 29 June 2012, p. 454.

[66] CHP İstanbul MP Osman Taney Korutürk, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 127, 26 June 2012, p. 446.; MHP Osmaniye MP Hasan Hüseyin Türkoğlu, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 37, 14 December 2011, p. 160.; MHP Elazığ MP Enver Erdem, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 33, 10 December 2011, p. 344.; MHP Ankara MP Tuğrul Türkeş, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 3, 1 October 2013, p. 227.

[67] BDP Bingöl MP İdris Baluken, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 3, 3 October 2013, p. 234.

[68] BDP Bingöl MP İdris Baluken, BDP Şanlıurfa MP İbrahim Binici, BDP Hakkari MP Adil Zozani, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 10, 30 October 2013, pp. 864, 877, 1001.

Are you constructing the Great Wall of China? Today, there is no Berlin Wall and the Great Wall of China is destroyed but 630-meter-long wall is being constructed in Hatay. So, what about fraternity and comradeship? Then, why did you ruined the fences, why couldn't you control the (border) entries so that you had to construct a wall? Who gave you the instructions? Did you initiate the construction after the instruction of "stay away from the Al-Qaeda"? Constructing the Great Wall of China or the Berlin Wall does not fit to the 21st century… If you come to Hatay, you will see that the Great Wall of China is being constructed in various regions. Is this fraternity? Who are you protecting us from? Are you going to be protected from your brothers via the Great Wall of China?[69]

The AKP government's construction of the Wall is conceptualized as the discriminator between two nations. Similarly, the BDP MPs Sırrı Sakık and İdris Baluken suggested that fraternity is only possible through destroying the walls and demining the borderland.[70] Moreover, they asserted that the wall will be preventing the State from building the peace in the region. As in the case of state officials' re-drawing efforts, the fixed and static conceptualization of borders

3.4. Borders as Politico-legal Institutions

3.4.1. Access to Rights

Refugees' access to rights is interlinked with the State's conceptualization of borders. In this regard, the Parliament has been discussing the refugees' rights as settlement, employment or health in relation to the State's decision on opening its borders. However, the refugees' access to rights was one of the less debated issues in the Parliament compared to such other dimensions as refugees' entry into state borders, security or identity management. Among the three mass refugee flows, only in the Syrian case, the MPs predominantly

---

[69] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 13, 6 November 2013, p. 527.
[70] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 13, 6 November 2013, p. 515.; Tutanak Dergisi, Session 10, 30 October 2013, p. 864.

submitted parliamentary questions to the government about the Syrian refugees' access to rights.

The cases of Bulgaria and Iraq differ from the Syrian refugee flow in terms of the number of discussions on refugees' access to rights in the Parliament. Iraqi refugees' access to rights is not discussed in the Parliament due to their settlement in the refugee camps in the buffer zone. However, some MPs discussed the Iraqi refugees' access to humanitarian aid and health services either in the camps or in Iraq.[71] On the other hand, although the refugees from Bulgaria were settled in Turkey, the Parliament did not underscore the regulations regarding their settlement and employment except the amendments in the laws. Only the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz briefly referred to on-going regulations regarding settlement and employment of refugees from Bulgaria during his speech in the Parliament about the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria.[72] In other words, the Parliament did not discuss the refugees' access to rights regardless of their status in the country during the refugee flow from Bulgaria and Iraq.

The mass refugee flow from Syria indicates a major shift in the ways in which the Parliament discuss refugees' access to rights. Contrary the cases of Bulgaria and Iraq, during the Syrian mass movement, the MPs submitted parliamentary questions to the government about several issues related to refugees' access to rights. The MPs did not only ask about the settlement and employment but also educational, familial and health issues that the Syrian refugees face in Turkey. Although this could be perceived as a major development in the Parliament's attention to refugees' rights, most of the parliamentary questions build on 'alarmist language'.[73] For instance, the center-right MHP MPs and the center-left CHP MPs

---

[71] Towards the end of the Gulf War, the leftist SHP MP Mustafa Sarıgül asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin whether the government take any measures for the wellbeing of children in Iraq. see. Tutanak Dergisi, Session 92, 12 March 1991, p. 341.
[72] Tutanak Dergisi, Session 98, 7 June 1989, pp. 279-286.
[73] See Akkerman (2016) in Chapter I.

submitted several parliamentary questions to the government about the number of Syrian refugees who received residence permits or acquired citizenship.[74] As discussed in *3.2.1. Border Opening,* again the state officials presented the number of refugees as a 'threat' in the discursive level.

Similarly, refugees' access to education has been discussed in the Parliament to charge the government with bestowing privileges on Syrian refugees. The rightist MHP MP Mesut Dedeoğlu submitted a parliamentary question about the number of Syrian refugees who are accepted to universities in Turkey.[75] He stated that the government's decision on accepting Syrian refugees to the universities drew reaction from all segments of the society.[76] As a result, Syrian refugees' access to rights is mostly debated in the Parliament to criticize the government's welcoming of refugees in high numbers.[77] In a way, rather than approaching the issue 'as a matter of rescuing'[78] and helping people in need, the Parliament chose to present the refugee flow as a problem that should be overcome.

