

**Politics of Social Assistance Provision:
Contentious Politics and *Child Support Grant* Provision in South Africa**

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DEDICATION

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ABSTRACT

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What explains the variation in the social assistance expenditure and coverage over time in developing countries? What is the role of political factors, especially of the contentious politics and conflicts, in the social assistance provision in developing countries of the global South? Although the literatures of social assistance provision and welfare state underestimate the significance of political factors, I argue that political concerns about contentious politics are crucial in the provision of social assistance benefits. In other words, when the degree of contentious politics - including violent and non-violent protests, demonstrations, riots, and conflicts - increases, the political actors would have more incentives to distribute more benefits in order to appease protesters and to contain the dissidents as a counter-insurgency strategy. This dissertation provides a quantitative analysis of the contentious politics' effect on the social assistance provision, through focusing on the theory-testing critical case of South Africa, which experienced considerable social assistance expansion over time. I pursue a mixed methods strategy to test my hypothesis that as the number of protests increases, the number of material beneficiaries increases. Empirical analyses based on *Instrumental Variable Estimation* with administrative level data confirm the association between the number of protests and of social assistance beneficiaries. Later, I provide a historical account of welfare provision in South Africa. In the last chapter, I conduct a *Most Different Systems Design* in order to increase the external validity of my findings with the Brazilian, Indian, and Turkish cases, suggesting that this relationship is a worldwide phenomenon rather than an idiosyncratic case.

Keywords: Politics of Social Assistance, South Africa, the Child Support Grant (CSG), Contentious Politics, Conflict, Developing Countries

ÖZETÇE

Sosyal Yardım Sağlamanın Siyaseti: Güney Afrika'da Çekişmeli Siyaset ve Çocuk Destek Yardımı Programının Sağlanması

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Gelişmekte olan ülkelerde, sosyal yardım programlarının harcama ve kapsamındaki zaman içindeki değişimi açıklayan etkenler nelerdir? Küresel Güney'in gelişmekte olan ülkelerindeki sosyal yardım programlarının sağlanmasında değişimde siyasal faktörlerin, özellikle de çekişmeli siyasetin ve çatışmaların rolü nedir? Her ne kadar sosyal yardım sağlama ve refah devleti literatürleri politik faktörlerin önemini hafife alsa da, bu tezde ben, çekişmeli siyaset konusundaki politik kaygıların sosyal yardımların sağlanmasında çok önemli olduğunu savunuyorum. Başka bir deyişle, şiddet içeren ve şiddet içermeyen protestolar, gösteriler, isyanlar ve çatışmalar da dahil olmak üzere çekişmeli siyasetin yoğunluğu ve derecesi arttığında, siyasi aktörler protestocuları yatıştırmak ve muhalifleri sınırlamak amacıyla bir karşı-ayaklanma politikası olarak daha fazla yardım dağıtmaya teşviki olacaktır. Bu tezde, zaman içinde kayda değer derecede sosyal yardım artışı yaşayan Güney Afrika'ya *teori test eden* kritik vaka olarak odaklanarak, çekişmeli siyasetin sosyal yardım sağlanması üzerindeki etkisinin nicel bir analizini sunmaktayım. Bunu yaparken de, protestoların sayısı arttıkça, sosyal yardımdan faydalanan sayısının arttığına dair hipotezimi test etmek için karma bir yöntem stratejisi izliyorum. İdari seviye verisi ile Araç Değişkenli Ölçüme dayanan ampirik analizler, protesto sayısı ile sosyal yardım yararlanıcıları arasındaki ilişkiyi doğrulamaktadır. Daha sonra, Güney Afrika'daki sosyal hizmetlerin tarihsel olarak açıklanmasını sağlıyor ve günümüz çekişmeli siyaseti hakkında daha fazla bilgi veriyorum. Son bölümde ise, *En Farklı Sistemler* tasarımı ile Brezilya, Hindistan ve Türkiye vakalarıyla bulgularımın dış geçerliliğini arttırıyor ve bu ilişkinin Güney Afrika'ya özgü bir vaka olmaktan ziyade dünya çapında bir fenomen olduğunu öne sürüyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Yardım Sağlamanın Siyaseti, Güney Afrika, Çocuk Destek Yardımı, Çekişmeli Siyaset, Çatışma, Gelişmekte Olan Ülkeler

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

Over the last three decades, the ‘retrenchment of welfare state’ discussion attracted considerable scholarly interest given the precarious trend of social security retrenchment in the global North. The political, economic, and social forces that are thought to leading welfare expansion became reverse, forcing governments to implement austerity policies and cut-offs in social expenditure. Following the end of the Cold War, a burgeoning literature underscored the significance of globalization, regional integration and intergovernmental and international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the neoliberal policies that forecasts further retrenchment of welfare state. This phenomenon is considered as a shift in the understanding of welfare from the one that is based on social securities through employment entitlements to the one with needs-based provisions and the minimal state involvement.

Yet at the same time, there has been a considerable expansion in the number and the extent of social assistance programs in developing countries with innovative conducts (Gao 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; ILO 2010; Jawad 2009; Sugiyama 2011). According to estimates, more than one billion people in the emerging market countries started to receive some kind of social assistance program (World Bank 2015; ILO 2014). It is important to note that by 2014, in only China, India, and Brazil, more than 486 million people were covered by at least one social

assistance program, which is almost equal to the European population (World Bank 2015; Yoruk and Cemen 2019). Moreover, Yoruk and Cemen showed that while social assistance coverage decreased in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries after 2004, the developing countries experienced increasing trend in the coverage of these programs (Yoruk and Cemen 2019).

Table 1: Social assistance coverage in the global South (Source: Yoruk and Cemen 2019)

Country	Percentage of People Covered by Social Assistance Programs
Brazil	25%
Indonesia	54%
Turkey	44%
Mexico	59%
South Africa	61%

These expansions have led many scholars to ask the following questions: What factors account for the expansion of social assistance policies over time in the developing countries? Why is there a variation in the expansion of social assistance policies over time? What is the role of political factors, especially of contentious politics and conflicts, in the social assistance expansion in the global South? Last but not least, does contentious politics lead to the provision of more social assistance benefits in the developing world?

In the literature of social assistance provision and more broadly of welfare state, the widespread expansion of social assistance programs in emerging markets is dominantly explicated by either structuralist or institutionalist theories. The structuralist approach puts emphasis on socio-economic and demographic factors, including robust economic growth, widespread poverty, high inequality, high

unemployment rates, deindustrialization, high labor informalization, and the increasing share of service sector in the GDP in the expansion and provision of social assistance programs (Franzoni and Voorend 2011; Gough and Wood 2004; Hemerijck 2012; Hong and Kongshoj 2014; Matsaganis 2012; Vanhuysse and Goerres 2013). Institutional theories, on the other hand, underscores the significance of “rules of the game” and the evolution of political and economic institutions, such as developmental strategies adopted and the prevalent political systems, in the formations and development of welfare state and more specifically introduction and implementation of social assistance policies (Song 2003; Jo-Seol 2004; Rudra 2007; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Beramendi 2009; Seekings 2012; Barrientos et al. 2013). Despite their merits, the predominant emphasis on these structural and institutional theories disregard political determinants of social assistance expansion and distribution.

This dissertation is aimed at elaborating on the theories of social assistance expansion that underscore the political causes of social assistance policies in the global South. More specifically, I ground my argument on the theory of Piven and Cloward (1971), which posits that governments instrumentalize social assistance programs as a response to contentious politics to contain protestors and to prevent protests from becoming even larger and influential because governments anticipate that the provision of material benefits is likely to decrease the willingness to mobilize. In other words, combining Piven and Cloward’s hypothesis with conflict literature, I argue that as the number and intensity of contentious politics escalates, governments would have incentives to utilize social assistance programs as they

anticipate that material benefit would mitigate people's willingness to protest and contention for their causes.

In testing my hypothesis that the more protests an administrative unit hosts, the more people receive social assistance benefits in the following time period, I use the South Africa case. This is due to the fact that South Africa constitutes a critical case for both (1) theory-testing purposes and (2) theory-developing purposes.

First, South Africa is a critical case for testing my hypothesis because South Africa has experienced considerable variation in both social assistance (dependent variable) and the protests (independent variable). Indeed, the South Africa's flagship social assistance program, the *Child Support Grant* (CSG), proves as a great policy to investigate as the number of its beneficiaries increased from one million in 2000 to 12 million people in 2017. Moreover, among largest seven social assistance programs, namely, *the Child Support Grant*, *Old-Age Grant*, *Care Dependency Grant*, *War Veterans Grant*, *Grant-In-Aid*, *Foster Child Grant*, and *the Disability Grant*, the CSG is the largest program with less clearly-defined-and-implemented provision, opening considerable space for discretion. Regarding my independent variable, contentious politics, many authorities considered South Africa as "the protest capital of the world," implying the high number of protests taking place in South Africa each year. Hence, South Africa provides an appropriate and suitable case to investigate the association between the protest and the social assistance provision. Moreover, the dominant structural and institutional factors of social assistance expansion have been relatively insignificant in South Africa. Having other factors with comparatively weak explanatory power creates a quasi-

least-likely-case design as many other structural, economic, and institutional factors cannot totally explain the South African case that substantiate the explanatory power of the proposed independent variable.

Second, having developed social assistance programs relatively earlier than many other developing countries, the history of South Africa stands as an exploratory case to understand how and why social assistance policies are expanded and provided to the larger masses. Indeed, even though I propose and test that as the number of protests increases, the more people receive social assistance benefits, this empirical investigation does not answer the question that what makes governments willing to provide material benefits alongside repressive policies as a response to contentious politics. One striking finding is that the Apartheid government employed the social assistance programs in order to not only sustain the racially segregated Apartheid regime but also contain the contentious activism of Indian and African residents of South-West Africa through using it as a “carrot” to “win hearts and minds.” This is mostly in line with the expectation of the conflict literature that because governments anticipate people who receive material benefits have less incentive to participate into protests, governments introduces new social assistance programs or increases the extent of the existing ones to larger masses in order to decrease people’s grievances over socio-economic or redistributive issues, and to lessen willingness to protest. Furthermore, analyzing and comprehending the history of the South African social assistance provision practices proves to be significant, provided that major part of Apartheid bureaucratic apparatus and administrative capacity remained intact without substantial reforms and that the

democratic South Africa inherited these anti-contentious state capabilities and practices.

By focusing on the critical case of South Africa, I test my hypothesis that as an administrative unit hosts the more protests, the more people receive social assistance benefits in the following time period. Building upon the South African case, this thesis draws on an empirical investigation of assistance provision in relation to the contentious politics activism and expert interviews conducted in South Africa in September 2018. My sample is composed of 540 province-month observations with 60 months (from 2013 to 2018, total of 5 years) and 9 South African provinces. I use the number of CSG beneficiaries as my dependent variable where I take the number of protests as my independent variable of interest. Furthermore, I make use of a number of political and socio-economic control variables. Acknowledging the endogenous nature of the association between protests and social assistance provision that would introduce bias to my estimates, I do not only use entity-and-time-fixed effects in my *Ordinary Least Squares* (OLS) estimation but also employ *Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation* with an identification strategy that is composed of three exogenous and relevant instrumental variables. These instrumental variables include percentage *change in maximum temperature*, *number of days with thunder*, and *number of official holidays*.

While the unbiased results I obtain through IV estimation substantiates the positive association between protests and social assistance provision, its scope highly limited to the South African provinces. In order to increase the external validity of the study with further implications for developing countries, I conduct a

Most Different Systems Design among developing countries. Alongside with South Africa, all other three countries that I analyze in the case design, namely Brazil, India, and Turkey, show considerable increase in the provision of social assistance. However, the design shows that there is no overarching explanatory factor among the widely employed factors in the literature that explain this substantial increase in the social assistance provision other than the viable contentious activism in these countries.

The structure of this dissertation is as follows: In the subsequent chapter, I present the prevalent theoretical framework of social assistance provision vis-à-vis the literature of welfare state and the introduction, expansion, provision of social assistance programs. Then I propose my hypothesis and discuss potential explanations of mechanisms by benefiting from the conflict literature. In the following chapter, I present my case selection design with South Africa as my theory-testing and theory-building case. In doing so, I introduce *Child Support Grant* and contemporary contentious activism. Later on, I further delve into the South African welfare state and social assistance provision from a historical point of view. Through the investigation of the social assistance provision during the Apartheid era, I provide some insights regarding why and how political elites provide grants to the larger masses. In the next chapter, I test my hypothesis that the number of protests is associated with the number of grant beneficiaries. In order to attain robust and unbiased results, I use an *Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation*, drawing on the weather and holiday instrumental variables. After discussing the result of empirical analysis, Lastly, I extend my analysis to three other developing countries, namely Brazil, India, and Turkey based on *the Most*

Different Systems Design to increase the external validity of my findings and to show that similar mechanisms have been impactful worldwide in the variation of social assistance provision over time. In the concluding chapter, I discuss my findings and their implications for the developing countries.



CHAPTER 2:

SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVISION AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, many developed countries of the global North have experienced serious ‘welfare state retrenchment’ as a result of political, economic, and budgetary pressures following neoliberal transformation (Pierson 1994; Deacon 2007; Starke 2008). This ‘retrenchment’ manifested itself as a decrease of the share of social spending in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and benefit levels as well as loosening of eligibility criteria, a reduction in duration and coverage of the social schemes in many developed countries (Starke 2008). This ‘regressive trend’ in developed countries is associated with a shift from an understanding of welfare based on social securities of employment entitlements to the one with needs based income-oriented social assistance programs and minimal state involvement (Ginsburg 2001; Deacon 2007; Starke 2008). Addressing to the increasing number of people at risk of poverty and exclusion from 116 million in 2008 to 123 million in 2012, the International Labor Office (ILO) report warned against the “erosion of European social model” (ILO 2014). Moreover, the report suggested that the successful European social model has “eroded” after the 2008 financial crisis that led many European countries to implement adjustment reforms that replace the state-contributory and near-universal social security schemes with non-contributory social assistance programs with narrower scopes that signals the profound shift

from the understanding of universal access to decent living standards to the one that accepts state provision only when market and family fails (ILO 2014).

The same recipe of policy choices that is promoted by international organizations such as International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank, and that envisions minimal state interventions and fiscal prudence with fewer state-contributory social security programs are adopted by many developing countries (Armada, Muntaner, and Navarro 2001; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Van Gils and Yörük 2017). At the same time, non-contributory social assistance programs in the forms of conditional cash transfers (CCT's), free healthcare programs, food aids, and workfares that are originally concocted to mitigate the effects of neoliberal reforms, which dismantle occupation-based securities, have considerably expanded in the global South (Wehr, Leubolt, and Schaffar 2012). Becoming one of the most popular social policy tools, social assistance programs are reinvented and much more extended to larger audience that they have become a considerable portion of the social expenditure in middle-income countries (Gao 2006; Fiszbein et al. 2009). The proliferation of innovative social assistance policies in developing countries, such as China (Gao 2006; Solinger and Hu 2012), Turkey (Jawad 2009; Jawad and Yakut-Cakar 2010; Yoruk 2012a), and Latin American countries (Sugiyama 2011), especially of the means-tested cash benefits, has attracted considerable scholarly attention that attempted at explicating the causes and effects of these social assistance expansion.

