

**POLITICS OF NOSTALGIA:
PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POPULISM**

by

Ezgi Elçi

A Dissertation Submitted to the
Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for
the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

International Relations and Political Science



September 27, 2019

Politics of Nostalgia: Psychological Origins of Populism

Koç University

Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities

This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a doctoral dissertation by

Ezgi Elçi

and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by the final
examining committee have been made.

Committee Members:

Prof. Ali Çarkoğlu




Asst. Prof. Selim Erdem Aytaç



Assoc. Prof. Gülseli Baysu



Prof. Cas Mudde



Assoc. Prof. Şener Aktürk



Date: September 27th, 2019

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of his knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Ezgi ELÇİ



ABSTRACT

Politics of Nostalgia: Psychological Origins of Populism

Ezgi Elçi

Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations and Political Science

September 27, 2019

This study aims to scrutinize the relationship between collective nostalgia and populism. Many populists around the world exploit nostalgia by referring to the good, glorious days of their country and reflecting their resentment against the elites and establishment. By using three original datasets from Turkey, this study first analyzes the populist discourse of political leaders in their speeches and discusses changes in the level of populism over time by using quantitative and qualitative content analysis tools. Populists appear as mnemonic warriors while instrumentalizing nostalgia to justify their actions and aims, in which they establish a memory regime in which the opposition becomes enemies to be destroyed. Secondly, this study analyzes whether collective nostalgia also characterizes populist attitudes of the electorate by using representative survey data. The results illustrate that collective nostalgia has a significantly positive relationship with populist attitudes even after controlling for various independent variables including religiosity, partisanship, satisfaction with life, and Euroskepticism. Finally, this study tests which type of nostalgic message affects populist attitudes by using an online survey experiment. The results indicate that while Ottoman nostalgia paves the way for increasing populist attitudes of AKP constituency, it has a

negative impact on CHP voters' populism. Kemalist nostalgia, on the other hand, has an indirect effect on populist attitudes despite having a weak direct effect.

Keywords: Populism, Nostalgia, Populist Attitudes, Content Analysis, Survey Analysis, Survey Experiment



ÖZET

Nostalji Siyaseti: Popülizmin Psikolojik Kökenleri

Ezgi Elçi

Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Siyaset Bilimi, Doktora

27 Eylül 2019

Bu çalışma, kolektif nostalji ve popülizm arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Dünyadaki pek çok populist nostaljiden faydalanırken ülkelerinin geçmiş güzel günlerine atıf yapmakta ve elitler ile kurula düzene olan hınçlarını belirtmektedirler. Türkiye’den üç original veriseti kullanarak bu çalışma, ilk olarak nicel ve nitel içerik analizi yöntemlerini kullanarak siyasi liderlerin populist söylemini analiz etmekte ve zaman içinde değişen popülizm seviyesini tartışmaktadır. Populistler hatırlatıcı savaşçılar olarak belirirken kendi eylem ve amaçlarını meşrulaştırmak için nostaljiyi araçsallaştırır ve kurdukları hafıza rejiminde muhalefeti yok edilmesi gereken düşmanlar haline getirirler. İkinci olarak bu çalışma, temsili anket verisi kullanarak kolektif nostaljinin aynı zamanda seçmenlerin populist tutumlarını belirleyip belirlemediğini analiz etmektedir. Sonuçlar göstermektedir ki birçok bağımsız değişken ile – dindarlık, partizanlık, hayattan tatmin olma ve AB karşıtlığı - kontrol edildiğinde dahi kolektif nostalji ile populist tutumlar arasında anlamlı bir pozitif ilişki vardır. Son olarak bu çalışma, hangi nostaljik mesajın populist tutumlar üzerinde etkili olduğunu internet anketi deneyi ile test etmektedir. Sonuçlar, Osmanlı nostaljisinin AKP seçmeninin sahip olduğu populist tutumları arttırdığını gösterirken, CHP seçmeninin populist

tutumlarını düşürdüğünü işaret etmiştir. Diğer yandan, Kemalist nostaljinin popülist tutumlar üzerine dolaylı bir etkisi gözükürken direkt etkisi zayıftır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Popülizm, Nostalji, Popülist Tutumlar, İçerik Analizi, Anket Analizi, Anket Deneyi



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation came out of with the support of so many people. I would like to take the opportunity to thank a number of them. I would like to express my most profound appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Ali arkođlu who always provided full support during my academic life at Ko University. His guidance and feedbacks illuminated my research ideas. I would like to thank Dr. Selim Erdem Ayta for his invaluable support, guidance, and trust. His encouragement and advice made me a better academician. I would like to thank Dr. Glseli Baysu who always provided instructive feedbacks for my dissertation. I express my gratitude to Dr. Cas Mudde who invited me to the University of Georgia for an academic year and accepted to be the committee member. The long discussions with him in Athens shaped many pieces of my studies. I would like to thank Dr. Őener Aktrk for his final feedbacks on this study which provided a second thought and perspective to my dissertation.

I would also like to thank Dr. Kerem Yıldırım, Dr. GneŐ Ertan, Dr. AyŐen stbici, Dr. Murat Somer, Dr. Emre Erdođan, Dr. Levente Littvay, Dr. Ethan Busby, and Dr. Ryan Carlin for their support, comments, and feedbacks.

My parents, Nazan and Cumhuri Eli, and my brother zgn Eli never stopped supporting and encouraging me. I do not know how to express my appreciation to them. A special thanks go to my grandmother YaŐar Canlı and my uncle Ferhat Canlı who always make me happy.

I wish to thank Simge Andı, Zsofia Bocskay, Semuhi Sinanođlu, Sinemis Temel, Bijan Tafazzoli, Erhan Arslan, Fatih Erol, and Emine Arı Erol for their feedbacks, critiques, ideas, support, and friendship!

Umut Koray Tuncay, Rifat Buğra Özdoğan, Bilgi Erişir, Pınar Ünsal, Yiğit Şimşit, Ceren Çağcı Şimşit, and Ezgi Özdoğan: What would I do without you!

The Athens crew: Alp Aytuğlu, Damla Dağ, and Chimedregzen (Chimede) Sanduijav. You were there in my darkest hours. I sincerely appreciate your support and friendship!

I would like to thank Koç University Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities for their help and support during my days at the university. I would also like to thank the Open Society Foundation in Turkey for their material support for the data collection. Finally, I am grateful to Fulbright Program for the doctoral thesis research grant.

None of this would have been possible without you!

Ezgi Elçi

2016 – 2019

Istanbul – Izmir – Athens, GA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables	xi
List of Figures	xii
Abbreviations	xiv
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1. Topic	1
1.2. Case Selection	3
1.3. Contribution	5
1.4. Overview of the Chapters	11
Chapter 2: Theoretical Background	14
2.1. Populism	14
2.1.1. Dimensions of Populism	17
2.2. Collective Nostalgia	25
2.3. Populism and Nostalgia	29
2.4. Conclusion	40
Chapter 3: Populism and Nostalgia in Turkey: Historical Background	41
3.1. Populism in Turkey	44
3.1.1. Narodnik Populism: Late Ottoman and Early Republican Period	44
3.1.2. DP and Populism of Center-Right	48
3.1.3. <i>Milli Görüş</i> : The Origins of the AKP	54
3.1.4. AKP: From A Conservative Democrat to a Right-wing Populist Party	58
3.1.5. From Left Populism to the Party of Establishment: CHP	62
3.2. Nostalgia in Turkish Politics	65
3.2.1. Ottoman Nostalgia: An Undead Glorious Past	66
3.2.2. Kemalist Nostalgia: A Nostalgia for Modern	68
3.3. Conclusion	70
Chapter 4: Populist and Nostalgic Rhetoric in Turkish Politics: A Content Analysis	73
4.1. Dimensional Approach on Populist Political Communication	74
4.2. Populists as Mnemonic Warriors	76
4.3. Hypotheses	78
4.4. Data	78
4.5. Method	80
4.6. Populist Words: Establishing a Dictionary	82

4.7. Results	83
4.8. Nostalgic Rhetoric in Contemporary Turkish Politics	86
4.8.1. Erdoğan’s Nostalgia	86
4.8.2. Kılıçdaroğlu’s Nostalgia	95
4.9. Conclusion	100
Chapter 5: Populism and Nostalgia: A Survey Analysis	102
5.1. Dependent Variable: Populist Attitudes	104
5.2. Independent Variables and Hypotheses	107
5.3. Data	118
5.4. Analysis	119
5.5. Alternative Hypothesis: Is It Nationalism or Populism	124
5.6. Conclusion	126
Chapter 6: Politics of Nostalgia and Populism: An Experimental Analysis	130
6.1. Data	131
6.2. Experimental Design	132
6.3. Effects of Nostalgia Treatments on Collective Nostalgia	133
6.4. Effect of Nostalgia Treatments on Populist Attitudes	140
6.4.1. The Direct Effect of Nostalgia Treatments on Populist Attitudes	141
6.4.2. Mediation and Moderated Mediation Designs	146
6.5. Conclusion	154
Chapter 7: Conclusion	156
7.1. Discussion of Results	156
7.2. Final Contributions of the Results	163
7.3. Shortcomings and Limitations of the Dissertation	165
7.4. Future Studies	167
Bibliography	170
Appendix	190

List of Tables

Table 3.1: Populism in Turkey	71
Table 5.1: Exploratory factor analysis results.	105
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics and correlations of populism items.	105
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics and correlations of nostalgia items.	108
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics.	118
Table 5.5: OLS regression analysis with beta coefficients.	120
Table 5.6: OLS regression analysis with interaction terms.	123
Table 5.7: OLS regression analysis with beta coefficients (DV: Nationalism)	125
Table 6.1: Sample characteristics of experimental data (mean of each category).	132
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics and correlations of nostalgia items (experimental data).	136
Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics and correlations of populism items (experimental data).	141
Table 6.4: Moderated mediation analysis (Model 1).	150
Table 6.5: Moderated mediation analysis (Model 2).	151
Table 6.6: Simple mediation analysis (Model 3).	153
Table A.1: Distribution of the texts.	190
Table B.1: OLS Analysis with unstandardized coefficients.	191
Table B.2: OLS Analysis with unstandardized coefficients (DV: Nationalism).	193
Table B.3: Logistic regression analysis (DV: Nationalism).	194
Table C.1: Regression analyses of average treatment effects on nostalgia.	195
Table C.2: Regression analyses of average treatment effects on populism.	196

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Responses to the nostalgia question in the Pew Research 2017 Survey.	6
Figure 1.2: Responses to the nostalgia question in the Pew Research 2017 Survey according to party preference (Ordinal scale).	7
Figure 1.3: Responses to the nostalgia question in the Pew Research 2017 Survey according to party preference (Continuous scale).	8
Figure 1.4: Replication of de Vries' (2018) nostalgia measurement according to the left-right self-placement of the respondents.	9
Figure 2.1: Nostalgic attitudes of the populist radical right, center-right, and center-left constituency in Sweden and the Netherlands.	39
Figure 3.1: Timeline of Turkish politics between 1908 and 2018.	42
Figure 3.2: Vote shares of <i>Milli Görüş</i> Parties and AKP in general elections.	57
Figure 3.3: Vote shares of CHP, HP, SHP, and DSP (center-left parties) in general elections.	64
Figure 4.1: Level of populism by four dimensions.	84
Figure 5.1: Histograms of populism items.	106
Figure 5.2: Histogram of populism index.	106
Figure 5.3: Histograms of nostalgia items.	108
Figure 5.4: Histogram of nostalgia index.	109
Figure 5.5: Bar graph of populism index according to four major political parties.	121
Figure 5.6: Bar graph of nostalgia index according to four major political parties.	122
Figure 5.7: Marginsplot of the CHP preference and nostalgia interaction.	124
Figure 6.1: Histograms of nostalgia items (control group).	135
Figure 6.2: Histogram of nostalgia scale for each group.	136
Figure 6.3: Mean plot of nostalgia across treatment groups.	136
Figure 6.4: Mean plot of nostalgia across treatment groups and party preference.	137
Figure 6.5: Histogram of nostalgia scale for each group of the AKP voters.	138
Figure 6.6: Histogram of nostalgia scale for each group of the CHP voters.	138
Figure 6.7: Regression analyses of average treatment effects on nostalgia.	139

Figure 6.8: Histograms of populism items (control group).	141
Figure 6.9: Mean plot of populism across treatment groups.	142
Figure 6.10: Mean plot of populism across treatment groups and party preference.	143
Figure 6.11: Histogram of populism scale for each experiment group.	144
Figure 6.12: Histogram of populism scale for each experiment group of the AKP voters.	144
Figure 6.13: Histogram of populism scale for each experiment group of the CHP voters.	145
Figure 6.14: Regression analyses of average treatment effects on populism.	145
Figure 6.15: Path diagram of Model 1 and Model 2.	149
Figure 6.16: Path diagram of Table 6.4.	150
Figure 6.17: Conditional direct and indirect effects of Model 1.	151
Figure 6.18: Path diagram of Table 6.5.	152
Figure 6.19: Conditional direct and indirect effects of Model 2.	152
Figure 6.20: Path diagram of Table 6.6.	153

ABBREVIATIONS

ADNKS	<i>Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi</i> (Address-Based Population Registration System)
AP	<i>Adalet Partisi</i> (Justice Party)
AKP	<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i> (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	<i>Anavatan Partisi</i> (Motherland Party)
BBP	<i>Büyük Birlik Partisi</i> (Grand Union Party)
CFI	Comparative Fit Index
CHP	<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i> (Republican People's Party)
D-8	Developing Eight
DP	<i>Demokrat Parti</i> (Democratic Party)
DPT	<i>Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı</i> (State Planning Organization)
DSP	<i>Demokratik Sol Party</i> (Democratic Left Party)
DYP	<i>Doğru Yol Partisi</i> (True Path Party)
EU	European Union
FIDESZ	<i>Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége</i> (Alliance of Young Democrats)
FN	<i>Front National</i> (National Front)
FP	<i>Fazilet Partisi</i> (Virtue Party)
HDP	<i>Halkların Demokratik Partisi</i> (Peoples' Democratic Party)
HP	<i>Halkçı Parti</i> (Populist Party)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
İP	<i>İyi Parti</i> (Good Party)
İTP	<i>İttihat ve Terakki Partisi</i> (Party of Union and Progress)
JİTEM	<i>Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele</i> (Gendarmerie Intelligence)
KWIC	Key Word in Context
M	<i>Moderata samlingspartiet</i> (Moderate Party)

MGK	<i>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu</i> (National Security Council)
MHP	<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i> (Nationalist Action Party)
MNP	<i>Milli Nizam Partisi</i> (National Order Party)
MSP	<i>Milli Selamet Partisi</i> (National Salvation Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PiS	<i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i> (Law and Justice)
PKK	<i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê</i> (Kurdistan Worker's Party)
PSUV	<i>Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela</i> (United Socialist Party of Venezuela)
PvdA	<i>Partij van de Arbeid</i> (Labor Party)
PVV	<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i> (Party for Freedom)
RMSEA	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
RP	<i>Refah Partisi</i> (Welfare Party)
SAP Party)	<i>Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti</i> (Swedish Social Democratic Party)
SHP	<i>Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti</i> (Social Democrat Populist Party)
SODEP	<i>Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi</i> (Social Democracy Party)
SP	<i>Saadet Partisi</i> (Felicity Party)
SRMR	Standardized Root Mean Residual
SYRIZA	<i>Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás</i> (Coalition of the Radical Left)
TBMM	<i>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi</i> (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
TİP	<i>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</i> (Worker's Party of Turkey)
TLI	Tucker-Lewis Index
TÜİK	<i>Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu</i> (Turkish Statistical Institute)
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UN	United Nations
US	United States
VVD	<i>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</i> (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Topic

“I do not want to crumble under stress, quotas, and standards, but simply to work, as my father and grandfather did before me. I need the help of Marine” says a French fisherman in a presidential campaign ad of Marine Le Pen. We do not know whether fishing was easier before the quotas and standards implemented by the EU. Neither do we know whether the fisherman’s father and grandfather simply worked without any challenges. What we know is the promise of a populist leader, taking power from the EU elites and returning it to the ordinary fishermen, as it was in the past.

One can find multiple examples of populist leaders’ nostalgic rhetoric. Donald Trump’s slogan, “Make America Great Again”, implies the glorious past of the US and American society “in which there was a clear order, non-whites and women ‘knew their place,’ and white working-class males made a decent living doing an honest day’s work” (Mudde, 2016). For Prime Minister Viktor Orban, “Hungary hadn’t been able to influence the fate of the Carpathian Basin since 1920 ... but now, thanks to the achievements of the last seven years, Hungary plays a central role in the region” (Kovács, 2017), who implies how the Treaty of Trianon diminished the power of Hungary. The FIDESZ government declared June 4th as the “Day of National Cohesion” in 2010, the 90th anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon, to

commemorate the glorious past of Hungary. The founding of the Trianon Museum in Várpalota and the revision of educational curriculum are examples of other attempts of the Orban era's commemoration practices (Petö, 2016).

The picture is similar in Turkey. The populist Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*-AKP) dominates Turkish politics and similar to previous cases, they commonly exploit nostalgic rhetoric. The AKP governments frequently emphasize the good, glorious days of the Ottoman and Seljukian Empires on all occasions. They continuously assert that since the AKP has come to power, Turkey has changed. Now, there is a "New Turkey" which rises from its ashes. The AKP has structured their narrative with slogans like "Resurrection once again, rise once again" (*Yeniden diriliş, yeniden yükseliş*), which means once the country was glorious and strong in the past and will be glorious and strong again.

Following these examples, this study questions the relationship between nostalgia and populism. Many populists around the world exploit nostalgia by referring to the good, glorious past of their country. Populists frequently emphasize that the "elites" hijacked "the people's will" long ago and they offer "bringing power back to the people." Back in the good old days, corrupt elites were not powerful enough to abuse the authentic people. However, now, many regulations and institutions hinder the people's will. Populists exploit nostalgia to build their populist heartland which corresponds to a retrospectively constructed utopia on an abandoned but undead past (Taggart, 2004; Bauman, 2017).

So far, the literature on populism has covered qualitative case studies (e.g., Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Weyland, 2001; Taggart, 1995), populist political communication (e.g. March, 2017; Hameleers et al. 2017; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011), and survey studies (e.g. Akkerman et al. 2014; Stanley, 2011; Rooduijn et al. 2017;

van Hauwaert and van Kessel, 2017). However, there are few studies which test the psychological determinants of populism such as declinism (Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016), emotions (Rico et al. 2017), personality traits (Bakker et al. 2016), societal pessimism (Steenvoorden and Hartevelt, 2018), and political identities (Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). This study aims to make further contributions to the literature of psychological factors that are shaping populist attitudes.

1.2. Case Selection

The euphoria following the Third Wave democratization evolved into political anxiety due to democratic stagnation over the last decade. Scholars pointed out that the electoral victories of populist parties are a dangerous trend for explaining the erosion of democratic values and institutions. This erosion does not only occur in defective democracies but also in countries previously qualified as full democracies (Bermeo, 2016; Diamond, 2016; Müller, 2016).

Turkey had been presented as a model country with its secular and democratic system in contrast with the authoritarian countries in the Middle East during the early 2000s. In order to receive an EU membership bid, the coalition government of the time launched a democratic reform process in 2001 with significant constitutional and legal amendments. This reform process continued through the first AKP period between 2002 and 2007, with accession negotiations officially started in 2005. Following the 2008 global economic crisis, as the EU lost its leverage over both member and periphery countries, Turkey has gradually moved away from liberal democratic norms and practices and the reform process has stalled since then (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2016; Öktem and Akkoyunlu, 2016; Öniş, 2015; Öniş and Kutlay, 2017; Somer, 2016). Consequently, as concerns over democratic backsliding in Turkey have increased, scholars have begun to question populism during the AKP rule.

Above all, the literature on populism in Turkey has recently been growing. Prior to AKP's rise to power, there were very few studies which discussed populism in Turkey. The most prominent examples are Sunar's (1990) analysis on DP's populism during the 1950s, Erdoğan's (1998) comparison of the CHP and Revolutionary Path (*Devrimci Yol*) during the 1970s, Öniş's (2004) discussion on Özal's neoliberal economic policies, Berkes' (1964) analysis on Kemalist populism, and some chapters from the İletişim Publishing House's nine volumes of Political Thought in Modern Turkey (*Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*) series (2006, first edition 2003) edited by Bora, Gültekingil, Aktay, and Laçiner. As the AKP consolidated its hegemony and Turkey moved into competitive authoritarianism, populism literature has recently begun to grow.

The existing studies on populism in Turkey mostly used qualitative methods. So far, the only survey study was conducted by Aytaç and Elçi (2019). The authors concluded that contrary to the Western European cases where populist parties are in the opposition, satisfaction with life, the economy, and democracy have a positive relationship with populist attitudes in Turkey, where populists are in power.

There are also very few comparative analyses on Turkey. Öniş and Aytaç (2014) compared Turkey with Argentina regarding political leadership and economic policies, as well as the reasons for the emergence of populism in these cases. Selçuk (2016) discussed the leadership characteristics and institutional weaknesses in Turkey, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Hadiz (2014) compared Turkey with Indonesia and Egypt by analyzing the new economic relations in the Islamic world and populism. Yabancı and Taleski (2018) compared Turkey with Macedonia to show how populist parties in power exploit religion, sacralizing people's will to justify their illiberal actions. In another study, Kirdiş and Drhimeur (2016) analyzed

Islamic populism in Turkey and Morocco to understand how Islamist parties evolve and adopt populism when they come to power in order to cement their constituency.

There are still other studies that have analyzed populism in Turkey within the perspectives of neoliberal economic policies and social redistribution (Bozkurt, 2013; Özden, 2014; Tuğal, 2012; 2009), family policies (Yılmaz, 2015), us versus them identity (Arat-Koç, 2018; Yılmaz, 2018; Yılmaz, 2017), governmentality (Boyraz, 2018), political style and emotions (Çelik and Balta, 2018), conventional and social media (Bulut and Yörük, 2017; Özçetin, 2019), leadership (Türk, 2018), exploitation of NGOs such as labor unions and women organizations (Yabancı, 2016), parochial understanding of democracy (Çınar and Sayın, 2014), and populist discourse (Dinçşahin, 2012; Erçetin and Erdoğan, 2018).

All these studies evaluate populism in Turkey at meso and macro levels. However, except Aytaç and Elçi (2019), none of them conducted a micro level analysis. Thus, this study aims to fill this gap in the literature by estimating populist attitudes and values at the mass level. Additionally, this study evaluates collective nostalgia and populism at multiple levels, which is also missing in populism literature.

1.3. Contribution

In 2017, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey in 38 countries. One of the striking findings of the survey is about the nostalgic attitudes of respondents. The question for measuring nostalgia was, “In general, would you say life in (survey country) today is better, worse, or about the same as it was fifty years ago for people like you?” Although the report concluded that better economic perceptions have a positive correlation with less nostalgic attitudes, the wording of the question has flaws. Firstly, providing a historical benchmark is

confusing for respondents because, as this dissertation argues, (1) there can be multiple nostalgias and (2) the era that the people are yearning for can be older than “fifty years” in countries like Turkey, Venezuela, and Hungary. Looking at the cases where populist parties are in power, a majority of respondents in Turkey (66%) indicated that life was better now than fifty years ago. In Venezuela, a striking majority of participants indicated that life was worse now than fifty years ago (75%). In Hungary, 34 percent of respondents said better, 41 percent said worse, and 25 percent indicated about the same. Turning to Western European countries, where populists are in the opposition like Sweden and the Netherlands, the results show that a majority of respondents said life is better now than fifty years ago, 67 and 70 percent, respectively.




Figure 1.1: Responses to the nostalgia question in the Pew Research 2017 Survey.

However, when I subset the data according to populist and other political parties, I received interesting results (Figure 1.2). Starting with the “better” option, the majority of respondents

are close to populist parties in Turkey, Hungary, and Venezuela. In contrast, in Sweden and the Netherlands, other party supporters had a favorable opinion contrary to populist party voters. Turning to the “worse” option, other party supporters indicated their frustration about the contemporary period in Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela. In the Netherlands and Sweden, the results were reversed.




Figure 1.2: Responses to the nostalgia question in the Pew Research 2017 Survey according to party preference (Ordinal scale). Parties are *Fidesz* in Hungary, Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*-PVV) in the Netherlands, Swedish Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*-SD) in Sweden, AKP in Turkey, and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela*-PSUV) in Venezuela.

Figure 1.3 presents the results by treating the ordinal measurement of nostalgia scale as continuous (1 = worse, 2 = about the same, 3 = better, $M = 2.1$, $SD = 0.91$). The results illustrate that populist party supporters are more satisfied with their contemporary conditions in comparison with other party supporters in countries where populists are in power, like Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela. However, the populist constituency is less satisfied with

their current situation compared with other party supporters in countries where populists are in the opposition, like Sweden and the Netherlands. These results once again confirm that, firstly, there can be multiple nostalgias according to respondents' political position – whether they voted for the winner. Secondly, providing a historical benchmark yields false positives or negatives because Ottoman, Dual Monarchy, and Bolivar nostalgias are strong in Turkey, Hungary, and Venezuela, respectively.




Figure 1.3: Responses to the nostalgia question in the Pew Research 2017 Survey according to party preference (Continuous scale). Vertical lines indicate confidence intervals. Parties are *Fidesz* in Hungary, Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid-PVV*) in the Netherlands, Swedish Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna-SD*) in Sweden, AKP in Turkey, and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela-PSUV*) in Venezuela.

Contrary to measuring nostalgia with a historical benchmark, this study offers four nostalgic items which do not imply any historical period. This study argues that capturing the period that respondents yearn for should be measured separately, either by directly asking the era or with an experimental design that stimulates the most prominent nostalgias within a given

society. This study adopted the latter design to detect the past era that most stimulates respondents' nostalgia.

More recently, de Vries and Hoffmann (2018) measured nostalgia with a four-level-Likert scale and the following question: To what extent do you agree with the following statement? "The world used to be a much better place." Although de Vries and Hoffmann's item seems to have better wording, single item measurements may have shortcomings compared with multiple-indicator scales. According to Evans et al. (1996), firstly, single item questions suffer from addressing the complexity of multi-faceted topics. However, multiple-item scales are better for assessing the attitude consistency across a wide range of social and political topics. Secondly, the risk of idiosyncratic interpretations of single item questions is higher than multiple-item scales because asking multiple questions cancels out random errors and increases reliability. Thirdly, multiple-item scales have more discriminatory power than single item measures. Finally, using shorter and single-item measures may lead to Type-1 and Type-2 errors when compared to longer and multiple-item scales (Crede et al., 2012).




Figure 1.4: Replication of de Vries and Hoffmann's (2018) nostalgia measurement according to the left-right self-placement of the respondents.

Although de Vries' (2018) raw data is unavailable, her report provides the results of respondents' nostalgic feelings according to the self-reported left-right scale.¹ Figure 4 illustrates that respondents who identify themselves as "right" are more nostalgic only in France. In Germany, center-right respondents are more nostalgic than any other constituency, whereas center-left respondents are less nostalgic than others. In Italy, center-right participants are more nostalgic than the rest of respondents. In Poland, the majority of right-wing respondents are both nostalgic and not nostalgic. In Spain, it is the same for left-wing respondents. In summation, since the data is not available, I cannot speculate more on de Vries and Hoffmann's attempt to measure nostalgia. However, the results are complicated and do not indicate a clear pattern of whether populists are more nostalgic than others.

Yet another significant contribution of this dissertation is that while nostalgia is conducive to the rise of populist attitudes, not every type of nostalgia causes populism. Although the literature suggests that there is a relationship between nostalgia and populism (e.g., Wiles 1969; Betz and Johnson, 2004; Taggart 2004), there are very few empirical studies that analyze this relationship (e.g., Steenvoorden and Harteveld, 2018; Gest et al., 2017). However, as Chapter 5 broadly covers, these studies mostly used proxy variables rather than using nostalgia and populist attitudes batteries. Also, as Chapter 6 indicates, these studies also do not test what type of nostalgic message leads to the rise of populism.

¹ Self-reported left-right scale is measured with the question of "If you had to choose one of the below, which option best describes your political views on a left-right scale?" The responses are left, center-left, center-right, and right. She classified respondents as nostalgic when they either respond to "agree" or "completely agree" with the statement, and those as non-nostalgic who either "completely disagree" or "disagree."

1.4.Overview of the Chapters

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical background of the dissertation. The chapter first presents the definition of populism and its dimensions which are people-centrism, anti-elitism and anti-establishment, and the Manichean outlook. The chapter then discusses the definition of nostalgia, its impacts on social identity, and how nostalgia is used to build in-group versus out-group dichotomies. Next, Chapter 2 provides a discussion on the relationship between collective nostalgia and populism. Finally, Chapter 2 elaborates on how nostalgia differs from populism.

Chapter 3 discusses the historical background of populism in Turkey. I argue that the center-periphery cleavage, coined by Şerif Mardin (1973), breeds both populism and nostalgia in Turkish politics. Since the Young Turk era of the Ottoman Empire and the early Republican period (circa between 1908 and 1945), populism has been an embedded characteristic of politics in Turkey. Following the transition to the multiparty era, right-wing parties exploited populism by promoting themselves as the sole representatives of authentic Muslim people. However, the AKP became the champions of populism by fusing its populist ideology with conservatism and Islamism. The right-wing parties, but especially the AKP, utilized Ottoman nostalgia to create an “us versus them” distinction, corrupt secular elites versus pure Muslim people, in Turkish society. More recently, during the 1990s, Kemalists also developed nostalgia for the era of Atatürk as a reaction to changes in the political and economic structure of Turkey, especially against rising Islamism (Özyürek, 2008). So far, the effects of Kemalist nostalgia on populism have not been questioned in academic literature. Moreover, this study shows that Kemalist nostalgia has a weaker effect on populist attitudes, contrary to its Ottoman counterpart.

Chapter 4 scrutinizes populist and nostalgic political communications of the two prominent political leaders and contemporary representatives of the center-periphery cleavage in Turkey: President and party leader of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (periphery), and the leader of the main opposition party, CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (center). Chapter 4 first analyzes the parliamentary group addresses of these leaders by using a dictionary-based content analysis method. Next, Chapter 4 analyses the exploitation of Ottoman and Kemalist nostalgia in domestic and foreign policy issues by these political leaders. The results show that Erdoğan appears as more populist than Kılıçdaroğlu during the period between 2011 and 2018. Erdoğan exploits Ottoman nostalgia by criticizing the elites and interest groups as enemies of the people and using this criticism to justify his actions. Contrary to Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu utilizes Kemalist nostalgia for criticizing the illiberal and undemocratic attempts of Erdoğan and the AKP.

Chapter 5 asks the following question: does collective nostalgia also characterize the populist attitudes of the electorate? Using a representative survey data and OLS regression models, the chapter first explains populism and nostalgia batteries with exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis methods. Next, the chapter presents the control variables of the regression design and hypotheses. Briefly, the results show that there is a positive relationship between nostalgia and populism at the mass level, even after controlling for crucial independent variables such as party preference, religiosity, EU support, and satisfaction with life, the economy, and democracy. However, while the results indicate that the AKP constituency is significantly more populist than the rest of respondents, there is no significant difference between AKP, CHP, MHP, and HDP supporters in terms of nostalgic attitudes. The statistical

difference tests and OLS analysis with interaction variables also suggest that in order to detect different types of nostalgias, additional tests should be conducted.

Chapter 6 questions which type of nostalgia positively effects populism with an online survey experiment. In order to measure the impacts of Ottoman and Kemalist nostalgias, I created a between-group experimental design with three experimental groups: Ottoman nostalgia, Kemalist nostalgia, and pure control group. The chapter first analyses the effects of nostalgia messages on nostalgic attitudes by an OLS design. The results show that party preference moderates the impact of nostalgic messages on nostalgic attitudes. Next, Chapter 6 tests the central hypothesis of this dissertation: the impact of nostalgia on populist attitudes. The results show that Ottoman nostalgia has a significantly positive impact on populist attitudes. However, the impact of Kemalist nostalgia is barely significant in comparison. Finally, Chapter 6 analyses the complex relationship between nostalgia and populism with both simple mediation and moderated mediation analysis, as previous analyses suggested that party preference, collective nostalgia attitudes, and particular nostalgic messages have significant impacts on populism. The results show that voting for AKP positively moderates the impact of Ottoman nostalgia on populist attitudes through collective nostalgia, whereas moderation of CHP voting has a negative effect. Also, Kemalist nostalgia has an indirect effect on populist attitudes through collective nostalgia. In all mediation models, the direct effects of nostalgia treatments disappear, which indicates that respondents' level of nostalgia matters when it comes to measuring the impacts of nostalgic messages on populist attitudes.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation first by discussing the results. Next, the chapter presents the shortcomings of this dissertation. Finally, Chapter 7 suggests ideas for future studies.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In his treatise “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life”, Nietzsche (1874[1980]) says that “we are all suffering from a malignant historical fever and should at least recognize the fact.” After more than a century, we have again begun to suffer from a malignant historical fever which infects politics and society. This study, as a recognition of this nostalgia fever, aims to analyze its effect on populism.

This chapter explains the theoretical background of the dissertation. It first covers the definition of populism and its dimensions which are people-centrism, anti-elitism and anti-establishment, and the Manichean outlook. Next, the chapter explains the definition of nostalgia. Subsequently, the chapter analyzes the theoretical relationship between populism and nostalgia. Finally, the chapter explains how populism differs from nostalgia and that nostalgia is not a dimension, but rather, an impetus of populism.

2.1. Populism

There is a plethora of literature that discusses the definition of populism as an essentially contested concept (e.g., Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Weyland, 2001; Aslanidis, 2016; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014; Stanley, 2008). While scholars emphasize differences between the various definitions of populism, it is more fruitful to discuss the intersections of these definitions. One of these intersections indicates that the very core of the populism is

“the people” (Mudde, 2007; Müller, 2016; Laclau, 2005; Canovan, 2005). However, rather than having empty references to the people, populism requires antagonism towards the elites, who repress the people as the silent majority. This antagonism has to be based on morality to differ populism from other ideologies such as socialism, where the conflict is constituted on class struggle. While populists attach purity and authenticity to construct “the people” as an identity, they stigmatize the elites as immoral and traitorous (Mudde, 2017).

According to Mudde (2007, p. 23) populism is “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonte generale* (general will) of the people.” According to this definition, populist ideology divides society into two basic camps in a Manichean sense: good people and corrupt elites. Populist ideology creates an “us and them” distinction by glorifying “the people” and discrediting “the elites.” Against the hegemonic elites, the will of the people should be the ultimate authority in politics. Populists also constitute “dangerous others”, which imply that certain groups do not belong to “the people.” While antagonism towards the elites indicates the vertical axis of populist exclusion, the horizontal one refers to the exclusion of dangerous others (March, 2017; Meny and Surel, 2002).

The elites and “others”, which are covered in those who do not belong to the “people”, can be any groups such as elites, immigrants, minorities, foreigners, other countries, great powers, the European Union, the United Nations, and so on. Populists exclude specific groups to delineate who is included in “the people” (Müller, 2014). According to populists, these subordinate out-groups manipulate the democratic system for their ends and usurp “the

people's will." Thus, people's will in the majoritarian sense should be the ultimate authority in decision-making.

Contrary to thick-centered or full ideologies like socialism, conservatism, or liberalism, thin-centered ideologies such as populism are "incapable of providing on its own a solution to questions of social justice, distribution of resources, and conflict-management which mainstream ideologies address" (Freeden, 1998, p. 751). Hence, populism has a symbiotic relationship with thicker ideologies, which is the reason for the emergence of populist parties both from the left and right of the political spectrum. Left-wing populism, which includes the third wave of Latin American populism along with cases like SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain, exploit both socialist and populist ideas (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). The rise of far-right politics in Europe and the US, on the other hand, carries populist, conservative, nativist, and authoritarian characteristics (Mudde, 2007).

Many scholars agree that populism appears as a backlash to a sense of severe crisis (Taggart, 2004; Rooduijn, 2014a) or discontent (Spruyt et al. 2016). The sense of extreme crisis paves the way for raising concerns on present conditions, which is a breeding ground for populism (Akkerman et al., 2014). Populists blame the establishment for the decline in the economic, political, and living standards of the people (Rooduijn et al., 2016). However, populism can also appear due to the unsolved, long-lasting and crosscutting political cleavages within a given society. Somer and McCoy (2019, p. 8) define these cleavages as formative rifts which "either emerged or could not be resolved during the formation of nation-states, or, sometimes during fundamental re-formulations of states such as during transitions from communism to capitalism, or authoritarian to democratic regimes." Hence, while the sense of extreme crisis can be a recent change in a society, such as immigration for European countries, it can be the

secular-religious cleavage in Turkey (Aytaç and Elçi, 2019; Somer, 2019) or changes in gender and race relations in the US (Davis, 1979; Doane and Hodges, 1987).² Eventually, populists aim to reestablish the present and future retrospectively by emphasizing the golden past of society to cope with contemporary challenges. Their goal is to return to a paradise lost where life was better and more straightforward.