At the reception on the borders, the Parliament does not prioritize the discussions on refugees' access to rights. Although the refugees from Bulgaria were settled in the country contrary to Iraqi refugees who were settled in the camps, the Parliament did not discuss the issue of rights in detail in both cases. Only time that the Parliament discuss the rights was the amendments in the Law of Settlement and the Law on the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity during the refugee flow from Bulgaria. Even when the Parliament discuss the access to rights, as in the case of Syria, the MPs mostly used an 'alarmist language' and

---

[74] MHP Ankara MP Özcan Yeniçeri, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 1 November 2013, pp. 610-611, 685, 868-869.; MHP Kocaeli MP Lütfü Türkkan, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 1 November 2013, pp. 686-687; CHP Hatay MP Mehmet Ali Ediboğlu, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 1 November 2013, p. 125.; CHP Bursa MP Sena Kaleli, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 1 November 2013, p. 150.
[75] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 29, November 2012, p. 11
[76] Ibid.
[77] Although some MPs from opposition submitted parliamentary questions about the refugees' access to education or health in the camps, these were few in number that does not reflect the context of discussions in general.
[78] See Broeders and Hampshire (2013) in Chapter I.

approach the issue as a problem that should be tackled. This difference in the Syria case indicates that the third paradigm shift in the IRR influenced the Turkish Parliament in terms of conceptualization of the mass refugee flows.

3.4.2. From Law of Settlement to the Law on Foreigners

Muslim refugees' access to rights was based on two main laws in the Turkish Constitution: The Law of Settlement and the Law on the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity.[79] The Law of Settlement was rearranged for the Turkish descent immigrants from Bulgaria to ease their settlement on 13th of June. In this regard, the MPs in the Parliament took a vote for adding an article to the Law. The first draft of this new Article No. 33 indicates that Turkish descent people coming to Turkey due to the forced migration in Bulgaria after 01.01.1989 are entitled as "settled or state-sponsored" immigrants. The first draft of this article has been rejected by five MPs who proposed to extend the time for refugees coming prior to 1989.[80] In this regard, the new article was adopted as proposed by these five MPs and included the refugees coming after 1984.

The Parliament had also modified the Law on the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity for refugees from Bulgaria. The purpose of this law was to assist citizens in need, to strengthen their social solidarity and to maintain social peace. Thus, the State could not implement this law for the refugees from Bulgaria who were not citizens during this period. In this regard, the State Minister Cemil Çiçek gave a speech in the Parliament to express that the government aimed to change the intendment of law to include the ethnic kins within the scope of the Law.[81] The MPs approved the amendment in the intendment of law and the law is modified as the following:

---

[79] [Law no 3294 dated 29/5/1986], see. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 103, 16 June 1989, p. 309.
[80] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 103, 16 June 1989, pp. 310-311.
[81] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 103, 16 June 1989, pp. 308-309.

Article.1 - The purpose of this law is to encourage social aid and solidarity and help the citizens and people, accepted or come to Turkey under any circumstances, in poverty and in need to consolidate social justice and to take precautions to ensure fair distribution of income.[82]

The amendment added a new clause to include the people came to Turkey for any reason within the scope of this law. Needless to say, the production of laws of exception is remarkably related to racialized boundaries where the unwanted aliens are subjected to states' "discretionary humanitarianism" (Fassin, 2011, p. 221).

Nevertheless, some MPs from the opposition suspected the government's main target and criticized the government for "hiding behind the ethnic kins" due to the change in the Article No.4 of the Law. The rightist DYP MP Tevfik Ertüzün stated that the change in the law would benefit indigent ethnic kins seeking asylum from "magnanimous" Turkish state.[83] However, he stated that the government abused the change in the law through pretending to protect the rights of the ethnic kins. Ertüzün also suggested that the government aspired to change the law to reduce the municipal budget through the changes in another article in the Law. In response to Ertüzün's claim, ANAP MP Ömer Okan Çağlar suggested that the borders of the State are always open to the ethnic kins and anyone opposing the changes in the Law is against the ethnic kins.[84] These discussions show that, despite the consensus on opening the borders to ethnic kins of Turkey, MPs from the opposition suspected the main target of the government during the mass flow from Bulgaria. These kinds of allegations by MPs from the opposition were also existed in the cases of Iraq and Syria, which could be an indicator of a continuity in the ways that the Turkish Parliament discuss refugee flows.

---

[82] The translation is made by the author.
[83] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 103, 16 June 1989, p. 304.
[84] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 103, 16 June 1989, pp. 306-307.

The Law on the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity whose scope was expanded for refugees from Bulgaria, has also been implemented for refugees from Iraq.[85] However, the implementation of the Law has not been discussed by the MPs. The lack of discussions on legal arrangements for refugees reveals the deficiency of Turkish migration laws in 1990s. The Özal government succeeded to settle refugees from Bulgaria through the help of the Law of Settlement. However, during the Iraqi mass refugee flow, the government could not even describe these refugees in relation to its national laws.

As discussed in Chapter II, until the 1994 Asylum Regulation, the entry exit, stay, residence, and labour rights of refugees were not defined by the national laws (İçduygu, 2015). Although the Regulation is considered as an outcome of the Iraqi mass refugee flow (Danış & Bayraktar, 2010; İçduygu, 2004), a high-ranking judge suggested that the draft of the Regulation was started before the mass refugee flow in 1991.[86] He asserted that the Regulation was drafted in 1990 and revitalized after the mass refugee flow Iraq in 1991.[87] However, the 1994 Regulation was still insufficient and inefficient due to the confusion over the definitions of 'refugee' or 'asylum-seeker'.

Similar to the case of Iraq, prior to the mass refugee flow from Syria, the Turkish state was preparing another draft for constituting a far-reaching document for migration and asylum. As discussed in Chapter II, the Ministry of Interior founded a Bureau to draft the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (Soykan, 2012). Although the MPs did not discuss these issues in the Parliament, they heavily discussed these issues under the HRIC. In this regard, the AKP Sakarya MP Ayhan Sefer Üstün suggested the following:

---

[85] "Fakir Fukara Fonu'ndan Kürtlere 21 milyar yardım", Hürriyet, 09 April 1991, p. 15.
[86] Judge, Turkish Armed Forces, In-depth interviews, 26 April 2018.
[87] Ibid.

