Government Fragmentation and Intrastate Conflict Termination: How Fragmentation
Reduces the Chances of Negotiated Settlements

by

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DEDICATION

I dedicate my thesis to my dear family and friends who supported me for two years. I thank my mother and father Gulnur Onder and Kursat Onder who provided me moral support throughout my life. I would like to thank my friends and colleagues Efe Can Coban, Alper Gencer and Ipek Cinar for their constant support.

ABSTRACT

Government Fragmentation and Intrastate Conflict Termination: How Fragmentation
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Main purpose of this thesis is to develop and test hypotheses about the factors that make
it difficult to reach a negotiated settlement that terminates the intrastate conflicts. The
theoretical question on how characteristics of governments affect the termination of
intrastate conflicts remains relatively unexplored. This thesis makes contribution to the
literature by presenting a framework explains intrastate conflict termination (or lack of
it) as a result of the information and credibility problems exacerbated by government
fragmentation. This framework reasons that government fragmentation (conceptualized
as the abundance of factions within the government and the internal incoherence of
each faction) decreases the likelihood of intrastate conflict termination. I test my
hypotheses on a Large-N time-series dataset of 503 rebel groups in 108 countries from
1946 to 2014. Empirical analysis shows that intrastate conflicts are less likely to
terminate when the level of government fragmentation is high.

ÖZETÇE

Hükümet İçi Ayrılıklar ve İç Savaşları Sonlandırmak: Hükümet İçi Ayrılıklar İç
Savaşların Müzakere ile Sonlandırılma Şansını Nasıl Azaltır

Ilayda Bilge Onder

Uluslararası İlişkiler, Yüksek Lisans

4 Haziran 2019

Bu tezin birincil amacı iç savaşların müzakere ile sonlandırılma şansını azaltan faktörler
üzerine hipotezler geliştirip bu hipotezleri test etmektir. Farklı hükümetlerin
karakteristik özelliklerinin iç savaşların sona ermesi üzerine nasıl bir etkiye sahip
olduğuna dair teorik sorular literatürde yeterince çalışılmamıştır. Bu tez literatüre katkı
yapmak için iç savaşların çözümünü (ya da çözülememesini) hükümet içi ayrılıklardan
kaynaklanan bilgi ve güvenilirlik problemler üzerinden açıklayan bir teorik çerçeve
geliştirmektedir. Bu teorik çerçeveye göre, hükümet içi ayrılıklar (hükümetin içinde
birden fazla hizbin bulunması ve bu hiziplerin kendi içlerinde de ayrılıklar yaşaması) iç
savaşların çözümlenmesini zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu tez, bu hipotezleri 1946 ile 2014
yılları arasında 108 ülkede aktif olmuş 503 silahlı grup üzerinde test etmektedir.
Ampirik testler, hükümet içi ayrılıkların yoğun olduğu durumlarda iç savaşların
çözümlenme olasılığının daha düşük olduğunu göstermektedir.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Intrastate conflicts substantially vary in their duration. While 25% of intrastate conflicts terminate within only eight months, 25% of them last more than five years, and 8% of them continue more than two decades (Cunningham 2006). Although majority of such intrastate conflicts terminate in a very short period of them, a substantial percent of them prolong for several years. Such drastic statistical differences between the short-lived and prolonged intrastate conflicts have attracted scholarly attention on the factors that facilitate or prevent conflict termination.

Conflict termination and the factors that influence termination attracts the attention of Political Science and International Relations scholars for several reasons. First, the costs of intrastate conflicts are positively correlated with the length of such conflicts. Data on battle-related deaths in intrastate conflicts reveal that conflicts that terminate within two years cause 3000 casualties on average while conflicts that last more than two years cause 44000 deaths on average (Cunningham 2006). Second, conflicts that last longer tend to increase the government spending on militarization which otherwise can be allocated to public spending and human development. Third, prolonged interstate conflicts tend to trigger other political problems such as high levels of polarization among the citizenry or the rise of authoritarian politics. Thus, understanding

the factors that facilitate quick termination of intrastate conflicts is significant in order to develop more effective responses that minimize the human costs in intrastate conflicts.

Despite all the political, human and material costs an intrastate conflict raises, conflicting sides are likely to be reluctant to end it. It is well established in the conflict literature that intrastate conflicts last much longer than inter-state militarized disputes (Cunningham 2006). The reason for this difference in duration might be due to several reasons. For example, intrastate conflicts differ from inter-state wars in that their sides reside within the same borders, and thus defeat could mean cease of existence. The fact that existential stakes are high makes compromise in intrastate conflicts more difficult to make (DeRouen and Sobek 2004), and lack of compromise makes it harder to terminate intrastate conflicts. This study seeks to explain conflict termination by addressing a specific phenomenon that make it very difficult to reach a negotiated deal through conflict resolution attempts: fragmentation within the government. As it will be explained in detail in the theory and hypothesis sections, government fragmentation poses difficulty for conflict termination because it exacerbates information and credibility problems that we know to be associated with failures in negotiations.

Government fragmentation (i.e. factionalization within government) may exacerbate information and credibility problems between several actors involved in intrastate conflicts: between government and the rebels, between two different branches of the government, between government and the public, between government and the military. Information and credibility problems between each of these actor dyads are likely to inhibit negotiated settlements to conflict, but through radically different channels. For the theoretical purposes of this study, I only focus on the information and credibility problems between government and rebels; and explain how these problems are exacerbated by the fragmentation within the government. I limit my focus for two

reasons. First, scholarly studies on the link between internal security threats and political actors mostly study how the internal security environment affects the behavior of political actors. For example, there are several studies exploring how governments or opposition parties react to the political difficulties posed by prolonged intrastate conflicts or rising levels of political violence. However, the theoretical question on how characteristics of political actors and governments affect the onset, prolongation, and resolution of intrastate conflicts remains relatively unexplored. A handful of studies that explore how characteristics of governments affect intrastate conflicts mostly present arguments related to regime type using the Polity IV indicator as the independent variable (Collier et al. 2004; Fearon 2004; Cunningham et al. 2009). However, these studies find inconsistent results about whether or not democracy prolongs intrastate conflicts. Similarly, studies focusing on other domestic variables or conflict-level variables like ethnic fractionalization or severity of violence find inconsistent results. For instance, Regan (2002) finds that intrastate conflicts that experience severe violence tend to last longer whereas Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) find exactly the opposite result. These inconsistencies in previous findings suggest that there are additional domestic factors that are influential in the intrastate conflict termination.

Second, scholarly studies focusing on the impact of actor fragmentation in intrastate conflicts mostly study rebel fragmentation whereas they treat the government side as a relatively unitary actor. Cunningham (2006) finds that civil war duration tends to be longer in intrastate conflicts characterized by the competition of various rebel groups. However, his study does not fully address the various factions that might be present in the government side. The unitary government assumption is made for parsimony, but likely to be empirically incorrect.

In this study, I go beyond the unitary government assumption. By diverting my attention to the fragmentation in the government, I present a framework that explains conflict termination (or lack of it) as a result of the information and credibility problems exacerbated by government fragmentation.

Chapter 2

WHAT FACILITATES TERMINATION OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT

Existing studies on intrastate conflict termination in the literature can be classified into four general categories: (1) economic approaches that focus on the costs of war, (2) informational approaches that focus on the demands of the two conflicting parties in the negotiations, (3) commitment approaches that focus on the credibility of conflicting parties in terms of commitment to the provisions of a negotiated settlement (Cunningham 2006), and (4) institutional approaches that focus on the characteristics of domestic institutional structures.

