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ERCIYES ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI
İNGİLİZ EDEBİYATI BİLİM DALI**

**DISCOURSES OF ORIENTALISM IN POST-SEPTEMBER
11 NOVELS: JOHN UPDIKE'S *TERRORIST*, DON
DELILLO' S *FALLING MAN*, MOHSIN HAMID'S *THE
RELUCTANT FUNDAMENTALIST*, AND IAN MCEWAN'S
*SATURDAY***

**by
Fikret GÜVEN**

**Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Eugene STEELE**

Ph. D. Thesis

**December 2018
KAYSERİ**

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Tez Başlığı: **DISCOURSES OF ORIENTALISM IN POST-SEPTEMBER 11 NOVELS: JOHN UPDIKE'S *TERRORIST*, DON DELILLO' S *FALLING MAN*, MOHSIN HAMID'S *THE RELUCTANT FUNDAMENTALIST*, AND IAN MCEWAN'S *SATURDAY***

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SUITABILITY FOR GUIDE

The PhD thesis entitled “Discourses of Orientalism in Post–September 11 Novels: John Updike’s *Terrorist*, Don DeLillo’ s *Falling Man*, Mohsin Hamid’s *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, and Ian McEwan’s *Saturday*” has been prepared in accordance with Erciyes University Graduate Study Thesis Proposal and Thesis Writing Guide.

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ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL PAGE

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10/12/2018


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24.12.2018

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My most humble and sincere thanks to my advisor, Prof. Dr. Eugene Steele who patiently provided me invaluable assistance and support during my research. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my committee members, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Melih KARAKUZU, Assist. Prof. Dr. Kağan Kaya, and Assist. Prof. Dr. Sinan Akıllı for devoting their time to read and supervise my thesis.

Finally, I would like to express my most sincere appreciation to my extraordinary wife, Pınar, for her love and patience.

Fikret GÜVEN

Kayseri, December 2018

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this dissertation is to examine post-September 11 novels for discourses of Orientalism, opposition to Orientalism, and to present alternative discourses that envision a peaceful engagement. The novels analyzed are known as post-September 11 novels due to the fact that the narratives take place around September 11, and the mention of the event happens to be background information. The dissertation mainly utilizes Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) as the theoretical perspective to analyze the selected texts. Said states that the Western discourse creates prejudices against non-Western cultures by classifying them as the ‘Other’. He delineates that this discourse continues to manifest itself after September 11. While I partially agree with Said and present evidence that the same discourses can be witnessed in certain post-September 11 novels, I further look for evidence of other novels that resist Orientalism, which use Occidental discourses against the West’s hegemonic purposes. Unlike many previous studies, my dissertation presents a comparative perspective on how these novels engage with the conflict between the West and Islam after September 11. The dissertation analyzes four post–September 11 novels: John Updike’s *Terrorist*, Don DeLillo’ s *Falling Man*, Mohsin Hamid’s *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* and Ian McEwan’s *Saturday*.

Keywords: Orientalism, Occidentalism, post-September 11 Novels, Peaceful Engagement, Islamophobia.

11 EYLÜL–SONRASI ROMANLARDA ORYANTALIST SÖYLEMLER: JOHN UPDIKE’ IN *TERRORIST*, DON DELILLO’ UN *FALLING MAN*, MOHSIN HAMID’IN *ZORAKI RADİKAL*, VE IAN MCEWAN’ IN *SATURDAY* ADLI ESERLERINE BAKIŞ

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ÖZET

Bu tezdeki amaç, 11 Eylül sonrasında yazılan romanlarda, Oryantalist, Oryantalizme karşı çıkan söylemleri ve barışçıl söylemleri öngören alternatif söylemleri incelemektir. Ele alınan romanlar 11 Eylül saldırıları etrafında gelişmesi ve olayların arka planında 11 Eylül’ün yer almasından dolayı, 11 Eylül sonrası romanlar olarak bilinmektedir. Metinleri analiz etmek için teorik çerçeve olarak Edward Said’ in *Oryantalizm* (1978) adlı eseri kullanılmaktadır. Said, Batılı söylemlerin, Batılı olmayan kültürleri “Öteki” olarak sınıflandırarak, bu kültürlerle karşı önyargılar oluşturduğunu belirtmektedir. Ayrıca, bu söylemlerin 11 Eylül’den sonra artarak devam ettiğini belirtmektedir. Çalışma, Said’in söylemlerine kısmen katılırken, bu söylemlerin devam ettirildiğini gösteren kanıtlar sunmaktadır. 11 Eylül sonrası romanlarda, Batı’nın hegemonyacı yaklaşımlarına cevaben Oksidentalist söylem kullanan bir 11 Eylül sonrası roman da incelenmektedir. Daha önce yapılan birçok araştırmadan farklı olarak, bu çalışma, 11 Eylül’den sonra Batı ile İslam arasındaki çatışmanın 11 Eylül sonrası romanlarında nasıl ele alındığına ilişkin karşılaştırmalı bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır. Tezde John Updike’ in *Terrorist*, Don DeLillo’ nun *Falling Man*, Mohsin Hamid’ in *Zoraki Radikal* ve Ian McEwan’ in *Saturday* adlı 11 Eylül sonrası romanlar analiz edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Oryantalizm, Oksidentalizm, 11 Eylül sonrası romanlar, Barışçıl Söylemler, İslamafobi.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISCOURSES OF ORIENTALISM IN POST–SEPTEMBER 11 NOVELS: JOHN UPDIKE’S *TERRORIST*, DON DELILLO’S *FALLING MAN*, MOHSIN HAMID’S *THE RELUCTANT FUNDAMENTALIST*, AND IAN MCEWAN’S *SATURDAY*

CONFORMITY TO THE SCIENTIFIC ETHICS.....	i
SUITABILITY FOR GUIDE.....	iii
ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL PAGE.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v
ABSTRACT.....	vi
ÖZET.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Theoretical Framework.....	4
1.2. Significance and Overall Objectives.....	17
1.3. Methodology and Background.....	18
1.4. Criticism to <i>Orientalism</i>	27
1.5. Definition of Terms.....	44
1.5.1. Orientalism.....	44
1.5.2. Occidentalism.....	45
1.5.3. Colonialism, Imperialism, Post-Colonialism.....	46
1.5.4. Post-Colonial Melancholia.....	47
1.5.5. Islamophobia and Jihad.....	48
1.5.6. The Clash of Civilizations.....	49

CHAPTER II

ORIENTALISM IN POST–SEPTEMBER 11 NOVELS

2.1. Reinforcing Binary Oppositions in the post–September 11 Novels.....	55
2.2. Stereotyping Islam as Anti – West.....	60
2.3. Stereotyping Muslims as a Monolithic Entity.....	67
2.4. Stereotyping Muslim Identity with Defeat, Revenge, and Displacement.....	73
2.5. Stereotyping Muslims as Death – Loving Fanatics.....	79

2.6. Stereotyping Islam as a Violent Religion Spreading Anxiety	83
2.7. Stereotyping Muslims as Fatalist and Islam as a Misogynist Religion.....	86
2.8. Stereotyping Muslims as Insatiable Sensualists.....	92

CHAPTER III

RESISTANCE NARRATIVES POST– SEPTEMBER 11 NOVELS

3.1. The Exilic Identity and Deterritorialized – Self.....	103
3.2. Frustration and Ambivalence towards the US	107
3.3. Identity Issue and Reacting against Stereotypes	111
3.4. Geo-political Critique of <i>The Reluctant Fundamentalist</i>	116

CHAPTER IV

PEACEFUL ENGAGEMENT IN POST–SEPTEMBER 11 NOVELS

4.1. Post–September 11 Anxiety and Spaces of Comfort	137
4.2. New Discourses: Atheism, Science, and Secularism	143
4.3. The Rising Anti -Americanism and Multiculturalism	147

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY	171
ÖZGEÇMİŞ.....	185

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four airplanes and carried out suicide attacks against targets in the United States. Planes were flown into the landmarks in America killing thousands of civilians, which triggered major U.S. initiatives to combat terrorism and defined a new world order governed by discourses of Orientalism. The terrorist attacks were conceived and accomplished to have a greater symbolic effect as they precipitated a powerful rhetoric to resurface and reinvigorate old antagonisms, arouse anxieties, and justify the use of violence. On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush reminded the United States of new dangers and called for a long war against an evil enemy to defend America's freedoms (Jackson, 128). While America succumbed to dangerous rhetoric on terrorism, this left a vast amount of space to speculate on and necessitated a redefinition of the concepts such as justice, nature of these evil enemies, and provided all the supportive evidence to recreate old cultural and political myths. Since September 11, violence has spread around the world in response to what has been perceived as a persistent scourge of terrorism. Politicians, writers, and filmmakers have drawn upon, recreated, and circulated those myths, as they found the Western psyche receptive due the dramatic effects of September 11. One such myth was the persistent and sinister threat of Islamic fundamentalism to the West.

September 11 and contemporary terrorism committed by Muslim radicals, are presented as visible manifestations of the historical rivalry between two civilizations. This rivalry is realized through the use of strategies to depict a contrasting and malevolent 'Other' who is solely opposed to the existence of the West. September 11 and its aftermath witnessed an intense use of those strategies to renew the fear of the 'Other' in the Western psyche. After the attacks, political discourse and the media reemphasized the division of the world into two rival blocks based on the binaries of

“us” versus “them,” and “good” versus “evil.” Yet, the seeds of a conflict between Islam and the West were already there in Western discourse prior to September 11. Samuel Huntington’s theory of “Clash of Civilizations” depicted Islam as West’s major enemy in conflicts around the world in current and future wars. His theory took its support from events already taking place on the contemporary world stage. The theory explained contemporary rifts between societies, and including other minor conflicts, and predicted a major cultural war between Islam and the West after the Cold War.