As you all know, Turkey has a dispersed migration policy and insufficient legislation. Therefore, there is no far-reaching document. The Ministry of Interior prepared a new law draft for migration. This draft is extremely humanitarian, progressive and will fill the gaps in the legislations.[88]

Only after a few months from Üstün's declaration on the law, the HRIC is held under the title of "The Law on Foreigners and International Protection Draft".[89] These sessions are spared for the new law and officials from the Ministry of Interior and MPs discuss the issue only in terms of such issues as migration, mass refugee flows, and asylum processes. During this session, Deputy Secretary of Ministry of Interior Murat Koca declared that the Ministry of Interior prepares the basis for the establishment of DGMM in Turkey's provinces.

As a result, this could be stated that the regulations and legislations on migration were the issues of grey-area in Turkish national law until the Law on Foreigners. The refugees from Bulgaria were treated under the Law of Settlement due to their ethnic kinship ties whereas the Iraqi refugees could not be identified under any legal category. Indeed, the Parliament did not even elucidate the deficiencies or absence of Turkish migration regime during the Iraqi mass flow. However, in the case of Syria, the MPs in the HRIC discuss the new draft of law in-detail and received information from key-bureaucrats. This could be an indicator of a significant shift towards raising importance of migration issues in Turkish national laws and regulations.

3.4.3. A New Phenomenon in Border Management: Biometrics and Surveillance

In terms of the government's security measures on the borders during Iraqi and Syrian refugee flows, the Turkish state's border security policies resemble each other. However, the Syrian case differ from other two cases in terms of implementation of security policies.

---

[88] İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, (15 February 2012), p. 12.
[89] İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, (24 May2012). pp. 19-38.

During the Syrian mass refugee flow, the State has shifted towards 'biometric' surveillance. In response to CHP MP Umut Oran's parliamentary question on implementation of the Integrated Border Management Action Plan, the Minister of Interior Muammer Güler stated that the State received biometric surveillance equipment:

> As part of the Integrated Border Management Action Plan 1st Phase, 3 electronic document screening devices, 2 thermal cameras, 5-night vision binoculars, 5 metal door detectors, and 6 microscope systems are purchased between 2010 and 2013 for the use of Turkish National Police Department serving in the Syrian border gates.[90]

The Action Plan was supported by the EU to ensure "the development of high-level border management and border surveillance systems and standards" in Turkey's national borders[91]. The government expressed that the increasing illegal border crossings not only in Turkey but also in Europe encouraged both sides to take the Action Plan for implementation of a comprehensive border security system.[92]

Analysing the ways in which the state officials discuss the biometric security measures, one of the major aims of the State is to prevent illegal border crossings. The Turkish state's perception of refugees as 'illegal border crossers' correlates with Frelick's (2007) security paradigm. In this regard, head of emergency response department at AFAD Fatih Özer made speech on the HRIC to inform the MPs about the Syrian refugees' registration process:

> We have moved into biometric registration system, we fingerprint to avoid duplication in humanitarian aid, and when they commit crime... Because, we don't have their criminal

---

[90] See: http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-25426c.pdf. Retrieved September 18, 2018.
[91] For more information about Integrated Border Management Action Plan 1st Phase, see:
https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/establishing-integrated-border-management-system-1st-phase-160. Retrieved September 28, 2018.
[92] Ibid.

records. At least, we can establish a control mechanism for them. We have registered 118,000 people via biometric information systems. [93]

Similarly, the leftist BDP MP Murat Bozlak suggested that the State should have strict border controls to prevent illegal migration in the HRIC:

How can we tackle illegal migration?... First, we need to control border passages very well, we need to prevent illegal crossings. Second, we need to increase border security officials' capacity working in border gates, and we need to develop technological knowledge to fight forgery.[94]

In response to Bozlak's speech, Directorate of Turkish National Police Department stated that they are taking precautions at border gates through training border police to prevent forgery.[95] Moreover, he suggested that border police are trained for determining financial situation of undocumented migrants. If border police are convinced that these undocumented migrants will become a burden on the State's economy, these migrants will not be accepted to enter the State.

In sum, state officials serving during the Syrian refugee flow emphasize the significance of benefiting from technology to prevent illicitness. The emphasis on illicitness is unique to the Syrian mass refugee flow. Neither in the case of Bulgaria nor in Iraq, state officials did not focus on migration and border management in terms of biometrics. The period that these refugee flows occur falls under prior to the third paradigm in IRR. Therefore, one of the reasons for the absence of biometrics during these refugee flows could be related to the paradigm in IRR. Moreover, as Muller's (2004) argues, the Turkish state had the opportunity to authenticate between qualified and disqualified bodies through identity

---

[93] İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, (12 November 2013), p. 4.
[94] İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, (14 January 2014), p. 12.
[95] İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, (14 January 2014), p. 3.

management in which Syrian refugees' body functions as a password enabling inclusion or exclusion. As discussed in *3.3.3. Construction of borders as discriminative tools*, Turkey had also constructed a wall on its Syria border to control the border crossings. However, as Üstübici and İçduygu (2018) asserts, the function and effectiveness of the border closure attempts are still questionable. Therefore, as Malkki (1992) remarks, the controllability of migration through border closures could be an illusion rather than a solution to illicitness.

CHAPTER IV

Conclusion

4.1. Aims and Contribution

This research examined the Turkish Parliament's conceptualizations of borders during mass refugee flows. It built on critical border studies and mass refugee flows which are understudied areas in Turkey. Juxtaposing border studies with mass refugee flows helped me to reveal the interactions between state official's conceptualizations of border and migration. In a way, this research indicated that borders are precursors of state's policies on migration. To do so, the research utilized from parliamentary minutes of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and in-depth interviews with key actors in policy-making. The research used content analysis as the main research method to analyse the parliamentary minutes.