Economic approaches tend to evaluate the failure to terminate intrastate conflicts as a result of the conflicting parties' perceptions that war is less costly than settlement (Keen 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 2005; Scokpol 1979). Scholars in this body of literature focus on the famous 'greed vs. grievance' discussion (Cederman et al. 2011; Gurr 1970; Ostby 2008) and argue that greed is the main factor that drives the continuation of war. Accordingly, conflicting sides pursue armed confrontation in order to rip economic benefits; and continue doing so as long as war generate economic benefits such as extraction of valuable natural resources. Thus, this body of literature argue that conflict termination is not likely unless peace promises more economic benefit than war does.

Informational approaches primarily argue that once conflicting parties acquire accurate information about their battling capacities and true preferences, they revise their demands in negotiations and may terminate the conflict as a result (Smith and Stam 2004). Scholars in this body of research argue that a certain amount of wartime is needed to reveal accurate information about the capacities and preferences of each side. Conflict termination becomes possible only when sufficient information is revealed. Thus, termination is conditioned on the level of informational ambiguities and how clearly the course of the conflict reveals information.

Commitment theories consider the failure to terminate intrastate conflicts as a direct outcome of failure to uphold the terms of a bilateral agreement (Fearon 2004). Scholars in this body of research argue that the uncertainties that surround post-war settlements prevent battling sides to credibly commit to the terms of agreements. This body of literature cites that third-party enforces to the peace agreements increase the likelihood of credible commitment, and intrastate conflicts that lack such third-party international enforcement is not likely to terminate.

Institutional approaches highlight the role of domestic institutional structures in facilitating or inhibiting conflict termination. Some explanations developed within this body of research revolve around the argument that financially and politically weak governments make armed rebellion more attractive to rebels for resource extraction (Mason, Weingarten & Fett 1999; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Snyder 2006). In the sense that the arguments regard resource extraction as the main motivation behind the decision to continue fighting, they share similarities with the economic approaches. However, there are other arguments within this body of research that discuss the impact of state capacity to a larger extent. Goodwin

and Skocpol (1989) conceptualize state capacity as a function of democracy, bureaucratic effectiveness, and the size of the military. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) put forward that these high levels of democracy, effective bureaucracy and large military increase the chances of conflict termination, because democracies are better equipped to deal with political grievances, and effective bureaucracy and military equip the state with better tools to defeat the rebels.

The existing literature on conflict termination summarized above present valuable ideas that give insight to how conflicts terminate or why they fail to terminate. Still, there are some gaps in the literature that needs to be addressed. First, in the literature that employ economic approaches, there is little discussion on how external state support to one of the conflicting parties alter the costs of war. Economic approaches put forward that conflicting sides pursue armed confrontation in order to rip economic benefits but fail to address how third-party support can facilitate or prevent ripping economic benefits. DeRouen and Sobek (2004), in their study on factors that determine civil war duration and outcome, find that UN intervention decreases the likelihood of government military victory and rebel military victory whereas it increases the likelihood of peace agreements. Their findings underpin that external intervention is likely to alter the battling capacities of each side; and affect the time and mode of conflict termination. However, they focused on UN interventions which are theoretically neutral. In reality, many intrastate conflicts attract third-party intervention that actively support on the sides in the conflict. For example, external support acquired by the government side at the later stages of the conflict may increase the costs of war for the rebel side, prevent them from continue ripping benefits from war, and increase the likelihood of

government victory. Therefore, external interventions that are not neutral in their character needs to be addressed as well.

Second, informational approaches argue that government side and rebel side in intrastate conflicts hide information from each other, but they assume that governments and rebels are unitary actors. In reality, both governments and rebels are often internally fragmented actors within which there are several factions. The presence of factions within government and also within rebels increase informational ambiguities even more, because, theoretically, each faction within the government or within the rebel group may hide information from each other. Moreover, such factions may weaken the state capacity or rebels' fighting capacity, and significantly affect the course of war. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) find that strong state bureaucracy undermines the fighting capacity of rebels and decreases the likelihood of conflict termination by rebel victory. However, their findings also show that strong state does not directly lead to government victory over the rebels. A number of studies acknowledge that rebel movements are not unitary actors and examine how rebel fragmentation influences the course of intrastate conflict (Cunningham 2006; Findley and Rudolf 2012; Atlas and Licklider 1999; Bapat and Bond 2012; Cunningham 2011; Cunningham 2012 et.al.; Nilsson 2008; 2010). Therefore, a broader perspective that account for the presence of internal factions within the government, and their impact on state capacity is needed in order to understand all potential ambiguities in intrastate conflicts.

Third, commitment approaches focus on why governments do not trust the credibility of rebels but fail to address other factors that may affect the level of commitment on the part of the governments. In the literature, there is little discussion on internal fragmentation affects the commitment of the government side.

Another gap in the literature is the relative minor attention directed to the outcomes of conflict termination. A conflict may terminate by resulting in different outcomes such as peace agreement, government military victory or rebel victory. Different conflict outcomes result in different post-war conditions. Although studies on post-war settlements are abundant, which factors related to conflict termination is more likely to result in peace agreement or military victory is relatively understudied.

In this study, I try to address these gaps identified above. First, by focusing on fragmentation in the government, I go beyond the unitary government assumption that dominates most of the studies within the domain of informational and commitment approaches. Second, by analyzing an institutional variable such as government fragmentation, I show that democracy and the state capacity are not the only domestic institutional variables that facilitates or inhibits conflict termination.

This article proceeds as follows. First, I explain how information and credibility problems may inhibit negotiated settlements to conflicts. Second, I introduce an overview of the veto player concept that has an important influence on the level of government fragmentation. Third, I explain how I conceptualize government fragmentation. Fourth, I elaborate on how fragmentation within the government exacerbates the information/credibility problems and make termination of intrastate conflicts harder to achieve. The central argument is that intrastate conflicts in countries with more fragmented civilian structures will be less likely to terminate. Following that, I provide empirical tests of this expectation on a set of intrastate conflicts using detailed data on the government fragmentation.

Chapter 3

INFORMATION AND CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS IN CONFLICTS

Theories regarding bargaining failures explain when negotiations to resolve armed conflicts are more likely to fail. Bargaining theories assume that, because fighting is costly for everyone, both sides would prefer a negotiated settlement to their dispute. That is to say that conflict termination is plausible if all actors to the dispute know with perfect information what the true objectives of each actor are, what each of them can achieve by fighting and if all the actors are able to credibly commit to the terms of a negotiated agreement in the future. In this bargaining framework, information problems arise with regard to information on the true objectives and fighting capacity of each actor whereas credibility problems arise with regard to the commitment of each actor to a potential negotiated agreement. With regard to the objectives, each actor is assumed to have an "ideal point" that is its preferred policy outcome (or specific clauses in a negotiated agreement). Each side to the conflict is motivated by a desire to reach its ideal point.

Whether either side will prefer fighting to settlement depends on its calculation of odds of reaching its ideal point through fighting. The point at which one side of the conflict will prefer settlement to fighting ("reversion point") is defined by its relative capabilities and

the costs of fighting. Since fighting is costly for all sides, negotiations should help finding a compromise that is acceptable by each actor.

The difficulty in reaching such compromise is that typically none of the actors to a conflict knows with certainty the ideal points and capabilities of other actors. In addition to initial uncertainty, each other has incentives to misrepresent its capability in order to strike a better deal during negotiations. These problems regarding uncertainty between actors are the information problems in conflicts.

Even if all actors to the conflict resolve their information problems and find a compromise, their concerns about whether each side will credibly commit to the terms of the settlement remain. Reaching a negotiated settlement does not automatically mean that one of the actors in the conflict will not try to repress the other in the future or relaunch its armed challenge later on. These problems regarding the possibility of not complying with the agreement to settle down are the commitment problems in conflicts.

