

Terrorism Democracy Nexus: Is Democracy at Stake?  
A Mixed-method Approach on the Effects of Terrorism on Democracy

By

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
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
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and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects,  
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## DEDICATION

I dedicate my thesis to my dear family and friends who supported me for two years. I thank my mother and father Nesrin Coban and Mustafa Coban who provided me moral and financial support throughout my life. I would like to thank my friends and colleagues Ilayda Bilge Onder and Alper Sukru Gencer. I also would like to thank my dog, Biftek, this thesis could have been finished earlier without him.



## ABSTRACT

### Terrorism-Democracy Nexus: Is Democracy at Stake? A Mixed-method Approach on the Effects of Terrorism on Democracy

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The aim of this thesis is to understand the effects of terrorism on democracy. Existing research on democracy and terrorism nexus focuses on the effect of regime type on terrorism while it falls short in answering the questions about the effect of terrorism on democracy. This thesis tries to contribute to the literature by exploring the causal linkages from terrorism to democracy. In recent years, we witnessed that increasing terrorist threat causes governments to expand the powers of security forces, introduce policies limiting individual liberties and freedoms, and, thus, leading to a tradeoff between security and freedom. The empirical analysis in this thesis shows that increasing threat of terrorism is statistically significant and negatively correlated with liberal democracy, civil liberties, equality before law and individual freedoms and independent judiciary in all countries. The case comparison of Brazil, Peru and Colombia shows that increasing threat of terrorism forces democratic countries to expand the powers of security forces to deal with the terrorism. Aggressive measures that countries conducted to deal with terrorism increase human rights violations and restrict civil liberties.

**Keywords:** Terrorism, terrorist threat, democracy, autocracy, democratization, regime type, civil liberties, equality before law, individual freedoms, civil-military relations.

## OZETCE

Terrorizm – Demokrasi Baglami: Demokrasi Risk Altinda mi?  
Terrorizmin Demokrasiye Etkileri Uzerine Karma Metod Yaklasimi

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Bu tezin birincil amacı artan terör tehdidinin demokrasi üzerindeki etkilerini anlamaktır. Mevcut literatür demokrasinin terör oluşumu üzerindeki etkilerini araştırmaya yoğunlaşırken, tersi bir etkinin sonuçlarına dair soruları cevaplamaya yönelik etkisiz kalmaktadır. Bu tez literatüre katkı yapmak için artan terör tehdidinin demokratik kurumlar ve değerler üzerindeki ampirik etkileri test ederken, bu etkilerin sebep-sonuç mekanizmasını da anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu teorik çerçevede, artan terör tehdidi, kişisel hak ve özgürlükleri olumsuz yönde etkilerken, bağımsız yargının artan tehdit altında bağımsızlığını kaybetmesi ile konsolide olan politik gücün demokrasiyi negatif yönde etkilemektedir.

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## INTRODUCTION

Does increasing threat of terrorism put democracy at risk? Achieving the perfect democracy is a never-ending journey. A hundred years ago, one may tell democracy was about the right to vote and fair and open competition in the elections. However, today democracy has a more comprehensive meaning. When we say democracy, it includes political rights such as natural justice<sup>1</sup> in law, right to assemble, civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, protection from discrimination, and freedom of press and so on. In the future, it is highly likely that there would be other rights and freedoms that democracies will try to cover. Terrorism, on the other hand, is turning into a serious threat in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. For many scholars, terrorism-democracy nexus became an important topic to study. While existing research focuses on the effect of democracy on terrorism, scholars rarely talk about the reverse causal effect. However, both democracies and autocracies face the increasing threat of terrorism especially in the last couple decades. Argumentation in the existing research which focuses on the democracy-terrorism nexus is problematic since the effect of terrorism on democracy is not well established. Even though the United States is one of the most advanced democracies in the world, Al Qaeda targeted the U.S., which was completely unrelated to the regime type of the United States. Al Qaeda was aiming to cause pressure on the US to withdraw its military existence in the Middle East (Riedel 2007). Likewise, Savun and Philips (2009) suggest that, regardless of the regime type, countries that follow a certain type of foreign policy are more likely to attract transnational terrorism. In that sense, in the previous years, ISIS

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<sup>1</sup> Natural Justice is a technical justice terminology which indicates the rule against bias.

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targeted France since France's involvement in Syrian crisis escalated . What ISIS aimed was to break the coalition that was fighting against ISIS in Iraq and Syria (Gidda 2017). Although scholars put a lot of effort into establishing the causality from democracy to terrorism, we do not have much research on the reverse causality. Given that in several democracies, such as UK, US, France and many others, democratic backsliding has become a huge debate lately, it is time that we focus on this linkage. How is the regime type of a country affected by increasing threat of terrorism? This thesis aims to contribute to the democracy and conflict literatures by exploring the link between terrorism and democracy. By taking terrorism as the independent variable in contrast to the existing use of terrorism in terrorism-democracy nexus, I try to explain the dynamics of change in democracies and democratization efforts of countries when they face an increasing terrorist threat.

In November 2015, ISIS launched a series of attacks in Paris. Some gunmen and suicide bombers targeted a concert hall, football stadium, restaurants and other life and leisure places simultaneously in Paris, killed 130 people and wounded other hundreds. Former President of France, François Hollande, described the attacks as 'act of war' following the incidents ("Paris attacks: What happened on the night" 2015). Earlier same year, in January, ISIS organized another attack to French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and killed several people. After November Attacks, then President François Hollande declared state of emergency across France. The state of emergency had ended last November. During the state of emergency, French officials stated the security forces prevented 32 terror attacks in France and 13 of them were prevented in 2017 only. However, in the meantime, ISIS killed 239 people and Paris-based Center for the Analysis of Terrorism indicated that France is the top Western country that ISIS had been the most active in organizing attacks (Nordstrom 2017). French security forces conducted more than 4000 warrantless house raids. While only a thousand of them have been resulted in criminal investigations, according to Le Monde, only 23 cases had been found

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terror-related (Nordstrom 2017). 752 people put under house arrest during the 23-month-long state of emergency and only eight of them have been confined. In France, state of emergency basically allows security forces to search homes and arrest people without the consent of a judge. Moreover, during the state of emergency, French security forces are allowed to tap computer and phone communications easier. In November 2017, even though France ended the state of emergency, expanded powers that the state of emergency gives to the security forces became permanent with newly introduced law. The newly introduced law allows security forces to search properties, to tap electronic devices and shut locations that are suspected of preaching hatred (Hartmann 2017). The human rights activists and NGOs in France have largely criticized the new law since it is injecting unusual measures into ordinary law. However, according to a poll, more than 80% of people in France supported the bill (Hartmann 2017). Thus, increasing threat of terrorism in a democratic country like France legitimized the restriction of civil liberties and individual freedoms.

Countries' undemocratic response against increasing terrorist threat is not a new phenomenon. For instance, in 1972, the UK Army killed 13 unarmed protestors on the streets of Derry. The crowd was protesting the arrest of suspected IRA members. The commission did not find soldiers guilty after the incident. Years later, Tony Blair said the incident would be investigated again and Savile Inquiry, which was led by Lord Savile, prepared a report about it. However, the report became public in 2010. Former British Prime Minister David Cameron accepted the responsibility of the UK Army, and officially apologized on behalf of the British Government (Gillespie 2018). After the incident, the violence became widespread in the UK. IRA detonated a bomb at the Aldershot military facility. Several car bombings followed it in 1973 ("The IRA campaigns in England" 2001). Following the incidents, in 1974, the Parliamentary in the UK passed an emergency legislation as "Prevention of Terrorism Act". The act basically made arrests easier for security forces. After starting to enforce the law in

1974 to 1982, the number of detentions had been reported as 5,555 while only 98 of them charged under the law. 83 of 98 were found guilty, 50 of 83 were punished with suspended sentence (Sim and Thomas 1983). On the other hand, the act was actually a temporary legislation. After the renewal of the act for several times, it was replaced with the permanent Terrorism Act in 2000.

Even in the most developed democracies, terrorist threat causes backsliding in the practices of civil liberties and individual rights. In order to acknowledge the effects of terrorism on civil liberties, individual rights and democracy, I conduct a multi-method analysis in this thesis. Countries may face increasing threat of terrorism for several different reasons. However, what happens to democratic consolidation of countries when they encounter increasing threat of terrorism?

## WHAT TRIGGERS DEMOCRATIZATION AND DE-DEMOCRATIZATION

Democracy is a scholarly contested term. Diamond (2015) builds his concept of the 'minimal' democracy on Schumpeter's definition of democracy. According to Diamond, democracy is a system in which popularly elected people acquire power to take political decisions. Lipset (1959), in that sense, presents a deeper meaning of democracy, and states that democracy is a political system which provides regular constitutional opportunities to change the policymakers and a social mechanism which allows the largest possible groups of the population to take part in both elections of officials as well as in decision-making processes.

Even though it is hard to find a consensus on the definition of democracy, it is important to find a precise definition of democracy in order to measure, conceptualize and understand the variations. There are four main types definition that focus on different aspects of the concept of democracy in the existing research. They are constitutional, substantive, procedural and process-oriented definition of democracy (Andrews and Chapman 1995, Collier and Levitsky 1997, Held 1996, Inkeles 1991, O'Donnell 1999, Schmitter and Karl 1991). The constitutional definition focuses on the laws that a regime has on paper. The substantive approach focuses on the quality of life and politics in a given regime. The procedural approach emphasizes the fundamental settings of a democracy such as organizing regular elections, universal suffrage etc. On the other hand, the process-oriented definition is different from others. This definition identifies a set of processes that should be observed and sustained in a regime in order to be qualified as democracy (Tilly 2007).

On the other hand, Dahl uses a more comprehensive conceptualization for democracy. For national regimes, Dahl emphasizes the importance of six institutions, which provides democratic practices to endure. These institutions are; free, fair and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship (Dahl 1998, Dahl 2005). Dahl calls regimes that have these institutions “polyarchal democracies” (Dahl 2005). According to Dahl, state is an organization which “controls the major concentration of coercive means within a substantial territory, exercises priority in some regards over all other organizations operating within the same territory, and receives acknowledgement of that priority from other organizations, including states, outside territory” (2007). In that sense, we call people who live under the jurisdiction of that state as “citizens”. Democracy is a set of relations between states and citizens and changes in these relations would lead to democratization or de-democratization (Dahl 2007).

Simply, transition to democratic rule is called as “democratization”. Democratization means changing into a broader, more equal, more protected, and more mutually consultation-included type of regime (Tilly 2007). The literature has many explanations for democratic transition. In the first wave democratization, countries became modern states before introducing universal suffrage while in the third wave democratization; countries have introduced free and fair elections before becoming modern states (Rose and Shin 2001). Establishing institutions was considered as democratization. On the other hand, during the 1950s, modernization was considered as a way of democratization. According to modernization theory, economy is the driving engine of democratization. Growing economy will lead to the emergence of a middle class, which will start to seek for equal rights and suffrage in the elections. However, later on, Huntington claimed that economic growth would not necessarily lead to democratization especially when the political institutions were not strong enough to include the newly mobilizing middle classes. He claimed that it would lead

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to instability rather than democratization (1968). On the other hand, as we can see in the example of India, economic backwardness is not an obstacle for democratization.

Many theorists put forward arguments in order to explain democratization. Boix asserts that declining inequality and asset specificity in Europe played a major role in the democratization of Europe in the first wave (2003). Theoretically, this argument is able to explain why we have not seen any democratization processes in many oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar etc. On the other hand, Acemoglu and Robinson's study emphasizes the importance of the middle class on democratization as well as the influence of economic structure and the implications of globalization (2006). According to Acemoglu and Robinson, democracy is an outcome of the fight between the poor and rich. The study illustrates that there would be three options for the poor;

- (1) Immediate redistribution
- (2) Democracy, or
- (3) Repression

Furthermore, Himmelfarb argues that democracy is an outcome of the efforts of sustaining political power among competing political organizations (1966). She claims that once the electoral institutions are set in a society, in order to sustain political power, competing political organizations will compromise in order to gain more votes from the possible largest group in a society, to be more specific, the poor and the working class. On the other hand, Collier argues that there is no single way for democratization (1999). Collier comes with two findings: first the labor played a less important role than it is assumed in the first wave of democratization, and second labor played a more important role in the third wave of democratization. According to her study, for instance, in the first wave of democratization, the political elite played a more important role than it is assumed in the previous literature. Charles Tilly asserts that, democratization can actually be a by-product of some other processes (2005). According to



him, some societal changes are necessary in order to trigger democratization. These societal changes can be summarized under two categories: First, changes in trust networks, and second changes in categorical inequality.