This research filled the gap in two literatures: critical border studies and forced migration studies in relation to mass refugee flows. Disciplines of IR and political geography have been focusing on border-related studies, yet the studies focusing on Turkey are still insufficient. Especially migration studies mostly focused on the policy outcomes through using the data from the implemented laws and regulations. However, examining the parliamentary minutes enabled me to analyse how and in which levels state officials discuss borders before implementing a law. In other words, this research aimed to contribute to reveal the policy-making process in border and migration management.

4.3. Findings

The research analysed the data in accordance with the conceptual schema (*see* Table 2). Under each theme, state officials' conceptualization and framing of borders are analysed in line with the politico-historical background of mass refugee flows as well as paradigm shifts in IRR. As a result, while some themes became prominent in each mass refugee flow in the Parliament, the others were only peculiar to one or two cases.

Firstly, as discussed in *3.2.1. Border Opening,* the data shows that opening borders of the State was not the only option on the table. In all three cases, despite the differences in duration and demographic structure of the flows, the State was initially hesitant to open the borders to mass refugees. The first reaction of the policy-makers was to consider and calculate the 'absorption capacity' of the State. When the first group of refugees arrived at borders, high-ranking bureaucrats strived for calculating the expected number of refugees. Although the decision of opening the borders to the refugees from Bulgaria is associated with their ethnic kinship ties with the Turkish state, the decision was not unconditional. In other words, despite these ethnic kinship ties between the Turkish nation and refugees from Bulgaria, the State paid attention to its 'absorption capacity' with caution. Therefore, this can be argued that *raison d'etat* remained similar in terms of the Turkish state's decision on opening borders.

Although the State decided to open the borders of Turkey to Syrian refugees, its primary aim was not to accept the refugees inside Turkey but to keep them out national borders. Therefore, as in the case of Iraq, the State made efforts to create buffer zone in Syrian border. Contrary to what Kirişci and Karaca (2015) argue, the open-door policy in Syrian refugee flow could not be completely parallel to the open-door policy implemented in Bulgaria in which the State did not consider creating a buffer zone. Although the ethnic-affinity would be one of the triggering factors in implementing an open-door policy in both cases, possibility of creating a buffer zone in Syria and prioritizing border security over Syrian refugees distinguishes the case

of Syria from Bulgaria. Rather than focusing on ethnic-affinity, this research focuses on the ongoing civil war and terrorism threat in the cases of Iraq and Syria which prompted the State to prioritize its border security, control the border-crossings, and create a buffer zone.

Secondly, this research indicated that policies and discourses on borders are not always compatible with each other during the mass refugee flows. Especially in the case of Syria, policies implemented for Syrian refugees and discourses on the mass refugee flow contradict with each other. For instance, as discussed in *3.4.2. From Law of Settlement to the Law on Foreigners*, although the Turkish state provided refugees from Bulgaria and Syria with rights, the Parliament comprehended the act of giving rights to each refugee group differently. Whilst the Parliament during the mass refugee flow from Bulgaria unanimously supported the refugees' access to rights, it did not give the same reaction in the case of Syria. Especially most of the MPs from the opposition running during the mass refugee flow from Syria opposed to giving rights to Syrian refugees. These MPs perceived their access to rights as a threat to social and economic cohesion of the State. Similarly, the Parliament did not approach the open-door policy implemented during Bulgaria and Syria from a similar perspective. In the case of Syria, the open-door policy is not supported by the MPs from the opposition contrary to the case of Bulgaria in which all MPs arrived at a consensus on perceiving the border opening as the 'duty' of the State.

Thirdly, the shift towards a dominant party-system in the structure of the Turkish Parliament created contestation which is reflected in discussions on the mass refugee flows. In the cases of Bulgaria and Iraq, the MPs from opposition did not submit parliamentary questions as in the case of Syria. Rather the MPs from opposition supported the government on its decision on refugees during the mass refugee flows from Bulgaria and Iraq. Although the scope of discussing the rights in the Parliament is expanded during the mass refugee flow from Syria, the MPs' tone was mostly alarming. While this difference in the Syria case indicates that the

third paradigm shift in the IRR influenced the Turkish Parliament in terms of conceptualization of the mass refugee flows, it could also be an indicator of the changing dynamics of the Turkish Parliament. Therefore, the structure of the Parliament should not be overlooked. However, to arrive at a conclusion on the effect of the changing composition of the Parliament on the discussion levels of the MPs, further research is needed.

Fourth, borders were not only a matter of 'increasing numbers' but also a matter of controlling the demographic structure of the source country. Socio-cultural aspect of borders revealed that state officials refer to borders as if they are the scenery of the world in which the state officials are the performers (Genova, 2015). In all the three cases, state officials indicated that if they re-draw the borders, they can solve the issue of 'irregular migration'. Especially the existence of Turkish descent refugees (i.e. Turkish descent citizens in Bulgaria, and Turkmens in Iraq and Syria) in source countries prompted state officials to close the borders to protect the Turkish-descent population. By this way, the State might aim to reconstruct its soft-power through perceiving the Turkish descent-people as an extension of the Turkish state.

Lastly, the IRR is limited to explain the Turkish state's response to mass refugee flows. For instance, the socio-cultural aspect of borders is not included in the IRR paradigms. Moreover, debates on border management during the mass refugee flow from Iraq are compatible with the third paradigm in which the border opening is associated with 'loss of security'. However, it could explain the cases of Bulgaria and Syria at the discursive level if not at the policy-implementation level. Especially, the case of Syria contradicts with the third paradigm because of the government's welcoming policies on refugees from Syria. Yet, considering the 'alarmist language' performed in the Parliament, the case of Syria is in accordance with the IRR.