The information and commitment problems may prevent conflict resolution through several channels. For example, the bargaining literature focusing on civil war underline the problem with "spoilers". Stedman (1997) defines spoilers as "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it" (p. 5). His further elaboration however contends that spoilers should be using violence in order to be classified as spoilers and his stress on the necessity of violent strategy is accepted by various scholars (Ayres 2006; Johnston 2010; Blaydes and De Maio 2010).

Stedman's view is challenged by various scholars who argue that spoiler actors may use both violent and non-violent means to spoil a peace process (Pearlman 2009; Newman

and Richmond 2006; Zahar 2008). Non-violent means employed by spoilers to undermine the process may include systematically refusing to negotiate, entering into negotiations to slow them down, refusing to demobilize and disarm or signing agreements that will be annulled later. Zahar (2008) makes a critical contribution by differentiating between inside and outside spoilers. Inside spoilers are those actors included in the peace process and outside spoilers are those who are left out either by their own choice or by the government. The typology developed by Zahar (2008) maintains that inside spoilers tend to use non-violent means whereas the outside spoilers are more likely to use violent means to sabotage the process.

These discussions are valuable with regard to my own study on the government fragmentation and how it exacerbates information and commitment problems. The fragmentation within the government has a potential to create inside spoilers that increase the commitment problems associated with governments lack of success in implement ting peace processes. For example, Columbian military actively sabotaged the peace efforts initiated by the governments and the presidents without once attempting a coup d'etat. Rather, military has continuously increased its institutional autonomy and political influence over the civilian authority, and created an environment in which any political initiative taken for resolving FARC conflict that didn't acquire military's support is destined to fail. (Art and Richardson 2007).

Similarly, in late 1970s, Spanish government decided to abandon the previously military-oriented counterterrorism approach to Basque conflict. Attempts to de-militarize counterterrorism strategies against ETA, and to adopt a police-oriented approach supported by political initiatives faced resistance from the military (Art and Richardson 2007). In 1979,

in the wake of escalating violence from ETA, Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez had to replace the minister of interior with an army general. Although, that change lasted for only one week, military's competitive approach toward civilian government's de-militarized counterterrorism strategies did not immediate end. In February 1981, an unsuccessful coup d'etat attempt occurred. In response, government allowed four army companies to operate in Basque region in order to appease military's discontent.

On the other hand, in the early 1970s, the British military realized that despite the asymmetry in military power, it could not defeat IRA militarily. British General J.M. Glover, commander of the forces in Northern Ireland, wrote a top-secret report to the government insisting that the IRA could not be defeated militarily, the IRA campaign would not end unless British military exists the province, failure to defeat the IRA on the battle ground hurts the military's public image and, it is strategically faulty to rely on purely military means when confronting the Northern Ireland problem (Art and Richardson 2007). In British case, military's strategic calculations about the impossibility of a military success facilitated its opinion, which favors the initiation of a peace-process. In such cases like the Columbian case, the military's reaction causes high levels of commitment problem and effectively spoils government attempts to terminate the civil conflict with a negotiated settlement whereas in other cases like the British case, the government is not fragmented with regard to the civil conflict.

Chapter 4

VETO PLAYER CONCEPT

Tsebelis (1995) defines veto players as "individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo" (p. 301) and states that "potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players), and lack of internal cohesiveness of each veto player" (p. 289). Here the status quo refers to any sustained position of the state taken with regard to a particular issue area. The continuation of the status quo refers to a policy stability regarding that specific issue, and change in the status quo refers to policy change regarding that issue.

Tsebelis (2002) differentiates between 'institutional' veto players and 'partisan' veto players. Institutional veto players are legal/formal actors or institutions whose roles are defined in the constitution of a country. Tsebelis's definition of veto player includes only those "actors whose agreement is required for a policy change" (p. 301). Therefore, in order to identify institutional veto players, one has to determine which actors must accept a policy change according to the constitution, in order for it to become legalized. Institutional veto players include parliamentary chambers (if they are entitled by the constitution as a law-making authority), the presidents in the presidential systems, or the military (if the country's constitution puts forward an oligarchic military junta of some kind). On the other hand, partisan veto players emerge as a result of politics. One should pay attention to the allocation

of power within the institutional veto players in order to approximate the probability of a change in the status quo (Zohlnhöfer 2009). For example, rather than treating the parliament as a single veto player, one should treat the political party or parties which make up the majority within the parliament as separate partisan veto players. In a single party government, the governing party should be treated as a partisan veto player; since it controls the majority of the parliament, its agreement is sufficient to enact a policy change that will alter the status quo. In a coalition government, all coalition partners should be treated as separate partisan veto players, since they all have to agree on a policy change in order for it to be accepted in parliament. In semi-democracies, emergence and maneuvers of veto players are much more complex because of the extra-political actors. In semi-democracies where civilian politics is fragile, extra-political actors, especially the military, often emerge as a notable veto actor, calling the last shots.

According to Tsebelis (1995), three qualities of a veto player pattern affect the opportunity for policy change that will alter the status quo. The first is the number of veto players; as the number of veto players increases, the number of preferences regarding which policy option to adopt increases. Fractionalization of the preferences makes it harder to adopt policies that will change the status quo. The second quality is the congruence between the ideological positions of different veto players. As the ideological gap between veto players increases, the congruence decreases, and bargaining range of acceptable agreements between veto players becomes considerably smaller; therefore, the possibility of change in the status quo decreases. The third quality is the veto player cohesion. Tsebelis (1995) describes cohesion as ''the similarity of policy positions of the constituent units of each veto player'' (p. 301). Assuming that before a veto player puts forward its policy position in opposition to

another veto player, it should first make an internal decision and convince at least the majority of its constituent units. Thus, as the internal cohesion decreases, policy stability increases and opportunity to change the status quo decreases.

Zohlnhöfer (2009) makes significant contributions to the veto player literature by distinguishing between competitive veto players and co-operative veto players. What he proposes is also a serious critic of Tsebelis' original conceptualization. Tsebelis does not present a model for where policy positions of veto players come from, and by which considerations whey are affected. He takes policy positions as given, and focus on how policy positions of each veto player differ from each other. On the contrary, Zohlnhöfer conceptualizes how policy positions are formed. The first step Zohlnhöfer takes to model policy position formation relies on the 'partisan theory' in the literature on political parties. Partisan theory suggests that there are distinct electorate groups with distinct interests, each electorate group is represented by political parties, and when a political party takes office, it is motivated to implement policies that will satisfy the interests of its electorate group. On the other hand, Zohlnhöfer (2009) reminds that parties need to first win the elections in order to implement those policies. The need to win elections is the second step to be used to model policy positions. Thus, two main goals of political parties, which are also veto players, can be put forward: "policy pursuit and vote maximization". Tsebelis' original conceptualization pays attention to the policy pursuit goal, but fails to capture the vote maximization goal. Zohlnhöfer's conceptualization holds that political parties will need to care which political decisions positively affect their vote share. Political parties may decide to adopt policies that contradict with their original policy positions, if those policies have a potential to bring more popular vote. Or they may completely change their policy positions if they conclude that they

suffered electoral defeats due to their policy positions. In sum, Zohlnhöfer introduces the idea that veto players make strategic calculations (i.e. political parties' calculations with regard to vote maximization) when forming their policy positions.