2.1.1. Dimensions of Populism

Many dimensions have been attributed to populism in academic literature. According to Stanley (2008, p. 99), “the core of an ideology is comprised of a cluster of decontested concepts which, as a result of their mutual proximity, form a relatively distinct and coherent ideational framework with a large degree of durability over time.” Despite disagreements on various aspects of populism, contemporary literature agrees that the very core of the concept is “the people.” All of the remaining characteristics of populism arise from “the people” (Mudde, 2007; Stanley, 2008; Laclau, 2005; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis; 2014; Moffitt, 2016). In essence, this section covers the very core of populism, “the people”, and its dimensions: (1) people-centrism, (2) anti-elitism and anti-establishment, and (3) the Manichean outlook of politics (Castanho Silva et al., 2017; Rooduijn, 2014a; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Schulz et al., 2017).

People-centrism

“The people” as an empty signifier occupies the center of populism (Laclau, 2005). The people consist of the “ordinary man” or the “silent majority” who are not represented by corrupt elites. However, “the people” as a slippery concept raises the question: who are “the

² Also see Duyvendak (2011) for the comparison of nostalgia in Europe and the US.

people” exactly? According to Mudde (2004, p. 546), “the people” is an imagined community which is “in fact a mythical and constructed subset of the whole population.” The boundaries of this subset are always vague and change contextually.

According to Canovan (2005), “the people” is a contested concept which carries three meanings in general: the people as sovereign, the people as a nation, and the people as opposed to the elites (i.e., the common people). While “the people as sovereign” treats people as “the outcome of political will,” “the people as a nation” conceives people “as organic growth.” However, the theory of populism rests on its appeal to “the common people” – the people as opposed to the elites. The people is “a daily plebiscite”, (Renan, 1882[1992]) which is “as an entity or group capable of exercising power is/are not readily available. Far from being a given, it/they has/have to be in some way constructed, mobilized or represented to be in a position either to wield power or to be checked in doing so” (Canovan, 2005, pp. 88-89).

“The people” is a broad group that is adversely affected by problems in a given country. The non-people, on the other hand, are the outsiders who are responsible for these problems. According to Moffitt (2015, p. 201), “the demonization of social groups, and particularly the antipathy towards the elite, provides populists with an enemy, but it is also a crucial component of the attempt to construct an identity.” In turn, the masses who are vulnerable to crisis, the deprived and frustrated, appeal to being a member of “the people” to cope with these problems. Following the formation of “the people,” particular problems no longer belong to individuals, but then, they become a member of “the people” who have same concerns (Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Spruyt et al., 2016).

For populists, the people's will is the backbone of politics. The wishes of the people should be fulfilled no matter what it takes because "the voice of people is the voice of God – *Vox populi, vox Dei*" (Hawkins, 2010, p. 34). According to Hans-George Betz (1998, p. 4), populists have "a pronounced faith in the common sense of the ordinary people; the belief that simple solutions exist for the most complex problems of the modern world and the belief that the common people, despite possessing moral superiority and innate wisdom, have been denied the opportunity to make themselves heard."

The people's will is not something external to democracy. Instead, the people's will implies that decision-making is accountable to the constituency and the decision-makers are not appointed to their posts by God but elected by citizens. In the last instance, populism is "a shadow cast by democracy itself" (Canovan, 1999, p. 3). In this context, the problem for populists is not related to the people's will, but rather a representative democracy which fails to fulfill the demands of ordinary people (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014). Populist democracy is illiberal due to the rejection of fundamental principles of liberal democracy such as division of powers, checks and balances, individual freedoms, and so on. More specifically, populism is "an illiberal democratic response to decades of undemocratic liberal policies" (Mudde, 2016b).

At this point, it is also essential to ask whether the people really do want to be involved in politics all the time. According to Mudde (2004), the answer is no because although the people desire to take part in essential decision-making, they actually want a leader, a responsive leadership, who is well aware of people's demands. Moreover, populists rule "as if they had obtained a popular imperative mandate and as if laws correspond to some

antecedently ascertained general will, hence there is no need for the actual ratification of such laws by the people” (Müller, 2014, p. 487).

Populist movements claim that the people’s will is always right because there is the only one, unique will of the people. The elites, politicians, and institutions of representative democracy are corrupt. The institutional mediators such as constitutional courts, mechanisms of checks and balances, the rule of law, and supranational agreements are obstacles to the people’s will. Plebiscites and referendums are the only instruments for controlling the controllers (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014; Kriesi, 2014; Pappas, 2016; Mudde, 2010; Hawkins, 2010; Aslanidis, 2016).

Thus, populism requires an unmediated relationship between the people and a populist leader (Akkerman et al., 2014; Kriesi, 2014; Oliver and Rahn, 2016). Besides plebiscites and elections, mass rallies and opinion polls are crucial for both mobilizing and convincing the populist constituency. These mass rallies and surveys are utilized for constituting an in-group feeling and makes political or economic issues socially desirable, even if the subject under discussion is against the liberal democratic principles. In turn, the crowds in rallies and the high confirmation rates in public opinion surveys confirm and boost the populist leader’s popularity and support (Weyland, 2001).

Anti-Elitism and Anti-Establishment

Similar to “the people,” the boundaries of “the elite” is vague. The elite is also socially constructed in the Manichean sense, which is a mirror image of the people. For Collier (1999), there are at least three different definitions of elites according to their roles in politics and society. The first one is a class-based definition. In the class-based hierarchy, elites are

above the working class, which is comprised of traditional landed classes, or middle classes, and the urban sectors including the bourgeois, professionals, managerial, and white-collar groups. The second definition refers to those holding political power, who are incumbents and other parties in government. The third definition of the elites refers to leaders who are in strategic positions of organizations and social movements.

Contrary to these clearcut definitions, populists make vague references to the elites and those elites may refer to all three of Collier's definitions. Populist movements use this as an advantage for tapping into the various crosscutting cleavages in a given society (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). According to Mudde (2004), Jews, the wealthy, and bankers were stigmatized as proponents of special interests. In contemporary populism, the elites can be the ruling party, bureaucracy, intellectuals, journalists, the wealthy, international and supranational organizations, international finance organizations, foreign countries, and so on.

"The elite" is infamous for populists. They are enemies and exploiters of the people. There is a complex and antagonistic relationship between the elite, minorities, and the people. Minorities and the corrupt elite mutually support one another against "the people" in the name of rights and pluralism. "The elite" is also a traitor. Populists reject compromise because it perverts the purity of the people (Mudde, 2004; Hervik, 2012; Müller, 2014; Stanley, 2008).

The system has failed according to populists. Thus, the rise of populist parties is a reaction to specific factors which are promoted as crises (Taggart, 1995). These parties aspire to meet the preference of the constituents who dislike the establishment and have a feeling of being marginalized and being unrepresented by the traditional parties (Hino, 2012; Kriesi et al., 2008; Mudde, 2007). The displeasure of the constituency can be due to social injustice, as in

the case of Podemos in Spain (Kioupkiolis, 2016) or SYRIZA in Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014), or to neoliberalism, such as in Latin America (Filc, 2015). Meanwhile, it can be immigration, as in the case of the FN in France, UKIP in the United Kingdom, or PVV in the Netherlands (Pappas, 2016).

According to Barr (2009, p. 37), anti-establishment refers to frustration against the existing system. Hence, for populists, power in the hands of elites should be eradicated. There are three possible ways to achieve this eradication: (1) a change of personnel (replacement of the political class with the anti-establishment politicians), (2) a change of personnel plus increased accountability and government effectiveness, and (3) a change in personnel plus citizen participation, which is direct democracy. According to populists, guardians of the system should be the authentic people rather than the constitution, independent institutions, mechanisms of checks and balances, and the rule of law. If the constitution serves to protect the interests of the elites and the establishment, it should be amended, if not reinterpreted, by a populist appeal (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014; Hawkins, 2009; Levitsky and Loxton, 2013).

Manichean Outlook of Politics

The antagonism between the people and the elite is viewed through the Manichean outlook, which means dichotomizing the outside world with a moralist understanding of good and bad, a struggle between good and evil. The Manichean Outlook works as a mechanism that reduces the most complicated issues to a binary outcome (Hawkins, 2010). You are either of the pure, authentic people or the evil, corrupt elite. You either support the people's will or the establishment. You either uncritically support the populist leader or you are a traitor. There is no place for grey zones.

As a feature of populism, the Manichean outlook establishes a moralistic imagination of politics (Müller, 2016). Adopting a Manichean way of understanding paves the way for establishing binary oppositions like us versus them, in-group versus out-group, and friend versus foe. These binary oppositions are best known as the “concept of the political” as Schmitt addresses. According to Carl Schmitt (2007, p. 26), “the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.” As a critique of liberal democracy, Schmitt (2007, p. 53) posits that “[t]he political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity” because the “political world is a pluriverse, not a universe.” If the friend versus enemy distinction ceases to exist, what would remain is “neither politics nor state, but culture, civilization, economics, morality, law, art, entertainment, etc.” Schmitt’s criticisms against liberal democracy posit that “humanity”, which is central to liberalism, is incapable of constructing a political frontier or entity. Instead, “the people” – who are the rulers - are able to create a border between “us” and “them” (Mouffe, 1999).

In the most extreme cases, the Manichean outlook leads to pernicious polarization, which corresponds to a “polarization that divides societies into ‘Us vs. Them’ camps based on a single dimension of difference that overshadows all others” (McCoy and Somer, 2019, p. 234). Manichean outlook causes erosion of the middle ground in politics, where political identities become social identities and, in turn, a total rejection of other camp’s existence. The two hostile camps, in the end, cease dialogue and interaction and they begin to see each other as enemies to be destroyed, rather than political opponents.

The Manichean mindset emerges when the political structure or political entrepreneurs intensify cross-cutting cleavages (McCoy and Somer, 2019). However, these cleavages do

not appear ex-nihilo. When binary opposition between groups intensifies, the in-group begins to perceive itself as morally superior to the materially more powerful out-group (Levi-Strauss, 1990). The authentic in-group stereotypes the morally inferior out-group as its primary obstacles to establishing a just order which the in-group is trying to form. The out-group, on the contrary, intuitively pursues a strategy of protecting the hierarchical relationship from the less dominant in-group (Ramakrishna, 2015). Eventually, the friend versus enemy polarization leads to the emergence of a strong group identity, which becomes more critical than the physical existence of individuals (Norris, 1998).

Manichean outlook argues that “we are not 99% but 100%” (Müller, 2014, p. 487). This argument may decrease political and social tolerance for three reasons. Firstly, the otherization of out-group members with negative signifiers may lead to the demonization of the other camp. Secondly, by rejecting plurality in society, populists also deny the existence of opposition, which may lead to a vulgar implementation of politics. Thirdly, it may lead to value-based politics because the Manichean outlook is normative rather than objective (Hervik, 2012).

In some cases, “us versus them” antagonism channels previously unsatisfied grievances against the establishment, in turn, establishes a struggle as “the status quo versus ordinary people” (Kioupkiolis, 2016; Salter, 2016; Spruyt et al., 2016). The emancipatory nature of an “us versus them” distinction seems to pave the way for inclusive politics, to the advantage of the unfulfilled demands of the underdogs. However, it could be harmful for democracy when dichotomization is built on long-lasting formative rifts and when the balance of power between two groups shifts in favor of one party (McCoy and Somer, 2019).

2.2. Collective Nostalgia

The etymological roots of nostalgia come from Greek, which is the combination of *nostos* “return home” and *algia* “a painful condition” and can be roughly translated as “a painful yearning to return home” (Davis, 1979, p. 1). Nostalgia first appeared as a problem of isolated monks who experienced extreme loneliness and melancholy due to their withdrawal from earthly life. The word nostalgia, however, was coined by a Swiss medical student Johannes Hofer in 1688 when he observed the symptoms of soldiers fighting abroad (Boym, 2001; Stauth and Turner, 1988; Lowenthal, 1985).

In line with Wildschut et al. (2014), I define collective nostalgia as “the nostalgic reverie that is contingent upon thinking of oneself in terms of a particular social identity or as a member of a particular group and concerns events or objects related to it.” According to Stauth and Turner (1988, p. 47), nostalgia is yearning for “some golden age of heroic virtue, moral coherence and ethical certainty, a period in which there was no gap between virtue and action, between words and things, or between function and being.” Nostalgia has four major components. First, “there is the view of history as decline and loss, being a departure from some golden age of ‘homefulness.’” Second is the problem that there exists “a sense of the loss of wholeness and moral certainty.” At this point, “history is seen to be a collapse of values which had once provided the unity of social relations and personal experience.” The third one is related to “the loss of individual autonomy and the collapse of genuine social relationships.” Last but not least, nostalgia is “the sense of a loss of simplicity, spontaneity, and authenticity” (Stauth and Turner, 1988, pp. 30-32).

The studies during the 20th century considered nostalgia as a psychologic disorder and emphasized its adverse outcomes like depression and severe compulsive disorder (Sedikides

et al., 2008a). More recently, many studies indicate positive relationship between nostalgia and terror management (Routledge et al., 2008), self-continuity (Sedikides et al., 2008b; Sedikides et al., 2015), socio-historic continuity (Brown and Humphreys, 2002), and social identity (Wildschut et al., 2014; Smeekes et al., 2015; Smeekes, 2015; Smeekes and Verkuyten, 2015; Sedikides et al., 2016; Cheung et al., 2017).

“The nostalgic subject,” for Tannock (1995, p. 454), “turns to the past to find/construct sources of identity, agency, or community, that are felt to be lacking, blocked, subverted, or threatened in the present” because nostalgia is “the search for continuity amid threats of discontinuity” (Davis, 1979, p. 35). As a group-based emotion, nostalgia is related to social identity (Davis, 1979; Psaltis et al. 2017). According to the Social Identity Theory, identities are “part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership” (Tajfel, 1982, p. 2). The self-categorization of “us versus them” is the heart of social identity theory (Greene, 1999). When absolute differences are salient between groups, people tend to perceive similarities of the in-group and exaggerate the in-group’s differences from the out-group (Hornsey, 2008). Nostalgia, or the way we remember our past, exacerbates in-group versus out-group distinctions (Martinovic et al. 2018). Nostalgia strengthens shared social identity and provides distinguishing characteristics of the in-group from other groups (Brown and Humphreys, 2002; Wildschut et al., 2014).

In the process of identity construction, history becomes a useful instrument for people to understand who they are, where they come from, and where they should be going. The past emerges as a guideline during the constitution of group identity, its relationship with other groups, and as a defense mechanism for external threats (Davis, 1979; Liu and Hilton, 2005;

Jetten and Hutchison, 2011). In turn, nostalgia legitimizes the present action with references to the past (Gaston and Hilhorst, 2018). According to Searle-White (2001, p. 49), group identity “is not only its image of who it is now, but also who it has been in the past, and who its people hope it will be in the future.” References to past and nostalgic reveries help to constitute people’s identities and functions as an intermediary tool between memory and identity (Kalinina and Menke, 2016). According to Smeekes (2015, p. 56), collective nostalgia triggers an in-group prototype “as being part of a moral community based on shared past experiences” and out-group prejudice. The in-group and out-group stereotyping illustrates group boundaries between the authentic “us” and the alien “them.”

Boym (2001) classifies nostalgia as restorative and reflexive. Restorative nostalgia emphasizes *nostos* (home) and pursues to reconstruct the lost home retrospectively. This type of nostalgia does not consider itself as nostalgia, but rather as truth and tradition. Reflective nostalgia, on the contrary, is developed on *algia* (the longing itself), which does not aim to recover the truth, past, and tradition.

Restorative nostalgia has two underlying narratives which are the restoration of origins and belief in conspiracy theories. The conspiratorial mindset paves the way for the Manichean outlook in tandem with scapegoating of the mythical enemy. For restorative nostalgia, the “home” – the heartland – “is forever under siege, requiring defense against the plotting enemy” (Boym, 2001, p. 43) and members of in-group should protect the heartland from the others by any means. “They” consistently conspire against “our” heartland. Thus, “we” have to fight against “them” to defend “our” imagined community. In the nostalgic mindset, decline from the Golden Age to the Fall “is caused by forces external to a previously stable

and utopian system ... Decline, naturally must come after, from elsewhere, from the 'cut' or the Catastrophe" (Tannock, 1995, p. 460).

Restorative nostalgia, in short, is a longing for the heartland and returning to the desired collectivity. The past is a snapshot which is purified of failures and bad memories. It is reconstructed according to the requirements of today (Davis, 1979). Bryan (2012, p. 27) defines purification of the past as false nostalgia which is "a yearning for a kind of home that we may have never had" (See also Verovsek, 2016). False nostalgia is not a crucial issue for nostalgics because when they reach it, the difference between the real and fake will be forgotten (Boym, 2001). In Mudde's (2016b) words, "both the left and the right populists refer to the past that does not and has never existed. The politics of nostalgia exaggerate positive aspects and eliminates negative ones. The past is whitewashed."

Collective nostalgia is strongly related to both remembering and amnesia. According to Ernest Renan (1882), in the making of "the people," "to forget" and "to get one's history wrong" are essential elements. The failures of the imagined past are not crucial to populists. Instead, they suppress unwanted parts of the past and focus more on their positive aspects. It is about selection and elimination of memories. Nostalgia is a constant interaction between remembering and forgetting. For Nisbet (1982, p. 236), nostalgia is "the rust of memory, the detritus left by waning tradition and ritual." The past in nostalgia is recreated as a practice of escape. "Nostalgia makes the past a mere cornucopia of anodynes" (Nisbet, 1982, p. 237). Nostalgia emerges by romanticization, idealization, simplification, mythologization, and symbolization of the past (Assmann, 2008; Kalinina and Menke, 2016; Mazrui, 2013; Brown and Humphreys, 2002; Smeekes and Verkuyten, 2013).

For Boym (2001, p. 44), “nostalgia is an ache of temporal distance and displacement.” Restorative nostalgia takes care of both of these symptoms because it is the homecoming where “predictability, safety, and familiarity” prevails (Duyvendak, 2011, p. 13). Distance is “compensated by intimate experience and the availability of a desired object.” Purification of the home from the elites and their collaborators, in the case of populism, compensates for the distance of the people. Displacement, on the other hand, “is cured by a return home, preferably a collective one”, which refers to the heartland that the people wish to return, where enemies, corruptions, and disruptions are absent.

2.3. Populism and Nostalgia

For Betz and Johnson (2004, p. 324), right-wing populism is “a backward-looking reactionary ideology, reflecting a deep sense of nostalgia for the good old days.” Similarly, Wiles (1969, p. 170) also argues that populism dislikes “the present and the immediate future” by seeking “to mold the further future in accordance with its vision of the past.” For Sullivan (2017), the rise of populism is closely related to “acute despair at the present moment and a memory of a previous golden age.” Populists aim to destroy the current status quo and “return to the past in one emotionally cathartic revolt.” Populists constitute a new ideology of home, a vision of the lost homeland which is a nostalgia for a reconstructed past, and in turn, provides some sense of security against perceived loss of identity (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). Golden ages are crucial for populists because they provide sources for political legitimacy for the present, along with the rhetoric of authority and authenticity against troublesome changes, crises, or decline (Elgenius and Rydgren, 2018; Kenny, 2017). The golden age corresponds to the heartland in populism literature. Coined by Taggart (2004, p. 278), “the heartland is a construction of the good life derived retrospectively from a

romanticized conception of life as it has been lived.” It is turning back to the prelapsarian world, a Golden age before a catastrophic lapse or fall, because in the post-lapsarian era individuals feel lacking, deficient, or oppressed (Tannock, 1995). Populists aim to reach a “retrotopia”, which are “visions located in the lost/stolen/abandoned but undead past, instead of being tied to the not-yet-unborn and so inexistent future” (Bauman, 2017, p. 5).

As mentioned earlier, myths and memories of an imagined past become tools for constructing the people (Chiantera-Stutte, 2005). While populists utilize selective memory to cement their constituency and build the people, they demonize enemies by delineating them with disruption and disorder (Cento Bull, 2016). Populists “rely on representations of a them that are designated as not only not ‘the people,’ but as its film negative; an image of what society should not be” (Salter, 2016, p. 117). For Steenvoorden and Hartevelde (2018), when individuals are concerned that society is in decline, societally pessimistic people are fascinated by the nostalgic appeals of right-wing populist parties. Davis (1979, p. 49) points out that collective nostalgia grows “on the rude transitions rendered by history, on the discontinuities and dislocations wrought by such phenomena as war, depression, civil disturbance, and cataclysmic natural disasters – in short, those events that cause masses of people to feel uneasy and to wonder whether the world and their being are quite what they always took them to be.” In turn, according to Tannock (1995, p. 454), by appealing to the past, the nostalgic subject is “in escaping or evading, in critiquing, or in mobilizing to overcome the present experience of loss of identity, lack of agency, or absence of community.”

The construction of the “us versus them” is a function of crosscutting conflicts in a given society (Barr, 2009). During the construction of the antagonistic “us” and “them”, the

heartland provides raw material where values are collected (Taggart, 2004). There can be varieties of heartlands that no single theory can explain due to the unique characteristics of each society. The only thing one can argue is that society is divided along a single cleavage: the good, authentic people are separated from the corrupt elites, establishment, and minorities (Pappas, 2016). Populists draw the borders of in-group and out-group by reconstructing the past and referring to the founding moment of “the people” (Cento Bull, 2016). The “founding moment” corresponds to “the point of escape from our reality”, as well as the “escape from some traumatic, real kernel”, which is the function of populist ideology (Zizek, 2009, p. 45; Savage, 2012). It is an escape to the heartland which posits that “a life has already been lived and so shown to be feasible. It assumes or asserts that there was a good life before the corruptions and distortions of the present” (Taggart, 2004, p. 274).

According to Rodrik (2018), the rise of populist tide is related to two kinds of political cleavage. On the one hand, there is the identity cleavage which emerges from national, ethnic, and religious conflicts. On the other hand, there is the income cleavage due to changing class relations and income inequality. Populists tap either one or both of these cleavages, and in turn, there is an “other” that become the target of populist resentment. Populists claim that they are the voice of excluded and/or deprived people and they offer narratives which are practical but mostly misleading solutions. One of the narratives that populists offer is nostalgia, in which they propose a retrospectively built golden age (Gest et al., 2018).

Referring to Hochschild’s (2016) “strangers in their own land,” Inglehart and Norris (2017) argue that populists complain about alienation from today’s society. Populists claim that liberal elites and their collaborators, such as immigrants and minorities, have hijacked the people’s economic and political power. Those immigrants and minorities are also a threat to

their social and physical existence. The elites have humiliated the authentic people and excluded them from decision-making mechanisms. In turn, the sense of exclusion created a “cultural backlash” and its symptoms like rallying around strong leaders, strong in-group solidarity, exclusion of outsiders, and intense obedience to group norms. Consequently, populist leaders promise their constituency to make their countries like it used to be and to eradicate the sense of alienation.

What are the kinds of narratives that populists offer? What is the difference between populist mnemonic narratives? For Cento Bull and Hansen (2016), populists have a distinctive memory style, which is antagonistic memory. In antagonistic memory, the nature of the conflict is established as good (us) versus evil (them). Historical context is manipulated in where past events become myths. This antagonistic mode remembers past sufferings and the passion of belonging by demonizing and blaming “them” as evil. Quoting from Mouffe (2005, 2012), the authors argue that “the very relational character of cultural identity implies the potential for antagonistic confrontation, where political opponents are viewed as enemies to be destroyed” (p. 393). As Art (2010) indicates, populists denounce the politically correct histories offered by elites as “out of touch with the values and historical memories of ordinary people.”

Olick (2008, p. 152) broadly explains mnemonic practices and collective memory. Above all, according to Olick, “collective memory —or, alternatively, collective or social remembering—directs our attention to issues at the heart of contemporary political and social life, including the foundations of group allegiance and the ways we make sense of collective experience in time.” While doing so, collective memory uses mnemonic practices (like reminiscence, recall, representation, commemoration, celebration, regret, renunciation,

disavowal, denial, rationalization, excuse, and acknowledgment, and so on) and products (like stories, rituals, books, statues, presentations, speeches, images, pictures, records, and historical studies). These mnemonic practices and products, in summary, cover both individual and social dimensions. Populists exploit these mnemonic practices to popularize and legitimize their aims while discrediting tolerance and pluralism of all kinds in politics (Mols and Jetten, 2014). In the end, the instrumentalization of nostalgia becomes a political strategy for populists to increase their power.

However, the instrumentalization of nostalgia is not a sufficient condition to increase populism. As in the case of restorative nostalgia, it must carry resentment towards the elites and the demonized “non-people” (Betz, 2017; Betz and Johnson, 2004; Kenny, 2017; Wodak, 2017). The Nietzschean concept of *ressentiment* – or resentment, refers to a “seething hatred” of the slaves against their masters. Betz and Johnson (2004, p. 313) define resentment by quoting Salomon (1994), as “an emotion that reflects the blame and personal outrage with an excessive sense of injustice.” As resentment is an expression of weakness, it is an appeal to a radical change where “the world could and should be other than it is, with those at the top no longer on top, and those on the bottom no longer at the bottom.” As Nietzsche elaborated in the *Genealogy of Morals* (1887 [1969]), resentment is “a sense of grievance and an inability to do anything about it,” and in turn, frustration from this weakness paves the way for “grand politics of revenge” (Muldoon, 2017, p. 673).

Although nostalgia often represents “the longing to overcome present circumstances”, it is not limited to clashes between different groups but also exists “in the struggles with and against ‘progress.’” Nostalgia finds “present circumstances poor and horrid and in need of redemptive, reformative or emancipatory action” (Bryan, 2012, p. 26). According to Bryan

(2012, p. 31), nostalgia is a tool for carrying revenge. “Through nostalgia, we vengefully create a past out of our present sufferings, a past to which we can refer and which spurs action towards a future that will redeem the present along with the past.” It is creating a better world by improving conditions of contemporary circumstances with a vengeance.

Finally, one may ask whether nostalgia is a core dimension of populism like people-centrism, anti-elitism, and the Manichean outlook. The short answer is no. Firstly, as can be understood from Mudde’s definition, nostalgia is not an embedded characteristic of populism. Nostalgia has a very strong affective-emotional base which can be felt at many different levels – individual or collective. However, populism is an ideology. Nostalgic feelings can lead to endorsement of populist ideologies or certain populist leaders can try to trigger these feelings to get support for their parties.

Secondly, there are non-nostalgic populist parties, such as Podemos and SYRIZA, which have forward-looking ideologies and discourse. For example, leader of Podemos Pablo Iglesias posits that “The Republic should not be nostalgic for lost battles, nor just the vindication of the symbols of the struggles for democracy in our homeland. With the regime in trouble, the republic is a toolbox to think of a better country, with institutions free of the corrupt plot that parasitizes them, that take care of the people. ... To speak of the republic in Spain is to speak of memory itself, but memory develops its democratic power when it serves to speak of the future, of innovation, of youth” (Iglesias, 2017a). In one of his interviews, Iglesias (2017b) argued that “when we speak about popular sectors and assert the rights of the social majority against the elites, we are making a diagnosis of the class composition of our country much more accurately than those who have a nostalgia for an industrial working class. We live in a society in which the fundamental characteristic of young people’s work is

precariousness and that implies a form of cultural socialization very different from the traditional blue-collar jobs.” SYRIZA is another non-nostalgic case. Stelios Kouloglou, a member of the European Parliament of SYRIZA, argued that “there are times when you can feel a nostalgia for people who in the past you may have been totally against. In the face of extremism, with hardliners on the rise, this is one of them” while criticizing Trump’s policies and their effects on the EU’s goals (Smith, 2019).

Thirdly, one might argue that the populist right is nostalgic whereas the populist left is not. This argument is also not valid. The most prominent example of nostalgic left-populist movement is *Chavismo* and the PSUV, which have a strong nostalgia for the era of Simon Bolivar. For example, one of the first attempts of Chavez, when he came to power, was changing the name of the country from the Republic of Venezuela to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 1999. In short, Bolivar nostalgia became a tool of the Chavistas to justify the reformation of Venezuelan politics and society following the establishment parties’ decades of domination, also known as the Punto Fijo Pact (See: Hawkins, 2010, p. 3).

Fourthly, if nostalgia is one of the core dimensions of populism, then every nostalgia would follow with the rise of populism. However, we know that this is also not true. For example, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan has been depicted as a nostalgic politician by adopting policies like revising the post-war constitution to enable a full-fledged military, whitewashing Japan’s wartime atrocities by visiting the Yasukuni war shrine, revising educational curriculum, and reestablishing a “beautiful country”, a pure Japan which is free of contamination from western ideas like liberalism, individualism, and pacifism. These attempts are part of the policy to “Make Japan Great Again” as it was before its disastrous defeat in the Second World War (Torio, 2017; Brasor, 2017; Lee, 2015; Scanlon, 2014).

However, Abe is not a populist, but a conservative politician. Moreover, Mussolini's nostalgia for the Roman Empire does not qualify him as populist. Mussolini was a fascist (Giardina, 2008; also see: Kallis, 2002).

Fifthly, these examples may bring a follow-up question: nostalgia affects nationalism rather than populism, because, continuing with the previous examples, Abe, Mussolini, Le Pen, Wilders, even Chavez, and Maduro can be considered as nationalist to a varying extent. These political figures are indeed nationalists, and nationalists also exploit nostalgia in order to create an "us versus them" distinction. However, as Brubaker (2019) argued, nationalism and populism have overlapping characteristics that can be mainly seen in the construction of "the people." As mentioned above, Canovan (2005) argued that the people have three meanings: the people as sovereign, the people as a nation, and the people as opposed to the elites. While Laclauian school more recently tried to detach populism from nationalism (De Cleen 2017; Stavrakakis et al. 2017; De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017), Brubaker (2019) posit that populism and nationalism are overlapping yet distinct concepts. For example, both nationalism and populism refer to sovereignty. However, while the latter aims to restore dysfunctional democracy, the former had a transformative power during the era of rising nation-states. More recently, in a world of nation-states, nationalism also aims to restore the nation and the nation-state against the rising challenges such as globalization and back-stage politics of the supranational organizations such as the EU. Thus, the vertical and horizontal oppositions of populism and nationalism are intertwined. In Brubaker's words (2019, p. 14) the people are "a *two-dimensional* category, employed to construct both vertical and horizontal oppositions and, more specifically, to link vertical and horizontal oppositions by positioning 'the elite' as both top and outside" (emphases are in original). Rather than

dismantling populism and nationalism, we should focus on how they do overlap with each other.

Finally, right-wing populism's nostalgia does not stem from its populism but instead its attachment to a thick ideology of conservatism (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Fremeaux and Albertazzi, 2002). Conservatism as a political ideology can be elusive, yet the "main characteristic of political conservatives everywhere is their pride, their nostalgia, their sentiment with respect to their own nation's (or group's) history, and their determination to cherish, perpetuate, or 'conserve' policies and institutions particularly identified with it" (Freund, 1955, p. 10; also see: Müller, 2006). Conservatism applies to "the Burkean contract between the living, the dead, and the unborn." Thus, rulers can establish an organic identity only if they "listen to the dead" and serve as "fit guardians of the unborn" (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 302; Scruton, 2006).

Nevertheless, although nostalgia is mostly associated with conservatism, it is not the rule (Tannock, 1995). There can be a myriad of nostalgias, as can be seen from examples like *Ostalgia* - yearning for the German Democratic Republic (Kubicek, 2009), communist nostalgia in the former territories of the Soviet Union and its satellite states (Ekman and Linde, 2005), *Yugonostalgia* for the former Yugoslavia (Lindstrom, 2005), Bolivar nostalgia in Venezuela (Roberts, 2016), pre-colonial nostalgia in previously colonized countries (Mazrui, 2013), radical nostalgia, like nostalgia for the Spanish Civil War (Glazer, 2005), and the 1960s civil rights movements (Harris, 2015). Also, Turkey is no exception from these examples. While Islamist and ultranationalist parties yearn for the Ottoman Empire (Karakaya, 2018), secularists miss the early Republican period (Özyürek, 2006).

In short, all right-wing political parties instrumentalize nostalgia to a certain extent. However, not all populist parties are nostalgic and conservative, nor are all conservatives equally nostalgic and populist. What we know is that the center-right constituency is less nostalgic than the populist radical right constituency (Steenvoorden and Hartevelde, 2018; Jylhä et al., 2019). Figure 2.1 once again proves that the populist radical right is more nostalgic than the center-right and center-left. By using the Pew data elaborated in the introduction chapter and treating the nostalgia item as a continuous variable, I measured differences between populist radical right parties – PVV in the Netherlands, SD in Sweden – , center-right parties – VVD in the Netherlands, M in Sweden –, and center-left parties – PvdA in the Netherlands and SAP in Sweden. Populist radical right voters appear more nostalgic than both the center-left and center-right constituencies. Interestingly, there is no significant difference between center-left and center-right parties in terms of nostalgia.




Figure 2.1: Nostalgic attitudes of the populist radical right, center-right, and center-left constituencies in Sweden and the Netherlands. Responses to the question “In general, would you say life in (survey country) today is better, worse, or about the same as it was fifty years ago for people like you?” Higher scores indicate positive assessments. Parties included are the Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*-PVV), People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*-VVD), and Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid*-PvdA) for the Netherlands. For Sweden, the Swedish Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*-SD), Moderate Party (*Moderata samlingspartiet*-M), and Swedish Social Democratic Party (*Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti*-SAP).

In summary, nostalgia is also not a core characteristic of the right-wing populism and populism in general. Despite being attached to conservatism, right-wing populism is more nostalgic than both center-right and center-left parties. Populist parties both from the left and right of the spectrum instrumentalize nostalgia rather than embracing it. Hence, there is a sophisticated relationship between populism and nostalgia.

2.4. Conclusion

Following the ideational approach, I claim that there are three core dimensions of populism, which are people-centrism, anti-elitism and anti-establishment, and the Manichean outlook. Populists facilitate the moralistic separation between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite.” While facilitating the vague boundaries of “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” populists create an in-group versus out-group identity. To this end, one of the primary tools that populists utilize is collective nostalgia. Populists aim to build the present and the future retrospectively. What populists offer to their constituency is a golden age, a heartland where corruptions, disruptions, and enemies do not exist. In summation, in this study, my primary goal is to demonstrate the positive effect of nostalgia on populist attitudes and values.

CHAPTER 3

POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA IN TURKEY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Gustave Flaubert, who visited Istanbul 102 years before my birth, was struck by the variety of life in its teeming streets; in one of his letters he predicted that in a century's time it would be the capital of the world. The reverse came true: After the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the world almost forgot that Istanbul existed. The city into which I was born was poorer, shabbier, and more isolated than it had ever been before in its two-thousand-year history. For me it has always been a city of ruins and of end-of-empire melancholy. I've spent my life either battling with this melancholy or (like all İstanbullular) making it my own.

Orhan Pamuk, Istanbul: Memories and the City (2004)

This section provides a historical background for populism in Turkey. It also covers the most prominent nostalgias in Turkish politics, which are Ottoman and Kemalist nostalgias. Unlike contemporary European or US cases, populism in Turkey is based on the conflict between two opposing parties of modernity: Islamists and Secularists. Since the late 19th century, when Narodnik populists in Russia influenced Turkish intellectuals, populism has been an embedded characteristic of Turkish political structure. More recently, the AKP fused its conservative Islamist ideology with populism, coinciding with the global rise of the populist parties.

Nostalgia, on the other hand, has been a tool of politicians since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman nostalgia is a characteristic of mainly Islamist political parties in Turkey as a resentful reaction to the secular state-building process (Yavuz, 1998). Since the 1990s,

nostalgia for the early Kemalist era has visibly emerged, which is defined as *the nostalgia for the modern* against the rise of political Islam, claims of Kurdish political rights, challenges to the nation-state, and economic restructuring (Özyürek, 2006).

As argued in the previous chapter, in order to identify the populist movements, one should retrospectively seek the cross-cutting cleavages of a given society (Barr, 2009). Populists construct “the people” versus “the elites” dichotomization by tapping into those crosscutting cleavages by exaggerating and exacerbating the differences between “us” and “them”. In the case of Turkey, this cross-cutting cleavage corresponds to the long-term conflict between Secularists and Islamists, which can be summarized as the center-periphery cleavage coined by Şerif Mardin (1973).




Figure 3.1: Timeline of Turkish politics between 1908 and 2018. The dotted line indicates the Polity IV scores for each year. Horizontal lines indicate the periods in parentheses.

According to Mardin (1973), modern Turkey inherited the Ottoman Empire’s economic and cultural mistrust between the ruling center and ruled periphery. This division ascended particularly during the 19th century due to modernization efforts to prevent the collapse of state following consecutive military defeats. According to ruling classes, modernization

requires centralization in order to create a strong state which was the zeitgeist of the period. Centralization efforts increased especially following the 1908 Young Turk revolution and the victory of the Party of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Partisi*-ITP), which ended the tyrannical rule of Abdülhamid II. The ITP adopted “the secular version of history shaped by the positivism of Auguste Comte [which] provided the frame of reference for reform for progressive Turkish elites” with the motto of “progress and order” (Göle, 1997, p. 48). As Young Turks extended modernization attempts, Islam became an anchor of the periphery’s identity as a reaction to modernization efforts. According to Mardin (1973, p. 179):

modernization of media and of cultural life in Turkey generally increased, rather than decreased, the gap between the “little” and the “great” culture. A clinging to Islam, to its cultural patrimony, was the ... response to the center's inability to integrate it into the new cultural framework. The provinces thus became centers of “reaction.” Most significant, however, was the fact that the provincial world as a whole, including both upper and lower classes, was now increasingly united by an Islamic opposition to secularism.