4.4. Limitations and Further Research

Analysing the parliamentary minutes enabled me to avoid the passing of time after an issue is included in the States agenda. In other words, contrary to in-depth interviews which are generally conducted after a problem arise, the parliamentary minutes shed light on state officials' border conceptualizations almost immediately after an issue. Although this could also be provided by the media analysis, some of the speeches in the Parliament could not be reflected in the media due to the media's order of importance or some other reasons. However, analysing the Parliamentary speeches might also limit the researcher because of the 'filtering' affects in the Parliament. As discussed in *3.1. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: Towards a Dominant Party System,* the shift towards a dominant party system in Turkey negatively affects the diversity and multivocality in the Parliament. Therefore, this research might require the analysis of other sources of data for future studies.

Secondly, this research focused on how state officials conceptualize borders during the first entry of refugees. Since the research focused only on the first entry, it did not analyse the data prior or after a long time of border passages. To compare the differences between the time of mass refugee flows and each stage of border passages, a further research could be conducted through selecting the data prior to mass refugee flows. By this way, this could be argued that state officials' conceptualization of borders during mass refugee flow are parallel to or different from the conceptualizations prior to mass refugee flows.

Finally, the research aimed to contribute to both critical border and forced migration studies through examining the parliamentary minutes. Since the research is built on border studies, it did not focus on the MPs party-affiliations which could helped me to analyse the ideological differences in state officials' discourses. By this way, further research might study the relationship between ideologies of state officials and mass migration. Moreover, comparing

the differences in ideologies, ethnic backgrounds or election district of the MPs could reveal another aspect of mass refugee flow.

Appendix 1: The List of In-depth Interviews

Order	The title of the informant has during the mass refugee flow	The institution that the informant is affiliated with during the mass refugee flow	The date and place of the interview
1	Minister-1	-	05.04.2018 Ankara
2	Minister-2	-	05.04.2018 Ankara
3	Minister-3	-	09.04.2018 Istanbul
4	High-ranking bureaucrat	Ministry of Labor and Social Security	02.03.2018 Istanbul
5	Judge	Turkish Armed Forces	26.04.2018 Adana
6	Jounalist	-	23.03.2018 Stockholm

Bibliography

Adamson, F. B. (2006). Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security. *International Security, 31*(1), 165-199.

Agnew, J. (1999). Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity, and Movement in World Politics. *Millennium, 28*(3), 499-521. doi:10.1177/03058298990280030701

Agnew, J. (2008). Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking. *Ethics & Global Politics, 1*(4), 175-191. doi:10.3402/egp.v1i4.1892

Akkerman, M. (2016). Border Wars: the Arms Dealers Profiting from Europe's Refugee Tragedy. *Stop Wapenhandel and Transnational Institute*, 33.

Aksel, D. B., & Danış, D. (2014). Diverse Facets of Europeanization at the Iraqi-Turkish Border. *Migration, Asylum, and Refugees in Turkey. Studies in the Control of Population at the Southeastern Borders of the EU, Lewiston, S*, 267-304.

Altunişik, M. B. (2006). Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 14*(2), 183-196. doi:10.1080/14782800600892242

Anderson, J. (2001). Theorizing state borders:'politics/economics' and democracy in capitalism. *Belfast, Centre for International Borders Research Working papers*.

Anderson, J. (2012). Borders in the New Imperialism *A Companion to Border Studies* (pp. 137-157): John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Anderson, J., & O'Dowd, L. (1999). Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings, Changing Significance. *Regional Studies, 33*(7), 593-604. doi:10.1080/00343409950078648

Anderson, M. (1997). Frontiers and Migration. In M. Anderson (Ed.), *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (First ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Andreas, P. (2003). Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-first Century.

International Security, 28(2), 78-111. doi:10.1162/016228803322761973

Ataç, I., Heck, G., Hess, S., Kaşlı, Z., Ratfisch, P., Soykan, C., & Yılmaz, B. (2017). Contested B/Orders. Turkey's Changing Migration Regime. An Introduction. *movements. Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies, 3*(2).

Ayaşlı, E. (2018). *Mass migration movements to Turkey: the cases of Turks of Bulgaria, Northern Iraqis, and Syrians.* (Unpublished Master Thesis), Bilkent University, Ankara.

Aydın, M. (2001). *Türkiye ve Irak hudûdu mes' elesi* (Vol. 13): ASAM.

Balibar, E. (2002). What is a Border? In E. Balibar (Ed.), *Politics and the Other Scene* (pp. 75-86). London, New York: Verso.

Betts, A., & Loescher, G. (2011). Refugees in International Relations. In A. Betts & G. Loescher (Eds.), *Refugees in International Relations* (pp. 1-29). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives, 27*(1_suppl), 63-92. doi:doi:10.1177/03043754020270S105

Broeders, D., & Hampshire, J. (2013). Dreaming of seamless borders: ICTs and the pre-emptive governance of mobility in Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39*(8), 1201-1218.

Brown, W. (2011). Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. *Ethics & International Affairs, 25*(1), 98.

Brunet-Jailly, E. (2007a). *Borderlands : comparing border security in North America and Europe*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.

Brunet-Jailly, E. (2007b). *Borderlands: comparing border security in North America and Europe* (Vol. 10): University of Ottawa Press.

Carr, E. H. (1946). *The Twenty Years Crisis*. London: Macmillan.

Chimni, B. S. (1998). The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 11*(4), 350-374. doi:10.1093/jrs/11.4.350-a

Coleman, M. (2012). From border policing to internal immigration control in the United States. *Companion to Border Studies, A*, 419-437.