Assuming that in addition to ideological positions, strategic calculations make an impact on the policy position of veto players, Zohlnhöfer states that not all veto players have an incentive to impede a change in the status quo. For example, although partners of a coalition government are counted as separate partisan veto players whose ideological positions may differ, their strategic calculations may favor a successful coalition record, and therefore they are likely to cooperate with each other if one of them suggests changes in the status quo. Such kinds of partisan veto players are termed co-operative veto players. Others, who have an incentive to impede a change in the status quo, are competitive veto players. The two goals mentioned above –policy pursuit and vote maximization- can be used to operationalize competitive and co-operative veto players.

If an actor does not have an incentive to impede a change in the status-quo due to policies it pursues and its strategic calculations about vote maximization, it emerges as a co-operative veto player. If an actor has an incentive to impede a change in the status-quo either due to policies it pursues or due to its strategic calculations about vote maximization, it emerges as a competitive veto player.

Naturally, policy stability is higher, and the likelihood of a change in the status quo is lower when engaging with competitive veto players than when engaging with co-operative veto players (Zohlnhöfer 2009). The implications of the presence co-operative and competitive veto players for conflict termination are different. Co-operative veto players are likely to support the head of governments in their attempts for conflict termination because

they don't have an incentive to block the resolution process (either because their ideological position is in line with the head of the government or because their strategic calculations favor the conflict termination). On the other hand, competitive veto players are likely to have an incentive to block the termination process either because they ideologically oppose a resolution or because their strategic calculations necessitate the continuation of the conflict. For instance, the studies on the relationship between internal conflict and voting patterns suggest that vote shares of ultra-nationalist parties increase due to ethnic conflicts (Gould and Klor 2006; Berrebi and Klor 2006; 2008; Kibris 2011; 2014). A strategic calculation to boost the vote share may provoke nationalist parties to emerge as a competitive veto player and block the termination attempts.

Zohlnhöfer (2009)'s contribution to veto players literature is crucial in understanding how veto players emerge and operate in autocracies as well. Tsebelis's original conceptualization of veto player is actually derived from an analysis of Western democracies. Constitutions in democracies clearly indicate institutional veto players, and partisan veto players are easier to identify in democracies because political parties in democracies are more transparent. Although, Tsebelis (1995) acknowledge that even the most autocratic regimes possess some amount of veto players, he does not present a separate framework to identify veto players in autocracies. However, Zohlnhöfer (2009)'s conceptualization that focus on the co-operative and competitive veto players allows for analyzing veto players in autocracies. Apart from the political parties, extra-political actors in autocracies may have ideological considerations and strategic calculations as well. Even in autocracies where no sustainable political parties exist, extra-political actors such as the military, the intelligence etc. may emerge as competitive veto players. Thus, although democracy and veto players

literature are inter-related, relevance of veto player concept is not restricted with the democratic systems. Non-democratic systems may lack political actors with significant veto powers, but they still have extra-political actors with veto powers. Moreover, veto players in democracies are not restricted with political parties either; extra-political actors may emerge as veto players in democracies as well. In cases where extra-political actors such as the military possess significant political roles in democracies or autocracies, it is important to consider whether it will act as a competitive veto player or a co-operative veto player.

Chapter 5

GOVERNMENT FRAGMENTATION

The primary limitation in applying a bargaining framework to the context of intrastate conflicts is the prevalence of the assumption that the sides to the conflict are unitary actors. However, veto player concept informs us that governments, even in autocracies, are rarely unitary actors with coherent internal structures/ On the contrary, the existence of institutional, partisan and competitive veto players creates the possibility that governments will not act as unitary actors when trying to change the status quo (i.e. end a civil conflict).

The assumption that governments are unitary actors may be relatively plausible when applied to inter-state conflicts since we may be able to reasonably assume that all factions within each government have more or less similar preferences with regard to the conflict with an external power (Putnam 1988; Schelling 1960; Milner 1997; Tarar 2001)[1]. However, intrastate conflicts, essentially being domestic disputes, are likely to evoke different sentiments in each faction within the government. Each civilian faction might have radically different preferences with regard to the terms of a negotiated settlement of the intrastate conflict. In this case, it is theoretically not plausible to assume that government involved with an intrastate conflict will act as a unitary actor. Thus, the first assumption of the

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[1] See Milner (1997) and Tarar (2001). These studies show that domestic politics create both a set of constraints and a set of opportunities for the bargaining process.

framework I will present is that factions within the government might have different preferences with regard to the intrastate conflict.

A conceptualize government fragmentation as the presence of multiple factions within the government. These factions might be either constitutional/institutional factions or partisan factions. Institutional factions are legal/formal actors or institutions whose roles are defined in the constitution of a country (Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis 2002). Institutional actors include parliamentary chambers (if they are entitled by the constitution as a law-making authorities), the presidents in the presidential systems, or the military (if the country's constitution puts forward an oligarchic military junta of some kind). On the other hand, partisan factions emerge as a result of politics. One should pay attention to the allocation of power within the institutional veto players in order to approximate the constellation of partisan factions (Zohlnhöfer 2009). For example, rather than treating the parliament as a single faction, one should treat the political party or parties which make up the majority within the parliament as separate partisan factions. In a single party government, the governing party should be treated as a partisan faction. In a coalition government, all coalition partners should be treated as separate partisan factions. In semi-democracies, emergence and maneuvers of partisan factions are much more complex because of the extra-political actors. In semi-democracies where civilian politics is fragile, extra-political actors, especially the military, often emerge as a notable partisan faction.

Since a key assumption of my framework concerns the preferences of factions within the government, it is essential to explain what qualities of such factions and their preferences account for their different approach to intrastate conflict. Three qualities with regard to civilian factions affect the potential negotiations during the conflict. The first is the number

of factions; as the number of factions increases, the number of preferences regarding the termination of intrastate conflict increases. The second quality is the congruence between the ideological positions of different factions. As the ideological gap between factions increases, the congruence between their preferences decreases, and bargaining range of acceptable terms of termination to the conflict becomes considerably smaller. The third quality is the internal cohesion of each faction. Here cohesion refers to the similarity of preferences of the constituent units of each faction. Assuming that before a faction puts forward its preference in opposition to another faction, it should first make an internal decision and convince at least the majority of its constituent units[2].

The unitary state assumption is problematic in the context of civil wars because the number and internal cohesion of factions within the government cause different preferences to emerge in the government side and affect the ability of the state to bargain. Fragmented governments generate greater information and credibility problems between the government and rebels, and make termination of intrastate conflicts harder to achieve.

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[2] See Tsebelis (1995) for an extended discussion of how number of, congruence between and cohesion of veto players affect policy change and status quo.

Chapter 6

HOW FRAGMENTATION EXACERBATES INFORMATION AND CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS

In conventional approaches to bargaining in conflict situations -where both sides to the conflict are assumed to be unitary actors- information and credibility problems exist because each side has private information about its own capacity and suspicions about the credibility of the other side (Fearon 1995; Cunningham 2013). In the context of intrastate conflicts - where I go beyond the unitary actor assumption- fragmentation within the government exacerbates these problems because each civilian faction may have different preferences with regard to the intrastate conflict and different levels of credibility depending on their institutional standing or partisan position.

Government fragmentation exacerbates information and credibility problems between several actor dyads involved in intrastate conflicts: government and the rebels, two different branches of the government, government and the military etc. As explained before, for the theoretical purposes of this study, I only focus on the information and credibility problems between government and rebels; and explain how these problems are exacerbated by the fragmentation within the government.

5.1   Information Problems between Government and Rebels

In fragmented civilian authorities, there are multiple factions making incongruent claims - thus postulating different information- about what their constituents prefer with regard to the intrastate conflict they struggle in. Each faction possesses a distinct "ideal point". For example, in the context of an intrastate conflict concerning self-determination demands of an ethnic group, the governing party may be in favor of turning down all sorts of self-determination demands whereas the main opposition party may be in favor of granting partial autonomy in exchange for the termination of armed activity.