Two of the most prolific and renowned contemporary Orientalists Francis Fukuyama and Bernard Lewis, whose works revolve around one central argument, namely that Islam is violent and culturally incompatible with the West, also contributed to a discourse of conflict between Islam and the West. Events in the 1990s seem to bear witness to their predictions. It was a decade that witnessed the First Gulf War, appearance of Al-Qaeda and their terrorist activities against Western targets around the world, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and an upsurge in crises in the Middle East. Orientalists used these events to support their claims of an inherent West-Islam rivalry. Media contributed to aggravate the conflict further while filmmakers produced several movies based on Islamic terror attacks, thereby making Islam the embodiment of fear and bewilderment. Movies like Stuart Baird’s *Executive Decision* (1996) and Edward Zwick’s *The Siege* (1998) appeared in Hollywood to visualize attacks, in which Muslim terrorists carry out mega-attacks on American soil to kill a large number of Americans based on the pattern of Thomas Harris’s novel *Black Sunday*. (1975)¹ *Executive Decision* was more prophetic of September 11, as the film dramatized Islamic terrorists hijacking a passenger plane with the intention to use it as a bomb on Washington D.C. with nerve gas Toxin DZ-5 on board. *The Siege* depicts a New York paralyzed by bombings carried out by Islamic terrorists. The idea that a constant battle was inherent between the West and Islam was already implanted in Western perception long before September 11.

Orientalist discourses intensified in the wake of September 11 attacks. This can be seen in the way a series of global events that took place in the last two decades are

¹ *Black Sunday* brings the Arab-Israel conflict to the US as al-Rasd, an Islamic militant group in Beirut plans Black Sunday, a September-11 like attack, to kill 80,000 Americans, including the President of the United States, watching the Super Bowl in New Orleans.

presented as a form of East and West conflicts. These events have been talked about, pictured, discussed, critiqued, and offered as such in literature, the media, and common parlance. Beginning with the attacks of September 11, followed by the subsequent American invasion of Iraq, and even with the Arab Spring,² the use of the Orientalist discourses have dominated the way the contemporary world talks about these issues.

Policies and imperialist interventions continue to frame themselves using Orientalist rhetoric to gain the support of people. This could be seen in the way the politicians have mobilized the rhetoric of protection against an outside threat, often an Islamic terrorist, in order to win the favor of their supporters. The rhetoric has been used even to win the vote of Britain for the Brexit: an economic deal between the United Kingdom and Europe that is supposed to have nothing to do with any countries in the East. In their campaign, some right-wing propaganda included a flyer (see Fig. 1, p. 188) with a map that consists of a white background, with a map of the United Kingdom and Europe, in addition to Turkey, Syria and Iraq, in order to invoke the fear that terrorists from those areas will gain access to the United Kingdom rather soon. The American elections have also seen a prominent rise in Orientalist discourses, often targeting Muslim immigrants, who are escaping war zones to find a safer place for their families. The Arab Spring, leading to the war in Syria and the subsequent immigrant crisis, is filled with examples of how Orientalist discourses still govern how the world is presented. Even before that, the War on Iraq campaign first claimed Saddam Hussein to have weapons of mass destruction capable of damaging the United States, and when they were not found, the war was quickly turned into a “War on Terror.” The Orientalist tradition of the threatening unknown has been especially useful in this case. The unknown remains unknown when it is blown out, and has to stay framed in mystical Orientalist terms. Even positive and democratic movements in East have been presented in an Orientalist fashion. The Arab Spring was on the media as a social media revolution, implying that the coordination of demonstrators in Arab countries is the success of a Western democratic tool, downplaying the very potential for political action by people oppressed and silenced for decades. The Syrian refugee crisis quickly

² A series of revolutions throughout the Arab world against their dictators, of people calling for freedom and equality, and oppressive regimes cracking down violently on protestors and calling them terrorists. The image of the Islamic terrorist has been used globally by these dictators to justify their violent crackdown.

changed in right-wing discourse and propaganda into an immigrant crisis, evoking the sentiment that ‘they’ are coming to take ‘our’ jobs, which in itself shows the extent to which a binary division is mostly useful as a geo-economic division that only benefits the internal hierarchy that aims to maintain it. The effect of Orientalist discourses is immense and direct on social and political life. Humanitarian crises are prolonged in the name of security against an enemy that does not exist *per se* as an objective truth, but as an element in the construction of a narrative.³

1.1. Theoretical Framework

The binaries, the critical commentators, politicians, and filmmakers were building on had been anticipated in the theoretical field by Edward Said. His theory challenges the destructive thesis of the West-Islam conflict and “Clash of Civilizations” with “Clash of Definition” (*Reflection on Exile and Other Essays*, 569) and “Clash of ignorance” (“The Clash of Ignorance”). According to Said, the clashes are not between actual realities or histories, but constructed perceptions or outright lies. In his *Orientalism* (1978), and its literal sequel, *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), Said looks at the prejudiced discourse of colonial, postcolonial, and imperial relationships as they had manifested themselves in diverse forms in history from the late eighteenth century onwards. He claims that Western literature and cultural representations create and reinforce prejudices against non-Western cultures, putting them in the classification of the ‘Other.’ Drawing on examples in various fields of Western art and scholarship, he discovers and theorizes a pattern of misrepresentation of the East in Orientalist discourse. The objective behind such a representation is to help the West define itself in psychological, cultural, and political terms against its “contrasting image” (*Orientalism*, 2). Using Orientalist strategies of othering and stereotypes, the ‘Other’ is always depicted as inferior, backward, and violent in order to allow for the projection of a progressive, democratic, and enlightened West.

In Orientalist discourse, such abstractions are circulated through a system of

³ The Iraq War started as a campaign against the threat of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, which have never been found. Later on, it was turned into a War on Terror. The Syrian “Immigrant Crisis” is prolonged under the claim of not allowing ISIS terrorists to enter, and similarly support is given to, or withdrawn from, Syrian groups under the claim of whatever might make it or not make it into the hands of the wrong people. Support for military campaigns happens under the guise of benevolent power, and withdrawing that happens under the pretext of terrorists, which naturally spawn elsewhere.

knowledge about the Orient. The knowledge is distorted because it derives from other abstractions circulated in the same discourse (*Orientalism*, xxii). Knowledge informs Western social and political discourse about the East and Islam; Westerners internalize what Said calls “textual attitudes” (*Orientalism*, 93) towards Islam. Pervasive in its outreach and disseminated from the sources of power and hegemony, such an attitude penetrates aesthetic, scholarly, sociological, economic, philosophical, and historical texts. British and French colonialist forces of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries followed Orientalism in order to control large parts of the world during their colonial projects. As the United States emerged as a world power after 1945, it inherited Orientalism without major differences from its predecessors, as the intent to subjugate and control is common in all. According to Said, during the 1990s and after the Cold War, there was an intense effort in the West to depict Islam as the new empire of evil after the dismemberment of the USSR (*Orientalism*, 346). This depiction of Islam through the continuation of Orientalism met with heightened intensity after September 11 (*Orientalism*, xvii-xviii). Use of *Orientalism* will be made in the second chapter of this dissertation, which argues that some September 11 novels sustain Orientalism as they employ Orientalist strategies and binaries to depict a violent and backward Islam against a peaceful and progressive West.

Said’s *Culture and Imperialism* offers a theory of narratives that subjugated and marginalized people can use as resistance against West’s Orientalism, colonialism, and imperialism. He believes that along with the white man’s attempt to subjugate, the subjugated and imperialized always resort to active armed, political, and cultural resistance to assert their nationalist identity in order to take control of their territories. In resistance narratives, Third World writers appropriate and subvert the strategies of Western discourse to allow it accommodate their viewpoints. They also complicate its totalizing, marginalizing, and exclusive aspects. The goal of such narratives is to enable the disenfranchised to renegotiate their identities, which had been depicted as inhuman by Orientalism. Chapter three of this dissertation analyzes a post-September 11 novel to explore such a historical resistance by a Third World writer.

Said also believed that uncorrupt writers in the West could resist Orientalism’s restricting influences to engage with the ‘Other’ by using strategies that are less biased and more humane (*Orientalism*, 236). This engagement is based on concrete

experiences and instances, contrary to Orientalism, which derives from abstractions and myths. Using their critical thinking, Western writers could resist the myths created and circulated by texts or images. In chapter four of this dissertation, I will present how Western novelists have principally enabled themselves to engage the ‘Other’ in ways, which are directed to achieve greater understanding and conciliation among different cultural and political conflicts after September 11.

The novel has become an effective medium through which Said’s ideas can be explored. Moreover, the novel has provided a pertinent narrative about how September 11 has become a point of reference for multivocality around the world. Its ability to provide a sustained narrative enables us to see the trajectory of current and prospective evolution of the world in terms of difference and conflicts among entities of cultural, religious, and political denominations. Most early September 11 novels deal with themes such as trauma, family, invasion of private and domestic spaces by events in the public spaces, the media, and to a lesser degree, the conflict between Islam and the West. Novels like Jonathan Safran Foer’s *Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close* (2006), Paul Auster’s *Man in the Dark* (2008), and, to a certain degree, Don DeLillo’s *Falling Man* (2007) deal with all these related issues. Some of these novels also try to show the inability of old tropes to comprehend and communicate a traumatic event. Others deal with the events on a much more peripheral level. Claire Messud’s *The Emperor’s Children* (2006), for example, is about issues of family and fidelity in corporate America with a slight engagement with the September 11 event and its repercussions.