Coles, G. (1989). Approaching the Refugee Problem Today. In G. Loescher & L. Monahan (Eds.), *Refugees and International Relations*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon.

Çağaptay, S. (2003). Citizenship policies in interwar Turkey*. *Nations and Nationalism, 9*(4), 601-619. doi:10.1111/1469-8219.00129

Çarkoğlu, A. (2011). Turkey's 2011 General Elections: Towards Party System? *Insight Turkey, 13*(3), 43-62.

Çelik, N. (2009). The Political Participation of Turkish Minority in Bulgaria and the Public Reaction: The Case of Movement for Rights and Freedoms (1990-1994). *Journal of Black Sea Studies, 6*(22).

Danış, D. (2009). Irak'tan Uzağa: 1991 Sonrası Dış Göç. *Ortadoğu Analiz, 1*(6), 15-22.

Danış, D. (2011). Changing fortunes: Iraqi refugees in Turkey. *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 5*(2), 199-213.

Danış, D., & Bayraktar, D. (2010). Away from Iraq: Post 2003 Iraqi Migration to Neighboring Countries and to Turkey. *Ankara: OSRAM. Rapor*(21).

Danış, D., & Parla, A. (2009). Nafile Soydaşlık: Irak ve Bulgaristan Türkleri örneğinde göçmen, dernek ve devlet. *Toplum ve Bilim, 114*, 131-158.

Danış, D., Perouse, J.-F., & Taragh, C. (2006). Integration in Limbo: Iraqi Afghan and Maghrebi Migrants in Istanbul. *MireKoç Project*(6).

Danış, D., & Soysüren, İ. (2014). *Sınır ve sınırdışı : Türkiye'de yabancılar, göç ve devlete disiplinlerarası bakışlar*. Ankara: NotaBene Yayınları.

De Genova, N. (2012). Border, Scene and Obscene *A Companion to Border Studies* (pp. 492-

504): John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

de Wenden, C. W. (2007). The frontiers of mobility. *Migration without Borders*, 51.

Demirtaş-Coşkun, B. (2001). Turkish-Bulgarian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: The
Exemplary Relationship in the Balkans. *The Turkish Yearbook of International
Relations, 32*, 26-60.

Donnan, H. (2001). Borders: Frontiers of identity, nation and state.

Dowty, A., & Loescher, G. (1996). Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action.
International Security, 21(1), 43-71. doi:10.1162/isec.21.1.43

Ezzy, D. (2002). *Qualitative analysis: Practice and Innovation*. London: Routledge.

Fassin, D. (2011). Policing borders, producing boundaries. The governmentality of
immigration in dark times. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 40*, 213-226.

Frelick, B. (2007). Paradigm shifts in the international responses to refugees. *Fear of
persecution: Global human rights, international law, and human well-being*, 33-57.

Gavrilis, G. (2008). *The dynamics of interstate boundaries*. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Genç, D. (2014). Türkiye'nin Yabancıların Hareketliliğine İlişkin Sınır Politikası. In D. Danış
& İ. Soysüren (Eds.), *Sınır ve sınırdışı: Türkiye'de yabancılar, göç ve devlete
disiplinlerarası bakışlar* (pp. 24-36). Ankara: NotaBene Yayınları.

Genç, D. (2015). An Analysis of Turkey's Bordering Processes: Why and Against Whom?
Turkish Studies, 16(4), 527-553. doi:10.1080/14683849.2015.1081069

Genova, N. d. (2015). Extremities and Regularities: Regulatory Regimes and the Spectacle of
Immigration Enforcement. In Y. Jansen, R. Celikates, & J. d. Bloois (Eds.), *The
irregularization of migration in contemporary Europe : detention, deportation,
drowning*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gökçek, A. (2017). *State Response to Mass Refugee Flows: The Cases of Bulgarian Turks,*

Iraqi Kurds and Syrians in Turkey. (Unpublished Master Thesis), Koç University,
İstanbul.

Green, S. (2012). A Sense of Border. In T. M. Wilson & H. Donnan (Eds.), *A Companion to Border Studies* (pp. 573-592). Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Hacısalihoğlu, M. (2012). 89 Göçü İle İlgili Tarih Yazımı ve Kamuoyu Algıları. In N. Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu & M. Hacısalihoğlu (Eds.), *89 Göçü: Bulgaristan'da 1984-89 Azınlık Politikaları ve Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç* (Vol. 89, pp. 1984-1989). İstanbul: Balkar ve Balmed.

Heisler, M. O., & Layton-Henry, Z. (1993). Migration and the links between social and societal security. *Identity, migration and the new security agenda in Europe*, 148-166.

Heper, M., & Cinar, M. (1996). Parliamentary Government with a Strong President: The Post-1989 Turkish Experience. *Political Science Quarterly, 111*(3), 483-503. doi:10.2307/2151972

Hobbes, T. (1996). *Leviathan* (R. Tuck Ed. Rev. student ed.). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Houtum, H. v. (2005). The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries. *Geopolitics, 10*(4), 672-679. doi:10.1080/14650040500318522

HRW. (2012). Iraq/Turkey: Open Borders to All Syrian Refugees. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/14/iraq/turkey-open-borders-all-syrian-refugees

HRW. (2014). Syria/Turkey: Landmines Kill Civilians Fleeing Kobani. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/02/syria/turkey-landmines-kill-civilians-fleeing-kobani

HRW. (2016). *Turkey: Border Guards Kill and Injure Asylum Seekers, Human Rights Watch* https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/10/turkey-border-guards-kill-and-injure-asylum-seekers.