Thus, fragmented civilian authorities provide the rebels with multiple (and possibly competing) views of what the government's "reversion point" is. In order to determine the government's reversion point, the rebels need to have information about the preferences of civilian faction. Yet, even if all factions publicly announce their preferences, it doesn't completely solve the information problems. Internal cohesion (or lack of cohesion) of each faction is an additional factor that contributes to the exacerbation of information problems. For example, going back to the example about a self-determination conflict, the governing party may declare its opposition to self-determination demands because its leader holds these individual preferences. Still, if the party is not internally coherent, representatives of the same party might hold differing preferences.

Both the increasing number of civilian factions and the decreasing level of internal cohesion within each faction contribute to sending uncertain signals to the rebel leaders. Unclear information and uncertain signals cause considerable challenge for the rebels in

assessing when this fragmented government will want to terminate the conflict with the rebels and when it will want to continue fighting. Uncertainty as such would increase the chances of failure in negotiations between government and rebels, making it harder to terminate the conflict.

5.2   Credibility Problems between Government and Rebels

In fragmented civilian authorities, there are multiple factions that should make credible commitments to terminate the conflict. Assuming that the government, opposition parties, and in some cases judicial authorities have to reach a certain level of agreement in order to take steps in ending the fight, it is necessary for each faction to credibly commit to the agreed position.

First, it is difficult to ensure the commitment of several factions at the same time. For example, an opposition party may declare its commitment to the government's attempts to end the conflict. However, if faced a backlash from its constituency, this opposition party may revert back to its original position. In this case, its original commitment to the resolution of the conflict was obviously not credible. Second, it is difficult, oftentimes impossible, for different factions within the government to make credible promises about the future behavior of other factions. Theoretically, some government factions might have a constitutional authority over other factions. For example, the Constitutional Court in Turkey had rights to exert control over the behaviors of the governing or the opposition parties. In such cases, the constitutional court, which is one of the government factions, can make credible promises

about the future behavior of other factions. However, empirically such cases are not many in numbers.

Thus, both the capacity and legitimacy of a particular government faction to exert authority over others are challenging for the rebels to evaluate. This situation exacerbates the credibility concerns because it is unclear whether all the government factions will commit to the terms of any agreement that will be potentially made with the rebels in the future. Just like in the case of information problems, uncertainty as such would make the rebels suspicious of the possible attempts to reach peace, making it harder to terminate the conflict.

Literature on negotiations in internal conflicts and resolution attempts frequently refers to the military stalemate situation as a significant determinant of whether the negotiations will start and excel or not. Scholars have argued that stalemates between warring sides are an impetus for negotiations (Zartman 1989). Warring sides make calculations about the expected costs of fighting and expected chances of military victory. A military stalemate obscures such calculations, and lead the warring sides to negotiations fearing that there will be no military victory in the near future. However, although stalemates may facilitate the initiation of negotiations, they may become obstacles to reaching an agreement, and successfully implementing it. A stalemate situation presents substantial uncertainty about the distribution of capabilities (Findley 2012). When the information from the battlefield is not sufficient to induce the relative distribution of power, negotiating sides may not make sufficient calculations about how much to offer or how much concession to give. Under such circumstances, negotiations are likely to lead to what Werner and Yuen (2005) call "inherently risky" peace agreements. Negotiating parties would want to reach and implement an agreement that attains each side what it expect based on their respective capabilities.

"Inherently risky" agreements are those which is not based on the capabilities since under stalemate conditions oftentimes exact capabilities are not known. For example, the government side may want to give little concessions because it sees the rebels very weak, or it may be ready to offer a lot thinking that the rebels are powerful when in fact they are not. Under such situations, the opposition factions may want to veto the process, fearing of unnecessary losses at the end of a negotiated settlement, which are more likely to be challenged by either side later on.

Military stalemate discussion suggests that the ambiguity about the distribution of capabilities prevent at least some government factions from foreseeing the potential consequences of negotiations. The extent to which such ambiguities affect the likelihood of negotiated settlements in civil conflicts depends on the level of government fragmentation.

Chapter 7

WHEN WILL WE OBSERVE THE TERMINATION OF INTRASTATE CONFLICTS OR NOT?

I acknowledge that the intrastate conflict process and its subsequent termination is an interactive bargaining process affected by the behavior of both sides (government and the rebels). However, here I focus on the characteristics of the fragmentation within the government, and their effect on the information/credibility problems. Thus, I hold the rebel side constant. A more comprehensive bargaining approach should take the characteristics of both sides into consideration.

During the bargaining phase, governments should be strong and credible enough to persuade the bureaucratic cadres, and also to force the rebel side to abide by the requirements set by the deal such as demobilization. Govrnments ability to carry out the policy preferences and oversee the implementation of the deal depends on two major factors related to the power of the civilian political leaders: constitutional powers and partisan powers (Pusane 2009). Constitutional powers include veto powers of the head of governments, decree powers, power of legislations, powers related to budgetary decisions, while partisan powers are dependent on the level of political leaders control over their own political parties and those parties' control over the majority of seats of the parliament. Therefore, the degree of partisan

powers possessed by the civilian authority is contingent upon whether or not the head of government has control over his/her own political party and whether or not that party has effective control over the of parliament.

Single party governments have substantial advantage in pursuing their policy preferences. Heads of single-party governments can much easily mobilize their cabinet and other political cadres to carry out policy changes with regard to conflict resolution attempts, and implement potential peace-deals that requires parliamentary approval. Another instrumental condition for the head of government is to have the full support of his cabinet and party members. Not all political leaders possess high levels of intra-party support and loyalty. Sometimes leaders don't have firm control over their own parties, don't have much influence over their deputies. In other cases, there may be ideological or programmatic differences between the intra-party factions or personal intra-party struggles that undermine the authority of the party leader. Without loyal party cadres and co-operation from party members, even the heads of single-party governments will have difficulty when it comes to negotiating and implementing controversial peace-deals. In Sri Lanka, attempts to develop a political solution to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were impeded by the fragmentation in the civilian authority. First in the first half of the 1980s, prime minister attempted to launch negotiations with LTTE. However, his attempt failed because of intra-party factionalism within the ruling party UNP, because some MPs from UNP feared that negotiations with rebels may strengthen the hands of the opposition parties that play the 'ethnic card' against the Tamil conflict, and the prime minister was unable to convince his own party. Then in early 2000s, Sri Lankan government was against led by the head of the first party UNP, Ranil Wickremasinghe. However, the president Kumaratunga was from the

main opposition party SLFP (Sri Lanka has a semi-presidential system which allows presidents to keep their ties with political parties). Wickremasinghe's decision to start peace talks with LTTE was not welcomed by Kumaratunga. In 2003, Kumaratunga dismissed three of Wickremasinghe's ministers, who are most closely associated with peace talks (Art and Richardson 2007). This move by the president was followed by LTTE's decision to revoke negotiations and return to violent strategies. This time, fragmentation within the executive caused failure of the peace process.

A fragmented government, in which the leader's party does not control the majority of the parliament, and the leader does not have loyal party cadres to implement policies, is likely to be unsuccessful during the conflict resolution attempts. Fragmented governments failure may arise either during the negotiation phase (by giving too much concessions) or during the peace-deal implementation phase (by not being able to force the rebels to abide by the deal).