Since the novel has provided one of the most effective sites for reflection on September 11, within the scope of dissertation, it has been observed that in its current form, three distinct formations in September 11 novel have evolved during the past two decades. The first group includes novels like Cormac McCarthy’s *The Road* (2006), Martin Amis’s short story “The Last Days of Muhammad Atta” (2006), Don DeLillo’s *Falling Man* (2007) and John Updike’s *Terrorist* (2007). These narratives differentiate the West from Islam, using binaries and other strategies in the discourse of Orientalism. Such narratives take their inspiration from the concept of the “Clash of Civilizations” in which Islam and the West are perceived as antagonistic to each other because of their inherent differences. McCarthy’s novel *The Road* (2006) depicts the life of a father and a son who try to survive in a devastated landscape where the reason for the nearly total

destruction is unknown. In the nearly wiped-out land, there are few surviving people, most of them cannibals, and grey is the most dominant color as there is not a single day of sunlight. Despite all the hostility of the situation, the two unnamed characters try to keep being ‘the good guys’ as much as they can and continue their journey to wherever it may lead. The novel presents an Orientalist engagement due to the fact that Middle Eastern people are disparaged as “the bad guys” (92). Martin Amis’s “The Last Days of Muhammad Atta” is noteworthy here as it is a perfect execution of strategies intended to demonize the ‘Other’. The short story presents a significant attempt to reinforce hostility between Islam and the West from the viewpoint of Atta, the principal terrorist of September 11. Even though portrayed as nonreligious, Atta attends to Islamic rituals such as prayers, disbursing alms, washing or making ablutions often, and eating and sleeping little. All these actions are typically Islamic actions emanating from sources like the Quran and the Sharia. In Atta’s case, these innocent religious actions take on horrible connotations given the fact that they are performed by a person who is going to pilot one of the planes that fly into the twin towers. Amis’s story tries to understand individual psychological ills to find motivations for such a ghastly act, but leans on a religious discourse because a psychoanalytical approach to explain Atta’s madness in the context of a body-mind conflict proves insufficient. The approach is seriously prejudiced as Atta is located within the religious discourse of Islam. It takes on an even worse meaning when Atta, a psychotic man who hates all life, joins the movement of jihad to end his life to experience oblivion. He did not join jihad for piety or hope of paradise or fighting in the way of God but Amis finds that the only imaginative way to deal with the terrorist as the ultimate ‘Other’ is to connect him to faith and then attack it.

A second group of novels have a mainly Third World viewpoint regarding September 11 and terrorism. Four works are especially important as they deal with these themes. A short story, “Alone and All Together” (2002) by Joseph Geha, Laila Halaby’s novel, *Once in A Promised Land* (2007), Mohsin Hamid’s *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* (2007) and H. M. Naqvi’s *Home Boy* (2009) engage with September 11 and terrorism in the context of Muslim-Americans’ experiences after September 11. Geha’s short story takes place in Chicago where Libby, the first person narrator, who is an Arab-American teenage girl, experiences the shock of September 11, which makes

her reflect on her cherished American-ness. Similarly, her sister Sally, shares her feelings. The story captures the fear of an immigrant family due to persecution and alienation after September 11. Similarly, the Haddad's family in Halaby's novel experiences the same sense of displacement and isolation Libby feels towards the end of Geha's story. This Jordanian family in Halaby's novel is economically successful in the US, but faces excessive challenges due to their identity in the wake of September 11. The attacks and the increased discrimination afterwards, leave the family physically and spiritually estranged. Like the protagonist in *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, the terrifying incident of September 11 makes the Haddad family deeply conscious of their Muslim identities. H. M. Naqvi's *Home Boy* (2009) is an example of counter-narrative to Orientalism in Western discourse that writes back to the American Empire in the aftermath of September 11. The protagonist, Chuck Shehzad, and his friends try to negotiate a new identity in pursuit of social and economic goals, contrary to the Orientalist discourse, which fixates identities. The discourse heightens after September 11, and Muslim characters suffer disorientation, as their religious and national identities become suspect in the eyes of the people and law in America. After relentless discrimination and loss of hope, they reconsider their previous allegiances, and become resentful towards America. Similarly, the protagonist in Mohsin Hamid's *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* (2007) has assimilative tendencies in the beginning regarding his stay in United States. This tendency shifts to a provocative outburst against the United States after experiences of othering, stereotyping, and discrimination post-September 11. He rebels and offers a discourse of resistance to American imperialism.

A third group of novels have a typical European stance that looks for a middle ground between these two positions. Ian McEwan *Saturday* (2005), Dan Fesperman's *The Warlord Son* (2005), and Joseph O'Neill's *Netherland* (2008) are significant attempts in this regard to engage with spaces of conflict and discomfort resulting from a discourse of binaries. Fesperman's novel takes place in the present-day Afghanistan, where the fates of an American journalist and a Pakistani translator become intertwined. By exploring spaces for meaningful engagement with the 'Other', the novel attempts to develop a discourse that avoids the binary opposition the other two groups employ. Such novels look for a multicultural and multiethnic space in today's cosmopolitan centers, dictated by a discourse, which might facilitate smooth interaction among people

of different ethnicities, nations, and faiths. Joseph O'Neill's *Netherland* (2008) is a significant novel, which has not received the attention it deserves given that it embraces transatlantic, cosmopolitan, and international inclinations. The novel introduces an immigrant 'Other' space through the game of cricket. A Dutch national, the protagonist Hans van den Broek, finds his life paralyzed after September 11. This anxiety compels him to look for stability, and he leans on the game of cricket, played by an immigrant community in New York City. In the process, he discovers the presence of large multiethnic communities in the city. Predominantly sport, and, to a lesser degree, business, become the medium of interaction in the cosmopolitan space like New York City as a means of trying to reach a great understanding of the life of the 'Other'.

Literary criticism of the September 11 novels bemoans the binary position most narratives in the first group of novels take. Generally, these criticisms have been less consistent and more diffuse as critics try to deal with many issues in a single text or group of texts. One book or article tries to explore many tropes or themes in a number of texts or genres like novel, drama, poetry and the media. What most critics have in common is their critique of the September 11 novel in terms of its ability to respond to a cataclysmic event of immense repercussions. They examine the power of literature and language to represent the new event and the trauma caused by it, the effect on the family unit, and the blurring of boundaries between public and private spaces. Recent criticism also examines September 11 literature for its capacity to engage with issues outside the United States' national borders, cultural conflicts, and its effective engagement with the 'Other' to understand terrorism and terrorists' psychology. *Literature After September 11* (2008) characterizes September 11 literature by drawing on trauma theory, genre theory, and political theory to deal with a plethora of issues embodied by September 11 literature. The collection explores the evolution of September 11 literature from early innovative responses in newspapers, magazines, and poetry collections to a more thoughtful and collective appraisal. Richard Gray's *After the Fall: American Literature after 9/11* (2011) brings together in book form the thesis he presented in "Open Doors, Close Minds: American Prose Writing at a Time of Crisis," published in 2009. Gray analyzes the characteristics of literature in response to crisis in American history to find patterns of disorientation after such events. He is critical of the September 11 novel for its failed imaginative response to the crisis, and wants it to engage the 'Other' by

following the pattern of immigrant novels like Christina Garcia's *Dreaming in Cuban* (1992) and Bharati Mukherjee's *Jasmine* (1989).

Michael Rothberg, in his article "A Failure of the Imagination: Diagnosing the 9/11 Novel: A Response to Richard Gray," considers Gray's model for the novel to be centripetal, which tries to bring the world to America, thus making it a universal nation. Rothberg believes in the possibility of a centrifugal model, and he believes that some September 11 novels, like *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, have already begun that process. Kristiaan Versluys, in his book *Out of the Blue: September 11 and the Novel* (2009), analyzes September 11 novel, and believes that most of the novels have been mostly successful. He also studies trauma in these novels, and investigates the novel's evolution from narrow patriotism to new ethical insights. Martin Randall's *9/11 and the Literature of Terror* (2011) follows more or less similar patterns. He investigates patterns in September 11 novels, the debate surrounding the representation of traumatic events, narrative, the relationship between visual and the written texts, and controversies of history. He also discusses the rivalry surrounding the take of Western and Third World writers on September 11 and terrorism. Most criticism of the September 11 novels finds some early responses less germane because they dwell on the rugged themes of trauma and domesticity. Gray, Versluys and Randall agree that such themes restrain meaningful understanding of the event, terrorism, terrorists' psychology, and the gamut of the conflict between Islam and the West in global perspectives. Most of this criticism finds the September 11 novel ineffective as it rewrites American imperialism and depicts the West as an innocent victim of violent Islam. I argue that some of this criticism is valid, as writers locate terrorism in a mythical and textual misperception, contrary to actual histories of imperialism. What I do differently is to apply Orientalism to these novels to locate the sources and reasons for such misperceptions. I also argue that there are also significant departures from such narrow views towards narratives of resistance, as well as reconciliation, due to the fact that a large number of different people and cultures occupy the same cosmopolitan space in our contemporary world.