İçduygu, A. (2000). The Politics of International Migratory Regimes: Transit Migration Flows in Turkey. *International Social Science Journal, 52*(165), 357-367. doi:doi:10.1111/1468-2451.00265

İçduygu, A. (2004). From nation-building to globalization: an account of the past and present in recent urban studies in Turkey. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28*(4), 941-947.

İçduygu, A. (2012). Turkey's evolving migration policies: A Mediterranean transit stop at the doors of the EU. *Population, Space and Place, 18*(4), 407-415.

İçduygu, A. (2015). *Syrian refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead* Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

İçduygu, A., & Aksel, D. (2012). Irregular Migration in Turkey. *IOM Report, Ankara*, 23.

İçduygu, A., & Aksel, D. B. (2013). Turkish Migration Policies: A Critical Historical Retrospective. *Perceptions, 18*(3), 167.

İçduygu, A., Erder, S., & Gençkaya, Ö. F. (2014). Türkiye'nin uluslararası göç politikaları, 1923-2023: Ulus-devlet Oluşumundan Ulus-ötesi Dönüşümlere. *MiReKoc Araştırma Raporları, 1*, 2014.

İçduygu, A., & Kaygusuz, Ö. (2004). The Politics of Citizenship by Drawing Borders: Foreign Policy and the Construction of National Citizenship Identity in Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies, 40*(6), 26-50.

İçduygu, A., & Sert, D. (2010). *Irregular migration at two borders : The Turkish-EU and Mexican-U.S. cases*. Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States.

İçduygu, A., & Sert, D. (2015). The Changing Waves of Migration from the Balkans to Turkey: A Historical Account. In H. Vermeulen, M. Baldwin-Edwards, & R. v. Boeschoten (Eds.), *Migration in the Southern Balkans: From Ottoman Territory to Globalized Nation States* (pp. 85-104). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

İçduygu, A., & Üstübici, A. (2014). Negotiating mobility, debating borders: migration diplomacy in Turkey-EU relations *New Border and Citizenship Politics* (pp. 44-59): Springer.

Ihlamur-Öner, S. G. (2013). Turkey's Refugee regime Stretched to the Limit? The Case of Iraqi and Syrian Refugee Flows. *Perceptions, 18*(3), 191.

Ikizoglu Erensu, A., & Kaşlı, Z. (2016). A Tale of Two Cities: Multiple Practices of Bordering and Degrees of 'Transit' in and through Turkey. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 29*(4), 528-548. doi:10.1093/jrs/few037

Jacobsen, K. (1996). Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes. *The International Migration Review, 30*(3), 655-678. doi:10.2307/2547631

Kalaycıoğlu, E. (1995). The Turkish Grand National Assembly: A Brief Inquiry into the Politics of Representation in Turkey. In Ç. Balım-Harding (Ed.), *Turkey: Political, social and economic challenges in the 1990s* (pp. 42-60): Brill.

Karpat, K. H. (1959). *Turkey's Politics The Transition to a Multi-Party System*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Kaşlı, Z. (2014). Limits of the Changing Border Regime: Insights from the Greek-Turkish Borderland. *Perspectives on Europe, 44*(1), 79-84.

Kaya, A. (2015). Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and Charity. *South European Society and Politics, 20*(1), 47-69. doi:10.1080/13608746.2014.979031

Kirişci, K. (1993). "Provide comfort" and Turkey: decision making for refugee assistance. *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 2*(2), 227-253.

Kirişci, K. (1995). *Refugee movements and Turkey in the post Second World War era*: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi.

Kirişci, K. (1996a). Refugees of Turkish Origin: "Coerced Immigrants" to Turkey since 1945. *International Migration, 34*(3), 385-412. doi:doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.1996.tb00534.x

Kirişci, K. (1996b). Turkey and the Kurdish Safe-Haven in Northern Iraq. *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 19*(3).

Kirişci, K. (2000). Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices. *Middle Eastern Studies, 36*(3), 1-22.

Kirişci, K. (2003). *Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration* Migration Policy Institute.

Kirişci, K. (2007). Border management and EU-Turkish relations: convergence or deadlock.

Kirişci, K., & Karaca, S. (2015). Hoşgörü ve Çelişkiler: 1989, 1991 ve 2011'de Türkiye'ye Yönelen. In M. M. Erdoğan & A. Kaya (Eds.), *Türkiye'nin göç tarihi: 14. yüzyıldan 21. yüzyıla Türkiye'ye göçler* (pp. 295-315). İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Koca, B. T. (2015). Deconstructing turkey's" open door" policy towards refugees from Syria 1. *Migration Letters, 12*(3), 209.

Kolossov, V. (2005). Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches. *Geopolitics, 10*(4), 606-632. doi:10.1080/14650040500318415

Konukman, R. E. (1990). *Tarihi Belgeler Işığında Büyük Göç ve Anavatan (Nedenleri, Boyutları, Sonuçları)* (K. Doğan Ed.). Ankara: Türk Basın Birliği.

Loescher, G. (1993). *Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loescher, G. (2001). The UNHCR and World Politics: a Perilous Path. *Refugee Survey Quarterly, 20*(3).

Loizides, N. G. (2009). Elite Framing and Conflict Transformation in Turkey. *Parliamentary Affairs, 62*(2), 278-297. doi:10.1093/pa/gsn038

Malkki, L. (1992). National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of

National Identity among Scholars and Refugees. *Cultural Anthropology, 7*(1), 24-44.

Mannaert, C. (2003). Irregular migration and asylum in Turkey. *UNHCR*(Working Paper No. 89).

Micallef, R. (2006). Hatay joins the motherland. *State Frontiers: Borders and Boundaries in the Middle East*, 141-158.

Migdal, J. S. (2004). Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints: Struggles to Construct and Maintain State and Social Boundaries. In J. S. Migdal (Ed.), *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices* (pp. 3-27). Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: A. A. Knopf.