Modernization efforts of the declining Empire, in turn, created a new powerful military and bureaucratic elite class, thanks to massive investments in modern education. Primarily, the School of Political Science (*Mülkiye*) and the military (*Askeriye*) gained the upper hand in politics against the Sultan after the 1908 revolution (Mardin, 1973). These graduates became prominent members in the War of Independence, including the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who in the following period accelerated modernization efforts during the establishment of modern Turkey.

The duality between center and periphery continued during the War of Independence (1919-1923), which appeared as the Kemalists (in power) versus the Second Group (opposition) in the parliament. While the former was supportive of secularism, plebiscitarian democracy, and elimination of intermediate groups such as local notables (*ayan*), the latter advocated decentralization along with economic and political liberalism (Mardin, 1973). Later, this duality evolved into the continuous political divide between the CHP and the DP during the 1950s.

While the elites of the center are a relatively coherent group of individuals, the periphery has consisted of religiously, ethnically, and regionally heterogeneous groups. The center has supported Turkish nationalism, centralism, a unitary state, secularism, and a mixed economy with state supervision against the values of the periphery which are Islamic orthodoxy, conservatism, decentralization, and a liberal economy. The foreign service, judiciary, and especially the military are representatives of the center and guardians of the Kemalist establishment against the rural, lower educated, religious masses of the periphery (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, Sunar, 1990). This duality came to the surface as the left-right dimension, *a la Turca*, where the left mostly overlaps with secularism and the right with pro-Islamism (Çarkoğlu, 2012; Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006). The following sections provide an in-depth historical analysis of populism in Turkey.

3.1. Populism in Turkey

3.1.1. Narodnik Populism: Late Ottoman and Early Republican Period

The history of populism in Turkey starts during the Ottoman era, particularly during the Second Constitutionalist Period between 1908 and 1920. The origins of Turkish populism

were inspired by Russian populism (*Narodnichestvo*). Intellectuals such as Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Gökalp, Ömer Seyfeddin, Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, and so on, who were immigrants from Balkans and Russia, imported the idea of populism, and even published a journal called “Toward the People” (*Halka Doğru*) between 1913 and 1914. Their resentment was against the Ottoman elite, who were alienated from the ordinary people’s Anatolian values. These intellectuals also inspired the founders of the republic, who went on to establish the CHP (Aksakal, 2015; Mert, 2007; Toprak, 2013; Sunar, 1990).

Despite being well-educated, Ottoman elites blocked the upward mobility of these intellectuals, hence, leaving no political space to them but to belong to the opposition. According to populist intellectuals, there is a gap between the values of ordinary people and Western-oriented intellectuals. Populists despised European-oriented and cosmopolitan intellectuals, who, for populists, lost their spirit and were alienated from the real values of people. According to populists, the intellectual should be involved in an exchange: while visiting the people to learn their original values, the intellectual must carry the values of civilization to the people. In an attempt to seek the values of pure people, these intellectuals appealed to the peasant values due to the weak urbanization of that era (Aksakal, 2015; Avcıoğlu, 1973; Gökalp, 2006; Mert, 2007; Toprak, 2013).

According to Ömer Seyfeddin, there is a centuries-old divide and indifference between the people and the upper classes which hinders change in Turkish society (Avcıoğlu, 1973). The upper classes, the Ottoman elites, had humiliated the authentic people of Anatolia for centuries as vulgar and incomprehensible (Gökalp, 2006). The people, for Akçura (2015), should get rid of these elites and even the sultanate like Western countries. The fundamental

idea of these intellectuals' populism was eliminating all privileged classes, casts, and nobility to establish an organic society base on equality (Aksakal, 2015; Haspolat, 2011).

Founders of the early republic, including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, embraced many of these intellectuals. For example, Atatürk praised Ziya Gökalp as “my biological father is Ali Rıza Efendi but the father of my feelings is Namık Kemal, and the father of my ideas is Ziya Gökalp” (Gürkün, 2017).³ During the Independence War, the sovereignty of the people principle (*hakimiyet-i milliye*) was formed and supported by the founders of the Republic against the sultanate and external powers who comprised the elites then. The first constitution of Turkish Republic (1921) declared that “sovereignty rests unconditionally with the people” (*hakimiyet bila kayd-u şart milletindir*) and this act is still the motto on the walls of the Turkish Parliament.

Populism is acknowledged in the constitution by the amendments of 1937, along with other five pillars of Kemalism, which are statism, secularism, republicanism, reformism, and nationalism.⁴ Atatürk defined populism as “authorizing and vesting power, potency, sovereignty, administration directly to the people” (Toprak, 2013, p. 405). In another speech, Atatürk explained the establishment of the CHP as “the aim of a people's organization as a party is not the realization of the interests of certain classes over against those of other classes. The aim is rather to mobilize the entire nation, called People, by including all classes and

³ Namık Kemal (1840-1888) was a poet, playwright, journalist, and political activist who also known as Vatan Şairi (the poet of fatherland). His ideas on freedom and liberty has been extremely influential on Young Turks.

⁴ Republicanism represents the new regime of Turkey, abolishment of the Sultanate and the Caliphate. Secularism means removal of religious aspects from state institutions, modernization of state, and a society free from Islamic traditions and ways. Nationalism represents creating a new Turkish national consciousness and the establishment of a nation state. Populism is equality for all Turkish citizens regardless of class, rank, religion, or occupation. Revolutionism is the reform of the traditional state and society into a new and modern structure. Statism is mixture of private enterprise with governmental supervision and participation in the economy (Shaw and Shaw, 1977, pp. 375-395).

excluding none, in common and united action towards genuine prosperity which is the common objective for all” (Berkes, 1998, p. 463). The CHP, on the other hand, defined populism as establishing a classless, unprivileged society in their Charter 1923. In practice, early Kemalist populism carried all characteristics of the six pillars: “nationalist in terms of its conception of political community, secularist with regard to origins of political authority, and etatist in terms of its understanding of ‘popular welfare’” (Sunar, 1990, p. 749).

The Republicans adopted democracy, rejection of class struggles, and the abolishment all privileges of any individual or coterie except for the universal rights that were recognized for all of society (Aydemir, 2011). The idea of establishing a classless society was a response to both the Ottoman nation system and communism. The modern Republic of Turkey was established on the rejection of religious orders and communities, which had been intermediary institutions during the Ottoman era. Adopting secularism, for the founders of the Republic, meant that the people no longer needed these intermediary institutions because they could directly join the decision-making process. The new Republican populism was solidarist in nature by rejecting antagonisms within the people and by referring to complementariness of the people in a Durkheimian sense (Berkes, 1998; Karaömerlioğlu, 2006). For Atatürk, the new Republic of Turkey was a people’s state which belonged to the people. However, the Ottoman Empire belonged to a single individual, if not a single family. To establish a coherent nation-state, early founders of the Republic sought out the heartland before the Ottoman Empire, in the ancient Turkish empires. The Ottoman family hijacked the people’s will and exploited the authentic people for 700 years, and in return, the people were always humiliated and discriminated against by the Ottoman elites (Kışlalı, 2003). To sum up, these populist intellectuals and founders of the new Turkish Republic, who aimed to

form a new order based on the authentic people's will and values, were against the Ottoman elites and Ottoman establishment.

3.1.2. DP and Populism of Center-Right

Following the Second World War, Turkey held its first multiparty elections in 1946 on the open ballot, secret counting principle. In other words, the election was neither free nor fair. After 27 years of single-party rule, in 1950, the CHP lost elections, and DP governments dominated politics until the 1960 military coup d'état. Democratization in Turkey, however, happened after the bureaucratization of the state, yet, before the industrialization of society. At the time of the DP's election victory, "there was, on the one hand, the modernist, bureaucratic state, and, there was, on the other hand, a non-industrial society steeped in tradition" (Sunar, 1990, p. 745).

The right-wing parties, in the following period, frequently mention the trauma of the fraudulent 1946 elections. Practically, the single-party CHP government rescheduled the 1947 elections for an earlier time to prevent the newly established DP's rise. Although the tug-of-war between Western elites and conservatives dates to the late Ottoman era, this election became the milestone of the vicious cycle of democracy in Turkey, and the 1960 coup was the consolidation of this cycle (Çınar and Sayın, 2014). According to Prime Minister and the head of the DP, Adnan Menderes, the CHP did not win the elections in 1946, but they remained in office by a coup. The CHP's defeat in the 1950 elections after four years was actually a national uprising (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2014a).

Since the beginning of the 1950s, modern Turkey's political spectrum was determined as two opposing sides. While the CHP represented the center and consisted of the military, civilian

bureaucrats, and some large landowners, the DP spoke for the periphery, which included the urban poor, commercial middle classes, religious conservatives, and the rural population (Mardin, 1973; Özbudun, 1995). According to Mardin (1973, p. 185), the “electoral platform of the opposition, especially as seen in Democrat Party political propaganda, in newspapers, and in the media, established the lines of a debate between ‘real populists’ and ‘bureaucrats.’”

The emergence of a new middle class, thanks to US economic aid, led to structural change at the expense of the civilian-military bureaucracy. As previously excluded economic, social, and political groups began to participate in politics, the political influence of the civil-military establishment gradually decreased. However, economic crises towards the end of DP rule also hit the civil-military bureaucracy’s financial status. Finally, the rise of religiosity in political and public life, with the expansion of religious instruction, translation of the Islamic call to prayer from Turkish to Arabic, and the increase of Islamic cult leaders’ public appearances, further frustrated the secular establishment (Özbudun, 1995; Brown, 1988).

Consequently, at the beginning of the new decade, the military overthrew the DP government and suspended democracy between 1960 and 1961. The military junta sentenced many top DP cadre to death, but only Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan’s death sentences were carried out. Referring to Menderes and the two other ministers’ execution after the 1960 coup, in 1970, Süleyman Demirel⁵ argued that, up until now, the people replaced governments. However, later, the

⁵ Süleyman Demirel (1924-2015) was the 9th president of Turkey between 1993 and 2000. Previously, he had been prime minister five times between 1965 and 1993. He was chairperson of the AP (the successor of the DP) and TPP (the successor of the AP).

death penalty was invented as a means of toppling governments (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2014b).

The first elections subsequent to the transition to democracy in 1961 were a great disappointment for the military rule. While the CHP was the winner of the election with 36.7 percent of votes, the AP (*Adalet Partisi*-Justice Party), which was the heir of the DP, came in second by gaining 34.8 percent of the vote. Following four coalition governments between 1961 and 1965, the AP won the 1965 elections with 52.9 percent of the vote. The AP once again won the majority in the 1969 elections, yet due to the rise of left-right wing clashes, along with massive street protests and student movements, the military once again intervened in civilian politics in 1971 and overthrew the Demirel government.

The rise of the AP and Demirel was halted during the 1970s with a new populist leader from the left: Bülent Ecevit, who was the young leader of the CHP. Despite failing to gain a majority in parliament, the AP established two coalitions and one minority government between 1973 and 1980. The fragmentation of right-wing politics due to the rise of the MHP and MSP⁶ decreased the vote share of the AP. Nevertheless, these parties formed two coalition governments, also known as the Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*). However, due to skyrocketing inflation, the black-market economy, and recurring political crises surfacing, such as failing to elect a president for 174 days, coupled with guerilla and counter-guerilla conflicts, and finally political murders, the military once again launched a coup d'état on September 12th, 1980.

⁶ The MHP was established by former colonel Alparslan Türkeş in 1969, which is the ultranationalist far-right party of Turkish politics. The MSP was established by Professor Necmettin Erbakan in 1973, which embraces Islam as an ideology.

So, what are the common populist characteristics of right-wing politics in Turkey? The degree of populism of the right-wing parties mentioned above have varied over time and in context but has reached its zenith in the AKP era. The DP in the 1950s and its successors, continuing with numerous AP governments between 1960 and 1980, the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP*)⁷ and National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*) coalition in 1997, and more recently the AKP, have established themselves as an antagonistic front against the CHP and all “tutelary institutions”, championing the underdog Muslim majority and its representatives (Mert, 2007, Sunar, 1990).

Referring to Rousseau’s noble savage, right-wing populism portrayed Muslim people as oppressed, hardworking, honest, abstemious, and optimistic, who are harmonized with life and the community. They are the “protectors of the tradition” as an organic community and resist against the secular, modern construction of “the people” by preserving their Anatolian and Muslim characteristics, which transcend from the Ottoman era to the contemporary period. Western-oriented elites, on the other hand, are alienated from the ordinary people’s values by preferring and imposing a non-native lifestyle. Right-wing populism depicts these elites as wealthy snobs who exploit the will of people for the sake of their own interests (Bora and Erdoğan, 2006; Bora, 2006).

For right-wing parties, they are the authentic and organic continuation of “the people”. The democratic vision of these right-wing parties was moralistic and majoritarian. If democracy means appealing to the people’s will, the conservative majority of the Turkish population constitutes the people. Attaching a spiritual superiority to the people’s will makes it a political

⁷ Ironically, remaining cadres of the DP established the AP following the closure of party with the 1960 coup. Following closure of the AP with the 1980 coup, the ex-members established DYP.

taboo, and in turn, opposition to these right-wing governments are manipulated and reframed as a desecration of the people's will (Bora and Canefe, 2008). Islamism and nationalist conservatism are the main pillars of the right-wing parties, which helped to manifest themselves as true representatives of the people's will (Taşkın, 2015). The common populist characteristics of these right-wing parties are the rhetoric based on fetishizing the will of people, the struggle built on the West-East dichotomy, and the envisionment of politics as a battlefield (Türk, 2014). Contrary to the secular, Western, and modern nation-building aim of the Republican elites, right-wing parties utilized nativism, Islamism, and Ottoman nostalgia in building their constituency.

By exaggerating the antagonism between “the people” and “the elites,” these parties claim that the secular establishment constructed a system of exploitation in Turkey. In 1965, Süleyman Demirel argued that even during the age of decolonization in Africa, some groups still aimed to treat Turkish people as a colonized people. Right-wing populist leaders frequently emphasize that governments cannot rule Turkey, only administrate, because even if they hold the office, they are not the actual rulers. Therefore, the people's will should be liberated from the tutelage of the designated over the elected (Çınar, 2015; Mert, 2007; Taşkın, 2015).

The most dominant *designated* power is the military, which has been a critical actor in Turkish politics throughout the years. As mentioned above, starting from the 19th century, army officers who were trained in Europe returned with ideas of modernization and Westernization of the state. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, these officers established modern Turkey under the leadership of Atatürk (Jenkins, 2001; Hale, 2007; Rustow, 1994). Since then, directly or indirectly, the military has

always influenced civilian politics. For example, the 1960 coup overthrew ten years of DP rule. The 1971 and 1980 takeovers occurred when the AP was in power. The “post-modern coup” in 1997 was against the RP-DYP coalition and the 2007 e-memorandum was issued against the AKP.

Complaints by right-wing populists are not limited to military tutelage. They frequently emphasize that intermediary institutions and the separation of powers are obstacles that override the people’s will. According to Menderes, the tutelage of the designated over the elected emerges from the separation of powers. For him, the parliament represents all power. Providing autonomy and immunity to the judiciary corresponds to a disqualification of the people’s judicial authority. While complaining about the strict separation of powers of the 1960 constitution, Demirel said that “with this constitution, one cannot rule the state” (Taşkın, 2015; Türk, 2014). Ironically, the amendments following the 1971 coup and particularly the adoption of the 1982 constitution under military rule weakened the separation of powers.

In addition to the military and bureaucracy, right-wing politics have been critical of university professors and the media. According to Menderes, the elites penetrate politics via the judiciary and universities. Once, he even defined academics as “dark-cloaked.” For Menderes, the press, elites, opposition, and academics were united as “a front for destruction” and mobilized against the DP (Türk, 2014). Those academics and intellectuals had no connections with ordinary people’s values. Even a prominent right-wing intellectual, Taha Akyol, self-critically admitted that the right-wing parties have always despised intellectuals (Taşkın, 2015). In terms of media freedom, the Menderes government established the Committee of Inquest (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) in 1960. DP deputies were given jurisdiction

with the purpose of investigating the activities of the CHP and press, who were allegedly plotting a civil-military uprising to overthrow the government.

Between the 1980s and the mid-2000s, the military established its dominance with various privileges and prerogatives over civilian politics. The rise of PKK terror and the gradual decline of Cold War politics gave an upper hand to the military in terms of establishing law and order, which the civilian leadership had failed to do. In turn, there was no option for politicians but to obey the rules of the game, which were determined by the Turkish military. Even Turgut Özal, who was depicted as a populist politician of that period, exploited the rules which were set by the military junta to his advantage. For Taşkın (2012), Özal was not as populist as Erdoğan and the pro-AKP media depicts. Özal's close connections with the big economic and political capital stakeholders of Istanbul, his pro-US stance, and his ties to the military junta of 1980 coup were even harshly criticized by Islamists back in the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, *the Milli Görüş* movement led by Necmettin Erbakan remained as the sole populist movement during the 1990s. The next section covers the populism of *Milli Görüş*, which is the predecessor of the AKP.

3.1.3. Milli Görüş: The Origins of the AKP

In order to understand contemporary populism in Turkey, it is essential to touch upon the *Milli Görüş* ideology and its founder, Professor Necmettin Erbakan. The *Milli Görüş* is a political-Islamist ideology with strong anti-republican and pro-Ottoman characteristics (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). The *Milli Görüş* movement established many political parties, namely, the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP*), National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP*), Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi-RP*), Virtue Party (*Fazilet*

Partisi-FP), and Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*-SP), respectively. Except for the last one, all of them were closed by the Constitutional Court due to having an anti-secular agenda.

The importance of the *Milli Görüş* and these parties, which is in practice a coalition of Islamist groups in Turkey (Çakır, 2013), stems from the fact that founders of the AKP entered politics as members of those parties. Since 1976, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has occupied various crucial positions in the RP, including as the mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998. Abdullah Gül, the former president of Turkey, was the deputy of the RP starting in 1991 as well as a minister in the toppled RP-DYP government. The former Speaker of Parliament, Bülent Arınç, also entered politics as a deputy of the RP.

The *Milli Görüş* is essentially an outsider ideology which supports an Islamist “Just Order” (*Adil Düzen*) against materialist and secular Western thought. The ideology is merely a search for a third way between the capitalist and collectivist economic systems. According to Erbakan, while Demirel and the AP supported the capitalist system, Ecevit and the CHP embraced collectivism, both of which are non-native and Western-oriented ideologies. Erbakan had a strict anti-Western and anti-materialist rhetoric in which the *Milli Görüş* was promoted as the only viable alternative against Masonic, Zionist, and Crusader mindsets. The European Common Market and other Western institutions were viewed only as oppressors of underdog nations. In contrast, the *Milli Görüş* is a cause and a movement of the oppressed Muslim community, which originates from the spirit of the people (Erbakan, 1975; Türk, 2014; Bora, 2016).

Rather than focus on material development, the *Milli Görüş* prioritized moral development of the people by instilling “our basic values” into politics. For their members, the *Milli Görüş* is more than an ordinary political ideology. Instead, it is a way of establishing a new

civilization due to Western civilization's incapability of designing a just world order free of domination, colonization, and imperialism. Only the *Milli Görüş* is able to do so because the movement is the heir of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the Old World in peace and equality (Atacan, 2005; Türk, 2014).

With Erbakan's leadership, the *Milli Görüş* was also a global anti-establishment movement with the aim of founding an Islamic union with an Islamic currency. During his prime ministry, Erbakan paid visits to various Muslim countries in this effort and, in the end, an international cooperation organization named the D-8 (Developing Eight) was established by eight Muslim countries (Kuru, 2005).⁸ However, particularly following the 1997 coup and the closure case against the RP, its successor, the FP, softened their anti-EU and anti-globalization tone in order to gain international support by portraying religious rights and freedoms "as part of a broader agenda on individual rights and democratization" (Öniş, 2001, p. 288).

The February 28th, 1997 "post-modern" coup was a turning point in Turkish politics. Rather than launching a direct intervention, the military forced the RP-DYP government to resign following a National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK*) meeting. The generals expressed their concerns on the threats against secularism and requested extensive measures to restrain the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Prime Minister Erbakan, Deputy Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, and other government officials were forced to sign a resolution which covered the concerns of the military and outlined necessary steps to be taken to prevent the rise of political Islam. These steps included banning Islamic cults, closing the middle school branches of *Imam Hatip* (preacher training) schools and increasing mandatory education

⁸ D-8 members are Bangladesh, Egypt, Nigeria, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey.

from five to eight years, as well as ending nepotism to prevent the recruitment of Islamists into public institutions (Jenkins, 2009).

On January 16th, 1998, the Constitutional Court closed the RP with the conviction that the party had become a center of anti-secular activities. Subsequently, RP officials established the FP as the new party of the *Milli Görüş*. Yet another important event was the imprisonment of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for ten months, who was the Mayor of Istanbul at the time, after reciting a poem with religious connotations in public.⁹ The conviction of Erdoğan imposed a political ban, with newspaper headlines of that period reporting the imprisonment of Erdoğan as “he cannot even be a *mukhtar* (local headman).”¹⁰




Figure 3.2: Vote shares of *Milli Görüş* Parties and AKP in general elections. Source: YSK.

⁹ The lines of the poem: “The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers.”

¹⁰ The political ban of Erdoğan was later revoked due to a legal change with the support of the CHP after the 2002 elections.

Following the closure case against the FP in 2001, the Milli Görüş divided into two factions, known as the *Gelenekçiler* (Traditionalists) and the *Yenilikçiler* (Reformists). The younger reformist generation, led by Erdoğan, Arınç, and Gül, targeted their criticisms against the traditionalist faction of the *Milli Görüş*, as the older generation was uncompromising and committed to carrying out hardline policies. Finally, the *Yenilikçiler* was established the AKP, which inherited all the populist characteristics of the DP, AP, and *Milli Görüş* lineages. The *Gelenekçiler*, led by Erbakan and Recai Kutan, established the SP but has become a smaller party in terms of vote share since the 2002 elections.

3.1.4. AKP: From A Conservative Democrat to a Right-wing Populist Party

Just after its establishment in 2001, the AKP won a parliamentary majority in the 2002 elections and has dominated Turkish politics ever since. The AKP won the 2007, 2011, June 2015, November 2015, and 2018 general elections. It ranked as the first party in the 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 local elections. The AKP also won three referendums in 2007, 2010, and 2017. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also won two presidential elections in 2014 and 2018.

During the first tenure, the AKP promoted its ideology as conservative democratic and identified themselves as a center-right party. However, the Islamist and conservative tone of the party has increased over time. The AKP's charismatic leader, Erdoğan, portrays himself as a warrior against the elites and a protector of the people. He is the savior of the silent majority from economic and political inequalities, the secular military-bureaucratic tutelage, corruption, as well as domestic and foreign conspiracies (Özbudun, 2006; Selçuk, 2016; Yabancı, 2016).

Öniş (2015) divides the 15 years of AKP rule into three subperiods. The first period was the golden age of AKP following their electoral success in 2002 and continuing until 2007. During this period, the AKP prioritized economic recovery from the aftermath of the devastating 2001 economic crisis, as well as the full EU membership bid, rather than directly confronting the civil-military elites. In order to gain the consent and support of domestic and international public opinion, the AKP pursued a softer policy on sensitive issues like religion's role in the public sphere and the power of the military (Somer, 2017).

The second phase between 2007 and 2011 was a period of relative stagnation which coincided with the global economic crisis of 2008.¹¹ As the EU lost its ability to attract and influence both its member and candidate states, Turkey gradually diverged from its full membership goal and moved towards partnerships with Middle Eastern countries (Öniş, 2015; Öniş and Kutlay, 2017). This phase is also the period when the struggle between the AKP and the military and judiciary took place. For example, on the evening of CHP's application to the Constitutional Court to annul the election of Abdullah Gül as president, the military released a memorandum stating their complaints regarding the anti-secular activities of the AKP. Later, the Constitutional Court declared the election of Abdullah Gül as president null and void.

Meanwhile, in 2007, Republic Rallies (*Cumhuriyet Mitingleri*) were held in five provinces of Turkey on the initiative of Kemalist civil society organizations against the candidacy of Abdullah Gül. In 2008, the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals proceeded with the closure case of AKP. Although the Constitutional Court adjudicated that the party's

¹¹ Dinçşahin (2012) broadly analyzes this period from the perspective of populism theories.

actions were against the constitution, the closure request was rejected by one vote, as only six of the eleven judges ruled in favor, whereas seven are required.

Subsequently, the AKP launched a series of policies to curb the mechanisms that had enabled the military's direct and indirect involvement in civilian politics. The most prominent examples were the large-scale court cases like *Ergenekon* and *Balyoz*, in which many retired and active military officers, intellectuals, journalists, civil society leaders, political party chairpersons, and lawmakers stood trial. In 2010, the AKP held a referendum on various constitutional and legal changes, which eroded the separation of powers and judicial independence. However, the same referendum also included articles which weakened the military tutelage over civilian politics and removed the privileges established under the 1980 military junta.¹²

The third period covers the era since 2011 as a period of decline, particularly in the areas of the economy, democracy, and foreign policy. As the AKP strengthened its position and diminished the dominance of military as a veto power, Turkey's democratic structure moved from domain democracy to delegated democracy.¹³ The most prominent example of the erosion of liberal values took place during the Gezi protests in 2013. The uprising altered the political calculus in Turkey. As a response to these events, Erdoğan and AKP held Respect to the People's Will Rallies (*Milli İradeye Saygı Mitingleri*) in six provinces of Turkey. While the repercussions of so-called Arab Spring continued, AKP top cadre worried of a possible

¹² Since developments in the civil-military relations in Turkey is beyond the scope of this study, I will not include further details. See Aknur (2013) and Gürsoy (2015) for detailed developments of that era.

¹³ See Merkel (2004) for the varieties of defective democracies. For Esen and Gümüşçü (2016) Turkey moved from tutelary democracy to competitive authoritarianism.

replication of the Egyptian coup d'état, which coincided with the Gezi protests in Turkey (Öniş, 2015; Çandar, 2013).

Another issue was the conflict between the AKP and Gülen organization, which came into the open around the end of 2013. During this conflict, the Gülen organization used their followers, who had infiltrated the judiciary, to stalemate the AKP and Erdoğan in many cases. For example, the Public Prosecutor called the Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization, Hakan Fidan, for testimony regarding his meetings with the PKK's representatives in Oslo in order to establish a peace process. Erdoğan defined this call as an indirect move against himself because Fidan was very close to Erdoğan (Özışık, 2015).

Finally, the failed coup of July 15th, 2016, marked the nadir of democratic backsliding in Turkey. Two hundred and forty-eight people lost their lives while resisting the coup attempt, with more than a thousand wounded. Coup plotters bombed the campus of Turkish Grand National Assembly with fighter jets while some deputies were inside the building. Declaration of a State of Emergency followed the coup attempt and was extended five times. Mass purges of public officers by government decrees followed the state of emergency. Between July 2015 and July 2018, the government issued 36 executive orders. More than 130,000 public officers were fired from their positions and 1,748 associations, foundations, and unions were closed (Erem, 2018).

To sum up, as former enemies of the authentic people, civil-military elites have gradually lost their power to influence politics, and in turn, the AKP and Erdoğan have increased their populism. As a response to political and economic crises that the AKP and Erdoğan faced, they chose to solidify their political constituency by fueling the friend versus foe style of politics and inventing new enemies (Aytaç and Elçi, 2019).

3.1.5. From Left Populism to the Party of Establishment: CHP

Before proceeding to the next section, it is necessary to briefly explain the progression of the CHP's politics from the 1970s until now. The rise of socialism, both in Parliament with the small but significant electoral victory of the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP*) and with street protests and student riots coupled with ascending anti-Americanism, unsettled the CHP's internal affairs. Starting from the mid-1960s, the CHP moved towards the "left-of-center" of the political spectrum. Since the early 1970s, Bülent Ecevit's supporters began to win local positions within the CHP against İsmet İnönü and his supporters. Finally, in 1972, Ecevit became the chairperson of CHP, which marked the left-populist turn of the founding party of Turkey (Ahmad, 1993).

As a charismatic leader, Ecevit, who was nicknamed *Karaoğlan* (Dark Boy), always dressed in a light-blue shirt and a peasant's cap. According to Çelik (2008, p. 197), "his political discourse comprised nationalistic/patriotic, pro-working class, and populist elements" who supported "the just order" (*hakça düzen*) to build his image as "a man of people." According to Ecevit, "the people" comprise of the individuals who earn their living by his labor and whose income does not lean on others' exploitation. "The people" who are the peasant, the worker, the civil servant, craftsman, does not seek discrimination among the society, yet fails to exert authority on the society and government by their means, because they are exploited and oppressed. The groups that perceive themselves as "privileged" who unequally take the share from the surplus value of the labor does not belong to "the people." These are the middlemen, pawnbrokers, big landowners, monopoly capital, and "unproductive" groups who have enormous authority on the administration of the society (Erdoğan, 1998, p. 26).

The major split between Ecevit's left-wing populism and the Republican populism is while the latter supports the idea of "despite the people, for the people," the former asserts "with the people, for the people" (Bora and Canefe, 2008; Erdoğan, 1998). Under the leadership of Ecevit, the CHP came in first in the 1973 and 1977 elections by earning 33.3 and 41.4 percent of the vote, respectively. However, the CHP failed to gain a parliamentary majority in both elections.

The 1980 coup also hit the CHP, as the military closed the party via a ban on all active political parties and leaders. Towards the first elections since the coup in 1983, and with the transition to democracy in sight, the CHP lineage was reformulated as the Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti-HP*). The HP later merged with the Social Democracy Party (*Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi-SODEP*) and labeled itself as the Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti-SHP*) in 1985 under the leadership of Erdal İnönü, son of İsmet İnönü. Meanwhile, Bülent Ecevit established the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP*) in 1985.

Despite carrying populism in their names and adopting the six pillars of Kemalism, it is difficult to categorize these parties as populist. Firstly, as political Islam gained strength in politics, these parties became self-proclaimed guardians of the Kemalist establishment during the 1990s. Second, particularly the SHP, and later the CHP, tried to imitate the British Labor Party's social-liberal policies with an emphasis on individualism, civil society, and the market economy, yet failed to do so due for various reasons. Finally, as mentioned above, the dominance of the military in politics following the 1980 coup also prevented these center-left parties from conducting anti-establishment policies similar to other center-right parties (Ayata and Ayata, 2007; Coşar and Özman, 2008).




Figure 3.3: Vote shares of CHP, HP, SHP, and DSP (center-left parties) in general elections. Source: YSK.

In 1992, the CHP was reestablished and merged with the SHP in 1995, while Ecevit refused to join the merger. In the 1999 elections, the CHP failed to pass the ten percent electoral threshold, whereas Ecevit’s DSP became the first-place party with 22.2 percent of the vote. The DSP established a coalition government with the far-right MHP and center-right Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi* -ANAP). However, the devastating 2001 economic crisis, coupled with Ecevit’s sickness and senility as well as corruption scandals, brought the coalition to the brink of dissolution. In November 2002 early elections, all parties in parliament failed to pass the ten percent electoral threshold. The CHP became the second place party by gaining 19.4 percent of the vote.

Since then, the CHP has continued its guardianship role of the Kemalist establishment against consecutive AKP governments. While the party moved towards the center until 2010 and made a left turn following the election of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as chairperson, it still remains as the party of the Kemalist status quo (Gülmez, 2013). More recently, Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP

established electoral coalitions with other right-wing parties including the MHP, SP, and Good Party (*İyi Parti*-İP) against the AKP in the 2014, 2018, and 2019 elections.¹⁴

3.2. Nostalgia in Turkish Politics

In August 2018, a well-known research center, IPSOS, published its biyearly report named “The Guide for Understanding Turkey.” Among the interesting results was one indicator discussed broadly: yearning for the past. According to IPSOS report, 76 percent of participants feel nostalgic, which was 71 percent in 2012 and 72 percent in 2014. Moreover, according to the latest report, nostalgia became endemic among the Turkish population. The report indicates that environmental consciousness, being religious, and yearning for the past have been the top three strongest attitudes of respondents since 2014.

Both Professor Şükrü Hanioglu and columnist Yıldırım Oğur approached the report from similar perspectives: politics in Turkey has been under a strong influence of nostalgia. According to Oğur (2018), it became impossible to understand daily news without interpreting them within the context of past reckonings. Stories, memories, and symbols of the past are haunting us and the shadow of nostalgia and history is seen in politics. For Hanioglu (2018), the proliferation of yearning for the past is not surprising in a society in which the two main axes of politics and intellectuals reproduce nostalgia in everyday discussions. However, this not a simple “yearning for the past” issue or missing the good, old days that we speak of while spending time with our families during holidays. Nostalgia causes problems. It becomes an obstacle for a society to keep pace with the current age,

¹⁴ İyi Parti (Good Party) was established by former members of the MHP under the leadership of Meral Akşener after failing to remove MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli from his chairmanship position. IP supports Turkish nationalism with a bolder secular tone and has a strong opposition towards the AKP.

which blesses past utopias instead of forgetting them, and focuses on the past rather than the future.

Both Haniöglu and Ođur argue that Ottoman and Kemalist nostalgias are the most common types in Turkey. There are also other periods that the people yearn for. One example is nostalgia for the 1970s when socialist organizations were dominant and social movements had been hugely influential on politics. Another example is a longing for an era of a specific political leader when he or she is in power, such as Özal or Demirel. However, I picked the most powerful and long-lasting nostalgias in Turkish politics, which are Ottoman and Kemalist, because these nostalgias also represent the center-periphery dichotomy.

3.2.1. Ottoman Nostalgia: An Undead Glorious Past

Ottoman nostalgia embodies a reaction to Kemalist modernization efforts and the cutting of ties to the Ottoman legacy in order to create a modern, secular nation-state (Karaveli 2010, Özyürek 2008). According to Bora (2011), the AKP inherited the Islamic nationalism of the Milli Görüş tradition, which imagines Turkey as the potential leader of the Islamic world. Nostalgia for the Ottoman past at this point appears as an imperial and irredentist fantasy. Ottomanism of the Milli Görüş lineage aims for “reinstating and regenerating the spirit of pax Ottomania, especially in the ex-Ottoman provinces” (Çolak, 2006, p. 596). Therefore, Ottoman nostalgia can be summarized as discourse and actions “on the past intended to legitimize contemporary neoliberal and cultural policies by drawing on anachronistic reinterpretations and the glorification of the Ottoman past in Turkey” (Iğsız, 2015, p. 327). Ottoman nostalgia is an exploration of the native against corruptive modernism and the approval of today by tradition (Bora and Onaran, 2006).

For right-wing politics, mainly Islamist and ultranationalist factions, the Ottoman Empire is the zenith of the Turkish people's history (Çetinsaya, 2006; Bora, 2011). As a response to the Kemalist establishment's secular nationalism, political Islam aggrandizes the Ottoman past as a tool for the reconstruction of "the Great Turkey" today. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire corresponds to an absence of home. As goes Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's referral to the verses of his favorite poet, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, "the people are odd and a pariah in his own homeland," because, they no longer live under the authentic Ottoman rule but under the secular, modern Turkish Republic.

AKP officials, mainly President Erdoğan, frequently exploit nostalgia during their speeches as well as in public events. For example, Erdoğan launched his referendum campaign in 2017 with a short film full of references to the past, particularly the greatest sultans in Turkish history, like Alaeddin Keykubat III, Osman I, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, and Abdülhamid II. Anniversaries of the conquest of Istanbul have been celebrated with spectacular events with the motto of "*Yeniden diriliş, yeniden yükseliş*" (resurrection once again, rise once again), referring to the glorious days of the Ottoman Empire. The AKP sets artificial deadlines for their goals such as 2023 (centenary of the establishment of Turkish Republic), 2053 (sexcentenary of the conquest of Istanbul), and 2071 (millenary of the Battle of Manzikert).¹⁵ President Erdoğan generally presents his ideas and goals by citing old sultans and continually emphasizes his dedication to serving his people in the pursuit of being worthy of these forefathers.

¹⁵ Battle of Manzikert (Malazgirt Savaşı) was a clash between the Byzantine Empire and the Seljuk Empire on August 26, 1071. Defeated Byzantine Empire's authority over the Anatolian peninsula was undermined. In turn, Turkification of the Anatolia was accelerated.

In addition to official policy, Ottoman nostalgia began to appear in popular culture more recently. TV series like *Diriliş Ertuğrul*, *Muhteşem Yüzyıl*, *Payitaht*¹⁶, and many others became among the most popular programs, all of which refer to the glorious periods of Turkish history, replete with conspiracy theories (Çevik, 2019; Ergin and Karakaya, 2017). For Sinanoğlu (2017), we cannot think these TV series are independent from the AKP's ideological hegemony. He rightfully argues that those TV series manufacture public support for nationalist-conservative-authoritarian politics of the government by refictionalizing past events and establishing connections with contemporary ones.