In understanding what accounts for expansion of social assistance policies over time and which factors cause this variation in developing countries, this chapter first introduces the concept of social assistance program with its different

forms and later differentiates it from other social welfare programs. In the following section, the social assistance programs are examined in the context of more comprehensive welfare state literature. Then, I review the structural, institutional, and electoral factors that are associated with the proliferation of social assistance programs. Subsequently, I introduce and elaborate on an overlooked association, which is between social assistance programs and contentious politics. In doing so, I put emphasis on the mechanisms that suggest the use of social assistance programs as a counterinsurgency strategy to contain the contentious politics. Last but not least, I propose my hypotheses throughout this dissertation that I would be testing.

2.2. SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Social assistance programs, also known as social safety-nets, are defined as a variety of benefits and services that are available to guarantee pre-defined subsistence level living standards to people who are in need (Eardley et al. 1996). Provided based on means-tested criteria with income and/or asset assessments, social assistance programs are distinguished from the social security programs because of the fact that social security programs are distributed based on employment status, membership rights and the amount of social security benefits are determined by sum of the state, employer, and employee contribution (Bahle, Pfeifer, and Wendt 2010). Compared to the social security programs that is accepted as a social right, social assistance programs are easier to draft, enact, implement, and target to certain groups of people. Moreover, social assistance schemes are aimed at providing at least subsistence level income to either i) all population or ii) deserving poor. Moreover, while some programs provide cash or in-kind benefits or services, some social assistance programs are “tied” programs that decreases the

cost of certain services when bought (housing, health services etc.) (Eardley et al. 1996). However, within the framework of this dissertation, social assistance programs are taken as those with means-tested assessments and with either cash or in-kind benefits rather than universal income schemes.

One of the most significant social assistance programs is conditional cash transfers (CCT's) that have gained considerable scholarly attention. The CCT's are generally means-tested programs that are distributed to the poor with some conditionalities attached to the scheme (Gough 2001; Fiszbein et al. 2009). Requiring the recipient households to satisfy health (periodic check-ups, vaccinations), nutrition (food parcels), or education (enrollment, attendance)-related conditionalities, the CCT's aim at increasing the human capital of households' children (Fiszbein et al. 2009). While every country in Latin America has some kind of CCT programs (note that these schemes constitute the largest welfare programs in Brazil with *Bolsa Família* and in Mexico with *PROSPERA*), many developing countries, including India, China, Cambodia, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, and South Africa, have some kind of CCT's with substantial coverages (Fiszbein et al. 2009; Barrientos et al. 2013) .

One important point to make is that while social assistance programs were one of the oldest forms of welfare provision (e.g. the Poor Law of 1834), their functions and the extent they are used show considerable variation over time. Briefly analyzing the four historical phases of the development of welfare states in the global North reveals these significant differences (Schustereder 2010). From early 19th century up to the end of WWI, most of the incipient welfare systems were composed of preliminary poverty-alleviating social assistance programs, with the

most prominent example of the English Poor Laws of 1834 that provided minimum income to the deserving poor (Thane 1996; Pierson 2001; Goldberg and Rosenthal 2002). It was not surprise that the first kind of social assistance developed in England as the industrialization and land enclosure led to considerable labor mobility, pressuring the state to intervene in a centralized manner (Polanyi 2001; Pierson 2001; Bahle, Pfeifer, and Wendt 2010). Furthermore, it should be noted that the introduction of first social assistance programs was a significant step forward in the invention and implementation of the social securities since they constituted the “baseline” of social securities to further institutionalize the norm of social rights (Leibfried 1992; Goldberg and Rosenthal 2002; Kuhnle and Sander 2010).

During the second phase, covering the interwar period, many European countries introduced some forms of social security in addition to poor-targeting and non-contributory social assistance programs. Three main drivers of this consolidation was i) the social assistance programs that served as a precedent, ii) the devastating effects of the 1st World War, and ii) the Great Depression of 1929 that required many governments to intervene in the face of market failures (Leibfried 1992; Eardley et al. 1996; Schustereder 2010; Kuhnle and Sander 2010). As new social security programs, such as unemployment benefits, old-age pensions, and sickness insurances became more prevalent, the function of social assistance programs changed. According to Titmuss (1987), the welfare regimes in the first phase could be considered rather “residual” that the dominant social assistance programs only served as social-security nets in the areas where the market failures occurred. However, the second phase onward, many European countries and some of the Latin American countries started developing “institutional” welfare regimes

with a diversity of employment-based, contributory social security policies where social assistance programs functioned as a more residual system (Titmuss 1987; Pierson 2001).

Table 2: Four historical phases of welfare state development vis-a-vis the role of social assistance programs

Time Period	Significant Events	Welfare Regime	Role of Social Assistance
From early 19th century to WWI	Role of industrialization and land enclosure, leaving traditional relief regimes ineffective	Residual	Dominant means of provision
Interwar Period	Devastating effects of the WWI and the Great Depression	Residual but more institutionalized	More residual role
From WWII to mid-1970s	Adoption of the Keynesian policies, developmentalism, ILO activism, the Cold War context	Well-institutionalized, Golden days	Residual role
1970s onward	Globalization, neoliberal transformation and structural adjustment policies, transnational activism of the IMF and the World Bank, the fourth wave of democratization	Dismantling in the global North whereas Entrenching in the global South	More significant role: Southern invention of the CCT's

Following the influential 1942 Beveridge Report in Britain towards the end of World War II, widespread adoption of the Keynesian macroeconomic policies and developmentalism as well as the promotions of the International Labor Organizations (the ILO), many European countries developed more complex and complementary set of institutions contributory-based old-age pensions and unemployment insurances (Titmuss 1987; Hicks and Kenworthy 2003;

Schustereder 2010; Seekings 2012). The generous social security programs provided people with comprehensive social rights while social assistance programs remained residual policies active where the market failed or where families were aimed at strengthened (Eardley et al. 1996; Schustereder 2010; Bahle, Pfeifer, and Wendt 2010).

Lastly, globalization and structural adjustments subsequent to neoliberal economic and political reforms led to the retrenchment of the generous social security programs in the global North (Ginsburg 2001). During this phase, in parallel with the objective of minimal state, many employment-based contributory social security programs were replaced with non-contributory social assistance programs that only targeted the poor in need (Pierson 1994; Schustereder 2010). It must be noted that within this period, the fourth wave of democratization with electoral pressures has been another significant factor in the expansion of social assistances in the global South.

It should be noticed that although social assistance programs are drafted and implemented since the mid-19th century, and they played a significant role in corresponding welfare state formations, their proliferation and worldwide salience is a recent phenomenon that has gone hand in hand with a number of socio-economic, institutional, and political factors. In the subsequent subchapter, I present the theories of social assistance provision and proliferation.

2.3. THE CAUSES OF THE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVISION, AND EXPANSION

Why have the governments of developing countries increased the social assistance expenditure and coverage over time despite its fiscal burden? How can we understand this increasing social assistance expenditure and coverage trend in

developing countries? Some sets of theories gained considerable attention in explaining the variation in the social security and social assistance provision among developing countries. These can be analyzed under three categories: 1) structural explanations; 2) institutional explications; and 3) electoral explanations.

2.3.1. Structural Factors of Social Assistance Provision

One of the most prominent explanations of social assistance provision and expansion is grounded on the *economic origins of welfare theory*. This theory suggests that a country could afford the cost of social assistance programs only when she yields robust economic growth. It is based on the logic of *increasing capabilities* that the revenues and capabilities of the governments with the high economic growth would increase the provision of the welfare (Quadagno 1987; Gough and Wood 2004). Especially economic growth that developing countries experienced throughout 1990s constituted critical cases for this phenomenon. Moreover, many scholars used this theory in interpreting the welfare state regime development in Asian countries (e.g. China, Hong Kong, Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) during in the last decades of the 20th century (Hort and Kuhnle 2000; Croissant 2004). It should be noted that this interpretation is in line with the “trajectory” approach, anticipating that the welfare provision would converge to the European models as developing countries experience enough economic development (Rudra 2007; Seekings 2008). Notice that this theory only explains the necessary conditions for social assistance provision but not the sufficient conditions. For that, we should be further asking what makes governments incentivized and willing to introduce and to expand the provision of social assistance.

Another set of structural factors that is associated with the introduction of generous and inclusive social programs in developing countries is *evolving demographic and socio-economic conditions*. Increasing population growth, old-age ratio, urbanization, and deindustrialization over time as well as people's changing needs required more intricate and demanding welfare state formation from demand side that addresses the changing structures (Miliband 1969; Quadagno 1987; Gough 2004; Seekings 2008; Kuhnle and Sander 2010; Hemerijck 2012). For instance, Esping-Andersen's argument (1990) about the role of social assistance in corporatist and liberal welfare state regimes can be taken as examples of theories that locate social assistance as a response to socio-economic conditions (Isakjee 2017).¹ In his systematic and inspiring analysis of the western welfare state regimes that investigates the interaction among state, family, and market in the provision of securities and in the polling of the risks, Esping-Andersen claimed that in *the corporatist welfare state regimes*, social assistance programs have not only substantiate families' role alongside promoting family-related values but also responded to and reinforced the low levels of female labor participation rates in countries, such as Germany, Italy, Austria, and France. (Gosta Esping-Andersen 1990; Bahle, Pfeifer, and Wendt 2010). Moreover, in the development of *liberal welfare state regimes*, as the increasing reliance on market following industrialization and land enclosure caused market failures, thus, serious poverty, state intervention in forms of social assistance policies were formulated to address

¹ The other two welfare state regimes in the global North countries are conservative (corporatist) and social-democratic welfare state regimes (Gosta Esping-Andersen 1990).

the emerging needs of masses (Gosta Esping-Andersen 1990; Bahle, Pfeifer, and Wendt 2010).

The literature that focuses on the socio-economic conditions also goes hand in hand with *government reaction to neoliberalism* that assumes that globalization and neoliberal reforms following late 1970s exacerbated the vulnerabilities of masses with economic liberalization, deregulation, and dismantling of existing social security programs, seriously deteriorated people's living standards (Pierson 1994; Korpi and Palme 2003; Starke 2006; Sugiyama 2011). This development, furthermore, incentivized states to invent novel and generous safety-nets and social assistance programs (Pierson 2001; Powell and Barrientos 2004; Seekings 2008; Matsaganis 2012; Ozkan 2017).

2.3.2. *Institutional drivers of social assistance provision*

Some scholars attributed the expansion in the scope and extent of the social assistance programs to institutional factors. The theory of *policy diffusion*, for instance, posits that federations are anticipated to provide more inclusive welfare regime compared to unitary systems because people are considered to be capable of choosing states they would like to reside that leads to competition among different states (Beramendi 2009). In return, this competition to attract more citizens in order to yield the highest amount of taxes is expected to lead to more generous welfare provision (Beramendi 2009; Seekings 2012).

One striking example of this policy diffusion theory is the Brazilian national CCT program, *Bolsa Familia*, Claimed to be one of the most influential social assistance programs not only in Latin America but also worldwide, *Bolsa Familia* led to adoption of innovative social assistance policies around the world (Hall 2006;

“Brazil: Bolsa Família Program – Scaling-up Cash Transfers for the Poor” 2018). Originally, however, it was launched as a municipal policy in the mid-1990s, and as its popularity increased, similar programs (such as Federal District, Campinas, Belo Horizonte, Vitoria, Recife, etc.) mushroomed in other municipalities (“Bolsa Escola (2001-2003),” n.d.). Following its popularity and success, it was later adopted as national social policy (*Bolsa Escola* in 2003 and finally as *Bolsa Família* in 2004). As it can be seen in the case of *Bolsa Família*, policy diffusion following social policy experimentation in different municipalities and states and the electoral success the policy brings are considered significant drivers of the proliferation of social assistance policies (Lindert 2005; Seekings 2012; Wiesebron 2014).

Second institutional theory of social assistance provision in developing countries is concerned with the *developmental strategies* that countries adopted (Kuhnle and Hort 2004; Rudra 2007; Carroll 2017). As developmental state literature revealed, many states in global south have pursued various developmentalist agenda, during which they confronted diverse interests and resistance of large domestic families, strong multinational companies (MNC) and institutional imperfections (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Carroll 2017). The underlying rationale is that the policy choices and preferences of economic development and the reaction they received from different interest groups would shape the welfare state formations (Haggard and Kaufman 2008). In her work, Rudra delineated two welfare state regimes in the developing countries: “protective” and “productive”(Rudra 2007). In “productive” regimes, free trade-based development strategy, namely export-oriented industrialization (EOI), requires countries to commodify their laborers to sustain comparative advantage in

production whereas in “protective” regimes import-substitution industrialization (ISI) leads to more entrenched employment-based securities (Rudra 2007) In countries with ISI experience, governments are more likely to provide generous welfare benefits to formal workers to sustain industrial peace and stability (Goldberg and Rosenthal 2002; Rudra 2007). In other words, in countries with protective welfare regimes, such as Brazil and Argentina in mid-1980s, more generous and developed employment-based social security programs were provided to formal workers (whereas the larger population were deprived of subsistence level income). Furthermore, because this developmental strategy envisions controlled capital and financial accounts rather than liberal markets, by passing the burden of social securities to consumers in an indirect way, the distributive system remained sustainable (Seekings 2008). On the other hand, in the countries where the workers are commodified (e.g. South Africa in the mid-1960s-1970s with productive policies), the welfare state policies remained residual that were mostly composed of social assistance programs that targeted just a small number of people in most need (Powell and Barrientos 2004; Rudra 2007; Seekings 2012). Moreover, through suppressing welfare provisions to general segments, the countries with productive regime minimized the welfare burden on employers and the state and maintained comparative advantage in cheap labor force be attained (Rudra 2007).

Intergovernmental and international organizations are deemed as considerably influential in the expansion of welfare policies - especially in the proliferation of social assistance programs such as the CCT's in the last three decades. Historically, the ILO was an important promoter of old-age pensions and other securities in the early 20th century. In the 1990s and 2000s, furthermore, the

IMF asked many Latin American governments to minimize the social security expenditures (Haggard and Kaufman 2008). During the same period of time, the World Bank was an active policy advisor that suggested and supported the innovation and implementation of various social assistance programs in developing countries (Van Gils and Yörük 2017). Van Gils and Yörük (2017) argued that the World Bank was politically motivated in advising the adoption of welfare policies in order to contain protests and political unrest.

Lastly, *state capacity theory* posits that development of more generous and inclusive welfare state regime goes hand in hand with the development of state capacity, means of extraction, and government effectiveness (Goldberg and Rosenthal 2002; Rudra 2007; Kuhnle and Sander 2010; Barrientos et al. 2013). Especially, some scholars of the welfare state formation asserted that many developing states do not have adequate legitimate and autonomous capacities to maintain a fully-functioning welfare state with extensive social assistance policies (G. Wood and Gough 2006). Up until very recently, many developing countries lacked strong state capability, mature market, and financial system that would first lead to commodification and then develop welfare state regimes (Gough and Wood 2004). According to Gough and Wood (2004), in those cases, governments either do not attempt at provision (informal security regimes) or do hamper the welfare of the larger segments (insecurity regimes). It is further claimed that in the absence of full state capacity, state apparatus could not extract, thus, redistribute resources in the form of social provisions (Gough and Wood 2004; Rudra 2007; Seekings 2010).

