WHO BENEFITS FROM PEACE?

DETERMINANTS OF CIVIL WAR PEACE AGREEMENT DESIGN

By

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis studies the determinants of civil war peace agreements and investigates whether the objective and capacity of rebel groups influence the proportion of public benefits provisions the actors include when designing a peace agreement. By using a recent dataset, I measure the proportion of public benefits provisions in each peace agreement. Then, I question whether a rebel group's capacity and territorial goals are significant motivations for including benefits to the public by looking at the peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2009. The findings suggest that the rebel group and the state sign peace agreements with a greater percentage of public goods and benefits when the group has financial external support. The empirical analysis also show that group objective is a crucial determinant of the public benefits provisions and the groups with territorial aims include a significantly higher proportion of public benefits in agreements. Additionally, I show that the effects of external support and war objective remain significant when they are controlled for the variables regarding alternative explanations of peace settlement.

Keywords: Peace agreements, public goods, external support, rebel objective, civil war

ÖZET

BARIŞ'TAN KİM YARARLANIYOR?

İÇ SAVAŞ SONRASINDAYAPILAN BARIŞ ANLAŞMALARININ İÇERİĞİ ÜZERİNDE BELİRLEYİCİ OLAN FAKTÖRLER

Merve Keskin

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Bu çalışma, iç savaş sonrasında imzalanan barış anlaşmalarının içeriği üzerinde belirleyici olan faktörleri incelemekte ve devletlere karşı savaşan isyancı grupların amaç ve kapasitelerinin anlaşma hükümleri üzerinde etkili olup olmadığını araştırmaktadır. Tezde güncel ve orijinal bir veri seti kullanılarak, iç savaş sonrasında imzalanan barış anlaşmalarının maddeleri üzerinden isyancı grup ve devlet ile doğrudan ya da dolaylı şekilde ilişkili olan siviller, elitler, lider ya da askerler arasından hangi gruba daha çok fayda sağladığı incelenmektedir. Öncelikle 1989 – 2009 yılları arasında imzalanan barış anlaşmalarındaki sivillere yönelik maddelerin anlaşmanın tüm maddelerine oranı ölçülmüş, ardından isyancı grupların kapasite ve savaş hedeflerinin tarafların sivillere yönelik anlaşma maddesi düzenleyip düzenlememe noktasındaki etkisi sorgulanmıştır. Tezin dördüncü bölümünde iki önemli bulguya ulaşılmıştır. Öncelikle savaş sırasında dışarıdan finansal destek alan grupların barış anlaşmasına daha yüksek oranda sivillere ilişkin ve onların çıkarını gözeten madde kattığı saptanmıştır. Ayrıca, isyancı grubun hedefleri de imzalanan barış anlaşmasının içeriğini etkilemekte, motivasyonu ayrılıkçılık ve otonomi olan grupların savaş sonrasında daha yüksek oranda kamu çıkarına ilişkin madde içeren anlaşma imzaladığı görülmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış anlaşması, kamu malları, dış destek, isyancı grubun hedefi, iç savaş

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I owe the deepest gratitude to my family. I would have never been able to pursue this career and follow my passions without their hands on my shoulders. My mother, Bilgin, and my father Recep have raised me and my brother Safa, with the idea of the importance of education. I believe my brother and I have been faithful to their dreams. Thanks to my lovely brother, Safa, for bringing joy to my life and being a true friend. I am grateful to the strongest women I have ever met, my mom, who is the reason for my existence, and I dedicate this thesis to her – *Anneciğim'e*.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"When somebody goes to a negotiation table not convinced

that an agreement can be turned to his or her advantage,

then reaching an agreement is going to be nearly impossible."[1]

Juan Manuel Santos – Former President of Colombia (2010-2018)

and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate

Rebel groups typically frame their rebellion as a criticism of the exclusive nature of the state system and emphasize the exigency of revising the existing political, social, and economic programs. Framing the struggle in the broadest possible way through an emphasis on public goods, rebels aim to attract the attention and acceptance of the civilians as well as the international community, since both audiences are crucial for them. Furthermore, strong wartime relations with civilians allow rebels to enjoy mobilization and material aid. Similarly, the recognition of the international community contributes to their rebellion with direct and indirect international support. Thus, rebel groups make many claims regarding public goods and benefits as they launch a rebellion. However, what they reach at the end of the conflict usually becomes different from what they aimed at the beginning of war. This thesis looks at what causes this variation through a systematic analysis of peace agreements. Examining the agreement provisions in terms of

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[1]Interview with His Excellency Juan Manuel Santos, Former President of Colombia, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Retrieved from: http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2019/7/7/interview-with-his-excellency-juan-manuel-santos-former-president-of-colombia

whom they benefit most, I aim to understand what becomes important in warring parties' decision of including public goods in civil war peace agreements.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) report on conflict termination has shown that 141 intrastate conflicts ended during the Cold War, while 147 battles terminated between 1990-2005. The report suggests that victory was the dominant type of conflict termination during the Cold War, but peace agreements and ceasefires replaced it in the post-Cold War period (Kreutz, 2010). In a more recent report by the UCDP, Petterson, and Wallensteen (2015) note that there has been an increase in the number of peace agreements that have been signed to end intrastate conflict since 2011; however, they critically point out that most of these peace agreements fail to end intrastate disputes. These findings led many scholars to ask the questions of "Why and how have some peace agreements been successfully implemented, while others have not?", "What affects the durability of peace?", "What leads to civil war recurrence in the aftermath of conflict?". Although these are all significant questions that enrich the peace agreement literature, there has been no systematic analysis of what determines the terms of peace agreements. However, the high number of civil war recurrence after the termination of conflict with peace settlements suggest that studying the determinants of civil war peace agreements' design, implementation, and failure is urgent. Thus, this thesis focuses on the variation on peace agreement design, and it argues that conflict actors draft peace agreements with regards to their capabilities and objectives. It takes into account the effect of rebel objectives and capacity on peace agreement design, which in turn likely to affect the implementation of a peace agreement, its duration, quality, and the likelihood of war recurrence.

This thesis argues that peace agreement design is not systematically linked to peace process outcomes, as empirical cases suggest that comprehensive or public goods-oriented peace agreements do not always last longer, and they may not be successfully implemented. For example, to address the incompatibilities between themselves and to end the civil wars in Angola in 1991 and Burundi in 1992, the conflict parties signed comprehensive peace agreements and agreed to verify a ceasefire and demobilization process. While Burundi's civil war ended, and peace was established with a high peace agreement implementation record, Angola's peace process failed, the treaty was never implemented, and the conflict recurred. On the other hand, the 1993 Interim Constitution Agreement between South Africa and the African National Congress (ANC) and the 1999 Lome Peace Agreement between Sierra Leone and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) have very different contexts and organization. While the former gives extensive public benefits, the latter included a better future for the old militants of the group. However, they were both successfully implemented (Cil and Prorok, 2018).

These cases suggest that there are other factors that determine whether peace agreements that are designed to maintain peace lead to the long-lasting implementation of peace settlements and the resolution of civil wars. This thesis argues that we need to consider who benefits from peace through the application of peace agreements. Thus, the general question that this thesis seeks to answer is, "What factors determine the specific content of a peace agreement that is signed after a civil war?" In the research focusing on who benefits from peace, the literature focuses on the effect of the civilian-rebel relationship on the design of peace agreement (Cil and Prorok, 2018). However, it is crucial to understand how the civilian-rebel relations emerge and develop. Therefore, we need look at from a broader perspective on what determines peace agreement design. Rebel

objective and capacity determine their interactions with the civilians and the state, and the capacity and willingness of the rebel group determine to what extent a peace agreement address the incompatibilities leading to civil war and resolve intrastate conflict. Therefore, the specific research question of this thesis is, "To what extent does external support determine the specific content of civil war peace agreements?". While looking for an answer to this question, this thesis examines the effect of rebel objectives on the design of peace agreements to test when the war objective of a rebel group is reflected in the post-war era, and how it interacts with external support. Hence, this thesis focuses on the factors that determine a rebel group's decision on whether to create a public-oriented peace agreement or not, and it specifically looks at the effect of the relationship between rebel groups and their external state sponsors on the terms of a peace agreement on the one hand, and how their war objective affect their behavior on the other hand. It seeks to answer if there is a variation among peace agreements signed by rebel groups with external support and ones without external support in terms of who benefits from peace while controlling for how do a rebel group's identity, military strength, natural resources, conflict duration, and conflict intensity affect these dynamics.

Understanding the determinants of peace agreement design will provide the foundation for examining why some peace agreements are sometimes successfully implemented and other times not, and consequently of the variation in rebel objective and strength in its effect on the peace process. The scope of this thesis is limited to peace agreements that are signed following armed intrastate conflicts and internationalized internal conflicts. In the remainder of this chapter, I will define civil war peace agreements, examine what a peace process is and its dynamics, review existing literature on the

determinants of peace settlement together with their impact on duration, implementation, and failure of the peace agreement, and provide an outline of this thesis.

1.1. *Defining Peace Agreements*

A peace agreement is defined as an agreement that is designed to resolve an existing incompatibility between conflict parties. The contract should address all or the central aspects of the issues leading to conflict (Kreutz, 2010). There is a clear distinction between peace agreement and victory. While victory is a battlefield outcome, peace agreements can be signed while parties sustain their military assets. Thus, there is no need for a specific battlefield result for parties to agree on a peace agreement. However, a peace agreement is different from a ceasefire agreement because in the latter, parties promise only the termination of military activity whereas they need to address the existing incompatibilities[2] in the former.

Peace agreements vary in their content and comprehensiveness. In the literature, they are categorized according to different features. Harbom et al. (2006) look at peace agreements from the comprehensiveness perspective. By following the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset coding rules, they divide them into three categories: full agreement, partial agreement, and peace process agreement. Full agreements are accords in which at least one of the warring sides agrees to settle the complete incompatibility while addressing a part of the existing disagreement by at least one conflict party is sufficient

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[2] This thesis uses the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset's definition of incompatibility defined as "the stated general incompatible position" between belligerents. It can be over government or territory, or both (Petterson and Eck, 2018; Gleditsch et al., 2002).

for signing a partial agreement. However, it is necessary for initiating a peace process agreement that at least one party of the dyad to accept to resolve the incompatibility.

In all types of agreements, provisions are designed to address existing incompatibilities. Therefore, it is expected for a conflict over the control of the government to have different provisions in peace agreements than a territorial dispute (Harbom et al., 2006). The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset includes information on five fundamental characteristics of a peace agreement: military, political, territorial, justice, and implementation provisions (Högbladh, 2012). On the other hand, the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM_ID) divides agreement provisions into five categories: institutions, security, rights, external arrangements, and other arrangements (Joshi et al., 2015). Although there is variation between the provisions of these two datasets, certain areas under each provision type are more frequently referred to in peace agreements. The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset cites that formal ceasefire is the most common term in a peace agreement, and it is followed by provisions regarding demobilization, disarmament, reintegration among all military provisions. While the most common political provision is elections and supported by the establishment of an interim government, integration in local government is the most common territorial provision, and the most common justice provision is the release of prisoners (Högbladh, 2012). When we look at the implementation records of specific provisions, they show that electoral or political reform is the most successfully implemented institutional provision, whereas prisoners release and amnesty have the highest implementation rate among security and valid provisions, respectively (Joshi et al., 2015).

In addition to the type of provisions, an examination of content-based and implementation-based datasets shows that peace agreements are mostly categorized as either comprehensive or narrow according to the number and extent of provisions. However, when we look at what determines the scope of a peace agreement, Joshi and Quinn (2015) say that warring parties create peace agreements based on their potential to accomplish a set of sociopolitical objectives. Therefore, each warring party has some clear intention for war and peace at the beginning of negotiations, and the content of provisions are essential in addition to the number of them. Based on this assumption, this thesis argues that in addition to the number of provisions and their implementation rates, the intention and characteristics of warring parties also affect the terms of peace agreements; therefore, we need to classify peace agreements according to the parameters influencing warring and peacemaking capacity of the conflicting sides. Thus, following the question, "What accounts for the variation in peace agreement content?", this thesis highlights the need to look at the factors that drive rebel groups' demands from a peace agreement and their capacity to fulfill this plan. Existing empirical studies have shown the relationship between peace agreement design and the duration, implementation, and failure of peace. However, these studies neglect to consider the effect of conflict and rebel group characteristics on peace. However, understanding how these determine the terms of the peace agreement is crucial because the content of peace agreements is a significant factor affecting the course of peace following the end of the war. Thus, this study, as one of the few problematizing peace agreements themselves, brings a new perspective to the peace agreements by looking at it through the objective and capacity of the rebel groups. In that way, it aims to contribute to the civil war

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termination and peace agreement literature by demonstrating that the design of peace agreements is also a function of rebel group features.

1.2. Emergence and Dynamics of a Peace Process

While examining the design of peace agreements, it is crucial to look at the existing literature on conflict termination, peace agreements and peacebuilding in general to seek a place where exactly peace agreements are located and to what extent their design is essential for the prospects of peace. There is a divergence among civil war termination scholars regarding the best means of ending the civil war and ensuring peace. While some scholars argue decisive victory on the government or rebel side as the most successful way of ending the conflict because they tend to give more stable results than political stalemates (Maoz, 1984; Hensel,1994; Wagner, 1993; Licklider, 1995; Luttwak, 1999), others favor negotiated settlement, which is agreed among belligerents and mostly followed by a peace agreement (Hartzell, 2016). Fortna (2003) says if the conflict ends with the victory of one side, then there is no need for cooperation, which leads to overlooking the incompatibility among the combatants. Furthermore, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) claim that negotiated settlements produce durable peace, while military victory has no substantial impact on it.

Regarding the side of the victor, Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007), Toft (2010), Mason et al. (2010) say that rebel victories create more durable peace, while Kreutz (2010) advocates that government victories generate more peaceful results. On the other side, Fortna (2008) finds that both military victories and negotiated settlements produce a

durable peace, whereas Walter (2004) argues that neither type of outcome has a significant impact on post-war peace. While these studies theoretically demonstrate that military victory means the destruction of the fighting capacities of the defeated side based on the empirical analysis covering civil wars happened in an extended period, they neglect to consider that peace is a process. Hence, they overlook the parameters that affect this process. Hartzell (2016) says that two conditions must be met to discuss the end of a civil war. First, conflict parties should reach a war-ending agreement or a settlement among themselves; second, fighting between the warring sides must stop completely. When these two conditions are met, parties reach the necessary conditions for signing a peace agreement and enter a peace process. However, this process is not smooth and comfortable in most of the cases. Findley (2013) argues that peace emerges out of a complex process of battle, negotiation, agreement, and implementation.