Jean Baudrillard in *The Spirit of Terrorism and Other Essays* (2003) looks at terrorism in the context of universalization, expanding globalization, the totalitarian monopoly of power by the West, and the logical resistance to such power. He

contextualizes the West-Islam conflict, terrorism and suicide bombing in similar contexts. Baudrillard thinks that contrary to the common perception that radical Islam's terrorism is motivated by faith, it is America's definitive power in the contemporary world that instigates terrorism. Slavoj Žižek's *Welcome to the Desert of the Real! Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates* (2002) take psychoanalytic approaches to study September 11, terrorism, media, and the "Clash of Civilizations". Instead of a "Clash of Civilizations," Žižek believes that contemporary terrorism emanates from clashes inside civilizations. Similarly, his *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections* (2008) draws upon mostly Lacanian psychology and Kantian analysis to differentiate between objective and subjective violence, and systemic varieties of violence. He believes that different political, religious, and economic ideologies disguise these varieties (23). The topic of terrorism is vast, but these two contemporary critics are useful to any study of terrorism. Baudrillard's argument that Islam's reaction against West's expansive global power is representative of a resistance to a definitive order (6) relates to the resistance narrative discussed in chapter three. His examination of feelings of humiliation in the Islamic world and the phenomenon of suicide bombing is also relevant to the discussion of these topics in chapter two. Similarly, Žižek's essays are important in the context of the West's different perspectives regarding violence in the West and the Third World, the angry American response to September 11, and the Islam-Modernity debate.

Baudrillard believes that the totalizing and "definitive order" of the empire, represented by The World Trade Center, provoked a reaction against it (*The Spirit of Terrorism*, 6). The complete shift from a textual history to an image-dominated, mediated reality, where the mediated image replaces any need for an experience beyond it, is called something, which Baudrillard terms "simulation". This shift happens over three stages as summarized by Paul Hegarty in *Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory* (2004). The first stage is the making of copies. Natural signs of power exist, but the shift in these signs results in competition, which opens up the door for creating "copies". At this stage, there is a reality being imitated, a genuine copy as it is. In the second order of simulation, what we have is the "political economy of the sign," a stage where what we have is representation. Paul Hegarty calls this stage in his book on Baudrillard "the industrial era, or, approximately modernity" (50). In the third order of simulacra, all we have is simulation. The real no longer exists. Simulation is its own reality as the sign

replaces what it represents. Baudrillard sees that we are moving towards, if not already inhabiting, hyper-reality, where data and the flow of information shape who we are and how we live. He gives the example of loyalty card companies being only interested in the purchases one makes, and the amount of money they spend, and where. There is no interest in the individual qua person. The individual does not exist as a potential singularity but is instead a set of data that represents him, and predicts his or her desire, only to manufacture more objects of desire that fit their size perfectly. *Falling Man* points towards the representational and provocative quality of the World Trade Centers which were built as the sign of prestige and power, which would become signs of destruction and fall in future (116).

The Arab perspective of September 11 is akin to those in the novels studied in the third chapter. Arab writers lament the resurfacing of the old discourse of conflict between the West and Islam, discrimination against Arab immigrants to the West, and the counter-terrorism narrative of “War on Terror” against Muslim countries after September 11. Like the novels in chapter three, Arab writers also focus on an intensified othering, stereotyping, discrimination, and the use of force by the U.S. against mostly Islamic countries. Susan M. Akram’s “The Aftermath of September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims in America” (2002), and Salah Hassan’s “Arabs, Race and the Post-September 11 National Security State” (2002), are some examples. These writers, like the author of *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, critique what Said feared to be an intensified discourse of Orientalism. Similarly, Fawaz A. Gerges’ contributions in pleading the case of Arabs and Islam is significant because he, like Žižek and Baudrillard, puts post-September 11 violence in the broader context of globalization.

The response to the West’s Orientalist discourse after September 11 mostly comes from women writers in the Arab world. This response poignantly undercuts Orientalists’ charge against Islam as a misogynist religion. These women include authors such as Naomi Shihab Nye, Mohja Kahf, Dima Hilal, and D.H. Melhem. They wrote articles, poems, and letters to intertwine their personal pain with those of Americans. Their works mostly revolve around themes of intersections between Arab and American experiences. As a response to Orientalism, these works also contextualize events in historical terms without justification or rationalization of violence. Like *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, these writers also reconsider the concept of home and

homeland in light of the new notion of the “enemy within” after September 11. As a result, their works are critical towards exclusive discourses like Orientalism, and bring a challenge to US’s misperception of Islam. Similar to narratives in chapter three in terms of Muslims, these authors insist on depicting verisimilitude between Arabs and Arab-Americans to counter prejudiced discourses of ‘othering’. More importantly, they try to explore possibilities of reconciliation by problematizing the misconstrued distances separating the ‘Other’ from America.

Amal T. Abdelraze’s book, *Contemporary Arab American Women Writers: Hyphenated Identities and Border Crossings* (2008), points out how Muslim authors are calling attention to the othering, racism, oppression, discrimination, and marginalization they have experienced in America. Using postcolonial and feminist literary theories, the book investigates Arab-American women writers’ critique of intellectual tendencies that might be grasped as making concessions to Western and Orientalist fundamentalist regimes and movements that in effect abandon Arab women to their iron rule. Abdelraze argues that Arab American women writers are critical towards marginalizing and othering discourses, and describe what it means to belong to a nation as it wages war in their homelands, supports the elimination of Palestine, and stereotypes Muslim men as extremists, wife beaters, rapists while women as oppressed, marginalized, and silenced by male absolute authority and domination.

Backlash September 11: Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans Respond (2009), by Annay Bakalin and Mehdi Bozorgmehr explore the backlash against Arabs and Muslims after September 11. Not surprisingly, the backlash against Muslim Americans was considerable, as the attacks stirred up a string of retaliatory hate – crimes, ethnic profiling, appearance – based prejudice, and devastating governmental practices that curtailed civil liberties. In addition to verbal and physical assaults, the book gives an account of numerous violent incidents that included property damage, loss of jobs, and special scrutiny at airports caused by anti-Muslim hate propaganda. The interviews with Muslims display their commitment to the US and the expression of their distancing themselves from extremism or terrorists. Most Islamic responses concentrate on identity and an increased sense of ‘othering’ after September 11 while defending their rights and distancing themselves from terrorism.

Similarly, postcolonial critics have found similar continuities of exploitation and suppression in terrorism's discourse as it is "couched in familiar orientalist metaphors" to frame "the anti-colonial other" and legitimize the colonial self by contrast (Boehmer and Morton, 7). *Postcoloniality: And Anthology of Cultural Theory and Criticism* (2005) brings together essays that study postcolonial theory and postcolonial cultures in the contemporary world. The anthology tackles postcolonial themes like ideologies of imperialism, colonial discourse, politics of language and literary studies, nationalisms, hybridity, gender and sexuality, the subaltern, globalization and postcoloniality. These themes are more important in the post-September 11 period as Mohsin Hamid's narrative in the chapter three deals with all these related themes. Similarly, *Terror and the Postcolonial: A Concise Companion* (2010) is an important work, as it deals with postcolonial themes in the post-September 11 era. The work takes a comparative approach to the study of terrorism and its representations in postcolonial theory, literature, and culture. Critics in this anthology analyze the representation of terrorism in a variety of postcolonial literary texts from South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Critics find the subject of terror a result of globalization and a result of post-colonialism.

Shahid Alam's *Challenging the New Orientalism: Dissenting Essays on the 'War Against Islam'* (2006) argues that a new form of Orientalism has been developing over the past two decades. As exemplified by a discourse of the "Clash of Civilizations," and advocated by Huntington, Lewis, Fukuyama, and the novelists in chapter two, the new form points to Islam as the West's archenemy. These Orientalist supporters of the new clash represent the rise of political Islam and its opposition to Western domination of the Islamic world as evidence of a deep and inherent hatred of the West. Therefore, as Alam argues, these "new Orientalists" call for comprehensive reforms, regime changes, wars, and the imposition of democracy in the Islamic world. "New Orientalists" caution that if the West disregarded these challenges, the Islamists will gain power through violence and annihilate the West (*Challenging the New Orientalism*, 183). Like the narrative in chapter three, Alam disputes the new Orientalist presumption of an unchanging Islam post-September 11, which is opposed to "Western" values and incapable of adapting to the modern world. He also believes that the objective of the new Orientalism is to promote US and Israel's imperialist penetration into the Islamic world as both operate through a new security imperative, and the continuation of the so-

called colonial civilizing mission. Alam also argues that the new Orientalist claim of a conflict between Islam and the West is based on an unfair interpretation of history (204). As a matter of fact, Alam does not glorify the Islamic world due to its failures, but believes that these are legacies of two centuries of Western imperialism and these failures are common in regions on the periphery of the contemporary global capitalism.

There are several theses and dissertations on Islam and September 11 in the fields of Literature, International Relations, Political Science, Media Studies, and Cultural Studies. Zipporah Yamamoto's *After September 11: Transformation of Memory into History* (2011), a PhD dissertation in the field of Culture and Performance, investigates the transformational processes in public spaces to facilitate the emergence of a national "narrative memory" from personal memories of loss and remembrance. Public ceremonies, speeches, emblems, monuments, and vigils become parts of such a national narrative memory. The research is interesting in terms of how the American September 11 nationalist rhetoric drew on the Pearl Harbor incident in 1941 to describe an enemy belonging to an "Axis of Evil." My research is different because only one chapter in this work studies the depiction of a similar enemy in September 11 novels in terms of Said's Orientalism. Martyn Oliver's PhD dissertation, in *A Thousand and One Nights" and the Construction of Islam in Western Imagination* (2009) explores the history of Orientalism in the Western psyche. The writer argues that *A Thousand and One Nights*, though not a purely religious text, influenced western imagination as a religious and cultural text. According to the author's findings, many factors blurred the boundaries between facts and fiction, and added to the already flawed representations. Discussion of Updike's *Terrorist* in chapter two deals with a similar misrepresentation, but unlike Oliver, I argue that the source is not some fairy tale, but the very script of the Quran, which the writer manipulates to reinforce certain Orientalist stereotypes.