3.2.2. Kemalist Nostalgia: A Nostalgia for Modern

Unlike Ottoman nostalgia, Kemalist nostalgia is relatively more recent. Kemalist nostalgia appeared during the 1990s, an era of significant transformations in world politics. The collapse of the Soviet Union and dismemberment of Yugoslavia created a power vacuum in the region, leading to the rise of ethnic conflicts. Moreover, it was a period of growing religious politics which also coincided with the rise of political Islam and religious extremism. These transformations were echoed in Turkey with Kurdish separatism and PKK terror and the rise of the RP as an Islamist party. According to Bora (2013), Kemalism during the 1990s mobilized against two significant threats, the Kurdish political movement and Islamism. As a result of growing anxiety vis-à-vis these threats, Kemalists developed a nostalgia which glorifies the period of Atatürk as a golden age. Similar to the DP's policies

¹⁶ *Diriliş Ertuğrul* (The Resurrection: Ertuğrul): TV series about the father of Osman Bey, founder of the Ottoman Empire, Ertuğrul Gazi and his fight against the Templars, Mongols, and Byzantines. *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* (The Magnificent Century): TV series about Sultan Süleyman's (Süleyman the Magnificent) era, who is accepted as the most successful sultan in Ottoman history. *Payitaht* (The Capital City): TV series about last 13 years of Sultan Abdülhamid II and his resistance against Zionists, Free Masons, and liberals.

that led to the decline of civil-military bureaucracy's status during the 1950s, Kemalism in 1990s was based on the anxiety of educated middle class' power and reputation loss.

To date, Esra Özyürek has conducted the most comprehensive study on Kemalist nostalgia (2008). In addition to the rise of identity and religious politics, she argues that the increasing demands of the EU, economic privatization along with increasing interaction with the IMF and the World Bank has also challenged Kemalist ideology. In turn, many Kemalists began to share “the memory of a strong, independent, self-sufficient state and its secularist modernization politics which dominated the public sphere through the past century” (2008, p. 2). As political Islam, in particular, became more visible in the public space, Kemalist symbols and practices gained popularity as a reaction.

According to Özyürek (2008, p. 10), “many Kemalists have ... suggested that Turkey stopped moving forward and has even gone backward in the past several decades and let slip away the stage of modernity it had ever achieved, especially after political Islam came to power.” Contrary to Atatürk's Westernization goals, contemporary Kemalists became suspicious about the EU and the US. For Kemalists, demands by the EU and other Western institutions may weaken Turkey and eventually divide the country. Kemalists, in turn, have returned to the 1930s strong Turkish state mentality as a response to the demands of the West. In other words, when foundational principles were at stake, Kemalists started yearning for “the childhood of the nation when everything was pure and citizens were gathered around the authority of their father” (Özyürek, 2008, p. 16).¹⁷

¹⁷ In 1934, with the adoption of Surname Law, which required all citizens to have a fixed surname, the parliament granted the surname “Atatürk” which can be translated as “the Father of Turks” to Mustafa Kemal.

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter presents the historical background of populism and nostalgia in Turkish politics. Populism has been an endemic characteristic of Turkish politics since the late 19th century. Early Republican populism aimed to build a modern society by eliminating all privileges of the Ottoman ruling class. While the establishment of the Republic and abolishment of Sultanate were progressive attempts taken during the Kemalist revolution, modernization efforts in general invited backlash. Right-wing populism and Ottoman nostalgia in Turkey, in turn, arose as a response to Kemalist modernization attempts.

During the 1990s and 2000s, the rise of ethnic and religious politics around the world was also echoed in Turkey. Kemalist nostalgia emerged as a response to the Kurdish issue and the rise of political Islam, coinciding with the neo-liberalization and massive economic crises of that period. As the twin threats of Kurdish nationalism and political Islam gained strength in politics (Jenkins, 2001), Kemalists started to revisit the foundational principles that appeared as the basis for Kemalist nostalgia.

Type of populism	Definition of the people (in-group) (People-centrism)	Definition of elites (out-group) (Anti-elitism & Anti-establishment)	Populism (in short)
Early Republican Populism	(Secular) Turkish people	Ottoman elites and the Sultan	The Ottoman elite exploited and humiliated Turkish people for centuries.
Center-right parties' populism	Muslim Turkish people	Kemalist elites and the CHP	The Kemalist elite established a non-native system which does not allow the people to live their authentic (Muslim) lifestyle.
<i>Milli Görüş's</i> populism	Muslim people	Kemalist elites, the AP, the CHP, the Great Powers, Zionists, Free Masons.	Materialist ideologies dominate both domestic and international politics. The non-native elites and their collaborators suppress the authentic Muslim people both in Turkey and around the world.
AKP's populism	Muslim people	Kemalist elites, the CHP, the Great Powers.	Kemalist elites and the establishment usurped the will of the people for decades. Kemalist elites exposed their non-native lifestyle to the authentic Muslim people.
CHP's left-populism	Exploited (secular) Turkish people	The middlemen, pawnbrokers, big landowners, monopoly capital.	Certain groups in the society keep their privileged positions at the expense of the oppressed people.

Table 3.1: Populism in Turkey

In summary, five major populist movements in Turkish politics are embedded in the center-periphery conflict. Table 3.1 depicts the types of populism. Firstly, the populism of the early Republicans and the CHP and populism during the 1970s contain a significant shift: while the former aims to construct a secular, nation-state as a social project, the latter aims to be the voice of the oppressed people against the oppressors. Secondly, center-right populism's nationalism tone is decreased in AKP's populism. AKP seems to be closer to *Milli Görüş's* populism. However, despite their criticisms, the AKP has more interactions with political

actors and organizations than *Milli Görüş* parties. The AKP's populism at this point appears as more pragmatic than the *Milli Görüş*'s populism. Finally, the two anchors of center and periphery – secularism and Islam – define the group boundaries which pave the way for rising populism in Turkey.



CHAPTER 4

POPULIST AND NOSTALGIC RHETORIC IN TURKISH POLITICS: A CONTENT ANALYSIS¹⁸

This chapter scrutinizes populism and nostalgia in Turkey by using the content analysis method.¹⁹ In order to map populist discourse in Turkey, I collected 308 speeches addressed between 2011 and 2018 by the President and Chairman of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the leader of the main opposition party, CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. The first part of the analysis uses the dictionary-based quantitative content analysis method for examining longitudinal changes in populist discourse in Turkey. The second part qualitatively examines the instrumentalization of nostalgia by these two leaders by analyzing their mnemonic practices.

While measuring populist rhetoric, I seek answers to these questions: Which leader uses populist rhetoric more frequently? Are there any changes in the use of populist rhetoric over time? Which dimensions of populism are more prominent in a Turkish context? What are the different mnemonic practices of the two leaders? The results indicate that there are significant differences between Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu over time. In addition, the exclusive type of populist rhetoric is more prominent in comparison with anti-elitist discourse. The results also

¹⁸ Another version of this chapter is published in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* (Elçi, 2019).

¹⁹ Early versions of this chapter presented in *Disentangling Populism: Reception and Effects of Populist Communication*, Bucharest, Romania (May 2017) and *Empirical Studies in Political Analysis Workshop* (ESPA), Izmir, Turkey (January 2017).

demonstrate that AKP leader Erdoğan uses populist words more than CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu. Lastly, Erdoğan appears as a mnemonic warrior while instrumentalizing Ottoman nostalgia as a golden age against the Kemalist establishment. Kılıçdaroğlu, on the contrary, uses Kemalist nostalgia in criticizing illiberal policies of the AKP and Erdoğan.

The upcoming two sections provide a dimensional analysis of populist communication and a theoretical explanation of how populists appear as mnemonic warriors in politics. Next, I will present my hypotheses. Subsequently, I will explain the method and dictionary building for the analysis. Then I will demonstrate how Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu use nostalgia in their populist rhetoric and how they differ in their mnemonic practices. Finally, I will conclude the chapter.

4.1. Dimensional Approach on Populist Political Communication

Previous studies offered various dimensional approaches for capturing the characteristics of populist political communication (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; March, 2017; Schmidt, 2017; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011; Wirth et al., 2016; Reinemann et al., 2017). According to the authors, there should be at least two dimensions of populism, which are people-centrism and anti-elitism. Although these dimensions were broadly discussed in Chapter 2, I want to quickly provide a refresher on their definitions. People-centrism corresponds to “the populist claim for unrestricted popular sovereignty [which] is closely connected to specific understandings and valorization of the people” (Wirth et al., 2016, p. 49). Anti-elitism comprises “references against a slim minority of unaccountable power holders engaging in the misappropriation of popular sovereignty” (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 15).

In addition to anti-elitism and people-centrism, I also test the Manichean outlook as a dimension to capture references to the “us” - “we” and “them” - “they”. The Manichean outlook presents a moralistic and antagonistic understanding of the outside world as a struggle between good and evil. In populism, this moralistic struggle emerges as the conflict between “the people” and “the elites” (Mudde 2017; Reinemann et al. 2017; Hawkins 2009; Vasilopoulou et al., 2014).

There are two reasons for analyzing populist rhetoric dimensionally. Firstly, countries and populist political movements within them are not identical. Each movement emphasizes different dimensions. Hence, a dimensional test will provide more information about the spatial differences between populist parties and figures. Secondly, a unified approach may overestimate the position of a political party on the populism map. However, the dimensional approach mitigates this risk by analyzing each dimension of populism.

While Jagers and Walgrave (2007) argued that appealing to the people is the sufficient condition for classifying political actors as populist, some studies oppose this view. References to the people per se are a necessary but not sufficient condition for populism because every party or political figure refers to “the people” in one way or another. Thus, scholars should avoid labeling parties as populist just because of their empty references to “the people” (March 2017). One should test the combination of other dimensions to map the degree of populism (Schmidt 2017). Hence, I created four indexes as:²⁰

(1) Thin populism: people-centrism

(2) Anti-elitist populism: people-centrism + anti-elitism

²⁰ This formula was revised from Schmidt (2017) and Jagers and Walgrave (2007).

(3) Exclusive populism: people-centrism + Manichean outlook

(4) Thick populism: people-centrism + anti-elitism + Manichean outlook

4.2. Populists as Mnemonic Warriors

As mentioned in the theoretical background chapter, Boym (2001) proposed the use of restorative nostalgia as an attempt to rebuild the lost home within a conflictual paradigm by creating “us” versus “them” distinctions. However, she did not explain how political actors selectively instrumentalize nostalgia and conflictively use memory. Populists, at this point, appear as antagonistic actors when they aim to use memory and the past as tools for establishing or cementing the “us” versus “them” difference.

This chapter draws mostly from the studies of Kubik and Bernhard (2014), and Cento Bull and Hansen (2016) to explain the memory practices of political actors. Kubik and Bernhard (2014) offer the theory of “politics of memory” to explain remembrance and commemoration practices in post-socialist societies. In order to understand the memory regime of a particular country, one should analyze its mnemonic actors as well as the structural and cultural enablers that the actors operate within. These mnemonic actors “often try to treat history instrumentally, as they tend to construct a vision of the past that they assume will generate the most effective legitimation for their efforts to gain or hold power” (Kubik and Bernhard, 2014, p. 9).

According to Cento Bull and Hansen (2016, p. 390), right-wing populists use an antagonistic mode of memory which “relies on heritage as monumentalism and on a canonical version of history, as well as a Manichean division of the historical characters into good and evil.” The good and the evil are moral categories wherein evil opponents are portrayed as enemies

needing to be destroyed. Antagonistic memory has triumphant, glorifying, and nostalgic narrative styles. The antagonism requires victimhood in which the “us” is depicted as the victim and “them” are the perpetrators.

Antagonistic use of memory corresponds with the mnemonic warriors’ practices in Kubik and Bernhard’s typology (2014, pp. 12-15). Mnemonic warriors build strict boundaries between us – who are the proprietors of the true vision of the past – and them – who are the opponents of the truth. For mnemonic warriors, there is only one correct version of the past. They have a single, unidirectional, and mythologized vision of the time in question. Mnemonic warriors contest their mnemonic opponents by defeating and delegitimizing their alternative visions of the past. Those “others”, who support different versions of the past, must repent or disappear from public life. There is no room for compromise. This correct version of the past built by the mnemonic warriors, in turn, legitimizes their claim to power.

When a mnemonic warrior enters the political debate, they fracture the memory regime of a given country (Kubik and Bernhard, 2014). Mnemonic warriors tap into the ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages in a society in the name of political identity. In turn, the fractured memory regime causes serious problems. As the power struggle is built on a system of no-compromise, one side of the mnemonic debate becomes delegitimized. Mnemonic warriors constantly attack the legitimacy of their opponents. Thus the opposition becomes enemies rather than competitors within the democratic system. Fractured memory regimes increase polarization between political actors, and meanwhile, civil society becomes more contentious.

4.3. Hypotheses

In light of this theoretical and historical background, (1) I assume that Erdoğan uses populist words more frequently when comparing with Kılıçdaroğlu. In response to the AKP's dominance and having become Turkey's new ruling elites, (2) I expect that Kılıçdaroğlu has also adopted populist rhetoric, as populism has contagious characteristics to it (Mudde, 2004). Finally, (3) I presume that Erdoğan emerges as a mnemonic warrior while supporting or legitimizing his actions and goals. The instrumentalization of Ottoman nostalgia by Erdoğan is more contentious and vengeful than Kılıçdaroğlu's exploitation of Kemalist nostalgia.

4.4. Data

I collected the raw data from Kılıçdaroğlu's speeches in parliamentary group meetings between July 2011 and December 2018 ($N = 308$). Similarly, I collected the parliamentary group addresses of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his chairmanship of the AKP before August 2014. In order to establish longitudinal data, I also collected his speeches that he delivered during his meetings with the *mukhtars* (local headmen) during his presidency, before Turkey's transition to the presidential system. Erdoğan continued parliamentary group meetings after the April 2017 referendum due to the repeal of the presidential impartiality clause in the constitution (See: Appendix A for the distribution of texts).

Under normal circumstances, each political party holds a weekly parliamentary group meeting if the parliamentary session is not prorogued. During these meetings, the chairpersons address the deputies, party members, and other guests, typically with TV networks broadcasting these meetings live. Besides weekly or daily topics, chairpersons also

take the opportunity to discuss with and reply to each other in these meetings. Like parliamentary group meetings, TV networks also broadcast the speeches of President Erdoğan's meetings with the *mukhtars*. The concept of mukhtar meetings are similar to the parliamentary group meetings.

Instead of using election manifestos, I preferred collecting these speeches for four reasons. Firstly, manifestos are official documents designed to communicate election goals and policies which are important for upcoming elections. Speeches by leaders, on the other hand, are directly related to weekly, if not daily, routine political issues (Rooduijn, 2014b). Highlighting this point, Hawkins and Castahno Silva's (2018) empirical analysis indicates that election manifestos are less populist in nature than speeches given even during election periods. While the introductory sections of manifestos contain a populist style of communication, the rest of the documents are designed pragmatically and technically, and thus, are less populist.

Secondly, the number of observations would have been lower if I had used election manifestos. There were four elections in Turkey between 2011 and 2018. Hence, I would have eight election manifestos if I had used them as raw data. If I had used all the election manifestos since the 2002 parliamentary elections, I would have sixteen election manifestos since the AKP was established in 2001. However, there are many more speeches by leaders in the same frame, which provide more observations over time. Additionally, weekly gatherings offer an opportunity to capture even minor changes in a short time frame. These speeches are like discrete polylogues among party leaders, in which one leader instantly replies to other leaders.

Thirdly, these speeches serve as a prototype of populist communication in which the leader directly addresses his/her constituency. Although the communication format is not as direct as Hugo Chavez's *Alo Presidente* TV shows, the structure of these meetings is designed as an address to the people. Many party members, even from the lowest rankings, guests, and ordinary citizens, can attend parliamentary group meetings by appointment. The participants sometimes even chant and bring banners to the meetings (Milliyet, 2017; Sabah, 2015).

Fourthly, the Turkish political structure is leader-dominant, where the chairpersons have immense authority over major political decisions. According to Özbudun (2000, p. 152), in Turkey

Election campaigns stressed the personal qualities and trustworthiness of individual leaders rather than party programs and policies. Party leaders are presented as "saviors of the country." Their policies in office, however, typically bore scant resemblance to what they had promised while campaigning.

Hence, capturing the populist political communication of party leaders by using parliamentary group speeches as data is the easiest and most informative system.

4.5. Method

I used content analysis to test the assumption above, which is "a method that may be used with either qualitative or quantitative data and in an inductive or deductive way" (Elo and Kyngas, 2008, p. 107). While running content analysis, any written, verbal, or visual communication messages become raw material to be analyzed systematically and objectively (Wimmer and Dominick, 2010). According to Krippendorff (2013, p. 24), "content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other

meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.” Content analysis is a powerful tool for identifying changes over long periods of time. Content analysis is one of the most advantageous methods for conducting a retrospective design by using large volumes of documents (Wimmer and Dominick, 2010; Krippendorf, 2013).

Validity and reliability are the two essential principles of content analysis. Crucially, as for all empirical analyses, the content analysis should yield replicable (reliable) and valid results. Reliability means that “researchers working at different points in time and perhaps under different circumstances should get the same results when applying the same technique to the same phenomena” (Krippendorf, 2013, p. 24). Validity, on the other hand, implies that “the research effort is open to careful scrutiny and the resulting claims can be upheld in the face of independently available evidence” (Krippendorf, 2013, p. 24-25). In other words, the researcher must ask the question of “are we measuring what we want to measure?” while considering the validity factor (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 112).

With the rise of big data analysis, computerized and automated methods have gained prominence in the use of empirical political science research. Dictionary-based content analysis emerges as a useful tool for analyzing the substantial corpora. While the methodological risk for hand coded content analysis is reliability, the risk for dictionary-based content analysis is validity. (Krippendorf, 2013; Neuendorf, 2002; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). Examining this methodological discussion, Roodujin and Pauwels (2011) used both methods and concluded that there is a high correlation between the results of the two measures ($r = 0.8; p < .001$). This result indicates that despite the contextual sensitivity, we can successfully estimate the degree of populism in texts by using dictionary-based content analysis.

4.6. Populist Words: Establishing a Dictionary

In this article, I mostly utilized from the dictionaries of Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), Pauwels (2011), and Espinal (2013). In addition to these dictionaries, I also utilized new words in order to capture populist rhetoric in Turkey.²¹ After constructing the dictionary, I checked the face validity of the results by running the Key Word in Context (KWIC) analysis tool (Manning and Schütze, 1999; Luhn, 1966). KWIC displays the usage of each word within the context of the five words preceding before and following after it. Disadvantages of studying with an agglutinating language emerged at this stage. Many suffixes produced false positive words that should be removed from the populist words list. For this purpose, I created another set of dictionary and specified the false positive words to be subtracted.²² In the next step, I replaced the names of some institutions which included populist words with

²¹ List of the words used in the dictionary-based content analysis.

Anti-elitism		People-centrism		Manichean outlook	
Turkish	English	Turkish	English	Turkish	English
darbe*	coup*	egemenli*	sovereignty*	biz	us ²
egemenler*	hegemons*	ezilen*	oppressed*	bunlar / bunlarda / bunların	they / them ²
elit*	elite* ¹	halk* ¹	people*	hain*	traitor* ¹
oligar*	oligarch* ²	irade	will	ihanet*	betray* ¹
seçkin*	notable*	kardeş* ²	brother* / sister*	kirli	dirty
tahakküm*	dominance*	millet* ¹	people*	onlar*	they / them ²
vesayet*	tutelage*	referandum*	referendum* ₁	taviz*	compromise*
yolsuzlu*	corrupt* ¹	sandık* / sandığ*	ballot box*	tehdit*	threat* ²

¹ Pauwels, “Measuring Populism”; Rooduijn and Pauwels, “Measuring Populism”. ² Espinal, “A Case Study”.

²² Linguistically, it is difficult to apply dictionary-based content analysis to agglutinating languages like Turkish and Hungarian. Most of the software, applications, or programming codes are designed for fusional languages like modern English, French, Italian, and so on. Although Yoshikoder software is not designed with any linguistic concerns, the existing populism dictionaries are built for fusional languages. This study, in a nutshell, will transform the fusional language dictionaries to an agglutinating language which is densely populated with suffixes. Irrelevant words: halkalı*, halkapınar*, halkbank*, onlar*, milletler*, milletli*, milletvekil*

their abbreviations.²³ I established a third dictionary for detecting stop words and conjunctions which help to build ideas but do not necessarily carry any significance themselves.

4.7. Results

Figure 4.1 illustrates the level populism of two leaders over time.²⁴ Starting from thin populism, Erdoğan uses populist words more frequently than Kılıçdaroğlu in all years. Erdoğan's thin populism -references to the people - increased particularly following the year 2013 and peaked in 2015. Although thin populism per se does not indicate whether a political figure is populist, it is the minimum requirement for speculating on the degree of populist rhetoric. Thus, the analysis of thin populism provides a valid starting point for discussing populism in Turkey.

According to Figure 4.1, instead of anti-elitist populism, exclusive populism appears as the driving characteristic of populist rhetoric in the period between 2011 and 2018. Since 2012, Erdoğan's exclusionary rhetoric has been significantly different from Kılıçdaroğlu's. Finally, Figure 4.1 illustrates that Erdoğan exploits populist rhetoric significantly more frequently than Kılıçdaroğlu. Particularly following the year 2013, Erdoğan's populism had gradually increased and peaked in 2015. Meanwhile, Kılıçdaroğlu's populism also increased until 2015 but has decreased in contrast to Erdoğan's. Overall, the results confirm the first hypothesis: Erdoğan uses populist words more frequently than Kılıçdaroğlu.

²³ "Birleşmiş Milletler" (United Nations) is replaced as "BM," "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi" (Turkish Grand National Assembly) is replaced as "TBMM," "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi" (Republican People's Party) is replaced as "CHP," and "Ulusal Egemenlik ve Çocuk Bayramı" (National Sovereignty and Children's Day) is replaced as "ue".

²⁴ For the analysis, I extracted the frequency of words by using Yoshikoder (Lowe 2011) and analyzed the data by using R (ggplot2 for visualization (Wickham 2016) and Rmisc for calculations (Hope 2013)).




Figure 4.1: Level of populism by four dimensions. Vertical lines indicate one standard error difference.

In order to test whether populist rhetoric became contagious, I checked the correlation between the thick populism of Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu. The results indicate that there is a positive but weak correlation for all years ($r = 0.36$). However, considering the difference between the two leaders in 2015, I also checked the correlation after dropping the year 2015. This time the results showed a robust correlation ($r = 0.93$). Overall, the results reveal that there is a positive correlation between the two leaders' level of populism. However, rather than being contagious, the opposition may use populist rhetoric tactically as a response to populist discourse of a populist leader. Hence, the results partly confirm the contagion theory.

Figure 4.1 suggests that although populist actors use particular rhetoric as a method of political communication (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007), exogenous factors may shape the degree of populism exploited by political figures. The results indicate that the period between 2013 and 2015 was a breaking point regarding the rise of populist rhetoric, a time when extremely critical developments occurred in Turkey. As can be seen in the historical analysis of populism during the AKP era, the Gezi uprising, December 17th-25th investigations, initial clashes with the Gülen organization, and dire developments in the Syrian civil war all occurred in this period. The decrease between 2017 and 2018 may indicate different results. Firstly, Erdoğan could have adopted a different characteristic of right-wing populism. Nativism and authoritarianism could have become more prominent in this period rather than populism (Mudde, 2007). Secondly, the transition from the parliamentary to the presidential system in 2017 may have also affected his discourse. In order to gain a majority, Erdoğan was forced to establish an alliance with the MHP and the BBP. Thus, while he increased his exclusionary politics, he was forced to soften his stance towards his alliance members. Thirdly, Erdoğan's perception of the enemy changed during his long tenure. While the enemies were Kemalist elites and

establishment at the beginning of his rule, more recently they became the Gülen organization, foreign powers, and various vague actors that aim to undermine the AKP and Erdoğan's rule (Aytaç and Elçi, 2019).

Having demonstrated the level of populism in Turkey, the next section covers the instrumentalization of nostalgia by the two leaders. In order to justify his policies and cement his constituency, Erdoğan exploits Ottoman nostalgia. As a response to the rising Ottomanism and illiberal actions of Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu utilizes Kemalist nostalgia. The next section analyses this mnemonic battle.

4.8. Nostalgic Rhetoric in Contemporary Turkish Politics²⁵

This section qualitatively analyses the nostalgic rhetoric of the two sides of the center-periphery cleavage. I used a qualitative approach because I am not interested in whether a leader is more nostalgic than the other. Instead, I seek to illustrate the ways that they instrumentalize nostalgia in their rhetoric. In pursuit of this goal, I again created a dictionary to detect nostalgic rhetoric in texts by using QDA Miner software. QDA Miner tags paragraphs that contain specific keywords which enables the author to analyze a vast corpora of work in a relatively short time.²⁶

4.8.1. Erdoğan's Nostalgia

Erdoğan exploits nostalgia broadly for elucidating and justifying his policies. Above all, he instrumentalizes mnemonic practices to dichotomize the people and the elites. Erdoğan portrays himself and the AKP as the only saviors of the people while stigmatizing the

²⁵ All speeches are translated by the author.

²⁶ Keywords for both leaders: *geleneklerim** (our traditions), *geçmişim** (our past), *kültürüm** (our culture), *tarihim** (our history), *şanlı* (glorious), *görkemli** (magnificent). Keywords for Erdoğan: *osmanlı** (ottoman*), *ecda** (ancestor*), *sultan*, *han* (khan), *selçuklu** (seljuki*), *çanakkale**, *padişah** (monarch*). Keywords for Kılıçdaroğlu: *devrim** (revolution*), *inkılap** (revolution*-transformation*), *atatürk**, *kurtuluş* (literary translation is “liberation,” but it is used for “independence” as in the War of Independence), *laik** (secular*), *inönü**.

opposition and the global order as foes of authentic Muslim people. In this portrayal, he presents the Ottoman era as the golden age of the people.

Erdoğan claims that early Republican elites and the secular establishment are responsible for the contemporary problems of Turkey. The elites and the establishment manipulated history and historical education to their ends, cutting the bond of communion between the people and their glorious past. In addition, he complains about international bodies and organizations while promoting the *Pax Ottomana* as an era of justice and equality. He also highlights that the Ottoman Empire had inclusionary structures. The people who have been living in post-Ottoman lands are still yearning for the peace and prosperity that the Empire established.

According to Erdoğan, since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the people have been suffering from many problems. The people lost their physical home due to territorial losses during the late Ottoman era. While thousands of people were forced to immigrate back to Anatolia, the ones who remained have suffered under their new states. Erdoğan also indicates that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is an emotional loss of a home where the people had lived in peace and justice. One way or another, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a traumatic experience for the people.

*Now, when we look back, the Ottomans were so great, so deeply rooted that the collapse of the Empire in 1914 led to both physical and deep spiritual wounds among our people. See, where we have come from. Alas, does our youth know this? The size of our land, which was 2.5 million square kilometers, was reduced to 780 thousand square kilometers.*²⁷

²⁷ Erdoğan's speech on October 19, 2016.

For Erdoğan, even the National Pact²⁸ and establishment of the new Turkish Republic failed to heal this trauma. The elites who made the National Pact forced the people to accept the territorial losses as given fact. According to him, the Treaty of Lausanne was not a success as Republican elites claimed, but instead a disastrous defeat. However, the elites prevent the people from perceiving this reality.

*We refuse this understanding. The aim of [the elites] who have imprisoned Turkey in such a vicious cycle since 1923, is to make us forget our Seljukian and Ottoman past and our existence on these lands.*²⁹

According to Erdoğan, Republican elites, as well as the secular establishment, oppressed the people from the 1930s until 2002. Rather than representing the authentic people's will, the elites exploited the system for their own special interests.

I believe that our most important reform among the others is our achievement in fighting against the tutelage and guardianship. This country has always suffered from the engineers of politics and society. The ones who always talk about the people and populism have brought the greatest oppression on the people. Those who impose an alien lifestyle on our values, our history, our culture, and our people under cover of modernity have severed the ties between the people and the Republic. With this counterfeit project, the country's facilities were handed down to a handful of elites, while the people became weak and unable to meet their basic human needs. Politics, unfortunately, has

²⁸ The National Pact is the roadmap of the founders of Turkish Republic. The Pact consisted of six points which present the goals to achieve independence following the Allied Powers' occupation of Anatolia and Istanbul.

²⁹ Erdoğan's speech on October 19, 2016.

*become a part of this distorted order rather than being representative of the people.*³⁰

The rule of the AKP is the rule of the people according to Erdoğan. “We became the power of Turkey [instead of] the elite, the rich, the noble, and the Galata bankers.”³¹ He makes analogies between the Ottoman Empire and the AKP rule while explaining the difficulties and enemies that they fight. The most prominent example of these enemies is the *interest lobby*, who undermined the Ottoman economy with 900 percent interest rates and now aim to do the same thing to Turkey. The Gezi uprising was an outcome of this fight, a result of his and the AKP’s rejection of interest lobby’s demands.³²

Erdoğan establishes the same analogy while expressing his anti-intellectualism. According to him, academia and university professors only betray the country and the people. Even if the professors provide academic studies which are beneficial to the country and humanity, their support for terrorist organizations rule out their contributions.

*Like their masters, the only characteristic of these [professors] has been they were the enemy of the Ottoman [Empire] in the Ottoman period, against the national struggle in the War of Independence, and were the enemy of the people in the Republican period since the Tanzimat era.*³³

*These are their features. Names are changing, but the mentality is the same.*³⁴

³⁰ Erdoğan’s speech on June 13, 2017.

³¹ Erdoğan’s speech on May 29, 2011. Galata Bankers were a group of non-Muslim people who lent money to the state with high interest rates during the late Ottoman era.

³² Erdoğan’s speech on December 7, 2016.

³³ Tanzimat Era means the Reform Era in English and covers the period between 1839 and 1876 in which many modernization efforts took place.

³⁴ Erdoğan’s speech on January 20, 2016.

For Erdoğan, there are still intellectuals who dislike and have an animosity against the people, similar to thinkers of the Ottoman period.

During the late Ottoman Empire and the early period of the Republic, there were the so-called intellectuals such as Abdullah Cevdet³⁵ who did not hesitate to express that they do not like their people openly. Thank God, the area of influence according to their ideological obsessions of this mob, who makes all kinds of insults to the people who are not in the direction they have determined, is gradually decreasing.³⁶

Erdoğan emphasizes that the people and the AKP take power from “our history, our civilization, and our culture.”³⁷ We must draw a lesson from history and stick to our culture and civilization by any means. If we do not do this, we may experience the same disasters again.

Some external powers are trying to drag Turkey into the same chaos, the same disorder. Unfortunately, some of [their internal collaborators] support them. For this aim, the centers of guardianship have stuck daggers in the nation's heart for years. They were behind the processes that led Turkey to coups. They executed Menderes for it. They did all they could to persecute Özal. They declared Abdülhamit Han a dictator and then dethroned him. They dethroned this Sultan who served the Empire for 33 years without losing a piece of land. They created barriers over the past 13 years [of the AKP rule] in every step that we

³⁵ Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) was one of the founders of Ittihat ve Terakki Partisi (Committee of Union and Progress). His ideas were so Western oriented that he was labeled as “the enemy of Islam” (Alkan, 2005).

³⁶ Erdoğan’s speech on November 4, 2015.

³⁷ Erdoğan’s speech on February 10, 2016.

*have taken. They even called me a dictator. There was always the same goal behind the Gezi events, the December 17-25 coup attempt, and finally the re-enacting separatist terror.*³⁸

*In order to cope with the enemies of the people and all the problems they created, we have to teach history to the young generation because these enemies deceived us with a false history. We have to learn and understand the period before and after the Independence War, the Lausanne Treaty, and the National Pact.*³⁹

According to Erdoğan, there is an established global political inequality among the states. Besides his famous slogan, “the world is bigger than five”, which indicates the unfair composition of the UN Security Council, he frequently criticizes US and Russian interference in the Middle East. For him, Israeli actions in Palestine are also the result of global inequality. For Erdoğan, all conflicts around the world derive from a power struggle. Hence, Turkey must be powerful enough to prove its rightful place in the political sphere. Despite problems during the pre-AKP period, Turkey now conducts a just foreign policy throughout the region.

We established a very strong and powerful state in this region, like the Seljuks and the Ottomans, which were very rare in history. While we still live in this region, we can protect our reputation by not converting

³⁸ Erdoğan’s speech on October 26, 2015. Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) was the first prime minister after the transition to multiparty system in Turkey. He served between 1950 and 1960 but was removed from his position by a military coup. He was executed by the military junta in 1961. Turgut Özal (1927-1993) was the prime minister and the 8th President of Turkey. He was the planner of January 24, 1980 reforms which led to transition of Turkey from import-substitution industrialization to liberal economic model. Abdülhamit (Sultan Abdülhamit II) (1842-1918) was the 34th sultan of the Ottoman Empire. He was dethroned following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution in 1909. December 17-25 (2013) events refers to an alleged corruption scandal. Many individuals including Suleyman Aslan, the director of Halkbank, Iranian businessman Reza Zarrab, and several family members of cabinet ministers were detained by police. The police officers that conducted these operations had ties with the Gülen Organization.

³⁹ Erdoğan’s speech on October 19, 2016.

our power to oppression, but instead, by being fair to everyone and every group. There is a saying I always say, here again, I will repeat: Our [Turkey's] physical boundaries are different from our emotional boundaries. We currently have a population of 83.5 million within our physical boundaries in 81 provinces, 780 thousand square kilometers of land, and with our citizens abroad. However, there is no limit to our emotional boundaries.⁴⁰

For Erdoğan, Turkey under AKP rule has been resisting the global powers who are conspiring against Turkey and region. The bloodshed all over the Middle East is a result of this power struggle.

What I call the “mastermind” comes up every day with a new evil. They are trying to plant new seeds of discord in our region. They try to darken the future of our region with sectarianism and civil wars with bloody tears.⁴¹

In order to defend the people against these external powers, Turkey adopted an active foreign policy like the Ottomans, contrary to the passive foreign policy of the Kemalist establishment.

The AK Party has made the dream of foreign policy come true. The AK Party stood upright in every platform, in line with the dreams and aspirations of the people. [The AKP] defended the honor of the people, the flag, and this great land without being shaken. Turkey demonstrated [itself] as descendants of the Ottoman Empire, not only

⁴⁰ Erdoğan's speech on November 19, 2017.

⁴¹ Erdoğan's speech on December 14, 2016.

*within the country but all over the world, especially on behalf of the oppressed and the victimized peoples at every opportunity.*⁴²

According to Erdoğan, the history of Turkey is not limited to its foundation in 1923. Turkey has a long history going back to ancient times that originated in Central Asia. Even during the Crusades, Turks protected holy lands such as Damascus and Al-Quds (Jerusalem). Hence, Turkey has every right to intervene in the civilian crises in Syria because the people of Turkey are brothers with the Syrians, Iraqis, Palestinians, Egyptians, and Lebanese.⁴³

*We are a generation who came upon the legacy of the Great Ottoman State (Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye). Therefore, if there is sadness anywhere in the world, if there is crying, if there is persecution, our faith and values require us to go there, how our ancestors went to Aya, how they went to the Indian Peninsula.*⁴⁴

Erdoğan stresses the generosity of humanitarian aid distributed by Turkey throughout Africa and the Middle East. For him, only Turkey represents the poor and oppressed of those regions. It was the Ottoman Empire that had reached and served in this region for centuries to provide justice, peace, and security. However, following the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, colonization was accelerated, which paved the way for severe clashes, wars, and partitions.⁴⁵

Erdoğan supports the Ottoman concept of inclusiveness of the people. This inclusiveness, according to him, does not discriminate against people according to their national

⁴² Erdoğan's speech on April 24, 2012.

⁴³ Erdoğan's speech on June 26, 2012.

⁴⁴ Erdoğan's speech on April 22, 2014.

⁴⁵ Erdoğan's speech on January 27, 2015.

identities. In almost every speech, he counts some prominent national identities residing in Turkey and delivers a message of solidarity.

*We established this state on the remaining lands [of the Ottoman Empire] with Turks, Kurds, Laz, Circassian, Georgian, Bosnian, Roman, Arab, in sum, with everyone who feels and accepts himself as a part of this country.*⁴⁶

Erdoğan also highlights his aim of establishing *a new Turkey* where there is no insulation, discrimination, and ill-treatment as it was under the previous elites. For Erdoğan, brotherhood, freedom, and justice are central to understanding the origins of a new Turkey, deriving from the spirit of the Seljuks and Ottomans.⁴⁷

*We fought shoulder to shoulder with our Kurdish brothers in the Battle of Malazgirt, which opened the gates of Anatolia to Islam. We fought shoulder-to-shoulder throughout our region against the Crusades, which meant the banner of Islam. We were not different from each other as Muslim brothers in the army of the Al-Quds Conqueror Saladin, in the army of Nureddin Zengi, in the great army of Yavuz Sultan Selim. We became one under the same blessings of the holy cause. Together, we became brothers to each other forever.*⁴⁸

However, as clearly understood from the lines above, this inclusiveness only covers Muslims. By referring to minority problems during the late Ottoman era, he accepts that the state is composed of Islamic elements. He says “there is no place for the race. There

⁴⁶ Erdoğan’s speech on February 24, 2016.

⁴⁷ Erdoğan’s speech on April 2, 2013.

⁴⁸ Erdoğan’s speech on March 25, 2015. Saladin (1137-1193) was the founder of Ayyubid dynasty who had Kurdish origins. Nureddin Zengi (1118-1174) was the ruler of Syrian Seljukis who fought against the Crusaders. Yavuz Sultan Selim (Selim I) (1470-1520) 9th sultan of the Ottoman Empire who conquered Islamic holy lands and brought caliphate to Ottomans.

is Islam, and there is non-Islam.”⁴⁹ In other words, he also adopts the Sevres Syndrome of the previous secular establishment, which can be defined as the paranoia of the separation of Turkey.