Considering the complex nature of peacemaking, many scholars argue that civil war is a bargaining process (Fearon, Walter, Fortna, 2004; Pillar, 1983; Wagner, 1993; Licklider 1995; Walter, 2002, 2004) in which commitment problems are embedded in the very heart of it (Fearon, 1998; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007; Walter, 1997, 2002). Fearon (1995, 1998) and Reiter (2003) say that once a war-ending settlement is reached, peace will last if the former combatant remains committed to the bargained terms. Nevertheless, commitment problem is relevant both for government and rebel sides. While a government is fighting rebels, whose fighting capacity is mostly unknown to the government, it is difficult for the government to agree to sign a peace settlement. Similarly, the weaker government may not commit to a peace agreement with a rebel group because it fears that rebels might renege on the contract. Therefore, misperceptions and insecurity among conflict parties following the essential bargaining

process make reaching and sustaining peace after the civil war more difficult (Snyder and Jervis, 1999; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). For instance, the success of peace settlement talks in former Zaire hinges primarily on coordinating the preferences of a half-dozen intervening African states. Therefore, it stands as an example of the central importance of the collective action problems in intrastate conflicts, multiple sets of preferences, and civil war duration and outcome (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce, 2008).

Several enforcement devices were suggested to overcome the challenges arising from information asymmetries and commitment problems. A large body of research discussed the inclusion of third parties in peace agreement negotiation and implementation process (Walter, 1997; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2004; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, 2007; Mattes and Savun, 2010; Joshi, 2013), while others argued that power-sharing provisions play a significant role in post-war peace settings (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Nilson 2008; DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen, 2009). In particular, Fortna (2003) finds that cooperation among warring parties is crucial for peacekeeping after civil war. She offers three empirically overlapping strategies for ceasefire agreements to employ: making attack costlier by limiting themselves through withdrawal of troops, creation of demilitarized buffer zone, arms control, committing to a third-party guarantor, and declaring ceasefire formally; reducing uncertainty about actions and intentions by specifying the terms of the agreement; preventing or controlling accidental violations.

Third parties are portrayed to be bound to intervene in the civil war to stop the bloodshed, and they are designated as the effective guarantors in ensuring peace because they provide a stable transition environment for adversaries through fostering negotiation

and conflict resolution processes (Holbrooke, 1998). Rosenau (1964) theorizes that third-party intervention is influenced by the type and evolution of civil war, and he adds that the goals of third parties shape how the conflict ends. Regarding the nature of civil war, Suhrke and Noble (1977) find that third parties are more likely to intervene in ethnic civil wars. On the other hand, scholars have looked at the relationship between third-party intervention and conflict duration. For instance, Holl (1993) found that third parties tend to involve in the civil war near to the end of the conflict while Mason, Weingarten & Fett (1999) show that third-party intervention makes negotiated settlement less likely. Also, Walter (2002) argues that the effect of third parties in reaching a negotiated settlement is high when the civil war becomes protracted; Regan (1996, 2000) finds that third parties are more likely to be successful in their interventions in civil wars when they resort to a mixed strategy of economic and military policies.

On the other hand, some scholars bring a counterargument to the involvement of third parties in conflict resolution. They argue that third-party presence lengthens the conflict process. For instance, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) argue that third-party intervention has a decisive role in the civil war process. Nevertheless, this role varies in outcome regardless of the side of intervention. Thus, it increases the time until a negotiated settlement is reached while it decreases the time until the supported groups reach a military victory. Also, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) find that simultaneous intervention on the government and rebel side increases civil war duration, which is also supported by Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000) and Regan (2002). In contrast to the traditional third-party intervention, Mattes and Savun (2011) suggest to the third parties to include mechanisms in peace agreement such that they will work to collect and convey information about military capacities of conflicting parties during the peace process. In

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this way, they aim to increase the availability of reliable information in a post-civil war environment, which will work as an uncertainty-reducing mechanism for the actors of the peace agreement.

Joshi and Quinn (2015) think that the issue of enforcement and vulnerability regarding commitment problems in negotiated peace agreements is no more as critical as it has been because of the qualifying of third-party enforcement, mediation, and power-sharing arrangements. However, although such influential devices have been utilized in peace agreements, bargaining is accepted as an essential tool for ending the incompatibility peacefully and overcome commitment problems. However, there are many challenges inherited in bargaining theory. Enduring peace is conditional on many factors, and one of the most important of these is sending each other a message of genuine and credible commitment to peace. The failure of peace agreements which involve third-party guarantors and power-sharing devices shows that we should be concerned about other features of the agreements through the dynamics of the conflict and the conflicting parties themselves. Therefore, following Fortna's (2008) and Walter's (2004) argument that the type of outcome is not systematically related to the peace, this work adopts Werner's (1997, 1999) position that changes in the relative capabilities of parties after fighting stops may cause the breakdown of peace. Hence, this work argues that it is not the type of outcome, but the rebel objective and capacity that are more effective in the course of war and peace. The losing side, whether government or rebel groups, can reaccumulate military capability in a shorter time than expected if it has an existing or emerging external supporter. In this way, conflict recurs, and decisive victory negatively affects the duration of peace. Hence, the prospects of peace are dim,

convincing each other and their constituents on the terms of the peace agreement are crucial.

In short, this study aims to contribute to the literature by looking at how the intention and capacity of rebel groups influence their decisions on peace agreement settlement, and in turn, address commitment problems. Even though war-fighting size and objectives of the warring parties are related to information problems and uncertainty, there is no empirical study looking at the impact of rebel capacity and conflict interest on the design of peace agreements. This work investigates the relationship between relative power balances of conflictual parties and the content of peace and argues that rebel groups that want to sustain strong relationship with their audience and have financial resources to finance peace are more likely to design more public-oriented provisions which necessitate more significant commitment in the peace process. Through examining the variation on the terms of peace agreements, this study aims to understand the relationship between rebel group features and the peaceful resolution of conflict.

1.3. The Existing Literature on the Peace Agreement Design and Provisions

Although civil war and civil war termination is a widely studied topic, peace agreements have been overlooked within this literature compared to other types of war outcomes mainly because of the small number of them (Harbom et al., 2006). However, the number of civil war peace agreements has increased significantly following the end of the Cold War (Badran, 2014). Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015) say that the number of intrastate conflicts and the number of annual deaths associated with civil disputes has increased in

the last ten years, and it will be the prevalent form of conflict in the upcoming years. They add that the number of peace agreements that have been signed between the state and the rebel group(s) to end a civil war raised since 2011. This development shows that peace agreements have been a popular way of ending the civil war, which has been supported by the significant shifts in international norms and laws towards the prevalence of peacebuilding (Joshi and Quinn, 2015; Howard and Stark, 2017). Although the international community has emphasized peace agreements as the best way of conflict termination, almost one-third of peace settlements signed in the same era have failed (Walter, 2009) and the number of recurring conflicts has increased (Petterson and Wallensteen, 2015).

This development brings forth many questions regarding the effectiveness of peace agreements. A focus on whether, how, when, and why peace agreements produce their expected effects has been required to understand the conditions under which successful peace agreements are designed. This motivation led many scholars to look at different relationships about the design and implementation of a peace agreement and the duration of peace. It can be seen in the literature that there is a significant relationship between the provisions of a peace agreement and the post-war environment. Fortna (2003) says the mechanisms within peace agreements that make peace more or less likely.

However, studies that focus on peace agreement provisions mainly look at them from the perspective of power-sharing. Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) argue that the agreements that include provisions for sharing and dividing military power contribute significantly to the sustainability of peace. They say the more dimensions of power-sharing provisions among former combatants are specified in a peace agreement, the more prolonged the

peace endures. Similarly, Walter (2004) says that civil war recurrence occurs less frequently in the countries where the power sharing has been ensured. It is argued that settlements that distribute state power among warring parties, that make provisions for the security of the actors, and that put high cost of returning to conflict increase actors' commitment to peace (Mattes and Savun, 2010; Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007). Joshi and Mason (2011) look at the impact of the governing coalition on the duration of peace in a post-civil war setting. After examining the composition of power-sharing coalitions, they find that the larger size of the governing alliance increases peace duration because it prevents actors to monopolize power and distribute the cost among them.

On the other hand, Badran (2014) looks at the quality of design to understand the durability of peace agreements. He argues that peace does not fail because of moral depravity, but rather because of the complexity of interaction among conflicting parties that emerges due to having different conflict interests, preferences, and values, which makes communication between themselves more difficult. However, if they improve the design quality and efficiency of the agreement by increasing the number of provisions, they will manage the complexity more quickly, and peace will last longer.

While the effect of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements has been discussed in the context that they increase the duration of peace significantly, this argument has been challenged by other studies on the ground that the cost of peace is high for the government and the rebel group as long as the inequitable power structure is sustained, Thus, power asymmetry between the government and rebel factions in most civil wars creates problems in the peace process. Rebels are challenging the existing power

structure that makes governments unwilling to weaken their regime and reward belligerency. If rebels engage in negotiations under these conditions, they will be in a disadvantaged position (Lounsbery and DeRouen Jr., 2017), which increases the risk of peace agreement failure. Similarly, DeRouen Jr et al. (2009) argue that power-sharing provisions that are costlier to the government are less likely to last for very long because the slow implementation of provisions creates a situation for rebels to renege more quickly. Although they do not specifically mention which provisions are costlier and which are easier to implement, they say that political power-sharing provisions lessen the duration of peace while military integration and autonomy increases it.

Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) argue that economic development in the post-war environment reduces civil war recurrence. This idea was supported by Blatman and Miguel (2010) who also show that a useful next step might be focusing on the patterns of institutional change during the post-conflict period. As suggested by these authors, there is a growing body of research arguing that peace agreements provisions contribute to peace agreement implementation. A more recent perspective on the prospects of economic development in post-conflict countries examines the role of economic provisions in peace agreements. Wennmann (2009) argues that the inclusion of economic provisions such as taxation arrangements, natural resources funds, budget transparency in settlements facilitate the prospects of economic interactions in the country and regulate the future of resource sharing in the society. More importantly, addressing economic problems that led to the conflict in the first place are expected to increase the sustainability of peace. For instance, he says that omitting the inclusion of provisions regarding the reintegration of former combatants into the economy contributed to their involvement in the rubber plantations that fostered insecurity and crime following the

end of the war in Liberia. However, he shows that the nonfulfillment of the expected economic transition in Sudan and Guatemala during the post-conflict period despite the inclusion of economic provisions in peace agreements can be explained by the failure of the implementation of these provisions. These examples stand as evidence that economic development in the post-wat period requires careful design and implementation of policy provisions determined in peace agreements.

In these studies, peace agreement implementation is taken both as a peace-building process and an outcome. For instance, in the research examining the sequence of these provisions, Joshi et al. (2017) find that implementing the first post-accord election before other peace agreements provisions facilitate the start of the peace process and lessen the chance of returning to war. Regarding a cumulative implementation record, Joshi and Quinn (2015) argue that how peace is implemented is significantly related to how long peace lasts and whether it recurs or not. Hence, their findings suggest that the low implementation record of peace agreements creates incentives for non-signatory rebel groups to benefit from the failed implementation process and makes governments more likely to fight with them in the future.

The literature shows that the civil war termination literature looks at peace within the context of how the civil war ends, what is the duration of peace following the end of the conflict, and how peace is implemented. In extension, scholars started to ask questions about conflict recurrence following the increasing trend of civil war settlement failures. Although this research shows that the outcome of the war is undoubtedly related to the terms of the settlement; it is not a sufficient proxy for understanding war-ending bargains because it is neither victory nor peace agreement that make peace more

enduring (Hartzell, 2016). Besides, the content of the peace agreement is considered always concerning the process and outcome of the peace process rather than what leads parties to include specific provisions in the peace agreement while excluding others. There is minimal discussion on what determines the content of a peace settlement. However, we know that when composing an agreement, conflicting parties come together with the intention to address the several incompatibilities. If they agree, they sign a peace agreement with only limited information about each other. In this regard, there is always more public information about the state as most of the existing empirical studies mainly focus on the characteristics of states while examining different aspects of the conflict and the process of settlement. For instance, some literature discusses how the nature of government in the target country affect the design of agreement (Joshi, 2013).

Similarly, the effect of third parties is broadly studied, as explained above. However, these approaches undermine the role of rebel groups, which has a significant impact on conflict and peace processes. For example, Joshi and Quinn (2015) argue that agreements with few provisions leave government unaffected. However, this thesis argues that these kinds of agreements may leave rebel groups less affected in some situations if there is less expectation from the government regarding policy changes. The recent research criticizes the state-focused analysis of civil war duration and outcome while asserting the need incorporate rebel groups into the process and to adopt multi-level theories and research designs in studying conflict processes (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2009). It is not enough to look only at one of these processes to understand how peace emerges, develops, or fails. This thesis argues that we need to look at the expectations and capabilities of rebel groups to address the complexities of peace agreement design and the commitment problems in civil war agreements. Because they

create the mechanisms of agreements together with the government to better understand why parties sign a peace agreement, what their expectations from a peace settlement are, and how they arrange their relationship with the actors of war following the end of the war. The only research focusing on peace agreements from this perspective is Cil and Prorok's (2018) working paper suggesting that civilian-rebel relations determine the content of peace agreement to a great extent such that civilian reliant rebel leaders design more public-oriented peace agreement provisions while other groups distribute more benefits to rank-and-file members and/or leader and elite members. This thesis seeks to contribute to the study of peace agreement design by bringing additional characteristics of rebel groups in addition to civilian reliance to broaden the perspective focusing on peace agreement design while testing Cil and Prorok's (2018) argument with new variables and in different models.

1.4. Outline of the Main Argument and Research Approach

In this thesis, I study the factors that determine whether the objective and external support of rebel groups affect their bargaining during the process of peace agreement design. As of that, it focuses on the prospects of this relationship on the future of peace in terms of duration, implementation, and success/failure. I propose that capabilities and intentions determine rebel groups' decision-making. If these groups receive external state support, then they have more bargaining and policy-making power, which affects their likelihood of including costly provisions such as public benefits into peace agreement. Also, they consider both their own and their audience's interest and preferences. As the

rebel group's war objective is related to its constituency, they give higher proportion of public goods to the civilians with the agreement.

To develop and test the theoretical arguments this thesis proceeds as follows. In the next chapter, I construct principal propositions regarding the effect of external support on conflict parties' decision-making over whether to include public-goods and benefits in the peace agreement. Furthermore, I discuss how the conflict intention and objective of the rebel group affect the conditions under which rebel groups utilize external support to provide goods and benefits to the public. After discussing the theoretical arguments and specifying the hypotheses, I explain the research design of this work based on the literature, and then I test the theory with regression analysis in the remaining chapter. Finally, I conclude the study with a discussion of the theoretical implications of the findings and offer future avenues for research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

DETERMINANTS of CIVIL WAR PEACE AGREEMENT DESIGN

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework to explain why warring parties design a public-oriented peace agreement and to what extent rebel capacity and war objective become important in the provision of public benefits in an agreement.