Therefore, ceteris paribus, fragmented governments are more likely to exacerbate the information and credibility problems between the government and rebels. Because such information and credibility problems are likely to make the rebels suspicious of the reliability of the promises made by the government during negotiations, fragmented governments are less likely to successfully terminate the intrastate conflicts. Thus, I expect intrastate conflicts characterized by fragmented governments to have a lesser chance of successfully terminating the conflict. This expectation yields one central and two accompanying predictions about the termination of intrastate conflicts:

Hypothesis 1: Intrastate conflicts in countries characterized fragmented governments are less likely to see the termination of the conflict.

If the number of factions within the government as well as the level of internal cohesion of each faction contribute to the fragmentation within the government, both factors should have an influence on the likelihood of termination. Therefore:

Hypothesis 1a: Intrastate conflicts are less likely to terminate when the number of factions within the government is high.

Hypothesis 1b: Intrastate conflicts are less likely to terminate when the internal incoherence within each government faction is high.

Chapter 8

DATA

I evaluate my approach by testing my hypotheses using a comprehensive dataset of intrastate

conflicts between the state and the rebels occurred in 108 different countries from 1946 to

2014. To identify the population of intrastate conflicts, I rely on the UCDP/PRIO Armed

Conflict Dataset (ACD). ACD's definition of an armed conflict is ""a contested

incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force

between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25

battle-related deaths" (Strand, Wilhelmsen, and Gleditsch 2004, p. 3) This definition includes

four types of conflicts: civil wars, internationalized civil wars, extra systemic wars, and

interstate wars. Among those four types, only interstate wars do not include rebel forces as

parties. Thus, I exclude interstate wars in my data.

The unit of analysis is state-rebel group dyad years since ACD data is collected on

the basis of a calendar year system. ACD codes the start year of each conflict and end year

if it had terminated. In order to increase the accuracy of the termination data, I also use UCDP

Conflict Termination Dataset (CTD). CTD defines a conflict episode as "the continuous

period of active conflict years in the UCDP-PRIO armed conflict dataset" (Kreutz 2010, p.1).

According to CTD, a conflict episode ends when an active conflict year (where there are at

least 25 battle-related deaths) is followed by a year in which there are fewer deaths. CTD first codes a dummy variable indicating whether a conflict has terminated or not. In addition, if the conflict has terminated, it codes the outcome of the conflict. A conflict may terminate due to following reasons: (1) warring sides sign a peace agreement, (2) warring sides sign a ceasefire agreement, (3) government side achieves a military victory, (4) rebel side achieves a military victory, (5) conflict ceases due to low activity (no 25 battle-related deaths in that year), and (6) rebel side ceases to exist. So there are six categorical outcomes listed in the dataset.

CTD collects information on the initial and later outcomes of each conflict. Initial outcome refers to the events during the final year of armed activity whereas later outcome refers to the events during the first year of non-activity (after the violence had stopped). For instance, if the conflicting sides signed a peace agreement in the end of the last year of armed activity, CTD indicates that the initial outcome is peace agreement. However, if the peace agreement could not have been implemented, and thus abrogated next year, CTD also codes this failure. The criteria for peace agreements to be included in the dataset refers to the following definition: "peace agreements should be signed by at least two opposing primary warring parties and concern the incompatibility: in effect solving, regulating or outlining a process for how to solve it" (Högbladh 2012, p.2). Because CTD data collects information on both the initial and later outcomes, it is suitable to capture not only the signing phase of peace agreement, but also the success in the implementation phase. However, six categories listed by CTD are not all relevant to my thesis. For example, whether conflict ceases due to low activity (outcome #5) or rebel side ceases to exist (outcome #6) are irrelevant to my

hypothesis because they do not make a clear distinction between whether the warring sides reach an agreement to terminate the conflict.

Therefore, I make a distinction between termination by peace agreements or temporary ceasefires and government or rebel victories. Since my theoretical framework speaks to the negotiated settlements, I only consider the cases of termination by peace agreements or temporary ceasefires. My dependent variables are intrastate conflict termination by negotiated settlement (peace agreement and ceasefire agreement) dummies.

In order to test the impact of fragmentation within the government on the likelihood of conflict termination, I use two measures of fragmentation: the number of factions within the government and level of internal incoherence within each civilian faction. Both measures are adopted from the V-Dem Projects.

To measure the number of factions, I use V-Dem Projects "National Party Control" variable as a proxy. "National Party Control" variable is an index developed to answer the question "how unified is party control of the national government" (Coppedge et. al 2018, p. 91). "National Party Control" variable takes three values in V-Dem's dataset: unified coalition control, divided party control, unified party control.

A unified coalition control points that a single multi-party coalition controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the government. This is generally the case when a coalition holds the majority of the seats in the parliament in parliamentary systems. A divided party control points to three situations: (1) different parties/individuals control the executive and the legislative branches of the government, (2) executive branch disperses power between a president (or a monarch) and a prime minister who belong to different parties, (3) executive branch disperses power between a non-partisan president (or a monarch) and a

partisan prime minister. This is generally the case in semi-presidential systems or parliamentary monarchies. A unified party control points that a single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the government. This is the case when a single party holds the majority of the seats in the parliament in parliamentary systems.

According to these definitions, the parliamentary control is highest in unified party control; lowest in divided party control and moderate in unified coalition control. Although the scale for this variable is ordinal, dataset converts it to interval by a measurement model developed by V-Dem. V-Dem's interval scale varies between (-3) and (+3). In order to make interpretation easier, I re-scaled the interval into a scale between (0) and +6 where (0) refers to lowest level of fragmentation and (+6) refers to the highest level of fragmentation. I call this variable "Abundance of Factions" in my dataset.

To measure the level of internal incoherence within each faction, I use V-Dem Projects "Legislative Party Cohesion" variable as a proxy. "Legislative Party Cohesion" is an ordinal variable coded to answer the question "is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?" (Michael et. al 2018, p. 90). V-Dem develops four categories as answers: not really (0), more often than not (1), mostly (2), and absolutely (3).

Although the scale for this variable is ordinal, dataset converts it to interval by a measurement model developed by V-Dem. V-Dem's interval scale varies between (-3) and (+3). In order to make interpretation easier, I re-scaled the interval into a scale between (0) and +6 where (0) refers to lowest level of fragmentation and (+6) refers to the highest level of fragmentation. I call this variable "Faction Incoherence" in my dataset.

Figure 8.1 shows the distributions of two government fragmentation variables. Vast majority of the state-rebel group dyads is characterized by the presence of fragmented governments.


Figure 8.1: Distributions of Two Government Fragmentation Variables.

It is also essential to clarify that government fragmentation is never a proxy for democracy. To some extent, it captures the concept of separation of powers, which is a component of composite democracy scores. However, since government fragmentation does not give any insight on civil liberties, rule of law, freedom of speech or freedom of media, it is not directly related to the democracy level of a country. Figure 8.2 clearly shows that neither of the two government fragmentation variables are linearly correlated with democracy scores.

We can also compare the fragmentation levels of a number of exemplary democratic and autocratic countries. Figure 8.3 shows the trend of government fragmentation in the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey and Algeria for the years 2000-2014. United States, India and Israel, being liberal democracies with the highest possible Polity IV scores (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2016), have radically different levels of government fragmentation. On the other hand, a fully autocratic country, Algeria, has a higher fragmentation level than the United States and India.

Figure 8.2: Distributions of Government Fragmentation Variables over Democracy Scores.

Figure 8.3: Trends in Government Fragmentation in the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey and Algeria.

In the models I present here, I control for several factors likely to influence both the extent of fragmentation within the government and the likelihood of conflict termination. These include: population of the country, military coup history, external state support to the rebel side, whether the conflict involves territorial claims, whether it reaches to the threshold of a civil war and number of military personnel of the state. Population size of the county may affect the course of the intrastate conflict. Military coup history is another variable that should be controlled for because it points to that the military is more likely to interfere against the government's settlement attempts.