Noreen Kousar Zaman's PhD dissertation *Understanding the Experiences of Discrimination in Muslim Americans Post-September 11* (2009) analyzes first-hand stories of discrimination against Muslims in America due to misperceptions of Islam and Muslims after September 11. Zaman's dissertation is relevant in terms of similar instances in chapter three of my dissertation of discrimination suffered by Muslim protagonists after September 11, but my research locates this discrimination in terms of how Orientalism fits into the context of September 11 novel. *Who Defines Me:*

Orientalism Revisited and Occidentalism Redefined in Post September 11 Era (2011), a PhD dissertation by Eid Ahmad Abdelwahab Mohamed, examines Occidentalism in Arab fiction and films after September 11. According to his findings, Arab fiction and films depict the West according to the same binaries of “us” and “them.” As I discuss in chapter three, a Pakistani writer responds to the stereotyping he is subjected to by stereotyping the United States as an aggressor. Unlike Eid Ahmad’s dissertation, which studies Occidentalism in the context of popular Occidental stereotypes in the Middle East, I argue that the Pakistani author writes back to the empire in terms of Said’s resistance narratives.

A Master’s thesis by Nathan Chapman Lean *Islam and the West: Problematizing a Discourse of Dualism* (2010) investigates how a dualistic discourse presumes, configures, and reinforces a relationship of conflict between Islam and the West. Lean’s research is relevant in terms of my discussions of Orientalist narratives in chapter two, but unlike Lean’s research on the linguistic aspect of the dualistic discourse in religious and political terms, my research explores Orientalism and Occidentalism in the context of empire and resistance. Sheila Knight’s Master’s thesis *Out of the Ruins: Reconstructing the Symbolic in Three 9/11 Novels* (2010) investigates *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, *Saturday* and *Falling Man* as symbolic crisis narratives, employing Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of ‘chronotopo’ and Jacques Lacan’s theories of psychoanalysis. The thesis is interesting in terms of a crisis in the Symbolic, and the writers’ attempt to fill the void created by September 11. Though the perception of a changed world in chapter two and three of my dissertation are related to Knight’s thesis, unlike her psychoanalytic approaches, my discussions approach the change in terms of Islam-West conflict after September 11. Kathryn Mary Elizabeth Lee’s Master’s thesis *Fiction as Resistance: The post-9/11 novel as an alternative to the dominant narrative* (2012) analyzes *Falling Man*, *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, and *Saturday* in terms of their resistance to the dominant narrative that overtook the media and political rhetoric in the days after September 11. The author argues, through this resistance, the novels create spaces for the reader to re-examine and re-imagine the causes for, consequences of, and responses to September 11. According to Lee’s findings, the dominant narrative is that, although Americans suffered huge loss of life and significant trauma, the media and government agencies overwhelmingly focused firmly on the heroics of the days

rather than the more uncomfortable or tragic elements. Unlike Lee's thesis my dissertation analyzes the same novels for continuities and transformations of Orientalism in novels written after September 11. I also investigate variations in the September 11 novels to see Orientalism's evolution in the West, and a response to it from the Third World. As shown by these examples, researchers in different fields have investigated the event to contribute to knowledge about September 11. Some of these dissertations use the theoretical framework of Orientalism, but its application is either limited or applied to fields other than literature.

1.2. Significance and Overall Objectives

Unlike earlier criticisms and publications in the discursive field of Orientalism, this examination explores how post-September 11 novels engage with the conflict between the West and Islam after September 11. Don DeLillo's *Falling Man* and John Updike's *Terrorist* are examined for an intensified Orientalism after September 11. Both texts depict the West under attack from Islam, a fundamentalist religion of inherent violence. Mohsin Hamid's *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* is investigated as a resistance narrative to respond to that intensified Orientalism after September 11. The purpose of this novel is to resist America's imperialism by countering its discriminations, othering, and stereotypes of the Other. Ian McEwan's *Saturday* is analyzed for its exploration of new spaces to engage with post-September 11 anxiety and the Other. This novel looks for spaces of comfort to counteract that anxiety and engage with the Other in the cosmopolitan space. The evolution of the September 11 novel in the last seventeen years and its intersections with the media are also examined.

The dissertation looks for patterns of continuities in, and transformations of Orientalism in these September 11 narratives. Two such continuities are the discourse of Orientalism, and a discourse of resistance to Orientalism. I argue that these discourses have transmuted into more explicit and provocative forms due to the intensification of the conflict between Islam and the West post-September 11. It is important to note that in this context Orientalism has evolved from a subtle "textual attitude" into an explicit one that uses unambiguous vocabulary to connect individual terrorists to their collective ideology. Othering is one aspect of Orientalism, but I apply the theory of Orientalism, and its variations in a comprehensive manner to see its dispersal in many texts. The

research goes beyond ‘othering’ to include cultural, political, economic, and historical reasons causing misunderstandings and conflicts. I claim that these criticisms have overlooked important texts in the field or have only partially analyzed them. This limitation has influenced their assessment of the September 11 novel as an ineffective response to September 11 and terrorism.

More importantly, and unlike previous research and criticisms, my research investigates variations in the September 11 novel to see Orientalism’s current evolution in the West, and a response to it from the Third World. As the analysis shows, the world has changed after September 11, resulting in a different perception of East-West relationships. The phenomenon of terrorism has destabilized hitherto totalizing theories, as can be seen in these novels. These novels attempt to challenge stereotypical discourses in imaginative ways, and explore inclusive, non-partisan and co-existential spaces for interaction despite conflicts. While it is true that critics have called for such an engagement, I argue that an exploration of spaces for engagement has already begun. I claim that a balanced and inclusive assessment has begun to manifest itself in certain September 11 novels that have taken strides to accommodate difference. As good literature takes time to respond appropriately to events of immense magnitude, the September 11 novel also needs some time to evolve. One positive evolution is that people from both sides of the Orientalist divide are trying to arrive at some discourse of understanding to stop wars and killing. This dissertation is meant to make a contribution to that evolutionary process. The selection of texts is dictated by the same impulse to include representations of major views about September 11, terrorism and the conflict between Islam and the West to avoid repeating exclusive or limited views. The major analysis includes two novels by American authors, a novel by a Pakistani, and a novel by a British writer. It is important that responses from around the world are included to represent the multivocality initiated by September 11 events.

1.3. Methodology and Background

My approach to analyze the selected texts will be based on cultural criticism. The analysis primarily employs Edward Said’s *Orientalism* as the theoretical framework to study the selected texts. The othering aspect of Orientalism also connects to similar concepts in Frantz Fanon and Homi Bhabha in the postcolonial context: as

projects of colonialism and imperialism in both postcolonial theory and Orientalism have similar means and ends. However, my dissertation predominantly uses Said's *Orientalism* for the theoretical framework to look at these September 11 novels.

To support the claim that some September 11 novels sustain Orientalism, chapter two examines Don DeLillo's *Falling Man* and John Updike's *Terrorist* as conflict between Islam and the West is the main theme of these narratives. *Falling Man* has become an important September 11 novel because it engages with many tropes in post-September 11 fiction. Versluys, for example, has analyzed *Falling Man* for the themes of trauma, melancholia, family, and dystopia. According to Versluys, DeLillo "indicates that September 11 can only be understood geopolitically as the clash of two opposing frames of reference, two world visions on a collision course" (Versluys, 44). Though I partially agree with Versluys' view, I will argue that the novel does not explain those opposing frames of reference, but instead recreates them through othering and stereotyping, thereby showing DeLillo contributing to the discourse of othering. More importantly, my purpose here is to explain the reason behind the opposition, and how that opposition is sustained through an Orientalist discourse. Updike's *Terrorist* has received mixed criticism in its dealing with the "Other." Versluys believes that the novel is a successful attempt to deal with the "Other," even though he details the divided views of critics on how well *Terrorist* deals with the 'Other' (170). Anna Hartnell considers *Terrorist* a major departure from a typical western "victim" narrative to a "perpetrator" narrative, and that instead of "us," Updike throws light on "them," a discursive move that establishes the political other ("Violence and the Faithful in Post-9/11 America", 478). I argue though that Updike portrays Islam by using Orientalist stereotypes, and sometimes resorts to inauthentic and out of place references from the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet to establish such stereotypes. Gray has harsh criticism for *Terrorist*, arguing that it fails to get inside the skin of the 'Other' (36).

Terrorist not only fails to engage with the Other, but it resorts to an Orientalist discourse to malign the Other and reinforce stereotypes about Islam and Muslims, thus contributing to the antagonism. Both of these selected primary texts portray the West under attack from Islam, a religion of inherent violence and radical fundamentalism. The application of Orientalism is pertinent as the authors draw upon the political and scholarly discourse of their time, using approaches, which according to Said, makes one

an Orientalist. These approaches include the location of the authors, narrative voices they adopt, the type of structure they build, the kind of images they use, and themes and motifs they have behind such efforts.