To this end, I use the concept of 'power relations' from Ottmann and Vüllers to explain why rebel capacity and objective determine the context of peace agreements. They define power relations as the relative strength between the government and the rebel group after the signing of a peace agreement (2019: 19). They use the word 'strength' as a general concept rather than a measure of military capacity. They argue that power relations between the government and the rebel group is based on zero-sum logic during conflict. The literature assumes that the zero-sum logic tends to remain in the post-conflict stages because parties do not convincingly signal to each other that they will not renege on their part (Kreutz, 2018: 221). However, it is not always the case for the governments and the rebels to follow the same logic. They may also design a positive sum peace. Inclusion of power-sharing arrangements in many peace agreements is a valid example of positive sum logic that build a balance between the power of the government and the rebels in the post-conflict period to provide benefits to both parties and prevent

conflict recurrence. In this thesis, I argue that governments and rebels design a public goods-oriented peace agreement at the end of conflict to create a positive-sum environment. To understand how the government and the rebels interact with each other during this process and why they design a positive-sum peace settlement, I draw a relational structure model showing the interactions between the government and the rebels with each other and with their constituents, respectively.

Figure 1: The Key Relations Structure between the Government, Rebel Group and Their Constituents in the Post-Conflict Process

As it is seen in the Figure 1, the first interaction in the peace process is built between the government and the rebel group as the main signatories of an agreements. However, the second and third steps[3] show that both parties have relationships with the civilians as well. Figure 1 shows that civilians constitute the most salient common ground that the government and the rebels may come together to work on as they are in the intersection of these relationships. Thus, when the government and the rebels design the peace

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[3] There is no ranking between these numbers and they do not constitute successive steps. They are randomly assigned just to show that these are different interactions between the government, rebels, and civilians.

agreement in accordance with public benefits to cure the costliest problems in the state, they invest in the common ground. Designing a public benefiting peace agreement, they plan to increase trust in public institutions, and they send each other credible signals about their commitment to peace. Public benefiting peace agreement does not only arise from the warring parties' willingness of allying with each other; but also, they renew the trust of their constituents to themselves through giving them concessions because it is crucial for both sides to guarantee the support of civilians.

Civil wars put a high cost on the society: loss of life, destroyed infrastructure, economic damage, and the insecurity. Governments are held accountable for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of humanitarian and material damage by the people. Hence, they receive significant recovery aid from donors following the end of the war. They utilize this aid not only to reconstruct security and order in the society; but also, regenerate popular support to their rule. As it is argued in the literature that leaders need to retain political support (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Joshi and Mason, 2011). Thus, it is always important for the government to sustain a reliable image in the eyes of civilians to ensure domestic stability.

Nevertheless, rebel groups care about their relations with the civilians as well. Civilians are important for the mobilization of the rebellion, provision food, shelter, and information about the government, and the spread of propaganda before and during the war (Weinstein, 2006), and they remain important after the rebel group signs the peace agreement. Former rebels continue their life as political and social actors through governmental positions or in other state institutions. They run political parties and join elections, especially after they build a power-sharing political arrangement with the

government. Therefore, they want to be recognized as legitimate actors in the eyes of people. In addition, even if the war has ended and rebels promised not to renege, it is always a possibility for rebels to face further challenges in the country with the arrival of a new government, changes in the power balance or the emergence of an unexpected external factor. Therefore, they also want to have a good relationship with the civilians to become easily organized in the future, and supply manpower, if needed.

Public goods provision following the end of war is a significant strategic tool of political actors in addition to be an essential need of the people for the post-war settings. The inclusion of former rebels into politics, social and economic life broadens the winning coalition of the government to the selectorate in the country that means that both the government and the rebel group try to gain the support of the whole population in political competitions. To that end, establishment of an inter-elite cooperation between the government and rebel leaders facilitate the recognition of their political activities. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that the provision of public goods is a strong political tool to ensure popular support. When we think about it in a post-conflict setting, it becomes even more crucial as there are not many private companies to make an investment or other actors who generate wealth for society. Therefore, government and former rebels utilize public goods as a function of their peace arrangement when the scope of winning coalition increases as a proportion of the selectorate. As of that, investing public goods not only allows them to gain popular support; but the commitment problems between the government and the former rebels decrease when they spare the budget for the same goal. In this way, the provision of public goods by the peace government reduces the chances of peace failure, incorporate masses to politics, and decreases the likelihood conflict recurrence.

In this thesis, I examine which factors allow the government and rebel group for the realization of a positive sum peace and how designing a public-oriented peace agreement becomes possible. Existing research has shown that the nature of the previous regime, conflict duration, level of violence, number of fatalities, the existence of third-party support, and the conflict objective of parties and their military capacity determine conflict outcome and the post-conflict peace. But we still know very little about what determines the terms of peace agreements. However, every rebel group is different from another in terms of its fighting and bargaining capacity against the government, which affects not only the onset, duration, and termination of civil war, but also steers a rebel group during negotiation and peace processes. In this chapter, I start by distinguishing the fighting capacity of rebels from their policymaking and bargaining capacities. I explain why the policymaking and bargaining capacities of insurgents highly determine the terms of peace agreements. In line with the existing arguments of external state support in the civil war, this work argues that if a rebel group has the intentional or de facto support of a foreign state, then they are more likely to agree with the government about making costly post-war policies compared to rebel groups without external support. In this way, this work shows that even though rebel groups that have external support use more indiscriminate violence against civilians as they have comparatively less incentive to have a good relationship with civilians during war setting (Weinstein, 2007:7), rebels may utilize external support to provide public goods in the aftermath of conflict that increase their political power.

In addition to the capacity-driven factors related to external support, this thesis argues that the fighting motivation of the rebel group influences its interests from a peace agreement. Some rebel groups fight interest-driven and result-oriented wars, which

require a longer time and higher commitment; others can use violence for smaller, short-term, or more easily answerable demands. Their motivation for conflict influences their relationship with the civilian population in the conflict territory. Therefore, this study looks at whether the conflict intention of a rebel group is reflected in their peace design and how it interacts with the use of external support during the design of peace settlement. Is it the case that when the goals of the rebel groups are related to the civilian population, rebels employ more public-benefits provisions in the peace agreement in contrast to other groups? Based on the hypotheses designed according to the effect of external support and objective on rebel behaviour, this chapter discusses the determinants of the provision of public benefits in peace agreements.

2.2 Capacity-Driven Factors

It is argued in the literature that the capacity of the rebel group determines the outcome of the war and the prospects of peace. Nevertheless, determining the type and amount of specific capacity of rebel groups is very difficult because most rebel groups are weakly institutionalized, and do not have clear rules and norms of power-sharing and decision making as states. This situation makes observing the power distribution in a rebel group harder. However, it does not mean that states and other rebel groups do not have information about the capacity of each other. Even it is a limited information; they can predict each other's military, financial, and political positions. In this part, first, I analyse how the rebel capacity is discussed in the literature. Then, I consider the effect of having external support on the capacity of rebel groups, and consequently on the peace process.

Rebel group's capacity determines the likelihood of guarantee provision in a peace agreement in addition to rebel group's relationship with the civilians and the target state, respectively.

Existing research shows that there is mostly a power asymmetry between the government and rebel factions in civil wars, which makes signing a peace agreement harder for the rebel group as well as the state (Cunningham et al., 2013). If rebels engage in negotiations under the inherent risks of failure, they will most probably be in a disadvantaged position at the end. However, if the rebel group can bargain and directly influence the civilians as well as the ability to fight, then it is more likely to reach a more favourable result. In the literature, rebel capacity is mostly understood in terms of military power. For instance, regarding the impact of rebel strength on peace agreement provisions, Gent's (2008) findings show that rebels who stay at parity or become stronger than their warring government are able to improve their bargaining position, and therefore, successfully demand more favourable terms for peace which necessitates a more significant commitment to peace process (Joshi and Quinn, 2015). However, this understanding is very limited because rebel groups' financial, diplomatic, and mobilization capacities can affect their bargaining position in addition to their military capability. Therefore, this study investigates to what extent and how the external support to rebel groups is relevant to the peace-making capacity of rebel groups.

Rebel capacity is determined by various components such as rebel's military strength, arms procurement capacity, having the support of civilians, having an institutionalized leadership structure, and external sponsorship. BAAD II looks at rebel strength to understand rebel capacity and define it according to the number of members in the

organization (Asal et al., 2018), while UCDP/PRIO codes rebel strength by looking at yearly troop size (Eck and Pettersson, 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2002). In the Non-State Actors (NSA) Dataset, Cunningham et al. define rebel strength with composite and component measures. The former is measured according to the troop number of the rebel group, while the latter is measured according to three indicators: the ability of rebel group to mobilize civilian support, the capability of arms procurement, and the fighting capacity different from the number of troops (2013: 522). All these variables are measured relative to the state capacity. In their analysis, they found that almost 90% of rebel groups that fought internal wars between 1945-2011 were weaker than the government in terms of troop numbers. However, almost half of the rebel groups were equal to the government in terms of mobilization, arms procurement and fighting capacity, which shows that what makes government stronger in most of the conflicts is their ability to launch a larger fighting force (Cunningham et al., 2013: 526). Lounsbery and DeRouen found that rebels were weaker or much weaker than the government in almost 75% of civil war peace agreement signed between 1975 and 2011 (2018: 152). This result shows that even though rebel groups fight relatively disadvantaged wars against governments, they sign a peace agreement to stop the conflict through a successful diplomatic exchange. On the literature on rebel diplomacy, it is discussed that rebel groups use diplomacy during civil war through opening offices abroad, lobbying foreign capitals, and creating foreign affairs departments to advance their military and political objectives both in the battlefield and in the international stage (Huang, 2016: 90). Huang argues that rebel groups attain wartime needs, such as taxes, territory, intelligence, logistical aid, through both coercion and persuasion. However, this is not a possible way of attracting international support. Instead, they need to convince foreign supporters and the independent people,

insurgents, ethnic kin, businessman, etc. living in these countries. Thus, as much as in domestic politics, rebel groups have incentives to watch their words and actions in international politics (2016: 99-100), which also presents that external support is not only relevant for rebels' fighting capacity; but also it is linked to rebels' political program and peace plans. Therefore, external support diplomacy feeds political motivations of rebel groups while it indicates the recognition of the state and the non-state armed group each other, which is found crucial for reconciliation by Bayer who states that "acceptance or recognition of other is an important milestone in relations" (2010: 536)[4]. If a state signs a peace agreement with a rebel group which has fought over an objective threatening the sovereignty of the state, then it means that they recognize each other and agree to negotiate on certain principles. However, Gent argues that how rebels and state negotiate is very much determined by the rebel group's bargaining power, which is shaped significantly by their relative strength against the government (2011: 152). Therefore, stronger rebel groups can get more significant benefits in the negotiations while weaker ones may have to sign a disadvantageous peace agreement. Although this can be the case for many rebel groups, this argument is built on a one-sided measurement of rebel capacity, which is the troop size. However, as Cunningham's et al. (2013) findings show that we need to look at different measures of rebel capacity beyond the troop size because only then we can learn more about their war-making and peacebuilding options and preferences. Hence, this study argues that what we need to clarify is that who benefits from a peace agreement and to what extent they benefit by looking at rebel capacity beyond the troop size. As it is discussed in the first section, external states involved in civil

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[4] Cunningham et al. divide rebel strength in five categories: much weaker, weaker, at parity, stronger, and much stronger (2013: 525).

wars and civil war settlements process in different ways. While the involvement of third-party states is mainly understood in the form of external military intervention, it has become clear with the emerging literature that states intervene in conflict processes by giving external support to the government or the rebel group, or both. They might have different motivations such as to increase rebel's fighting capacity, to affect the outcome of civil war, or to gain leverage in their domestic and sometimes international affairs. However, San-Akca says that it is not only the states that choose rebel groups to support; but also rebels make a selection while receiving support from other states based on operational costs calculations, ideational ties, conflict history between the target and supporter states (2016: 106, 113). Thus, it is important to differentiate between the type and side of intervention. For instance, third-party support of an external state for the opposition can work as a demonstration to the population that the rebel group presents a credible threat to the government. On the other hand, third-party support does not only help rebel group to destroy the capacity of the government but also it allows rebel groups to provide goods and services to the population and gain the hearts and minds of them while rendering governments' image in the eyes of its people. In that sense, this study looks at the effect of external support on the design of peace agreement based on the argument that external support can increase rebel group's benefit from peace through policies ensuring civilian and in-group support as well as their likelihood of winning the war in another scenario.

On the literature of the external support for rebel groups, it is never discussed how external support influences the design of civil war peace agreements. The dominant discussions have been around the effect of external support on the onset, duration, (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2005; Cunningham, 2010; Regan and Aydin, 2006)

intensity and outcome of civil war (Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2004; Sawyer et al., 2015).