4.8.2. Kılıçdaroğlu’s Nostalgia

Kılıçdaroğlu exploits nostalgia by referring to the past successes of the young Turkish Republic during the 1920s and 1930s, using them to criticize the illiberal and exclusive politics of Erdoğan and the AKP. Although 1920s and 1930s Kemalist rule was not democratic in practice and has carried out authoritarian policies, Kılıçdaroğlu depicts this era as the initial stage towards democracy. However, Kılıçdaroğlu does not act as a mnemonic warrior nor adopts the antagonistic memory politics.

Kılıçdaroğlu frequently quotes Atatürk and makes references to the Kemalist era, opposing the AKP’s exclusionary and majoritarian understanding of the people. In addition, Kılıçdaroğlu criticizes Erdoğan and the AKP’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy and supports readopting a more cautious foreign policy.

*There was the ummah instead of the people during the Ottoman [rule].
Each person was not a citizen but the slave and the vassal of the Sultan.
There was no free individual, no concept of citizen. However, the
founders of Republic declared that “We are a nation,” “We are the
people,” “We are the citizens of the free Republic.” ... What was
Atatürk saying? “The sovereignty rests unconditionally with the
people.” You say ummah, but I say the people.⁵⁰*

⁴⁹ Erdoğan’s speech on April 19, 2016.

⁵⁰ Kılıçdaroğlu’s speech on August 2, 2016.

In another speech, Kılıçdaroğlu says that the CHP is ready to defend the country as Atatürk did.

Every time, once again, we understand the greatness of Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk mentioned about sovereignty the first time in the Amasya Circular.⁵¹ There was a sultan in Istanbul, but he [Atatürk] was talking about sovereignty. He was stressing the tenacity and judgment of the people. We too never give up on our tenacity and determination on the issue of terror. We will protect our country in every condition, against every enemy with the same tenacity and determination. This is our oath. This is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's oath.⁵²

Against the illiberal and majoritarian moves of Erdoğan and the AKP, Kılıçdaroğlu argues that these moves pave the way for losing the achievements of Republic. According to Kılıçdaroğlu, the AKP came to power with a discourse of fighting against repressive understanding, but they became the party of repressive actions.⁵³

Every individual of this republic is free, and each can state his/her ideas freely. This is the aim of establishing the republic. "Ask me everything! I will decide everything! I will consider all problems!" Neither the republic, the reason, democracy, or parliament accepts this understanding, nor does the CHP.⁵⁴

Kılıçdaroğlu frequently establishes analogies between individual freedoms and rights, resistance against the AKP, and the determination of the people during the War of

⁵¹ Amasya Circular (22 June 1919) was the first written document of Turkish War of Independence which was consisted of eight decrees.

⁵² Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on June 19, 2012.

⁵³ Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on May 22, 2012.

⁵⁴ Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on August 2, 2016.

Independence. While giving a speech on the protest of female farmers, he criticizes Erdoğan's attacks on newspapers and demands for the resignation of two journalists. He invites women to stand against the AKP's repression, like the women who participated in the Independence War.⁵⁵ In another speech on press freedom, Kılıçdaroğlu once again quotes Atatürk.

*Dear friends, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk said that “the press is the common voice of the people” in 1922, which was the period when the idea of a republic was slowly sprouting. Also, in 1923, Atatürk said that “Journalists publish even if they witness or have a grasp of treatments against the law and the public good.” Now, publishing against someone has almost become a crime. Look at the understanding during the 1920s... That is why we always say that we must return to this understanding.*⁵⁶

According to Kılıçdaroğlu, the presidential system equates to separatism for Turkey. He also argues that the adoption of the presidential system is no different from sultanism. While criticizing the presidential system, he again quotes Atatürk, who said that “the republic is [based on] merit, but sultanism is an administration based on fear and menace.”⁵⁷ For Kılıçdaroğlu, the transformation from a parliamentary to a presidential system is the opposite of what Atatürk and his colleagues did. While the founders of the Turkish Republic bestowed sovereignty upon the people by taking it from the palace and the sultan, Erdoğan aims to take sovereignty back from the people.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on March 5, 2013.

⁵⁶ Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on August 2, 2016.

⁵⁷ Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on May 10, 2016.

⁵⁸ Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on January 10, 2017.

While criticizing the AKP and Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu states that Turkey has distanced itself from Western values, which are unionization, freedom of organization, constitutionalism, human rights, freedom of the press, civil society organizations, and judicial independence. For him, Atatürk's definition of civilization is that of Western civilization, which includes the ideas of legitimate opposition and democracy.⁵⁹

According to Kılıçdaroğlu, Erdoğan's discriminatory rhetoric is dangerous for Turkey. Erdoğan sometimes insults and criticizes Kılıçdaroğlu by referring to his Alevi identity. Against Erdoğan's discriminative discourse, Kılıçdaroğlu says that

We are the descendants of martyrs who lie in Çanakkale, Sarıkamış, Yemeni deserts, Sakarya, and Dumlupınar. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, how dare you try to cause a rift between the sons of the people? How dare you make mischief? I am sure that you are the first prime minister who dares to do this and hopefully you will be the last one. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, do not forget the fact that I am not only from Dersim but also Konya, İzmir, Uşak, Diyarbakır, Trabzon, [I am from] Turkey.⁶⁰

Contrary to the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy of the AKP, Kılıçdaroğlu stresses that Turkey should stay away from the problems of the Middle East. Referring to Atatürk's ideas on peace in the Middle East, Kılıçdaroğlu opposes the Islamic tone of the AKP's foreign policy. In addition, Kılıçdaroğlu criticizes the alliance between Wahabi organizations and the AKP, which poisons the beauty of Islam.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on October 16, 2012.

⁶⁰ Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on November 29, 2011.

⁶¹ Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on February 16, 2016.

Kılıçdaroğlu strongly opposes military action in the Middle East. He always refers to the famous quote of Atatürk, “Peace at home, peace in the world”, while opposing the ethnic and religious cleavages around the Middle East, Balkans, and the Caucasus.

Turkey’s dynamism and power influences this area. Thus, we always have the power to influence this area. Who gave this power to us? How did we obtain this power? This is the power of the Turkish Republic which was founded by Mustafa Kemal and [his] friends’ extraordinary struggles. We take this strength from the founding philosophy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk because he once told that “if the war is not imperative, it is murder.”⁶²

As mentioned above, Erdoğan criticizes the passage of Lausanne Treaty by portraying it as a failure due to the loss of Ottoman lands. Against this rhetoric, Kılıçdaroğlu argues that:

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his friends increased the territory [of Turkey] from 470 thousand kilometers square [as a result of the Treaty of Sevres] to 736 thousand kilometers square. Following the annexation of Hatay, it becomes 738 thousand kilometers square. I am not sure whether the individuals who attack Atatürk and the Lausanne Treaty have a conscience, character, belief, and patriotism.⁶³

Consequently, Kılıçdaroğlu supports that Turkey must readopt the Republican orientation, which requires a peace-oriented foreign policy, by supporting cooperation and friendship as well as enhancing democratic principles in domestic policy.

⁶² Kılıçdaroğlu’s speech on June 26, 2012.

⁶³ Kılıçdaroğlu’s speech on July 25, 2017.

*We are going to fight in a second Independence War for democracy and freedom until having a neutral president, until the will of people is represented correctly in the parliament, until every citizen can freely declare his/her ideas, until there are no prohibitions, until making a Turkey where everyone speaks freely.*⁶⁴

4.9. Conclusion

This chapter analyzes populist rhetoric in Turkish politics by using the content analysis method and speeches by Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu between 2011 and 2018. The available speeches provide raw data to capture populist rhetoric during an era of democratic backsliding in Turkey. The results show that both Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu utilize populist discourse to a varying extent. However, Erdoğan is significantly more populist than Kılıçdaroğlu in all years observed. The dimensional approach shows that while exclusionary populism is dominant in Turkey, anti-elitism has the lowest share in total populist discourse. This result may stem from the fact that there has been a populist party in power for almost two decades, diminishing the power of the former civil-military elites starting in 2007, but particularly since 2010.

The qualitative analysis of Erdoğan's speeches shows that he appears as a mnemonic warrior against Kemalist elites, the establishment, and the CHP. He uses nostalgia both for domestic and foreign policy issues. Erdoğan exploits nostalgia to create antagonism towards the secular Republican elites and to show how the elites are alienated from the politics of the common people. For Erdoğan, regional and global problems stem from the unequal distribution of power. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire is the primary reason for problems in the broader Middle East and Africa, where external forces intervene in

⁶⁴ Kılıçdaroğlu's speech on March 22, 2016.

the region to secure their special interests. Kılıçdaroğlu, on the other hand, uses nostalgia to criticize Erdoğan's and the AKP's illiberal moves. He offers a historical linchpin, which is the 1920s and 1930s Republican era. For Kılıçdaroğlu, the ideas of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his colleagues are the ones that we must readopt, both in foreign and domestic policy issues.

Unfortunately, due to the unavailability of speeches and their associated raw data prior to 2011, a thorough examination of populism levels for the entire AKP period since 2002 is unattainable. I can argue that if I had pre-2011 data available I might have captured more anti-elitist rhetoric. Because, the years between 2007 and 2011 encompass the period with the most significant conflicts occurring between the AKP and Erdoğan, as *the voice of the authentic people*, and the Republican elites, who *hijacked the will of the people*.

CHAPTER 5

POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA: A SURVEY ANALYSIS

This chapter examines the relationship between collective nostalgia and populism at the mass level.⁶⁵ The previous chapter illustrated that politicians instrumentalize nostalgia for their goals. However, does collective nostalgia also characterize populist attitudes of the electorate? By using a representative survey data, this section tests the link between predisposition to nostalgia and populist attitudes. I assume that after controlling for other independent variables, nostalgia should have a significantly positive impact on populist values. The results confirmed this hypothesis. After controlling for religiosity, partisanship, income, support for EU membership, satisfaction with life, democracy, economic conditions, and demographic variables such as sex, age, and education, collective nostalgia appears as the most important explanatory variable.

Previous studies which evaluated the relationship between nostalgia and populism either used proxy variables or provided a specific period to respondents to compare their current conditions against. Gest et al.'s (2017) study on the UK and the US measured nostalgia by contrasting respondents' answers to the question, "how important you (and other people) are to your society", with another question, "how central and important you (and other people like you) were to society 30 years ago." In the end, they created a scale of nostalgic deprivation for each respondent. As a dependent variable, Gest and his

⁶⁵ Early versions of this chapter are presented in Political Studies Association 68th Annual International Conference, Cardiff, the UK (March 2018) and *Politicologenetmaal* 2017, Leiden, the Netherlands (June 2017).

colleagues used the usual suspects approach in which they asked opinions of the respondents about Donald Trump, the Tea Party Movement, British National Party, United Kingdom Independence Party, and English Defence League. In another article, Steenvoorden and Hartevelt (2018) questioned whether nostalgia reverberates with societal pessimism among populist radical right voters in eight European countries. They measured societal pessimism for today and the future with two, five-level-Likert-scale agree/disagree questions: “Hard to be hopeful about the future of the world” and “For most people in this country, life is getting worse.” Their dependent variable is party preference, in which they classified parties as far-left, far-right, and mainstream.

Both studies concluded that there is a positive relationship between nostalgia and populism. However, their measures have two main shortcomings. Firstly, voting for a populist party or candidate does not directly demonstrate whether respondents have populist attitudes. Treating party preference as an indicator for populism may lead to an overestimation of populist values, because individuals who do not hold populist attitudes may also vote for these populist parties. Populist attitudes can also be shown as abstention, even support for mainstream parties (Castanho Silva et al., 2018; Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016; Rico and Anduiza, 2016). Secondly, as broadly discussed in the introduction, providing a historical period for comparison may underestimate nostalgic attitudes. For example, in their article, Ekman and Linde (2005) showed that Baltic countries such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania presented lower levels of nostalgia in comparison with other post-communist Central and East European countries. The authors concluded that this result stemmed from the fact that Baltic countries are not nostalgic for the communist era but rather for their pre-war history. In order to overcome these shortcomings, this study uses the populist attitudes scale as the dependent variable along with a nostalgia index which does not provide a specific historical period.

This chapter proceeds as follows; After explaining the dependent variable in this chapter, the populist attitudes index, I will present the independent variables and hypotheses. Next, I will explain the data and present results. Finally, I will conclude the chapter.

5.1. Dependent Variable: Populist Attitudes

The dependent variable of this study is constructed from four survey items coined by Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde (2012). These four items aim to “capture key elements of populism, especially a Manichaeian view of politics, a notion of a reified popular will, and a belief in a conspiring elite” (Hawkins et al., 2012, p. 7). I aggregated the four items and created an index ranging from 0 to 100.

According to histograms, the last three items are negatively skewed except the item “Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.” Contrary to the other three items, this item is more ceiled. Although it appeared as a problematic question in previous studies (Akkerman et al. 2014; Castanho Silva et al. 2017), both the exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis revealed that I could create an index of populism by using these four items (See: Hu and Bentler (1998) for universal CFA fit indices).

Variable	Nostalgia	Populism	Uniqueness
POP1- Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.	-0.011	0.521	0.732
POP2- The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.	-0.078	0.588	0.673
POP3- The politicians in the Parliament need to follow the will of the people.	-0.025	0.681	0.545
POP4- The people, and not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	0.175	0.604	0.548
NO1- Listening to new pieces of music, I miss the old days and those beautiful folk songs. ⁶⁶	0.644	0.042	0.569
NO2- We must not forget the values that we had in the past.	0.581	0.184	0.571
NO3- I miss my country's good, old glorious days. ⁶⁷	0.781	-0.162	0.433
NO4- We can get rid of today's problems we experience today as "the people" only by looking to our past.	0.725	-0.001	0.475
Eigenvalue	2.277	1.177	
Proportion	0.285	0.147	
Cumulative Proportion	0.285	0.432	

Table 5.1: Exploratory factor analysis results. Method: Principal-component factors with Promax rotation and Kaiser normalization. N = 1,492.

Confirmatory factor analysis fit statistics of the populism index (with maximum likelihood estimation): $\chi^2 = 6.407$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.041$, CFI = 0.982, TLI = 0.947, SRMR = 0.016, RMSEA = 0.038 [0.007 – 0.074].

Confirmatory factor analysis fit statistics of the nostalgia index (with maximum likelihood estimation): $\chi^2 = 19.237$, $df = 2$, $p = 0$, CFI = 0.976, TLI = 0.929, SRMR = 0.024, RMSEA = 0.076 [0.047 – 0.109].

	N	M	SD	POP1	POP2	POP3
POP1- Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.	1802	3.13	1.47	1		
POP2- The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.	1760	3.74	1.22	0.21	1	
POP3- The politicians in the Parliament need to follow the will of the people.	1824	4.14	0.99	0.17	0.15	1
POP4- The people, and not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	1802	3.92	1.12	0.19	0.11	0.33

Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics and correlations of populism items.

⁶⁶ This question is from Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009).

⁶⁷ This question is adapted from Smeekes (2015). The original version of the question is "How often do you long for the good old days of the country?"




Figure 5.1: Histograms of populism items.




Figure 5.2: Histogram of populism index.

5.2. Independent Variables and Hypotheses

The relationship between nostalgia and populism is controlled with various independent variables. In order to capture the effects of identity politics and the center-periphery cleavage in Turkey, I used variables such as Alevi, Kurdish, and religiosity where the cross-cutting cleavages in Turkish society occur. In order to connect the study to broader populism literature and comparing Turkey with the previous studies on populism in different contexts, I used support for EU membership, satisfaction with democracy, economic conditions, and life, and interpersonal trust questions. Lastly, I also controlled for the effect of nostalgia with partisanship variables.

Nostalgia

The primary independent variable of this study is nostalgia, which is constructed from four survey items. Similar to populism questions, nostalgia items are negatively skewed. These items aim to measure the importance of past values, past experiences, old tastes, and the glorious past of the country. Without anchoring to any particular period or group, these items aim to capture collective nostalgia, which can be different periods for the respondents. For example, as discussed in the previous chapters, while CHP supporters could be nostalgic for the achievements of Kemalist single party era, AKP supporters are yearning for the glorious days of the Ottoman Empire. In light of the theoretical background, I assume that there is a positive link between collective nostalgia and populism.

H1: The more nostalgic are respondents, the more populist attitudes they express.

	N	M	SD	NO1	NO2	NO3
NO1- Listening to new pieces of music, I miss the old days and those beautiful folk songs.	1840	3.9	1.13	1		
NO2- We must not forget the values that we had in the past.	1879	4.18	1.02	0.30	1	
NO3- I miss my country's good, old glorious days.	1864	3.76	1.26	0.31	0.32	1
NO4- We can get rid of today's problems we experience today as "the people" only by looking to our past.	1863	3.97	1.16	0.23	0.34	0.41

Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics and correlations of nostalgia items




Figure 5.3: Histograms of nostalgia items.




Figure 5.4: Histogram of nostalgia index.

Interpersonal trust

The relationship between interpersonal trust and democracy (or authoritarianism in reverse) has long been discussed in political science literature (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963[1989]; Inglehart, 1990; Putnam, 1994). By referring to Tocqueville, Poggi (1972, p. 59) argued that “interpersonal trust is probably the moral orientation that most needs to be diffused among the people if republican society is to be maintained.” The norms of interpersonal relationships, general trust, and confidence in the social environment are necessary dynamics for establishing civic culture and democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963[1989]). According to Putnam (1993, p. 15), “the civic community is marked by an active, public-spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations, by a social fabric of trust and cooperation.” Hence, interpersonal trust appears as an essential asset that is conducive to the existence of democracy (Inglehart, 1990). To sum up, higher interpersonal trust

leads to better economic development and higher levels of support for democracy, which are crucial for an enduring democratic structure (Krouwel et al., 2017).

These arguments explain the preferences of populist radical right in other countries. For example, the 2017 French presidential election results showed that the vote share for the populist Marine Le Pen was low in the southwestern provinces, where social capital and interpersonal trust are high. In contrast, the vote share for Le Pen was high in the northeastern France, where individualism and low levels of interpersonal trust are more prominent than in other provinces (Algan et al., 2017). Hence, I expect that lower interpersonal trust positively correlates with populist attitudes.

Interpersonal trust is measured with the question, “In your opinion, can most of people be trusted in general? Or do they need to be approached with precaution?.” The respondents who chose “Most people can be trusted” are coded as 1 and “People need to be approached with precaution” are coded as 0.

H2: Respondents who expressed positive interpersonal trust have less populist attitudes.

Euroskepticism

Euroskepticism can be defined as “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). It is a symptom of both radical right and left parties in Europe and its periphery (Roodujin et al., 2017). Nativist and authoritarian characteristics of right-wing populism appear as a rejection of Brussels’ authority in policy-making (McDonnell and Werner, 2017). Since the elites in Brussels are non-native and intervene in domestic politics to protect those non-natives, right-wing populism interprets the EU as “the most proximate Western enemy and a threat to ... national independence” (Pirro, 2014, p. 605). For left-wing populists, the EU’s neoliberal

economic agenda is the source of discontent. They mostly criticize the EU on issues like the welfare state and market liberalization (van Elsas et al., 2016).

In terms of Euroskepticism, Turkey appears as a curious case. Turkey is a candidate country with a predominantly Muslim population, where its relations with the EU have always been turbulent (Çarkoğlu and Glöpker-Kesebir, 2016). While the AKP had pursued a pro-EU policy during their first term between 2002 and 2007, the party adopted a conflictual discourse in the following period (Öniş, 2015). As the EU's leverage over its periphery has decreased, particularly following the 2008 economic crisis, Turkey has gradually moved away from EU norms (Öniş and Kutlay, 2017).

This study measures Euroskepticism with the question, "Would you vote in favor of or against membership in the EU if a referendum were to be held today?". While support for EU membership is at 45.7 percent, 38.9 percent of respondents are against EU membership. Rather than treating the 15.3 percent of "No idea/No response" as a missing value, I coded them neutral and created a three-level index as -1 (no support), 0 (neutral), 1 (support).

H3: Respondents who are more supportive of the EU membership have less populist attitudes.

Religiosity

As broadly explained in the previous chapters, religiosity plays a pivotal role in explaining the party preferences of the Turkish constituency. Religiosity also appears as a key independent variable for explaining the cross-cutting cleavages within Turkish society. While more religious people have typically been on the periphery of politics, they have always distanced themselves from the Western-oriented secular politics of the establishment since the late Ottoman period.

Previous studies on populism mostly used religiosity as a control variable. Rooduijn (2018) concluded that religiosity has a significant but negative relationship with vote share for populist parties in five out of fifteen cases, which are *Vlaams Belang* (Belgium), *Die Linke* (Germany), *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, *Socialistische Partij*, and *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (the Netherlands), and nonsignificant for the rest. In another study, Steenvoorden and Hartevelt (2018) showed that the populist radical right constituency attends religious gatherings more often than mainstream right-wing party voters in eight Western European countries. Religiosity is also crucial for understanding the rise of populism in Eastern Europe, particularly the success of PiS in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary. According to Stanley (2019), the more frequently the respondent attends church services, the more likely they have positive feelings towards the PiS in Poland. To sum up, in addition to the significance of religiosity in Turkish politics, measuring the link between religiosity and populism becomes crucial in understanding the differences and similarities of Turkey within the broader populist literature. In this study, religiosity is measured with the question, “Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are a religious person?”, where 0 represents not religious at all and 10 represents very religious.

H4: As religiosity increases, respondents show more populist attitudes.

Alevi and Kurdish Identity

Alevis and Kurds are the most populous yet non-recognized religious and ethnic minorities in Turkish politics, respectively. While religiosity represents the secular versus Islamist cleavage in Turkish politics, the tension between the Kurdish political movement and Turkish nationalism represents a nationalism conflict (Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006). Within these dichotomies, Alevi identity appears as an unusual case due to their changing

historical conditions since the Ottoman era. Alevi is a religious minority in Turkey who are descendants or followers of Ali ibn Abi Talib (the fourth caliph of the Islamic caliphate and the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad). Alevism is not a Shia sect precisely, but rather a syncretic, pluralistic tradition which includes elements from Islam, shamanism, Christianity, and the pre-Christian religions of rural Anatolia (Çarkoğlu and Elçi, 2018). While Alevi were perceived as a threat during the Ottoman era and in the early Turkish Republic, the rise of center-right parties with a Sunni-Islam discourse paved the way for the rapprochement between the Alevi minority and secular establishment (Çarkoğlu, 2005).

Following the first multiparty elections, both Alevi and Kurds had been close to the DP. After the 1960 military intervention, a more liberal political environment, coupled with constitutional reforms and the global rise of socialist movements, affected Turkish politics. Many Alevi and Kurds who immigrated from rural to urban areas were politicized within leftist political organizations until the 1980 coup. Also, massacres in Alevi villages in Maraş, Çorum, and Malatya, conducted by the far-right, ultranationalist, and anti-communist Ülkü Ocakları and MHP members, led Alevi to become closer to socialist organizations (Çarkoğlu and Elçi, 2018). Following brutal suppression of the left by the military junta of the 1980 coup, socialist organizations lost much of their power. However, the PKK survived as the most significant socialist and pro-Kurdish armed political organization during the 1980s and 1990s (Bozarslan, 2008).

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of identity politics reshaped preexisting conflicts in Turkey. Since then, both Alevi and Kurdish organizations have become more visible in public space. Alevi support for the CHP increased starting from the 1990s. The Sivas Massacre in 1993, conducted by a group of Islamic fundamentalists, made

Alevi staunch supporters of the secular establishment. Consequently, the Alevi minority became an ally of the civil-military establishment (Çarkoğlu and Elçi, 2018).

On the other hand, the Kurdish minority gravitated towards being a strong anti-establishment movement and founded their own political parties. While more religious Kurds expressed their anti-establishment sentiment by voting mostly for the RP, during the same period, secular ones joined the political movements which are close to the PKK's ideology. To sum up, the positions of Alevi and Kurdish minorities are critical to understanding populist attitudes in Turkey.

Detecting minorities in Turkey has always been difficult because those minorities do not have visible, distinguishing characteristics from the Sunni, Turkish majority. While Kurds and Zaza's have different languages which makes them relatively more distinguishable, Alevi do not have any particular differentiating characteristics. Hence, it is impossible to detect an Alevi person unless he or she openly expresses his or her Alevi belief (Çarkoğlu and Elçi, 2018; Çarkoğlu, 2005).

For this reason, we asked respondents various questions in order to identify whether he or she is Alevi. First, we openly ask the respondents whether they are Alevi or not. Second, we ask who are the most important and the second most important religious figures according to their beliefs. Third, we ask whether there are any pictures of significant religious figures or religiously important places at the respondent's home. I coded respondents as 1 who openly express his/her Alevi belief in the first question. Next, I coded respondents who said Imam Ali and Haji Bektash Veli are the most and second most important figures as 1. Then, I coded the respondents as 1 if they have pictures of

the 12 Imams and Imam Ali's pictures in their home. Followingly, I summed all of these variables and recoded the values above 0 as 1 to create the Alevi dummy variable.⁶⁸

H5: Alevi respondents are supposed to have less populist attitudes because they are more supportive of secularism.

As mentioned previously, the identification of Kurdish respondents is relatively easier in comparison with Alevi participants. For identifying Kurdish respondents, we asked the question of "Among the following, which languages and dialects can you speak?" and I coded the responses of Kurdish and Zaza as 1.

H6: Kurdish respondents are supposed to have more populist attitudes because they are more critical of the Kemalist establishment.

Satisfaction with Life, Economic Conditions, and Democracy

Another set of variables measures the subjective satisfaction of respondents with life in general, current economic condition, and democracy. Previous studies treated (dis)satisfaction as a proxy of the expression of populist attitudes and received inconclusive results (Mudde, 2007). According to the scholars that support the idea of populism as a response to political crisis, subjective dissatisfaction with economic, social, and political conditions leads to an increase in populist attitudes (Akkerman et al., 2017; Bowler et al., 2017; van Hauwaert and van Kessel; 2017). I also expect that nostalgia still appears as a significant driving factor for populist attitudes after controlling with satisfaction variables.

In this study, satisfaction with life was measured with the question, "Overall, to what extent are you satisfied with your life?", subjective economic satisfaction measured with

⁶⁸ I followed the method in Çarkoğlu (2005) to detect the Alevi respondents.

“How satisfied are you with your current economic condition?”, and satisfaction with democracy measured with “Could you tell me how satisfied you are with the way democracy works in Turkey in general?.” For all three items, 0 represents a lower level of satisfaction and 10 corresponds to a higher level of satisfaction.

H7: The more dissatisfied respondents are with their lives in general, subjective economic conditions, and democracy, the more populist attitudes they have.

Partisanship

As broadly discussed in the previous chapters, populism has been a prominent dimension of Turkish politics throughout the years. The Russian Narodnik populism inspired the founders of the Turkish Republic and intellectuals of the early 20th century (Toprak, 2013). Contrary to the secular modernization efforts of Republican elites, right-wing parties developed a conservative populism with Islamist and nativist tones. Although these right-wing parties have been dominating the ballot box since the first free and fair elections in 1950, they have always complained about tutelary institutions like the military, judiciary, and bureaucracy (Çınar and Sayın, 2014).

Since the 2002 elections, four parties have dominated contemporary Turkish politics. The ruling AKP is a right-wing party that embraces Islamism, conservatism, and populism as its ideology (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Dinçşahin, 2012; Taşkın, 2013; Selçuk, 2016). The CHP is the main opposition, which supports Kemalist ideology and is positioned as a center-left party. During the Cold War, the MHP had been an ultranationalist and anti-communist far-right party. By the end of the Cold War, the MHP's youth branch Ülkü Ocakları withdrew from guerilla street fighting. Meanwhile, the MHP substituted the image of communism as the enemy with the EU and the PKK terrorism during the 1990s (Avcı, 2011). The HDP is the latest party of the Kurdish political movement. Although

the party adopted radical democracy as their ideology (Tekdemir, 2016), the HDP constituency is a curious case in the sense that whether they have adopted populist attitudes or not.

I checked whether collective nostalgia still has a significant positive impact on populist attitudes even after controlling with the party preferences. In this aim, I used responses to the question of “Which party did you vote for in the 1st of November, 2015 elections?”.

H8a: AKP and HDP supporters are supposed to have more populist attitudes.

H8b: CHP and MHP supporters are supposed to have less populist attitudes.

Demographic Variables

Demographic variables consist of sex, age, education, income, and urban residency. For the sex variable, females are coded as 1. Urban is coded as 1 for the respondents who reside in the center of metropolises. Educational attainment ranges from 1 (no formal education) to 5 (university graduates). I used the natural logarithm of monthly household income to control for the effect of nostalgia. I also used age-squared to detect the nonlinear relationship of the age variable. While previous studies on populist attitudes did not report a significant relationship between gender and age, higher levels of education and income have a negative correlation with populist attitudes (Hawkins et al., 2012, Spruyt et al., 2016, van Hauwaert and van Kessel, 2017, Rooduijn et al., 2017).

Variable	Obs.	M	SD	Min	Max
Populism Index	1,593	67.93	18.39	0	100
Nostalgia Index	1,724	72.66	20.17	0	100
(Log) Income	1,724	7.45	1.18	0	10.31
Female	1,954	0.50	0.50	0	1
Metropol	1,954	0.47	0.50	0	1
Education	1,952	3.18	1.24	1	5
Age	1,940	42.57	16.21	18	89
Religious	1,791	7.12	2.06	0	10
Alevi	1,954	0.17	0.38	0	1
Kurdish	1,954	0.14	0.35	0	1
EU Support	1,954	0.03	0.94	-1	1
Trust	1,874	0.15	0.36	0	1
Satisfaction with Life	1,943	5.91	2.94	0	10
Satisfaction with Democracy	1,852	5.15	3.13	0	10
Satisfaction with Economy	1,898	4.05	2.68	0	10
AKP	1,954	0.44	0.50	0	1
CHP	1,954	0.15	0.36	0	1
MHP	1,954	0.08	0.27	0	1
HDP	1,954	0.03	0.18	0	1

Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics

5.3.Data

The data used for analysis is a representative sample. Face-to-face interviews were conducted by Frekans Research (www.frekans.com.tr) between February 17th – April 2nd, 2017. The survey is part of a larger project, “Populism in Turkish Politics and the Syrian Refugees”, conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu, Selim Erdem Aytaç, Sedef Turper, and Ezgi Elçi from Koç University and funded by the Open Society Foundation.

The sampling procedure starts with the classification of the Turkish Statistical Institute’s (*Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu-TUIK*) 26 NUTS-2 regions. We distributed the target sample according to each region’s share of the urban and rural population according to the current records of the Address-Based Population Registration System (*Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi-ADNKS*). Next, we used TUIK’s block data, with a block size of 400 residents. We aimed to reach twenty voters from each block without using any substitutions. We selected individuals in households, based on the reported target population of 18 years or

older in each household, with a lottery method. Pollsters visited the same household up to three times until a successful interview was conducted. If for any reason that individual could not be reached, the household was dropped without applying a substitution.

5.4. Analysis

For the first analysis, I established ten different models for controlling the effect of collective nostalgia with party preferences and satisfaction with life, democracy, and economic conditions. I controlled for the effects of satisfaction variables in separate models because once they enter the equation, they can affect party preference due to a moderate correlation with party preference variables. It is not surprising that the AKP constituency is more satisfied with democracy, their lives, and subjective economic conditions since they voted for the winning party in elections. I reported the standardized coefficients for comparing magnitudes of independent variables.

The results confirm the primary hypothesis, which is collective nostalgia positively correlates with populist attitudes in all models. One standard deviation increase in nostalgia leads to almost a 0.3 standard deviation increase of populist attitudes – which is the twice the size of other significant control variables. Collective nostalgia remains significantly positive even after controlling for other independent variables, including religiosity and party preference. Unfortunately, many independent variables appeared as nonsignificant, which limits producing more commentary on the determinants of populist attitudes in Turkish politics.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism
Nostalgia	0.276***	0.278***	0.277***	0.276***	0.276***	0.273***	0.274***	0.272***	0.272***	0.272***
(Log)income	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.019	0.020	0.016	0.017	0.015	0.015	0.015
Female	0.024	0.027	0.026	0.020	0.024	0.012	0.013	0.010	0.010	0.011
Metropol	0.045	0.054 ⁺	0.046	0.046	0.045	0.062 ⁺	0.064 ⁺	0.062 ⁺	0.062 ⁺	0.062 ⁺
Education	0.049	0.059	0.052	0.046	0.048	0.044	0.048	0.040	0.042	0.044
Age	0.181	0.152	0.183	0.200	0.187	0.222	0.206	0.223	0.231	0.234
Age ²	-0.241	-0.209	-0.239	-0.264	-0.247	-0.271	-0.254	-0.277	-0.283	-0.282
Religiosity	0.137***	0.129***	0.134***	0.131***	0.138***	0.106***	0.105***	0.109***	0.104***	0.107***
Alevi	-0.034	-0.027	-0.032	-0.037	-0.036	-0.029	-0.028	-0.030	-0.030	-0.030
Kurdish	-0.036	-0.032	-0.039	-0.042	-0.045	-0.026	-0.024	-0.023	-0.028	-0.039
EU Support	-0.068*	-0.056 ⁺	-0.065*	-0.069*	-0.068*	-0.059 ⁺	-0.056 ⁺	-0.061 ⁺	-0.060 ⁺	-0.059 ⁺
Trust	0.014	0.002	0.012	0.012	0.014	-0.002	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003
Life Sat.						0.106***	0.105***	0.107***	0.106***	0.106***
Dem. Sat.						0.001	-0.009	0.006	-0.001	0.006
Econ. Sat.						0.041	0.037	0.045	0.041	0.043
AKP		0.071*					0.031			
CHP			-0.017					0.021		
MHP				-0.046					-0.020	
HDP					0.024					0.036
<i>N</i>	1273	1273	1273	1273	1273	1208	1208	1208	1208	1208
<i>R</i> ²	0.124	0.128	0.124	0.126	0.124	0.142	0.143	0.142	0.142	0.143

Table 5.5: OLS regression analysis with beta coefficients. Poststratification weights are applied. ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.01$. (See Appendix for the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors)

In line with expectations, religiosity also has a significantly positive impact on populist attitudes. However, standardized coefficients indicate that the magnitude of nostalgia is even higher than religiosity. EU supporters have lower levels of populist attitudes, which is also the case in broader populism literature. However, contrary to expectations, respondents who are more satisfied with their lives have higher populist attitudes. Last but not least, only AKP voters emerge as a populist constituency among the other party supporters. In line with the expectations, voting for the AKP and HDP has a positive relationship with populist attitudes, while preference for the CHP and MHP are negatively correlated. However, none of them have a significant relationship with populist attitudes except the AKP.




Figure 5.5: Bar graph of populism index according to the four major political parties. Vertical lines indicate confidence intervals.

Figure 5.5 also indicates that AKP voters are significantly more populist than the other party constituencies. The One-way ANOVA indicates that there is a significant difference between political parties [$F(3,1158) = 9.13, p = 0$]. The Tukey HSD test suggests that AKP constituency is significantly different from the rest of the electorate. Unlike populism, there is no significant difference between political party preference for the nostalgia index. None of the statistical tests yielded a significant result. While the HDP constituency has less nostalgic attitudes, the difference is not statistically significant.




Figure 5.6: Bar graph of nostalgia index according to the four major political parties. Vertical lines indicate confidence intervals.

The first analysis demonstrated a positive relationship between collective nostalgia and populism. However, in order to detect different nostalgias, I reran the regression with interaction variables, such as party preference and nostalgia index. Table 5.6 shows the results. Except for the interaction between CHP preference and nostalgia index, none of the interaction variables are statistically significant. Interestingly enough, the interaction

between CHP preference and collective nostalgia is negative, which suggests that not all type of nostalgias are conducive to the rise of populism. Figure 5.7 indicates that for the nostalgia values of less than 50, the CHP preference is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.