In the beginning of the second chapter, Orientalism is introduced and its basic tenets are discussed. Emphasis is placed on Said's description of the Orientalist discourse, the processes of its creation, the psychological, economic and cultural motives behind such efforts, the processes of stereotyping and 'othering,' and the history of the relationship between the West and the East. In the analysis part of the chapter, *Falling Man* and *Terrorist* are explored to identify traces of Orientalism. The first thing that these narratives share is their use of a system of Orientalist binaries to depict Islam and the West in opposition. A second pattern depicts Islam as anti-West in these narratives, which intensifies the West-Islam opposition. Thirdly and closely related with the first two patterns, another pattern characterizes Islam and Muslims as inherently violent entities. Individual Muslims and collective Islam are represented as failures due to a sense of a lost history and revanchist tendencies. Islamic identity is one of defeat, loss, revenge, and displacement. There are also several examples of Orientalist stereotypes of Muslims in these narratives. They are depicted as death-loving fanatics who hate life and love death and suicide. Closely related are other stereotypes of Muslims as violent Jihadists. All these violent stereotypes contribute to the phenomenon of Islamophobia in the West, which visibly increased after September 11. Some other common stereotypes of Muslims in these narratives are those of fatalism, misogyny, oppression of women, and sensuality.

The two narratives create the Other through othering and stereotyping by going inside the mind of the Muslim-terrorist. A psychoanalytical approach is employed in both texts in an attempt to understand the working processes in their minds. *Falling Man* recreates these stereotypes by going inside the Hamburg Cell, the September 11 terrorists. The Western civilization is depicted as "us," which is under attack by the civilization of Islam, the 'Other'. This use of binaries differentiates one civilization from the other, and identifies Islam with terrorism by connecting the September 11 terrorists with Islam in the novel. Important to the othering and stereotyping is the character of Hammad, a member of the cell. The attempt to go inside the mind of the terrorist 'Other' recreates the very process of 'othering.' The conflict between the West

and Islam is minimized to the latter's hatred for the former's unrestrained technological progress. This hate is realized in the mind of Hammad. Throughout the novel, two civilizations are pitted against each other. DeLillo creates a civilization under attack from another civilization, thus creating a vicious cycle that shows no sign of ending. This is exhibited at the end of the novel, where the narratives of the West and Islam meet only in conflict. As Islam seems to be incompatible with the ideals of Western civilization, so Islam is identified as the problem. A reductive approach to use the totalizing word "Islam" interchangeably with terrorism in the novel makes it a perfect example of the stereotyping Said identifies in *Orientalism*. Along with the narrator, American characters draw upon the discourse of *Orientalism* when they characterize Islam and Muslims.

Updike's *Terrorist* also attempts to go inside the mind of Ahmad Ashmawy, an American-Arab Muslim terrorist-would-be, to understand the reasons behind a mad act of terrorism. The narrative depicts the strange, weird and exotic world of Islam in the mind of Ahmad when he thinks aloud about the so-called immoral West, and uses quotes from the Quran and sayings of the prophet Muhammad to justify his thinking. His mind is employed to differentiate between two civilizations: the liberal, consumerist and capitalist West, and a despotic, backward, and anti-West Islam. Ahmad, influenced by the interpretations of his Islamic mentor Rashid, believes that Western godlessness and immorality eat at the roots of his religion - Islam. His radical Islamic belief teaches him that all other religions are false and strayed. His evolution from a tormented teenager to a suicide bomber is a commonplace theme in terrorists' narratives circulated by the media. To malign and demonize Islam and Muslims, Updike resorts to all kinds of stereotypes. This portrayal is seriously prejudiced as Ahmad is strictly situated within the religious discourse.

In chapter three, I argue that there are September 11 novels which respond to *Orientalism's* prejudices. These novels follow the model of resistance narratives in Said's *Culture and Imperialism*. Such a resistance is instigated by an intensified *Orientalism* post-September 11, as Third World people experience marginalization and discrimination in metropolitan centers like New York City. Similarly, they think that their countries suffer poverty and violence due to America's imperialistic designs. Such narratives are corollaries to *Orientalism* because Said believes that colonialism and

imperialism have always attracted resistance from the natives or those subjugated. In other words, there is always resistance and Occidentalism whenever there is Orientalism. Opponents portray the West in much the same uniform and negative way Orientalism portrays the East. In fact, I argue that there are texts written by Third World writers, in my dissertation by a Pakistani writer, which use more or less similar approaches to counteract the West's stereotyping of the Orient, and stereotype the West in the process. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* is a counter-narrative, because it depicts a dehumanizing image of the West after the protagonist experiences othering and stereotyping post-September 11.

Said's resistance narrative to the discourse of Orientalism and imperialism would be an inversion of Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* (1899). This novella depicts the voyage of an imperialist to the Third World space-first Kurtz's and then Marlowe's voyages to Congo. A resistance narrative would do the opposite-a voyage a Third World person takes to the imperialist space. Said considers *The River Between* (1965) and *Season of Migration to the North* (1969) as model resistance narratives where the imperialized writers appropriate as well as undermine the Western discourse because of its totalizing tendencies towards them. Such stories reinterpret the colonial discourse to renegotiate the identities of the subjugated. I argue that these novels are similar to post-September 11 resistance narratives. These narratives also respond to those in chapter two to emphasize the fact that the Third World is not a perpetrator of terrorism, but like the West, its victim. Similarly, unlike the American narrative, the Third World narrative raises questions about America's hegemony in the world, and its contribution to violence. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* offers a more internationalized form of resistance against Orientalism and imperialism. The analysis will include economic, political, and cultural aspects that lead to the imbalanced relationship between Islam and the West.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist is an example of counter-narratives to Orientalism in Western discourse. The novel approaches the conflict in two ways: trying to destabilize Orientalism's stereotypes, and then Occidentalizing the West by representing it as a discriminatory and unjust power which does not hesitate to use violence to achieve its economic objectives. The protagonist from the Third World comes to the United States in hopes of a good life in educational, economic, and social

terms. He goes through experiences of dislocation, a common theme in postcolonial theory. He also develops ambivalence towards America as he is excited by prospects of a promising life in the U.S., but feels shame towards his own national identity. At this initial stage, his deterritorialized self is located in the interstices between two cultures. However, all prospects of a good life and the enriching experiences of living between these cultures are disillusioned because of the transformed mood of the U.S. after September 11. This identity shift takes place because of intensified stereotyping, othering, and discrimination after the event. Next how this narrative tries to break the stereotypes in the Orientalist discourse as a means of countering the popular stereotypes of Islam and Muslims in the West is analyzed. This shift pushes the protagonist back to identifying with his cultural, national, and Third World identity. A previous sense of inferiority switches to superiority and pride as he tries to connect himself to his rich heritage back home. As this occurs, an anti-American resentment and resistance takes hold of the narrative as the U.S. is blamed for all sorts of problems: economic exploitation of the Third World; interference in other countries; and the U.S. empire's use of violence to advance its policies.

The chapter explores how *The Reluctant Fundamentalist's* protagonist Changez is torn between the West and his identity as a Muslim and a Pakistani. His education and stay in the United States expose him to Orientalism, which discriminates against him on the basis of his identity. He rebels and comes out with a discourse of Occidentalism. Like a typical Orientalist, he uses the same techniques against the West. Through the use of monologues, the narrator takes control of the narrative and imposes meanings and interpretations on his American interlocutor and the reader. Two incidents change his perception of America. During a visit to Manila, Philippines, he finds himself connected to marginalized people through a Third World sensibility. Similarly, while in a hotel room in Manila on September 11, he feels unusually delighted at the sight on a TV screen of the two towers falling. These instances make him realize his hidden hatred against America. This hatred reaches its climax during another visit to Valparaiso, Chile, as he starts believing that he is participating in an imperialist system exploiting the Third World, including his country. Added to these resentments are experiences of discrimination, which pushes Changez to rebel. He leaves America, goes back to Pakistan, and starts an anti-American campaign to

disengage Pakistan from America.

Chapter four explores a novel that departs from Orientalism's limiting influences to engage with terrorism and the Other. There are still traces of Orientalism, but protagonist in this novel tries to look for a middle ground to counteract the anxiety in the post-September 11 world. McEwan's *Saturday* has patterns of accommodation, peaceful co-existence and human decency. This text has a more nuanced approach towards the conflict, although critics disagree. While Versluys says that *Saturday* depicts "a life marked by decency and a concern for the other," (191) Martin Randall has the opposite view. Randall argues that *Saturday*, like early responses to the event, "established certain boundaries that close down alternative responses" (23). I argue that the novel has both views, but juxtaposes them to create a middle ground, a space of harmony despite difference and conflict.

Saturday makes a case for a peaceful co-existence and a new ethos in a world of conflicting identities, a request confirmed by Said in his 2003 preface and afterword to *Orientalism*. The novel calls for such a discourse in a migratory world of evading borders and conflicting identities. As can be seen in Said's writings after September 11, one finds him struggling with looking for exceptions to his theory, which was criticized for its limiting tendencies. Responding to these accusations, and meditating on the positive outcomes of his theory, he believed that if writers engage with concrete instances of conflicts using unbiased approaches, there might be some possibilities of reconciliation between the West and Islam. Said was also happy with the fact that critics around the world have interpreted *Orientalism* as an attempt to reemphasize the worth of multiculturalism in the contemporary world. He wants Western writers to challenge Orientalism intellectually, ideologically, and politically to explore possibilities of such a negotiating space. At the same time, he recognizes that there are some writers in the West who have made successful attempts to resist Orientalism and engage with the Other. As the analysis shows, while there are traces of Orientalism in *Saturday*, it also embraces a new approach towards that difference and the 'Other' that is compassionate, balanced, and humane.