However, recent studies have started to look at the relationship between external support

and conflict recurrence (Karlén, 2017) as well as post-war dynamics. On the effect of

external support on civil war onset, Fearon and Laitin (2003) say that civil war is more

likely to erupt in and around a previous conflict territory where rebel groups can easily

access to remote support such as arms, funds, logistics and safe havens. Similarly,

Salehyan (2007) argues that if the rebel group has external sanctuary in neighbouring

countries, then they are more likely to mobilize rebels and the conflict onset. Regarding

the impact of external support on conflict duration, Aydin and Regan (2012) and Balch-

Lindsay and Enterline (2000) found that external support shortens or prolongs civil war

duration by the side of intervention. If both the state and the rebel group have external

support, then it is likely to have a long-term conflict in contrast to the situation in which

only one side receives support from one or more external states. Nevertheless,

Cunningham (2010) criticizes arguments that state that external states intervene in

conflicts either to help one side's victory or to reach a negotiated settlement with the

other side. He rather argues that many external states intervene in conflict to pursue their

agenda as a separate actor, which in turn prolongs the conflict and make resolution harder

because of two reasons. First, it is harder to reach a peaceful outcome in conflicts that

contain many different warring parties with different end goals. Second, foreign actors

involved in a conflict where they can pursue their individual goals rather than support

negotiation among the main conflict parties (2010: 116-117). In addition to the significant

effect of external support on civil war onset and duration, scholars looked at how it

contributes to civil war termination. Sawyer et al. (2015) found that different types of

external support to rebel groups have different impacts on their war-making capacity and

peacemaking preferences. They argue that fungible resources such as direct financial support or weapon decrease the chance of conflict resolution because these resources increase uncertainty on the side of the government through creating a war-making environment for the rebel group. This idea is built on the arguments about the rebel commitment problem in the civil war. Sawyer et al. (2015) say that external support exacerbates the bargaining problem because it facilitates the rebel's return to war through financing their warfare and rebuilding their forces. In that sense, even the external support can facilitate the signing of the peace agreement for the group because it theoretically facilitates the return to the war for the rebel side in case of any government renege and make the government to less trust the rebel group, it does not necessarily direct the group to renege. A signed peace agreement shows that both the rebels and the state agree to negotiate despite never-ending commitment problems at both sides. This study rather argues that bargaining for peace can be a reciprocal initiative among the warring sides. As the government signs the peace agreement with the rebels to prevent the further exacerbation of war, it agrees to make various concessions responding to the demands and objectives of the rebel group. Making such concessions shows that the government ensures the credibility of the rebel group while the latter honors the former through leaving its' fighting forces behind. When we look at the dynamics of a peace settlement from the rebel groups who has external support, they sign a peace agreement in two cases. First, if the cost of war is higher than the cost of peace even if it has external support, and the second is if it achieves the war objective through a peace settlement. In other words, although external support increases the fighting capacity of the rebel group and the government and determines the course of war to a great extent, external support can also work as a conflict-reducing mechanism. Against the argument that external

support deters government to sign a peace agreement with the rebel group because it increases uncertainty and exacerbates commitment problems, it may also facilitate the signing of a peace agreement when peace reduces the potential level of damage for both sides. This damage is understood mostly militarily in the current literature, but in fact, any civil war causes various devastations to the population and the credibility of the government both inside and outside of the country. About the credibility issue, it is always important for rebel groups too to sustain their legitimacy not only in the international environment but also in the eyes of their constituents who jeopardize their lives for the cause of war. However, the reciprocal recognition between the government and the rebel group is not exempt from criticisms. On the government side, the domestic audience criticizes the state because of forgiving former terrorists and giving them serious concessions. There can be even public backlash if the government provides political, military, and economic positions to former rebels. However, even if these provisions become costly for the government, they are critical promises contributing to the security environment. On the rebel side, the rebel group abolishes its' fighting capacity by signing the peace agreement. As they abandon their fighting tools and organization behind with the settlement, it is crucial for the rebel group to ensure the long-term credibility and wellbeing of the constituents as well as having an enduring political program. Thus, they make costly policies and broad concessions appealing the constituents by their capacity and bargaining power. Therefore, as it is in the introduction of this section, both the government and rebels need to have the support of civilians. Rebels need it to survive in the post-conflict era, while it is crucial for the governments who need to have domestic stability and peace in their territory. Therefore, they want to invest in public goods and benefits through peace agreements. External support allows rebel groups to invest in

public goods and benefits together with the government during peace process as a direct material capability. Rebel groups who want to include public benefits in peace agreements utilize their external sources as a mechanism to signal the government about their peace intentions. Thus, even though external support does not resolve commitment problems completely, it contributes to the decrease of insecurity through the inclusion of positive sum strategies.

Consequently, external support contributes rebel groups to use their power to invest in broad public benefits with the government. Investing in public goods help rebels to gain or to sustain the loyalty of civilians in the post-war era. Rebel groups utilize external support as a bargaining mechanism against the government during peace negotiations to guarantee the implementation of their objective-based demands while considering the repercussions of peace among the group members. Therefore, external support can help the rebel group to work with the government in peacebuilding, which enforces credibility between the government and the rebels.

As this thesis argues that a group having external support is more likely to include public-benefits to the constituents, it differentiates between the types of external support in addition to how to rebel group has this support because these two are crucial details for understanding the effect of aid on rebel's policymaking capacity and the expected outcome. Based on Sawyer et al.'s (2015) theory suggesting that fungible external supports such as financial support and weapon increases rebel's quick decision-making and policymaking capacity because they are easily transferable to money, this work argues that these sources can directly affect rebel group's ability to invest in some material goods. Therefore, fungible external sources are determined to influence the design of

peace agreement towards including a higher number of public benefits provisions while it is not expected to observe an effect of the external support related to fighting capacity of the group.

Hypothesis 1: Rebel groups who have fungible external support design peace agreements with a higher proportion of public benefits compared to other rebel groups.

The above hypothesis on the design of civil war peace agreements suggests that external support affects the bargaining and peace-making of a rebel group with the government as well as the type and content of the peace agreement provisions. Rebel groups want to sustain their effectiveness and political power during post-war governance similar to the government if they sign a peace agreement. However, agreeing on giving significant public benefits to the population make them send credible signals to the government about peace. Therefore, I argue that rebel groups seek to gain the loyalty of the public in the aftermath of conflict as much as the government who wants to change the bad image of conflict in domestic politics. This study suggests that rebels with fungible external support are better able to include public-benefits provisions in peace agreements than other rebel groups. Agreeing on providing public goods and benefits with the government does not only result with peace agreements with more public-benefits provisions but also it creates a positive sum peace plan and security environment for both sides, in which observing the renege of the rebels or the government is less likely.

2.3. Objective-Driven Factors

As well as this thesis investigates to what extent external support determine the design of peace agreements, it also looks at other factors based on the objective of rebel groups. Mampilly (2011) argues that groups with territorial aspirations are almost always ethnonational movements, which seek autonomy or independence for an ethnoreligious minority group. Such groups are more likely to engage in operations to build governance capacity than groups that seek to overthrow an existing regime. This argument presents how conflict dynamics systematically differ across different rebel groups seeking territorial vs. governmental benefits through civil war. To follow up, when deciding whether to include a specific provision in a peace agreement, rebel groups decide according to parameters arising from the objective-based expectations and demands of the group members and their constituency. In this part, I argue that rebel groups build a relationship with the civilians to the extent of their war objective and plans as instruments. Therefore, their objective and preferences determine the likelihood of a guarantee provision in a peace agreement.

Two central arguments about the objective of rebel groups have dominated the literature of civil war: greed vs. grievance. Two leading works on the greed argument - Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004)- mainly argue that civil war is the problem of the poor. Fearon and Laitin (2003) say that when the government is weak, poverty is high, and the population is vast; groups have ample opportunities to rebel. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), civil wars occur where rebellions are most feasible rather than where ethnic inequalities motivate actors. Therefore, the greed-based argument claims that rebels fight to increase their profit and ensure their economic wellbeing. For instance, The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone is known for

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selling diamonds to raise their capacity and finance their rebellion. However, this approach was criticized by scholars because it downplays the relevance of political interactions (Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch, 2009). Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) show that ethnic groups excluded from state power are more likely to start a conflict while states that are characterized by specific ethnopolitical configurations of power. Similarly, states are more likely to experience violent conflict if they prohibit a large portion of the population based on ethnic background, if a large number of competing elites share power in a segmented state, or if it is an incohesive state with a short history of direct rule. In another article, they show that high degrees of exclusion, segmentation, and lack of cohesion cause rebellion, infighting, and secession (2009). In short, the grievance-based approach highlights that political objectives motivate rebel groups. For instance, the Karen National Union (KNU) in Myanmar is known as a grievance-led rebel group that wants to establish a state for the Karen people and stop the discrimination of the central government (Rajah, 2002).

In addition to classifying the objectives of a rebel group based on greed versus grievance-based arguments, another body of research directly focuses on the specific aim of the rebel group. Buhaug (2006) categorizes the goals of armed civil conflicts as governmental or territorial based on the Armed Conflict dataset v.3 of the Uppsala/PRIO (Gleditsch et al., 2002)[5]. While the first includes overthrowing the existing government or modifying the political system, the latter implies gaining the control and authority of a specific territory. Regarding why some groups launch self-determination conflicts while

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[5] While the earlier versions of the UCDP/PRIO dataset contain two incompatibility categories, territorial and governmental; a third category, government and territory, is included in the newer datasets since version 4-2007 (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 18.1; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Eck & Pettersson, 2018).

others seek governmental concessions, Buhaug (2006) argues that the capacity of state influences the political aim of an emerging rebel group; countries with high institutional and economic capacity are less likely to have governmental civil wars because they have the ability to respond to the grievances of people through political and economic reforms. Therefore, Buhaug (2006) assumes that political conflicts are quickly resolved compared to territorial disputes. This argument has been empirically proven that two-thirds of the peace agreements signed between 1989-2005 were signed after political battles (Harbom et al., 2006: 623). Harbom et al. (2006) also found that a peace process following a governmental conflict has more partial peace agreements than the peace process of a territorial dispute. Although this finding shows that rebel groups with political and economic objectives such as regime change, autonomy, policy or leadership change are more flexible in peace agreement design; whereas actors who claim territorial demand present a more resolute attitude; it does not answer the question that how these peace agreements differ from one another in terms of their content.

Nevertheless, Buhaug's (2006) study is unique because it stands as one of the first research articles on the relationship between rebel capability and rebel objective. However, it neglects to measure rebel capacity as a unique variable; but focuses on state capacity by comparing the relative capacity of the rebel group and the state fighting each other. More recent studies go beyond classifying conflicts as governmental or territorial and disintegrate them into specific goals. In their analysis, which they look at the rebel groups in Africa between 1962-2010, Lutmar and Terris (2018) find that 58.8% of the rebel groups aim to overthrow the existing government. Among all, 15% of them fought to increase their political power, 5.8% had irredentist goals, 3.9% wanted to secede, 1.9% sought autonomy. Although this analysis gives us important information about the goals

of rebellion in Africa, it fails to capture the general trend in the world because of the regional focus. In the *How Terrorists Groups End* dataset, Jones and Libicki (2008) analyse 648 rebel groups that existed between 1968-2006, and they mainly argue that groups may fight to support the existing regime, the status quo, or against a challenger group. Additionally, they may fight for their policy demands and policy change, changing the regime through overthrowing the existing one or establishing a single sovereign such as an empire or a caliphate. They might also seek territorial demands and autonomy or incite a social revolution to live under different social and cultural norms. On the other hand, the *Dangerous Companions Dataset* (San-Akca, 2016) distinguishes between regime change and toppling a current leadership while classifying groups who want to protect the status quo, build an empire or start a social revolution under the category of other. In general, it divides rebel group objectives into six categories: toppling the existing leadership, change of regime type, demands for autonomy, secession/territorial demand, demands for policy change, and the rest is coded as other. These classifications show that rebel groups' objectives are significantly different from one another. San-Akca (2016) argues that rebel groups may have more than one objective[6], and these objectives may overlap in particular situations, or rebel groups can shift their objectives during the conflict in accordance with changes in the level of conflict and the relative capacity of the rebel group, rebel ideology, group composition, leadership, and external shocks. When it was established in 1993, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)'s objective, which was shaped by the strong influence of the Islamic Tabliq community in Uganda, was to overthrow the Ugandan government. They were not secessionist or seeking autonomy, but they planned

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[6] In Dangerous Companions Dataset, San-Akca (2016) classifies the objectives of non-state armed groups under five different categories as listed in the body of the text. These are binary variables. Therefore, it captures the variation in rebel objective in a more detailed manner than the UCDP/PRIO dataset.

to establish an Islamic state. To achieve this, they created an organized military force. But they lost this motivation after they established a base in Western Uganda. Thereof they loosened their attacks toward the Ugandan state and focused on illegal cross-business between Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Scorgie-Porter, 2015: 212), and the conflict between the ADF and Uganda continues until today. Sharing the same goal with the ADF, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) in Djibouti fought to topple the existing leadership with additional goals of regime and policy changes. In a couple of months, FRUD occupied two-thirds of the country, which resulted in the "Peace Accord of 26 December 1994" including a ceasefire. The government did not dissolve, but crucial constitutional amendments and electoral changes responding to FRUD's demands were ensured (Reiter, 2016: 31). In turn, FRUD stopped its armed struggle as it agreed to continue as a political party. Two hundred former rebels have started to work in government positions, and 700 former rebels were integrated into the army and police[7]. However, these developments led to internal discontent within the rebel group, which resulted in the emergence of the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy – Ahmed Dini (FRUD-AD) from within FRUD. Both ADF and FRUD cases show that some rebel groups shift objective during or after conflict. Either mutual benefits or substitutes abate their motivation for their primary objective and redirect them to other goals, or they are convinced with the partial fulfilment of their demands by the government despite the development of internal discontent within the group. Nevertheless, "Peace Accord of 26 December 1994" has not ensured peace in Djibouti, but it has just transformed the actors of civil war. However, rebel groups do not only fight

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[7] Minorities at Risk Project, *Chronology for Afars in Djibouti,* 2004, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f3882c.html (accessed 1 May 2019)

for governmental changes. Harbom et al. (2006) says that UCDP classifies two-thirds of all intrastate conflicts since 1946 as governmental while the remaining being territorial both before and after the Cold War. When this result is controlled for the effect of ethnicity, Buhaug (2006: 693) shows that around 90% of all territorial conflicts were initiated by ethnic rebel groups included in the Sambanis (2001), Licklider (1995), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) datasets. However, this does not imply that ethnicity does not affect governmental conflicts because almost half of all ethnic conflicts were for governmental objectives. Therefore, it is common among identity-based rebel groups to fight for political and territorial objectives simultaneously. Even if ethnicity plays a significant role both in governmental and territorial conflicts through different mechanisms, there is also a small number of non-ethnic rebel groups who have the same objectives as well. These objectives are secession, self-determination, and autonomy.

Even though secession, self-determination, and autonomy are all built on territorial claims, they slightly differ from each other in terms of the end goal and international recognition. Secession is the creation of a new independent state through the division of a country's homeland territory (Tir, 2005: 714). Thus, secession is both a challenge to and reiteration of the idea of the state because rebel groups who attack the sovereignty of their host state have a claim of establishing another sovereign. In cases where the demands of an ethnic minority are encouraged by the international community due to observed discrimination against this ethnic group by the host state, then this movement is called self-determination[8], which is defined 'the freedom for all peoples to

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[8] The concenpt of self-determination is first used following the end of World War I and Bolshevik Revolution. Vladimir Lenin considered it as a criteria for the liberation of people, which in turn contribute to the realization of socialist revolution whereas Woodrow Wilson viewed it as the right of people to choose their government; however, as long as it coincides with the interest of colonial and other states.

decide their political, economic, and social regime' (Mancini, 2012: 487). However, the theoretical distinction between self-determination and secession does not exactly apply to real-life cases. They are both used by rebel groups and people to denote conflicts with an idea of separation from the state.