	(11) Populism	(12) Populism	(13) Populism	(14) Populism
Nostalgia	0.275*** (0.0421)	0.286*** (0.0372)	0.257*** (0.0350)	0.253*** (0.0332)
(Log)income	0.263 (0.398)	0.196 (0.398)	0.241 (0.403)	0.243 (0.402)
Female	0.473 (1.190)	0.231 (1.187)	0.367 (1.179)	0.377 (1.188)
Metropol	2.371+ (1.217)	2.178+ (1.214)	2.306+ (1.206)	2.279+ (1.206)
Education	0.733 (0.582)	0.577 (0.598)	0.639 (0.582)	0.655 (0.585)
Age	0.237 (0.213)	0.289 (0.212)	0.274 (0.211)	0.278 (0.212)
Age ²	-0.00312 (0.00226)	-0.00382+ (0.00226)	-0.00355 (0.00223)	-0.00355 (0.00223)
Religiosity	0.911*** (0.291)	0.965*** (0.296)	0.912*** (0.291)	0.930*** (0.288)
Alevi	-1.434 (1.617)	-1.049 (1.653)	-1.469 (1.614)	-1.449 (1.613)
Kurdish	-1.482 (1.872)	-1.405 (1.883)	-1.635 (1.891)	-2.352 (2.071)
EU Support	-1.093+ (0.627)	-1.098+ (0.630)	-1.142+ (0.626)	-1.131+ (0.627)
Trust	-0.179 (1.648)	0.0346 (1.636)	-0.0945 (1.632)	-0.159 (1.631)
Life Sat.	0.671*** (0.254)	0.719*** (0.251)	0.685*** (0.252)	0.699*** (0.252)
Dem. Sat.	-0.0499 (0.244)	-0.00130 (0.233)	-0.00598 (0.230)	0.0337 (0.231)
Econ. Sat.	0.261 (0.267)	0.322 (0.267)	0.289 (0.268)	0.294 (0.268)
AKP	3.897 (5.278)			
AKP*Nostalgia	-0.0379 (0.0671)			
CHP		12.11* (6.112)		
CHP*Nostalgia		-0.151* (0.0746)		
MHP			-1.187 (7.222)	

MHP*Nostalgia			-0.00151 (0.0964)	
HDP				-4.338 (16.35)
HDP*Nostalgia				0.123 (0.206)
Constant	27.91*** (6.711)	26.66*** (6.843)	29.31*** (6.656)	28.83*** (6.607)
<i>N</i>	1208	1208	1208	1208
<i>R</i> ²	0.143	0.146	0.142	0.143

Table 5.6: OLS regression analysis with interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. Post-stratification weights are applied. ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.01$.




Figure 5.7: Marginsplot of the CHP preference and nostalgia interaction.

5.5. Alternative Hypothesis: Is It Nationalism or Populism?

Based on the examples in the introduction section, one may ask whether nostalgia is actually related to nationalism rather than populism because (1) populism and nationalism may overlap in some contexts and (2) the AKP's rising nationalist discourse and actions particularly following the year 2015, after the collapse of the peace process with the Kurdish political movement may have constituted a nationalist us versus them dichotomy.

In order to test this assumption, I created a nationalism index by using the following three questions: “Do you think some races or ethnic groups are less intelligent than others?,” “Do you think some races or ethnic groups are hard-working than others?,” and “Thinking about the world today, would you say that some cultures are much better than others or that all cultures are equal?.” I coded the answers such as “Turks,” “Turkish culture,” and “Turkey” of the follow-up questions as 1 and 0 otherwise. Then, I summed these three questions and created a continuous index of nationalism ranges from 0 to 3. ($M = 0.23$, $SD = 0.62$). Next, I conducted OLS regression with the independent variables of the first five models above.

	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)
	Nationalism	Nationalism	Nationalism	Nationalism	Nationalism
Nostalgia	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002
(Log)income	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	0.002	-0.003
Female	-0.041	-0.042	-0.042	-0.034	-0.040
Metropol	0.024	0.023	0.024	0.022	0.025
Education	-0.037	-0.039	-0.038	-0.033	-0.037
Age	0.201	0.206	0.201	0.167	0.189
Age2	-0.221	-0.227	-0.222	-0.180	-0.211
Religiosity	0.078*	0.079*	0.079*	0.086***	0.077*
Alevi	-0.009	-0.010	-0.010	-0.004	-0.007
Kurdish	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.015	0.022
EU Support	-0.078*	-0.079*	-0.079*	-0.075*	-0.077*
Trust	-0.022	-0.021	-0.022	-0.020	-0.021
AKP		-0.009			
CHP			0.007		
MHP				0.080*	
HDP					-0.043 ⁺
<i>N</i>	1395	1395	1395	1395	1395
<i>R</i> ²	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.024	0.020

Table 5.7: OLS regression analysis with beta coefficients (DV: Nationalism). Poststratification weights are applied. ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.01$. (See Appendix for the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors)

The results indicate that nostalgia has no significant relationship with nationalism in all models. The regression analysis also shows that more religious respondents and participants who are less supportive of the EU membership are more nationalist than others. In terms of party preference, MHP constituency appears as the most nationalist

group in the Turkish electorate. Despite being nonsignificant, CHP preference has a positive sign yet AKP choice has negative. Finally, not interestingly, HDP preference has a barely significant negative relationship with nationalism.⁶⁹ Overall, the results posit that although nostalgia has a constructive impact on nationalism, or constructing the us versus them in nationalist sense in theory, it has no significant relationship with nationalist attitudes in Turkey. In addition, populism and nationalism has a very weak correlation ($r_s = 0.09$). Consequently, even though nationalism plays a significant role in the contemporary period, it represents another major cleavage in Turkish politics.

5.6. Conclusion

“Some people insist on starting the history of this country from 1923. Someone stubbornly strives to tear us apart from our roots, our ancient values. The circle, in which the head of the main opposition party exists, takes the enemy of ancestry as a criterion of loyalty to the Republic. According to this circle, Republic of Turkey is rootless, undated, and a budding state”, said President Erdoğan in his address during the commemoration of Sultan Abdülhamit II. For him, “history is not only about the past of the people, but a companion to the future. History is the memory of the people at the same time. It is also impossible for a society that is not tied to its past to continue its existence as a nation.” Even from these few sentences from one of his speeches, we can extract how populists use nostalgia to express anti-elitism and build “the people”.⁷⁰

This study, first and foremost, aims to test whether nostalgic attitudes have a positive link with populist values. The results show that the more nostalgic the people are, the more populist attitudes they have, which confirms the primary hypothesis of this dissertation. Collective nostalgia’s positive link stays significant even after controlling for various

⁶⁹ The results are robust when I recoded a dummy variable of nationalism and conducting a logistic regression (See Appendix B for the logistic regression results).

⁷⁰ Erdoğan’s speech on February 10th, 2018 (translated by the author).

independent variables, including religiosity, which is the most critical determinant in Turkish politics, and party preference.

The analysis also reflects the cross-cutting cleavages in Turkish society within the context of populism. First, there is a positive relationship between religiosity and populism, which is the reflection of the longlasting clash between Islamists versus Secularists in Turkish politics. Second, AKP voters, who were historically located on the periphery of Turkish politics, are more populist in comparison with the other parties' constituencies. Interestingly enough, voters of the left-populist pro-Kurdish HDP, which is also on the periphery of Turkish politics, do not appear populist. However, statistically speaking, this could be the result of a high standard error due to having few HDP observations. Finally, the results demonstrate that having an anti-EU stance also has a positive impact on populist attitudes. While EU membership for Turkey had been the ultimate goal during the first tenure of the AKP, populist zeitgeist turned towards an anti-Western discourse, particularly during the last ten years. In short, the center-periphery conflict echoed as the populist dichotomy in Turkish politics, which can be interpreted from the analyses.

The significant and positive satisfaction with life variable indicates that contrary to the cases in Western Europe, where populist parties are mostly in the opposition, populism does not stem from a sense of severe crisis (Taggart, 2004) or discontent (Spruyt et al., 2016). When respondents' preferred populist party is in power, they may display favorable views on their lives, even if they struggle with problems. Also, if populism becomes hegemonic in a country, the electorate internalizes the core principles of populism even if they are satisfied with their lives.

The results confirm that the four populism items can be applied to non-Western cases and successfully indicates populist behavior in a different context. Populism in Turkey has

some similar characteristics with its European counterparts, like being unsupportive of the EU. Not surprisingly, the religious character of the Turkish populist right makes Turkey similar to Eastern European cases of populism, such as Poland and Hungary.

This study is one of the first studies to test populist attitudes in Turkey. We can say that the majority of respondents have embraced populist attitudes. 66 percent of participants agree that the power of a few special interests prevents Turkey from making progress, which indicates the conspirational understanding of the elite minority. The will of people is the ultimate authority for 79 percent of respondents. Rather than politicians, the people should make the most important decisions, according to 70 percent of participants. Finally, 48 percent of respondents agree that politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil, which reflects the Manichean mindset of populism.⁷¹

Yet another novel contribution of this study to the broader field and literature is the four items of nostalgia. While previous studies tried to measure the link between nostalgia and populism by using proxy variables, this study offers four items specific to measuring collective nostalgia. For Turkey, we can say that the majority of respondents have nostalgic attitudes. The past emerges as a key for understanding today (71%) and we should maintain the values that we had in the past (79%). The participants miss the good, glorious days of Turkey's past (63%). New types of music also make respondents long for old and traditional songs (68%). However, these items should also be validated in other case studies.

On the other hand, the results do not provide any information about which type of nostalgia stimulates the populist attitudes of respondents. The interaction design failed to demonstrate respondents' golden past and nostalgia items did not indicate any particular

⁷¹ Sum of the answers of "I am inclined to agree" and "I fully agree."

era for measuring the effect of Ottoman or Kemalist nostalgia. The best way to overcome these shortcomings is an experimental analysis in which participants will receive particular messages to stimulate their populist attitudes. The next section aims to overcome those shortcomings with an experimental test.



CHAPTER 6

POLITICS OF NOSTALGIA AND POPULISM: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

This chapter tests the impact of nostalgic messages on populist attitudes.⁷² Previous chapters analyzed the nostalgic discourse of political leaders and correlations between nostalgic values and populist attitudes. However, in order to capture the causal effect of nostalgic messages on populist attitudes, this section applies experimental analysis in order to understand the causal link between nostalgia to populism.

For this goal, I created a between-group experimental design in which two groups received different types of nostalgic messages: Ottoman and Kemalist. There was also a pure control group which did not receive any stimulus. I recruited respondents via Facebook and Instagram advertisements and used Qualtrics for collecting responses and randomization.

The results, firstly, posit that respondents who received the Ottoman nostalgia treatment are more populist than control group respondents. Secondly, when the impact of nostalgic messages was controlled by the collective nostalgia index with a moderated mediation design, the direct effect of Ottoman nostalgia disappears but still indirectly affects populist attitudes. In other words, the first stage moderated mediation analysis illustrates that nostalgic attitudes fully mediate Ottoman nostalgia. Thirdly, Kemalist nostalgia has

⁷² Early versions of this chapter presented in (2019-April) the Midwest Political Science Association 77th Annual Conference, Chicago, US (2019 April) the Northeast Working Group 3rd Annual Graduate Student Conference, New York, US (January 2019).

an indirect effect on populist attitudes but a weak and barely significant direct effect. Lastly, party preference selectively moderates the effect of nostalgic messages on nostalgic attitudes. The respondents' existing political positions matter when they are exposed to different nostalgic messages.

In the next two sections, I will explain the data and experimental design, respectively. Then I will analyze the impact of nostalgia treatments on nostalgic values. Subsequently, I will test the direct and indirect effects of nostalgic messages on populist attitudes. Finally, I will conclude the chapter.

6.1. Data

The data of experimental analysis is convenience sampling. I recruited respondents through Facebook and Instagram advertisements by using the Qualtrics survey tool. The percentage of clicks on advertisements was 67.6 percent for Facebook, 32.3 percent for Instagram, and 0.5 percent for the Audience network and Messenger. I conducted the survey experiment between June 23th-24th, 2018, funded by the Koç University Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities.⁷³

In total, 911 observations were collected. After dropping respondents who failed in attention checks, 803 observations remained.⁷⁴ The Qualtrics survey tool applied randomization without any external intervention. Likelihood ratio tests from multinomial logistic regression suggests that randomization was successful ($\chi^2(10) = 12.92, p = 0.23$). Participants did not receive any bonus or additional incentives.

⁷³ Prior to data collection, I conducted cognitive interviews with five people (3 males and 2 females. 2 AKP, 2 CHP, and 1 HDP supporters). Respondents voluntarily participated to interview and did not receive any bonus. Interviews were conducted outdoors, where respondents were available.

⁷⁴ Attention checks are applied just after the treatment messages.

Due to having convenience sampling, there are inconsistencies between the representation of the survey sample and characteristics of the Turkish population. Firstly, participants were predominantly comprised of males. Secondly, there were more CHP voters than AKP voters. Lastly, the survey sample consists of more educated respondents. Besides this, online data collection failed to reach people who do not have a formal education (See Table 6.1).⁷⁵

Variable	Control	Ottoman	Kemalist	All Obs.
Age	31.26	31.49	33.45	32.09
Female	0.23	0.23	0.26	0.24
Education	3.3	3.26	3.23	3.26
AKP	0.24	0.24	0.21	0.23
CHP	0.35	0.41	0.37	0.37
N	281	246	276	803

Table 6.1: Sample characteristics of experimental data (mean of each category).

6.2. Experimental Design

After the informed consent procedure, in the first part of the survey, respondents replied to warm-up questions, such as satisfaction with democracy, their lives, and economic conditions. Participants responded to party preference questions before receiving treatments in order to avoid post-treatment bias (Montgomery et al., 2018). Followingly, respondents were randomly assigned into three groups, as the control group, the Ottoman nostalgia group, and the Kemalist nostalgia group. The next button appeared after 3 seconds of receiving treatment messages. The average time that respondents spent on the stimulus was 25.8 seconds ($SD = 12.13$). Overall, the average response time was 16.41 minutes ($SD = 18.34$).

Ottoman and Kemalist nostalgia groups read texts only differ in the underlined parts.

⁷⁵ Age ranges between 18 and 71. Education ranges from 0 (elementary school graduate) to 5 (post-graduate).

Ottoman nostalgia group received the following message:

This heavenly homeland is the trust of our ancestors. Since the Ottoman Empire, this people have always stood firmly against several external outbreaks, and their collaborators within us, that have played games with our country. Remember the glorious Ottoman! Remember Fatih, [and] Abdülhamit Han! When I miss those times, I wish I had lived in these good old days.⁷⁶

Kemalist nostalgia group received the following message:

This heavenly homeland is the trust of the founders of the Republic. Since the early years of the Republic, this people have always stood firmly against several external outbreaks, and their collaborators within us, that have played games with our country. Remember the glorious War of Independence! Remember İnönü, [and] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk! When I miss those times, I wish I had lived in these good old days.⁷⁷

Followingly, all three groups responded to nostalgia, identity, and populism items, respectively. In the final part of the survey, participants responded to demographic questions such as sex, age, and education.

6.3. Effects of Nostalgia Treatments on Collective Nostalgia

I started the analysis by controlling for the effects of nostalgia treatments on collective nostalgia. I expected to see that the respondents in the treatment groups should be more nostalgic than control group participants (H1). In order to test the impact of treatments, I

⁷⁶ Fatih refers to Mehmet the Conqueror (1432-1481) who was the seventh sultan of the Ottoman Empire. He conquered Istanbul and ended the Byzantine Empire. For Abdülhamit see page: 91, footnote 38.

⁷⁷ İnönü refers to İsmet İnönü (1884-1973) who was the second president of Turkey after Atatürk and a hero of the Independence War. However, Islamist groups in Turkey broadly criticize him due to his staunch secularist rule.

asked a battery of nostalgia questions just after respondents received the nostalgia stimuli. To this end, I used the four items of nostalgia that were used in the previous survey analysis. I summed up all items and built a scale between 0 and +100.⁷⁸

Nostalgia items

- NO1 - Listening to new pieces of music, I miss the old day and those beautiful folk songs.
- NO2 - We must not forget the values that we had in the past.
- NO3 - I miss my country's good, glorious old days.
- NO4 - We can get rid of the problems we have experienced today as the people by only looking to our past.

Histograms below show that a majority of the respondents gravitated towards the positive extreme for all items. The item, "We must not forget the values that we had in the past", is negatively skewed, which demonstrates the respondents' appreciation of past values. A considerable number of participants also chose the negative extreme for the items, "I miss my country's good, old glorious days", and, "We can get rid of the problems we have experienced today as the people by only looking to our past." Finally, new music genres make a majority of the respondents nostalgic for the old days and authentic folk songs. However, many respondents also neither agree nor disagree with this question.

⁷⁸ Cronbach's alpha of the nostalgia items is very low (0.39). Nevertheless, I decided to continue with this set of items because other combinations of available nostalgia items did not yield a higher alpha score. Also, these items were previously tested in the representative survey design in which CFA results received acceptable fit indices.




Figure 6.1: Histograms of nostalgia items (control group).

The mean of the nostalgia scale (67.54) is closer to the positive extreme, which indicates that in line with the representative survey study, a majority of the respondents have nostalgic feelings. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of the nostalgia scale. According to Figure 6.2, histogram bars leaned towards the positive extreme in the Kemalist nostalgia group more than Ottoman nostalgia. In other words, the Kemalist treatment seems to be more successful than the Ottoman treatment in stimulating nostalgic feelings. Figure 6.3 also proves this assumption. According to Figure 3, participants who received the Kemalist nostalgia treatment are significantly more nostalgic than the control group respondents. However, there is no significant difference between respondents who received the Ottoman treatment and participants in the control group. This result suggests that a subgroup analysis of participants according to party preference would be better because, theoretically speaking, while AKP respondents have been attracted to Ottoman nostalgia, it is Kemalist nostalgia for CHP respondents.

Variable	N	M	SD	Bivariate correlations			Partial correlations ¹		
				NO1	NO2	NO3	NO1	NO2	NO3
NO1	797	0.79	1.28	1	0.13	0.19	1	0.12	0.22
NO2	794	1.15	1.31	0.13	1	0.08	0.12	1	0.15
NO3	796	0.42	1.6	0.19	0.08	1	0.22	0.15	1
NO4	795	0.45	1.57	0.19	0.19	0.05	0.19	0.16	0.20
Nostalgia Index	790	67.54	21.41						

Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics and correlations of nostalgia items (experimental data).

¹ Partial correlations are controlled with AKP and CHP voting




Figure 6.2: Histogram of nostalgia scale for each group.




Figure 6.3: Mean plot of nostalgia across treatment groups. The horizontal line indicates the mean. Vertical lines indicate confidence intervals.

According to Figure 6.4, AKP voters who received the Ottoman nostalgia treatment are more nostalgic than the control group respondents. The Tukey HSD test also suggests that the difference between the Ottoman nostalgia group and control group respondents is statistically significant. CHP voters who received the Kemalist nostalgia are also more nostalgic than the CHP constituency in the control group, but the result is not statistically significant. Figure 6.4 also illustrates two striking results. Firstly, the Kemalist nostalgia message has a positive impact on AKP voters, but this effect is not statistically significant. Secondly, CHP voters who received the Ottoman nostalgia message are significantly less nostalgic than the CHP control group. Despite being nonsignificant, the positive impact of Kemalist nostalgia for AKP voters is interesting since AKP's populism regularly targets the secular Kemalist establishment. However, the Ottoman nostalgia treatment created a backlash for CHP respondents, which eventually made them less nostalgic than the CHP control group. Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 also suggest that the histogram bars moved to the positive extreme for AKP respondents who received the Ottoman nostalgia message. Reversely, histogram bars leaned towards the negative extreme for CHP voters who received the same Ottoman nostalgia treatment.




Figure 6.4: Mean plot of nostalgia across treatment groups and party preference. The horizontal line indicates the mean. Vertical lines indicate confidence intervals.




Figure 6.5: Histogram of nostalgia scale for each group of the AKP voters.




Figure 6.6: Histogram of nostalgia scale for each group of the CHP voters.




Figure 6.7: Regression analyses of average treatment effects on nostalgia. Horizontal lines indicate 90% and 95% confidence intervals (See Appendix C for regression tables).

Figure 6.7 illustrates the regression analysis of three models. In the first model, with no interactions, the Kemalist treatment has a significant positive impact on nostalgic attitudes. However, the magnitude of the Ottoman treatment is almost zero and nonsignificant. Interaction models show that, on the one hand, AKP voters who received the Ottoman treatment were more nostalgic, and on the other hand, CHP voters who were stimulated by the same Ottoman nostalgia treatment are less nostalgic. Contrary to the positive effect of Kemalist nostalgia in Figure 6.4, the magnitude of Kemalist nostalgia and AKP interaction is close to zero and nonsignificant in the regression analysis. The magnitude of Kemalist nostalgia and CHP interaction is close to zero and nonsignificant, which was also a very interesting result.

To sum up, while the Ottoman nostalgia stimulus appeared as less successful than the Kemalist treatment in the first instance, interaction models imply that specific messages are absorbed according to the party preference of respondents, which indicates motivated reasoning (or skepticism) on the part of participants (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge,

2006). Respondents did not simply avoid the message that they disagree with, but they rejected the nostalgia messages that were not congruent with their preexisting political positions. Regression analysis illustrates that, on the one hand, the Ottoman nostalgia message positively stimulated pro-AKP respondents. On the other hand, the Ottoman nostalgia treatment led to a backlash among pro-CHP respondents, who appeared as less nostalgic.

6.4. Effects of Nostalgia Treatments on Populist Attitudes

I tested the effect of nostalgia treatments on populist attitudes by building a populism index with five items taken from Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2014).⁷⁹ I summed up all items and built a scale between 0 and +100.

Populism items:

- POP1 - The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
- POP2 - The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
- POP3 - I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.
- POP4 - Politicians talk too much and take too little action.
- POP5 - Interest groups have too much influence over political decisions.

The mean of the populism scale is 70.69, which indicates that the majority of the participants embrace populist attitudes. Among the five items of populism, interestingly, the item, “I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician”, is positively skewed, which was negatively skewed in the previous chapter. Except for this item, all questions are negatively skewed, which indicates a homogeneous understanding

⁷⁹ The item, “The politicians in the Parliament need to follow the will of the people”, was dropped due to low variation and extreme negative skew, which makes it impossible to manipulate with nostalgia messages. The item, “What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles”, was also dropped because it decreased Cronbach’s alpha from 0.61 to 0.57, which was already a poor score.

of the people as a political entity, mistrust towards interest groups, belief in the inefficiency of politicians, and confidence in the people’s wisdom in decision-making.




Figure 6.8: Histograms of populism items (control group).

Variable	N	M	SD	POP1	POP2	POP3	POP4
POP1	800	1.17	1.2	1.00	0.13	0.20	0.14
POP2	797	0.96	1.2	0.13	1.00	0.20	0.30
POP3	802	-0.31	1.53	0.20	0.20	1.00	0.28
POP4	800	1.1	1.25	0.14	0.30	0.28	1.00
POP5	799	1.23	1.08	0.20	0.29	0.26	0.46
Populism Index	788	70.69	19.72				

Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics and correlations of populism items (experimental data).

6.4.1. The Direct Effect of Nostalgia Treatments on Populist Attitudes

Hypotheses

First and foremost, this section tests the primary hypothesis of this dissertation: nostalgia has a positive impact on populist attitudes. Hence, I expect that respondents in the two treatment groups should be more populist in comparison with the control group participants.

H2a: Respondents in treatment groups are more populist than control group participants.

As broadly covered in previous chapters, Ottoman nostalgia appears as a tool for directing resentment towards Kemalist elites and establishment in Turkey. However, Kemalist nostalgia emerged as a reaction to the rise of political Islam and Islamist populism, as embodied by AKP and Erdoğan’s policies. Hence, I expect that the impact of Ottoman nostalgia on populist attitudes should be stronger than Kemalist nostalgia.

H2b: Respondents in the Ottoman nostalgia group are more populist than participants in the Kemalist nostalgia group.

Results

According to Figure 6.9, respondents who received the Ottoman treatment are more populist than the control group participants, which confirms the primary hypothesis of this study. Although Kemalist nostalgia also has a positive impact on populist attitudes, its difference from the control group is not statistically significant.⁸⁰ Lastly, the difference between Ottoman and Kemalist nostalgia is also nonsignificant, which rejects the second hypothesis.




Figure 6.9: Mean plot of populism across treatment groups. The horizontal line indicates the mean. Vertical lines indicate confidence intervals.

⁸⁰ Mean difference between control and Ottoman nostalgia group is 3.66 ($p = 0.09$). Mean difference between control and Kemalist nostalgia group is 2.96 ($p = 0.18$).




Figure 6.10: Mean plot of populism across treatment groups and party preference. The horizontal line indicates the mean. Vertical lines indicate confidence intervals.

Building on the previous nostalgia analysis, I also created a subgroup design according to partisanship. Figure 6.10 illustrates that unlike collective nostalgia, the effect of treatments does not work through party preference. Although there are differences between the control group respondents and treatment groups, Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13 shows that histogram bars moved towards the positive extreme for both AKP and CHP voters.




Figure 6.11: Histogram of populism scale for each experiment group.




Figure 6.12: Histogram of populism scale for each experiment group within the AKP voters.




Figure 6.13: Histogram of populism scale for each experiment group within the CHP voters.




Figure 6.14: Regression analyses of average treatment effects on populism. Horizontal lines indicate 90% and 95% confidence intervals (See Appendix C for regression tables).

Figure 6.14 highlights that the Ottoman nostalgia treatment has a positive impact on populist attitudes for the model with no interaction. Kemalist nostalgia treatment also has a positive effect on populism at the 90% significance level. However, the effects of nostalgia treatments do not differ according to party preference. None of the interaction variables are statistically significant. Interestingly, CHP supporters appear more populist than AKP voters. However, this result may stem from having used convenience sampling. The results so far suggest that there is a complex relationship between nostalgia and populism. Thus, a more detailed regression model may provide a better picture. The following section analyzes the direct and indirect effects of nostalgia treatments on populist attitudes by controlling with a collective nostalgia index and with moderated mediation analysis.

6.4.2. Mediation and Moderated Mediation Designs

This section examines the combination of previous tests by using simple mediation and moderated mediation models. Previous analyses suggest that party preference, collective nostalgia, and motivated reasoning to the particular type of nostalgic message play a significant role in manipulating populist attitudes. Mediation and moderated mediation tests combine all analyses within one regression design. These models also allow testing both the direct and indirect effects of the nostalgia treatments on populist attitudes.

Hypotheses

Previously, in Chapter 5, the OLS design showed that there is a correlational relationship between collective nostalgia and populist attitudes. This chapter demonstrated that the interaction between respondents' party preference and a particular type of nostalgic message affects the level of collective nostalgia. This chapter also showed that there is a direct link from the Ottoman nostalgia message to populist attitudes, yet party preference

had no significant role in this analysis. Hence, considering all previous tests, a more complex design may show a better picture. Therefore, these are the revised hypotheses for the moderated mediation analysis.

H3a: The Ottoman nostalgia message has a direct effect on populist attitudes.

H3b: Voting for the AKP positively moderates the indirect effect of the Ottoman nostalgia treatment on populist attitudes through collective nostalgia.

H3c: Voting for the CHP negatively moderates the indirect effect of the Ottoman nostalgia treatment on populist attitudes through collective nostalgia.

According to previous analyses, Kemalist nostalgia has a weak direct effect on populist attitudes. Also, interaction with Kemalist nostalgia and party preference has no significant effect on nostalgic attitudes. However, Kemalist nostalgia has a significantly positive impact on nostalgic attitudes. Thus, I conducted a simple mediation analysis to test whether there is an indirect effect of Kemalist nostalgia on populist attitudes through collective nostalgic attitudes independent from party preference.

H4: The Kemalist nostalgia message has an indirect effect on populist attitudes.

Method: Simple Mediation and Moderated Mediation Analysis

Hayes (2009) defines the simple mediation analysis as an intervening variable model where variable X is assumed to apply an effect on an outcome variable Y through one or more mediators. Simple mediation analysis has three outcomes, which are indirect, direct, and total effects of the independent variable X on dependent variable Y . In simple mediation analysis, a represents the coefficient for X where predicts M . b and c' , on the other hand, are coefficients that predict Y from both M and X , respectively. Thus, while c' quantifies the direct effect of X , a and b show the indirect effect of the independent

variable on the outcome variable through the mediator variable. Hence, $c = c' + ab$ means the total effect of X , both directly and indirectly. On the other hand, indirect effect can be formulated as $ab = c - c'$, which means “the amount by which two cases who differ by one unit on X are expected to differ on Y through X 's effect on M , which in turn affects Y ” (Hayes, 2009, p. 409).

Moderated mediation analysis, on the other hand, is defined as “a mediated effect that varies across levels of a moderator variable” (Edwards and Lambert, 2007, pp. 6-7). According to Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007, p. 193), “moderated mediation occurs when the strength of an indirect effect depends on the level of some variable, or in other words, when mediation relations are contingent on the level of a moderator.”

Previous studies argued that a moderated mediation could be inferred from the significant interaction between the independent variable and moderator. However, according to Hayes (2015), a significant interaction can be insufficient to detect moderated mediation. For Hayes (2015, p. 3), “a mediation process can be said to be moderated if the proposed moderator variable has a nonzero weight in the function linking the indirect effect of X on Y through M to the moderator,” calling this weight the index of moderated mediation. In this study, I used the recommended 10,000 bootstrapped samples to calculate the bootstrapped confidence intervals for the index of moderated mediation. If the confidence interval includes a zero, we cannot talk about moderated mediation, but if the confidence interval does not include a zero, this means that there is a moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015).⁸¹

⁸¹ I used “processR” (Moon, 2019) and “processr” (White, 2018) packages for the moderated mediation analysis and graphs. I used “ggplot” (Wickham, 2016), “psych” (Revelle, 2018), and “ggstance” (Henry et al., 2018) packages for rest of the analysis in this chapter.

Model Specification

I established three different models to test the effect of nostalgic messages on populist attitudes. The first two models test the effect of Ottoman nostalgia (X). In the first model, the moderator variable (W) is voting for AKP, and in the second one, it is CHP preference. In all moderated mediation models, interaction is on the a path, i.e. first stage moderated mediation. The third model, simple mediation, tests the effect of Kemalist nostalgia (X). Finally, in all models, the dependent variable (Y) is populist attitudes, and the mediator (Mi) variable is nostalgia.




Figure 6.15: Path diagram of Model 1 and Model 2.

Results

For Model 1, Table 6.4 and Figure 6.16 demonstrates that AKP voters who received the Ottoman treatment (a_3) tend to have significantly higher nostalgic attitudes. This result validates the previous interaction analysis in this chapter. The significant b_1 path and index of moderated mediation confirm the mediation through collective nostalgia values. The nonsignificant c' path also indicates that there is a full mediation. Consequently, Model 1 suggests that there is a full mediation in which voting for the AKP positively moderates the indirect effect of the Ottoman nostalgia message on populist attitudes

through collective nostalgia. Figure 6.17 shows the conditional indirect effect of Ottoman nostalgia treatment on populist attitudes at values of the moderator AKP preference.

DV	Nostalgia		Populism	
Label	Coefficients	SE	Coefficients	SE
Ottoman (a1)	-5.656**	1.957		
AKP (a2)	-7.348***	1.954		
Ottoman*AKP (a3)	14.543***	3.524		
Nostalgia (b)			0.161***	0.036
Ottoman (c')			2.313	1.558
N	777			

Table 6.4: Moderated mediation analysis (Model 1). Index of Moderated Mediation: 2.336 95% Bootstrapped CI [1.074, 4.219]




Figure 6.16: Path diagram of Table 6.4.




Figure 6.17: Conditional direct and indirect effects of Model 1.

For Model 2, Table 6.5 and Figure 6.18 shows that CHP voters who received the same Ottoman treatment (a3) have significantly lower nostalgic attitudes. The significant b1 path and the nonsignificant c' path also indicates that there is a full mediation. However, the index of moderated mediation confirms that mediation through collective nostalgia has a negative value, which means voting for the CHP negatively moderates the indirect effect of the Ottoman nostalgia message on populist attitudes through collective nostalgia. In short, Ottoman nostalgia makes CHP voters less populist.

DV	Nostalgia		Populism	
Label	Coefficients	SE	Coefficients	SE
Ottoman (a1)	2.875	1.998		
CHP (a2)	3.098	1.911		
Ottoman*CHP (a3)	-12.897***	3.496		
Nostalgia (b)			0.161***	0.036
Ottoman (c')			2.313	1.557
N	777			

Table 6.5: Moderated mediation analysis (Model 2). Index of Moderated Mediation - 2.071 95% Bootstrapped CI [-3.892, -0.923]




Figure 6.18: Path diagram of Table 6.5.




Figure 6.19: Conditional direct and indirect effects of Model 2.

Moderated mediation models indicate two significant results. Firstly, when collective nostalgic attitudes enter the equation, the direct effect of Ottoman nostalgia disappears. This result is significant because it indicates that respondents' level of nostalgia matters in the manipulation of nostalgic attitudes. Secondly, Ottoman nostalgia creates a backlash for CHP voters, whereas it increases the populism of the AKP constituency. This result may indicate that Ottoman nostalgia is more successful in terms of generating the in-

group versus out-group dichotomy because it leads to taking two sides in populist attitudes.

Simple mediation analysis indicates that there is a full mediation of the effect of Kemalist nostalgia through collective nostalgia. The weak direct effect of Kemalist nostalgia also disappeared in the mediation model, as can be seen in the nonsignificant c' coefficient. The significant indirect effect also confirms full mediation.

DV	Nostalgia		Populism	
Label	Coefficients	SE	Coefficients	SE
Kemalist (a)	4.688**	1.576		
Nostalgia (b)			0.157***	0.038
Kemalist (c') (Direct Effect)			0.696	1.473
Total Effect (c)			1.430	1.482
N	777			

Table 6.6: Simple mediation analysis (Model 3). Indirect effect 0.734 95% Bootstrapped CI [0.240, 1.474]




Figure 6.20: Path diagram of Table 6.6.

To sum up, moderated mediation analysis confirms that, firstly, (H3b) voting for AKP positively moderates the indirect effect of the Ottoman nostalgia treatment on populist attitudes through collective nostalgia. Secondly, (H3c) voting for CHP negatively moderates the indirect effect of the Ottoman nostalgia treatment on populist attitudes through collective nostalgia. However, the results fail to reject the hypothesis (H3a) which is Ottoman nostalgia message has a direct effect on populist attitudes in the

moderated mediation analysis. Finally, (H4a) Kemalist nostalgia message has an indirect effect on populist attitudes through collective nostalgic values. While moderated mediation models posit that Ottoman nostalgia works through the center-periphery cleavage, Kemalist nostalgia has a more homogeneous effect on both sides.

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter tested the effect of nostalgic messages on populist attitudes. The results confirmed that Ottoman nostalgia leads to an increase in populist attitudes, which has both direct and indirect effects. Kemalist nostalgia, on the other hand, has an indirect effect on populist attitudes despite having a weak direct effect. The results highlighted that Ottoman nostalgia, which carries resentment towards the elites, has different implications on populist attitudes. While Ottoman nostalgia created a backlash for the center's constituency, it positively stimulated the periphery's populist attitudes.

Besides, the direct effect of Ottoman nostalgia indicates that it has a broader impact on populist attitudes that are not limited to only the AKP constituency. If the Ottoman nostalgia treatment happened to have significant interaction with AKP preference, it would be tautological because this result would have indicated that Ottoman nostalgia only works for AKP voters. In addition, this argument is also valid for the indirect effect of Kemalist nostalgia which does not have a significant interaction with CHP preference.

The second significant output of this analysis is motivated reasoning according to partisanship and its effect on nostalgic attitudes. Results indicated that party preference conditions the effect of a particular nostalgic message. More specifically, respondents react in a positive direction when they receive a specific nostalgic message which is close to their preexisting political preferences. However, a nostalgia message which does not overlap with the preexisting political preferences of respondents creates a backlash.

Interaction between the Ottoman message and AKP preference increases collective nostalgia, whereas interaction of the same nostalgia message and CHP preference decreases it.

For testing the complicated relationship between collective nostalgia and populism, I established two first-stage moderated mediation models. Results confirmed that voting for the AKP, as a moderator, conditions the effect of the Ottoman nostalgia message on nostalgic attitudes, which has a positive relationship with populist attitudes. Also, when I changed the moderator from AKP to CHP, the relationship with populist attitudes turned to negative. Finally, the direct effect of the Ottoman nostalgia message turns nonsignificant when collective nostalgic values are represented in the regression analysis.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1. Discussion of Results

Nostalgia has a positive relationship with populism. This dissertation started with questioning this argument, and after conducting three different analyses with three different datasets, the results confirmed this hypothesis. Politicians instrumentalize and exploit nostalgia for their policy goals, to justify their actions, and for criticizing each other – but most importantly, criticizing the elites and the establishment (Chapter 4). The nostalgic electorate, on the other hand, displays more populist attitudes at the mass level (Chapter 5). Finally, particular nostalgic messages increase populist attitudes in an experimental setting (Chapter 6).

According to Mudde (2004), we have been experiencing a populist zeitgeist with the electoral victories of populist parties in Europe, India, the US, Latin America, and Turkey. I think we are not only experiencing a populist zeitgeist: we are also experiencing a nostalgic zeitgeist. Each generation may have thought that life was better and more comfortable in the past. Moreover, I do not argue that nostalgia is unique to our current era. However, nostalgia has become more visible through its instrumentalization by populist politicians in our time.

While expressing his concerns about the adverse effects of globalization, such as economic inequality and appealing to ethnic and sectarian identities, President Barack Obama (2016) complained about the rise of populism around the world:

And as these real problems have been neglected, alternative visions of the world have pressed forward both in the wealthiest countries and in the poorest: Religious fundamentalism; the politics of ethnicity, or tribe, or sect; aggressive nationalism; a crude populism - sometimes from the far left, but more often from the far right - which seeks to restore what they believe was a better, simpler age free of outside contamination.

Quoting, and in line with, President Obama, this dissertation also argues that populists seek to restore a better, simpler age free of external contamination. Populists offer a heartland for the authentic people in which there was no place for distortions and disruptions (Taggart, 2004). The people had been better off before the lapse when the elites usurped the power, authority, and potency of the people (Tannock, 1995).