Moreover, democratization has also been studied as a focal point of international foreign policy paradigm. Especially after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Bush administration reoriented the United States' dominant foreign policy paradigm, and considered nondemocratic countries as the producers of terrorism (Piazza 2007). Terrorism and democracy became an important part of the political agenda. Bringing democracy to nondemocratic countries became an important duty for the United States and its western allies.

Terrorism, in that sense, is one of the biggest issues that political leaders have to deal with. U.N. Secretary-General's High-Level Panel Report in 2004 identified terrorism as "any action . . . that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act". Terrorism can also be defined as a way in which violence and/or threat of violence can be used by an armed non-state organization that seeks policy change by exploiting fear (Art and Richardson 2007).

TERRORISM – DEMOCRACY NEXUS

When we think of the link between democracy and terrorism, there are strong camps in the scholarly world. One theoretical perspective argues that there is a negative correlation between the level of democracy and terrorism since democracies present channels for citizens to participate in nonviolent protests (Schmid 1992). In democracies, people are allowed to participate in decision-making processes and to spread their ideas about issues. Therefore, people will be less likely to choose violent ways when democratic channels are open. Furthermore, Poe and Tate (1994) find that increased levels of democracy are correlated with decreased levels of repression. The theoretical argument is that increased levels of democracy present legitimate channels for policy change by disadvantaged groups. Moreover, some researchers find a link between electoral systems and violence. Reynal-Querol (2002) argues that rebellion within a state is less likely when there is proportional representation in that state. Theoretically, in majoritarian or mixed systems, some sort of repression is more likely to appear while in proportional systems the motivation needed for engaging in a violent conflict is lower since the repression is supposed to be lower. In 2002, a report in White House indicated that only expanded free market applications and widespread democratic institutions in the world can help the United States to provide security against transnational terrorism (White House, 2002). However, Piazza (2008) finds that both democracy and degree of economic openness are not significantly related to terrorism. Even though Bush administration anticipated that spreading democracy and liberal economic values in the context of ‘War on Terror’ would end transnational terrorism, Piazza finds that only experiencing state failure is significant on promoting transnational terrorism (2008).

Other scholars think vice versa. Eubank and Weinberg (1994) claim that political and civil liberties that democracies provide create a suitable environment for terrorist organizations to spread their program of violence. Especially the freedoms of movement and association reduce the cost of establishing terrorist organizations. There may be a positive effect of freedom of press on terrorism. Media coverage can boost the efforts of recruitment for terrorist organizations. Being able to intimidate huge audiences is essentially important for terrorist organizations, and freedom of press may present increasing incentives for terrorists to conduct violence in democratic countries (Chenoweth 2010). For instance, in an interview, PFLP founder and leader George Habash told that hijacking El-Al's plane in the 1960s had been more effective than killing hundreds of Israeli soldiers in a battle since the world media covered the hijacking incident (Hoffman 2006). In that sense, especially in countries where checks and balances are very strong, it is less likely for the state to violate individual rights and freedoms as well as the freedom of press (Li 2005). However, in more autocratic regimes where these rights and freedoms can be violated more frequently, it could be easier for the state to find and crush terrorist organizations (Crenshaw 1981; Wilkinson 2001). In fact, there is another perspective that claims that freedom of press has a positive impact on terrorism. According to this perspective, autocracies and/or anocracies are less likely to report terrorism incidents (Drakos and Gofas 2006b). In such regimes, because of the pressure of the government on the media, these incidents may be censored while in democracies they are more transparently broadcasted. Paul and Bagchi (2018) investigate the impact of the civil liberties on terrorism in Middle East and North African countries in between 1998 – 2010. They find that increasing civil liberties reduces domestic terrorism while it does not significantly affect transnational terrorism. Moreover, the study shows that rule of law is a significant factor that decreases domestic terrorism.

Another perspective presents a more complicated explanation about the linkage between democracy and terrorism. Quan Li (2005) suggests that democracy both promotes and reduces transnational terrorism. In that sense, while democratic participation has a negative effect on terrorism, constraints on executive forces in democracies have a positive effect. Abadie (2006), on the other hand, argues that there is no linear relationship between democracy and terrorism. Mid-level democracies provide more opportunities for terrorism. In that sense, countries in transition from authoritarianism to democracy are more open for increasing terrorism. Pape (2003; 2005) argues that terrorists focus on democracies more than non-democracies since it is easier to operate in democratic countries. Chenoweth (2010) contributes to the literature by arguing that political competition, which motivates groups of a variety of ideological fractions to compete with one another, increases terrorism in democracies. Piazza (2013) investigates the relationship between regime type, regime longevity and terrorism. He finds that while young democracies are experiencing more terrorism than older ones, any age of dictatorships are less prone to terrorist activities (Piazza 2013). Moreover, Gaibullov, Piazza and Sandler (2017) find that regime type has a U-shaped relationship with different forms of terrorism. It is less likely to see terrorism in stable democracies and autocracies while it is more likely to see terrorism in anocracies (Gaibullov, Piazza and Sandler 2017). On the other hand, Wilson and Piazza (2013) investigate the complex institutional differences, which go beyond democracy – autocracy divide. They find that, single-party autocracies are less likely to experience domestic and transnational terrorism than military autocracies and democracies (2013). Their finding undermines the power of regime type as an explanatory variable.

Bringing a new explanation to the terrorism-democracy nexus, San-Akca (2014) examines how democracies encourage terrorism that targets other countries. States' support for terrorist groups is examined in many path-breaking studies (Saideman 2002; Salehyan 2008;

San-Akca 2009; Cunningham 2010; Maoz and San-Akca 2012). However, effect of regime type on influencing terrorism that targets other countries had not been investigated. The author uses the conceptualization of Byman (2005a) in order to distinguish between different type of state supports. Byman (2005a) puts forward two different types of support: *active support* and *passive support*. In active support, governments intentionally support a non-state armed organization through created channels. In passive support, a government does not support a non-state armed group intentionally, yet it allows other parties to do so knowingly. In democracies, since the governments are restricted with judiciary and legislative branches, they are more likely to support non-state armed groups through passive support. In that sense, San-Akca (2014) finds that increasing democracy level is negatively correlated with the active support while it is positively correlated with the passive support. She claims that in higher levels of democracy, it is hard for government to restrict the acts of rebel groups since freedoms and civil liberties that are embedded in democracies prevent executive branches to take further measures against these groups (2014). This finding supports Pape (2003; 2005) since it shows liberal aspect of democracy provides an environment in which cost of operation would be less costly for terrorist organizations. Within the context of the same logic, when a state encounters increasing threat of terrorism, the state would be more likely to implement illiberal measures in order to increase the deterrence against terrorism.

Furthermore, there is a camp that argues transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy causes terrorism since governability of a state reduces during these unstable times. Mansfield & Snyder (1995a,b, 2005) argue that democratization itself triggers terrorism. However, the hypothesis that democratization triggers terrorism is still debatable. Further research shows that there is no significant relationship between incomplete democratizers with weak institutions and participating in a conflict (Narang and Nelson 2009). Yet, it does not mean that institutions are not important for political instability. Goldstone et al. (2005)

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conclude that political institutions are the most important predictors of instability onset and economic conditions, demography and geography are not three of those important predictors. Moreover, Cederman et al. (2010) find that democratization is only effective on governmental conflict rather than territorial ones. Hegre (2001) focuses on the outbreak of a civil war but the theory can be usefully applied to the terrorism cases as well. They suggest that many democratization efforts fail, and countries turn into anocracies. Being trapped in between democracy and autocracy causes political instability, and increase the likelihood of experiencing a conflict. De Nevers (2003) also focuses on the transition from autocracy to democracy, and finds that transition from autocracy to democracy is positively correlated with the rising levels of terrorist activities. Lacina (2006) investigates the severity of conflicts and finds that democracy, rather than other factors such as economic development or state military strength, is most strongly linked with fewer deaths in internal conflicts. Theoretically, terrorist threat is less likely to spread in democratic countries since it is harder to execute violent operation in stronger countries. Sambanis (2001) conducts a large-N analysis in his study and concludes that having nondemocratic neighbors increases the possibility of facing terrorist threats for a country.

## WHY DO STATES REACT TERRORISM HARsher THAN OTHER VIOLENT ACTS?

‘Gemeinshacft’ creates the state as an institution, which has a claim over monopolization of the use of legitimate violence (Weber 1919). Moreover, in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, published in 1883, Nietzsche puts forward one of the earliest definitions of modern state. He criticizes the concept of the state as how it chews and rechews its citizens. He names the state as ‘cold monster’ and says: “State I call it, where all poison drinkers, good and bad: state, where the slow suicide of all – is called life” (Nietzsche, 2003:37). According to the Oxford Dictionary, state is “an organized political community under one government” (Thompson 1995). In the political science literature, the most commonly accepted definition is the definition of Max Weber. Other mostly accepted definition is the one given at the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States in 1933. According to the convention, state is a space that should possess a permanent population, a defined territory and a government that is capable of controlling the defined territory and conducting international relations with other states.<sup>2</sup>

Armed rebel groups and terrorist organizations pose challenges to state’s monopoly over the use of violence. Because of these challenges are pointed at the monopoly over the use of violence, they are existential challenges directed against the very nature of the state. While all terrorist organizations pose a direct challenge to state’s monopoly over the use of violence, some terrorist organizations may also challenge states’ claims on the population and territory as well. Terrorism is the use or threat to use violence by individuals or groups to pursue political or social agendas through reaching larger audience beyond the targeted unit or noncombatant victims (Enders and Sandler, 2012). When Al Qaeda hijacked four airplanes in 11 September, the aim was to create a pressure on the White House to remove its troops from Saudi Arabia.

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf>

## Chapter 4

By conducting terrorist operations, Al Qaeda tried to pursue a political agenda by threatening the security of the U.S, and to create intimidation among the US society. They also intended to be heard by a larger audience than they targeted. Terrorism, in that sense, creates two-way pressure over the state after shocking attacks: First, the society perceives threat and seek security; second, state feels insecure because the threat of terrorism is consistent even though the attacks itself are not. Bloch-Elkon finds that even though the importance of “War on Terror” decreased in time after 9/11 attacks, the expectation of American people about facing a terrorist attack in next few months did not significantly change and remained significantly high (2011). According to the polls, in October 2001, 71 percent of Americans were expecting that another catastrophic terrorist attack is “very likely” in near future and in October 2008, the answer was given by 68 percent of the Americans (Bloch – Elkon, 2011).

Since citizens demand increased security at the wake of traumatic terror attacks states’ response to political violence and terrorism is harsher than their response to other types of challenges they face. Considering that most states are stronger than rebel groups and terrorist organizations, states’ military response to such groups can be overwhelming. On July 22, 2011, Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik killed more than 85 young people at an island youth camp in Norway. He was captured after the incidence and got a 21-year sentence. His appeal to the European Court of Human Rights was rejected recently (Olsen, 2018). The camp was organized by the socialists, and the perpetrator was a right-winger individual. Norwegian courts found no link between any organization and the perpetrator. Therefore, the trial was fair and clear. The attack was horrific, yet having no linkage to any terrorist organizations prevented state to take harsher measures against potential attacks and the attack did not have any effect on individual rights, civil liberties and finally democracy in Norway.

States employ several security-related measures during counter-terrorism campaigns. These measures may include direct military deployments to regions affected by terrorism,



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military operations against terrorist groups, penetrating into terrorist groups through intelligence operations, developing preventive defensive measures like increasing the number of police units, mass arrests targeted against suspected terrorists, or widespread coercion directed against civilian population suspected to help terrorist organizations. For instance, on January 30, 1972, British soldiers killed 13 unarmed civilians. Beyond other countries, disciplined and well-trained armies such as the U.K Army commit violations of human rights. Later, British Army claimed four of those killed were already wanted by the army for being a member of IRA, which was not true (Pringle and Jacobson, 2002). In the meantime, the UK Army killed more civilians than IRA members in the Northern Ireland (Rogers, 2010). As these examples show, the threat of terrorism is different than other threats of violence. The threat of terrorism requires military measures as well as legislative measures. Increasing need of security following the attacks increases the involvement of military into daily politics.

Since management of a rebel conflict involves military response by the state, it provides many opportunities for the military to expand their authority and override the civilian control over the armed forces. Other than the fierce response of states against terrorism, the field that the state provides for military to act freely causes undemocratic applications, and undermines the rule of law principle of the democracy. In 1984, for the first time, a British soldier was found guilty for killing a civilian in the conflict. For instance, Lord Widgery was appointed to investigate the incident when UK Army killed 13 unarmed civilians. However, his report served as a whitewash. Every time state plays blind eye on such incidents, military gets a chance to exploit its powers.