2.3.3. *Electoral drivers of social assistance provision*

Democratization and electoral competition as a driver of social assistance provision and expansion proved to be capable of explaining many cases in both developed and developing countries. After elaborating on the electoral explications, I share some space for the *theory of the entrepreneurship of international organizations*, which has been recently influential

Among political explications, *democratization theory* and *electoral politics* have probably attracted the most attention. Contending that democratization and electoral concerns creates incentives to respond popular demands and address on the socio-economic cleavages (Myles and Quadagno 2002; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Seekings 2012; Barrientos et al. 2013; Yoruk and Kuhnle Forthcoming). Esping-Andersen (1990) suggested that historically speaking, the role that electoral politics played was crucial in the formation of social-democratic welfare state regimes with generous social securities and assistance programs in Scandian countries and Netherlands (Hicks and Swank 1983; Quadagno 1987; Allan and Scruggs 2004). Moreover, building on the third wave democratization cases of 1990s, scholars asserted that the developing countries with democratic transition as well as democratization experienced a more inclusive and generous move in welfare provision (Barrientos et al. 2013). One significant recent example of this phenomenon is South Korea, in which pro-democratization protests led government to reconcile with constitution and regulation changes (Song 2003, 20; Seekings 2012). Later on, during electoral competition following democratization, addressing to the popular demands, both incumbents and oppositions promised to increase benefits, and after the elections not only the existing old-age pension

provision is extended to larger population but also a new health insurance system is introduced (Jo-Seol 2004).

While democratization is widely associated with more inclusive governance and populism, different authors expressed various accounts on the relationship between authoritarian regimes and social assistance provision. Historically, authoritarian regimes, for instance Latin American authoritarian regimes, are considered as having upper-class biases, favoring the economic elites that in return prolonging regime stability and duration (O'Donnell, Cardoso, and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 1991; Snyder and Yackovlev 2000). However, others showed that a new group of authoritarian regimes dominant in the 21st century has made an effective usage of the social benefits to not only contain discontent but also legitimize the authoritarian regime (Yörük 2012a; Dorlach 2015; Somer 2016; Öniş 2017). For instance, Somer drew attention to the Turkish case, emphasizing how Justice and Development Part (AKP) effectively used the welfare programs for two reasons with implications for the authoritarian regimes. On the one hand, the AKP government introduced new means-tested social assistance programs that are promoted as a charity-related with the AKP governance rather than citizenship rights, which creates a distributive regime that is more likely to lead favoritism towards particular parties and political personalities and exclusion rather than democratic inclusion (Somer 2016). On the other hand, these social assistance policies are used as a means to legitimize of the authoritarian polities (Solinger 2015; Öniş 2017; Barrientos and Pellissery 2012).

2.4. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

Even though scholars are traditionally more concerned with the structural, institutional, and electoral factors of social assistance provision, there are some crucial cases in developing countries whose expansion of social assistance over time cannot be explained by these theories. Take South Africa and Mexico, for instance. Despite unpropitious structural, institutional and electoral factors, which include stagnant economic growth, productive developmental strategy, and one-party dominant electoral regime, both South Africa and Mexico experienced considerable expansion in the social assistance provision over time. So, which factors explain this phenomenon? What explains this?

There is another school of thought that is widely disregarded and underemphasized: *contentious politics and its effect on the proliferation of social assistance programs*. This body of literature aimed at attracting scholarly attention to social assistance provision that is directed at “prevention” and “containment” of contentious politics through the provision of welfare benefits (Isaac and Kelly 1981; Fording 1997). It is asserted that despite unpropitious structural, institutional and electoral factors, political elites might be willing to introduce and expand social assistance policies in order to prevent contentious activism from getting stronger and more influential (Piven and Cloward 1971). Various modes of contentious politics, such as social movements, labor movements, and protests, are claimed to be influential in the formation as well as conservation of social programs (Isaac and Kelly 1981; Gøsta Esping-Andersen 1993; Pierson 2001; Weiss 2005).

Many of these studies concentrate on the effect of social contention with social assistance claims and demands (Gosta Esping-Andersen 1990; M. G. Giugni

1998; Pierson 2001). A recent study, revealed that austerity policies with reduction in the welfare and assistance spending have led to an increase in the number of the protests in order to maintain the previous levels of benefits through grievances mechanism (M. Giugni and Grasso 2015)².

However, it should be noted that there are other scholars who have underscored the fact that contentious activism should not necessary be about social policies. Indeed, according to Polanyi, for instance, social assistance programs first developed in England because the industrialization and land enclosure led to considerable labor mobility in England that labor movements were pressuring the state that led to centralized state intervention (Polanyi 2001; Bahle, Pfeifer, and Wendt 2010). These labor movements were not necessarily demanding direct social assistance policies but an expansion of labor rights and improvements in working conditions.

In the case of the United States, moreover, it is theoretically and empirically laid out that during 1960s, the American government were directly targeting the protestors with social assistance programs in order to contain them (Piven and Cloward 1971; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Jennings 1983; Fording 1997). In *Divide and Pacify*, Vanhuysse (2006) showed that in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the unpopular liberal transition to market democracy amidst widespread poverty and unemployment was possible only because states used the welfare policies strategically to prevent and contain mass dissatisfaction, protests, and strikes.³ In

² For another account that explains why the reaction to austerity protests has been lower than expected, see Ebbinghaus (2012).

³ For same phenomenon that Lithuania underwent, see Atas (2018).

the case of Turkey, Yoruk showed that the Turkish government effectively used a social assistance program, namely *Green Card*, to target the Kurdish minority and Kurdish provinces in order to contain the Kurdish unrest (Yoruk 2012b; Yörük 2012b). Meng (2018), moreover, asserted that in its transition to neoliberal policies with mass privatization of the state-owned enterprises (SOE's), the Chinese government has openly used the pensions and social benefits in order to get the consent of the people.

Grounding on the Piven and Cloward's (1971) theory that governments employ social assistance policies as a response to contentious politics to contain and to prevent them from becoming even stronger, I argue that social assistance provision and coverage increases after the number of protests increases. As the number and intensity contentious politics escalates, governments would have incentive to utilize social assistance programs to mitigate people's willingness to protest and contend for their causes. Thus, my hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis: The more protests a province hosts, the more people receive social assistance benefits in the following time period.

However, what makes governments willing to provide material benefits alongside repressive policies as a response to contentious politics? In understanding the motivation of political elites in using social assistance provision to contain contentious politics activism, I make use of the theoretical and empirical investigations of many conflict studies that substantiated the negative association between the use of social programs as the independent variable and acts of terrorism and conflict onsets as the dependent variable in taking grievances, greed, opportunities, and governance into consideration.

Based on Gurr's groundbreaking work, *Psychological Factors in Civil Violence* (1968), grievance approach posits that the "relative discrepancy" between what is deserved and what is received results in discontent among social groups that is translated into "collective response of conflict and civil war" (Gurr 1968). In many developing countries, factors, including low human development, poor public health, social securities, low gross domestic product per capita, ethnic discrimination, and group rivalries, are assumed to reinforce existing grievances among different segments of society. This, in return, makes social harmony difficult to maintain and consequently leads to conflicts and acts of terrorism (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Kreutz 2010; Walter 2015; Paul Collier et al. 2003).

Regan and Norton (2005) proposed that resource distribution and subsequent grievances is a significant predictor of both civil wars and other violent forms of contestation. Burgoon (Burgoon 2006) contended that through the percentage of welfare spending in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is statistically and substantively associated with the acts of domestic and international terrorism (Burgoon 2006). In grounding his argument, he proposed a mechanism that social welfare policies decrease grievances caused by economic inequalities, poverty as well as religious extremism whereas it increases the capacity for terror through raising resources (Burgoon 2006; Hendrix and Young 2014). Another recent study, conducted by Sexton, suggested that because of the efficiency of material benefits and aids in decreasing grievances, many rebels reacted against these benefits through hampering its distribution in Afghanistan (Sexton 2016).

In addition to grievance-based accounts, Fearon and Laitin's work, *Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war*, (Fearon and Laitin 2003) brought greed into

the scene based on the opportunity dimension. Considered rational with preferences and interests over material resources, actors might remobilize in the presence of plunderable goods, state revenues and natural resources to exploit (Fearon and Laitin 2003). This paradigm does not only explain why states with rich natural resources experience conflicts more often but also sheds light on the reason why these states undergo prolonged wars (P. Collier 2004; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Based on an experimental design in Philippines, Crost, Felter, and Johnston revealed that the social assistance programs, in their case a CCT program, decreased the influence of the rebel groups and recruitment rates in villages where the CCT's are distributed compared to those without the provision (Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2016). In explaining this, they drew attention to decreasing grievances and increasing opportunity cost of participation into insurgency (Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2016).


Some scholars also drew attention to governance and institutions in answering the question of what leads to civil wars. Hegre and Nygård (2015) asserted that good political and economic governance has considerable impact on the peace maintenance that reduces the likelihood of onset or reignition of conflicts. Combining Gurr's theory of "relative deprivation" (Gurr 1968) and opportunity theories, Hegre and Nygård (2015, 987) suggested that since governments are perceived to be responsible for the discrepancy between expectations and reality, governments' political and economic performance in alleviating present grievances, in the forms of social benefits, is crucial in the prevention of civil conflict relapse.

Walter (2015) also contended that political and legal institutions serve as checks and balances on the governments where combatants reach a negotiated settlement. As governments are restricted by these institutions, they would have fewer incentives as well as fewer opportunities to act in an opposing way to the previous settlements and decisions (Walter 2015, 1). Moreover, as these political and legal institutions render the commitments of the incumbents more reliable and convincing due to the constraints they impose, the bargaining problem that arises as a result of the lack of information and credibility of commitment is resolved (Walter 2015, 8).

Taydas and Peksen (2012), furthermore, tested the argument that Burgoon proposed with a different dependent variable, *civil war onset*, which showed that as the welfare spending increases as a share of the GDP, the likelihood of having conflict onset is found to significantly decrease. Here, Taydas and Peksen (2012) suggested that the use of welfare policies potentially mitigates grievances and greed to mobilize and signals government commitment for a better and more just governance. Another study conducted in Iraq showed that a government change caused optimism among minorities that the new government would provide public goods and material benefits, consequently leading to diminished support for insurgents (Mikulaschek, Pant, and Tesfaye 2016). Last but not least, Fumerton contributed to this literature by showing that not only states but also militias that

fighters against rebel groups aim at benefits provision to maintain “wartime social order” (Fumerton 2018).

Figure 1: The graph of potential causal mechanism.



Building upon my hypothesis’ implications and conflict literature’s expectation of a negative association between social assistance and contentious politics, I propose the following mechanisms could be accountable for the aforementioned relationship: As an administrative unit hosts more number and more intense contentious activism, the political elite would be more concerned about (a) the decreased political and societal stability and (b) the undermined legitimacy of the government. Moreover, as once protests start and pass the tipping point, it would lead to (c) the decreased opportunity cost of contentious activism with a potential to augment the number of diversity of the protestors and (d) the increased likelihood of organized contentious activism that would further intensify the contentious activism.

At this point, governments introduce new social assistance programs or increase the coverage and extent of the existing ones to larger masses because as conflict literature has shown and suggested, governments anticipate that these new social programs could decrease people's grievances over socio-economic or redistributive issues, which leads governments to anticipate a diminishing contentious activism. Moreover, through providing material assistance, governments expect to increase the opportunity cost of contentious politics for the masses. Put differently, facing contentious activism, governments distribute benefits with the expectation of decreasing people's willingness to protest. Other than that, many scholarly studies and policy recommendations lead political elites, government members, and state officials to anticipate that further material benefit provision would lead to a serious reduction of the greed over material concerns, thus, decrease the contentious politics. Last but not least, by means of new and well-targeted policies, governments expect to signal their commitment for a better and more just governance and yield in legitimacy over contested issues. Hence, through reflecting its commitment for a better governance, governments anticipate lessening contentious activism. As a consequent to these expectations, governments introduce new social assistance or/and increase the extent of the existing social grants.

CHAPTER 3:

**CASE SELECTION: SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA**

3.1. CASE SELECTION

In this chapter, I present and justify my research strategy and the subsequent case selection. As mentioned in the previous chapter, my hypothesis is stated as follows: as the number of protests increases in an administrative unit, it is expected that the more people receive assistance provision in the following time period. In testing my hypothesis, I adopt a research strategy that is grounded on a critical case rather than a large-N across-country design for three reasons. First, in understanding the relationship between my independent and dependent variables and revealing the causal mechanism, theory-testing and theory-building critical case design proves to be stronger than large-N cross-country research designs. Second, given the endogenous nature of contentious politics and social assistance provision, conducting research with smaller and more fine-grained unit of analysis would be better empirical conduct because as the unit of analysis gets smaller, we expect less confoundedness caused by the endogeneity. Thus, having an empirical research with sub-national variation across regions would have less omitted variable and simultaneous causality bias than the one at the country level. Lastly, provided that many developing countries do not provide adequate data for the research purposes, the number and instances of missing observations might introduce bias to the estimation. Thus, guaranteeing the internal validity at the expense of the external validity is a reasonable trade-off for research design. In fact, I compensate this

trade-off through conducting another comparative research design (*the Most Different Systems Design*) that increases the external validity of my findings to larger number of developing countries.

Furthermore, as a theory-testing and theory-building critical case, I choose South Africa for (1) theory-testing purposes and (2) theory-developing purposes. First, for theory testing purposes, South Africa proves to be a suitable case to investigate the aforementioned relation provided that there is a substantial variation in both independent (contentious politics) and dependent (social grant provision) variables over time. Indeed, the number of social assistance program recipients has reached to 17 million people from two million people in the course of two decades. Among other social assistance programs, the South Africa's flagship social assistance program, the *Child Support Grant* (CSG), proves as a great policy to investigate as the number of its beneficiaries increased from one million in 2000 to 12 million people in 2017, which is the largest social assistance policy in South Africa and one the largest ones in the developing countries. Furthermore, compared to other programs, the CSG is less clearly defined and implemented program that creates fertile avenues for discretion.

Regarding my independent variable, contentious politics, many authorities considered South Africa as "the protest capital of the world," implying the high number of protests taking place in South Africa each year (De Juan and Wegner 2019). Having been one of the most significant aspects of political landscape, contentious politics and grassroot movements have been very vibrant (Runciman 2016). The South African Police Service's (SAPS) records reported an increase in the number of all crowd-related incidents from 8,907 (994 unrest) in 2009 to 14,693

(3,715 unrest) in 2017 (South African Police Service 2017). Another analysis of the SAPS' Incident Registration Information System (IRIS) unraveled that there were approximately 67,750 police-recorded protests (80% of them were 'orderly', 10% of them were 'disruptive', and 10% of them were 'violent') between 1997 and 2013 (Runciman et al. 2016). Among all protests, the highest in 2012 with around 5,500 police-recorded protests and the lowest in 2004 with about 2,300 protests (Runciman et al. 2016). Hence, South Africa provides an appropriate and suitable case to investigate the association between the protest and the social assistance provision.

Additionally, the relative weakness of the structural and institutional drivers of the social assistance provision makes South Africa a critical case where the association between social assistance and contentious politics is little influenced by other confounding factors. This setting with structural and institutional factors that have little explanatory power constitutes a *quasi-least-likely-case design* because other assumed drivers of social assistance provision cannot totally explain the South African case. Indeed, unlike many other developing countries that implemented the innovative social assistance policies to mitigate the grievances caused by neoliberal economic transformation, South Africa has had already an open-economy whose developmental state is interwoven with the liberal economic paradigm that is not considered as a likely initiator of the expansion (Seekings 2012). Economic conditions, in fact, were not propitious for the growth of the social assistance recipients provided that the GDP growth has not been robust enough to finance the serious number of people in need (Barrientos and Pellissery 2012).