As Chapter 3 broadly analyzed, unlike European cases and similar to Latin American ones, populism has been an embedded characteristic of Turkish politics since the late Ottoman era. Populists of that period were the secular, modernist, and positivist civil-military bureaucracy's members, who aimed to halt the collapse of a great empire. However, when the Ottoman Empire eventually failed, they established a new state, and they continued to implement their ideas and goals. According to Republican elites, the Ottoman clergy and the Sultan had exploited the pure people for centuries. In that era, it was time to take authority from the Ottoman family and give it to the people. However, when they became the new rulers, they also became the new elites. Opposition to these new Republican elites rose from the periphery, in which the primary defining characteristic was Islam and Ottoman nostalgia – the heartland that they wanted to return to, instead of living under the secular Turkish republic.

Since then, center-right and especially pro-Islamist parties have adopted populism and conducted populist politics against the secular-Kemalist establishment. According to these parties, Kemalist elites and the establishment installed a non-native system that hampers the will of authentic Muslim people. Those elites and institutions have always usurped the Muslim people's will and prevented the people from being part of decision-making mechanisms. In other words, although Turkey seemed like a democratic country, elected governments had no authority in decision-making. Instead, tutelary institutions such as the military and judiciary had influenced political decisions.

The AKP came to power in 2002 by promising to end the civil-military elites' tutelage in Turkey. However, particularly starting from their second tenure, right-wing populism in Turkey has reached its zenith as the AKP has won a dozen consecutive elections, gaining an absolute majority in parliament, and controlling the office of president while also curbing the power of the civil-military elites. During this period, as Chapter 4 points out, Erdoğan used more populist words than Kılıçdaroğlu (H1). Four populism indexes show that especially between 2013 and 2015, in which the period of significant political transformations and events took place such as Gezi events, estrangement with the Gülen organization, corruption investigations, terrorist attacks, repercussions of Syrian Civil War in Turkey, Erdoğan's populism peaked. Kılıçdaroğlu's populism, in contrast, remained significantly lower than Erdoğan. But, does populism of Erdoğan influence Kılıçdaroğlu's rhetoric (H2)? The answer is a partial yes because Kılıçdaroğlu's populism tactically increased and decreased as the correlation analysis showed.

As Chapter 4 broadly analyzed, President Erdoğan, the leader of the AKP, appears as a mnemonic warrior who aims to build an "us versus them" distinction by instrumentalizing Ottoman nostalgia and its history as a golden age – which confirms the third hypothesis of Chapter 4 (H3). He glorifies the people and the will of the people. For Erdoğan, the

secular elites have oppressed authentic Muslim people for decades. He has been fighting against the elites in the name of people to establish a just order, similar to what was established by the Ottoman Empire years ago. For AKP members, the period between the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the AKP's tenure was "90 years of an ad break," and now the break is over (Hürriyet, 2015). The AKP is the restoration of the great Ottoman Empire.

During the 1990s, global changes in politics and economics – such as neoliberal transformation, rising ethnic and religious conflicts, the EU enlargement process – also reverberated in Turkish politics and economics. As the Kurdish political movement and political Islam gained strength in politics and became visible in the public sphere, Kemalists developed a nostalgia for the era of Atatürk, which aims to restore the self-sufficient, modern, secular state under the leadership of a founding father. As the AKP established its hegemony and Turkey's democratic backsliding has quickened in pace, Kemalists hold on to the ideas of Atatürk. Interestingly enough, although Kemalist rule during the 1920s and 1930s showed no characteristics of liberal democracy, Kemalists began to instrumentalize nostalgia as a response to rising authoritarianism in Turkey in order to restore Kemalist era as a democratic system. This contradiction also points to the whitewashed past, in which Kemalists neglect the unwanted parts of the Kemalist era, instead they glorify some primitive steps of political liberalization and democratization.

Does nostalgia also characterize populist attitudes of the electorate? The answer is yes. Nostalgic people are more populist, according to the survey analysis, which confirms the primary hypothesis (H1) of Chapter 5. The regression analysis shows that Mardin's (1973) center-periphery cleavage overlaps with the determinants of populist attitudes in Turkey. In addition to nostalgia, AKP voters (H8a), anti-EU (H3), and more religious

(H4) respondents display more populist attitudes than the opposition constituency and less religious participants.

Contrary to the assumptions that populism is a reaction to a sense of crisis (Taggart, 2004) or discontent (Spruyt et al., 2017) as is valid in the cases of West European populism, respondents who are satisfied with their lives also display populist attitudes – which rejects the seventh hypothesis of Chapter 5 (H7). This result also points out that contemporary populism in Turkey does not stem from discontent but rather the formative rift on the center-periphery cleavage (Somer and McCoy, 2019). It may also posit that respondents internalized populist attitudes, and, in turn, even though they are satisfied with their lives, they are still populist because their supported populist party is in power. Moreover, as a follow-up question, one may ask how come that all parties are nostalgic, but only one is populist. This contradiction may stem from the fact that Ottoman nostalgia represents the resentment against the secular and Kemalist establishment in Turkey. Thus, this resentful and revengeful nostalgia breeds populism; in turn, AKP constituency becomes more populist than others.

The experimental tests in Chapter 6 illustrate that Ottoman nostalgia has a significantly positive direct effect on populist attitudes (H2a). Mean plots and regression analysis show that respondents who received Ottoman nostalgia treatment have significantly higher populist attitudes than control group respondents. Although Kemalist nostalgia also has a positive impact on populist attitudes, the result is barely significant. Nevertheless, overall, the results confirm the primary hypothesis of this dissertation: nostalgia has a significantly positive effect on populist attitudes.

Chapter 6 also showed that preexisting identities matter when respondents receive a message that is congruent or incongruent with their ideas. While Ottoman nostalgia

message positively stimulated collective nostalgia of AKP respondents, the same message created a backlash for the CHP constituency, which means there is another story that is hidden within the center-periphery cleavage: does the CHP constituency reject the Ottoman legacy by default, or do they reject it only because the Ottoman identity is now embedded within the AKP?

Finally, the direct effects of both nostalgia messages disappeared in all mediation models (H3a) which indicate that respondents' level of collective nostalgia also matters in manipulating populist attitudes. Moderated mediation analysis demonstrated that while AKP preference positively moderates the effect of the Ottoman nostalgia message through collective nostalgia (H3b), voting for CHP negatively moderates the same message through collective nostalgic attitudes (H3c). In other words, Ottoman nostalgia constitutes two sides in populist attitudes. Simple mediation analysis also showed that Kemalist nostalgia has a significantly positive impact on populist attitudes through collective nostalgia (H4). However, the homogeneous impact of Kemalist nostalgia on populist attitudes as a result of nonsignificant interaction variables with party preference requires further studies to picture how Kemalist nostalgia works on populist attitudes. In short, this may indicate the emergence of a possible upcoming new left-populist turn in Turkish politics.

Before moving to the shortcomings of the dissertation, I have to explain some unexpected results yielded from the empirical analyses. Chapter 4 demonstrated that Erdoğan's populism decreased in 2018 compared with the previous year. However, the analysis suggests that there is no linear increase in populist rhetoric; thus, a decrease is not surprising. What is surprising is that a significant decrease in populist discourse occurred when Turkey's democracy entered into a severe crisis. As broadly explained elsewhere (Aytaç and Elçi, 2019), Erdoğan's enemies had been the civil-military bureaucracy

between 2002 and 2010. While Erdoğan and the AKP have been successful in curbing the direct and indirect powers of the military with large-scale court cases and legal amendments, there had been an optimism for the democratization of Turkish politics. However, particularly following the 2008 economic crisis, the AKP gradually increased the tone of its authoritarianism in Turkey. In the end, they were faced with a bottom-up spontaneous resistance: The Gezi uprising in 2013. The brutal suppression of the Gezi uprising received much negative public criticism from the international community. However, in the meanwhile, the Gülen organization and its media outlets also became critical of Erdoğan. Between 2013 and 2015, Turkish politics witnessed a tug-of-war between the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan versus the Gülen organization and Fethullah Gülen. When the AKP was about to declare their victory against the Gülen organization, the July 15th, 2016 coup d'état occurred.

Meanwhile, the Turkish economy started to gradually decline due to various reasons, such as sizeable foreign debt, dependency on import and foreign cash, attacks on the independence of the Turkish Central Bank, and excessive nepotism (Erbil and Özlale, 2018). By the end of the peace process with the PKK, the AKP established a coalition with the MHP, which corresponds to a de facto third Nationalist Front government in Turkey, which means MHP became an ally instead of an enemy in the opposition. As a consequence, Erdoğan and the AKP's enemies changed from the civil-military bureaucracy to the Gezicis, Kurds, HDP, interest lobby, the mastermind, the parallel structure (Gülen organization). Thus, my dictionary for analyzing the populist discourse might have failed to capture these new enemies due to rapid changes in the threat perception of the AKP and Erdoğan (Aytaç and Elçi, 2019).

Another unexpected result is the positive impact of Kemalist nostalgia on the nostalgic attitudes of AKP respondents in Chapter 6. This is also the result of the opportunistic

discourse of Erdoğan and AKP officials. Starting from the 2017 Referendum, in which Turkey transformed from parliamentary to presidential system, Erdoğan began to make references to Atatürk in order to secure enough votes to pass the bill (Yetkin, 2017). Erdoğan continued this strategy in the 2018 elections in order to obtain the majority of the votes needed to become president. In other words, while he stigmatized and criticized the values of Kemalism, he was institutionally forced to soften his tone against the figure of Atatürk and the War of Independence for pragmatic reasons. Indeed, Erdoğan started to argue that now Turkey is fighting a second Independence War against the forces who want to bring Turkey to her knees through economic and political means and threats (Yeni Akit, 2018). I assume that this is the reason for the weak but positive effect of Kemalist nostalgia, as observed in Chapter 6.

7.2. Final Contributions of the Results

There are five major contributions of this dissertation. First of all, this dissertation presented methodological and theoretical evidence that nostalgia is not embedded in populism. Both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis confirmed that populism and nostalgia are two different constructs. Nostalgia is rather a tool for creating us and them distinction. Both left and right-wing populists frequently exploit nostalgia in order to draw borders between the people and the non-people – elites and other inferior groups. In the case of Turkey, Erdoğan instrumentalizes Ottoman nostalgia to draw the borders between the authentic Muslim people and the corrupt secular elites. Although Kılıçdaroğlu does not use a restorative nostalgia, Kemalist nostalgia also indirectly increases populist attitudes.

Secondly, building on Gest et al. (2017) and Steenvoorden and Hartevelt's (2018) analyses in which nostalgia has a positive relationship with populist party preference, this

dissertation confirmed that nostalgia also affects populist attitudes. This result is also significant because voting for populist parties does not mean that their electorate embraced populist attitudes. As argued in Chapter 5, populist attitudes can also appear as abstention and even support for mainstream parties. Confirming nostalgia's positive impact on populist attitudes posits that there is a more solid and robust relationship between nostalgia and populism.

Thirdly, nostalgia has varying impacts on populism according to the pre-existing identities. While AKP voting positively moderates the impact of Ottoman nostalgia on nostalgic attitudes, CHP preference has a negative relationship with Ottoman nostalgia. This situation can also be the case, for example, in the US. While Trump's nostalgia glorifies the post-war political and societal relationships in the US, it may create a backlash for people of color, immigrants, LGBTIs, and left-wing people in the contemporary period. In short, this type of resentful nostalgias may create two antagonistic groups in a given society.

Fourthly, despite having an impact on nationalism, in theory, the regression analysis showed that nostalgia has no significant effect on nationalist attitudes. In addition, there is a very weak correlation between nostalgia and populism, which indicates that populism in Turkey stems from Islamist versus secularist antagonism rather than nationalism as in the cases of European countries. Nationalism in Turkey crosscuts the secularist versus Islamist divide in which both right-wing (AKP-MHP) and center-left parties (CHP) demonstrate nationalist characteristics. Turkish versus Kurdish nationalism generates another dichotomy that should be analyzed. However, the results posit that there is a weak

attachment of populism on nationalism, or vice versa when it comes to mass attitudes in the case of Turkey.⁸²

Finally, this dissertation also demonstrated that the items generated measuring populism in Western Europe are also applicable in a non-Western and competitive authoritarian setting. I used the indexes generated by Hawkins et al. (2012) and Akkerman et al. (2014) in Chapters 5 and 6. Besides, by using a representative survey data, confirmatory factor analysis indicated that Hawkins et al.'s four-item index can be used in other comparative studies. Furthermore, as a non-Western case, Turkey appears as a significant country for developing comparative research in which us versus them antagonism is not built on anti-immigration but religious divide similar to the countries such as India and Israel. There should be more studies on different types of populism as well as nativism.

7.3. Shortcomings and Limitations of the Dissertation

The major shortcoming of this dissertation is that it is a single case study. Other case studies can challenge the external validity of some of these assumptions. However, Ottoman and Kemalist nostalgias are both sui generis. In other words, it is not easy to test their effects in another context. However, one can also argue that every country has its unique nostalgia for a specific period or periods. There are very few common historical eras that allow us to conduct a comparative experimental study such as the era before the influx of immigrants to Europe, pre-Second World War, or socialist rule. This type of study requires a cross-national dataset to compare multiple countries, as most-similar or most-different studies are designed. However, to my knowledge, there is no current cross-national dataset that covers both nostalgia and populism items. Therefore, it would be difficult to test the validity of results in another setting.

⁸² Also see Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006) on empirical analysis of crosscutting cleavages in Turkey.

Another shortcoming of this dissertation is having a non-representative sample for the experimental design. It is an open question as to whether I would have received similar results if I had used a representative sample. The results might be different due to the lack of non-educated respondents in the sample, who, I assume, would have been more receptive to the nostalgia treatments. Nevertheless, to my knowledge, this experimental design is the first attempt in academic literature to test the effect of nostalgic messages on populist attitudes, which I view as a first step in developing more advanced tests to detect the relationship between nostalgia and populism.

I mentioned another shortcoming in Chapter 4, which is the unavailability of data from 2002 to 2011, preventing an analysis on the change of populist rhetoric in political leaders. If I had access to the speeches of the entire tenure of the AKP and Erdoğan, I would be able to analyze whether the AKP was not a populist party from the beginning but evolved into a right-wing populist party over time.

Another limitation of this study is that data collection of both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 took place before a referendum and a general election, respectively. Thus, I assume that the political-electoral environment affected the results. Also, Turkey has experienced significant transformations during the same era. The system of government has been changed from parliamentary to presidential. The state of democracy and freedoms has been in a serious decline. Therefore, we need to read the results by considering all these exogenous factors.

What is more, this dissertation is conducted in a country where a populist party is in power for almost two decades. Hence, I assume that 17 years is sufficient time to establish hegemony in all dimensions of political, social, and economic lives of the electorate. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 2, besides pro-AKP media, state-owned television

channel TRT broadcasts pro-Ottoman TV series. Thus, it is easy to manipulate Ottoman nostalgia for the AKP as a party in power. On the other hand, the results can be different in countries in which populist parties are in opposition and find relatively less space in media.

However, from a theoretical perspective, if one can manipulate populist attitudes by using nostalgia in a country in which the populist electorate is satisfied with their current conditions, we can understand why populist politicians are extremely inclined to instrumentalize nostalgia for their ends. Nostalgia is a false memory, a whitewashed past, a glorious era that everyone can rally around it. Therefore, the cost of exploiting nostalgia is low because when we reach the nostalgic era, we do not care whether it is the one that we aim to go back as Boym argued (2001). Methodologically speaking, if one can manipulate populist attitudes in an extremely populist environment in which populism has already become an established ideology, the people's will has become extremely sacred, and the people represent the authentic and pure wisdom of politics, then it would be relatively easier to conduct a similar analysis in other settings in which populism has not penetrated all areas of political and social life.

7.4. Future Studies

An essential future study would be to conduct comparative research with the same survey items by comparing Turkey with other cases. It is also necessary to test whether the assumptions of this dissertation are valid for the cases where populists are in the opposition like the Netherlands and Sweden, or different political cultures such as Latin America and India.

Secondly, there can be unexplored mediator or moderator variables that may affect the link between nostalgia to populism. Emotions, inefficacy, and historical knowledge can

be essential variables within this picture that are not available in my datasets. As mentioned before, resentment and anger towards the elites can be important variables that are missing in this study.

In addition, how confident people are about their future can be another critical confounding variable. Very recent research conducted by Krastev et al. (2019) in 14 European countries concluded that although European voters are torn regarding the functioning of the Union, due to various issues such as immigration, emigration, radical Islam, and the economy, they are united in one common characteristic: nostalgia for a golden past. When people lost their hope for the future, *ceteris paribus*, they are supposed to become more susceptible to nostalgia.

Thirdly, there can be other important nostalgias that I failed to detect, or which I underestimated, due to theoretical and empirical reasons. One of the critiques that I received in a conference was whether the nationalist far-right's Central Asia nostalgia, built on ancient folk tales and sagas, can be significant in manipulating populism. Besides, I failed to detect whether the HDP constituency has nostalgia for a specific period. If the HDP electorate has a particular type of nostalgia that this study could not capture, it might affect the populist attitudes of HDP voters.

Finally, the effects of nostalgic messages on the in-group versus out-group formation should be analyzed. Although I tried to analyze this issue in the experimental design, I failed to receive significant results. I measured respondents' distance and closeness by using the feeling thermometer method with particular identities such as Ottoman, Islamist, Neo-nationalist (*ulusalçı*), Idealist (*Ülkücü*), Socialist, Atheist, in addition to groups such as elites, journalists, university professors, senior military officers, and so on. Although exploratory factor analysis successfully indicated two dimensions –

Ottoman, Islamist, and Ülkücü identities against the elites, journalists, and professors – difference tests and regression models did not show significant effects from nostalgic messages. Nevertheless, one of my plans is to develop this module by conducting additional tests.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahmad, F. (1993). *The making of modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Akçura, Y. (2015). *Siyaset ve iktisat*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat.
- Akkerman, A., Zaslove, A., & Spruyt, B. (2017). 'We the People' or 'We the Peoples'? A Comparison of Support for the Populist Radical Right and Populist Radical Left in the Netherlands. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 23(4), 377-403.
- Akkerman, A., Mudde, C., & Zaslove, A. (2014). How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(9), 1324-1353.
- Aknur, M. (2013). Civil-military relations during the AK Party era: major developments and challenges. *Insight Turkey*, 15(4), 131-150.
- Aksakal, H. (2015). *Türk Politik Kültüründe Romantizm*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2008). Introduction: The sceptre and the spectre. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (eds.). *Twenty-first century populism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Algan, Y., Guriev, S., Papaioannou, E., & Passari, E. (2017). The European trust crisis and the rise of populism. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 2017(2), 309-400.
- Alkan, N. (2005). 'The eternal enemy of Islam': Abdullah Cevdet and the Baha'i religion. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 68(1), 1-20.
- Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1989). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Arat-Koç, S. (2018). Culturalizing politics, hyper-politicizing 'culture': 'White' vs. 'Black Turks' and the making of authoritarian populism in Turkey. *Dialectical Anthropology*, 42(4), 391-408.
- Art, D. (2010). *Memory politics in Western Europe*. EUI Working Paper 2010/01, Available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13248/MWP_2010_01.pdf?sequence=1.
- Aslanidis, P. (2016). Is populism an ideology? A refutation and a new perspective. *Political Studies*, 64(1_suppl), 88-104.
- Assmann, A. (2008). Canon and Archive. In A. Erll & A. Nünning (Eds.), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Atacan, F. (2005). Explaining religious politics at the crossroad: AKP-SP. *Turkish Studies*, 6(2), 187-199.
- Avcı, G. (2011). The Nationalist Movement Party's Euroscepticism: party ideology meets strategy. *South European Society and Politics*, 16(3), 435-447.

- Avcıođlu, D. (1973). *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*. Vol. 2. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları.
- Ayata, S., & Ayata, A. G. (2007). The center-left parties in Turkey. *Turkish Studies*, 8(2), 211-232.
- Aydemir, Ş. S. (2011). *Tek Adam (1922-1938)*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
- Aytaç, S. E., & Elçi, E. (2019). Populism in Turkey. In D. Stockemer (ed.). *Populism Around the World*. Cham: Springer.
- Aytac, S. E., & Öniş, Z. (2014). Varieties of Populism in a Changing Global Context: The Divergent Paths of Erdoğan and Kirchnerismo. *Comparative Politics*, 47(1), 41-59.
- Bakker, B. N., Rooduijn, M., & Schumacher, G. (2016). The psychological roots of populist voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. *European Journal of Political Research*, 55(2), 302-320.
- Barr, R. R. (2009). Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics. *Party Politics*, 15(1), 29-48.
- Bauman, Z. (2017). *Retrotopia*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Berkes, N. (1964). *The development of secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.
- Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 5-19.
- Betz, H. G. (2017). Nativism across time and space. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 23(4), 335-353.
- Betz, H. G. (1998). *The New Politics of the Right*. London: Macmillan.
- Betz, H. G., & Johnson, C. (2004). Against the current-stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), 311-327.
- Bora, T. (2016). *Cereyanlar: Türkiye'de siyasi ideolojiler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Bora, T. (2013). AKP'ye tepki Atatürk nümâyişinde birleşti. Retrieved from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/akpye-tepki-ataturk-numayisinde-birlesti-1160471/>.
- Bora, T. (2011). Nationalist Discourses in Turkey. In A. Kadiođlu, & F. Keyman (Eds.), *Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey*. Salt Lake City: The University Of Utah Press.
- Bora, T. (2006). Muhafazakâr Yerlilik Söylemi. In T. Bora & M. Gültekingil (Eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Bora, T. & Canefe, N. (2008). Türkiye'de Popülist Milliyetçilik. In T. Bora & M. Gültekingil (Eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Bora, T & Erdoğan, N. (2006). Muhafazakâr Popülizm. In T. Bora & M. Gültekingil (Eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Bora, T & Onaran, B. (2006). Nostalji ve Muhafazakarlık. In T. Bora & M. Gültekingil (Eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Boym, S. (2001). *The Future of Nostalgia*. New York: Basic Books.

- Boyrac, C. (2018). Neoliberal populism and governmentality in Turkey: The foundation of communication centers during the AKP era. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 44(4), 437-452.
- Bowler, S., Denmark, D., Donovan, T., & McDonnell, D. (2017). Right-wing populist party supporters: Dissatisfied but not direct democrats. *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(1), 70-91.
- Bozarslan, H. (2008). Kurds and the Turkish State. In R. Kasaba (Ed.). *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World*, Vol: 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bozkurt, U. (2013). Neoliberalism with a human face: Making sense of the justice and development party's neoliberal populism in Turkey. *Science & Society*, 77(3), 372-396.
- Brasor, P. (2017). Identifying the 'liberal' in Japanese politics. Retrieved from: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/21/national/media-national/identifying-liberal-japanese-politics/#.XNTaJ45KjIW>.
- Brown, A. D., & Humphreys, M. (2002). Nostalgia and the narrativization of identity: A Turkish case study. *British Journal of Management*, 13(2), 141-159.
- Brown, J. (1988). The Politics of Disengagement in Turkey: The Kemalist Tradition. In C. P. Danopoulos (Ed.). *The Decline of Military Regimes, The Civilian Influence*. Boulder & London: Westview Press.
- Brubaker, R. (2019). Populism and nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism*. DOI: 10.1111/nana.12522
- Bryan, B. (2012). Revenge and Nostalgia: Reconciling Nietzsche and Heidegger on the question of coming to terms with the past. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 38(1), 25-38.
- Bulut, E., & Yörük, E. (2017). Mediatized Populisms Digital Populism: Trolls and Political Polarization of Twitter in Turkey. *International Journal of Communication*, 11, 4093-4117.
- Canovan, M. (2005). *The people*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. *Political studies*, 47(1), 2-16.
- Castanho Silva, B., Andreadis, I., Anduiza, E., Blanuša, N., Corti, Y. M., Delfino, G., ... & Littvay, L. (2018). Public opinion surveys: A new scale. In K. A. Hawkins, R. E. Carlin, L. Littvay, & C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.). *The Ideational Approach to Populism*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Castanho Silva, B., Vegetti, F., & Littvay, L. (2017). The elite is up to something: Exploring the relation between populism and belief in conspiracy theories. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 23(4), 423-443.
- Cento Bull, A. (2016). The role of memory in populist discourse: the case of the Italian Second Republic. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 50(3), 213-231.
- Cento Bull, A., & Hansen, H. L. (2016). On agonistic memory. *Memory Studies*, 9(4), 390-404.

- Cheung, W. Y., Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., Tausch, N., & Ayanian, A. H. (2017). Collective nostalgia is associated with stronger outgroup-directed anger and participation in ingroup-favoring collective action. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 5(2), 301-319.
- Chiantera-Stutte, P. (2005). Populist Use of Memory and Constitutionalism: Two Comments-I. *German LJ*, 6, 391.
- Collier, R. B. (1999). *Paths toward democracy: The working class and elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cosar, S., & Özman, A. (2008). Representation problems of social democracy in Turkey. *Journal of Global South Studies*, 25(1), 233-252.
- Credé, M., Harms, P., Niehorster, S., & Gaye-Valentine, A. (2012). An evaluation of the consequences of using short measures of the Big Five personality traits. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 102(4), 874.
- Çakır, R. (2013). *Ayet ve slogan: Türkiye'de İslami oluşumlar*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- Çandar, C. 2013. *Mısır'da darbenin Türkiye'deki iktidar için iki farklı sonucu...* Accessed January 29, 2018. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2013/07/turkey-akp-demoralized-egypt-coup.html#ixzz54AKn6nJf>
- Çarkoğlu, A. (2012). Voting behavior in Turkey. In M. Heper & S. Sayarı (Eds.). *Handbook of Modern Turkey*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Çarkoğlu, A. (2005). Political preferences of the Turkish electorate: reflections of an Alevi-Sunni cleavage. *Turkish Studies*, 6(2), 273-292.
- Çarkoğlu, A., & Elçi, E. (2018). Alevis in Turkey. In P. S. Rowe (Ed). *Routledge Handbook of Minorities in the Middle East*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Çarkoğlu, A., & Glöpker-Kesebir, G. (2016). Comparing public attitudes on EU membership in candidate countries: the cases of Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey from 2004 to 2011. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(2), 255-274.
- Çarkoğlu, A., & Hinich, M. J. (2006). A spatial analysis of Turkish party preferences. *Electoral Studies*, 25(2), 369-392.
- Çarkoğlu, A. and Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2009). *The rising tide of conservatism in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Çelik, N. B. (2008). Ecevit, Bülent (1925-2006). In Vol. 1 of the *Encyclopedia of Political Communication* edited by Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha 197-198. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Çelik, A. B., & Balta, E. (2018). Explaining the micro dynamics of the populist cleavage in the 'new Turkey'. *Mediterranean Politics*, 1-22.
- Çetinsaya, G. (2006). Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde 'Osmanlıcılık'. In T. Bora & M. Gültekinçil (Eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Çevik, S. B. (2019). Turkish historical television series: public broadcasting of neo-Ottoman illusions. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1622288>.

- Çınar, M. (2015). *Vesayetçi Demokrasiden "Milli" Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Birikim Kitapları.
- Çınar, M., & Sayın, C. (2014). Reproducing the Paradigm of Democracy in Turkey: Parochial Democratization in the Decade of Justice and Development Party. *Turkish Studies*, 15(3), 365-385.
- Çolak, Y. (2006). Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective memory and cultural pluralism in 1990s Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42(4), 587-602.
- Davis, F. (1979). *Yearning for yesterday: A sociology of nostalgia*. New York: Free Press.
- De Cleen, B. (2017). Populism and nationalism. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- De Cleen, B., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2017). Distinctions and articulations: A discourse theoretical framework for the study of populism and nationalism. *Javnost-The Public*, 24(4), 301-319.
- De Vries & Hoffmann, I. (2018). The Power of the Past: How Nostalgia Shapes European Public Opinion. Eupinions: What do you think?
- Diamond, L. (2016). Facing up the Democratic Recession. *Journal of Democracy*, 26(1), 141-155.
- Dincşahin, S. (2012). A Symptomatic Analysis of the Justice and Development Party's Populism in Turkey, 2007-2010. *Government and Opposition*, 47(4), 618-640.
- Doane, J. & Hodges, D. (1987). *Nostalgia and Sexual Difference*. New York: Methuen.
- Duyvendak, J. W. (2011). *The politics of home: Belonging and nostalgia in Europe and the United States*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S. (2007). Methods for integrating moderation and mediation: a general analytical framework using moderated path analysis. *Psychological methods*, 12(1), 1.
- Ekman, J., & Linde, J. (2005). Communist nostalgia and the consolidation of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 21(3), 354-374.
- Elchardus, M., & Spruyt, B. (2014). Populism, Persistent Republicanism and Declinism: An Empirical Analysis of Populism as a Thin Ideology. *Government and Opposition*, 51(01), 111-133.
- Elçi, E. (2019). The rise of populism in Turkey: a content analysis. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 19(3), 387-408,
- Elgenius, G., & Rydgren, J. (2018). Frames of nostalgia and belonging: the resurgence of ethno-nationalism in Sweden. *European Societies*, 1-20.
- Elo, S. and Kyngäs, H. (2008). The qualitative content analysis process. *J Adv Nurs.*, 62(1), 107-115.
- Erbakan, N. (1975). *Millî görüş ve 3. Beş Yıllık Plan*. İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları.

- Erbil, C. & Özlale, Ü. (2018). Turkey's currency collapse shows just how vulnerable its economy is to a crisis. Retrieved from: <https://theconversation.com/turkeys-currency-collapse-shows-just-how-vulnerable-its-economy-is-to-a-crisis-101556>.
- Erçetin, T., & Erdoğan, E. (2018). How Turkey's repetitive elections affected the populist tone in the discourses of the Justice and Development Party Leaders. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 44(4), 382-398.
- Erdoğan, N. (1998). Demokratik soldan Devrimci Yol'a: 1970'lerde sol popülizm üzerine notlar. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 78, 22-37.
- Erem, O. (2018). *OHAL sona erdi: İki yıllık sürecin bilançosu*. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-44799489>.
- Ergin, M., & Karakaya, Y. (2017). Between neo-Ottomanism and Ottomania: navigating state-led and popular cultural representations of the past. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 56, 33-59.
- Esen, B., & Gumuscu, S. (2016). Rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(9), 1581-1606.
- Espinal, C. (2013). A case study into the making and evolution of populist discourse: Examining Hugo Chávez's discourse and its radicalisation through time. Accessed December 1, 2016 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/degreeProgrammes/programmes/undergraduate/pdf/GV390-Cristina-Espinal.pdf>.
- Evans, G., Heath, A., & Lalljee, M. (1996). Measuring left-right and libertarian-authoritarian values in the British electorate. *British Journal of Sociology*, 93-112.
- File, D. (2015). Latin American inclusive and European exclusionary populism: colonialism as an explanation. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 20(3), 263-283.
- Freedon, M. (1998). Is nationalism a distinct ideology?. *Political studies*, 46(4), 748-765.
- Fremaux, I., & Albertazzi, D. (2002). Discursive strategies around 'community' in political propaganda: The case of Lega Nord. *National Identities*, 4(2), 145-160.
- Freund, L. (1955). The new American conservatism and European conservatism. *Ethics*, 66(1, Part 1), 10-17.
- Gaston, S., & Hilhorst, S. (2018). At Home in One's Past: Nostalgia as a Cultural and Political Force in Britain, France and Germany. *Demos*.
- Gest, J., Reny, T., & Mayer, J. (2018). Roots of the radical right: Nostalgic deprivation in the United States and Britain. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(13), 1694-1719.
- Greene, S. (1999). Understanding party identification: A social identity approach. *Political Psychology*, 20(2), 393-403.
- Giardina, A. (2008). The fascist myth of romanity. *Estudos Avançados*, 22(62), 55-76.
- Glazer, P. (2005). *Radical Nostalgia: Spanish Civil War Commemoration in America*. Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer.
- Gökalp, Z. (2006). *Türkleşmek, islamlaşmak, muasırlaşmak*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat AŞ.

- Göle, N. (1997). Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The making of elites and counter-elites. *The Middle East Journal*, 51(1), 46-58.
- Grimmer, J., & Stewart, B. M. (2013). Text as data: The promise and pitfalls of automatic content analysis methods for political texts. *Political analysis*, 21(3), 267-297.
- Gülmez, S. B. (2013). Rising euroscepticism in Turkish politics: The cases of the AKP and the CHP. *Acta Politica*, 48(3), 326-344.
- Gürgün, A. (2017). Atatürk ve Ziya Gökalp. Retrieved from: <https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/turkiye/2017-mart/ataturk-ve-ziya-gokalp>.
- Gürsoy, Y. (2015). Turkish public opinion on the coup allegations: implications for democratization. *Political Science Quarterly*, 130(1), 103-132.
- Hadiz, V. R. (2014). A new Islamic populism and the contradictions of development. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 44(1), 125-143.
- Hale, W. (2007). *Turkish politics and the military*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Hameleers, M., Bos, L., & de Vreese, C. (2017). Framing blame: toward a better understanding of the effects of populist communication on populist party preferences. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 1-19.
- Hanioglu, Ş. (2018). Nostalji ve gerçekliğe dönüş gerekliliği. Retrieved from: <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/hanioglu/2018/05/06/nostalji-ve-gerceklige-donus-gerekliligi>.
- Harris, F. C. (2015). The next civil rights movement?. *Dissent*, 62(3), 34-40.
- Haspolat, E. (2011). Meşrutiyetin Üç Halkçılığı ve Kemalist Halkçılığa Etkileri. *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, 12(47), 557-584.
- Hawkins, K. A. (2010). *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hawkins, K. A. (2009). Is Chávez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(8), 1040-1067.
- Hawkins, K. A., Riding, S., & Mudde, C. (2012). *Measuring populist attitudes*. Committee on Concepts and Methods.
- Hawkins, K. A., & Silva, B. C. (2018). Textual analysis. In K. A. Hawkins, R. E. Carlin, L. Littvay, & C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.). *The Ideational Approach to Populism*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Hayes, A. F. (2015). An index and test of linear moderated mediation. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 50(1), 1-22.
- Hayes, A. F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical mediation analysis in the new millennium. *Communication monographs*, 76(4), 408-420.
- Henry, L., Wickham, H., & Chang, W. (2018). ggstance: Horizontal 'ggplot2' Components. R package version 0.3.1. <https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=ggstance>.
- Hervik, P. (2012). Ending tolerance as a solution to incompatibility: The Danish 'crisis of multiculturalism'. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 15(2), 211-225.

- Hino, A. (2012). *New Challenger Parties in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Hochschild, A. R. (2018). *Strangers in their own land: Anger and mourning on the American right*. New York: The New Press.
- Hope, R. M. (2013). *Rmisc: Rmisc: Ryan Miscellaneous*. R package version 1.5. <https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=Rmisc>.
- Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: A historical review. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 2(1), 204-222.
- Hu, L. T., & Bentler, P. M. (1998). Fit indices in covariance structure modeling: Sensitivity to underparameterized model misspecification. *Psychological methods*, 3(4), 424.
- Hürriyet (2015). 90 yıllık reklam arası bitti. Retrieved from: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/90-yillik-reklam-arasi-bitti-27979061>.
- Iglesias, P. (2017a). Facebook post from Pablo Iglesias' official account. Retrieved from: <https://www.facebook.com/IglesiasTurrionPablo/posts/la-rep%C3%BAblica-no-debe-ser-nostalgia-de-batallas-perdidasi-ni-s%C3%B3lo-lareivindicaci%C3%B3n/1469636416442093/>.
- Iglesias, P. (2017b). Pablo Iglesias Thinks There Is an Alternative. Retrieved from: <https://jacobinmag.com/2017/12/pablo-iglesias-catalan-elections-podemos-spain>.
- İğsız, A. (2015). Palimpsests of Multiculturalism and Museumization of Culture: Greco-Turkish Population Exchange Museum as an Istanbul 2010 European Capital of Culture Project. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 35(2), 324-345.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Values, ideology, and cognitive mobilization in new social movements*. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis.
- Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2017). Trump and the populist authoritarian parties: the silent revolution in reverse. *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(2), 443-454.
- IPSOS (2018). Türkiye'yi anlama klavuzu. Retrieved from: http://www.halklailiskiler.com/pdf/Turkiyeyi-Anlama-Kilavuzu-EKitap_1347963063.pdf.
- IPSOS (2012). Türkiye'yi anlama klavuzu. Retrieved from: http://www.halklailiskiler.com/pdf/Turkiyeyi-Anlama-Kilavuzu-EKitap_1347963063.pdf.
- Jagers, J. A. N., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(3), 319-345.
- Jenkins, G. H. (2009). *Between fact and fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon investigation*. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
- Jenkins, G. (2001). *Context and circumstance: the Turkish military and politics*. London & New York: Routledge.