Many researchers discussed that terrorist attacks can cause a paradigmatic shift in the distribution of power in a democratic country for the benefit of executive and damage democratic institutions with the emergency measures which initiate swift actions by the executive. As Owens and Pelizzo (2009) discuss swift actions are harder to implement with

parliaments. Bay (2005) has recognized that terrorist attacks might blur the traditional lines which were created to protect the civil liberties from the excessive executive power. Rossiter (2017) claims that no government could survive by excluding the option of dictatorship when the nation's survival is at stake. According to Rossiter, war, rebellion, and economic depression might be the conditions of 'constitutional dictatorship' (2017).

On the other hand, democracy is a civilian rule. It aims to control security forces through constitution and law. According to Wilkinson, liberal democracies should use methods, which are not conflicting with the liberal values such as humanity, liberty and justice (2009). As Wilkinson suggests, liberal democracies do not need to suspend the rule of law in the name of national security and adopt extreme measures in order to conduct war on terror. Intimidation is what a terrorist organization wants to create among the society. When states suspend democratic rights and civil liberties in order to counter terrorist activities, it may help the terrorist organization for recruitment and propaganda purposes. Democracy, in its very essence, aims to provide a social agreement between the ruler and the citizens.

According to J. Samuel Fitch, democratic theory "... does not admit the possibility that any group –military or civilian- possesses greater legitimacy than the will of the people, democratically determined through free and inclusive elections and tempered by the interplay of constitutionality established institutions" (1998). In that sense, both civilian and military authorities are legitimate if and only if they represent the will of people. Moreover, a democratic rule requires being free from undesirable military behavior, coup threats or coups itself (Pion-Berlin 2005). Literature of civil-military relations inspects the armed forces as an organization in which the ways of professionalism and training, structure and tradition may isolate the military from the rule of civil society or the interests of social classes in a country (Pion-Berlin 1997; Rial 1990; Fitch 1989, 1998; Norden 1996; Hunter 1997; Stepan 1988). In order to understand the extent of civilian control over military in nation states, civil-military

## Chapter 4

relations literature focuses on electoral competition in democracies (Hunter 1997), the power relation between armed forces and civilian authorities (Stepan 1988; Agüero 1995), and the interest of armed forces as an organization (Nordlinger 1977).

When we think of civil-military relations, we assume that there are two unitary actors: civilian authority and the military. As Pion-Berlin (2015) indicates, democracies are expected to have a civilian rule over military, and they should be free from undesirable military acts, coup threats and coups. However, civil authorities generally depend on military experts not only when the agenda is about security but also to be able to sustain civilian control of armed forces (Bland 1999). Huntington (1957) notes that the objective of the security policy is to maximize military security by compromising minimum of other social values. In that sense, balancing civil-military relations is crucial for the sake of the state and democracy at the same time. When civil-military relations become unbalanced in favor of the military, the security forces would exploit the powers they gained.

When fighting against armed rebellion and terrorism, oftentimes states prefer to ignore human rights abuses committed by the military and other security forces. Potential human rights abuses during counter-terrorism operations cause threats to the civilian and constitutional character of democracy. Expanded powers that states give to security forces in the times of conflict may lead to the unnecessary killings, searches and so on. Michael C. Desch puts forward that "... if a country faces a significant internal threat, the institutions of civilian authority will most likely to be weak and deeply divided, making it difficult for civilians to control the military" (1996). Hunter (2016) finds that terrorism weakens civil liberties and political rights. The instability that associated with terrorism is able to affect civil liberties and political rights in a democratic polity. For instance, after the attacks of ISIL in France in 2015, the French President declared state of emergency. Within the first forty-eight hours of the state of emergency, French security forces raided 168 houses, placed 104 people under house arrest

and arrested 23 people. Over 1,000 of all investigations, only 23 cases were found terror related (Nordstorm, 2017).

Despite these important findings, the literature is still not able to answer many questions. As the terrorism literature shows, there are different camps about the effects of regime type and the level of democracy on terrorism. At the end, we can see that every type of regime in the world experiences transnational terrorism and/or domestic terrorism. However, how is the regime type of a country affected by terrorism? . This thesis tries to answer this question and discovers the effect of terrorism on democratic and judicial institutions all over the globe.

I argue that we need to study the effect of terrorism on democracy given the recent developments in the world. As Tilly puts forward, democratization may be the by-product of other processes (2005). At the same time, de-democratization or decline in democracy can be the outcome of some other processes. According to Weber (1919), state is the only human '*Gemeinschaft*', which presents claim as having the monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force. In that sense, terrorism as a violent tactic challenges the very basics of the state. Theoretically, we can expect that when a state is under attack of a terrorist organization rather than another state, it may act differently. Overall, I argue that, terrorism negatively affects democracies more than it negatively affects non-democracies. It can also reduce the efforts of democratization in democratizing countries.

As one can freely say, most probably a state is always more powerful than a terrorist organization. When it comes to military capacity, states are capable of dealing with non-state organizations. However, the problem about the link between terrorism and democracy is that states have to fight unconventional wars when facing terrorism. Therefore, their reaction can be destructive unless they have experience in fighting unconventional wars. This destructive unconventional war can undermine democratic institutions and practices because

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counterterrorism campaigns might end up producing anti-liberal policies. Due to the selective and clandestine nature of terrorism, states might end up violating the basic liberties and freedoms in an effort to prevent possible violent attacks from clandestine terrorist organizations. In conventional conflicts, states are confronted with the enemy's men in uniform. This is not the case when they try to reveal the terrorist plots. For instance, in 2015, a series of horrifying terrorist attacks had hit the capital of France, Paris. More than 100 were killed and hundreds of others were injured as a result of the incidents. It was the deadliest attack that occurred in the French soil since the WWII. Following the attack, former French President of France, François Hollande declared state of emergency (Bamat, 2017). With the leverage that the President gained due to the state of emergency, French army bombed the so-called capital of Islamic State, Raqqa without an approval of French parliament. French authorities tightened border control even though the suspects of the attack were actually French citizens. A report from Amnesty International emphasized the disproportional use of state force over citizens and immigrants after the attacks (2017). In that time of period, 168 homes were raided, 104 people were placed under house arrest, 23 people were arrested by French security forces in the first 48 hours of state of emergency (Chrisafis 2015). While 1,000 of all searches had resulted with criminal investigations, only 23 cases were found to be terror-related. 11 mosques and 19 Islamic centers were shut down by the French administration until the end of state of emergency (Nordstrom, 2017). Today, even though France is discussing to lift the state of emergency, the parliament and the president are working on a bill that will sustain security forces with permanent rights in counterterrorism operations (Bamat, 2017). France is known with its well-established liberal democracy for years. However, after facing an increasing threat of terrorism, state's response has been very harsh and undemocratic.

Gibler and Randazzo (2011) argue that consolidation of power in the executive branch of government can undermine the democratic principles unless it is checked by an independent

judiciary that grants the protection of individual rights. Some studies associate the rejection of democratic principles with military crisis (Desch 1996; Gibler 2012; Thompson 1996). Moreover, many of these theories follow a causal mechanism in which regime reversion happens as a response to an external threat. When the executive branch of government encounters or perceives an external threat, it seeks to increase political power in order to deal with the threat (Rasler 1986). That can be legitimized by the public who perceives more security is needed to defend the nation and national pride (Mansfield and Snyder 2003). Under these circumstances, different political parties and groups in the society may get closer with increasing nationalism which would eventually create an intolerant political atmosphere against minorities and opposition groups (Gurr 1998). The value of military can rise, and the executive may increase the powers of security forces (Laswell 1997). At the end, the country can turn into a polity in which there is a highly strong military and security forces that the executive branch of the government relies on to survive (Gibler 2010).

The mechanism by which perception of threat gives opportunity to increase the political power of the government leaves room for the rejection of democratic principles such as civil liberties. This argument provides a baseline hypothesis to test the effect of terrorism on civil liberties.

*H1: Civil liberties are more likely to decrease when threat of terrorism increases.*

Restricting civil liberties are expected to be prevented by the independent judiciaries in democratic countries. However, increasing threat and the need for security will create a pressure over judges and equality before law and individual rights would be at stake. This argument provides a baseline for my second hypothesis to test the effect of terrorism on equality before law and individual rights. My second hypothesis includes two parts in (a) I will test my model on equality before law and individual rights to see whether terrorism prevents

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access for citizens to judiciary. In (b) I will test the independency of judiciary in countries when terrorism increases.

*H2a: Equality before law and individual rights are more likely to decrease when terrorism increases.*

*H2b: Observing independent judiciary in the countries is less likely when terrorism increases in the given year.*

If true, decreasing in both important aspects of liberal democracy would lead to a decrease in liberal democracy itself at the end. Therefore, my last hypothesis to test is:

*H3: Liberal democracy is more likely to decrease when terrorism increases.*

Democratic backsliding is also related to democratic survival. Scholars have argued the determinants of democratic survival for a long time. O'Donnell (1973) argues that economic crisis lead countries to be more authoritarian to facilitate painful economic measures. Gasirowski (1995) finds empirical support for the democratic reversion that follows economic crisis. Wallerstein (1980) also argues bad economic performance may lead to democratic breakdown. On the other hand, foreign policy literature puts forward that difficult economic times can be exploited by the leaders to provoke low-intensity conflicts in order to distract the public from the economic failure. Engaging in an international conflict may boost the votes of incumbent (DeRouen 2000). There are some empirical findings on internal conflicts during the economic crisis in the literature as well (Gelpi 1997; Levy 1989; Oneal and Tir 2006).

Possible alternative explanations about the link between democratization and violent conflict generally rely on the idea that instability leads to violent conflicts (e.g. Hegre 2001; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier, Hoefler & Söderbom, 2004; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; Gates et al., 2006). The literature on democratization on the other hand, relies on different independent variables other than terrorism. Przeworski (1991) claims that democracies do not become stable until the offices can be transferred to the oppositions peacefully.

One reason why terrorism affects democracy is “responsiveness of the government”. Countries in democratic transition may lack of democratic practices and political institutions with respect to democratic countries. If we consider that democratizing states are politically unstable, consolidation of democracy is an important factor that may affect the effect of increasing terrorist threat on democracy. Therefore, I created a control variable *duration\_democracy* in order to control the effect of consolidation of democracy.

On the other hand, the situation is not very different for democratizing countries when they face the increasing threat of terrorism. India has achieved record high point on Political Rights and Civil Liberties from Freedom House in 1977 when Indira Gandhi left the office with a peaceful and democratic election. In 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a Tamil militant and Hindu activists demolished a mosque, which triggered the clashes between Hindus and Muslims. In 1992, the government took serious counterterrorism measures, which undermined political and individual rights in the country. As a result of clashes, 1200 people were killed in 1993, and the following year, Indian political rights have seen the record low according to Freedom House scale; 4.0. After the end of clashes, India turned back to its previous scores in 1997 in the scale of political rights. However, civil liberties kept staying at the level of 4.0. In 1999, when the coalition government was formed in India, the regime was coded as “free” once again by the Freedom House.



## Chapter 5

### Research Design

In this study, the independent variable is the number of terrorism related killings in a given country. Increasing number of terrorism related killings would cause decreasing level of democracy in the country. As a result of increasing number of terrorism related killings and increasing horror in the society, states are likely to respond terrorism with increasing security measures. Security measures include expanded powers for security forces and impunity from the justice. In the table 2, the causal mechanism is illustrated. After conducting the Large-N analysis, I conducted an MSS design case analysis to emphasize the causal mechanism behind the linkage of terrorism-democracy nexus.

#### 5.1 Data and Operationalization

##### 5.1.1 Large-N Analysis

I am testing my models on four different dependent variables; Civil Liberties Index of V-Dem, Equality Before Law and Individual Rights Index of V-Dem, Liberal Democracy Index of V-Dem and Independency of Judiciary from POLCON. I rely on V-Dem since it is easier to disaggregate data for such a complex notion as democracy. In V-Dem, it is possible to find many different aspects of democracy. Even though V-Dem starts from the 1800s, due to the lack of data about terrorism before 1975, I only take from 1975 to 2016. According to the V-Dem Codebook, civil liberties are part of liberal freedoms. V-Dem conceptualizes it as the absence of physical violence by government agents and the absence of constraints on private and political liberties which ought to be properties of individuals in a democratic polity. In order to test the effect of terrorism on law and judiciary, I use two different dependent variables. The first one comes from V-Dem's Equality Before Law and Individual Rights

Index, the second one is Judicial Independence from POLCON (The Political Constraint Index) Dataset. While I am using fixed-effect OLS regressions for the rest of the hypothesis, since Judicial Independence is a dummy, I use logistic regression. The data covers 163 states from 1960 to 2017. Judicial independence has been operationalized in different ways such as using formal tenure and pay guarantees (Klermen and Mahoney 2005); the presence of a constitutional court (Alivizatos 1995) and so on and so forth. However, these indicators are all different proxies of a more comprehensive notion. Therefore, I rely on POLCON since it successfully merges Polity IV and the International Country Risk Guide datasets to measure judicial independence. As Gibler and Randazzo (2011) assert, it provides one of the best measurements of judicial independence. On the other hand, V-Dem's Equality Before Law and Individual Rights Index measures to what extent laws are transparent and enforced, to what extent citizens enjoy access to justice, and to what extent the law secures freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity and freedom of religion. All dependent variables are lagged for two years in order to capture the effect of killings in a year more accurately since it would take some time for countries to imply new measures against terrorist incidents. However, unlagged versions of regressions are also presented in the Appendix.