Cunningham highlights the point that not all the rebel groups seeking self-determination are violent. She says that about half of the 142 self-determination disputes between 1960-2005 reached the level of civil wars while the rest were peaceful processes or included limited use of military force (2019: 111). Notwithstanding that, why some secessionist rebel groups use violence while others do not is topic of another research, Cederman et al. discuss various examples showing that discrimination, political exclusion, and ethnic domination/exploitation have been the crucial motivation of rebel groups. For instance, Karenni, Kachins, and Shan ethnic groups organized secessionist wars against state repression, discrimination, and assimilation against the Burmese government (2011: 485-6; 2013: 82, 106). Similarly, Acehnese people in Indonesia started to seek self-determination through the use of force under the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) against government exploitation of the natural gas in Aceh dominated areas (Cederman et al., 2013: 83). Mancini argues that the legal aspect of secession is likely to encourage the government to make policy changes and concessions to respond to the demands of challenging community through accommodation (2012: 483). However, for those states who do not recognize the legal right of an ethnic or a non-ethnic community to secede, making policy changes is the preferred option to prevent instability in this territory.

Regarding state response to the challenger group who seeks self-determination, Cunningham argues that states choose between accommodation and war. She says that

the state decides to accommodate self-determination demands if the likelihood of war decreases considerably after the policy implication. However, in most cases, divided states chose to fight with the challenger group to prevent the revival of other potential challenger groups (2014: 16-17). Cunningham develops a theory of self-determination politics to explain better what leads states and self-determination groups to wage war. She argues that the status of self-determination groups is an ongoing bargain between the group and the state in which state wants to minimize the cost of the dispute while the group seeks to gain concessions varying from recognition and protection of their identity to a complete territorial secession (2014: 31-32). For instance, the Chittagong Hill conflict started against all-encompassing Bengali nationalism recognized by Article 8 of the Constitution of Bangladesh on 4 November 1972. Rebel group representing Bengali people demanded constitutional recognition of their rights and cultural uniqueness. However, the continuous rejection of their demands led to the creation of Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS-SB), a rebel group seeking autonomy to secure the rights of Chittagong Hill peoples (Panday and Jamil, 2009: 1056-57). Though Shanti Bahini, the military faction of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, demanded independence of the district of Chittagong Hill Tracts, it agreed to sign the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord with the government in 2 December 1997, which ensures the autonomy of the group with additional economic and political regulations (Cunningham, 2014: 39; Fortna, 2008: 52-54). The JSS-SB example shows that states agree to give significant concessions to self-determination groups to minimize the cost of the dispute.

In fact, Cunningham's (2014) theoretical structure recalls Walter (2003) argument about the intractability of territorial conflicts. Walter (2003) argues that argue that territorial disputes are the most intractable type of conflict as the likelihood of

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negotiations over territorial conflicts between 1946-1996 were 70% less likely than other forms of conflicts. Walter says that governments do not refuse to negotiate with rebels over territory not because of the value of this specific land; but they hesitate to face that this concession would lead to further territorial challenges in the country. Thus, she says that the considerably low rate of negotiations in territorial disputes is caused by the reputation-building calculations on the side of the government. Similarly, rebels do not sign a peace settlement until they ensure that they will not gain self-determination (2003: 138). However, even though it is very difficult to reach a settlement in territorial wars, there are several dyads who signed peace agreements. Walter says that the government and the rebel group sign a peace settlement based on rational calculations. Government signs an agreement with the rebel group in a territorial conflict if it ensures that no further territorial challenge will arise in the country after the settlement for sure. On the other hand, rebel groups agree on a settlement if the agreement benefits themselves more than self-determination (2003: 139-140). When we think that what would convince both the government and the rebel group to stop fighting without reaching a victory after paying such a high cost for war, it seems that they can only come to agree on a settlement if they send each other credible signals about their present and future security. As I argued previously, public constitutes the common ground for both sides. Because of the nature of the territorial conflicts which automatically has a civilian constituent, there are more space for accommodation between the conflict actors compared to conflict over national power. Therefore, state gives more political, economic, social, and to some extent, territorial concessions to groups with territorial demands to prevent independence, which makes a peace agreement more detailed about the rights and demands of people. This argument shows that groups seeking secession make more challenging bargaining and

have more demands from the state as opposed to other rebel groups. So, it is more likely for the governments and the rebels to make greater proportion of public benefits provisions after territorial conflicts. Governments become more willing to sign peace agreements with a greater proportion of public benefits following territorial disputes because they want to increase the familiarity of the voluntarily or forcefully created rebel constituency in the specific conflict territory with the state in addition to taking credit in the eyes of the public. Likewise, I argue that the rebels want to make greater proportion of public benefits provisions to respond to the expectations of civilians in the conflict territory with substitutive benefits as they did not fulfill their territorial promises. At the same time, partnering the government in making higher proportion of public benefits bring the rebels a greater chance of gaining respect among their out-group population in the country.

The discussion about the effect of rebel group objectives shows that groups who seek governmental and territorial gains, respectively, differ from each other in terms of the threat they pose to the government. If a rebel group seeks governmental benefits such as policy, regime, or leadership change constitute a lesser threat to the government, than the groups who seek complete independence from the state or autonomy. In the latter case, the group does not only threaten the territorial unity of the state; but also challenges the state authority in the eyes of both groups' and states' constituencies. So, the state has to make more concessions to convince people about its sovereignty. Therefore, this thesis states the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Rebel groups who fight territorial war design peace agreements with a higher proportion of public benefits compared to other rebel groups.

The above hypothesis on the design of civil war peace agreements suggests that the objectives of rebel groups affect their bargaining over public-benefits versus other provisions with the state during peace negotiations. It is likely that state and rebel group mutually agree to include public benefits in peace agreements when the rebel group has a claim to manage civilians living a specific territory through a governance mechanism and the state wants to minimize the risk of dispute through ensuring the benefits for the rebel group and the public at the same time.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the theoretical framework from which the hypothesis derived for empirical testing. I identified two potential determinants for public benefits, one on the capacity and one on the objective-driven features of the rebel groups. While the objective-driven factors present a rebel group's interests in peace, capacity stands as the basis of the bargaining process for the rebel groups. However, whether a group creates a solely or mostly public benefiting peace agreement or vice versa is likely to be determined by the plans and perceptions of the rebel group and the state towards each other in terms of power relations.

This study suggests that it is common among rebel groups to include public benefits in peace agreement if they have the capacity and will to do it. However, not all

rebel groups include as much as public benefits even if they are so rich as well as impoverished groups may consist of only public interests in the peace agreement. This variation shows that other factors are influencing the rebel group's decision over peace agreement design. Therefore, I look at and analyse the independent and joint effects of the objective of the rebel group on including public benefits in the peace agreement.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Introduction

Before I test the hypotheses introduced in the previous chapter based on statistical analysis, which allows me to explore different patterns across several cases, I explain my variables in this part and give some descriptive statistics. Existing quantitative works on peace agreements look at a broad range of puzzles regarding the duration, implementation, and failure of peace agreements, both unilaterally and concerning the different types of peace agreement provisions.

This research aims to address some of the shortcomings of the existing quantitative analysis of peace agreements. Limiting the scope to all full peace agreement provisions included in multilaterally signed civil war peace agreements, I look at the content of peace agreements and seek to understand whether the conflict type and rebel capacity affect whether a specific agreement provision is included or not. Understanding this relationship is essential if we want to know why some peace agreement provisions are successfully implemented while others fail, as well as the effect of belligerent characteristics on the peace process and its aftermath. Disaggregating the provisions allows me to observe the determinants of rebel groups' and states' decision on a peace design.

Additionally, this study seeks to arrive at more generalizable results. To examine the hypothesis developed in the second chapter; I use a unique dataset that contains

information on peace agreement provisions. The most significant aspect of this dataset compared to other peace agreement datasets is the inclusion of all provisions in the peace agreements and the categorization of all substantive provisions according to whom they benefit. I combine several datasets to uncover the relationship between the capacity and characteristics of the rebel group and the beneficiaries of the peace agreement while I examine why some rebel groups include more public goods in peace agreements while others design leader, elite or rank-and-file member-oriented agreements. Therefore, examining the beneficiaries of peace agreement provisions with the specific indicators for the rebel groups, this work directly problematizes the relationship between rebel groups and settlement design as a criticism to the existing studies that treat rebel groups as unitary actors while accepting the plan of peace agreements as a given.

3.2. Databases on Peace Agreements

As briefly discussed in the first chapter, there are various datasets on peace agreements, and some of them include information on peace agreements provisions while others focus on the agreement itself. Among the former, the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset stands as the basis of the other datasets on peace agreements. The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset includes 216 peace agreements of various types among at least two opposing primary warring parties in armed conflict, that were signed between 1975 and 2011 (Högbladh, 2012). In this cross-sectional dataset, the unit of analysis is a peace agreement, but it includes additional information about dyads, third-party enforcers, and the provisions of peace agreements. The provisions are classified into 32 sub-categories under the categories of behavior, regulation of governmental incompatibility, regulation of

territorial disagreement, justice issues, and implementation issues. Although this classification gives crucial insights about the preferences and demands of opposing sides regarding peace, the dataset does not code all provisions in the peace agreements, such as provisions regarding specific groups in the society or individuals. Another shortcoming of the dataset is that it heavily relies on UCDP conflict data in the definition of variables and the selection of cases, which in turn makes the dataset complementary to the UCDP data instead of being a study addressing when, how, and why a peace process starts, a peace agreement is designed and signed.

Another significant dataset on peace agreements is Peace Accord Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM_ID) compiled by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. It contains 34 comprehensive intrastate peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2012 and looks at the degree to which extent the provisions in the peace agreements are implemented in the following ten years of the signing of the peace agreement. The unit of analysis is peace agreement-implementation year. The dataset classifies 51 different peace agreement provisions under the categories of the ceasefire, institutions, security, rights, external arrangements, and other arrangements, which results in 724 provisions across 323 observations. This dataset contains a wide range of information on the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements provisions in the following of conflict; however, it has a limited scope with a narrow focus on the general practice of peace agreements.

Recently, scholars have started to look at peace agreements beyond how they end the conflict and to what extent they are implemented. The most recent large-scale dataset on peace agreements, PA-X: Peace Agreement Database, is designed by the Political

Settlements Program at the University of Edinburgh. It contains 1518 intrastate and interstate agreements signed between 1990 and 2016 during any stage of 146 different peace processes ranging from ceasefires to pre-negotiation talks, partial and comprehensive substantive agreements to and implementation agreements. The unit of analysis is a peace agreement, and they are coded across 225 provisions in addition to information about the conflict type, agreement types, region, country, etc. The most salient difference of PA-X dataset from other ones is that it lists a more extensive set of peace agreements because it includes an agreement reached between belligerents with an inclusionary criterion on the level of agreement. Thus, it allows researchers to examine broad patterns of peace processes. Additionally, the dataset provides the most comprehensive examination of peace agreement provisions under 225 categories grouped under the nature of the state, governance, inclusion of different groups, human rights and equality, justice sector reform, socio-economic reconstruction, land, property, environmental issues, security sector reform, transitional justice, and implementation while UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset and PAM_ID code 38 and 51 types of provisions, respectively.

It is important to note that all these datasets provide valuable information about peace agreement design and implementation, yet this study utilizes the Implementation of Peace Agreements Dataset (IPAD) because it categorizes all provisions according to who benefits from it in the agreement-dyad level unit of analysis. The reason for using an agreement-dyad unit of analysis that is classified according to provision type is to get a more detailed picture of the relationship between the rebel group variables and their effect on the design of peace agreements.

3.3. Data and the Dependent Variable

The dataset I primarily use in this study is built on Cil's (2016) Implementation of Peace Agreements Dataset (IPAD) which consists of 68 final agreements which are signed among 65 dyads in 80 different peace processes between 1989 and 2009 (Appendix 1). IPAD defines a final agreement as to the final document of a peace process which ends when implementation is over, or it fails, and the conflict recurs. In this way, it excludes any pre-negotiation talks, negotiated settlements, or implementation accords. For instance, it does not include seven peace process agreements signed during the Juba Peace Process between Uganda and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in 2007 and 2008 because these agreements failed to ensure peace as they were designed to do so when the mediator disbanded the negotiation committee without reaching a final agreement (Cil and Prorok, 2018). The dataset includes a final agreement if it has signed at least one month before the data collection because it is hard to talk about a peace process and observe its' indicators otherwise. Nevertheless, investigators of IPAD say that they revise other types of peace process agreements and incorporate these provisions into the coding of the final deal if they are not coded as part of the final agreements (Cil and Prorok, 2018).

Additionally, IPAD codes the beneficiaries of the provision if there is an explicit or direct reference to the one of the actors of the rebel group in the provision. Therefore, it separates administrative and regulatory provisions[9] that have limited purpose or temporarily designed such as ceasefires, dispute resolution councils, implementation supervisory committees, etc. from substantive provisions that relate to people directly.

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[9] A total of 32 provisions in some of the 68 peace agreements are excluded from the dataset because they are classified as admnistrative and regulatory provisions.

These substantive provisions are divided into four categories according to the beneficiary of each provision: leader and elite members, rank-and-file members, and constituents. However, these categories are not mutually exclusive in their content, but a specific provision can benefit both the constituents and the rank-and-file members of a rebel group or their leader. Cil and Prorok (2018) say that more than 30% of all provisions benefit more than one of these four groups. Therefore, they code each provision accordingly. For instance, if the agreement regulates the integration of former military commanders into the national army, these provisions are coded as benefiting both the rank-and-file members and the elite of the rebel group. I stand with this classification since it includes all potential beneficiaries of a peace agreement, and I derive my dependent variables directly from this dataset, which is the proportion of the public benefit.

Table 1: Number of Different Group of Provisions in IPAD

Provision Type	Number
Substantive Provisions	661
Group Benefiting Provisions	323
Public Benefiting Provisions	320
Elite Benefiting Provisions	194
Leader Benefiting Provisions	85
Administrative and Regulatory Provisions	32
Total	693

Figure 2: Provisions by Whom They Benefit

The dependent variable, *proportion of public benefits*, is defined as all economic, territorial, political, and military provisions that give direct public goods and benefits to the people in the country. More generally, any provision that proposes a change in the political system, constitution, human rights and freedoms, electoral or economic system, taxation, local governance is coded under this category if they affect the lives of the constituency. For instance, the electoral reform provision in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord, signed between the Bangladeshi government and Jana Samhati Samiti/Shanti Bahini (JSS/SB) rebels in 1997, is coded as public benefiting because it extends voter registration to all citizens of Bangladesh including permanent residents of the Hill District where the supporters of the JSS/SB reside[10].

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[10] Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord, article 9. Retrieved from: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/Ban%201997_1202.pdf.