Table 3: The South African case as a theory-testing critical case

The South African Case	Structural Factors		Institutional Factors	Electoral Factors	Independent Variable of Interest	Dependent Variable
	Economic Growth	Demographic Factors	Developmental Strategy	Electoral Competitiveness	<i>Contentious Politics</i>	<i>Social Assistance Provision</i>
Present (Direction of Effect on the DV)	Stagnant (-)	No significant variation (-)	Productive (-)	One-Party Dominant Regime (-)	<i>High Variation (+)</i>	<i>High Variation (+)</i>

Moreover, with no significant change in de-industrialization, demographic, and age-related factors, South Africa stands as an interesting outlier case for the social assistance expansion. While explanations concerned with high poverty and inequality rates seem to fit to the South Africa case, many scholars drew attention to the fact that these problems require more structural reforms in labor market, business, and education (Seekings and Natrass 2015). In the absence of such reforms, the socio-economic necessities theory is less able to explain the increase in the incidence of social assistance programs as a sustainable and rational policymaking. Last but not least, Barrientos et al claimed that the main stimulus for the expansion of social assistance programs in South Africa was the introduction of a new constitution by the end of the apartheid regime that favors more egalitarian policies (2013). However, as the much of expansion occurred in the second half of 2000s, which was predominated by the one-party dominant electoral regime that caused anti-corruption movements and widespread protests, this theory cannot adequately address to the growth but to the introduction of the CSG (Barrientos and Pellissery 2012; von Holdt 2013; Piper and von Lieres 2016).

Second, for theory-developing purposes, the South African case stands as an “exploratory case” to better grasp and comprehend the nature of the association between contentious politics and social assistance provision given that South Africa had developed social assistance programs relatively earlier than many other developing countries, and the history of South Africa could answer the questions that how and why social assistance policies are expanded and provided to the larger masses. Indeed, while empirical investigations indicate statistical and substantive relationship between the two factors, it falls short in explaining what makes governments willing to provide material benefits alongside repressive policies as a response to contentious politics.

3.3. SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CHILD SUPPORT GRANT

Although the social assistance expansion with substantial coverage is a recent phenomenon, South Africa experimented with social assistance programs earlier than many other developing countries. Introduction of the first nationwide social pension in South Africa dates to 1928, which renders it the first country with full-fledged national program in African continent as well as one of the pioneer nations in the global ‘South’ (Seekings 2008, 2012; F. Lund 2012). Nonetheless, this is not the sole peculiarity of the South African welfare system. Social pensions were engineered and implemented as non-contributory, means-tested programs with institutionalized racism, functioning as diversified financial provision for those in need based on race rather than as a compensatory or saving mechanism like social securities (Pelham 2007). In other words, given its strikingly early development of welfare state that is centered around non-contributory social

assistance programs rather than social security or social work schemes, South Africa stood as an outlier case among developing countries (Seekings 2008).

When Apartheid period ended, democratic South Africa was facing serious problems, such as severe income inequalities, high poverty, unemployment, and infant mortality rates that were inherited from the Apartheid period. One of the first scientific studies revealed that about one half of the South Africans were living under the poverty line in 1993 (Seekings and Natrass 2015). This was a striking finding because researchers operationalized poverty line 60% higher than the internationally used 1\$ per day (Seekings and Natrass 2015).

The democratic South Africa had to take substantial measures to alleviate these issues and to democratize racially biased political, social and economic institutions. Among them, one reform was a significant step towards democratization: a new constitution. Expanding social rights to all people regardless of racial differences, the new constitution was providing the rights to access to healthcare, basic needs such as food and water, and social assistances for those in immediate need. Given the fact that social policy reforms and new policies during the transition period would have significant socio-economic and political implications for the democratic South Africa, *the African National Congress* (ANC), conducted numerous surveys and censuses to compile data on the poverty and inequality. Based on the needs revealed by surveys' findings, the ANC reformed the welfare system as a part of reconstruction after becoming the government party following the first democratic elections in 1994 (Seekings and Natrass 2015; van der Merwe 1997).

Promised in the *Reconstruction and Development Program*, the 1994 ANC election manifesto, a number of new social policies, including social pensions, social assistance grants, public work and social housing were introduced (Lombard 2008). It should be noted that, however, as the ANC was not able to carry out land reforms as it promised in the framework of reconciliation, it is largely compensated by social assistance provisions with considerable coverage. Put differently, subsequent to the end of Apartheid in 1994, the segregationist welfare policies were abolished and ‘principle of discrimination’ was replaced by ‘principle of equality’ that made the benefits more equal and fair (Leubolt 2014; F. Lund 2012). As a consequence of these progressive reforms, number of social assistance programs has significantly increased in regard to their expenditure and coverage. When we come to 2018, more than 17 million South African residents receive some form of social assistance, which amounts for the one third of the whole population.

The major South African social assistance programs today include Old-Age Grant, Disability Grant, Child Support Grant, Foster Child Grant, Care Dependency Grant, and War Veteran's Grant. While all of these social assistance programs are means-tested based on income and assets, it covers not only the citizens but also all residents, which has a significant implication given that there is a number of immigrant people from neighboring countries that cannot be underestimated. All social assistance programs are administered by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), which is an agency founded to administer social assistances by getting separated from the Ministry of Social Development.

One of the programs, namely the Child Support Grant (CSG), which was introduced in 1998, has experienced considerable increase in its coverage,

benefiting more than 12 million poor children in 2018. It should be noticed that the CSG is accountable for the much of the variation in the number of social assistance beneficiaries. Given the resources needed to finance the grant, and widespread poverty, inequality and unemployment, the CSG has attracted considerable scholarly attention.

Following the suggestions of the ‘Lund Committee,’ the Child Support Grant (CSG) replaced the State Maintenance Grant (SMG), which was given to a small number of single parents with children on racial terms during the Apartheid period. Deracialized and reformed to be more inclusive, the CSG is aimed at mitigating child poverty by targeting the primary caregiver (Westphal 2016; F. J. Lund 2008; F. Lund 2012; Patel and Plagerson 2016). Unlike Foster Child Grant and Care Dependency Grant, however, the CSG is aimed at to be more inclusive and less demanding for the larger masses without official documentation and adequate means to ask for social grant (F. Lund 2012; Patel and Plagerson 2016).

Because the SMG provided R127 for children in 1997, which could have been constituted serious finance burden as the coverage extends, the CSG was implemented with a sum of R100 for each child under seven years old in 1998, which was then deemed as a regressive, hostile enactment, causing widespread public debates (F. J. Lund 2008; Patel and Plagerson 2016). Another source of concern was means-tested eligibility criteria. Despite the Lund Committee’s suggestions that initially envisioned universal program for every child under seven years whose primary caregiver was the South African citizen, the South African government drafted and enacted the new CSG as a means-tested program (Patel and Plagerson 2016; F. Lund 2012). Even though the grant initially covered fewer than

100,000 people, as eligibility criteria loosen gradually, the number of the CSG beneficiaries increases steady, surpassing approximately 12 million in 2016 with the real cost per grant remaining constant over time (Seekings 2016). The requirement that the recipient must be a South African citizen is reregulated to be permanent resident in 2004 and documented refugees in 2012. The age restriction, furthermore, has kept on getting looser over time: incrementally increasing to 9 years in 2003, 11 years in 2004, 14 years in 2005, 15 years in 2009, and 16 years in 2010, 17 years in 2011 and 18 years in 2012 (F. Lund et al. 2009; Patel and Plagerson 2016; Westphal 2016; Seekings 2016). The extension from 15 years to 18 years, however, was controversial, sparking public debates regarding the costs and benefits of such a reform that, according to the opponents, would have increase the dependency to the state as well as the public expenditure (Patel and Plagerson 2016). In 2015, the Social Development Minister announced the plans to extend the CSG to those under 21 years old, yet there has not been any reform in the mentioned year (Donwald Pressly 2015). The reform is aimed at providing subsistence level income to the young adults so that they could increase their human capital through further trainings and education (Mogotsi and Engenas 2016). Furthermore, by 2016, it is anticipated that approximately 800,000 people would qualify for the program if the reform is enacted (Mogotsi and Engenas 2016). In 2017, the subject to raise it to 21 has been discussed again at the ANC's national policy conference in Soweto, which final decision is determined to be taken ANC's national elective conference in December (Whittles 2017).

In the policy-making of the CSG, furthermore, the Department for Social Development (DSD) took active role while the South African Social Security

Agency (SASSA), founded in 2006, administers and delivers the assistance grants. In order to receive the CSG, the primary caregivers apply to the SASSA with the birth certificate, biometric data, fingerprints, photographs, and voice recording as well as the formal documents showing income and assets for means-test (Westphal 2016). In addition to these documents, a reference and a sworn testament by a reputable person, including, councilor, traditional leader, social worker, minister of religion, who knows the applicant and child is recommended (Westphal 2016; F. Lund 2012). The delivery of the grants is carried out by a biometric electronic system that each recipient is given a SASSA card with a unique identification that stores all aforementioned personal information that the beneficiary could use to withdraw the payments (Westphal 2016).

For the research conduct of this dissertation, the CSG proves to be a suitable program to build upon. First, the number of the CSG beneficiaries has shown considerable variation over time and across different provinces. Thus, it provides adequate degree of variation across both time and entity. Secondly, unlike other programs, it is relatively easier and less demanding program that does not require any medical documentation that creates considerable space for discretion. Third, it takes considerable short time to apply and receive the benefit upon approval. Consequently, the CSG is a good candidate for the purposes of this paper. In the following subsection, I will be reviewing the scholarly works, which are concerned with the CSG with regard to the approaches they took in analyzing the grant.

3.4. SCHOLARLY STUDIES ON THE CHILD SUPPORT GRANT

As the flagship social assistance program, the Child Support Grant is one of the most popular social assistance programs in the developing countries. Like the literature of social assistance provision, nevertheless, the majority of the scholarly work on the Child Support Grant are either descriptive or policy-outcome-oriented. Some of these studies with policy-outcome orientation investigated the program's effectiveness and success in poverty reduction (Grinspun 2016; Coetzee 2013; Leibbrandt et al. 2010), child development (Grinspun 2016; Coetzee 2013; Agüero, Carter, and Woolard 2007; Seekings 2008; Seekings and Natrass 2015), human capital accumulation (Coetzee 2013), more birth registration (Grinspun 2016; F. Lund 2012), female labor participation (Grinspun 2016), and women empowerment (Patel and Hochfeld 2011).

Fewer studies took the CSG into consideration in an analytical manner to reveal the causes or dynamics behind its provision or expansion, and these mostly concentrated on the structural, institutional, and electoral factors. Seekings, for instance, emphasized the role of population growth and deagrarianization in the mid-20th century in early social assistance development through dispossession and exacerbation of the market-driven vulnerabilities (Seekings 2008). Many other scholars highlighted neoliberal development strategies of trade liberalization, social security retrenchment and the subsequent exigent circumstances in necessitating the provision of the CSG to alleviate vulnerabilities (Johnson 2000; Cheru 2001; Midgley 2001; Ferguson 2007; van Driel 2009; Leubolt 2014; Seekings and Natrass 2015; Devereux 2013; Harris and Scully 2015).

Barrientos et al. and many other scholars asserted that the main stimulus for the provision of social assistance programs in South Africa was democratization, ramification of the new constitution, and early electoral competition following the end of the apartheid regime (Barrientos et al. 2013). Therefore, governments have been more motivated to pursue policies of social protection and social assistance despite stagnant economy and fiscal incapability (Barrientos et al. 2013; Barrientos and Pellissery 2012; Plagerson et al. 2019). Seekings underscored democratic transition and proceeding electoral competition for the votes of the poor as the driving force that increased social assistance expenditure and coverage (Seekings 2008). Patel moreover warned against a probable populist relationship between the ruling party and the masses, since the 2014 general elections, the ANC campaign discourse championed the ANC as ‘the hand’ feeding them, whereas supporting the opposition would mean betraying that hand. Thus, electoral competition and populist policies is considered as another factor that caused further expansion of the CSG (Patel and Plagerson 2016; Sadie, Patel, and Baldry 2016).

Lastly, other authors claim that the civil society with organized non-governmental organizations and grassroot movements, such as the Black Sash, the Children’s Institute, and the Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security, played a crucial role in the provision of the CSG by pressuring the government for the loosed eligibility criteria, more transparent application and delivery processes, and raised awareness among the poor (Devereux 2010, 201; Proudlock 2011; F. Lund 2012; Plagerson et al. 2019).

As it can be seen, the potential role of the contentious politics in the provision of social assistance provision is widely disregarded in the South African

CSG literature. In the following subchapter, I make a literature review on the contemporary contentious politics in South Africa.

3.4. CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA

As discussed in the previous subchapters, demonstrations, grassroots movements, and both violent and non-violent protests have constituted significant parts of political landscape. It should be noted that especially after second half of 21st century, the intensity and frequency of contentious politics activism substantially increased, coinciding with the election of Jacop Zuma as the president in 2009 (Duncan 2014; Seekings and Natrass 2015; Runciman et al. 2016).

The Incident Registration Information System (IRIS) records of the South African Police Service's (SAPS) suggests that number of all crowd-related incidents increased from 8,907 (of which 994 of them are labelled as crowd-related unrest) in 2009-2010 period to 14,693 (3,715 of which were unrest incidents) in 2016-2017 (South African Police Service 2017). According to Alexander, Runciman, and Maruping (2015), nevertheless, taking SAPS' IRIS records might be misleading as (1) these data capture all crowd-related incidences regardless of their aims and organization structures, such as recreational and cultural events, rather than protests, and (2) the description that the IRIS provides as 'peaceful' and 'unrest' do not imply anything about the nature of the gatherings but how police responded to incidents (Runciman et al. 2016). When redefined based on the characteristic of protests, however, it turned out that the IRIS data exacerbated the number of crowd-related unrests by almost twice (Runciman et al. 2016). In fact, during the time covering from 1997 to 2013, 67,750 protests were recorded (80% of them were 'orderly', 10% of them were 'disruptive', and 10% of them were

‘violent’), the highest in 2012 with around 5,500 police-recorded protests and the lowest in 2004 with about 2,300 protests (Runciman et al. 2016). When we looked at the geographical distribution of protest, Gauteng and Eastern Cape proved to have the highest number of protests among all provinces while Northern Cape had the lowest number of protests (Runciman et al. 2016).

Among the common causes of widespread protests, following factors appeared to be significant: the feelings of injustice and disappointment that grow from inequality, widespread practice of venality, inadequate service delivery, and neoliberal policies favoring the privatization of local services have given a sustained impetus for contentious actions in poorer townships and informal settlements (Alexander 2010). To elaborate, according to estimates that covers between 1997 and 2013, approximately 46% of all police-recorded protests were labor-related protests and about a quarter of them were ‘community’ protests (Runciman et al. 2016; Alexander et al. 2018). Put differently, although widely disregarded as a part of the trend of global protests, South Africa has had an increasing number of protests over time.