The terrorism literature is short to answer many questions on terrorism-democracy nexus mostly because of the data issues. Most of the researchers in the literature rely on the Polity IV dataset to measure democracy. Polity IV does not necessarily cover all the derivations which might have less weight on the aggregated score of democracy. Moreover, there are plenty of critiques about Polity and measurement of democracy, as well (Gleditsch, Hegre & Strand, 2009; Treier & Jackman, 2008; Vreeland, 2008). Especially, Treier & Jackman (2008) find that using democracy as a latent variable allowed them to realize “noise”<sup>3</sup> in the measure. They claim that noise is considerable and will lead to substantive consequences. According to

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<sup>3</sup>Noise: measurement error.

Treier & Jackman (2008), using Polity's democracy measure as independent variable in cross-national statistical analyses would lead to considerable consequences. As we know, there are many indicators that determine the level of democracy. While these indicators and their weight are uncertain, the aggregated score of democracy contains many uncertainties. In that sense, in studies that taking democracy as an independent variable, there would be errors-in-variables, that might invalidate the conclusions. However, using democracy as a dependent variable would not have an adverse effect on the conclusions (Treier and Jackman 2008). Therefore, using democracy as independent variable is a methodological issue as well as being a theoretical issue. All research regarding that puzzle so far has taken the level of democracy as the independent variable.

My unit of observation is country – year and I have a total of 6121 observations in the panel data with total of 163 states and 41 years. In order to control my model, I use GDP per capita (logged), population size (logged), cold war dummy and economic crisis. The economic crisis measure is calculated with a 3 percent or more decrease in GDP in a country in two consecutive years. Thus, it is a dummy variable. GDP per capita and population size are logged since they are not normally distributed. I also logged my explanatory variable, total killings, since it was not normally distributed. Moreover, I also lagged my independent variable, total killings, in order to address endogeneity problem.

### 5.1.2 Dependent Variable: Level of Democracy

The dependent variable in this study is the level of democracy. I use V-Dem's Civil Liberties, Liberal Democracy and Equality Before Law Indices in order to measure the level of democracy. In V-Dem, most comprehensive democracy scores are Polyarchy Index, Liberal Democracy Index and Deliberative Democracy Index. I choose Liberal Democracy Index among them since I predict that increasing terrorist threat would be effective on civil liberties

and individual rights. These components are heavily covered in Liberal Democracy Index. I have also chosen Civil Liberties Index since I predict that increasing threat of terrorism primarily affect civil liberties in a country. Equality Before Law and Individual Freedoms Index has been chosen since expanded powers of security forces is providing army officials impunity against criminal charges. The dataset covers 177 countries. The dataset emphasizes the quality of democratic and autocratic authority in the countries rather than prudential and exclusive forms of governance. It captures regime authority with a 100-point scale ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. There are many critiques against institutions that measure democracies including V-Dem. However, there is no better way to measure the level of democracies so far. On the other hand, I did not use Freedom House, which is another popular institution that measures democracy levels since its range of scale is not sufficient for my purpose to show the differences in the democratic level. Freedom House, in the manner of level of democracy, uses 7-point scale where 1 most democratic and 7 is least democratic.

I also have a dummy dependent variable for measuring the independency of judiciary system. Judicial independence has been operationalized in different ways such as using formal tenure and pay guarantees (Klermen and Mahoney 2005); the presence of a constitutional court (Alivizatos 1995) and so on and so forth. However, these indicators are all different proxies of a more comprehensive notion. Therefore, I rely on POLCON since it successfully merges Polity IV and the International Country Risk Guide datasets to measure judicial independence. As Gibler and Randazzo (2011) assert, it provides one of the best measurements of judicial independence.

## Chapter 5

Figure 5.1 – Liberal Democracy Trends




Figure 5.2 – Distribution of Independent Judiciaries




Figure 3 shows the distribution of independent judiciaries in the world. The number of countries that have no independent judiciary is almost twice that of the ones that have independent judiciaries.

The Hausmann Test shows that my data is inconsistent, therefore I used fixed effect models for the OLS regressions. The results for Hausman Test can be found below.

#### Hausman Test

```
data: libdem.lag ~ ln_totalkilled + ln_gdp + ln_pop + coldwar + econ.crisis.3
```

```
chisq = 297.75, df = 5, p-value < 2.2e-16
```


```
alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent
```

#### 5.1.3 Independent Variable: Terrorist Threat

I operationalized terrorist threat in the manner of severity of terrorism related killings in a country for the observed year. In order to do so, I rely on GTD (Global Terrorism Dataset). GTD codes every terrorist incident with every details possible such as type of target, type of the weapons, total number of wounded and so on and so forth. I logged the independent variable, first to satisfy the assumptions of Gauss-Markov Theorem, second to increase substantive interpretability of the coefficients.

Figure 1 shows the terrorism related casualties' trend with respect to democratization waves. The figure also includes the global trend. Figure 2 shows the liberal democracy trend with respect to democratization waves. The figure again includes the global trend as well.

FIGURE 5.3 – Terrorism Related Casualties Trends



As it can be seen in the Figure 3, all waves and global trends in terrorism related casualties follow the same route (except for 9/11). I did not include the second wave of democratization and distributed them into first and third waves of democratization since there are a few countries in the second wave. Moreover, second wave is the shortest and least effective wave among other waves. The density of the first wave seems to be lower, however the number of countries in the first wave is less than the other waves.

As Figure 2 shows, the liberal trends for countries that democratized in different waves are also generally similar to each other. The sensitivity of the first wave countries results from having lesser countries in the first wave with respect to the other waves.

#### 5.1.4 Control Variables

Other control variables are GDP per capita, population and duration of the conflict. As Rostow (1971) claims, economic growth will lead to democratization with the efforts of newly

emerged middle class. In order to control that variable, I used World Bank's GDP data. Moreover, I created a dummy variable to catch significant decreases in GDP in order to identify and control the effect of economic crisis on the democracy. O'Donnell (1973) argues that economic crisis leads countries to be more authoritarian to facilitate painful economic measures. Gasirowski (1995) finds empirical support for the democratic reversion that follows economic crisis. The economic crisis measure is calculated with a 3 percent or more decrease in GDP in a country in two consecutive years. Tilly (2005) asserts that, changes in social inequality is a determining factor for democratization. Social inequality is generally measured by GINI coefficients in studies. However, using World Bank's GINI data reduces the number of observations significantly since it starts from 1990. Barro's study (1999) finds that there is small but significant positive correlation between the size of the population and democracy. Therefore, I controlled it by using population variable. Moreover, I control the effect of media freedom on democracy by using V-Dem's media freedom index. Even though V-Dem gives higher values for lower level of media freedom, to be able to substantively interpret the variables, I reversed the values. Therefore, higher levels of media freedom is associated with higher numeric values in my dataset. I also control my model with Civil War and Democratic Duration variables. Civil War variable is a dummy variable where number of battle related deaths in a country is higher than 1000 threshold. Democratic Duration is a continuous variable which counts the number of years that the country had been considered as democratic.



## Chapter 6

## Results

In table 6.1, given below, I test the effect of terrorism on democracy. For all of the models, I lagged Total Number of Killings for a year in order to address the problem of endogeneity. In model 1, I tested the effect of terrorism on Civil Liberties. *Total Killings (Logged)*, *GDP per Capita (Logged)*, *Population Size*, *Cold War* and *Media Freedom* are statistically significant. *Total Killings (Logged)*, *GDP per Capita (Logged)* and *Cold War* are negatively associated with Civil Liberties while *Population Size* and *Media Freedom* are positively associated with Civil Liberties. In that sense, increasing media freedom is associated with increasing civil liberties, as expected. As I expected, every 1-point increase in *Total Killings* corresponds to a 0,011 percent decrease in civil liberties. Negative association of GDP with civil liberties needs further research, however as it is known, democracy is a latent variable, therefore GDP per capita might be associated with different aspects of democracy in various directions. The results with the years that civil war was observed can be found in the Appendix section. These findings support my first hypothesis.

*H1: Civil liberties are more likely to decrease when threat of terrorism increases.*

In model 2, I tested the effect of terrorism on Equality Before Law and Individual Liberty. *Total Killings (Logged)*, *Population Size*, *Cold War* and *Media Freedom* are statistically significant on Equality Before Law and Individual Liberty. *Total Killings (Logged)* and *Cold War* are negatively correlated while *Population Size (Logged)* and *Media Freedom* are positively correlated with Equality Before Law and Individual Liberty. As expected again, more media freedom is associated with increasing equality before law and individual liberty. Every 1-unit increase in Total Killings is associated with 0.013 percent decrease in Equality Before Law. These findings support first part of my second hypothesis.

*H2a: Equality before law and individual rights are more likely to decrease when terrorism increases.*

## Chapter 6

In Model 3, *Total Killings (logged)*, *GDP per Capita (Logged)*, *Population Size (Logged)*, *Cold War* and *Media Freedom* are significant on liberal democracy. While *Total Killings* and *Cold War* are negatively associated with liberal democracy, *Population Size* and *Media Freedom* are positively associated. GDP per capita is significant on Liberal Democracy and this finding does support Tilly (2005) and Boix (2003)'s arguments about economy's effect on democracy. Moreover, economic crisis is also not significant on liberal democracy. These finding support my third hypothesis:

*H3: Liberal democracy is more likely to decrease when terrorism increases.*

Every 1 terrorism related killing is associated with 0.005 percent decrease in Liberal Democracy. For all of the models, end of the cold war represents better opportunities for democratization according to the findings. The years in which civil war was observed were dropped from the dataset for the regression. The results with the years that civil war was observed can be found in the Appendix section.

As I predicted, increasing threat of terrorism, which was measured with *Total Killings*, is associated with decreasing individual rights, civil liberties and liberal democracy in a country. In table 11, we see there is an upward trend in the number of countries that experience at least 25-battle-related deaths especially after 2010. After the Syrian Civil War, emergence of ISIS affected many countries in the world including Iraq, Turkey, France, Belgium and the United States. Therefore, *Total Killings* is a useful measurement to capture the increasing threat that terrorism possesses in a country. For instance, France did not declare state of emergency right after the Charlie Hebdo incident in January, but the state of emergency took place in France after the Paris Attacks in November same year. Moreover, Enders and Sandler (2000) investigate the threat that transnational terrorist incidents pose. They found that even though there is 50% decline in transnational terrorism after the Cold War, any terrorist incident is 17% more likely to result in death or injury than the previous two decades (Enders and Sandler

2000). These findings show that, terrorism became deadlier and more dangerous. Therefore, measuring the threat of terrorism with the increasing casualties provide more reliable results.

Table 6.1. Regression Analysis of the Effect of Terrorism on Democracy

	<b>Fixed Effect OLS Results</b>		
	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Liberal Democracy	Civil Liberties	Equality Before Law
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.001)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.018*** (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)
Population Size(Logged)	0.064*** (0.009)	0.182*** (0.010)	0.133*** (0.010)
Cold War	-0.060*** (0.004)	-0.074*** (0.005)	-0.063*** (0.005)
Economic Crisis	0.005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.0003 (0.004)
Media Freedom	0.110*** (0.003)	0.130*** (0.004)	0.119*** (0.004)
Observations	4,931	4,957	4,957
R <sup>2</sup>	0.409	0.457	0.387
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.389	0.439	0.368

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 6.2 Logit Analysis of the Effect of Terrorism on Independent Judiciary

<b>Logit Model</b>	
	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Independent Judiciary
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.134*** (0.030)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.634*** (0.034)
Population Size(Logged)	0.222*** (0.031)
Cold War	0.238** (0.101)
Economic Crisis	0.145 (0.106)
Media Freedom	1.415*** (0.060)
Civil War	-0.342 (0.620)
Democratic Duration	0.012*** (0.004)
Constant	-12.177*** (0.592)
Observations	5,067
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,754.227
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 6.1 – Predicted Probability of Observing Independent Judiciary




Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 show the results of my analysis of Independent Judiciary in all countries in the dataset. As predicted in the Hypothesis 2b, increasing terrorism is found statistically significant and negatively associated with the independent judiciary. The more terrorism in a given year, the less likely an independent judiciary exists. The substantive effect of terrorism on the likelihood of independent judiciary is large. Moving from the minimum to maximum values of Total Killings variable decreases the likelihood of observing independent judiciary from 30% to 10% which signifies a 20% decrease in the probability of observing an independent judiciary in a given year.