The public benefits proportion is calculated in two steps. First, Cil and Prorok (2018) take the sum of all public benefits provisions coded 1. Second, they divide the total number of public benefits provisions by the total number of positive provisions meaning that affects at least one actor of the rebel group. This variable is designed as a proportion to capture the relative weight of public benefits among all positive provisions of peace agreements without failing to focus only on more detailed agreements. It takes values between 0 and 1 with a mean value of 0.451. According to this calculation, 320 of the totals of 661 provisions in 68 peace agreements benefit the constituency of the rebel group. Additionally, the dataset lists 85 leader-benefiting, 194 elite benefiting, and 323 rank-and-file member benefiting provisions. As Cil and Prorok's (2018) study tried to find out what determines rebel group's decision of including public goods and benefits to their constituents, it includes descriptive details about non-public benefiting provisions without looking at the details of variation among non-public benefiting provisions.

To illustrate the measure of public benefits proportion more clearly, we can analyze the Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo and The Cairo Agreement with the lowest and highest values of the dependent variable, 0 and 1, respectively. The prior agreement was signed between the Republic of Congo and three rebel groups, Ninjas, Cocoyes and Ntsiloulous in 1999 following the end of six years of governmental conflict. The agreement contains seven provisions, and five of them are about the actors of rebel groups. The five provisions address disarmament, demobilization, paramilitary group provisions regarding the return of former combatants to their old ranks in armed forces and the civil service. Besides, it includes constitutional, electoral, political, and public administration reform. However, when we look at their content, we see that they regulate the reintegration of former militants to civil service,

demilitarization of political parties, movements, and associations, and non-resort to weapons and violence, which all address the rank-and-file and elite members of the group[11]. Therefore, the value of the proportion of the public benefit is 0.

On the other hand, the Cairo Agreement takes the value of 1 for the dependent variable. This agreement was signed between the Government of Sudan and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 2005 following the end of thirty-four years of governmental conflict. When we look at the content, there are six provisions in this agreement, and all of them address the constituency of the rebel group. More specifically, this agreement emphasizes that peace, development, democracy, unity, and stability are the priority for all people in Sudan. It includes broad reforms about the political, territorial, and military system in Sudan, all of which address the public, including the constituents of the NDA[12]. Observing the variation among peace agreement provisions in terms whom they benefit, this work seeks what causes this effect through independent variables discussed in the next section.

3.4. Independent Variables

The determinants of peace agreement provisions can be categorized according to capacity and objective-related factors. Hypothesis 1 that is derived from capacity-driven elements proposes that rebel groups are more likely to include public benefits provisions in the peace agreement if they receive external state support. Hypothesis 2 looks at the effect

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[11] Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo. Retrieved from: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/Con%2019991229.pdf

[12] The Cairo Agreement. Retrieved from: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/Sud%2020050618.pdf

of having an ethnic relationship with the constituents and fighting a territorial war on the same outcome. Therefore, the independent variables are external support and war objective.

To measure these effects, I use different variables from the *NAGs Dataset* (San-Akca, 2016). This dataset includes triadic information about 455 rebel groups existed and fought between 1945 and 2010. A triad consists of a rebel group, its target, and the supporter. In this way, San-Akca (2016) captures the relationship between the target and supporter states in addition to the effect of the dyadic relationship between supporter and rebel group. While traditional research on external support has focused on aiding weak rebels and using them as a proxy, San-Akca (2016) says that this approach neglects to consider rebel groups as autonomous actors in world politics despite their crucial impacts on international politics and security. Hence, she goes beyond the traditional understanding of external support and develops a selection theory of state support for rebel groups. She argues that "states select, if not form, the non-state armed groups that they provide support, and non-state armed groups select the countries from which they extract and acquire resources regardless of whether the state in a given country deliberately creates channels to aid them" (San-Akca, 2016:1). Therefore, she argues that external support is not only a type of aid coming from a state to the rebel group; but also, that rebels extract support from their constituents or other actors in other countries through their diplomatic, ideational and material powers (2016: 50). If state directly provides the support, *NAGs Dataset* calls it intentional, and it is de facto support otherwise.

The first independent variable is external support. This variable is coded across five different binary variables in this study instead of a single binary variable of external

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support for two reasons. First, it is not possible to determine the level of external support given to the rebel group and putting all types into the same basket would cause the underestimation of the influence of external support and hide the causal mechanisms behind the utilization of different kinds of external sources. For instance, Cunningham et al. (2013) measure rebel strength according to troop size; however, it is not possible to calculate how much money rebels receive or extracted with the intentional or unintentional help of another state or how many weapons are provided to them. Similarly, it is not possible to measure the impact of territory or office to the rebel group since we do not know how these sources are utilized. Also, for instance, research on informal finance and money transfer systems shows that official actors can act through informal institutions or parties. So, while we know that about half of support can come through co-national or co-ethnic support in the case of ethnic conflicts, it is possible that government agencies may support rebel actors through unofficial means. Field research on the relationship between government agencies/actors and "ordinary" supporters of rebel groups, which we today identify as unintentional support, may turn out not to be as such. Therefore, this study chooses to consider intentional and de facto support together. Second, this study includes the same four types of external support with Sawyer et al. (2015) to be consistent with the literature. I include the office variable instead of the intelligence variable utilized by Sawyer et al. (2015) since their added value to the rebel performance is expected to be similar compared to other support types. The five categories of external support in this study are: funds, territory, weapon, office, and troop. These categories include both intentional and de facto forms of support. In the main models, they are used as unitary variables since this work looks at the external support as a factor increasing rebel capacity and try to capture the impact of various forms of support

better to enrich the theoretical implications regarding how rebels utilize external support in the bargaining stage and afterward.

Among the types of external support, financial support (funds) indicates both the financial capacity acquired through fundraising in another state and direct economic help of a government to rebel group. For instance, Pakistan accused India for providing financial support to Baloch separatist groups[13]. Territory means that the members of the rebel group enjoy safe haven in the territory of another state, whether through the invitation of the host state or without their recognition. They may mobilize insurgents, finance activities, create a network among members, transport and transfer weapons, and hide from enemies in this territory. Rebel groups usually use offices to spread and make propaganda and raise funds. The weapon variable in the dataset indicates clear evidence that arms originated from another country. Lastly, troop means a state willingly sent their troops to the civil war territory to support the rebel group (San-Akca, 2016: 51-55). In identifying the effect of external support on peace agreement design, I use these five types to present how external support determine who benefits from peace. Each variable takes the value of "1" if the rebel group receives the specific kind of intentional or de facto support in settlement year or the year before. It is coded "0" if there is no support to the rebel group in these years. To test the effect of group objective on peace agreement design, I use three variables: 1. secessionism and autonomy, 2. toppling the existing government, 3. policy and regime change in the country. I use three variables instead of a single territorial conflict variable because groups may have more than one objective at

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[13] Balochistan: Pakistan's Pain in the Neck, Merinews, Jan 22, 2016. Obtained from: LexisNexis.

the same time. These variables are coded 1 if the aim of the rebel group responds to these categories, and 0 otherwise, according to the *NAGs Dataset* (San-Akca, 2016).

3.5. Control Variables

I add six control variables to the main models to capture the real effect of factors that impact both the capacity and character of rebel groups and the likelihood of providing public goods and benefits in peace agreements. Also, I re-test these models with three additional controls derived from alternative explanations of the design of peace settlement.

First, I control for rebel ideology. It influences rebel group behavior and preferences, both normatively and instrumentally in that the group socializes its members towards attaining some goals through collective solidarity among group members. Those who identify themselves with an ideology have some benefits with strict requirements because ideology creates a normative commitment structure that organizes/socialize members of the groups and motivates groups members about the group goals. In short, ideologies determine the purposes of a rebel group and help identify their strategies and shape their institutions. Therefore, ideology not only affects the membership and recruitment patterns or war techniques of rebel groups; but also determines the behavior of rebel groups and their relationship with civilians and the state directly and indirectly during and after conflict. In this study, I control for whether the group asserts that it fights an ethnonationalist war in the name of a specific group.

Regarding the effect of nationalist ideology on rebel group behavior and the conflict process, it is argued in the literature that sharing a common ethnicity creates a coherent motivation among group members and determines civilian-rebel relations in addition to the institutions and strategies of the rebel group (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). Akcinaroglu and Tokdemir (2018)[14] argue that rebel groups employ positive strategies towards their audiences such as providing public goods and not targeting civilians when they expect a high return in the form of popular support, recruitment, fundraising, and other similar actions. Citing Byman (1998), they argue that relying on an ethnic/religious community that has a shared history, culture, ethnic traits gives the rebel group a well-defined audience as opposed to leftist or other ideological groups who have more spread out and less-defined audiences. This, in turn, encourages ethnic rebel groups to build better relationships with their constituencies compared to other ideological rebel groups[15]. Since having an identity-based connectedness is thought to be a guarantee mechanism ensuring reciprocal accountability between the rebel group and the civilians, rebel groups would not hesitate to employ post-war policies towards the population who are connected to rebel group with ideational bonds. This variable is coded 1 if the group is ethnonationalist, and 0 otherwise based on *NAGs Dataset* (San-Akca, 2016).

Second, I control for rebel strength based on the Non-State Actors (NSA) Dataset of Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013) since stronger rebel groups pose a higher

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[14] *Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset* (Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu, 2017) identifies group names based on the Global Terrorism Database – Domestic Terror Groups by Enders et al. (2011), which code all these terrorist groups as rebel=1 if this terrorist group is a rebel organization in the UCDP/PRIO Dataset. However, this thesis only looks at the groups listed in the UCDP/PRIO Dataset and uses the name terrorist group interchangeably with the rebel groups.
[15] Byman (1998) and Walter (1997) argue that identity-based rebel groups are better at legitimizing themselves in the eyes of the civilians as their plans about the group mostly coexist with their constituency's agenda.

risk to the government (Kalyvas, 2006) and can convince them about making costly concessions which may include public goods and benefits. However, this variable measure only the relative military strength of the rebel group concerning the government. It is coded 1 if the group is militarily weaker than the government, and 0 if it is at parity or stronger.

Third, I control for natural resources based on Rustad and Binningø (2012). They code whether rebel groups use natural resources such as gems drugs, timber, crude oil, and other as income (Fortna et al., 2018). The availability of natural resources would likely reduce the necessity of external resources. For instance, a group with natural resources would be more self-sufficient; thus, they can include a higher proportion of public benefits in the peace agreement.

Fourth, I control for conflict duration. The literature argues that polarization increases as the conflict endures since actors become inflexible; therefore, parties become less likely to sign peace agreements which do not respond to their demands and expectations rightly (Badran, 2014: 202) as they would have multiple sources of support to finance their operations. Conflict duration is calculated in years. Data for this variable is taken from *NAGs Dataset* (San-Akca, 2016).

Fifth, I control for conflict intensity. Actors, whether they have external support or not, may want to include more public goods and benefits into peace agreement following the resolve of a high-intensity conflict to build a reliable post-war political, economic, and social system and to recover previous damage. This variable, conflict intensity, is coded 1 if the conflict reached 1000 battle-related deaths in at least one year during the war

before the signing of the peace agreement, and 0 otherwise based on the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom et al., 2008).

Sixth, I control for civilian support to the rebel group. It is literature, ethnonationalist ideology is utilized as a proxy for civilian support. Although this measure may capture the relationship between the ethnonationalist rebels and their supporters; I add a direct civilian support variable to capture the effect of civilians more broadly. I use the civilian support variable from the *Rebel Governance Dataset* (Huang, 2016).

I include three additional control variables to test the effect of main variables with the parameters of alternative explanations of peace settlement design in the literature. The sixth control variable is the nature of the government in the target country. Jarstad and Nilsson (2018) suggested and found that civil war peace agreement provisions vary depending on the regime type. While democracies make a greater number of territorial power-sharing provisions; autocracies are more likely to make political and military pacts. Also, it is found in the literature that higher democracy scores are associated with more enduring peace settlements as democracies will be abiding by the terms of agreement (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2013). Gurr (2000) said that democratic regimes are more inclusionary compared to nondemocracies. Based on the literature, this work expects that democratic states will regulate peace agreements by including a higher number of public goods and benefits provisions to establish a free and fair system. As well as the content of the peace agreement, democracy affects how external support is used. It is less likely to have the support of other democracies if the rebel group uses indiscriminate violence or if the inter-state relations with the target and potential supporter is good. In this study, I observe the level of democracy in the year the peace agreement is signed. It is measured

with the polity2 variable taken from the Polity IV Dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). In the Polity IV, it ranges from -10 to 10. However, it is converted into a binary variable, and coded 1 if the polity2 scored is 6 or higher, and 0 otherwise.

Seventh, I control for country-level economic factors. We know that a higher percentage of civil wars happens in economically weak countries, which, in turn, make the resolve of conflict harder (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). It is expected that more fragile states will have less of a chance of including public goods and benefits into the peace agreement as they do not have many sources to utilize for policymaking and development. However, stable states would have a higher chance of including public goods and benefits in the peace agreement to gain popularity among civilians. This effect is measured with the log of GDP per capita. Data for this variable is taken from World Bank Indicators (2019).

Lastly, I control for third-party involvement in the peace agreement. Research has shown that the existence of mediator or a guarantor in a peace agreement affects the content and implementation of an agreement (Svensson, 2009). When a third-party is involved in settlement negotiations and signs the agreement with the conflict parties, it is more likely to include public goods and benefits although the outcome might change according to who the mediator is (Reid, 2017). Also, Lounsbery and Cook (2011) argue that the government and the rebel group are more likely to address issues over group behavior during unassisted negotiations compared to other negotiations which are managed by third parties. To control the effect of the third-party, I create a third-party binary variable, which is coded 1 if a state, NGO, IGO or political party is involved in the peace negotiations and sign the agreement, and 0 otherwise. This variable is created based on the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh, 2012).

3.6. Descriptive Statistics

In this part, I give an overview of 80 peace processes and 68 final peace agreements that occurred among 65 state-rebel dyads, which offers some insights regarding the hypothesized relationship before turning to regression analysis. The unit of analysis in this study is peace agreement-dyad pairs, and there are 80 observations for each independent variable.

Table 2 illustrates the descriptive statistics for my dependent and independent variables. All the external support variables are binary variables that are coded 1 if there is the specific type of support in the year at the peace agreement is signed or the year before, and 0 otherwise. Among the five types of support, the most frequent is weapon support, which is followed by safe havens to the members of the group. This fact shows that groups are better at increasing their war-making capacity through external support rather than other types of benefits, such as financial aid or opening offices abroad to make propaganda and raise funds. However, the distribution of the proportion of public goods and benefits across support type is in reverse direction such that the mean of the proportion of public benefits is 0.570 across financial support while it is below the overall mean (0.451) across military-related forms of support (Table 3).