- Jetten, J., & Hutchison, P. (2011). When groups have a lot to lose: Historical continuity enhances resistance to a merger. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 41(3), 335-343.
- Jylhä, K. M., Rydgren, J., & Strimling, P. (2019). Radical right-wing voters from right and left: Comparing Sweden Democrat voters who previously voted for the Conservative Party or the Social Democratic Party. *Scandinavian Political Studies*. Doi: 10.1111/1467-9477.12147.
- Kalaycıoğlu, E. (1994). Elections and party preferences in Turkey: changes and continuities in the 1990s. *Comparative Political Studies*, 27(3), 402-424.
- Kallis, A. (2002). *Fascist ideology: territory and expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Kalinina, E., & Menke, M. (2016). Negotiating the past in hyperconnected memory cultures: Post-Soviet nostalgia and national identity in Russian online communities. *International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics*, 12(1), 59-74.
- Karakaya, Y. (2018). The conquest of hearts: the central role of Ottoman nostalgia within contemporary Turkish populism. *American Journal of Cultural Sociology*, 1-33.
- Karaömerlioğlu, M. A. (2006). Tek Parti Döneminde Halkçılık. In T. Bora & M. Gültekinil (Eds.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*. Istanbul: İletişim.
- Karaveli, H. M. (2010). An unfulfilled promise of enlightenment: Kemalism and its liberal critics. *Turkish Studies*, 11(1), 85-102.
- Kenny, M. (2017). Back to the populist future?: understanding nostalgia in contemporary ideological discourse. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 22(3), 256-273.
- Kışlalı, A. T. (2003). *Siyasal Sistemler: Siyasal Çatışma ve Uzlaşma*. Istanbul: Imge Kitabevi.
- Kioupkiolis, A. (2016). Podemos: the ambiguous promises of left-wing populism in contemporary Spain. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 21(2), 99-120.
- Kirdiş, E., & Drhimeur, A. (2016). The rise of populism? Comparing incumbent pro-Islamic parties in Turkey and Morocco. *Turkish Studies*, 17(4), 599-617.
- Kovacs, Z. (2017). PM Orbán: “Hungary hasn’t been this strong since Trianon.” Retrieved from: <http://abouthungary.hu/blog/pm-orban-hungary-hasnt-been-this-strong-since-trianon/>.
- Krastev, I., Leonard, M., & Dennison, S. (2019). What Europeans Really Want: Five Myths Debunked. European Council on Foreign Relations.
- Kriesi, H. (2014). The populist challenge. *West European Politics*, 37(2), 361-378.
- Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008). *West European politics in the age of globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. S. (Eds.). (2015). *European populism in the shadow of the great recession*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Krippendorff, K. (2013). *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

- Krouwel, A., Kutiyski, Y., van Prooijen, J. W., Martinsson, J., & Markstedt, E. (2017). Does extreme political ideology predict conspiracy beliefs, economic evaluations and political trust? Evidence from Sweden. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 5(2), 435–462.
- Kubicek, P. (2009). The “Wall in the Mind” And Nostalgia for Separation in Reunified Germany. Paper presented at the conference *The Fall of the Berlin Wall, Twenty Years After*, University of Cincinnati.
- Kubik, J., & Bernhard, M. (2014). A Theory of the Politics of Memory. *Twenty years after communism: The politics of memory and commemoration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin*, 108, 480–498.
- Kuru, A. T. (2005). Globalization and diversification of Islamic movements: three Turkish cases. *Political Science Quarterly*, 120(2), 253-274.
- Laclau, E. (2005). *On Populist Reason*. London & New York: Verso.
- Lee, C. M. (2015). Shinzo Abe’s Duty to History. Retrieved from: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/16/shinzo-abe-s-duty-to-history-pub-59826>.
- Lévi-Strauss, C. (1990). *Mythologiques* (Vol. 4). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Levitsky, S., & Loxton, J. (2013). Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. *Democratization*, 20(1), 107-136.
- Lindstrom, N. (2005). Yugonostalgia: restorative and reflective nostalgia in former Yugoslavia. *East Central Europe*, 32(1-2), 227-237.
- Liu, J. H., & Hilton, D. J. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: Social representations of history and their role in identity politics. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44(4), 537-556.
- Lowe, Will. 2011. *Yoshikoder: Cross-platform multilingual content analysis*. Java software version 0.6, 5.
- Lowenthal, D. (1985). *The Past is a Foreign Country*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Luhn, H. P. (1966). Keyword-in-Context Index for Technical Literature (KWIC Index). In *Readings in Automatic Language Processing* edited by David G. Hays, 159-167. New York: Elsevier.
- Manning, C. D., & Schütze, H. (1999). *Foundations of statistical natural language processing*. Cambridge: MIT press.
- March, L. (2017). Left and right populism compared: The British case. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 19(2), 282-303.
- Mardin, Ş. (1973). Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics?. *Daedalus*, 102(1), 169-190.
- Martinovic, B., Jetten, J., Smeekes, A., & Verkuyten, M. (2018). Collective Memory of a Dissolved Country: Group-Based Nostalgia and Guilt Assignment as Predictors of

- Interethnic Relations Between Diaspora Groups From Former Yugoslavia. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 5(2), 588-607.
- Mazrui, A. A. (2013). Cultural amnesia, cultural nostalgia and false memory: Africa's identity crisis revisited. *African Philosophy*, 13(2), 87-98.
- McCoy, J., & Somer, M. (2019). Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681(1), 234-271.
- Meléndez, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2016). Political identities: The missing link in the study of populism. *Party Politics*, doi: 1354068817741287.
- Mény, Y., & Surel, Y. (2002). *The constitutive ambiguity of populism. In Democracies and the populist challenge*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Merkel, W. (2004). Embedded and defective democracies. *Democratization*, 11(5), 33-58.
- Mert, N. (2007). *Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi*. Istanbul: Selis Kitaplar.
- Milliyet (2017). Meclis'teki grup toplantılarında ziyaretçilere özel kart. Retrieved from: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/meclis-teki-grup-toplantilarinda-siyaset-2531012/>.
- McDonnell, D., & Werner, A. (2017). Respectable radicals: why some radical right parties in the European Parliament forsake policy congruence. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1-17.
- Mols, F., & Jetten, J. (2014). No guts, no glory: How framing the collective past paves the way for anti-immigrant sentiments. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 43, 74-86.
- Montgomery, J. M., Nyhan, B., & Torres, M. (2018). How conditioning on posttreatment variables can ruin your experiment and what to do about it. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(3), 760-775.
- Moon, K. (2019). *processR: Implementation of the 'PROCESS' Macro*. R package version 0.1.0. <https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=processR>.
- Mouffe, C. (2012). An agonistic approach to the future of Europe. *New Literary History*, 43(4), 629-640.
- Mouffe, C. (2005). *On the Political*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Mouffe, C. (1999). Introduction: Schmitt's Challenge. In C. Mouffe (Ed.). *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*. London & New York: Verso.
- Moffitt, B. (2016). *The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Moffitt, B. (2015). How to perform crisis: A model for understanding the key role of crisis in contemporary populism. *Government and Opposition*, 50(2), 189-217.
- Moffitt, B., & Tormey, S. (2014). Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style. *Political studies*, 62(2), 381-397.

- Mudde, C. (2017). An Ideational Approach. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mudde, C. (2016a). Can We Stop the Politics of Nostalgia That Have Dominated 2016? *Newsweek*. Retrieved from <http://www.newsweek.com/1950s-1930s-racism-us-europe-nostalgia-cas-mudde-531546>.
- Mudde, C. (2016b). Europe's Populist Surge: A Long Time in the Making. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-10-17/europe-s-populist-surge>.
- Mudde, C. (2010). The populist radical right: A pathological normalcy. *West European Politics*, 33(6), 1167-1186.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and opposition*, 39(4), 541-563.
- Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). *Populism: A very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2013). Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America. *Government and Opposition*, 48(2), 147-174.
- Muldoon, P. (2017). The Power of Forgetting: Ressentiment, Guilt, and Transformative Politics. *Political Psychology*, 38(4), 669-683.
- Müller, J. W. (2016). *What is populism?*. London: Penguin.
- Müller, J. W. (2014). "The People Must Be Extracted from Within the People": Reflections on Populism. *Constellations*, 21(4), 483-493.
- Müller, J. W. (2006). Comprehending conservatism: A new framework for analysis. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11(3), 359-365.
- Nietzsche, F. (1980). *On the advantage and disadvantage of history for life*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Nietzsche, F. (1969). *On the genealogy of morals*. New York, NY: Vintage. (Originally published in 1887)
- Nisbet, R. (1982). What to Do When You Don't Live in a Golden Age. *The American Scholar*, 51(2), 229-241.
- Neuendorf, K. A. (2016). *The content analysis guidebook*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Neziroğlu, İ., & Yılmaz, T. (2014a). *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları: Cumhuriyet Hükümetleri Dönemi, Adnan Menderes*. Vol. 4. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi.
- Neziroğlu, İ., & Yılmaz, T. (2014b). *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları: Cumhuriyet Hükümetleri Dönemi, Süleyman Sami Demirel*. Vol. 6. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi.
- Norris, A. (1998). Carl Schmitt on friends, enemies and the political. *TELOS*, 1998(112), 68-88.

- Obama, B. (2016). Address by President Obama to the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Retrieved from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/20/address-president-obama-71st-session-united-nations-general-assembly>.
- Oğur, Y. (2018). Nostaljide kaybolmak. Retrieved from: <http://www.karar.com/yazarlar/yildiray-ogur/nostaljide-kaybolmak-7749#>
- Olick, J. K. (2008). From collective memory to the sociology of mnemonic practices and products. In E. Astrid & A. Nünning (Eds.). *Cultural memory studies: an international and interdisciplinary handbook*, Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Oliver, J. E., & Rahn, W. M. (2016). Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 667(1), 189-206.
- O'Sullivan, N. (2013). Conservatism. In M. Freedman, L. T. Sargent, & M. Stears (eds.). *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Öktem, K., & Akkoyunlu K. (2016). Exit from democracy: illiberal governance in Turkey and beyond. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(4), 469-480.
- Öniş, Z. (2015). Monopolising the centre: The AKP and the uncertain path of Turkish democracy. *The International Spectator*, 50(2), 22-41.
- Öniş, Z. (2004). Turgut Özal and his economic legacy: Turkish neo-liberalism in critical perspective. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40(4), 113-134.
- Öniş, Z. (2001). Political Islam at the crossroads: from hegemony to co-existence. *Contemporary Politics*, 7(4), 281-298.
- Öniş, Z., & Kutlay, M. (2017). Global Shifts and the Limits of the EU's Transformative Power in the European Periphery: Comparative Perspectives from Hungary and Turkey. *Government and Opposition*, 1-28.
- Özbudun, E. 2006. From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. *South European Society and Politics*, 11(3-4), 543-557.
- Özbudun, E. (2000). *Contemporary Turkish politics: challenges to democratic consolidation*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Özbudun, E. (1995). Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations, In L. Diamond, J. J. Linz & S. M. Lipset (Eds.), *Politics in Developing Countries, Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Özçetin, B. (2019). 'The show of the people' against the cultural elites: Populism, media and popular culture in Turkey. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 1367549418821841.
- Özden, B. A. (2014). The transformation of social welfare and politics in Turkey: A successful convergence of neoliberalism and populism. In A. Bekmen, I. Akça, & B. A. Özden (Eds.). *Turkey reframed: Constituting neoliberal hegemony*, London: Pluto Press.

- Özışık, S. (2015). *İşte Hakan Fidan'a yönelik 7 Şubat kumpasının bilinmeyenleri*. Retrieved from: <http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/iste-hakan-fidana-yonelik-7-subat-kumpasinin-bilinmeyenleri-48827.html>.
- Özyürek, E. (2006). *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey*. Durham & London: Duke University Press.
- Pamuk, O. (2004). *Istanbul: Memories and the City*. New York: Vintage.
- Pappas, T. S. (2016). Distinguishing liberal democracy's challengers. *Journal of democracy*, 27(4), 22-36.
- Pauwels, T. (2011). Measuring populism: A quantitative text analysis of party literature in Belgium. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 21(1), 97-119.
- Pető, A. (2017). Revisionist histories, 'future memories': far-right memorialization practices in Hungary. *European Politics and Society*, 18(1), 41-51.
- Pew Research Center (2017). Spring 2017 Survey Dataset. <https://www.pewglobal.org/dataset/spring-2017-survey-data/>.
- Pirro, A. L. (2014). Populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe: The different context and issues of the prophets of the patria. *Government and Opposition*, 49(4), 600-629.
- Poggi, G. (1972). *Images of Society Essays on the Sociological Theories of Tocqueville, Marx, and Durkheim*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (2007). Addressing moderated mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions. *Multivariate behavioral research*, 42(1), 185-227.
- Psaltis, C., Franc, R., Smeekes, A., Ioannou, M., & Žeželj, I. (2017). Social representations of the past in post-conflict societies: Adherence to official historical narratives and distrust through heightened threats. In C. Psaltis, M. Carretero, & S. Čehajić-Clancy. *History Education and Conflict Transformation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Putnam, R. D. (1994). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ramakrishna, K. (2015). *Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia*. Singapore: Springer.
- Reinemann, C., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Strömback, J., and de Vreese, C. H. (2017). Populist Political Communication: Toward a Model of Its Causes, Forms, and Effects. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömback & C. H. de Vreese (Eds.). *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York & London: Routledge.
- Renan, E. (1992). What is a Nation?. In Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*, Paris: Presses-Pocket, (translated by Ethan Rundell).
- Revelle, W. (2018) *psych: Procedures for Personality and Psychological Research*, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA, <https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=psych> Version = 1.8.12.

- Rico, G., Guinjoan, M., & Anduiza, E. (2017). The emotional underpinnings of populism: how anger and fear affect populist attitudes. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 23(4), 444-461.
- Rico, G., & Anduiza, E. (2016). Economic correlates of populist attitudes: an analysis of nine European countries in the aftermath of the great recession. *Acta Politica*, 1-27.
- Roberts, N. (2016). When the Boat Comes in: Myth, Reification, and the Changing Face of Simón Bolívar in Venezuelan Politics and Culture. In M. G. Shanahan and A. M. Reyes (Eds.). *Simon Bolivar: Travels and Transformations of a Cultural Icon*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Rodrik, D. (2018). Populism and the Economics of Globalization. *Journal of International Business Policy*, 1-22.
- Rooduijn, M. (2018). What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties. *European Political Science Review*, 10(3), 351-368.
- Rooduijn, M. (2014a). The Nucleus of Populism: In Search of the Lowest Common Denominator. *Government and Opposition*, 49(4), 572-598.
- Rooduijn, M. (2014b). The mesmerising message: The diffusion of populism in public debates in Western European media. *Political Studies*, 62(4), 726-744.
- Rooduijn, M., Burgoon, B., van Elsas, E. J., & van de Werfhorst, H. G. (2017). Radical distinction: Support for radical left and radical right parties in Europe. *European Union Politics*, 18(4), 536-559.
- Rooduijn, M., & Pauwels, T. (2011). Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis. *West European Politics*, 34(6), 1272-1283.
- Rooduijn, M., Van Der Brug, W., & De Lange, S. L. (2017). Expressing or fuelling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent. *Electoral Studies*, 43, 32-40.
- Routledge, C., Arndt, J., Sedikides, C., & Wildschut, T. (2008). A blast from the past: The terror management function of nostalgia. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 44(1), 132-140.
- Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2014). The responses of populism to Dahl's democratic dilemmas. *Political Studies*, 62(3), 470-487.
- Rustow, R. (1994). Turkish Democracy in Historical and Comparative Perspective. In M. Heper & A. Evin (Eds.). *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Sabah (2015). AK Parti grup toplantılarına randevu sistemi geliyor. Retrieved from: <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/12/14/ak-parti-grup-toplantilarina-randevu-sistemi-geliyor>.
- Salomon, R. C. (1994). One hundred years of resentment: Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, in R. Schacht (Ed.), *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Salter, L. (2016). Populism as a fantasmatic rupture in the post-political order: integrating Laclau with Glynos and Stavrakakis. *Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online*, 11(2), 116-132.

- Savage, R. (2012). From McCarthyism to the Tea Party: Interpreting Anti-Leftist Forms of US Populism in Comparative Perspective. *New Political Science*, 34(4), 564-584.
- Scanlon, C. (2014). Is Shinzo Abe fanning nationalist flames?. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26542992>.
- Schmitt, C. (2007). *The Concept of the Political*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schmidt, F. (2017). Drivers of populism: A four-country comparison of party communication in the run-up to the 2014 European parliament elections. *Political studies*, 66(2), 459-479.
- Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2017). Measuring populist attitudes on three dimensions. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 30(2), 316-326.
- Scruton, R. (2006). *A Political Philosophy: Arguments for Conservatism*. London: Continuum.
- Searle-White, J. (2001). *The psychology of nationalism*. London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Shaw, S. J., & Shaw, E. K. (1977). *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume 2, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975* (Vol. 11). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., Cheung, W. Y., Routledge, C., Hepper, E. G., Arndt, J., ... & Vingerhoets, A. J. (2016). Nostalgia fosters self-continuity: Uncovering the mechanism (social connectedness) and consequence (eudaimonic well-being). *Emotion*, 16(4), 524.
- Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., Routledge, C., & Arndt, J. (2015). Nostalgia counteracts self-discontinuity and restores self-continuity. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 45(1), 52-61.
- Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., Arndt, J., & Routledge, C. (2008a). Nostalgia: Past, Present, and Future. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 17(5), 304-307.
- Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., Gaertner, L., Routledge, C., & Arndt, J. (2008b). Nostalgia as Enabler of Self-continuity. In Fabio Sani (Ed.), *Self-Continuity: Individual and Collective Perspectives*. New York & Hove: Psychology Press.
- Selçuk, O. (2016). Strong presidents and weak institutions: populism in Turkey, Venezuela and Ecuador. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 1-19. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1242893.
- Sinanoğlu, S. (2017). Parti Ebed Müddet: Bir Siyaset Teknolojisi Olarak Yeni Osmanlıcı TRT Dizileri. <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel-yazilar/8236/parti-ebed-muddet-bir-siyaset-teknolojisi-olarak-yeni-osmanlici-trt-dizileri#.XAcsW2hKjIU>.
- Smith, H. (2019). Angela Merkel on 'victory tour' visit to Athens. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/10/angela-merkel-on-victory-tour-visit-to-athens>.
- Somer, M. (2019). Turkey: The Slippery Slope from Reformist to Revolutionary Polarization and Democratic Breakdown. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681(1), 42-61.

- Somer, M. (2017). Conquering versus democratizing the state: political Islamists and fourth wave democratization in Turkey and Tunisia. *Democratization*, 24(6), 1025-1043.
- Somer, M. (2016). Understanding Turkey's democratic breakdown: old vs. new and indigenous vs. global authoritarianism. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(4), 481-503.
- Somer, M., & McCoy, J. (2019). Transformations through Polarizations and Global Threats to Democracy. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681(1), 8–22
- Smeeke, A. (2015). National nostalgia: A group-based emotion that benefits the in-group but hampers intergroup relations. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 49, 54-67.
- Smeeke, A., & Verkuyten, M. (2015). The presence of the past: Identity continuity and group dynamics. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 26(1), 162-202.
- Smeeke, A., & Verkuyten, M. (2013). Collective self-continuity, group identification and in-group defense. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 49(6), 984-994.
- Smeeke, A., Verkuyten, M., & Martinovic, B. (2015). Longing for the country's good old days: National nostalgia, autochthony beliefs, and opposition to Muslim expressive rights. *Br J Soc Psychol*, 54(3), 561-580.
- Spruyt, B., Keppens, G., & Van Droogenbroeck, F. (2016). Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to It? *Political Research Quarterly*, 69(2), 335-346.
- Stanley, B. (2019). A new populist divide? Correspondences of supply and demand in the 2015 Polish parliamentary elections. *East European Politics and Societies*, 33(1), 17-43.
- Stanley, B. (2011). Populism, nationalism, or national populism? An analysis of Slovak voting behaviour at the 2010 parliamentary election. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 44(4), 257-270.
- Stanley, B. (2008). The thin ideology of populism. *Journal of political ideologies*, 13(1), 95-110.
- Stauth, G., & Turner, B. S. (1988). *Nietzsche's Dance: Resentment, Reciprocity and Resistance in Social Life*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2014). Left-wing populism in the European periphery: the case of SYRIZA. *Journal of political ideologies*, 19(2), 119-142.
- Stavrakakis, Y., Katsambekis, G., Nikisianis, N., Kioupkiolis, A., & Siomos, T. (2017). Extreme right-wing populism in Europe: revisiting a reified association. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 14(4), 420-439.
- Steenvoorden, E., & Harteveld, E. (2018). The appeal of nostalgia: the influence of societal pessimism on support for populist radical right parties. *West European Politics*, 41(1), 28-52.
- Sullivan, A. (2017). The Reactionary Temptation. NYMAG. Retrieved from: <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/04/andrew-sullivan-why-the-reactionary-right-must-be-taken-seriously.html>.

- Sunar, İ. (1990). Populism and patronage: The Demokrat Party and its legacy in Turkey. *Il Politico*, 745-757.
- Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(3), 755-769.
- Taggart, P. (2004). Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), 269-288.
- Taggart, P. (1998). A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems. *European Journal of Political Research*, 33(3), 363-388.
- Taggart, P. (1995). New populist parties in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 18(1), 34-51.
- Tajfel, H. (1982). Introduction. In H. Tajfel (Ed.) *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tannock, S. (1995). Nostalgia critique. *Cultural Studies*, 9(3), 453-464.
- Taşkın, Y. (2015). *Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına Milliyetçi Muhafazakar Entelijansiya*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınevi.
- Taşkın, Y. (2013). Hegemonizing Conservative Democracy and the Problems of Democratization in Turkey: Conservatism Without Democrats?. *Turkish Studies*, 14(2), 292-310.
- Taşkın, Y. (2012). The Conservative Populist Misrepresentation of Turgut Özal: Seeking Legitimacy for the Conservative Elite. *International Journal Turkish Studies*, 18(1), 63-80.
- Tekdemir, Ö. (2016). Conflict and reconciliation between Turks and Kurds: the HDP as an agonistic actor, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(4), 651-669.
- Toprak, Z. (2013). *Türkiye'de Popülizm*. Istanbul: Doğan Kitap.
- Torio, L. (2017). Abe's Japan Is a Racist, Patriarchal Dream. Retrieved from: <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/03/abe-nippon-kaigi-japan-far-right>.
- Tuğal, C. (2012). Fight or acquiesce? Religion and political process in Turkey's and Egypt's neoliberalizations. *Development and Change*, 43(1), 23-51.
- Tuğal, C. (2009). *Passive revolution: Absorbing the Islamic challenge to capitalism*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Türk, H. B. (2018). 'Populism as a medium of mass mobilization': The case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *International Area Studies Review*, 21(2), 150-168.
- Türk, H. B. (2014). *Muktedir: Türk Sağ Geleneği ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*. Istanbul: İletişim.
- Van Elsas, E. J., Hakhverdian, A., & Van der Brug, W. (2016). United against a common foe? The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens. *West European Politics*, 39(6), 1181-1204.
- Van Hauwaert, S. M., & Van Kessel, S. (2018). Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support. *European Journal of Political Research*, 57(1), 68-92.

- Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. *Comparative Politics*, 34(1), 1-22.
- White, M. (2017). *processr: R Implementation of the PROCESS Macro*. R package version 0.0.0.9000.
- Wickham, H. (2016). *ggplot2: Elegant Graphics for Data Analysis*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Wildschut, T., Bruder, M., Robertson, S., van Tilburg, W. A., & Sedikides, C. (2014). Collective nostalgia: A group-level emotion that confers unique benefits on the group. *J Pers Soc Psychol*, 107(5), 844-863.
- Wiles, P. (1969). "A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism," in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (eds) *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*. New York: Macmillan.
- Wimmer, R. D., & Dominick, J. R. (2013). *Mass media research*. Cengage learning.
- Wirth, W., Esser, F., Wettstein, M., Engesser, S., Wirz, D., Schulz, A., & Schemer, C. (2016). The appeal of populist ideas, strategies and styles: A theoretical model and research design for analyzing populist political communication. *Zurich: NCCR Working Paper*, 88.
- Wodak, R. (2017). The "Establishment", the "Élites", and the "People". *Journal of Language and Politics*, 16(4), 551-565.
- Vasilopoulou, S., Halikiopoulou, D. and Exadaktylos, T. (2014). Greece in crisis: austerity, populism and the politics of blame. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(2), 388-402.
- Verovšek, P. J. (2016). Collective memory, politics, and the influence of the past: the politics of memory as a research paradigm. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 4(3), 529-543.
- Yabancı, B. (2016). Populism as the problem child of democracy: the AKP's enduring appeal and the use of meso-level actors. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(4), 591-617.
- Yabancı, B., & Taleski, D. (2018). Co-opting religion: how ruling populists in Turkey and Macedonia sacralise the majority. *Religion, State & Society*, 46(3), 283-304.
- Yavuz, M. H. (1998). Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism. *Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East*, 7(12), 19-41.
- Yeni Akit (2018). Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: İkinci bir Kurtuluş Savaşı veriyoruz. Retrieved from: <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ikinci-bir-kurtulus-savasi-veriyoruz-468381.html>.
- Yetkin, M. (2017). Ve Erdoğan Atatürk'ü övüyorsa. Retrieved from: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/murat-yetkin/ve-erdogan-aturku-ovuyorsa-40642932>.
- Yılmaz, I. (2018). Islamic Populism and Creating Desirable Citizens in Erdogan's New Turkey. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 29(4), 52-76.

Yilmaz, Z. (2017). The AKP and the spirit of the ‘new’Turkey: Imagined victim, reactionary mood, and resentful sovereign. *Turkish Studies*, 18(3), 482-513.

Yilmaz, Z. (2015). “Strengthening the Family” Policies in Turkey: Managing the Social Question and Armoring Conservative–Neoliberal Populism. *Turkish Studies*, 16(3), 371-390.

Zizek, S. (2009). *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London & New York: Verso.



APPENDIX

Appendix A

Year	Leader		Total	Total (%)
	Erdogan	Kilicdaroglu		
2011	5	5	10	3.25
2012	22	20	42	13.64
2013	27	20	47	15.26
2014	14	18	32	10.39
2015	17	12	29	9.42
2016	17	33	50	16.23
2017	13	31	44	14.29
2018	24	30	54	17.53
Total	139	169	308	100
Total (%)	45.13	54.87	100	

Table A.1: Distribution of the texts.

Appendix B

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism	Populism
Nostalgia	0.261*** (0.0326)	0.263*** (0.0325)	0.262*** (0.0327)	0.261*** (0.0326)	0.261*** (0.0326)	0.257*** (0.0327)	0.259*** (0.0327)	0.257*** (0.0328)	0.257*** (0.0328)	0.257*** (0.0328)
(Log)income	0.326 (0.371)	0.331 (0.367)	0.333 (0.370)	0.300 (0.368)	0.320 (0.371)	0.250 (0.402)	0.266 (0.401)	0.238 (0.399)	0.241 (0.400)	0.237 (0.402)
Female	0.900 (1.165)	0.994 (1.164)	0.953 (1.162)	0.722 (1.159)	0.874 (1.165)	0.442 (1.186)	0.483 (1.189)	0.375 (1.186)	0.367 (1.179)	0.405 (1.186)
Metropol	1.672 (1.186)	1.979+ (1.196)	1.692 (1.190)	1.702 (1.182)	1.652 (1.187)	2.309+ (1.208)	2.387+ (1.218)	2.312+ (1.208)	2.307+ (1.206)	2.299+ (1.207)
Education	0.730 (0.582)	0.888 (0.577)	0.778 (0.592)	0.686 (0.576)	0.725 (0.582)	0.665 (0.586)	0.719 (0.584)	0.610 (0.599)	0.639 (0.582)	0.663 (0.584)
Age	0.213 (0.206)	0.180 (0.209)	0.216 (0.206)	0.236 (0.206)	0.221 (0.207)	0.263 (0.210)	0.244 (0.212)	0.264 (0.210)	0.274 (0.211)	0.278 (0.212)
Age ²	-0.00302 (0.00218)	-0.00263 (0.00221)	-0.00299 (0.00218)	-0.00331 (0.00218)	-0.00309 (0.00219)	-0.00341 (0.00221)	-0.00320 (0.00224)	-0.00348 (0.00223)	-0.00355 (0.00223)	-0.00355 (0.00223)
Religiosity	1.202*** (0.273)	1.131*** (0.279)	1.175*** (0.282)	1.156*** (0.275)	1.210*** (0.273)	0.928*** (0.290)	0.916*** (0.291)	0.953*** (0.294)	0.912*** (0.290)	0.936*** (0.289)
Alevi	-1.650 (1.610)	-1.326 (1.603)	-1.539 (1.647)	-1.800 (1.608)	-1.731 (1.616)	-1.386 (1.612)	-1.352 (1.609)	-1.468 (1.629)	-1.469 (1.613)	-1.468 (1.616)
Kurdish	-2.126 (1.826)	-1.850 (1.845)	-2.245 (1.845)	-2.432 (1.835)	-2.641 (2.025)	-1.491 (1.877)	-1.399 (1.885)	-1.326 (1.912)	-1.636 (1.890)	-2.271 (2.064)
EU Support	-1.293* (0.610)	-1.065+ (0.608)	-1.240* (0.617)	-1.313* (0.610)	-1.305* (0.610)	-1.125+ (0.626)	-1.075+ (0.624)	-1.166+ (0.628)	-1.142+ (0.628)	-1.126+ (0.626)
Trust	0.713 (1.543)	0.0962 (1.581)	0.619 (1.565)	0.641 (1.536)	0.722 (1.538)	-0.0923 (1.636)	-0.229 (1.645)	-0.0441 (1.643)	-0.0949 (1.629)	-0.138 (1.627)
Life Sat.						0.687*** (0.252)	0.676*** (0.254)	0.688*** (0.253)	0.685*** (0.252)	0.685*** (0.251)

Dem. Sat.						0.00615 (0.230)	-0.0576 (0.244)	0.0384 (0.234)	-0.00603 (0.230)	0.0347 (0.231)
Econ. Sat.						0.296 (0.267)	0.267 (0.268)	0.318 (0.269)	0.290 (0.268)	0.304 (0.268)
AKP		2.612* (1.197)						1.144 (1.360)		
CHP			-0.849 (1.680)					1.033 (1.808)		
MHP				-2.900 (1.813)					-1.296 (1.866)	
HDP					2.803 (3.680)					4.223 (3.786)
Constant	32.44*** (6.495)	31.55*** (6.466)	32.36*** (6.489)	33.15*** (6.474)	32.29*** (6.507)	28.92*** (6.579)	28.95*** (6.587)	28.77*** (6.604)	29.32*** (6.568)	28.53*** (6.595)
<i>N</i>	1273	1273	1273	1273	1273	1208	1208	1208	1208	1208
<i>R</i> ²	0.124	0.128	0.124	0.126	0.124	0.142	0.143	0.142	0.142	0.143

Table B.1: OLS Analysis with unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Poststratification weights are applied. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Nationalism	Nationalism	Nationalism	Nationalism	Nationalism
Nostalgia	-0.0000645 (-0.07)	-0.0000709 (-0.08)	-0.0000673 (-0.08)	-0.0000984 (-0.11)	-0.0000485 (-0.06)
(Log)income	-0.00140 (-0.10)	-0.00136 (-0.10)	-0.00147 (-0.10)	0.000769 (0.06)	-0.00124 (-0.09)
Female	-0.0466 (-1.38)	-0.0470 (-1.41)	-0.0471 (-1.38)	-0.0381 (-1.13)	-0.0448 (-1.34)
Metropol	0.0272 (0.69)	0.0261 (0.66)	0.0270 (0.68)	0.0251 (0.63)	0.0280 (0.71)
Education	-0.0168 (-0.96)	-0.0175 (-0.96)	-0.0174 (-0.97)	-0.0148 (-0.84)	-0.0170 (-0.97)
Age	0.00721 (1.18)	0.00738 (1.22)	0.00719 (1.18)	0.00599 (0.97)	0.00678 (1.12)
Age ²	-0.0000841 (-1.28)	-0.0000861 (-1.33)	-0.0000845 (-1.28)	-0.0000684 (-1.04)	-0.0000801 (-1.23)
Religiosity	0.0209* (2.43)	0.0212* (2.40)	0.0212* (2.53)	0.0232*** (2.71)	0.0206* (2.39)
Alevi	-0.0139 (-0.27)	-0.0154 (-0.30)	-0.0153 (-0.29)	-0.00543 (-0.11)	-0.00980 (-0.19)
Kurdish	0.00980 (0.13)	0.00863 (0.11)	0.0111 (0.15)	0.0264 (0.35)	0.0384 (0.44)
EU Support	-0.0456* (-2.46)	-0.0464* (-2.52)	-0.0462* (-2.39)	-0.0440* (-2.38)	-0.0452* (-2.44)
Trust	-0.0355 (-0.61)	-0.0333 (-0.58)	-0.0345 (-0.59)	-0.0319 (-0.54)	-0.0339 (-0.58)
AKP		-0.0104 (-0.26)			
CHP			0.00981 (0.22)		
MHP				0.154* (2.17)	
HDP					-0.146+ (-1.75)
Constant	0.00965 (0.05)	0.0123 (0.06)	0.0104 (0.05)	-0.0281 (-0.14)	0.0189 (0.09)
<i>N</i>	1395	1395	1395	1395	1395
<i>R</i> ²	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.024	0.020

Table B.2: OLS Analysis with unstandardized coefficients (DV: Nationalism). Standard errors in parentheses. Poststratification weights are applied. ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Nationalism	Nationalism	Nationalism	Nationalism	Nationalism
Nostalgia	-0.00438 (0.00481)	-0.00448 (0.00481)	-0.00446 (0.00482)	-0.00458 (0.00480)	-0.00432 (0.00482)
(Log)income	-0.0753 (0.0736)	-0.0740 (0.0728)	-0.0775 (0.0730)	-0.0667 (0.0718)	-0.0745 (0.0738)
Female	-0.144 (0.188)	-0.148 (0.187)	-0.158 (0.189)	-0.115 (0.190)	-0.138 (0.188)
Metropol	0.210 (0.208)	0.196 (0.210)	0.199 (0.209)	0.209 (0.208)	0.215 (0.209)
Education	-0.0549 (0.0940)	-0.0644 (0.0965)	-0.0717 (0.0963)	-0.0497 (0.0950)	-0.0575 (0.0942)
Age	0.0185 (0.0398)	0.0201 (0.0402)	0.0167 (0.0396)	0.0146 (0.0399)	0.0173 (0.0396)
Age ²	-0.000296 (0.000447)	-0.000314 (0.000453)	-0.000293 (0.000449)	-0.000244 (0.000447)	-0.000286 (0.000445)
Religiosity	0.145 ^{***} (0.0520)	0.148 ^{***} (0.0522)	0.153 ^{***} (0.0516)	0.154 ^{***} (0.0523)	0.144 ^{***} (0.0523)
Alevi	-0.0731 (0.281)	-0.0927 (0.277)	-0.118 (0.283)	-0.0444 (0.282)	-0.0603 (0.282)
Kurdish	-0.259 (0.352)	-0.277 (0.362)	-0.221 (0.356)	-0.199 (0.354)	-0.150 (0.369)
EU Support	-0.291 ^{***} (0.0971)	-0.301 ^{***} (0.0973)	-0.311 ^{***} (0.103)	-0.286 ^{***} (0.0973)	-0.289 ^{***} (0.0973)
Trust	-0.526 (0.322)	-0.499 (0.325)	-0.498 (0.326)	-0.509 (0.323)	-0.516 (0.323)
AKP		-0.140 (0.202)			
CHP			0.325 (0.284)		
MHP				0.481 ⁺ (0.273)	
HDP					-0.746 (0.881)
Constant	-1.912 (1.174)	-1.863 (1.171)	-1.865 (1.166)	-2.064 ⁺ (1.164)	-1.880 (1.173)
<i>N</i>	1395	1395	1395	1395	1395
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.038	0.038	0.039	0.041	0.039

Table B.3: Logistic regression analysis (DV: Nationalism). Standard errors in parentheses. Poststratification weights are applied. ⁺ $p < 0.1$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.01$.

Appendix C

DV: Nostalgia	Model 1 No Interaction	Model 2 AKP Interaction	Model 3 CHP Interaction
(Intercept)	65.95 *** (1.29)	67.61 *** (1.47)	64.76 *** (1.57)
Ottoman	-0.12 (1.87)	-3.49 (2.14)	5.34 * (2.36)
Kemalist	4.73 ** (1.82)	4.59 * (2.06)	5.08 * (2.25)
AKP		-6.79 * (2.97)	
Ottoman*AKP		13.85 ** (4.34)	
Kemalist*AKP		-0.39 (4.33)	
CHP			3.47 (2.68)
Ottoman*CHP			-13.87 *** (3.84)
Kemalist*CHP			-1.15 (3.78)
N	790	790	790
R ²	0.01	0.03	0.03

Table C.1: Regression analyses of average treatment effects on nostalgia. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

DV: Populism	Model 1 No Interaction	Model 2 AKP Interaction	Model 3 CHP Interaction
(Intercept)	68.56 *** (1.18)	73.35 *** (1.23)	65.56 *** (1.44)
Ottoman	3.66 * (1.73)	3.54 * (1.79)	3.38 (2.17)
Kemalist	2.96 + (1.68)	2.74 (1.73)	3.28 (2.06)
AKP		-19.53 *** (2.48)	
Ottoman*AKP		-0.58 (3.67)	
Kemalist*AKP		-1.73 (3.61)	
CHP			8.57 *** (2.44)
Ottoman*CHP			-0.65 (3.51)
Kemalist*CHP			-1.18 (3.45)
N	788	788	788
R ²	0.01	0.19	0.04

Table C.2: Regression analyses of average treatment effects on populism. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.1$.