Figure 4 shows the decrease in the predicted probabilities of observing independent judiciary as the number of killings increases with the rising terrorism. These analyses support my Hypothesis 2b that independent judiciary is less likely to be observed with the increasing

terrorism. This finding also theoretically supports why the decrease in civil liberties cannot be prevented by the judiciary.

In the following part of the thesis, the causal mechanism behind this relationship is examined with an MSS design case study. There are several studies that argue the relationship between civil liberties, individual freedoms and terrorism (Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Paul and Bagchi 2018). As these studies argue, democracy may be seen as a factor that encourages terrorism. Democracies present greater civil rights and freedoms to their citizens with respect to the non-democratic regimes. Within the same argumentation, policymakers might be thinking that restricting these rights, compromising from democratic values may help sustaining security. As we see in the instances of France and the United Kingdom, emergency laws became a part of permanent legislation after increasing terrorist threat in different time periods.

I categorized countries with respect to their V-Dem scores. Countries that have a V-Dem score between 0.00 and 0.5 are considered as 'Autocracies'. Countries that have a V-Dem score between 0.5 and 1 are considered as 'Democracies'. In Table 8, according to data, in 'autocracies' mean of total number of attacks is less than the mean of total number of attacks in democracies. These findings support Hegre et al (2001), Buhaug (2006) and Chenoweth (2010)'s arguments about democracies' being more conflict prone regimes than harshly authoritarian regimes. In Table 9, the data shows total number of attacks in democracies is higher than total number of attacks in autocracies. On the other hand, in table 10, we see that the mean of total number of attacks in autocracies is much higher than total number of attacks in democracies in recent years. In the Table 10 especially after 2010, we see that the mean of total number of attacks in autocracies surpasses the mean of total number of attacks in democracies. We also observe a general increase in the means of total number of attacks in both regime types in the same years. It is highly likely that the trend starts with the Arab Spring

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and continues with the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This finding supports the findings of Themnér and Wallensteen (2014) as well. Themnér and Wallensteen find that the average number of deaths in 2013 became the high record seen over long time period (2014).

Figure 6.2. Mean of Total Numbers of Terrorist Attacks with Respect to Regime Types




Figure 6.3 Distribution of Total Number of Attacks with Respect to Regime Types




Figure 6.4 Mean of Total Number of Attacks in Autocracies and Democracies with Respect to Years







Figure 6.5 Number of Countries Experienced at least 25 B-R-D in Years



Case Analysis – An MSS Design: Comparison of Brazil, Peru and Colombia

In order to see the effect of terrorism on democratization and democracy, I have conducted a case comparison of three countries from Latin America: Colombia, Peru and Brazil. I choose countries from Latin America because they are similar in their historical context, civilization and religion. In Asia, it is hard to find countries with similar historical background and similar democracy levels. In Europe, most of the countries are highly democratized and only a few of them experience terrorism. In the Middle East, on the other hand, countries' historical backgrounds are very different and there are significant national and religious differences between countries. According to Huntington (1996), civilizational differences have significant impact on the democratization process because they affect the mindsets of people. Theoretically, we would expect Western countries to defend democratic values while we cannot expect the same for the Middle Eastern countries according to Huntington. Since I study the effect of increasing threat of terrorism on democracy, I aimed to control cultural and civilizational differences by choosing countries from the same region and from a similar historical background. I employ a most-similar systems design. Columbia, Peru and Brazil are similar in terms of their regions, GDP levels, presidential systems, and civilizational and cultural characters. Every country in the comparison is located in Latin America. In 2016, Colombia's GDP per capita was calculated as 5,806.61 USD, Brazil's 8,649.95 USD and Peru's 6,045.65 USD. Peru, Brazil and Colombia are all presidential-legislative democracies. I have started the comparison from 1980 since the promotion of democracy is accelerated with the end of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, U.S centered the 'Democracy Promotion' as foreign policy goal in order to expand "market democracy" (McSherry 2000; Robinson 1996a; Smith 2000). I have chosen all countries from

Latin America since they are mostly low-intensified democracies that achieved to reduce the powers of armed forces and expand the individual rights formally, but stayed short for addressing social inequalities within Latin American societies (Gills, Rocamora, and Wilson 1993).

However, they are different in terms of the dependent variable I am trying to explain (democracy level) and the independent variable I am focusing on: their history of terrorism.

The graph below shows the number of casualties for three countries in between 1990 and 2017.

As it is seen in the graph, the number of casualties in Peru was the highest in the beginning of 90s and then decreases over time and became very low in 2000s. The number of casualties in Colombia decreases after 2002, yet it is still significant when we compare with other 2 countries. Brazil, on the other hand, has very low number of terror-related casualties from the beginning to the end.

Figure 7.1 Total Casualties in Brazil , Colombia and Peru




Table 7.1 Overview of Comparison of Peru – Brazil and Colombia

	<b>Peru</b>	<b>Brazil</b>	<b>Colombia</b>
<b>Region</b>	Latin America	Latin America	Latin America
<b>Religion</b>	Roman Catholic (81%)	Roman Catholic (64%)	Roman Catholic (75%)
<b>GDP per capita</b>	6,045.65 USD	8,649.95 USD	5,806.61 USD
<b>HDI</b>	0.740	0.754	0.727
<b>GINI</b>	44.30	51.30	51.10
<b>CPI</b>	36	38	37
<b>Polity Score</b>	9 (2015)	8 (2015)	7 (2015)
<b>Nature of Terrorism</b>	Shining Path – Socialist revolutionary	-	FARC – Socialist Revolutionary

Figure 7.2 Civil Liberties Score of Brazil, Peru and Colombia





Figure 7.3 Total Casualties of Colombia, Peru and Brazil



Colombia witnesses the longest conflict in the region and in the world (FARC), still being unresolved. Peru went through a protracted conflict with Shining Path but managed to end the conflict. Brazil, on the other hand, never faced an organized and pro-longed terrorism related conflict. Even though Colombia tried to make a peace agreement with FARC several times, they could not end the conflict. In Peru, after the capture of the leader of the Shining Path, Guzman, the terrorist organization tried to remain active, but their fighting capacity decreased significantly. In Brazil, terrorism related activities have never reached to a significant point and never shaped Brazil's political agenda. I start tracing the process in the comparison from 1980 in order to capture the possible effect of the end of the Cold War. After Soviets dissolved, a new democratization trend has started. Cold War represented the ideological conflict between the two superpowers: The United States and The United Soviet Socialist Republics. After the end of the Cold War, democracy that the United States and the

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Western Countries represented for years had won. Theoretically, it created an upward democratization trend in the world, especially in East Europe. I have taken these three countries for the time period between 1980 and 2015.

Table 7.2: Case Selection





Table 7.3: Theoretical Prediction




I have chosen my cases from Latin America since the external factors that may affect their democratic progress are similar. Each country had been colonized by European powers in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Each country's vast majority belongs to Roman Catholic Church. Each country experienced military regimes in their past. Under these circumstances, I have chosen Brazil in order to trace the natural progress of democracy in a Latin American country whereas no terrorist threat is possessed. Peru is chosen to see the effect of terrorist threat on a country and the changes in the democratization trend after the elimination of the terrorist threat. As it is known, after the capture of the leader of the Shining Path, number of activities and number of casualties in Peru significantly decreased. Colombia, on the other hand, is chosen to trace the backsliding in democratic achievements under the threat of terrorism for a long time. Even the existence of negotiation talks in Colombia between the government and the FARC represent fluctuations in Colombia's democratic journey. In the Large-N analysis, I try to prove the effect of increasing terrorist threat on democracy while all other factors that may be affecting democracy are controlled. As it has been presented in the literature review, there might be many factors that can affect democracy in a country. I do not claim that the increasing threat of terrorism is the only factor that is effective on democracy yet increase in the level of terrorist threat causes backsliding in civil liberties and individual freedoms. In order to figure out the causal mechanism, I employed an MSS design case comparison, and traced the processes in three countries as I mentioned above.

## 7.1 Country Cases

## 7.1.1 Brazil

Figure 7.4 Brazil's Civil Liberties and Casualties



4

Brazil gained independence from Portugal in 1822, and established a monarchy same year. The country became a republic later in 1889. Like many other Latin American countries, Brazil's democratic rule has been interrupted by military coups and autocratic military regimes several times. The last military junta ruled the country between 1964 and 1985. The country achieved to return to civilian rule in 1985. The military controlled the transition, and Jose Samey became the first civilian president after twenty-one years of military regime. Following the election of the president, direct elections for a bicameral National Congress were held, and preparations for a civilian constitution started.

Brazil was ruled under the military tutelage during 1964 and 1985. After the coup d'état in 1964, military kept controlling the country till 1985. The presidents were elected by the military. Assembly was popularly elected, yet it is weak (1982 freedomhouse.org). Political parties' organizations were controlled by the military, however, parties' activities were not

<sup>4</sup> Brazil's Civil Liberties Score is multiplied with 100 in order to show more comprehensively in the graph.



restricted. Only Communist Party was banned from the political arena. In 1982 elections, the citizens elected governors for the first time after fifteen years. According to reports of human rights organizations, police brutality was common and political violence against communists, peasants and Indians existed in 1982 (1982 freedomhouse.org). In 1985, the transition towards democracy started to take place in Brazil. The years between 1982 and 1988 were generally shaped by the massive opposition protests and, political protests became a feature of Brazilian politics (1986 freedomhouse.org).

In 1988, 8<sup>th</sup> constitution of Brazil was accepted. The constitution presented an opportunity to people to decide whether to stay in the presidential system or to move to a parliamentary system with a national plebiscite, which would be held in 1993. In 1989, 22 candidates ran for presidency. Among the most prominent candidates were Fernando Collor de Mello, a newcomer candidate of the center-right National Reconstruction Party (PRN), Luis da Silva of the Marxist-oriented Worker's Party (PT), and Leonel Brizola as the candidate of Democratic Labor Party (PDT). Despite the concerns about the possible prevention of the candidacies of leftist parties by the army, both Luis da Silva and Leonel Brizola joined the elections. In the second tour, Collor won the election.

Collor strengthened the civilian authority, and placed the state security service under civilian authority once again. Collor reduced the share of military spending from 6 to 2.2 of the national budget (freedomhouse.org, 1990). At the edge of the dissolution of the USSR and the emerging of the Fourth Wave Democratization, Brazil started to establish the fundamentals of a liberal democracy.

Even though Brazil kept democratic advancement between 1990 and 1992, in 1993 the government was nearly paralyzed as a result of corruption scandals. In 1993, the congress approved a bill, which keeps source of election campaign's financing secret. According to reports of several human rights organizations, number of people killed by police is steadily

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increased during 1992 and 1993 as a result of the paralyzed government (freedomhouse.org, 1993). Polls showed that the major concern of people of Brazil was violence during 1994, which was hardly addressed in 1994 election campaign. In 1994, Brazilian government ordered the Army to organize an operation in Rio de Janeiro in order to end drug trafficking, which was in connection with the local police forces.

In 1997, President Cardoso established a ministerial rank secretariat in order to follow human rights crimes in the country. New regulations increased the punishment for crime of torture up to 16 years in prison in the same year. He also proposed considering all rights violations as federal crimes. He also signed an order, which puts federal judges in charge for military police brutality cases. Despite all of the efforts of Cardoso to discipline one of the most corrupt and brutal police department in the world, police strikes and demonstrations created an insecure environment for Brazil between the years 1997 and 1998.

In 2000, Cardoso enforced a law that gives broader special powers to “travelling judges”. It led federal prosecutors to begin to act in favor of public interest. “Travelling judges” increased the access of poorer segments of the society to judicial system. The same year, the President Cardoso initiated 124-point national public safety plan in order to prevent corruption in the police department. The plan included creating a record for abusive police officers to prevent them to find a job in private sector as well.

In 2002, Da Silva won the presidential elections in Brazil. Freedom House marked the elections as free and fair. Brazilian citizens changed the president peacefully through elections. However, for last two decades the major problems of Brazil continued; poverty and poverty related street violence. In 2003, Da Silva promised to recognize and convert some lands as the indigenous reserves. From 2003 to 2007, 12,5% of Brazil’s territory has been recognized as the indigenous reserves. That situation increased the scores of Brazil in the sense of civil liberties.


In 2010, as a result of free and fair presidential elections, Dilma Rousseff was elected as the first woman president of Brazil. Even though some improvements, Brazil's epidemic problem, corruption remained as the major obstacle to democratic development. In 2011, the president started an anti-poverty campaign. Same year the Supreme Court gave broader rights to homosexuals including the right to form civil unions. Later in the same year, the President established Brazil's Truth Commission to investigate human rights violations committed by the previous military regime.