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Proportion of Public Benefits (DV)	79	0.451	0.246	0	1
Territorial Conflict (secession-autonomy)	80	0.300	0.461	0	1
Toppling Existing Government	80	0.588	0.495	0	1
Policy and/or Regime Change	80	0.475	0.503	0	1
External Support – Financial Support	80	0.587	0.495	0	1
External Support – Safe Haven	80	0.350	0.479	0	1
External Support – Weapon	80	0.500	0.503	0	1
External Support – Office	80	0.312	0.466	0	1
External Support – Troops	80	0.312	0.466	0	1
Rebel Strength (military)	80	0.713	0.455	0	1
Conflict Duration (log)	80	2.554	1.103	0	3.850
Conflict Intensity	80	0.275	0.449	0	1
Ethnonationalist	80	0.412	0.495	0	1
Religious	80	0.075	0.265	0	1
Leftist	80	0.100	0.302	0	1
Civilian Support	69	0.405	0.494	0	1
Democracy	80	0.225	0.420	0	1
Third-Party	80	0.800	0.403	0	1
GDP per capita (log)	80	6.049	0.910	4.726	10.24
Observations	80				

Table 3: Distribution of Public-Benefits Proportions Across External Support Types*

	Public Benefits Proportion
Safe Haven	0.435
Office	0.507
Weapon	0.449
Financial Support	0.570
Troop	0.446

NAGs Dataset ver. April 2015 (San-Akca, 2016); IPAD (Cil, 2016)

As I concentrate on objective-driven factors in addition to rebel capacity, I present the values of public benefits proportion across the identity-objective spectrum of the rebel groups in Table 4 and Table 5. On the side of the ideology-objective spectrum, among all, 33 rebel groups emphasize ethnicity, 6 groups emphasize religion, and 8 groups emphasize leftist ideology as their identity. However, the categories are not exclusionary as the MNLF carried and expressed both ethnic and religious features during their fight against the government of the Philippines. Similarly, there are three categories about the objective of rebel groups which are not mutually exclusive. 18 rebel groups solely demand secession and/or autonomy, while 4 groups want territorial changes together with policy and regime changes, and 2 groups want to achieve all three objectives at the same time. The groups who want to topple the existing government in their target country is almost double the number of rebel groups with territorial claims. It is widespread among rebel groups to seek policy and/or regime change together with toppling the existing government. Among the 30 groups whose ideology is shaped around the ethnic identity, 60.1% have secessionist and autonomy-seeking objectives, and the proportion of public benefits in peace agreements signed by these groups is 0.595 which is above the mean of public benefits proportion in the dataset.

On the other hand, more than %35 of all rebel groups in the dataset seek to topple the existing government or make policy and/or regime change, respectively. Among 6 religious rebel groups, MNLF from the Philippines is the only group with two identities. They assert their ethnic and religious bonds at the same time, and they want secession. The remaining five groups wish to both to topple the leader and make policy changes except Ntsiloulous in Congo-Brazzaville who want to change the regime only. Among the leftist groups, having a mixed objective is similarly common; however, none of the groups want to secede or gain autonomy.

Table 4: Distribution of Rebel Objective Across Group Ideology*

	Secession and/or Autonomy	Toppling Government	Policy and/or Regime Change
Ethnic	%60.1	%36.3	%39.9
Religious	%16.6	%66.6	%83.3
Leftist	%0	%62.5	%87.5

NAGs Dataset ver. April 2015 (San-Akca, 2016)

Table 5: Distribution of Public Benefits Provisions Across Identity - Objective Spectrum*

	Secession and/or Autonomy	Toppling Government	Policy and/or Regime Change
Ethnic	0.595	0.429	0.531
Religious	0.583	0.611	0.483
Leftist	0	0.400	0.430

NAGs Dataset ver. April 2015 (San-Akca, 2016); IPAD (Cil, 2016)

When we look at the distribution of public benefits proportion across the ideology - objective spectrum in detail, religious groups who want to topple the leader include the highest percentage of public goods and benefits provisions in the peace agreements. The second-highest proportion of public benefits is seen in the agreements signed by ethnonationalist groups who want to secede or gain autonomy over a territory. However, whether these results amount to a significant association will be discussed in the analysis.

Among the remaining variables, democracy and GDP per capita are related to the target country. There are 18 democracies in the dataset, and the average proportion of including public benefits in peace agreements among them is 0.542. This is above the mean of the all agreements whereas the mean of public benefit proportion is below the mean with a score of 0.426 for non-democracies. This finding shows that including public benefits is more common among democracies in contrast to non-democracies. Similarly, it shows that more affluent countries perform slightly better performance than poorer countries in including public benefits in peace agreements with a mean of 0.485 for those countries who stay above the average GDP per capita in the dataset.

Lastly, these statistics show that a third-party involved in 80% of the peace settlements in the dataset. The effect of third parties on the inclusion of a more significant proportion of public benefits can be observed looking at the mean of public benefits proportion. This value is 0.471 when there is a third-party, and 0.364 otherwise.

CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS and RESULTS

4.1. Regression Analysis and Results

The dependent variable, public benefits proportion, is measured as a proportional variable, and the majority of independent variables are binary. The reason why the dependent variable is designed as a proportional variable is that one provision may benefit more than one actor of the rebel group such as rank and file member, leader, elite and/or constituency. As it is explained in the previous section, each provision is coded with regards to whom it benefits inclusively. Therefore, one provision is coded more than one time. To measure the weight of public benefits provisions among all provisions in a peace agreement, I take the proportion of public benefits provisions and divide it by all positive provisions in a peace agreement. I use ordinary least square (OLS) regression to grasp the variation coming from all observations from 0 to 1 including all intermediate values.

In this part, I present the analyses in support of the arguments that rebel capacity and conflict objective determine peace agreement design. Table 6 shows the OLS regression models of different types of external support and rebel objective, which generally support my hypotheses.

In Hypothesis 1, I expected that financial capability would increase the likelihood of including public benefits in a peace agreement based on the argument that different

forms of external support increase rebel capacity in various ways. Confirming the results from the descriptive statistics in Table 3, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between external financial support and the proportion of public benefits given through a peace agreement. Model 1 and 2 present the results for the effect of different forms of external support on the proportion of public benefits provisions in peace agreements. Model 1 shows that financial support facilitates the inclusion of a greater number of public benefits provisions. Therefore, rebel groups with financial support sign peace agreements that are significantly more favorable to the general public than rebel groups who do not have financial support. In contrast to my expectation that weapons support would increase the proportion of public benefits because it is a form of support that is easily transferable to money, Model 2 shows that it has negative effect that is not statistically significant. Post-estimation results present in Figure 3 and 4 show the percentage changes that the fungible support variables lead to. Figure 3 presents that the predicted proportion of public benefits provisions increases from 41% to 56% when there is financial support (at p=0.05). However, the difference between predicted probabilities of public benefits provisions with and without a weapon is very small. Figure 4 shows that the presence of a weapon makes a different of about only 3%, which is not found statistically significant. These results bring out new theoretical perspectives to the argument. First, they show that rebels are not able to utilize all types of fungible support in the same capacity. Second, even if they can utilize all their sources in the same capacity for their plans, they would prefer to reserve their weapon sources, which are unknown to the government as they come through external states, against future security challenges even if they sign a peace agreement.

Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Financial Support on Public Benefits Proportion*

Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Weapon on Public Benefits Proportion*

Predicted in the 95% confidence interval

Table 6: OLS Results for the Proportion of Public Benefits

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Financial Support	0.155*	0.155*	0.145*				0.154**
	(2.52)	(2.32)	(2.02)				(2.66)
Weapon		-0.000302	0.0109				
		(-0.00)	(0.15)				
Troop			-0.114				
			(-1.37)				
Office			0.0566				
			(0.68)				
Safe Haven			-0.0476				
			(-0.61)				
Secession-Autonomy				0.217*			0.217*
				(2.37)			(2.34)
Topple Government					-0.106		
					(-1.59)		
Policy/Regime Change						0.0592	
						(1.01)	
Rebel Strength	-0.0739	-0.0738	-0.0725	-0.120	-0.0750	-0.0509	-0.134*
	(-1.25)	(-1.17)	(-1.10)	(-1.75)	(-1.22)	(-0.79)	(-2.07)
Natural Resources	0.00506	0.00515	0.0223	-0.0287	0.0199	0.0246	-0.0386
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.37)	(-0.52)	(0.36)	(0.45)	(-0.77)
Ethnonationalist	0.140*	0.140*	0.144*	0.0177	0.102	0.161**	0.00937
	(2.52)	(2.39)	(2.32)	(0.20)	(1.49)	(2.86)	(0.10)
Conflict Duration	-0.000760	-0.0007	-0.00009	0.00173	0.000645	-0.00111	0.00167
	(-0.33)	(-0.33)	(-0.04)	(0.67)	(0.27)	(-0.44)	(0.68)
Conflict Intensity	0.00504	0.00506	0.00848	0.0790	0.0528	0.0355	0.0275
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(1.39)	(0.84)	(0.54)	(0.52)
Constant	0.419***	0.419***	0.410***	0.421***	0.487***	0.396***	0.414***
	(5.69)	(5.56)	(4.78)	(6.26)	(5.72)	(4.63)	(6.23)
Observations	77	77	77	77	77	77	77

Note: All statistical analysis was conducted in Stata 16. 0

Robust standards errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The impact of financial support in including public benefits in a peace agreement is consistent when it is measured holding other forms of external support constant (Model 3). This effect is also consistent when it is measured with many other variables regarding the determinants of peace agreement design and external support. As the specific results derived from Model 1-2-3 and 7 show that the effect of external financial support is robust unilaterally and jointly with other factors, the general conclusion derived from these models is consistent with the argument that financial ability makes rebel groups invest in public goods and benefits in higher capacity.

By presenting the statistically significant positive impact of external financial support on peace agreement design, this work presents an original finding for the literature that expands our understanding of the relationship between external support and civil war termination. Following the logic of Sawyer et al. (2015) that fungible external sources increases rebel capacity and opens for them an area of operations as discussed in the theory part, I reach a conclusion that fungible external support contribute rebels' capacity to design positive-sum post-war policies for the government and themselves through the provision of public goods and benefits in civil war peace agreements. Warring parties include a greater proportion of public benefits provisions in peace agreements when the rebel side of the agreement has material capacity in the form of external financial support.

The remaining external support variables, namely office, troop, and territory, are not found to be statistically significant in any of the models. I expected that if the group had an office in a foreign country, it may collect more funds and build connections with people and organizations, which in turn would facilitate the inclusion of public goods and benefits in the peace agreement. Although the coefficient estimate for this variable is positive, it

is not statistically significant. This result can be related to the fact that the office's effect remains minimal, maybe at the leadership level, compared to other types of support. The remaining external support variables, safe haven and troops, which are directly related to the military capacity of the rebel group also do not have a statistically significant effect on the proportion of public benefits in peace agreements. They have negative coefficients, which show that military and security support to rebel groups are not effective in their bargaining over civilian benefits with the government. Although it is not statistically significant, the negative coefficient is in line with the findings of Cil and Prorok (2016), as they say in their working paper that rebel groups with extraterritorial sanctuary sign peace agreements with a lesser proportion of public benefits compared to other rebel groups.

Before I started to examine the impact of war objective on peace agreement design to test Hypothesis 2, I checked whether war objective influence external support; and I found that rebel group objective is not generally correlated with external support (see Appendix 2 and 3). Relying on these analyses, this research look at the capacity and objective variables separately and does not consider whether the objective of rebel groups determines how the group obtains and uses external support; in other words, it did not differentiate between de facto and intentional forms of support as shown in the analysis.

I test the individual effect of objective-driven factors on the design of peace agreements in Model 4, 5 and 6. As explained in Chapter 3, I use three variables regarding group objectives, which are not mutually exclusive. The positive coefficient estimate in Model 4 presents the main result for Hypothesis 2. The results in the Models 4 and 7 support my hypothesis that rebel groups who fight territorial civil wars design peace

agreements with a higher proportion of public benefits compared to other rebel groups who want to topple the leader or demand policy and/or regime change in their respective countries.

Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Territorial Objectives on Public Benefits Proportion*

Predicted in the 95% confidence interval

Figure 5 shows that the predicted proportion of public benefits provisions increases from 39% to 58% (at $p=0.05$) when the rebel group has territorial objectives. This significant increase confirms the theoretical expectations discussed in Chapter 2 that territorial conflicts result with a greater proportion of public benefits because there are plenty of areas open to public-related investments occur during these conflicts as well as the importance of civilian component in these cases.

In general, the results derived from the test for Hypotheses 1 and 2 show that the design of a peace agreement is a strategic attempt of warring parties. Rebels do not solely sign a peace agreement with the government to ensure the end of fighting; but also, they

design a future for themselves. If the cause of war is strongly related to the civilians organically or due to exclusively structural reasons, rebels and governments give importance to sustaining this relationship afterward by providing public goods and benefits. Model 7 shows that the effect of rebel objective on delivering a higher proportion of public benefits is consistent when controlling for external support as well.

Turning to the effect of control variables on the design of peace agreement, I find that rebel identity has significant impacts on the design of peace agreements. Models 1, 2 and 3 show that ethnonationalist conflicts result in peace agreements with a higher proportion of public benefits; however, this effect becomes insignificant when controlling for the group objective variables (Models 4,5,6 and 7). The reason for this variation could arise from the fact that more than %60 of ethnonationalist groups want to secede or gain autonomy (Table 4). Thus, it is not the ideology that shapes the provision of public benefits in secessionist and autonomy seeking groups; but the war objectives. Also, rebel strength, though not consistently, affects the provisions of public interests in peace agreements. Weaker rebel groups include a lesser proportion of public benefits compared to groups at parity or stronger than the government militarily.

Lastly, natural resources, conflict duration, and conflict intensity do not affect the proportion of public benefits provisions in the peace agreement. These are insignificant across models with inconsistent positive and negative coefficients.

4.2. Additional Analysis

As mentioned in the introduction chapter, there are alternative explanations for the design of peace settlements that were discussed in the literature, and this study brings a new explanation of determinants of peace agreement design based on rebel group objective and capacity. In this part, I retest the models presented in Table 6 together with the variables coming from the alternative explanation of settlement design to test the robustness of the effect of rebel objective and capacity, whether it is coming from the government and third-party related factors or independently.

As discussed in the section of control variables, I expect democracy and third-party to have a positive effect on the inclusion of more public benefits into a peace agreement. Similarly, if the government has a strong economy, it would have more chances of investing in peace vs. a weaker government who would have a significantly lower level of control over governance.

First, I reran my primary model for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 with the new democracy, GDP per capita, and third-party variables in Model 8-13, respectively. The results in Table 6 generally confirm my expectations about the positive effect of these variables on the proportion of public benefits in peace agreements. The coefficients of the three variables are positive; however, none of them are significant.