Contrary to the psychoanalytical approach to study the terrorists' minds in texts in chapter two, *Saturday* focuses on the minds of Western characters as they go through

experiences of anxiety. This anxiety is triggered by a constant fear of terrorism and close contact with the Other who is suspected of violence. The idea is to get these characters out of their comfort zone and bring them into a space of crisis so that they could find their spaces of comfort. This novel tries to establish a discourse governed by a scientific attitude, secularism or atheism because these are recognized as the only feasible discourses in a conflictive environment. Characters also have to come to terms with the rising power of America in comparison to the declining powers of their countries. In this instance, this narrative takes a resentful approach, like the one in *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*. The idea is to let this space of discomfort give way to an alternative, which is the concept of multiculturalism in the post-September 11 world. It forces these characters to come to terms with the Other for the sake of peace and a smooth working relationship.

McEwan's *Saturday* presents the cases of East and West and looks for a middle ground based on mutual understanding and human decency. The novel is set in the London of 2003, months before the Iraq war. The chapter analyzes how this novel dramatizes the conflict between the West and Islam in the one-day ordeal of a London family. Western civilization, symbolized by the prosperity and peace of London, perceives itself under attack from an Islamic terrorist, when a burning plane enters the skies of London. It turns out to be an unfounded threat later on, but the perception keeps the protagonist anxious for the remainder of the day. Millions of protesters march against the impending attack on Iraq the same day. This constant anxiety of terrorism is realized when Baxter, a marauding hooligan, takes the protagonist's family hostage. Somehow unexpectedly, protagonist's daughter's recitation of a Matthew Arnold poem, transforms this hardened criminal, and the protagonist, a neurosurgeon, operates on the same criminal that night. The message that is conveyed through the actions of the surgeon is human decency and care for the "Other."

When the writing style of the selected texts is observed, the common feature is the constant authorial commentaries and intrusions by the narrators. *Falling Man* employs a postmodernist style: a straightforward – but temporally and spatially disrupted – narrative to dramatize the effects of September 11 on a survivor from the Towers and his family. There is no real beginning or end and the narrative does not follow a chronological order. The reader bounces from one scene to another, and to yet

another in a few pages. There are two non-converging narratives of New Yorkers and the terrorist that never meet except in a deadly clash. Noting the novel's unconventional and non-linear structure, Keniston calls the novel a "temporally and spatially disrupted novel whose temporal shifts allow DeLillo to represent the effects of the attacks on the characters, but they also dramatize how the survivors integrate the experience into their lives" (5). The attacks are incomprehensible and therefore traumatic, and the writing style aims to reflect this. The part involving the hijacker's story presents a clear straightforward narration, which probably is meant to present the allegedly primitive and uncritical mind of the hijackers. Even though there are interruptions, Updike's *Terrorist*'s narrative is descriptive, chronological, and coherent. The narrator also intrudes everywhere as he comes up with a storm of comments. There is in-text information about the characters, Islam, and its history, and claims are supported with one-sided and inconsistent quotations from the Quran, the Sharia, and hadiths. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* also has authorial commentary due to the autobiographical nature of the novel. Hamid uses an extended dramatic monologue form with flashbacks from the narrator's past to fill the gaps. *Saturday* has a similar tendency of authorial commentaries. Through its poignant style, it is descriptive, coherent, and chronological because the story encompasses twenty-four hours of the characters. Though the narrative unfolds in concrete events, the narrator resorts to commentary to take us inside the minds of the characters.

Chapter five concludes the dissertation with an assessment of the September 11 novel, keeping in view its progression from a narrow and restricted engagement to a broader one. Such an assessment is necessary in order to visualize the trajectory of its future evolution, since it seems that all novels are September 11 novels now. The conclusion will also look at major terrorist events involving Muslims in the last two decades to explore intersection between some September 11 novels and the media. It is worth connecting actual terrorism with its representation in literature and media to see whether a collective discourse governs these representations. As the media appears in most September 11 novels, it is relevant to discuss the stakes of governments and the media in establishing such a connection. This assessment is also necessary because Said believes in the political nature of all representations. The media, like novels, project or instigate political affiliations or formations. There are political responses to the media in

the three categories of September 11 novels in this dissertation can be seen. *Terrorist* and *Falling Man* use similar strategies and images in the media, thus making both accessories to America's imperialism. Noam Chomsky's *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda* (2002) and

Said's *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (1981) critique a similar role the media plays in advancing America's imperialist goals. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* resists and critiques the same strategies and images in the media. *Saturday* has a sense of doubt, anxiety, and even feelings of guilt and responsibility for what the media is doing. The conclusion will try to give some sense of these intersections and trajectories.

1.4. Criticism to *Orientalism*

The publication of Edward W. Said's *Orientalism* marked a momentous intervention in the historiography of Western imperialism and Western representations of the Middle East. Many regarded *Orientalism* as "one of the most influential scholarly books published in English in the humanities in the last quarter of the twentieth century" (Lockman, 190). It stormed up a debate in the academic world by accusing the West of having a skewed and condescending view towards the East, particularly in the various ways in which Westerners wrote about and represented non-Western cultures. While *Orientalism* generated sympathy and agreement, it also raised complete rejection. Alexander Lyon Macfie points out this aspect in his book *Orientalism* (2002) as:

Opinion regarding the validity of Said's *Orientalism* was then mixed. But a pattern of sorts can be detected, based not so much on the nationality and religion of the scholars and intellectuals concerned as on their attitude to history and the modern and post-modern philosophical ideas (deconstruction, truth as illusion, intellectual hegemony, and so on) which frequently influence it. (109)

One of the main things which trouble critics of Said is that he defines *Orientalism* in three different ways: there is *Orientalism*, the academic profession; *Orientalism*, a way of viewing the world; and *Orientalism*, a mode of hegemony. The first definition is "the most readily accepted designation for *Orientalism*, the classical tradition of studying a region by means of its languages and writings: thus anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient – and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist - either in its specific or in its

general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism” (*Orientalism*, 2). By this particular definition an Orientalist has a buried but nevertheless a genuine disparaging regard and view of Orientals. From this point of view Said could then write, in his often-quoted statement, that “it is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric” (*Orientalism*, 204).

The second definition presents a more abstract aspect of Orientalism: “Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the Orient and the Occident” (*Orientalism*, 2). Aijaz Ahmad in his book *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (1992), takes this to be too much implicated in style and textuality as to aptly address the ‘material’ history of European colonization. Emphasizing the terminology used in the definition, Ahmad argues “the key word, here is style – which should save us from supposing that he might be talking about the political economy or ideological constructs of colonialism and imperialism” (1992, 184). Ahmad warns against using such abstract terms because it puts literature and culture over political and economic aspects of Orientalism.

Said’s third definition is “Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (*Orientalism*, 3). This definition fills in the gap that has been left by the other two: that Orientalism, as a textual creation “has been used to impose authority” (Kennedy, 21). It also criticizes its totalizing view of the Occident by providing Europe with a fixed and stable identity (*In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*, 100).

In addition to Said’s definitions, there is a significant amount of dissent about the structure and the content of the three chapters of *Orientalism*. In the first chapter “The Scope of Orientalism”, Said takes a retrospective look at the past centuries and points out the Western representations of the oriental long before the late nineteenth century, the age of colonization. By focusing on Napoleonic expedition and the stereotyping of Muslims and Arabs, Said provides a historical formation of Orientalism and how it came into being in the following decades. All the knowledge brought back

from the expedition allowed the European public to cultivate themselves, it also pushed for the power struggle between the French and the Egyptians to emerge as the former could use the knowledge they had of the latter to dominate them. The rhetoric of power within Orientalism uses knowledge to build domination, which is later translated into cultural relationship, the intrinsic importance of power being at the core of all social fields of study. Once the construction of Western dominance was established, this knowledge was transmitted from generations to generations resulting in an everlasting cultural domination. Through such a contextualization, Said underscores the ‘textual attitude’ of Orientalist discourse and justifies his gradual move from the text to the historical aspect – from textual to actual representations of the Orient.

The second chapter titled “Orientalist Structures and Restructures” is more concerned with the manifestations of Orientalism in the nineteenth century. To contextualize his argument, Said chooses two orientalists: Antoine Isaac Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan. Renan’s work is widely regarded as testifying to the relevance of the epigraph from Benjamin Disraeli: “The East is a career”. While Sacy is “the originator, whose work represents the field’s emergence and its status as a nineteenth-century discipline with roots in revolutionary Romanticism”, Renan’s function is “to solidify the official discourse of Orientalism, to systematize its insights, and to establish its intellectual and worldly institutions” (*Orientalism*, 130). On Renan, Said makes three basic points about his work: it was racist, this racism conformed it to the Orientalist discourse, and his writings were hugely influential on the discourse of Orientalism. Said writes, “Renan did not really speak as one man to all men but rather as a reflective, specialized voice that took, as he put it in the 1890 preface, the inequality of races and the necessary domination of the many by the few for granted as an antidemocratic law of nature and society” (*Orientalism*, 133). Renan’s work complemented by those of the French Orientalist Silvestre de Sacy, “constitute a formidable library against which no one, not even Marx, can rebel and which no one can avoid” (*Orientalism*, 157).