To sum up, when we look at the democratic situation in Brazil overall, between 2006 and 2015, their democracy stayed stable in terms of political rights and civil liberties. After the end of the military regime in 1985, democratic advancement of Brazil was shaped by the corruption and poverty. Even though violence has been an important variable that affected the Brazil's democracy, the type of violence is far from being political violence. The government took serious measures in order to end the discrimination, and political rights are mostly protected. Political violence creates a challenge against the authority of the state, yet unorganized criminal violence is primarily a social problem. In that sense, terrorism-related killings were very low in Brazil between 1990 and 2015. In the absence of such terrorist threat, Brazil did not need to expand powers of military officials, and did not let military to get involved in civilian rule. Civil liberties and individual freedoms have not been compromised in the name of national security. Civil liberties score of Brazil decrease after 2015 as corruption scandals start to occupy the political agenda. In 2014, Brazilian Federal Police launched the 'Operation Car Wash' that investigated black-market money dealers ("Brazil: The Car Wash Scandal," 2018). As it can be seen, in Brazil, where terrorism does not possess any significant threat, typical Latin American issues such as corruption, street violence and economic crisis have affected the democratic progress. Absence of terrorist threat let Brazil to follow ordinary pattern of democracy in the region while Peru and Colombia experienced many setbacks in

democracy as an outcome of increasing terrorist threat. In that sense, Brazil represents the “natural” flow of democratic progress in a Latin American country whereas the threat of terrorism has never been an important issue that may affect the democracy.

### 7.1.2 Peru

Figure 7.5 Number of Casualties and Civil Liberty in Peru



The independent Republic of Peru was established in 1821. Just like many other Latin American countries, civilian rule in Peru has been interrupted by military dictatorships several times. The most recent military rule had taken place between 1968 and 1980. After civilian rule had been established in 1980, democracy record of Peru was shaped by the political violence. In 1980, Peru was still under the control of military junta and, no political party was allowed to participate in the government. Existing political parties had limited rights to assembly, and their influence were very low. However, they were relatively able to criticize the government.

In 1981, the first multiparty election was conducted after the end of the military rule, and a multiparty parliament started to rule the country. During the campaign, the media was

<sup>5</sup> Peru's Civil Liberties Score is multiplied with 1000 in order to show more comprehensively in the graph.

largely controlled by the military, but all participants were given access to the media channels (1981 freedomhouse.org). The civilian government largely privatized the media after the elections. The new government abolished the censorship, and freedom of expression started to take place in public sphere while there was still the shadow of the military over civilian governments. Peru, in 1981, was considered as free as Colombia, while it was freer than Brazil (1981 freedomhouse.org). According to reports, between 1981 and 1985, even though the number of imprisonment for conscience is low, many people were killed or imprisoned as a result of anti-guerilla and anti-terror campaigns (1985 freedomhouse.org). Periodic state of emergency which took place in 60% of the country kept reducing the freedoms. In 1987, many military officials were arrested, however only a few of them found guilty, and was actually punished for crimes they committed during the anti-terror campaigns (1988 freedomhouse.org).

The year of 1989 was marked with the increasing activities of the Shining Path. In 1989, the Shining Path murdered 123 mayors and several other local officials in order to prevent the November municipal elections from taking place (1990 freedomhouse.org). The Shining Path's aim was to reduce the number of possible candidates in the elections in order to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the elections, and provoke a military coup (1990 freedomhouse.org). In the same year, also MRTA (Marxist Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) increased its sabotages and attacks against Peruvian government. Military's response was harsh in counter-terror methods.

In 1990, in the last two weeks of national election campaigns, the Shining Path and MRTA terrorists killed some of the congressional candidates, manipulated radio stations to broadcast propaganda messages against voting, and organized armed attacks against many public and private institutions. In order to enforce the call of strike, Shining Path organized bombing attacks in several major cities in Peru (Brooke, 1990). The elections in 1990 resulted

with Fujimori's victory, the candidate of independent movement Change 90. After taking the office, Fujimori implemented new counter insurgency measures against Shining Path and MRTA. As Freedom House reports show, Fujimori declared martial law for four more provinces, and thus put 60% of the country under the control of army (freedomhouse.org 1990). According to the Freedom in the World report in 1990 of Freedom House, political expression was restricted in Peru as a result of increasing political violence caused by the Shining Path and MRTA guerilla insurgencies. While more than the fifty percent of the population were living under martial law, the counter-measures that had been implemented by the Army were repressive, and army-linked paramilitary groups were violating human rights.

In 1991, the activities of Shining Path kept rising. It gained the control of most of the Upper Huallaga Valley, where most of the coca leaf was being produced in Peru. Same year, as an outcome of the pressure of U.S Congress, Peruvian government established an official human rights commission. However, Fujimori accused local human right groups for trying to topple the government (freedomhouse.org, 1991). Freedom House recorded the section of 'Civil Liberties' of Peru worse than last year, as a result of the abusive use of executive forces against terrorism. Less than 5 percent of the people, who were arrested for terrorism charges, were convicted, and 70 percent of prisoners waited for a trial for more than a year.

1992 became a critical point for the democracy of Peru. On April 5, Fujimori suspended the constitution with the support of the Army. While Fujimori suspended the constitution, and dissolved the congress, he cited the violent domestic conflict, and promised to capture the leader of Shining Path, Abimael Guzman (Brooke, 1992). The large majority of Peruvians supported the self-coup (freedomhouse, 1992). In October, the army achieved to capture Guzman alive. The Shining Path had suffered the most important major setback in its history after the capture of Guzman. The number of people who lost their lives in conflict dramatically changes after the capture of Guzman. While 3,044 people were killed in 1991, after the capture

of Guzman, in 1993 1,188 people were killed during the conflict (Kay 1999). Following the capture, Fujimori decided to go for snap elections in order to consolidate his powers with the help of increased popular support that he gained for capturing the leader of the Shining Path. As a result of the elections, Fujimori placed his followers to the head of the Congress, and restricted the ability of the Congress to rewrite the constitution. Before the elections, Fujimori signed a decree to change the electoral rules. The rules helped his party to win the majority of the congress with just 40% of the votes. 40% of the votes provided 44 of 80 seats for Change 90 movement in the congress. As the Freedom House World Report indicates, in a state-controlled referendum, Fujimori relied on state sources, including the military for his campaign, and correlated “no” vote as support for terrorists. Under these circumstances he achieved to get “yes” with a 6 percent margin. After the ‘*autogolpe*’, a major purge followed and the military started to assume larger role in law enforcement. Moreover, civilian authorities had not been able to sentence military officials who were convicted by civilian courts (Kay 1999).

When Fujimori decided to close down the Congress, the international community condemned the decision. However, the popular support for Fujimori after the self-coup kept rising. The public opinion polls showed that Fujimori had almost 80 percent support for the purge after the coup (McClintock, 1992). In the eye of Peruvians, Fujimori was a democratic dictator. Steven Levitsky (1999) explains the crisis on two levels: first, Peru was experiencing fatal political and socio-economic problems which brought the state to collapse; second, hyperinflation, unpreventable advances of guerilla organization the Shining Path and the deadlock that the executive-legislative clash created. These circumstances legitimized the coup that Fujimori organized. Significant majority of Peruvians had lost their faith in democratic institutions because of economic crisis, violence, terrorism and corruption (Legler, 2003). Under these circumstances, the military in Peru was not subordinated to civilian authorities. It

was acting like a government partner. The civilian authorities were not capable of designing the budget of army, enforce the principles of human rights and provide stronger military justice (Levitsky, 1999).

The dramatic decline in democratic level of Peru is considerable and well known for the period of Fujimori. Popular support that Fujimori was able to gather made it easier to establish his dictatorial regime. He had that support because Peruvians believed Fujimori's strategies ended the Shining Path violence by capturing the leader Guzman. Increasing presence of police forces and army in urban areas also helped Fujimori to get more support since people started to feel safe (Huby, 1994).

In 1995, Fujimori allowed the Military Commander Gen. Nicolas Hermoza to keep his position in the army for three more years even though he surpassed the age of active duty. Fujimori relied on the military elites to keep the military support for his authoritarian rule. Moreover, he continued to save the privileges for the military elite and the army as well. Even though the guerilla actions had decreased in 1994 at least by 70 percent, more than half of the country stayed under the martial law (freedomhouse.org, 1995). Same year Fujimori approved an amnesty, which provides impunity for security forces for the crimes they committed during the counter insurgency campaign.

In 1997, Fujimori appointed Gen. Nicolas Hermoza one more time even though he surpassed the age of active duty. Despite his wishes to remove army officers in 1994, he had been unable to remove any of army officers from their positions. In 1998, finally he forced Gen. Nicolas Hermoza into retirement.

In 2000, President Alberto Fujimori was removed from the office as a result of largely peaceful protests. The opposition controlled the congress, and highly respected leader, Valentin Paniagua was chosen as the interim president of Peru. The congress decided to go to elections



in 2001. In the years between 2000 and 2001, Peru had the highest points from Freedom House in terms of Political Rights and Civil Liberties since the end of the military regime in 1980.

After almost two decades, for the first-time, elections in Peru was considered to be free and fair in 2001. (Freedomhouse.org 2001). In between 2001 and 2009, Peru stayed stable in terms of democracy. The civilian rule sustained authority over the military. In 2009, former president Fujimori was sentenced to 25 years in prison for the human right violations he committed during his dictatorial rule.


Overall, after the overthrow of Fujimori and the elimination of political violence from the political sphere, Peru focused on typical Latin American issues such as corruption, economic inequality etc. Fujimori took the power in 1990 as a result of relatively free and fair elections. He continued consolidating his power by relying on the army for years. When he achieved to capture the leader of Shining Path, he gained significant popular support and reached the peak point of his power at the office between 1992 and 1993. After the elimination of the guerilla organization Shining Path, Fujimori did not lift the martial law, which affected more than fifty percent of the country. On the other hand, Shining Path tried to carry out attacks after the capture of their leader, Guzman. These attacks were not significant when they are compared to the ones in the previous years. Once the political violence largely eliminated, the popular support for the Fujimori significantly decreased. Increasing terrorism helped Fujimori to consolidate his power. However, elimination of the violence from the political agenda was that easy. The polls conducted in 1995 in Peru showed that 22% of people voted for Fujimori because “he defeated terrorism”. Another pool conducted in 2000 showed that 64% of people voted for Fujimori since “he defeated terrorism” (Arce 2003). In 2000, even though the benefits he got from the state’s institutions, he was not able to win the elections in the first round. His main opponent protested the elections and decided not to run in the second round as a result of threat he had taken. Fujimori tried to get the support of the entire army, yet he understood he

would not be able to win the support of the army and fled the country same year. The opposition assumed the congress and set the elections for next year. In 2001, Peru experienced first internationally recognized free and fair elections since the rule of Fujimori started in 1990. In that sense, elimination of political violence in Peru delegitimized the authoritarian rule of Fujimori. Once security issues were removed from the political agenda, the relations between the military and civilian authority changed.

In Peru, unlike Brazil, we observe a significant increase in democratization after the elimination of terrorist threat from political agenda in 2000s. However, it took some time for Peru to start progress in democratization after the elimination of the terrorist threat. This situation supports my finding in the Large-N analysis as well. I lagged democracy for two years to see the effect of terrorism on democracy and in Peru it took approximately 6 years to start progress. While we see a downward trend in democracy during the clashes between the government forces and the Shining Path, after the elimination of the threat of terrorism, a democratic jump occurs, and then democratization process starts to unfold in a more stable manner.

## 7.1.3 Colombia

Figure 7.6 Number of Casualties and Civil Liberties in Colombia



Colombia gained its independence in 1819. Republic of Colombia was declared in 1886. Colombian political history is based on elections and violence (Taylor 2009). Unlike other Latin American countries, Colombia's democratic history had not been interrupted by long-standing military regimes. A military coup in 1953 overthrew the leader of Conservatives, Laureano Gomez. Gen. Gustavo Rojas became the president with increasing popular support. However, he did not provide transition to full democracy and, was overthrown by another military coup in 1957. In 1957, Liberal and Conservative parties have agreed on establishing a National Front. They equally participated in government with National Front until 1974. Especially after 1980, political violence has become the major factor that shaped Colombian politics. Three main guerilla groups have been very important in that sense; the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the People's Liberation Army (ELP).

<sup>6</sup> Colombia's Civil Liberties Score is multiplied with 1000 in order to show more comprehensively in the graph.