Muller, B. J. (2004). (Dis)qualified bodies: securitization, citizenship and 'identity management'. *Citizenship Studies, 8*(3), 279-294. doi:10.1080/1362102042000257005

Newman, D. (2003). On borders and power: A theoretical framework. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 18*(1), 13-25. doi:10.1080/08865655.2003.9695598

Newman, D. (2006). The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our `borderless' world. *Progress in Human Geography, 30*(2), 143-161. doi:10.1191/0309132506ph599xx

Ohmae, K. (1994). *The borderless world : power and strategy in the interlinked economy*. London: HarperCollins.

Okyay, A. S. (2017). Turkey's post-2011 approach to its Syrian border and its implications for domestic politics. *International Affairs, 93*(4), 829-846.

Ozcurumez, S., & Şenses, N. (2011). Europeanization and Turkey: studying irregular migration policy. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 13*(2), 233-248.

Ozcurumez, S., & Yetkin, D. (2014). Limits to Regulating Irregular Migration in Turkey: What Constrains Public Policy and Why? *Turkish Studies, 15*(3), 442-457.

doi:10.1080/14683849.2014.954746

Özgen, N. (2005). Sınırın İktisadi Antropolojisi; Suriye ve Irak Sınırlarında İki Kasaba *Türkiye'de Antropoloji*. İstanbul: Epsilon Yay.

Özgen, N. (2007). Devlet, sınır, aşiret: Aşiretin etnik bir kimlik olarak yeniden inşası. *Toplum ve Bilim, 108*, 239-261.

Paasi, A. (1999). Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse: The Finnish-Russian Border. *Regional Studies, 33*(7), 669-680. doi:10.1080/00343409950078701

Parla, A. (2003). Marking Time Along the Bulgarian-Turkish Border. *Ethnography, 4*(4), 561-575. doi:10.1177/146613810344004

Parla, A. (2009). Remembering across the border: Postsocialist nostalgia among Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria. *American Ethnologist, 36*(4), 750-767. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1425.2009.01208.x

Poulton, H. (1993). *Balkanlar: Çatışan Azınlıklar* (Y. Alagon, Trans.). İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi.

Salter, M. (2011). Places Everyone! Studying the Performativity of the Border. *Political Geography, 30*(2), 66-67.

Sayari, S. (2002). Changing Party System. In S. Sayari & Y. Esmer (Eds.), *Politics, parties, and elections in Turkey* (pp. 9-33). United States of America: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Sert, D. (2013). Turkey's integrated border management strategy. *Turkish Policy Quarterly, 12*(1), 173-179.

Soja, E. W. (1989). Reassertions: Towards a Spatialized Ontology. *Postmodern Geographies: the Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (pp. 118-137). London: Verso.

Soykan, C. (2012). The new draft law on foreigners and international protection in Turkey. *Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration, 2*(2), 38-47.

Şenoğuz, H. P. (2017). Border Contestations, Syrian Refugees and Violence in the Southeastern Margins of Turkey. *movements. Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies, 3*(2).

Tachau, F. (2000). Turkish political parties and elections: Half a century of multiparty democracy. *Turkish Studies, 1*(1), 128-148. doi:10.1080/14683840008721224

Toktaş, Ş., & Çelik, N. (2017). Border Crossings between Georgia and Turkey: The Sarp Land Border Gate. *Geopolitics, 22*(2), 383-406.

Topak, Ö. E. (2014). The Biopolitical Border in Practice: Surveillance and Death at the Greece-Turkey Borderzones. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 32*(5), 815-833. doi:10.1068/d13031p

Topak, Ö. E., Bracken-Roche, C., Saulnier, A., & Lyon, D. (2015). From Smart Borders to Perimeter Security: The Expansion of Digital Surveillance at the Canadian Borders. *Geopolitics, 20*(4), 880-899. doi:10.1080/14650045.2015.1085024

Üstübici, A., & İçduygu, A. (2018). Border closures and the externalization of immigration controls in the Mediterranean: a comparative analysis of Morocco and Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 1-24. doi:10.1017/npt.2018.16

van Dijk, T. A. (2000a). Parliamentary Debates. In T. A. v. D. R. Wodak (Ed.), *Racism at the Top* (pp. 45–78). Vienna: Drava Verlag.

van Dijk, T. A. (2000b). Racism A Discourse Analytical Approach. In S. Cottle (Ed.), *Ethnic Minorities and the Media* (pp. 33-49). Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Van Houtum, H. (2011). The mask of the border. *The ashgate research companion to border studies*, 11-33.

Vasileva, D. (1992). Bulgarian Turkish emigration and return. *International Migration Review, 26*(98), 342-352.

Vaughan-Williams, N. (2009a). *Border politics : the limits of sovereign power*. Edinburgh:

Edinburgh University Press.

Vaughan-Williams, N. (2009b). *Border Politics : The Limits of Sovereign Power*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Walters, W. (2006). Rethinking borders beyond the state. *Comparative European Politics, 4*(2-3), 141-159.

Weiner, M. (1996). Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows. *International Security, 21*(1), 5-42. doi:10.1162/isec.21.1.5

Weizman, E. (2007). *Hollow land: Israel's architecture of occupation*. London; New York: Verso.

Wilson, T. M., & Donnan, H. (2012). *A companion to border studies Blackwell companions to anthropology* (pp. xvi, 620 p.). Retrieved from http://site.ebrary.com/lib/yale/Doc?id=10560513

Yıldırım, A. (2013). Devlet, Sınır, Aşiret: Nusaybin Örneği.

Zolberg, A. R., Suhrke, A., & Aguayo, S. (1989). *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Zürcher, E. J. (1993). *Turkey: A modern history*: IB Tauris.