Table 4: The estimated number of protests based on the estimates of Runciman et al. (2016)

<i>Year</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>Totals</i>
<i>Estimated number of protests within peaceful eventuality</i>	2,903	2,049	4,054	4,561	2,589	2,182	2,641	4,004	3,995	4,179	3,437	56,950
<i>Estimated number of protests within unrest eventuality</i>	287	329	662	542	506	401	711	691	845	1,410	1,389	10,800
<i>Estimated total number of protests</i>	3,190	2,378	4,716	5,103	3,095	2,583	3,352	4,695	4,840	5,589	4,826	67,750

The South Africa protest trend has coincided and largely caused by the increased number of precariat, underemployment, and unemployment (Paret and Runciman 2016). Indeed, according to Paret and Runciman (2016) contemporary protest movements in South Africa can be analyzed under two broad categories, the first one that is led by the landless, displaced, underemployed, and unemployed and the other one, which is spearheaded by the laborers, both within and outside labor unions. The first group of protests is considered very important given its anti-neoliberal attitude against ruling party's market policies. These movements include *the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign*, *the Anti-Privatisation Forum* and *the Landless People's Movement*. While these organized movements were stronger in the early 2000s, "community protests" that are more less organized and more spontaneous in nature have become more widespread second half of the 2000s onwards (Paret and Runciman 2016). Originating in poor townships and informal settlements, these community protests have demanded more better public good provision, more representative and responsive government given their disappointment arising from marginalization and exclusion (Alexander 2010). Another interesting fact about the contemporary South African contentious politics is that there is an increasing trend in the number of community protests over time with ever growing disruptiveness and violence (Alexander et al. 2018). With its characteristic of having mostly occurred in poor townships and informal settlements with the aim of demanding better housing, electricity, and water services, the 'service delivery protests' attracted considerable attention among the scholars (Booyesen 2007; Alexander 2010; Runciman 2016; McKinley 2016; De Juan and Wegner 2019). Booyesen (2007, 2011) claimed that many people participated in

these protests to provide the ANC with a ‘reminder’ or a ‘signal’ of electoral promises for better services, without decreasing their electoral support to the ANC. Other scholars, however, considered these service delivery protests as the ‘rebellion of the poor’ that are against insufficient service provisions and negligent and corrupt local councilors (Atkinson 2007; Alexander 2010). Revisiting Booyen’s ‘dual repertoire’ framework, furthermore, Runciman claimed that the strong trend of voter abstention among protesters should be taken as another form of informal political reaction (Runciman 2016). The second group of protests are organized by laborers and labor unions. In fact, although the role of the labor unions were more emphasized, as the major labor unions, such as COSATU have started to serve to the interest of the ANC, these labor protests become more informal and outside the formal expansion of contestation (Paret and Runciman 2016).

In facing one of the highest rates of protests per capita in global South and North, the South African government adopted various direct, indirect and sometimes repressive and benevolent forms of policies to contain the protests. Indeed, many municipalities intentionally have hindered protests and gatherings by actively limiting access to information on necessary procedures to organize protests (Mukumba and Abdullah 2017; Right2Protest 2017a; Lancaster 2016). Furthermore, there have been many cases where municipalities and the SAPS worked together to create inaccurate public beliefs such that citizens have to obtain permissions to organize a public protest (Right2Protest 2017b; Duncan 2016; Chamberlain and Snyman 2017). This strategy is considered to lead a downsizing effect on the protest activities and grassroots movements (Chamberlain and Snyman 2017). The employment of incommensurate violence by police forces has been

another means of prevention and repression of contentious politics (Right2Protest 2017b; Seekings and Nattrass 2015; Chamberlain and Snyman 2017). One striking yet tragic instance of police violence was *the Marikana Massacre* in 2012, during which police forces opened fire on workers and killed 34 miners who were striking (Adelman 2015; Lancaster 2016). As this thesis also argues, government also used social benefits are used to contain protests as benevolent means, as well. A study conducted by Staniland in Guguletu, Cape Town, for instance, revealed that by taking advantage of the social assistances such as food parcels and work programs, ANC councilors had been able to contain potential protests and dissents, and to create incentives to maintain amicable relationships with state representatives (Staniland 2008).



CHAPTER 4:

RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

4.1. METHODOLOGY

Before testing my hypothesis in the South African context that an increase in the number of protests and riots on average is associated with an increase in the number of social assistance beneficiaries, holding others constant, I believe it is mandatory to address the nature of the relationship between my dependent variable and independent variable of interest as well as justifying my assumptions. The relationship between the number of protests and social assistance recipients might be expected to suffer from endogeneity bias for two reasons that violate zero conditional mean of error term assumption.

First reason is that as literature on social assistance expansion has remained feeble, there is no settled set of alternative explanations and controls. Thus, despite attempts at controlling for the socio-economic and demographic factors as effective controls, as a result of some disregarded, discarded or omitted variables, the analysis might suffer from omitted variable bias. Omitting a variable that is correlated with the independent variable of interest and a determinant of the dependent variable at the same time, would lead to biased causal effects. Another source of endogeneity bias is reverse causality because one may intuitively anticipate that a decrease in coverage of social assistance program might foment a strong discontent among the masses, leading to clamor and protests. In the literature, some scholars draw attention to this social phenomenon. Dawson (2014), for instance, points out the waves of protest and social unrest followed temporary breakdown of social assistance provision in Zandspruit, Johannesburg due to

bureaucratic paralysis before 2014 national election. Thus, unless simultaneous relationship is well addressed, zero conditional mean independence assumption would be violated, and endogeneity bias arises (1):

$$E [X_j|u] \neq 0 \text{ for some observations, where } j = 1, \dots, k \quad (1)$$

4.1.1 Empirical models

In order to address the endogeneity bias, I use **(i)** instrumental variable estimation with an identification strategy, composed of three exogenous and relevant instrumental variables, including *percentage change in maximum temperature*, *number of days with thunder*, and *number of official holidays*, to estimate the asymptotically unbiased causal effect of number of protests on number of social assistance grant recipients, **(ii)** entity-fixed effects to control for province idiosyncratic factors that are time invariant, and **(iii)** time-fixed effects to control for temporal shocks that are province-invariant. Based on these considerations, the first stage and second stage of two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) models are proposed as follows:

$$X_{i,t} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 Z_{1,i,t} + \pi_2 Z_{2,i,t} + \pi_3 Z_{3,i,t} + \alpha_n W_{n,i,t} + \eta_{1,i} + \eta_{2,t} + v_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

$$Y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1,i,t} + \mathbf{J}_n W_{n,i,t} + \eta_{1,i} + \eta_{2,t} + u_{i,t} \quad (3)$$

where:

- $Y_{i,t}$ is the natural logarithm of the number of the CSG recipients in a given i^{th} province and t^{th} month,
- $X_{1,i,t}$ is the number of protests in a given i^{th} province and t^{th} month,
- β_1 is the causal effect of number of protests on the dependent variable,
- $W_{n,i,t}$'s are n-number effective control variables for a given i^{th} province and t^{th} month,

- $Z_{i,t}$'s are instrumental variables of percentage change in maximum temperature, number of days with thunder, and number of official holidays in a given i^{th} province and t^{th} month,
- π_1 , π_2 , and π_3 , are the effect of the instrumental variables on the number of protests in the first stage of 2SLS,
- π_0 and β_0 are the constants of first and second stages of 2SLS, respectively,
- $v_{i,t}$ and $u_{i,t}$ are the error terms of first and second stages of 2SLS, respectively,
- $\eta_{1,i}$ is time-invariant, province-specific factors, and
- $\eta_{2,t}$ is province-invariant, year-specific factors.

Note that under six assumptions, an instrumental variable estimator could be considered consistent (asymptotically unbiased) and approximately normally distributed:

- 1- Conditional mean independence v_{it} of $Z_{k,i,t}$ given controls $W_{r,it}$'s must be hold:

$$E(v_{it} | Z_{1,it}, \dots, Z_{k,it}, W_{1,it}, \dots, W_{n,it}, \eta_{1,i}, \eta_{2,t}) = E(v_{it} | W_{1,it}, \dots, W_{n,it}, \eta_{1,i}, \eta_{2,t}) \quad (4)$$

- 2- Observations is i.i.d. drawn from their joint distribution:

$$(Y_{i1}, \dots, Y_{iT}, X_{1i1}, \dots, X_{1iT}, W_{ni1}, \dots, W_{niT}, Z_{mi1}, \dots, Z_{miT}) \text{ are i.i.d.} \quad (5)$$

- 3- Large outliers are unlikely: $(Y_{it}, X_{1it}, W_{nit}, Z_{mit}, u_{it}, \text{ and } v_{it})$ have nonzero finite fourth moments.

- 4- There is no perfect multicollinearity.

- 5- Instrumental variables must be relevant that correlation between main independent variable of interest and IV's should not be equal to zero:

$$\text{cov}(Z_{mit}, X_{1it}) \neq 0. \quad (6)$$

- 6- Instrumental variables must be exogenous that correlation between the error term and IV's must be equal to zero:

$$\text{corr}(Z_{1it}, u_{it}) = 0, \dots, \text{corr}(Z_{mit}, u_{it}) = 0. \quad (7)$$

In my analysis, through adding socio-economic controls such as population, share of population without food access, a proxy variable for economic development as well as residential construction, and last but not least, political control variables of ANC vote share and number of protests in contiguous provinces, I assure the conditional mean independence of error term in the first stage (v_{it}) so that the predicted values of the independent variable of interest ($\hat{X}_{1,it}$) would be uncorrelated with the error term (u_{it}). Note that this also constitutes basis for adding the effective controls to the first stage of 2SLS as well.

Second assumption suggests that observations are independent across entities whereas there is no such restriction within entities. This enables us to have 60 observations for each 9 provinces in the course of 5 years. Yet, autocorrelation among error terms might arise as some omitted variables are correlated over time. So, neither homoscedasticity assumption nor heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors would be valid as they *do* assume no serial correlation (Stock & Watson, 2015, 413). Hence, I employ *clustered standard errors*, one type of heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors, to loosen the assumption of no serial correlation. As a result, standard errors as well as test statistics are robust to the presence of arbitrary heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-entity correlation. Moreover, according to Cameron & Miller (2015) and Stock & Watson (2015), if n (number of clusters) is small and T (time period) is


large, “ t -statistics need to be compared with critical values from the t_{n-1} and F -statistic testing with q restrictions needs to be compared to the $F_{q,n-q}$ critical value multiplied by $(n-1)/(n-q)$ ” (Stock & Watson, 2015, 429-30). Therefore, I use appropriate software (STATA) command that would correct for not only regression tests but also additional tests regarding the validity of instruments.⁴

For the third and fourth assumptions, necessary tests are conducted to see if they hold true in my analysis. A scatterplot graph reveals that one observation stands as an outlier out of 540 observations (see Figure 2).⁵ Consequently, in the empirical findings section, results with and without the aforementioned outlier are provided. For the fourth assumption, a correlation table is attained and controlled for any correlation among variables. Fortunately, there is no correlation larger than 0.60 between the variable of interest and other variables. Thus, I proceed by assuring that these two assumptions hold well.

⁴ Both STATA’s official *xtivreg* and Christopher Baum’s *xtivreg2* have *small* correction. Nevertheless, Baum’s *xtivreg2* applies same t_{n-1} adjustments for additional instrumental variable validity tests, which renders *xtivreg2* more preferable.

⁵ The outlier observation belongs to Eastern Cape province for June 2013 with 65 protests. Note that while it is 6 standard deviation greater than the average number of protests, it is 5 standard deviation greater than the province average.

Figure 2: Outliers



Fifth and sixth assumptions are about validity of an instrumental variable (IV). For relevance of the IV's, first, under-identification test with *Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics* are used to test the null that the statistic is under-identified.⁶ Second, I test my IV's to see if they are weak instruments. Stock and Watson warn against the weak instruments as they would introduce considerable bias to the results (2015). Thus, by using *Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics*, which are preferred over *Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic* if serial correlation within entities is allowed through clustering, I test for weak instruments with critical values provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). Finally, for the last assumption of exogeneity, I use *Hansen J statistics* of overidentification test for all IV's to test the null that IV's are

⁶ Note that it is distributed with chi-squared with degrees of freedom (exogeneous variable-endogenous variable+1). Yet, as I have a small set of clusters, appropriate adjustment is carried out by the STATA's unofficial command *xtivreg2*.

uncorrelated with the error term.⁷ As I have more instrumental variables (3) than endogenous variables (1), I am able to report *J-statistics*. Thanks to all these tests, I can be sure that my IV estimation is consistent.

One restriction that my research is facing arises as a result of using clustered standard errors. Given that rank of variance-covariance matrix of moment conditions is equal to number of clusters, in this case $n=9$, if variance-covariance moment condition (number of coefficients) is larger than its rank, variance-covariance matrix would not be of full rank. This situation, furthermore, renders overidentification test unfeasible and standard errors of individual coefficients untrustworthy.⁸ Hence, my analysis is economical in terms of control variables added to regression. To guarantee conditional mean independence assumption, however, different specifications are conducted. Further discussion is provided in the analysis section.

Lastly, for robustness-check, the model is also estimated by the generalized method of moments (IV-GMM), which proves to be more efficient than 2SLS when the equation is overidentified (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007). Thus, I test the significance of my variable of interest with a more efficient estimator as well.

4.1.2. Data and operationalization

Dependent Variable: In order to operationalize my dependent variable, I use monthly reports published by the South African Social Security Agency

⁷ Note that *Hansen J statistics* is preferable over *Sargan-Hansen J statistics* if the error term is not homoscedastic or not serially uncorrelated. Thus, I take into account correlation among observation of the same entities.

⁸ Despite the fact that it is advised to approach standard errors of individual coefficients with caution in case of not full rank, the overall significance of the model can be tested.

(SASSA). The monthly reports provide statistics on the number of social assistance beneficiaries for each social assistance scheme. Furthermore, reports provide the number of social assistance recipients for each province give a particular month. Given that these statistics are officially published, they fit well to my research. In operationalizing my dependent variable, I take the data on the Child Support Grant (CSG) as well as the total number of social assistance beneficiaries for all programs.

Independent Variable: I operationalize my independent variable of interest based on the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) dataset (Raleigh et al. 2010). This dataset contains disintegrated information about both violent and nonviolent events through variables, such as parties involved, aims, and location (Raleigh et al. 2010). The data, which are compiled through news coverage analysis from diverse news resources in terms of ideology and scale (local, regional, national, international), are coded manually by ACLED annotators (Raleigh et al. 2010). These observations are coded on a daily basis. While compiling data, ACLED team attempts at maintaining accuracy by inter-coder and intra-coder validity checks (Raleigh et al. 2010). In operationalizing my independent variable of interest, I excluded observations with less accuracy (especially if they are given less than 4 points out of 5 precision scores) with respect to temporal and spatial precession of events. As each event in ACLED is daily coded, I aggregated all protests and riots by month for each province. Consequently, I obtained aggregate number of protests and riots for each month and province. The aggregate variable does not imply information regarding their sizes. It is due to the fact that the ACLED dataset does not provide number of protest participants but only number

of deaths during the conflict. Therefore, I am contented with the number of protests solely.

Control Variables: Control variables are chosen based on alternative explanations in literature. As was discussed in the introduction, the literature emphasizes socioeconomic factors, such as population, poverty rate, and economic activity as alternative explanations. To account for these alternative explanations, I included three control variables: population, rate of people with inadequate food access as a proxy for poverty rate, and total amount of residential construction completed in a given month as other proxy variables for economic activity of the corresponding province. Furthermore, to control for political factors, I incorporated three control variables: number of votes received by the ANC in the most recent election, number of total death as a result of protests, and number of protests in contiguous provinces.

Variables of population and rate of people with inadequate food access are obtained from general household surveys that are annually published by the South Africa Statistics Agency (STATS SA). These variables vary annually, implying that for a given province, values of these variables do change on a yearly basis. I used these annual variables as a result of a lack of monthly statistics. Acknowledging that there are sophisticated methods of interpolation to generate missing values, I avoided generating new observations as for each province, I should have interpolated 11 data points based in one observation for a given year, which might have impaired my research conduct more than improving it. Hence, these effective controls aim at assuring conditional mean independence of the independent variable of interest. Last socio-economic variable, total amount of residential construction

completed in a given month at a constant price with 2010 base is included into the analysis. As a monthly variable, it would serve well as a proxy of monthly variation in economic activities. This variable is also obtained from the STAT SA. Controlling for these socio-economic variables, I aim at having an unbiased estimate of the impact of the number of protests on number of the CSG recipients.