In 1980, Colombia was a constitutional democracy unlike Peru and Brazil. However, the existence of violence was affecting the elections and civilian rule over military. As Freedom House reports show, personal rights and freedoms are generally respected, yet guerilla activity had led to periodic states of emergency in which these rights were restricted (1980 freedomhouse.org). In 1982, the opposition won the elections and the power was peacefully transferred from the incumbent to the opposition. However, the change in government did not necessarily affect the severity human rights violations that occurred during anti-terror campaigns by military. Security forces kept violating personal rights in Colombia between 1980 and 1983. (1983 freedomhouse.org). In 1984, the government tried to put military under civilian control more firmly. However, as the Freedom House indicates, in 1987, the government could not achieve to control security forces firmly (1987 freedomhouse.org). Even though constitution guarantees individual rights and freedoms, and courts are active in protecting them, existence of increasing violence had led to auto-censor for the press and political parties (1989 freedomhouse.org).

According to Freedom House reports in 1990, even though the constitution guarantees freedom of expression, freedom of religion and the freedom of organize political parties, civic groups and labor unions are significantly restricted due to the increasing threat of political and drug-related violence. “Political violence in Colombia takes more lives than in any other country in hemisphere” (freedomhouse.org 1990). There are several reports from Human Rights groups that indicate the military abuses in Colombia. In the press release of the U.N in 1997, military-linked paramilitary groups carried out executions, disappearances, torture and other human rights violations with the consent of the government. Moreover, as report indicates there are many cases that were investigated effectively, yet when the cases are transferred to military tribunals very little could be resulted.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> <https://www.un.org/press/en/1997/19970331.hrct485.html>

In 1991, a new constitution put into practice in Colombia. The constitution became the world's wordiest constitution with its 397 articles. The constitution aimed to limit the powers of the president, and expanded the political rights. However, due to the increasing political violence, the turnout was recorded very low; 30% in the referendum that accepted the constitution. During the 1990 campaign, drug traffickers, left-wing guerillas and the military killed many people and even candidates. In 1991, the government started negotiations with FARC and ELN until guerillas started major offensives. The government left the table as a result of the increasing violence. Impunity of military has always been an issue in Colombia. Even though the constitutional reforms that expanded the political rights in Colombia, it did not affect the military's lack of accountability. Moreover, the new constitution guaranteed police and military-linked human rights violations to be investigated and judged by military courts rather than civilian ones.

The 1991 constitution made it possible to ban strikes and charge labor leaders with terrorist acts in Colombia (Avilés, 2012). FARC created a political party in 1984 as a part of its agreement with the government. However, over 300 Union Patriótica (UP)'S members were killed by the sectors of the Colombian security forces in its first ten years (Dudley 2004; Bejarano 2003). Even though the end of the Cold War increased the pressure on Colombia to democratize, increasing political violence corresponded with the increasing counter-insurgency measures, which provided more powers for security forces.

After long-lasting state of emergency in Colombia, finally the state of emergency was lifted with 1991 constitution. However, increasing number of attacks from left-wing guerillas forced the government to declare state of emergency once again in 1992. By 1994, left-wing guerillas in Colombia achieved to control up to 15% of the country including more than 1,000 municipalities. In 1996, government declared an order, which created "public order zones" that permit local military commanders to act upon the civilian elected officials. In 1997, the

constitutional court ruled that human rights violations should be heard in civil courts rather than military courts. After that, the government authorized security cooperatives, which is known as “convivir”. The decision of the constitutional court decreased the number of killings that the military was involved in; yet the number of total human rights violations remained still as a result of increasing number of convivirs. In 2000, left-wing guerilla groups had achieved to control 40% of the national territory. As the Freedom House reports show in 2001, it was proven that FARC was acting like a state within a state in their “demilitarized zone”. Same year, Colombian authorities arrested a retired army general who was allegedly linked to one of the paramilitary groups. However, the president August Pastrana signed an order that provided military officials right to expand their authority over local civilian officials. Same year, Human Rights Watch released a report citing that alleged three army brigades were involved in the killings of several suspected guerilla sympathizers.

In 2003, for the first time after four decades-long violence in Colombia, civilian casualties reduced. In 2004, while the left-wing guerilla groups in retreat in different parts of the country, the President Alvaro Uribe Velez did not keep his promises about the stance against the right-wing paramilitary groups. According to the Freedom House reports, paramilitary groups increased their control over state institutions including the office of attorney general (freedomhouse.org 2004). In 2006, the president Uribe declared a state of emergency, and increased anti-guerilla efforts especially in urban areas. He created “special combat zones”, restricted civilian movement, and allowed conducting searches without warrant. However, according to Human Rights Watch report, these zones did not help the state to capture the control over FARC’s regions. Rather they worsened the situation. While the number of casualties in security forces decreased, attacks on civilians significantly increased in these regions. Moreover, number of people, who complained about human rights violations, dramatically increased. Military – paramilitary links continued to be documented by several

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human rights groups. However, the Colombian government claimed these are all personal ties and not the policy of government; and no paramilitary leaders had been arrested so far (hrw.org 2004).

In 2007, Freedom House reports show that there is a significant rise in extrajudicial killings committed by state officials. In 2009, the political violence increased and a scandal spread since the state surveilled the opposition politicians and civil society members according to the reports. In 2012, the talks between FARC rebels and the Colombian government started in Norway. The FARC declared 60-days ceasefire following the talks. In 2013 and 2014 peace accords kept continuing. The sides had agreed on the issues about the rural parts of the country.

Colombia has experienced one of the longest and most violent conflicts in the world. Even though several attempts for the peace have taken place in the country, peace is yet to be achieved. In the last two decades, hundreds of people had been killed, kidnapped and tortured by the military, military linked paramilitary groups and rebel groups. Most of the last two decades have passed under the rule of martial law for many districts in the country. The constitution and laws have enabled the military to act freely especially in 'special combat zones', which were all under a sort of martial law. Under these circumstances, the efforts for democratization was short to reach a better level.

Permanent security threats in Colombia unbalanced the relationship between civilian authority and military officials. This situation created an environment that the army officials can exploit. In need of security, Colombian government sacrificed other social values in order to maximize military security. As a result of that, civil liberties and individual freedoms were largely violated in Colombia, and Colombia's democratic development has been negatively affected. In the case of Colombia, increasing political violence and terrorism threat had been an important part of elections as well. While many other Latin American countries were hit by huge corruption scandals, Colombia was not able to investigate its own corruption issues due

to more imminent security concerns in the country. In the meantime, Colombian military officials learnt how to manipulate the government with illegitimate tactics such as undemocratic sabotage in order to protect autonomy (Porch 2008). In Colombia, unlike Brazil, we see a downward trend in democratic progress especially during the 1980s. These years are also the times that the intensity of terrorist threat was the highest. When the intensity of terrorist threat starts decreasing, we see a small upward trend in democracy. After 2004, the intensity of terrorist threat decreases significantly as a result of the negotiations between the government and the FARC. We see more a stable trend in democratization in Colombia afterwards. This situation also supports the findings in my Large-N analysis in which increasing intensity was significant and negatively correlated with the liberal democracy, civil liberties and individual freedoms.



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Conclusion

Between 2015 and 2016, 5 governments across world declared state of emergency; France, Tunisia, Mali, Venezuela and Turkey. France declared state of emergency in November 2015 following Paris attacks, Tunisia declared state of emergency after a deadly attack on the presidential guard in November 2015, Mali declared state of emergency after a series of terrorist attacks that killed 17 soldiers, Venezuela declared state of emergency after the start of popular uprising and Turkey declared state of emergency following a coup attempt in 2016. While the ratio of deadly terrorist attacks increases after the end of the Cold War, the threat that terrorism possesses increased as well. Increasing terrorist threat forces governments to provide security with tough security measures by compromising from civil liberties and individual rights. Governments try the counter uncertainty of terrorism by consolidating their political power. This threat also erodes the independency of judiciary. Compromising from civil liberties, individual freedom, equality before law and independent judiciary harms democracy. In this thesis, I tried to understand the dynamics behind the relationship between terrorism and democracy. I found that, the threat of terrorism is negatively correlated with the liberal democracy, civil liberties, equality before law and individual freedoms and likelihood of independent judiciary. When a country faces increasing threat of terrorism, government generally chooses to expand the powers of security forces as we observe in Peru and Colombia cases. Expanded powers of security forces empower military authority, and this creates a suitable environment for the army to undermine democratic values. Civilian authority loses its rule over the military, and generally plays a blind-eye on the human right violations that are committed by the military. Sometime later, governments choose to legalize those violations with permanent emergency laws. Even though the expanded powers that ‘state of emergency’

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allows for security forces are recognized for a limited period of time by countries' constitutions, increasing threat of terrorism forces governments to make these emergency laws permanent.

Even though the expectation on the end of internal conflicts after the end of the Cold War, in 2010s domestic and international terrorism became the most important issue in political agendas of countries in the world. The number of casualties increases worldwide especially after the Arab Spring in 2010. In 2015, the expectations on a new wave of democratization informed by the Arab Spring are likely to fail due to the emergence of non-state armed organizations in Arabic countries. Between 2014 and 2016, ISIS for instance, threatened the world's most developed democracies, Iraq and Syria very seriously. After the establishment of self-proclaimed caliphate in 2014, ISIS conducted or influenced more than 140 terrorist attacks in 29 countries excluding Iraq and Syria, and killed more than 2,000 people (Lister, Sanchez, Bixler, O'Key, Hogenmiller and Tawfeeq 2018). Following the attacks, many European countries and the United States took serious measures to protect their national securities. These measures include declaration of state of emergency, restriction of immigration and expansion of power of security forces. Many of these measures trigger violation of human rights, and undermine civil liberties and individual freedoms. In this study, I aimed to understand the dynamics behind this enduring puzzle, and explore the link between terrorism and democracy. While the conflict literature generally focuses on the effects of democracy on terrorism, I tried to understand the effects of terrorism on democracy.

In the conflict literature, scholars put forward some alternative explanations about the link between democratization and violent conflict. Their studies generally rely on the idea that instability leads to violent conflicts (e.g. Hegre et al., 2001; Gleditsch, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier, Hoefler & Söderbom, 2004; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; Gates et al., 2006). The literature on democratization on the other hand, focuses on different independent variables such

as economic conditions and socio-economic inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Przeworski (1991) claims that democracies do not become stable until the offices can be transferred to the oppositions peacefully. Hence, I argue that terrorism has an effect on democratic efforts and practices.

Firstly, I conducted a large-N study, which includes 176 countries for the time period in between 1970 and 2017. I tested 4 hypotheses. They were:

*H1: Civil liberties are more likely to decrease when threat of terrorism increases.*

*H2a: Equality before law and individual rights are more likely to decrease when terrorism increases.*

*H2b: Observing independent judiciary in the countries is less likely when terrorism increases in the given year.*

*H3: Liberal democracy is more likely to decrease when terrorism increases.*

In Model 1, the results show that *Total Killings (logged)*, *GDP per capita (logged)*, *Population Size (logged)*, *Cold War* and *Media Freedom* variables are found significant on Civil Liberties. However, GDP per capita is not statistically significant in this analysis. These results support the arguments of Tilly (2005) and Boix (2003). Tilly (2005) and Boix (2003) rely on modernization theory and claim that changing economic conditions are effective on democracy. Moreover, the findings support the argument of Barro (1999). According to Barro (1999) there is a statistically significant and positive correlation between population size and democracy. When we consider the restrictions over civil liberties in Colombia as an aftermath of increasing terrorist activity in the country, the statistical findings support my theory. As Rasler (1986) suggests, the executive branch of the government curtails civil liberties and political rights to decrease the unpredictability of political environment in the times of crisis. When executive branch of the government consolidates its political power, it is expected in a democratic country that judiciary intervenes. However, in such a crisis, judiciary loses its independency as the 4<sup>th</sup> model shows in the Table 8. Under these circumstances, military becomes too important, executive branch of the government hijacks the democratic institutions

and eventually these developments bring them compromising from the liberal democracy as the 3<sup>rd</sup> model shows. The case of Peru shows how terrorism is related with the consolidation of the executive branch of the government and hijacking of the institutions with all means. In all models, the findings supported the related hypotheses. The empirical data shows that increasing terrorist threat is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the liberal democracy, civil liberty scores of countries and equality before law and individual liberty indices. In the case comparison, it is seen that, increasing terrorist threat causes civilian authorities to lose its rule over the military. Expanding powers of security forces lead to violations of human rights. Many times, these violations had been legalized through changing laws. In Peru and Colombia, civilian authority compromised civil liberties and individual rights for security. As we see in Peruvian case, even though the terrorist threat and violence are largely eliminated, it takes some time for politics to be normalized. If we consider that, democracy is about the demands of citizens and outputs of the government accordingly, people tended to give up on their rights, liberties and freedoms in the name of securitization. In order to explore the causal mechanism behind this linkage, in chapter 2, I have conducted an MSS design case study, which focuses on the cases of Brazil, Colombia and Peru.