Nevertheless, the key result derived from Table 7 is that my explanatory variables remain consistent across all models after I added each additional control variables separately. This result supports both hypotheses that the effect of rebel objective and capacity on the proportion of public benefits in a peace agreement is independently significant; hence conflict objective and the capacity of rebel groups determine the context of the peace agreement to a great extent.

Table 7: OLS Results of Alternative Explanations for the Proportion of Public Benefits Provisions

	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13
Financial Support	0.143*	0.140*	0.148*			
	(2.27)	(2.17)	(2.42)			
Weapon						
Troop						
Office						
Safe Haven						
Secession-Autonomy				0.213*	0.206*	0.205*
				(2.42)	(2.25)	(2.27)
Topple Government						
Policy - Regime Change						
Rebel Strength	-0.0994	-0.0760	-0.0592	-0.153*	-0.122	-0.105
	(-1.56)	(-1.28)	(-1.00)	(-2.11)	(-1.77)	(-1.52)
Natural Resources	0.00934	0.00822	-0.00369	-0.0235	-0.0237	-0.0340
	(0.18)	(0.16)	(-0.07)	(-0.42)	(-0.43)	(-0.63)
Ethnonationalist	0.104	0.132*	0.139*	-0.0261	0.0134	0.0241
	(1.79)	(2.34)	(2.49)	(-0.31)	(0.15)	(0.27)
Conflict Duration	-0.0007	-0.0008	-0.00126	0.00167	0.00154	0.00116
	(-0.33)	(-0.35)	(-0.58)	(0.68)	(0.60)	(0.50)
Conflict Intensity	0.0162	0.0873	0.000124	0.0875	0.0837	0.0716
	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.00)	(1.56)	(1.46)	(1.27)
Democracy	0.0883			0.110		
	(1.20)			(1.59)		
GDP per capita (log)		0.000007*			0.000009**	
		(2.25)			(3.01)	
Third-Party			0.0796			0.0678
			(1.23)			(1.03)
Constant	0.430***	0.417***	0.362***	0.433***	0.418***	0.372***
	(5.92)	(5.64)	(3.77)	(6.53)	(6.18)	(4.04)
Observations	77	77	77	77	77	77

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1. Review of the Study and Theoretical Implications

The starting point of this study was the following observations: Even though it has been argued that the lack of public goods and universal benefits are related to the causes of civil war, peace agreements that are signed following the civil war are significantly varied in terms of whom they benefit. There are a significant number of studies on peace agreements; however, almost none of this research specifically focuses on what determines the content of a peace agreement and what causes the variation in their design. Existing research mostly considers the impact of third parties and governments on the design of peace agreements while disregarding the impact of rebel groups. However, this variation cannot be explained without examining the effect of rebel characteristics on the settlement design. Although it is never possible to fully know to what extent the government and the rebel group have full control over settlement design, they are the principal actors of this process.

In this work, I have developed a theory of peace agreement design derived from the literature on conflict termination and peace agreements and used statistical analysis of a recent dataset to evaluate the theory. The analysis has shown that capacity and objective related factors affect the decision of rebel groups and states over the peace agreement design, and which group of people connected to the state and the rebel group benefits

from the peace most. Specifically, the interests of rebel groups and states are the basis of the content of peace agreements.

With respect to capacity-driven factors, rebel groups with external financial support are more likely to include a higher proportion of public benefits provisions in a peace agreement in contrast to other groups without fungible external sources. Even though the literature argues that rebel groups with external support are less reliant on civilians and more laxer about employing costly strategies against them, this study shows that rebels utilize external sources for peace-related activities after they no longer need them to fight. Higher financial capacity increases the rebel's public policy investment. Additionally, when the government knows that the rebel group has the material sources to provide public goods, they would be more willing to include public benefits into the peace agreement because rebels signal to them that they will bear the cost of peace together. Also, the independent and joint effect of external support on the peace agreement design shows that the reason of the provision of a greater proportion of public benefits is not rebel group's military power or their reliance on the population to extract resources.

Additionally, rebel groups include a higher proportion of public benefits in conflicts that are difficult to resolve and has a civilian component. In making more public-oriented policies in peace settlements signed after territorial disputes, rebel groups and states respond to the expectations of civilians who go through the casualties of conflict in their respective territories. In this way, they bear the cost of peace together with the government, which reduces the security dilemma between them.

Consequently, this study contributes to the literature theoretically by bringing rebel characteristics to the center of peace settlement design, looking at the concept of

rebel capacity beyond troop size, and showing how external support affects the bargaining process and decision-making in the shadow of conflict. Particularly, it has demonstrated that external support and group objective direct the design of post-war peace by facilitating the inclusion of costly provisions such as the higher proportion of public benefits, which reduces the cost of peace and commitment problems for both sides of the conflict.

The number of systematic studies problematizing settlement design has increased in the last couple of years. This development broadened the scope of peace and conflict studies as recent studies focusing on peace agreement design in relation to conflict resolution, peace agreement implementation, and conflict recurrence has been done. This study accepts the fact that it is not fully possible for warring parties to build and ensure credible commitments to peace with the text of a peace agreement. However, peace agreements stand as significant texts that reveal the governments and the rebel willingness for peace and their efforts. Therefore, as one of the recent and rare studies problematizing peace agreement design, this study constitutes a significant contribution to the peace agreements literature. As it discusses how and to what extent civilians benefit from peace agreements, it opens new avenues for future research about civilian-rebel and civilian-government dynamics during peace processes as well as the quality of peace in the post-conflict era.

Lastly, the disaggregated analysis of external support shows the significance of measuring the impact of external support according to their type in addition to giving specific outcomes about the impact of various forms of external support on peace

agreement design. It has shown that external support does not have a uniform effect on peace agreement design.

5.2. Limitations of the Study and Future Research

The primary limitation of the current study is related to the methodology. Although this study focuses on the effect of rebel characteristics on the design of peace settlements, it does not explicitly cover to what extent the government and the rebel group have full control over settlement design because it relies on a specific dataset on civil war peace agreements. Examining the actual roles of conflict actors on peace agreement design necessitates conducting a further analysis such as doing interviews with elites who were involved in the peace process and conducting case studies that investigate how the causal mechanisms illustrated in this work are working in specific cases.

The second limitation is that this thesis considers rebels as unitary actors as a group without looking at the group dynamics, internal division, and leadership structure of the group. However, some groups have a unitary leader while others have fractional governance, or some of them have a hierarchical structure while others build a horizontal system. These factors influence to what extent a rebel leader becomes influential in settlement design. Moreover, they may determine the decision-making and bargaining of rebel groups as well as their relationship with the civilians and external actors. To broaden the scope of this limitation, in this work, I assume that each actor in a peace process has agency. However, it is important to check how well the civilian population is organized in addition to the rebel leadership because their organization can be effective in their

relations with the rebel group and the government. If the government repress the civilian population; it is more likely that civilians support the rebel group on behalf of wartime protection and post-war concessions, which in turn likely to influence post-war structure.

The third limitation of this thesis is that the data in this study does not measure any potential accumulation of resources over time. The five different types of external support are coded as binary variables in this cross-sectional dataset, which might underestimate the real impact of external support.

Suggestions for future work are shaped by the observations identified in descriptive statistics which are not statistically supported and by limitations described previously. First, Table 5 shows a surprising association between religious groups that aim to topple the existing government and the provision of a higher proportion of public benefits. There is no statistical evidence for this association; however, further case studies can be conducted to seek the causal mechanisms which may reveal some new theoretical insights.

Second, it is theoretically argued in this thesis that conflict actors share the cost of peace by including a higher proportion of public benefits, which contributes to their relationship with the public jointly. This theoretical argument can be tested with a new dataset that measures whether the risk of conflict recurrence is higher or lower in cases where the peace agreement is designed in the interest of both parties through the inclusion of higher percentages public goods and benefits.

Following the second suggestion, the findings of this thesis have also shown that we should care about who benefits from a peace agreement because this specifically determines the dynamics of domestic politics in the aftermath of conflict. Hence, a further

study may look at the relationship between the design and implementation of peace agreements to reveal the ramifications of causal mechanisms built in this work.

Fourth, this study includes only post-Cold War peace agreements. However, these hypotheses could be tested using a larger dataset that covers a more extended period. In this way, I would be able to observe the variation of the effect of external support according to the international structure.

Lastly, this study can be enhanced by extending the criteria of the full peace agreement to other types of the peace settlement. By including different types of settlements into the analyses, we can observe whether the proposed effects of rebel characteristics are relevant at different levels of negotiations.

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Dyad Name	Peace Agreement
Angola - UNITA	The Bicesse Agreement
Angola - UNITA	The Lusaka Protocol
Angola - UNITA	Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Intent
Burundi - Palipehutu	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi
Burundi - CNDD	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi
Burundi - Frolina	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi
Burundi - CNDD–FDD	The Global Ceasefire agreement between Transitional Government and the Forces pour la defence de la democratie (CNDD-FDD)
Burundi - Palipehutu–FNL	Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL
Burundi - Palipehutu–FNL	Declaration of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Great Lakes region on the Burundi Peace Process
Chad - CSNPD	Bangui-2 Agreement
Chad - FNT	El Geneina agreement
Chad - FNT	National reconciliation agreement
Chad - MDD	The Dougia Accord
Chad - FARF	Donya agreement
Chad - MDJT	Tripoli 2 agreement
Chad - MDJT	Yebibou agreement 2005
Comoros - MPA/Republic of Anjouan	The Famboni II Agreement
DR Congo (Zaire) - RCD	Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act
DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act
Djibouti - FRUD	Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale
Djibouti - FRUD – AD	Accord Cadre de Reforme et de Concorde Civile
Cote D'Ivoire - MPCI	Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords
Cote D'Ivoire - MPIGO	Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords
Liberia - NPFL	Lomé Agreement
Liberia - NPFL	Cotonou Peace Agreement
Liberia - NPFL	Abuja Peace Agreement
Liberia - NPFL	Abuja II Peace Agreement
Liberia - INPFL	Lomé Agreement
Liberia - LURD	Accra Peace Agreement
Mali - MPA	Pacte National
Mozambique - Renamo	The Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP)
Niger - CRA	Accord e´tablissant une paix définitive entre le gouvernement de la republique du Niger et l'órganisation de la résistance armée
Rwanda - FPR	Arusha Accords
Sierra Leone - RUF	Abidjan Peace Agreement

Sierra Leone - RUF	Lomé Peace Agreement
Sierra Leone - RUF	Supplement to the Lomé comprehensive peace agreement
Angola - FLEC–R	Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and National Reconciliation in Cabinda province
United Kingdom - IRA	The Good Friday Agreement
Bangladesh - JSS/SB	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord
El Salvador - FMLN	The Chapultepec Peace Agreement
Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace
Cote D'Ivoire - MJP	Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords
Philippines - MNLF	Mindanao Final Agreement
India - ATTF	Memorandum of Settlement - 23 August 1993
Bosnia-Herzegovina - Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement)
Croatia - Serbian Republic of Krajina	The Erdut Agreement
India - ABSU	Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993
Papua New Guinea - BRA	Bougainville Peace Agreement
Macedonia - UCK	The Ohrid Agreement
Colombia - EPL	Acuerdo final Gobierno Nacional-Ejército Popular De Liberación
Indonesia - GAM	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement
Nepal - CPN-M	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006
Liberia - MODEL	Accra Peace Agreement
Tajikistan - UTO	The Moscow Declaration - General agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan
Cambodia (Kampuchea) - KR	Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict "The Paris Agreement"
Cambodia (Kampuchea) - KPNLF	Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict "The Paris Agreement"
Cambodia (Kampuchea) - FUNCINPEC	Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict "The Paris Agreement"
Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi	Islamabad accord
Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat	Islamabad accord
Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi	Mahipar agreement
Uganda - UNRF II	Yumbe Peace Agreement
Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Ouagadougou Political Agreement
Chad - FUCD	Tripoli accord
South Africa - ANC	Interim Constitution
Sudan - SLM/A (MM)	Darfur Peace Agreement
Sudan - SPLM/A	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Sudan - NDA	Agreement between the GoS and the NDA (Cairo Agreement)
DR Congo (Zaire) - CNDP	23 March 2009 Agreement

Philippines - MILF	Agreement on Peace between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Somalia - USC/SNA	Addis Ababa Agreement
Somalia - USC/SNA	Nairobi Declaration on National Reconciliation
Somalia - USC/SNA	The Cairo Declaration on Somalia
Somalia - ARS/UIC	Decision of the High-Level Committee, Djibouti Agreement
Senegal - MFDC	Accord general de paix entre le gouvernement de la republique du Senegal el le Mouvement des forces democratique de la Casamace (MFDC)
Bosnia-Herzegovina - Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	The Washington Agreement
Congo - Ninjas	Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités
Congo - Cocoyes	Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités
Congo - Ntsiloulous	Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités
Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Accra III
Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire

Appendix 2: Table of Average Marginal Effects

Average marginal effects
Number of observations = 77
Model VCE: Robust
Expression: Conditional mean of public_proportion2, predict ()

	dy/dx	Std.Err.	z	P>z	[95%Conf.	Interval]
			Delta-method			
Financial Support	0.121	0.062	1.960	0.050	0.000	0.242
Weapon	0.051	0.068	0.740	0.459	-0.083	0.185
Office	0.045	0.076	0.600	0.549	-0.103	0.194
Troop	-0.074	0.100	-0.740	0.460	-0.270	0.122
Safe Haven	-0.027	0.069	-0.390	0.693	-0.162	0.108
Secession-Autonomy	0.207	0.087	2.370	0.018	0.036	0.378
Policy-Regime Change	0.081	0.057	1.420	0.156	-0.031	0.194
Topple Government	-0.020	0.069	-0.280	0.776	-0.155	0.116
Ethnonationalist	0.028	0.085	0.330	0.742	-0.139	0.195
Rebel Strength	-0.107	0.063	-1.700	0.090	-0.231	0.017
Third-Party	0.076	0.067	1.140	0.253	-0.055	0.207
Conflict Intensity	-0.010	0.064	-0.150	0.880	-0.134	0.115
Conflict Duration	0.006	0.025	0.240	0.808	-0.042	0.054
Natural Resources	-0.035	0.057	-0.610	0.541	-0.147	0.077

Appendix 3:Correlation Table of Rebel Objective and Rebel External Support Variables

Variables	Financial Support	Weapon	Office	Troop	Safe Haven
Secession-Autonomy	0.043	-0.235**	-0.029	0.056	-0.078
Policy-Regime Change	0.172	-0.074	0.277**	0.065	-0.194*
Topple Government	0.038	0.351***	0.017	0.216*	0.093

* p < 0.05 (2-tailed)

** p < 0.005 (2-tailed)

*** p < 0.001 (2-tailed)