Political controls, furthermore, are added into analysis so that variation in the number of the CSG beneficiaries caused by other political factors could be controlled. First political variable is the number of votes received by the African National Congress (ANC) in the most recent election. Between 2013 and 2017, two elections were held (2014 national and 2016 municipal as well as 2011 provincial election to be accounted for until 2014). This includes both municipal and national elections. It aims at differentiating the impact of business cycles and province favoritism based on votes received by the ANC from the protests in explaining the variation in the number of social assistance beneficiaries.

Remaining two political variables are the number of total death as a result of protests, and the average number of protests in contiguous provinces. I included number of deaths based on the intuition that number of deaths occurred during protests is likely to disrupt social order, which might lead the ANC government to be more generous to maintain stability. Lastly, I added the number of protests in contiguous provinces to take account the increase in social assistance beneficiaries as a consequence of protests in these provinces as well.

Instrumental Variables: In order to overcome the endogeneity problem mentioned in the methodology section, I include three instrumental variables into the IV estimation. The first two are exogenous weather variables, namely,

percentage change in maximum temperature and number of days with thunder. Relevance of these IV's comes from the social psychology literature. Indeed, many scholars suggested that as temperatures gets higher, tempers and anger are expected to increase as well (Bell and Baron 1976; Rotton and Cohn 2000). Furthermore, the number of days with thunder is a good proxy of precipitation that discourages people to participate into protests. Hence, both weather variables are relevant to the independent variable of interest. Another exogenous variable is number of days of official holidays and school vacations in each month and province. Note that, the fact that schools in South Africa follow either one of two disparate schedules designed for inland and coastal provinces for each year that consist of four school terms, the number of days for each month and province varies. As it can be seen, holiday and vacations are anticipated to decrease the cost of mobilization for a protest or riot, which makes it a relevant instrumental variable. Furthermore, for an instrumental variable to be exogeneous, the variable should not be correlated with the error term, thus, dependent variable. In theory, the number of social assistance beneficiaries or its determinants are unlikely to be correlated with either monthly weather or holiday variables. Hence, these IV's could be assumed to be relevant to independent variable of interest yet exogenous to the dependent variable.

Data for the weather instruments are taken from two major sources. For exogenous weather variables, both temperature (average, minimum, and maximum), and precipitation data is obtained from the National Climatic Data Center's (NCDC) Global Surface Summary of Day database. The NCDC dataset logs daily weather conditions from more than 150 weather stations across South

Africa. Holiday instrument, furthermore, is coded based on the South African National Calendar.

4.1.3 Descriptive Statistics

The sample that I analyze here consists of 540 province-month observations with 60 months (5 years) and 9 provinces. As it can be seen in Table 5, all variables have 540 observations except for average number of protests in contiguous provinces, which has 531 observations. Note that dependent variable is operationalized as natural logarithm in order to facilitate interpretation. The independent variable of interest, number of protests is lagged by one time period (one month) as the policymakers need at least one month to react against the protests. Note that mean of variable of interest is 9.6 with a standard deviation 10.9, which is considerably high. Furthermore, 15% of province-year observations did not experience any protests. The variables that are assumed to be directly related with the number of protests, including not only controls but also instruments, are operationalized as lagged by one period as well.

Table 5: Summary Statistics


VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Dependent Variable					
ln (Number of CSG Beneficiaries)	540	13.90	0.640	12.44	14.85
Independent Variable of Interest					
Number of Protest lagged (1)	540	9.639	10.87	0	65
Socioeconomic Controls					
Total Value of Residential Construction (<i>bilR</i>)	540	295,841	435,331	0	2.794e+06
Total Nonresidential Construction (<i>sqr meters</i>)	540	2,232	5,671	0	52,652
Rate of People without Adequate Food Access	540	0.248	0.0816	0.0820	0.396
ln(Population)	540	15.41	0.686	13.97	16.47
Political Controls					
Votes of the ANC in Recent Election	540	0.650	0.140	0.316	0.856
Average Number of Protest in Contiguous Prov. lagged (1)	531	7.999	4.581	0	24.75
Number of Deaths lagged (1)	540	0.117	0.430	0	4
Instrumental Variables					
Number of Days of Holiday lagged (1)	540	13.55	5.725	1	29
Percentage Change in Maximum Temperature lagged (1)	540	0.151	5.514	-14.84	15.94
Number of Days with Thunder lagged (1)	540	1.078	1.132	0	10
Number of Observations:	540				
Number of Provinces:	9				
Number of Months:	60				

Table 6: Averaged DV and IV for each Province

Provinces	Average Number of Social Assistance Beneficiaries	Average Number of Protests lagged (1)
Eastern Cape	14.43	15.52
Free State	13.39	1.55
Gauteng	14.33	21.27
KwaZulu-Natal	14.83	11.99
Limpopo	14.35	5
Mpumalanga	13.85	2
North West	13.59	4.43
Northern Cape	12.57	1.18
Western Cape	14.74	20.62

When we look at the average number of social assistance recipients and average number of protests for each province, we see that provinces with the highest average protests, which include Eastern Cape, Gauteng and Western Cape are also those with the highest number of people who benefit from the CSG (see Table 6). Moreover, these provinces have the most variation in the contentious politics, indicating that this protest activism shows considerable changes over time (see Figure 3). Yet, this table is not meaningful enough to infer about a relationship between social assistance beneficiaries and number of protests without taking population into account.


Figure 3: Number of Protests over Time, by Provinces



The temporal analysis of the relationship between dependent and main independent variable shows that except for 2017, there has been seemingly positive correlation between the DV and IV (see Figure 4). However, all these descriptive statistics are far from being insightful as they do not only take into consideration

other significant factors, but also might be suffering from reverse causality. In the next section, the hypothesis that everything held constant, as the number of protests increases, number of the CSG recipients increase, is tested through IV-2SLS and IV-GMM.

Figure 4: Temporal Relationship Between the DV and the IV



4.2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In the Empirical Analysis section, 4 sets of different models are estimated. In the first set of estimation, four different models with ordinary least squares and fixed-effect estimation are provided in order to (i) understand the nature of the relationship between error terms and (ii) prepare a reference point for further IV estimations.

The coefficient of the variable of interest in the first model is 0.025, meaning that one more protest is expected to increase the number of beneficiaries by 2.5% on average next month (see Table 7). Note that it is statistically significant at 1%

significance level. Nevertheless, as the model lacks control variables, the assumption of conditional mean independence of the error term cannot be held. In the following model, in the presence of province fixed-effects with clustered standards errors, the coefficient of the regressor becomes 0.0014. It is a substantial change revealing that there are province-idiosyncratic factors that have been accounted for the variation in the dependent variable. Note that it is still statistically significant at 1% significance level. When year dummies that capture year idiosyncratic factors are added, moreover, the coefficient decreases by half, becoming 0.0007. The new coefficient suggests that one more protest is anticipated to increase the number of CSG recipients by 0.07%, which is considerably smaller than the model without time and province fixed effects. When further socioeconomic control variables are added, the coefficient estimate becomes 0.0005, which is still statistically significant at 1% significance level. Furthermore, both individual and joint tests of significance reveal that all three effective control variables are crucial for the conditional mean independence.

Table 7: OLS and Fixed-Effect Estimations

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Number of Protest lagged (1)	0.0250*** (0.0023)	0.0014*** (0.0003)	0.0007*** (0.0002)	0.0005*** (0.0001)
Total Value of Residential Construction (bilR)	-	-	-	0.0708*** (0.0099)
ln(Population)	-	-	-	0.5054*** (0.1117)
Rate of People without Adequate Food Access	-	-	-	0.2239*** (0.0730)
Constant	13.6552*** (0.0368)	-	-	-
Observations	540	540	540	540
R-squared	0.1811	0.0474	0.7508	0.7923
Province Fixed Effect	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Province-Clusters	-	9	9	9
Year Fixed Effect	No	No	Yes	Yes
Number of Year Dummies	-	-	4	4
Standard Errors	Heteroscedasticity Robust	Clustered Std. Err.	Clustered Std. Err.	Clustered Std. Err.

As discussed in the Methodology subchapter, relationship between social assistance provision and protest is likely to suffer from reverse causality bias that implies the coefficients we estimated through OLS and fixed effect estimators might be biased. To eliminate simultaneity bias, I use IV-2LSL estimation with an identification strategy composed of three instrumental variables, including percentage change in maximum temperature, number of days with thunder, and number of official holidays. Fifth and sixth models suggest that as I estimate IV-2SLS, the coefficient of variable of interest increases significantly, from 0.0007 in third model to 0.0017 in the fifth model. Note that, for an IV-2LSL to be consistent, instruments should be valid. As it turns out, number of days of official holidays and vacations appears to be weak instrument (weakly correlated with the variable of interest), posing serious threat of bias. In fact, although *Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald*

F statistics that shows the first stage F-statistics of three instruments, is greater than Stock and Yogo critical value for 15% maximal instrumental variable size, it fails to pass under-identification test, which tests whether exogenous instruments are correlated with endogenous variables or not. A comparison with 5th model strengthens our suspicion that holiday instrument is the weak one. Hence, on model 6 onwards, only two weather instruments are included into first stage of the 2SLS.

Socio-economic controls are incorporated into models 7 and 8 in order to assure conditional mean independence of error term. As it can be seen, when I include socio-economic factors into model 7, coefficient estimate changes little and it is statistically significant at 5% significance level. Note that these standard error estimations are robust for (i) arbitrary heteroscedasticity, (ii) arbitrary serial correlation within provinces, and (iii) small cluster number. Only difference between model 7 and model 8 is that in model 8, an outlier observation belongs to Eastern Cape June 2013 is excluded to assure IV-2SLS assumptions. It turns out that neither the estimate nor the standard errors of variable of interest changes. Note that for the model 7 and 8, the null that the models are underidentified is rejected in 90% confidence interval. Two instruments' relevance is further substantiated as *Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic* is greater than the critical values of 15% IV size. Last but not least, the p-value of *Hansen J statistics* is larger than 10%, meaning that the two instruments are uncorrelated with error term, exogeneous.

Table 8: The IV Estimation with Different Identification Strategies and Model Specifications

VARIABLES	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Number of Protest lagged (1)	0.0017** (0.0006)	0.0018** (0.0006)	0.0016** (0.0006)	0.0016** (0.0006)
Total Value of Residential Construction (bilR)	-	-	0.0175** (0.0060)	0.0178** (0.0062)
ln(Population)	-	-	0.4419** (0.1502)	0.4368** (0.1488)
Rate of People without Adequate Food Access	-	-	0.2697*** (0.0791)	0.2653*** (0.0778)
Constant	-	-	-	-
Observations	540	540	540	540
R-squared	0.7243	0.7217	0.7637	0.7674
Province Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Province-Clusters	9	9	9	9
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Year Dummies	4	4	4	4
Standard Errors	Clustered Stad. Err.	Clustered Stad. Err.	Clustered Stad. Err.	Clustered Stad. Err.
Instrument-1	Prct. Change in Maximum Temperature	Prct. Change in Maximum Temperature	Prct. Change in Maximum Temperature	Prct. Change in Maximum Temperature
Instrument-2	Days with thunder	Days with thunder	Days with thunder	Days with thunder
Instrument-3	-	Holidays	-	-
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	21.246	10.393	16.947	16.989
S-Y Critical Values 10% maximal IV size	19.93	13.91	19.93	19.93
S-Y Critical Values 15% maximal IV size	11.59	9.08	11.59	11.59
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): Chi-sq(2) P-val	0.0945	0.1949	0.0964	0.0954
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): Chi-sq(1) P-val	0.4160	0.6710	0.8591	0.7895

At the third stage of my empirical analysis, I estimated alternative model specifications with political variables (see Table 9). In doing so, first, I incorporated all three political variables in model 9 without socioeconomic variables. Despite the fact that the estimated coefficient increases from 0.0016 in model 7 to 0.0024 in model 9, it is now statistically significant only at 10% significance level. More importantly, political variables are not statistically significant in neither individual nor joint. The model under scrutiny fails at both tests of instrument relevance, which is a precursor of asymptotically biased estimates. In next three models, I added political variables alongside with socioeconomic variables, which have already proved to be statistically significant. Only the twelfth model was able to pass the relevance tests whereas political variable, number of people who died during protests, is not statistically significant. Lastly, the estimate changes little in comparison with model 7. Hence, it turns out, the specifications with political variables do not satisfy the IV-2SLS assumptions and even in the satisfying one, the coefficient of the number of protests changes little.

To make a robustness-check for the statistical significance of estimates, I also employed IV-GMM estimator. As mentioned in Methodology section, if the model is overidentified, then the IV-GMM is more efficient than the IV-2SLS. To prove that I estimated two models, model 12 and 13 (see Table 15 in Appendix). Note that model 12 is actually model 7, which is chosen as it is well overidentified. The comparison suggests almost no difference other than little improvement in R-squared. Moreover, in order to ascertain that the relationship is statistically and substantively significant with different independent variable operationalizations, I reoperationalize the number of protests through lagging by two, three and six

months as alternative model specifications (see Appendix). The results show that the effect of protest on the natural logarithm of the number of social assistance beneficiaries is still statistically significant.

Table 9: Alternative Model Specifications with Political Controls

VARIABLES	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Number of Protest lagged (1)	0.0024* (0.0012)	0.0016** (0.0006)	0.0020** (0.0008)	0.0018** (0.0007)
Total Value of Residential Construction (bilR)	-	0.0175** (0.0062)	0.0174*** (0.0050)	0.0171** (0.0061)
ln(Population)	-	0.4411** (0.1652)	0.4293** (0.1720)	0.4322** (0.1545)
Rate of People without Adequate Food Access	-	0.2692*** (0.0646)	0.2793*** (0.0826)	0.2692*** (0.0791)
Votes of the ANC in Recent Election	-0.1029 (0.1506)	-0.0017 (0.1191)	-	-
Avg. No of Protest in Contiguous Prov. lagged (1)	0.0004 (0.0007)	-	0.0007 (0.0006)	-
Number of Deaths lagged (1)	0.0048 (0.0029)	-	-	0.0024 (0.0024)
Constant	-	-	-	-
Observations	531	540	531	540
R-squared	0.6969	0.7637	0.7596	0.7571
Province Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Province-Clusters	9	9	9	9
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Year Dummies	4	4	4	4
Standard Errors	Clustered Std. Err.	Clustered Std. Err.	Clustered Std. Err.	Clustered Std. Err.
Instrument-1		Prct. Change in Maximum Temperature Days with thunder	Prct. Change in Maximum Temperature Days with thunder	Prct. Change in Maximum Temperature Days with thunder
Instrument-2				
Instrument-3		-	-	-
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	5.655	15.416	4.955	16.049
S-Y Critical Values 10% maximal IV size	19.93	19.93	19.93	19.93
S-Y Critical Values 15% maximal IV size	11.59	11.59	11.59	11.59
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): Chi-sq(2) P-val	0.1297	0.1075	0.1301	0.0951
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): Chi-sq(1) P-val	0.2383	.	.	.

4.3. DISCUSSION

Taking model 7 as the reference model, the findings suggest that the null hypothesis that number of protests have no effect on the number of social assistance (the CSG) beneficiaries in the following month is rejected at 5% significance level (see Table 9). In fact, the model suggests that holding socio-economic variables constant, as one more protest occurs in a month (t), we would expect an average increase in the CSG recipients by 0.16% in the subsequent month ($t+1$). Given that monthly average number of protests is approximately 10 with a standard deviation of 11, economic significance of the findings besides statistical significance is striking. In spite of the challenges that my analysis faced, the results are so provocative that further research with more refined data and smaller unit of analysis (city-month, town-month, etc. rather than province-month) that would enable researchers to have larger rank for variance-covariance matrix of moment conditions, thus, more coefficients to add models. Moreover, a quasi-experiment conduct with observations obtained through matching similar villages or towns son of which experience great waves of protest (treatment) whereas the others do not (control) would reveal further proof for the causal effect of the number of protests on the number of social assistance provision.