Secondly, I have taken number of terrorism related killings as my independent variable. Increasing number of terrorism related killings would cause decreasing civil liberties, individual freedoms and equality before law, which are all important components of liberal democracy. As a result of increasing number of terrorism related killings and increasing horror in the society is likely to be responded by the state with increasing security measures. Security measures include expanded powers for security forces and impunity from the justice. This linkage relies on some assumptions, which were developed in civil-military relations literature. Wilkinson (2009) suggests, in liberal democracies, rule of law would not be compromised for the purpose of sustaining national security. J. Samuel Fitch's democratic theory (1998) presents

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a structure in which any group including civilian and military could claim greater legitimacy than the will of people in the country. In that sense, both civilian and military authority are legitimate if and only if they represent the will of people. Moreover, a democracy should be free from any sort of military intervention (Pion-Berlin 2005). Literature of civil-military relations studies the armed forces as an organization in which the ways of professionalism and training, structure and tradition may isolate the military from the rule of civil society or the interests of social classes in a country (Pion-Berlin 1997; Rial 1990; Fitch 1989, 1998; Norden 1996; Hunter 1997; Stepan 1988). In order to understand the ways in which the civilians can have control over the military in nation states; electoral competition as a specialty of democracies (Hunter 1997), the power relation between armed forces and civilian authorities (Stepan 1988; Agüero 1995), and the interests of armed forces as an organization (Nordlinger 1977) are central.

In the comparison of cases, in Brazil the threat of terrorism has never been very significant. In Peru, it had been significant for a time period and then it was largely eliminated; and in Colombia, it had always been significant for the period I covered in this study. Even though many factors that may affect democratic progress in these countries are similar, we see that Colombia is far behind of two other countries. Peru, in that sense, can be considered as a latecomer while Brazil has the best mean score for the time period in between 1990 and 2017. Brazil's civil liberties score has never significantly fluctuated in between 1990 and 2017. In Peru, it significantly increases after the toppling of Fukuyama in the first quarter of 2000s. While Brazil's issues on civil liberties were shaped by corruption and street violence generally, Peru and Colombia's issues on civil liberties were mostly shaped by terrorism-related concerns. 1990s start with increasing and significant terror-related casualties in Peru. This situation helped Fujimori to consolidate his power. Even though he was a civilian leader elected through free and fair elections, his rule turned into a military-backed dictatorship especially after the

elimination of Shining Path. Capturing the leader of the Shining Path strengthened the position of Fujimori. In Peru, Fujimori had not been able to change the Chief Commander of the Peruvian Army for four years in a row even though the age of active duty for the commander had passed. Moreover, Fujimori left the country when he realized he lost the support of army in general. This situation supports the argument that internal threats weaken the civilian rule over military (Desh, 1996). On the other hand, it is hard to mention any one-person rule in Colombia. However, significant terrorism threat in Colombia, which is possessed by FARC rebels, caused serious measures to be taken by the government all the time. While most of the country stayed under martial law for long terms, many human rights violations were observed. As an outcome of ongoing clashes, the government restricted many civil liberties and individual freedoms on the country. When the negotiations started in Colombia between FARC and Colombian government, civil liberties score of Colombia increased. Elimination of terrorism threats in large lifts the hold on the progress of democracy.

In further research, different conditions' contribution to the democratic change in countries that experience increasing terrorism threat should be investigated. Beyond the democratic scores, government types and factors of countries may be affecting the democracy scores of countries. In parliamentary systems, for instance, as a result of possible fragmentation in the Assemblies, the effect of increasing terrorist threat might be different than in presidential systems. Due to the lack of data that covers the time period in between 1970 and 2017, I was not able to use 'Veto Player' concept and governmental differences in countries. Furthermore, for autocratic countries, a new kind of measurement procedure might be used to see the effect of increasing terrorist threat on their democracy scores. While new rights and freedoms are being recognized every year in liberal countries, new restrictions might be installed in autocratic countries as well. Or in autocratic countries the level of human rights violations might be rising due to increasing terrorist threat in these countries. Even though this study finds

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a statistical association between terrorism and democracy, in principle that does not claim causality. For further research, instrumental variable for democracy variable can be used to eliminate the risk of endogeneity and sustain more precise causality between the variables. However, both terrorism and democracy are huge and complicated concepts which are very hard to tackle with any instrumental variable due to the latent status of democracy as a variable. Furthermore, natural experiment might be a real solution by using difference in differences method yet it would be very hard to collect the necessary data. However, as one of the earliest one of its kind, this thesis tries and finds an association between increasing terrorism and democracy which would help researchers to focus another side of the nexus.

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## APPENDIX

**Table A1 - Fixed Effect OLS Model of Civil Liberties in First Wave Countries, Country-Year Dyads – 1975 – 2016**

<b>Fixed Effect Simple OLS Results</b>	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Civil Liberties 1st Wave Countries (2 Years Lagged)	
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.007*** (0.001)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.018** (0.004)
Population Size(Logged)	0.012 (0.014)
Cold War	0.004 (0.005)
Economic Crisis	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	981
R <sup>2</sup>	0.120
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.093
<i>Note:</i>	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

APPENDIX

**Table A2 - Fixed Effect OLS Model of Civil Liberties in Third Wave Countries, Country-Year Dyads – 1975 – 2016**

<b>Fixed Effect Simple OLS Results</b>	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Civil Liberties 3rd Wave Countries (2 Years Lagged)	
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.017*** (0.002)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.024*** (0.004)
Population Size(Logged)	0.150*** (0.015)
Cold War	-0.166*** (0.007)
Economic Crisis	-0.002 (0.005)
Observations	3,740
R <sup>2</sup>	0.432
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.414
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



**Table A3 - Fixed Effect OLS Model of Civil Liberties in Fourth Wave Countries, Country-Year Dyads – 1975 – 2016**

<b>Fixed Effect Simple OLS Results</b>	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Civil Liberties 4th Wave Countries (2 Years Lagged)	
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.011*** (0.001)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.011*** (0.003)
Population Size(Logged)	0.172*** (0.011)
Cold War	-0.102*** (0.005)
Economic Crisis	-0.005 (0.004)
Observations	5,318
R <sup>2</sup>	0.335
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.315
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Table A4 - Fixed Effect OLS Model of Equality Before Law and Individual Liberties in First Wave Countries, Country-Year Dyads – 1975 – 2016**

<b>Fixed Effect Simple OLS Results</b>	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Equality Before Law and Individual Liberties in 1st Wave Countries (2 Years Lagged)	
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.003** (0.001)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.018*** (0.003)
Population Size(Logged)	-0.004 (0.013)
Cold War	0.008* (0.004)
Economic Crisis	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	981
R <sup>2</sup>	0.068
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.040
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

**Table A5 - Fixed Effect OLS Model of Equality Before Law and Individual Liberties in Third Wave Countries, Country-Year Dyads – 1975–2016**

<b>Fixed Effect Simple OLS Results</b>	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Equality Before Law and Individual Liberties in 3rd Wave Countries (2 Years Lagged)	
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.018*** (0.002)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.036*** (0.004)
Population Size(Logged)	0.088*** (0.015)
Cold War	-0.152*** (0.007)
Economic Crisis	0.001 (0.005)
Observations	3,740
R <sup>2</sup>	0.366
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.346
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

**Table A5 - Fixed Effect OLS Model of Equality Before Law and Individual Liberties in Fourth Wave Countries, Country-Year Dyads – 1975–2016**

<b>Fixed Effect Simple OLS Results</b>	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Equality Before Law and Individual Liberties in 4th Wave Countries (2 Years Lagged)	
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.013*** (0.001)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.020*** (0.003)
Population Size(Logged)	0.123*** (0.010)
Cold War	-0.087*** (0.005)
Economic Crisis	-0.003 (0.004)
Observations	5,318
R <sup>2</sup>	0.272
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.250
<i>Note:</i>	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

APPENDIX

**Table A6 – Logit Model of Independent Judiciary in Country-Year Dyads in First Wave Countries, Country-Year Dyads–1975–2016**

**Logit Model of Independent Judiciary in Country-Year Dyads, 1975-2016**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Independent Judiciary in First Wave Countries)
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.048 (0.107)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	2.443*** (0.183)
Population Size(Logged)	-0.092 (0.094)
Cold War	2.444*** (0.342)
Economic Crisis	0.493 (0.346)
Constant	-20.160*** (1.974)
Observations	988
Akaike Inf. Crit.	414.000
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX

**Table A7 – Logit Model of Independent Judiciary in Country-Year Dyads in Third Wave Countries, Country-Year Dyads–1975–2016**

**Logit Model of Independent Judiciary in Country-Year Dyads, 1975-2016**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Independent Judiciary in Third Wave Countries)
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.144 <sup>***</sup> (0.031)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.732 <sup>***</sup> (0.037)
Population Size(Logged)	0.051 (0.033)
Cold War	-0.208 <sup>*</sup> (0.109)
Economic Crisis	0.035 (0.106)
Constant	-7.313 <sup>***</sup> (0.582)
Observations	3,741
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,355.247
<i>Note:</i>	<sup>*</sup> p<0.1; <sup>**</sup> p<0.05; <sup>***</sup> p<0.01

APPENDIX

**Table A8 - Logit Model of Independent Judiciary in Country-Year Dyads in Fourth Wave Countries, Country-Year Dyads – 1975 – 2016**

**Logit Model of Independent Judiciary in Country-Year Dyads, 1975-2016**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Independent Judiciary in Fourth Wave Countries)
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.141*** (0.024)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.947*** (0.028)
Population Size(Logged)	0.176*** (0.027)
Cold War	0.235*** (0.079)
Economic Crisis	0.013 (0.088)
Constant	-11.067*** (0.498)
Observations	5,344
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,858.826
<i>Note:</i>	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

APPENDIX

**Table A9 - Fixed Effect OLS Model of Liberal Democracy in First Wave Countries,  
Country-Year Dyads–1975–2016**

<b>Fixed Effect Simple OLS Results</b>	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Liberal Democracy 1st Wave Countries (2 Years Lagged)	
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.004*
	(0.002)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.050***
	(0.006)
Population Size(Logged)	0.002
	(0.023)
Cold War	0.011
	(0.007)
Economic Crisis	0.011**
	(0.005)
Observations	981
R <sup>2</sup>	0.172
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.147
<i>Note:</i>	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01



**Table A10 – Fixed Effect OLS Model of Liberal Democracy in Third Wave Countries,  
Country-Year Dyads–1975–2016**

<b>Fixed Effect Simple OLS Results</b>	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Liberal Democracy 3rd Wave Countries (2 Years Lagged)	
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.007*** (0.001)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.040*** (0.004)
Population Size(Logged)	0.033*** (0.012)
Cold War	-0.130*** (0.006)
Economic Crisis	0.003 (0.004)
Observations	3,736
R <sup>2</sup>	0.341
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.320
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX

**Table A11 – Fixed Effect OLS Model of Liberal Democracy in Fourth Wave Countries,  
Country-Year Dyads–1975–2016**

<b>Fixed Effect Simple OLS Results</b>	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Liberal Democracy 4th Wave Countries (2 Years Lagged)	
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.005*** (0.001)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.031*** (0.003)
Population Size(Logged)	0.060*** (0.009)
Cold War	-0.082*** (0.005)
Economic Crisis	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	5,291
R <sup>2</sup>	0.268
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.246
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; *** p<0.01

**Table A12 – Random Effect OLS Model of Liberal Democracy in First, Third and Fourth Wave Countries, Country-Year Dyads–1975–2016**

<b>Random Effect Simple OLS Results</b>			
<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
Liberal Democracy 1st, 3rd and 4th Wave Countries Respectively (2 Years Lagged)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Total Killings(Logged)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.146*** (0.002)	0.098*** (0.002)	0.122*** (0.001)
Population Size(Logged)	0.003** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.001)
Cold War	0.113*** (0.005)	-0.089*** (0.005)	-0.023*** (0.004)
Economic Crisis	0.022*** (0.006)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)
Constant	-0.766*** (0.029)	-0.499*** (0.028)	-0.745*** (0.024)
Observations	1,962	7,472	10,008
R <sup>2</sup>	0.707	0.392	0.527
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.706	0.392	0.527

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

APPENDIX

**Table A13 – Fixed Effect OLS Model of Liberal Democracy in all Countries, Country-Year Dyads – 1975 – 2016 – Explanatory Variable lagged 2 years**

<b>Fixed Effect Simple OLS Results - Total Kill Lagged For 2 Years</b>	
	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Liberal Democracy
Total Killings(Lagged 2 Yrs)	-0.003*** (0.001)
GDP per Capita(Logged)	0.020*** (0.003)
Population Size(Logged)	0.058** (0.009)
Cold War	-0.090*** (0.004)
Economic Crisis	-0.002 (0.003)
Observations	5,279
R <sup>2</sup>	0.265
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.243
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01