The presence of external actors' involvement in the conflict alters the strategic calculations of the internal actors like rebels, government or the military. When there is external support to rebels, governments might become alert, fearing of a serious threat to the national security. Intrastate conflicts involving rebels with territorial claims are likely to differ from conflict involving rebels with demands regarding regime change. The nature of rebels' claims is likely to influence the preferences of the government factions. The intensity of the intrastate conflict (i.e. whether it reaches to the threshold of a civil war) is important because more intense conflicts are oftentimes harder to resolve. Intervention of external actors has a potential to create credibility problems because governments may fear the rebels are acting as proxies of national enemies if those rebels are supported by external powers and rebels fear that external actors have undeclared intentions if they are supporting the government.

For military coup history, I use Coup d'état Events dataset which collects information on all coups d'état occurred in all countries between 1946 and 2016. Dataset defines coup d'état as "forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction within the country's ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the executive leadership" (Marshall and Marshall 2017). Dataset makes a distinction between successful coups, failed coups and coup plots. I include all of them in my analysis. The military coup history is included in the analysis in order to account for military's tendency to interfere with civilian politics. Even if the past attempted coups were unsuccessful, the fact that the military attempted such a coup indicates that it has such tendency. Thus, I created a dummy variable for military coup history, and it is coded "1" if there were any previous successful or attempted coups in that country.

As for external state support to rebel side, I use Dangerous Companions: Cooperation between States and Nonstate Armed Groups (NAGs) dataset (San-Akca 2015). Version 4 of the dataset covers the rebel groups active between 1945 and 2015, and codes types of external support acquired by each rebel group. Several types of external support are included in the dataset; providing safe havens to rebel soldiers, providing safe haven to rebel leaders, providing headquarters to rebels, establishing training camps, giving training, providing weapons, providing funds, providing transit routes, and supplying troops. NAGs dataset provides information on how many external state supporters provided state support to each rebel group. Although number of supporters is also a meaningful indicator, my main hypothesis is concerned with the existence of some sort of support. That's why, I created a dummy variable for external state support.

Data on territorial claims by rebel groups and the intensity of each intrastate conflict also come from UCDP/ACD. They are both dummy variables. Data on the number of military personnel comes from the COW dataset.

Appendix 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables in my dataset.

Chapter 9

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Are intrastate conflicts in which the government side has a more fragmented internal structure more less likely to terminate with a negotiated settlement? Assessing this requires detailed information on the level of fragmentation within each government that experienced some level of intrastate conflict. I test my hypotheses using a dataset of intrastate conflicts between 504 rebel groups and their host states in 108 different countries from 1946 to 2014. The dataset is time-series. The unit of analysis is a state-rebel group dyad year. Each dyad has as many observations as the number of years the conflict between the rebel group and its host state is continuing. Datasets being time-series allows me to track the changes in the level of government fragmentation in each year, and assess whether the level of fragmentation in each year has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of intrastate conflict termination by negotiated settlement.

To evaluate my predictions, I employ multivariate logit models of conflict termination. One of the difficulties of modeling conflict termination is that termination is not likely to be independent of the duration of the conflicts. Absence of termination in a given year influences the probability of termination in subsequent years. To account for the temporal dependence, I structure my dataset as a binary time-series cross-section dataset;

and I include a measure of the number of years since the start year of the conflict (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). This allows me to account for the amount of time since the intrastate conflict has broken out until the termination.

An initial look at my dependent variable (intrastate conflict termination by negotiated settlement) shows that there are 81 incident of peace agreements and 71 incidents of ceasefire agreements in 2480 government-rebel group dyad years.

Chapter 10

RESULTS

Table 10.1 reports the results of my analyses of intrastate conflict termination. As predicted in Hypothesis 1a, the coefficient on the Faction Abundance variable in Model 1 is negative and significant. The more factions present within the government in a given year, the less likely an intrastate conflict termination is. As predicted in Hypothesis 1b, the coefficient on the Faction Incoherence variable in Model 1 is negative and significant. The more incoherent factions are in a given year, the less likely an intrastate conflict termination is.

All the control variables are significant in both models and have the expected signs. Population variables has a significant negative sign. The larger the population of the country is in a given year, the less likely an intrastate conflict termination is. This result is in line with the established consensus in the literature that more populous countries are more conflict prone.

Territorial Conflict variables has a significant negative sign, meaning that intrastate conflicts that involve rebels with territorial demands are less likely to see conflict termination in a given year. This is in line with the expectation that governments are less likely to give territorial concessions to rebel groups.

Table 10.1: Logit Models of Conflict Termination in Target State-Rebel Group Dyads,

1946-2014

	Dependent variable: Conflict Termination	
	Model 1	Model 2
Faction Abundance	-0.074**	
	(0.037)	
Faction Incoherence	-0.068*	
	(0.045)	
Overall Fragmentation		-0.172**
		(0.080)
Population (log)	-0.125***	-0.126***
	(0.046)	(0.046)
Territorial Conflict	-0.225**	-0.224**
	(0.108)	(0.104)
Civil War	-0.800***	-0.805***
	(0.141)	(0.140)
Military Coup History	0.809***	0.810***
	(0.159)	(0.159)
Military Personnel	0.0003**	0.0003**
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
External State Supporter	-0.518***	-0.518***
	(0.099)	(0.100)
Years since the onset of the conflict	-0.098***	-0.098***
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	1.266***	1.225***
	(0.441)	(0.440)
Observations	2,480	2,480
Log Likelihood	-1,280.715	-1,281.815
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,581.429	2,581.630
Note:	$^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$	

Civil War variable also has a significant negative sign, informing that more intense intrastate conflicts are less likely to terminate in a given year. This result is also in line with some of the previous studies (Regan 2002) that shows how and why intrastate conflicts that experience more severe levels of violence is less likely to terminate quickly.

Another variable that decreases the likelihood of termination is External State Supporter. Intrastate conflicts involving rebels that have external state supporters are less likely to terminate in a given year. This finding is also consistent with my expectations. Having external state supporters enhances the military capacity of rebel groups. Having more military capacity is likely to create higher expectations in rebel leaders about the likelihood of a rebel victory at the end of the conflict. Rebels, who expect to win the war, would not be willing to negotiate a settlement since a future military victory would likely to bring much more political gain that a negotiated outcome.

As expected, Years since the onset of the conflict variable has a negative sign. This result is also in line with the established consensus in the literature that prolonged intrastate conflicts are harder to resolve.

On the other hand, both Military Coup History and Military Personnel variables have positive signs. The larger the size of the military of the country is in a given year, the more likely an intrastate conflict termination is. These results confirm the notion that militarily stronger states have more leverage in the negotiation table which make them more successful at coercing the rebels to accept the terms of a negotiated settlement.

In Model 2, I drop the two different fragmentation variables and I add a composite measure of overall government fragmentation which is calculated using the abundance and incoherence measures. All the control variables have the expected signs just as in Model 1.

As predicted in Hypothesis 1, the coefficient on the Overall Fragmentation variable in Model 2 is negative and significant. The more fragmented governments are in a given year, the less likely an intrastate conflict termination is. The substantive impact of government fragmentation on the likelihood of intrastate conflict termination is large. Moving from the minimum to maximum values of Overall Fragmentation variable decreases the likelihood of termination from %29 to %18 which signifies a %35 decrease in the probability of termination in a given year[3]. Figure 10.1 shows the odds ratios calculated for both Model 1 and Model 2.