CHAPTER 5:

**THE SOUTH AFRICAN WELFARE STATE FROM A SOCIO-HISTORICAL
VIEW**

5.1. THE CRITICAL CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA: LESSONS FROM THE PAST

In the third chapter, *Case Selection: Social Assistance Programs and Contentious Politics in South Africa*, I introduced and reviewed the continuities and disruptions in the South African welfare policies with special emphasis on the introduction and evolution of the *Child Support Grant* (CSG). In this chapter, moreover, I review the South African welfare state policies and their evolution in a socio-historical manner. Conducting my research based on a case allows me to conduct this in-depth analysis that does not only reveal the development and evolution of social assistance programs in South Africa but also reveal causal mechanism and similar patterns from the South African welfare state history.

Even though substantial expansion of the social assistance programs can be considered as a recent phenomenon, the history of the South African social assistance goes back than many other developing countries. This renders South Africa the first country with the full-fleshed national social program in the African continent as well as one of the pioneer nations in the global ‘South’ (Seekings 2008, 2012; F. Lund 2012). Indeed, the introduction of the first nationwide social pension in South Africa dates back to 1928. Later on, many other social assistance programs that address to the needs of the racially segregated South Africa. Nonetheless, this is not the sole peculiarity of the South African welfare system. Social pensions were engineered and implemented as non-contributory, means-tested programs with

institutionalized racism, functioning as diversified financial provision for those in need based on race rather than as a compensatory or saving mechanism like social securities (Pelham 2007). In other words, given its strikingly early development of welfare state that is centered around non-contributory social assistance programs rather than social security or social work schemes, South Africa stood as an outlier case among developing countries (Seekings 2008).

One striking fact is that the Apartheid government used the social assistance programs in order to not only sustain the racially segregated Apartheid regime but also contain the contentious activism of Indian and African residents of South-West Africa. In fact, the political elites found it beneficial to provide social grants to all Indian and African residents of South-West Africa without means-tested even though in the remaining parts of the country, other Indian and African residents were subjected to means-tests with less amount of grants (Devereux 2007). Scholars showed that because of the armed struggle between the South African government and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC), political elites used the social pension as a means of containing the support as well as coopting with the African Namibians. Considering the fact that most of Apartheid state apparatus, bureaucracy, and administrative capacity remained intact without substantial reforms, it could be asserted that the democratic South Africa inherited these anti-contentious state capabilities and practices. Thus, understanding the practices of social assistance programs from a historical point of view proves to be significant.

5.2. WELFARE-STATE-BUILDING IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1920S-1940S

The nascence of the social assistance-dominant South African welfare state could be better understood under two stages. The initial phase covers from mid-1920s to mid-1940s, during which first nationwide grant programs were drafted and introduced for the ‘white’ and ‘colored’ residents of the Union of South Africa (Seekings 2007). 1920s witnessed shift of public attention towards the so-called ‘poor white problem’, responding to the deep-seated concerns about unemployed, poor white laborers, unable to compete with racial policy-driven supply of cheap, unskilled African labor and suffering from the British *laissez-faire* policies (Seekings 2007). Subsequent to the ‘Rand Rebellion of 1921-22’ that was given rise by a number of strikes led by Dutch workers under the slogan of ‘Workers of the world, unite and fight for a white South Africa!’ causing concerns as it disseminated an anti-British sentiment, the Dutch Labor Party proposed a means-tested, old-age pension plan in 1922 to address ‘poor white problem’ (Leubolt 2014). As political alliance between Dutch and British were forged in 1924 through participation of Dutch Labor Party and Nationalist Party into government, one significant pillar of this collaboration turned out to active policymaking to ameliorate the wellbeing of the white unemployed and dislocated laborer (Leubolt 2014). Further incentives came from the *1926 Pienaar Commission on Old-Age Pensions and National Insurance* that recommended for an exigent social policymaking for address ‘poor white problem’ (Devereux 2007; van der Merwe 1997). Consequently, the Pact coalition government introduced the Old Age Pension in 1928. The 1928 Pension Act entitled the ‘white’ and ‘colored’ residents of Union of South Africa who were 65 years or older and who satisfied means test

criteria whereas the ‘natives’, ‘Indians’, and all residents of Namibia were excluded from the grant so that racial segregation was maintained through further ‘disenfranchisement’ of natives (Devereux 2007).

It is important to note that large segments of white elites supported the introduction of old-age pension for various reasons. The non-contributory social assistance constituted a transitory stage with compensation of exploitation for the organized labor and Labor Party, a less costly system compared to employer-funded contributory regime for the employers hiring the white, and a requirement for Nationalist Party to lift the white out of poverty so that racial hierarchy could be maintained (Seekings 2007 p. 378). Furthermore, unlike Brazil, Chile and Argentina where only the organized labor had political power to pressure for further social protection giving rise to social security programs, South Africa had a racial problem in both industrial urban and rural areas that required non-contributory scheme rather than contributory saving or compensation programs (Seekings 2007). Besides the drives originating from ‘poor white problem’ with the desire to reassure the racial hierarchy, enactment of this social assistance policies had other political motives (van der Merwe 1997; Devereux 2007; Seekings 2007; F. Lund 2012). As van der Merwe and Devereux suggested, an old age program targeting the white and colored reassured electoral support of its political base composed of poor and dislocated whites and colored constituencies (van der Merwe 1997; Devereux 2007). One member of the Carnegie Commission reviewing the nascent welfare policies, for instance, criticized the program as ‘driven by the electoral concerns’ that creates ‘high expectations’ among the white indigent (Seekings 2007). Moreover, Devereux underscores the containment aspect of the provision that

coopted with poor or unemployed with laborers so that no social movement similar to previous 'Rand Rebellion' would reoccur (Devereux 2007).

Despite its racially biased agenda and stratifying nature that aims at increasing the wellbeing of the white above the 'natives' through *skeidsmuur*, a dividing line between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' labor, nonetheless, old-age pension constituted a significant step toward the emergence of a South African welfare state, in which nationwide government is assumed to take the responsibility of poverty alleviation with greater state capability and larger budget from the one of provincial governments (Seekings 2007; Devereux 2007). Throughout 1930s, as the 'poor white problem' kept dominating public discourse following the Great Depression, investigations of 'Carnegie Committee' took place and the consequent findings of these investigations led government to embrace further segregationist social policies such as Blind Persons Act (1936) and Unemployment Insurance Act (1937) and to found the first Department of Social Welfare in 1937 (van der Merwe 1997).

5.3. DISTRIBUTION BY 'PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION': 1940S-1980S

From mid-1940s onward until the end of Apartheid, moreover, partial expansion of welfare programs for the 'African and 'Indian' took place according to the 'principle of discrimination' that regards one's racial, territorial, and urban/rural residence characteristics (Devereux 2007). Increasing indigence and vulnerability among African and Indian communities, whose social reproduction were perceived to be in crises in a time period when South Africa experienced social, economic and political changes played a significant role in urging the government to compel of the welfare system. Brought together in 1943 by the

government, a Social Security Committee advised for an amendment envisioning the extension of welfare policies to Blacks and Indians (van der Merwe 1997). These pressures have forced the government to include Africans and Indians into the welfare regime (Devereux 2007). It should be noted that despite their inclusion, benefits were distributed at different rates, called ‘principle of discrimination’, based on race (4:2:2:1 ratios for the white, colored, Indian, and African, respectively) and types of settlement (urban, town, countryside), which was justified by differentiating amounts of taxes paid (Devereux 2007; F. Lund 2012). This reform also served to maintaining the influx control through the de-urbanization of the Africans. Furthermore, the eligibility condition for the Africans was stricter than the one for the white and colored, who were required having being dispossessed of land and dwelling in urban areas for a predetermined time with a family or relatives in the rural areas (Devereux 2007; F. Lund 2012). Although ‘differenced payment rates’ based on types of settlements were abolished in 1965 due to continuing African urbanization, the benefit inequality remained more severe than the regulation dictated.⁹

It was not until 1973 that Indian and African residents of South-West Africa were included into the social assistance programs. Yet, according to Devereux, expansion of social assistance for African Namibians posed a puzzle as program eligibility did not require means-tested criterion, rendering it universal. There are two significant theories regarding this curious case. The first explanation emphasizes the harsh socio-economic conditions that vast majority of Namibians

⁹ The de facto ratios were 11:4:4:1 for the white, colored, Indian, and African, respectively in 1965 whereas it became 7:3:3:1 in 1975 (Devereux 2007).

suffered as landless and unemployed; therefore, the program provided subsistence income to each resident in Namibia. Second theory, furthermore, posits that a universal social pension has instrumented as ‘wining hearts and minds’ of the African Namibians (Devereux 2007). Given the armed struggle between the South African government and the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC), as one member of the National Party suggested, the pension was a means of containing the support as well as coopting with the African Namibians (Devereux 2007). To put it in another way, as the government was challenged in South-West Africa, it extended the social program for larger masses without means-test to receive the support of the Namibian people.

One striking finding is that the Apartheid government employed the social assistance programs in order to not only sustain the racially segregated Apartheid regime but also contain the contentious activism of Indian and African residents of South-West Africa through using it as a “carrot” to “win hearts and minds.” This is mostly in line with the expectation of the conflict literature that because governments anticipate people who receive material benefits have less incentive to participate into protests, governments introduces new social assistance programs or increases the extent of the existing ones to larger masses in order to decrease people’s grievances over socio-economic or redistributive issues, and to lessen willingness to protest. Furthermore, analyzing and comprehending the history of the South African social assistance provision practices proves to be significant, provided that major part of Apartheid bureaucratic apparatus and administrative capacity remained intact without substantial reforms and that the democratic South Africa inherited these anti-contentious state capabilities and practices.

CHAPTER 6:

THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE FROM A COMPARATIVE VIEW

6.1. THE MOST DIFFERENT SYSTEMS DESIGN (MDS)

In the fourth chapter, I tested my hypothesis that as the number of protests increases, the number of social assistance beneficiaries increase in the case of South Africa. The results of instrumental variable estimation suggested that holding other factors constant, an increase in the number of protests in a province at the month (t) is associated with an average increase in the CSG recipients by 0.16% in the subsequent month (t+1), which is statistically significant at 5% significance level. Although the findings provide support with internal validity, the analysis lacks external validity unless the analysis is extended to other developing countries.

In order to increase the external validity of the empirical analysis, I conduct a complementary analysis based on *the Most Different Systems Design* (MDS). I analyze four significant and diverse cases with the same dependent variable, considerable increase in the social assistance coverage over time: Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa. In choosing my critical cases, I paid attention to the fact that the cases should resemble little to each other, yet all must end up with considerable social assistance coverage over time. In doing so, I made use of the indicators based on the 2013 data given the convenience in attaining those statistics.

The MDS, aka John Stuart Mill's *Method of Agreement*, is a methodology that enables researchers to conduct case selection through selecting those cases with most variation in the independent variables yet with same dependent variable from the same population so that investigators could reveal the "latent" independent variable whose consistency would lead to the same outcome across cases

(Przeworski and Teune 1970). In line with this study design, among developing countries four cases, namely Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa are chosen as they satisfy considerable variation in independent variables. Indeed, these countries have distinct welfare, developmental and political backgrounds so that they there should be some other factors that are hidden that lead to convergence into a considerable increase in the social assistance expenditure than other developing countries.

Table 10: The MDSD: Political Determinants

Country	Political Determinants				Outcome
	Regime Type ¹⁰	Ideology	Political Rights ¹¹	Civil Liberties ¹²	Considerable Increase in the Expenditure of Social Assistance Programs
Brazil	Free	Center-Left	2	2	YES 0.23% 1.26%
India	Free	Far Right	2	3	YES 0.15% to 0.39%
Turkey	Partly Free	Right	3	4	YES 0.8% to 1.3%
South Africa	Free	Center	2	2	YES 2.2% to 3.23%

First, in order to capture social assistance expansion among these different countries, I operationalized my dependent variable as the percent change in the share of total social assistance spending in the GDP. In doing so, I looked at the

¹⁰ Freedom House, 2013. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013>

¹¹ Freedom Rating Explanation: 1 = most free and 7 = least free. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013>

¹² Ibid.

change between 2000 and 2013. Furthermore, in conducting the MDSD, I chose some important political, cultural, socio-economic, and developmental factors that are widely used in the welfare and social assistance provision literatures as independent variables (Cnudde and McCrone 1969; Seekings 2008, 2010; Pierson 2001; Rudra 2007; Yörük 2012b). While operationalizing these factors, I tried to take these variables from the same sources and year, namely, 2013 (see Table 10-14).

Table 11: The MDSD: Socio-Economic Determinants

Country	Socio-Economic							Outcome
	Average Annual GDP Growth between 2000 and 2013 (%) ¹³	GDP per capita ¹⁴	Unemployment (%) ¹⁵	Poverty (%) ¹⁶	HDI ¹⁷	Trade (%GDP 2013) ¹⁸	Inequality GINI Index ¹⁹	Considerable Increase in the Expenditure of Social Assistance Programs
Brazil	3.92	15430	12.54	3.8	74.12	19.92	52.8	YES 0.23% 1.26%
India	6.51	5074	2.55	21.2	67.66	42.02	35.7	YES 0.15% to 0.39%
Turkey	4.45	21651	10.9	0.33	74.9	42.44	41.2	YES 0.8% to 1.3%
South Africa	3.21	12340	26.96	18.9	67.5	60.68	63	YES 2.2% to 3.23%

¹³ World Bank Dataset, 2013. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator>

¹⁴ Ibid. GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international \$)

¹⁵ Ibid. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate).

¹⁶ Ibid. Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population).

¹⁷ United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index, 2013. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report>

¹⁸ World Bank Dataset, 2013. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator>. Merchandise trade (% of GDP).

¹⁹ Ibid. GINI index (World Bank estimate).

Among the factors that are associated with the dependent variables, first I took political factors. In literature, most articulated cause of welfare grant provision is the extent of democratization. Many scholars argue that as a polity get more democratic, the government would have incentives to expand the social grant to further masses. In order to reassure variance in the democratization, I included *political regime, political ideology, and the extent that political and civil rights are provided to citizen*. All these variables are operationalized taken from the *Freedom House* based on the 2013 values. As it can be seen in the comparison, except for Brazil, which was center-left then, other countries are located between center-right and far-right in 2013. Moreover, there is enough variation in the other factors that indicate that these variables do not count for this variation alone.

In capturing the dominant socio-economic explanations of social assistance provision, such as high GDP growth, high GDP per capita, trade openness, high unemployment rate, high human development, serious poverty, and high income-inequality, I took the following variables: *average annual GDP growth between 2000 and 2013, GDP per capita in 2013, unemployment rate in 2013, poverty rate in 2013, human development index in 2013, share of trade in the total GDP in 2013, and GINI index*. Table 11 shows that among four countries, at least one of them show significant difference from others by a significant degree. This in term implies that the increase the in the social assistance expenditure is not a consequence of a common socio-economic factor.

Table 12: The MDS: Cultural, Geographical, and Historical Determinants

Country	Cultural		Geographical		Historical	Outcome
	Perc. Majority Ethnicity (%) ¹	Civilization ¹	Continent	Area	Colonial Past	Considerable Increase in the Expenditure of Social Assistance Programs
Brazil	51	Lat. Amer.	Lat. Amer.	Lat. Amer.	Yes (Portuguese.)	YES 0.23% 1.26%
India	26	Hindu	Asia	South Asia	Yes (British)	YES 0.15% to 0.39%
Turkey	75	Islamic	Europe	East Europe	No	YES 0.8% to 1.3%
South Africa	77	African	Africa	South Africa	Yes (British)	YES 2.2% to 3.23%

I also made sure that the cases included show variation in terms of culture, history, and demography. Indeed, some certain cultures and ethnic homogeneity are expected to have more assistance provision than others, subsequent variables are added into the conduct: *the share of major ethnic group in society and its assumed civilization*. Moreover, because having *British colonial past* is associated with higher provision in social assistance literature, I reassured that all cases included have different colonial pasts. Last but not least, I incorporated demographical factors, including *fertility rates, urbanization rate, population and percentage of old people over 65*.

Table 13: The MDSD, Demographical Determinants

Country	Demographical Determinants				Outcome
	Fertility Rate ²⁰	Urbanization Rate ²¹	Population ²²	Population over Age 65 (%) ²³	Considerable Increase in the Expenditure of Social Assistance Programs
Brazil	1.77	85.21	202 mil.	7.42	YES 0.23% 1.26%
India	2.43	32	1.279 bil.	5.39	YES 0.15% to 0.39%
Turkey	2.11	72.53	76 mil.	7.52	YES 0.8% to 1.3%
South Africa	2.53	63.79	54 mil.	4.9	YES 2.2% to 3.23%

Derived from the social assistance expansion literature, political, socioeconomic, cultural, geographical, historical, and demographic determinants show diverse values across these four countries, implying that the social assistance provision cannot be result of these drivers alone in the cases of Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa. As theoretically and empirically shown in the preceding chapters, contentious politics is one of the significant drivers of the social assistance expansion. In order to incorporate that, I operationalized contentious activism based on the *Cross-National Time Series Data Archive's* (CNTS) variable, *Weighted Conflict Index*. The CNTS creates the weighted conflict index as composite variable that is the composition variable of contentious activism that is weighted by the population. For each year, following acts of contentious politics are multiplied by

20 World Bank Dataset, 2013. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator>. Fertility rate, total (births per woman).

21Ibid. Urban population (% of total).

22 Ibid. Population, total.

23 Ibid.

the values shown in the parenthesis: assassinations (25), strikes (20), guerrilla warfare (100), government crises (20), purges (20), riots (25), revolutions (150), and anti-government demonstrations (10). The sum of the multiplication is later divided by number of contentious politics categories, which is 8. Put differently, the CNTS provides a value for each year, and these are composite values include many modes of contention that is weighted by population. To capture the variation of the contentious politics over time, I periodized 2000s by separating it into two: the time between 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. Later, I took the average of weighted conflict index observations within these time periods. Lastly, to reveal the variation, I showed the percentage change from 2000-2006 period to 2007-2013 period (see Table 14).

Table 14: The MDSD: Contentious Activism and Social Assistance Expansion

Country	Average Contentious Activism			Outcome
	2000 - 2006	2007 - 2013	Percentage Increase	Considerable Increase in the Expenditure of Social Assistance Programs
Brazil	625	2680	328.8%	YES 0.23% to 1.26%
India	2643	6750	155.4%	YES 0.15% to 0.39%
Turkey	1109	6708	504.9%	YES 0.8% to 1.3%
South Africa	107	1947	1719.6%	YES 2.2% to 3.23%

As it can be observed in the Table 14, all four countries experienced considerable expansion in the contentious activism from the first half of the 2000s to the second half of the 2000s that accompanies to the expansion in the social

assistance expenditure between the same time periods. In other words, across these four countries, contentious activism seems like to be one of the common causes of the social assistance increase in the same time periods. In order to reveal how the two are related in these countries, I focus on the main social assistance programs and welfare provisions of the four cases and their causal relationships with the contentious politics. In doing so, I take *the Bolsa Familia* in Brazilian case, *the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment* in the Indian case, and the *Green Card* in the Turkish case alongside with the *Child Support Grant* of South Africa.

6.2. CASES FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Based on these variables, four cases come into prominence: Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa. Note that all at least one country differs from other for every independent variable so that the distinctness of these countries other than substantial social assistance provision is guaranteed (see Table 10). Indeed, *Bolsa Familia* in Brazilian case, *the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment* in the Indian case, and the *Green Card* in the Turkish case can be comparable with the *Child Support Grant* of South Africa in terms of its scope and extent.

One of the most popular social assistance programs in the global South, *Bolsa Familia* was created with Law no. 10.836 in 2004, grounded on the previous Brazilian *Bolsa Escola* program. Promoted by a number of World Bank policy recommendations as one of the most innovative conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, *Bolsa Familia* provides poor families with benefits upon satisfying some education and health-related conditionalities. Indeed, it requires families to make sure that their 6-15 years old children attend 85% of the classes and 16-18 years old children to attend 75% of the classes. Moreover, it asks parents to prove that

children receive necessary vaccination. It should be noted that more than 13 million families benefited from the *Bolsa Familia* program in Brazil by 2013, which amounted to an average of R\$149.71 per month. Moreover, share of all social assistance programs in the GDP rose from 0.23% in 2000 to 1.26% in 2013, showing 5.48 times increase over time.

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is another popular workfare program that was first introduced in 2005 and later reached to millions of people who live in rural area. As India's and world's largest employee program, *the Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act* provides Indian peasants with 100 days of employment per year in local productivity-enhancing infrastructure projects (Deininger, Nagarajan, and Singh 2016). It should be noted that the program had a budget amounting to US\$ 7.8 billion in 2011 and provided 57.8 million rural workers with jobs in 2014 (Misra and Suresh 2014).

In the Turkish case, *Yeşil Kart* (Green Card) social assistance program was a significant means-tested healthcare program that initially covered a small proportion of population in 2000. Nevertheless, the number of the beneficiaries increased during 2000s and reached to 12 percent of the population (Yoltar 2009; Yörük 2012b). It should be noticed that in an environment that millions of people were informal workers without formal security coverage, the Green Card program proved to be a significant source of healthcare services. When the share of total social assistance expenditure in the GDP is compared, while the Indian share increased from 0.15% in 2000 to 0.39% in 2013, the Turkish share became 1.3% in 2013 from 0.8% in 2000 (see Table 10).

As discussed in the theory subchapter, the presence of organized and non-organized contentious politics is considered to be a significant driver of the social assistance provision. On the one hand, organized contentious politics and civil society activism pressed governments to introduce new programs and expand the extent of present social assistance provision (Isaac and Kelly 1981; Fording 1997; Pierson 2001; Weiss 2005; M. Giugni and Grasso 2015). On the other hand, non-organized or violent contentious politics of poor caused concerns among political elites regarding political legitimacy and societal order, leading them to increase social benefits in order to prevent contentious activism from getting stronger and more influential (Piven and Cloward 1971; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Jennings 1983; Fording 1997; Vanhuysse 2006; Yörük 2012b).

It should be noted that non-organized or violent contentious politics of the poor that were covered by social security nets have been influential on the decision of governments to increase social assistance expenditure 1990s onward. These poor people were those whose vulnerabilities exacerbated following the neoliberal transition with informalization and privatization of securities. Moreover, in all cases, the actors of the contentious politics were those who were not covered during the import substitution industrialization (ISI) period, remaining “outsider” of their welfare state provision. Indeed, as mid-1980s onwards, most developing countries abandoned closed border ISI models, and adopted free-market policies through capital and financial liberation.

Endowed with abundant cheap labor compared to the developed countries, many developing countries have attempted at attracting foreign direct investments through deregulating labor market rigidities, including welfare provisions and

securities. Neoliberal transformation, thus, has rendered already vulnerable informal workers and peasants even more unprotected against mishaps. As 1994 Mexican, 1997 Asian, and 1998 Russian, 1999 Argentine, and 2001 Turkish financial crisis have deteriorated the living conditions of peoples who were already in a precarious situation. As a result, 1990s have witnessed considerable size of social movements and activisms coming from the “unprotected” poor. Consequently, both organized and non-organized contentious politics activism led to considerable increase in the provision of social assistance benefits.

In the case of India, *the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act* was initiated in 2005 and implemented in 2006 subsequent to one of the greatest protests in India, in which more than 250,000 peasants are involved protesting against patterns of inequality in Indian society (Schulz 2015). Moreover, many scholars found that following the introduction of the program, there was a reduction in the intensity of the contentious politics. According to Dasgupta, Gawande and Kapur (2017), empirical investigations showed that the program decreased the violent Maoist conflict in the long-run. Furthermore, the program is considered one of the major counterinsurgency tools that local and central governments employ in India (Jenkins and Manor 2017). Given the fact that Indian government acknowledges that links between rural grievances and Maoist conflict, the rationale that the existing contentious politics could be tackled with a combination of security and poverty-reduction instruments has been influential (Koyuncu, Yörük, and Gürel, n.d.).

The Brazilian case shows similar patterns that social assistance and security provisions have been largely driven by both organized contentious activism, such

as *the Rural Women's Movement* and *the Landless Workers' Movement* (MST). In rural areas, women without employment entitlement deprived from social pensions independent of rural unions. However, large protests were organized under *the Rural Women's Movement* in mid-1990s. As a result of these contentious politics taking place in many provinces, Brazilian government conceded women's land and social pension rights in 2001 (Ginneken 2003). Moreover, crime has been another driver of the social assistance provision as many political elites and policy recommenders associated crime with poverty, education, and favelas and came up with social assistance-related solutions (da Silva and Sepulveda 2014).

The conflict between *the Kurdistan Workers' Party* (PKK) and Turkish led to internal displacement policy under the state of emergency rule in 1990s. The displaced Kurds in slum parts of metropolitan cities have constituted large poor informal proletariat, taking part in informal-labor-driven sectors, such as textile and electrical equipment production (Keyman 2007; Yörük 2012b). This Kurdish population later became a significant part of urban contentious politics with considerable grassroot power at the intersection of informalization, proletarianization and displacement. Perceived as a thread, areas with Kurdish population such as Central East Anatolia are found to be provided with Green Card program compared to other regions with similar poverty rates, such as West Black Sea region (Yörük 2012b). Moreover, Yörük found that at the neighborhood level, controlled for socio-economic and demographic factors, being Kurd is associated with higher Green Card provision than ethnicities (Yörük 2012b).

These examples show the significance of the contentious politics in the introduction and expansion of the social assistance programs in global south.

Seekings claimed that combined with democratization and redistributive populist trends in the global south, organized movements of the “outsider” poor has been crucial in the welfare state regime emergence in South Korea during 1990s, for instance (Seekings 2010). Thus, these cases of Brazil, India and Turkey show that organized contentious politics were crucial in the expansion of social assistance policies not only in South Africa but also in various part of the global South.



CHAPTER 7:

IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION

The significant increase in the social assistance expenditure and coverage over time in global South have had significant poverty, finance, and policy-related implication. While these consequences attracted considerable scholarly attention, the causes of this expansion are highly underestimated. Before this thesis, the majority of existing studies mainly focused the structural, institutional, and electoral drivers of this development. This thesis builds up Piven and Cloward's argument that when facing intense contentious politics activism, governments use social assistance provisions as a part of the counterinsurgency strategy to contain the dissidents.

In understanding the causal mechanism how contentious activities lead to provision of social assistance grants, I made use of the insights from conflict literature that suggests the anticipation of political elites that the provision of material benefits would decrease the grievances that people hold over various socio-economic or redistributive issues. Also, by means of material assistance, governments anticipate increasing the opportunity cost of protest and conflict. In addition, many scholarly studies and policy recommendations lead political elites, government members, and state officials to anticipate that further material benefit provision would lead to a serious reduction of the greed over material concerns, thus, decrease the contentious politics. Last but not least, by means of new and well-targeted policies, governments expect to signal their commitment for a better and more just governance and yield in legitimacy over contested issues. As a consequent

to these expectations, governments introduce new social assistance or/and increase the extent of the existing social grants.

Based on the South African case between 2013 and 2017, an instrumental variable estimation revealed that as contentious politics - including violent and non-violent protests, demonstrations, riots, and conflicts - increases, the number of social assistance beneficiaries increases in the following time periods. While the South African case also had historically similar counter-insurgency strategies in the past, the current practice is not only limited to South Africa. Having considerable expansion on social assistance expenditure and coverage, all Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa had one common factor in common: organized and non-organized contentious politics and grassroots politics, incentivizing political elites to provide further grants.

One significant implication of this thesis is that contentious politics and grassroots activism is likely to account for the social assistance expansion in the global South during 2000s. This, social assistance provision should be reconsidered from political point of view, with their targets, budgets, and coverage. Another contribution of this study is that unlike the orthodox approaches of counterinsurgency that defines it with violent means, this analysis reveals the weaknesses of mainstream approach and asks for a multifaceted manner in understanding the tools that the governments adopt.

Another important implication that this study poses it that with their capacity to contain contentious activism of masses, social assistance policies have become one of not only democratic regimes but also authoritarian regimes. Even though the mainstream approach suggests that democratic polities are more likely

to promote social grants to address to the needs of the people, this dissertation showed that they also provide benefits in order to decrease the protests of the masses, which are considered to be an important part of democratic participation. However, it must be held in mind that many recent studies showed that authoritarian regimes are also target masses with social grants in order to not only fabricate legitimacy but also prevent the protests and many other expressions of the contentious politics. Given the role that protests play in the authoritarian and in the regimes in-between in promoting pluralistic and democratic ideas, the widespread usage of well-crafted and well-targeted social assistance policies in the developing countries would have significant implications for future of democracy in the global South.

As discussed in the empirical analysis part, the hypothesized association between social assistance and contentious politics is likely to suffer from simultaneity bias. In this dissertation, to tackle this problem and attain unbiased estimates, I employed instrumental variable estimation. This study could be further developed through conducting qualitative and quantitative research. While quasi-experimental designs could provide further substantiation of the aforementioned association, ethnographic research could reveal the underlying causal mechanism of the association. Moreover, even though I attempted at increasing the external validity of the study through conducting a MDSD-based qualitative analysis, it is a must to conduct further large-N quantitative analysis with a larger sample of developing countries in order to make inferences about remaining developing countries.

CHAPTER 8:

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CHAPTER 9:

APPENDIX*Table 15: Comparison of IV-2SLS and IV-GMM*

VARIABLES	Model 13	Model 14
Number of Protest lagged (1)	0.0016** (0.0006)	0.0016** (0.0006)
Total Value of Residential Construction (bilR)	0.0175** (0.0060)	0.0177** (0.0059)
ln(Population)	0.4419** (0.1502)	0.4396** (0.1496)
Rate of People without Adequate Food Access	0.2697*** (0.0791)	0.2694*** (0.0791)
Constant	0.0016** (0.0006)	0.0016** (0.0006)
Observations	540	540
R-squared	0.7637	0.7650
Province Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes
Number of Province-Clusters	9	9
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes
Number of Year Dummies	4	4
Standard Errors	Clustered Stad. Err.	Clustered Stad. Err.
Instrument-1	Prct. Change in Maximum Temperature	Prct. Change in Maximum Temperature
Instrument-2	Days with thunder	Days with thunder
Instrument-3	-	-
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	16.947	16.947
S-Y Critical Values 10% maximal IV size	19.93	19.93
S-Y Critical Values 15% maximal IV size	11.59	11.59
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): Chi-sq(2) P-val	0.0964	0.0964
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): Chi-sq(1) P-val	0.8591	0.8591