Military coup history variable has the largest substantial effect on the likelihood of conflict termination by negotiated settlement in both models. It increases the chances of termination by more than two times. On the other hand, government fragmentation variables also have a substantial effect on the likelihood of termination by negotiated settlement. In both models, government fragmentation variables significantly decrease the likelihood of such termination. Another variable that substantially decrease the chances of the negotiated settlement is territorial conflict variable. Intrastate conflicts that involve territorial disputes are much less likely to terminate with a negotiated settlement. Looking at the odds ratios in Figure 10.1, country population, military personnel and years since the conflict onset all decrease the likelihood of negotiated settlements. However, their substantial impact is much smaller than the key independent variables which are government faction abundance and government faction incoherence.

[3] All the predicted probabilities are calculated by holding all the other variables at their means.

Figure 10.1: Odds Ratios of Logit Models.

Figure 10.2 shows a steady decrease in the predicted probabilities of intrastate conflict termination as the government fragmentation increases. The graph on the left-hand side of Figure 10.2 illustrates the effect of faction abundance on the likelihood of termination by negotiated settlement. The graph in the middle shows that effect of faction abundance and the one on the right-hand side shows the effect of overall government fragmentation. In all graphs, the predicted probability of conflict termination by negotiated settlement decreases as the government fragmentation increases. For example, the graph on the right-hand side shows that when the overall government fragmentation is very close to 0, the predicted probability of termination is approximately 28%. This probability decreases to 25.5% when government fragmentation is 1. The probability decreases to 22.5% when the government fragmentation is 2. Finally, the chances of termination by negotiated settlement decreases to 18% when the government fragmentation takes its highest value[4]. These analysis supports my hypotheses that intrastate conflicts characterized by fragmented governments are less likely to see termination by negotiated settlements.

[4] All the predicted probabilities are calculated by holding all the other variables at their means.

Figure 10.2: Predicted Probability of Intrastate Conflict Termination.

In order to test the performance of my models, I use receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. A ROC curve shows the ratio of true positives to false positives and can be used to evaluate the performance of two models by comparing the area under each curve (AUC) to assess the predictive performance. An AUC of 1 means a perfect predictive power.

Using ROC curves, I compare Model 1, Model 2 and Control Model. Control Model is another model I fit using only the control variables in Table 1. Figure 10.3 shows the ROC curves of the three models I am comparing and their AUC values. Both Model 1 and Model 2 have higher AUC values showing that their predictive power regarding conflict termination is higher than the predictive power of the Control Model.


Figure 10.3: ROC Curves of Model 1, Model 2 and Control Model.

Chapter 11

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this thesis is to develop and test main hypotheses with regard to the causes that make it very difficult to reach a negotiated deal through conflict resolution attempts. Literature on conflict termination have pointed out and empirically tested several causes of lack of termination in internal conflicts. However, the theoretical question on how the bargaining process in intrastate conflicts between the government and the rebels prolong and what factors influence the success of the negotiations remains relatively unexplored.

While most cross-national studies of intrastate conflict termination treat the actors in the conflict as unitary, a handful of studies acknowledge that fragmentation exists within these actors and focus on the rebel fragmentation. Yet, they still treat the government side as a unitary actor. To fill this gap in the literature, this study goes beyond the unitary government assumption by diverting attention to the fragmentation within the government.

I present a framework that explains conflict termination by negotiated settlement (or lack of it) as a result of the information and credibility problems exacerbated by government fragmentation. I argue that both the number of factions within the government and their internal incoherence have an impact on the information and credibility problems that are associated with bargaining failures. Therefore, I hypothesize that the more fragmented the

government is, the less likely that the intrastate conflict will terminate with a negotiated settlement.

To test my hypotheses, I rely on a Large-N dataset, and test my hypotheses with logit models. Focusing on two measures of government fragmentation (in Model 1) and overall government fragmentation (in Model 2), I demonstrate that the more fragmented governments are in a given year, the less likely an intrastate conflict termination is. The empirical findings suggest the following key implications for negotiated settlements in intrastate conflicts:

1) As expected, fragmentation within the government makes it harder to terminate intrastate conflicts with a negotiated settlement. Across all models used to test the effects of fragmentation on the likelihood of termination, high levels of government faction abundance, as well as high levels of faction incoherence, are associated with less likelihood of conflict termination by negotiated settlement.

2) Military coup history variable has a large substantial effect on the likelihood of negotiated settlement in both models. Military coup history increases the chances of termination by more than two times. This suggests that politically active militaries complicate the bargaining process even more than government fragmentation.

3) Intrastate conflicts involving external state supporters in favor of rebels are less likely to terminate with a negotiated settlement in a given year. Rebels enhanced military capacity decreases the chances that the conflict will see a successful termination through negotiations.

In this article, I only focus on the fragmentation within the government side and its intensifying effect on the information and credibility problems that emerge during negotiated settlement attempts. Doing that I hold the fragmentation within the rebel movements constant. Yet, I acknowledge that the intrastate conflict process and its subsequent termination is an interactive bargaining process affected by the behavior of both sides (government and the rebels). Thus, a more comprehensive bargaining approach should present a dyadic framework that incorporates the level of fragmentation of both government and rebels. Some existing studies examine the fragmentation within rebel movements (Cunningham 2013; Bapat and Bond 2012). However, future studies should look at the dyadic interaction between the government and rebels to further explore how actor fragmentation in both sides influence the likelihood of termination of intrastate conflicts.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1.1: Number of conflicts that terminated

Conflict Termination	Frequency	Percent
0 (Ongoing)	1898	73,94
1 (Terminated)	669	26,06

Appendix 1.2: Frequency of Different Conflict Outcomes

Conflict Outcome	Frequency	Percent
0: Ongoing	1957	74,72
1: Peace Agreement	85	3,25
2: Ceasefire Agreement/Low Activity	333	12,71
3: Government Victory	190	7,25
4: Rebel Victory	54	2,06

Appendix 2.1: Number of countries which had level of fragmentation in the specified range at least one year

	0-1	1-2	2-3	3-4	4-5	5-6	6-7
Faction Incoherence	13	49	55	34	12	3	2
Faction Abundance	21	43	47	55	33	12	0

Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics of All Variables in the Dataset

	Intrastate Conflict Termination	Faction Abundance	Faction Cohesion	Overall Government Fragmentation	Population (log)
Median	0	2.89679766	2.31022286	2.04404421	10.09485144
Mean	0.26032736	3.0557625	2.53355703	2.00278118	10.1457628
SE. Mean	0.00866435	0.02606796	0.02344881	0.01264314	0.02882857
CI.mean.0.95	0.01698983	0.05111603	0.04598019	0.02479163	0.05653024
Variance	0.1926321	1.77019835	1.43235063	0.41640678	2.08436415
Standard Dev.	0.43889873	1.33048801	1.19680852	0.64529588	1.44373272
Coef.Var	1.68594931	0.43540295	0.4723827	0.32219989	0.14229908

	External State Support to Rebels	Military Personnel (log)	Territorial Conflict	Civil War	Military Coup History
Median	1	4.77068462	0	0	0
Mean	0.97459893	4.72404802	0.487012987	0.21657754	0.085561497
SE. Mean	0.02476744	0.02919378	0.009770608	0.008051983	0.005467825
CI.mean.0.95	0.0485695	0.05724666	0.019158901	0.015788899	0.010721698
Variance	1.37652793	2.11620261	0.249926802	0.169736544	0.078270625
Standard Dev.	1.17325527	1.45471736	0.499926797	0.411990951	0.279768877
Coef.Var	1.20383394	0.30793873	1.026516356	1.902279206	3.269798751