In the third chapter “Orientalism Now”, Said focuses on the end of twentieth century and is mainly concerned with the transition of power from Britain and French to the United States in the post-Second World War period. Said brings up a significant shift from “an academic to an instrumental attitude” (*Orientalism*, 246). He claims that

this change is especially obvious in U.S concrete instances of exploitations, aggressions, occupations and interferences around the world and the U.S. role in them. He also introduces the distinction between the latent and manifest Orientalism in this chapter – the latent being “distinct from purely applied orientalist theories as it rather resides within a general unconscious certainty that the Orient is the way it has been described and pictured by Orientalists personalities: the distinction I am making is really between an almost unconscious (and certainly an untouchable) positivity, which I shall call latent Orientalism, and the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology, and so forth, which I shall call manifest Orientalism” (*Orientalism*, 354-355). According to Said, latent Orientalism is comprised of three broad characteristics: Racism, Ethnocentrism and Sexism (Varisco, 58). Latent Orientalism therefore resides as an inherent part of the Orientalist discourse within society as it defines the popular vision the West has of the Orient. Such a distinction allows Said to emphasize that modern Orientalism, being manifest in the supremacy of American imperialism, is actually rooted in the latent Orientalism. Valerie Kennedy argues that this final identification is “Said’s attempt to negotiate the historical and ahistorical, the totalizing and contextualized definitions of Orientalism used throughout the book” (“Edward Said: A Critical Introduction”, 24). That is, “the book seems to suggest at times that scholarly Orientalism paved the way for imperialism and was then superseded by it, but at other moments imperialism is seen as coming to determine the development of scholarly Orientalism as a field” (24).

The main argument against Said’s account of Orientalism has been one of historical errors. David Kopf in “Hermeneutics versus History” (1980) argues that Said’s account lacks historical precision. In particular, he suggests, “Said misunderstands the nature of British Orientalism in India. Far from promoting a Euro-centric view, British Orientalism in the early nineteenth century contributed to the modernization of Hindu culture, the reconstruction of the Hindu religion and the emergence of an Indian national consciousness” (2000, 194). On a related point, Ibn Warraq in *Defending the West* (2007) argues that Said’s understanding of ‘imperialism’ as an entirely negative phenomenon is misleading and facile. He writes that it was the British who contributed to the coming of a renaissance in India and “who restored the unity of India and re-established order” (235). Of special interest to Warraq is Lord

Curzon who embodied a progressive understanding of, and compassion for, India that stands in sharp contrast to Said's depiction of imperialists and Orientalists (238-244). Daniel Martin Varisco states that Ghandi used the views of Orientalist scholars to resist British colonial rule (152).

Sadik Jalal al-Azm in his essay "Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse" (2000) finds Orientalism to be a political book and accuses Said of doing what Said himself has been trying to say the West has done: essentialising the Other (123). This Other for Al-Azm is a real, objective, existing identity for a group that is in conflict with the West, which can only be understood if a particular Western identity is assumed to have preceded the argument that produced it. This is something which Said denies outright, for just as the Orient is not really there as some fixed identity that exists in and of itself, so is the Occident or the West. Both of them are man-made through the binary division, which is essential in the West's conception of its identity. Still, we can see from the very first paragraph Al-Azm's view of Orientalism as something, which is used politically to denote two conflicting groups as he refers to European colonialism:

In his sharply debated book, Edward Said introduces us to the subject of 'Orientalism' through a broadly historical perspective which situates Europe's interest in the Orient within the context of the general historical expansion of modern bourgeois Europe outside its traditional confines and at the expense of the rest of the world in the form of its subjugation, pillage, and exploitation (217).

Al-Azm also notes some Arabs' tendency to do what he called "Orientalism in Reverse,"—better known as Occidentalism—which is a tendency to think in binary division again, only giving privilege to "the Orient" over "the Occident" (Al-Azm, 231). For that purpose, he cites the example of an unnamed "prominent man of thought and politics in Syria" (231) who arrived at a reverse-Orientalist opinion: seeing the East as morally superior to an essentialized West understood in this Syrian man of thought's opinion by comparing his own analysis of the root of the word "Man" in Arabic to a single quotation from Hobbes (231). The view that Orientalism-in-reverse is 'something else' other than, and opposed to, Orientalism implies that Al-Azm takes Orientalism to be dealing with particular, pre-existing and unquestionable identities that are naturally different and conflicting as the starting point of his discourse, which is what Said calls the "style of thought" in his second definition of Orientalism quoted earlier. One of

these forms of identity essentializes the other, and the other essentializes the former.

Emmanuel Sivan includes Al-Azm and Nadim al-Bitar among the most important Arab critics of Said in his review “Edward Said and his Arab Reviewers.” Macfie summarizes their views as follows:

Al-Bitar wondered how Said, in a few short years, could have read the 60,000 or so books about the Arab East, published in the period 1800-1950. Al-Azm wondered why Said did not restrict his account of orientalism to the modern period. Both agree that Said’s study of orientalism is ahistorical and unscientific. It is not based on a close examination of the evidence (*Orientalism*, 128).

This focus again reflects these scholars’ conception of Orientalism as the historical study of the objective Orient, *Orientalism* as Said’s attempt to represent it, and their insistence on a particular form of knowledge, especially text written in the West, since the “evidence” required by the two scholars cited here is books and the written history of the past. This shows clearly how the writing of these scholars focuses on the question of representation. The oppositional thought of Al-Azm shows his commitment to a mode of representational knowledge in which West-written history is the unquestionable starting point for discussion. For him, what Orientalists do is a very necessary representation and what Said is doing is misrepresenting the Orientalist.

Similarly, Michael Richardson’s “Enough Said” (1990) assumes that Said is defending a real Orient out there (2000, 211). In discussing “the more substantial question raised by Said’s critique which is the nature of reciprocity between subject and object” (210). Richardson insists on a real, objective Orient, which Said wishes to defend in the light of this binarism. He tries to defend anthropological methods under attack by Said’s critique and also by Johannes Fabian’s *Time and the Other* (213), which, based on Said, relocates the sense of sight, thus threatening the anthropological gaze. His insistence on essentialized conflicting sides shows in his comment on *Time and the Other*: “Fabian has made the critique even more vague by focusing not upon a definable group of people that could be called Orientalists but by taking up the question of how a perceptual category (time) and a particular sense (sight) have been utilized ideologically by the West, particularly in anthropology, against its Other” (213). Richardson only sees the Orient as an entity that needs to represent itself to the West, but only in accordance with the West’s understandable norms of representations, which

for Richardson are only the academic norms he is trying to defend. Richardson's classical views on representation are clear in his rejection of "the so-called 'postmodern condition', founded in a dubious Nietzschean subjectivism" (214). He tries to prove the concept of discursive reality wrong, once by taking it too far, and once by suspecting the entire post-modern tradition, as something, which is opposed to factual written history. Richardson says, "it is only academic literary critics (whose work is by definition concerned primarily with representation) who would mistake a representation for the thing it represented," which is more or a less a paradox given his views on Nietzsche. Richardson attempts to challenge Said's premise that the Orient is a construction by saying that if it is "only a conceptualization of the subject's mind, it can never be a question of the former acting upon the latter" (211), thus removing the representation from the question of complicity with imperial projects. With this, he is trying to protect the work of the Orientalists as true descriptive representations. Indeed, if the Orient is an imaginary construction, then the "truths" which Orientalists produce are entirely suspect. Richardson asks, "by what right can Said stand as a representative of the Orient?" (211).

The role of intellectuals and academics is central throughout Said's critique of Orientalism. Said builds his entire deconstruction on the Western tradition of writing, and on theories, which are also generally characterized as Western. For this, he bases his work on ideas from Nietzsche (representation and the thing-in-itself), Foucault (discourse, power/knowledge, episteme and truth regimes), Gramsci (cultural hegemony), and Derrida (deconstruction). In rejecting the conflation between representation and truth, the tradition, which Said follows, is Nietzschean. Giving the example of a painting, which is normally conceived as a fixed image representing a fixed object, Nietzsche concludes "the human intellect allowed appearance to appear, and projected its mistaken conceptions onto the things" (2000, 38). This is based on the belief that the thing-in-itself always exists in the state in which it is depicted. Nietzsche considered such a conception to be erroneous, because "the appearance has come to being gradually, and will continue to be evolving, and can therefore not be a representation of an essence that created it. It is our minds, our intellect, that gradually create the appearance" (38). Hence, all representations are already misrepresentations by the sheer idea that they represent a thing. Orientalism claims to be representing the

Orient, but in doing so, it is only representing its own conception of what must be outside the construction of the ideal West. The Orient, which Orientalists claim to represent, and travel literature claims to depict, is therefore empty of essence: “Perhaps we will recognize then that the thing -in- itself deserves a Homeric laugh, in that it seemed to be so much, indeed everything, and is actually empty, that is, empty of meaning” (38).

Said owes to Antonio Gramsci the idea of cultural hegemony, which is exercised in society by the ruling class. For Gramsci, the intellectuals of society function as:

the ‘officers’ of the ruling class for the exercise of the subordinate function of social hegemony and political government of the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the direction imprinted on social life by the fundamental ruling class, a consent which comes into existence ‘historically’ from the ‘prestige’ (and hence from the trust) accruing to the ruling class from its position and its function in the world of production (Gramsci, 40).

Gramsci is here treating the knowledge of intellectuals as, literally, a “production” (39), albeit indirectly. The role of the intellectual in shaping public opinion is due to their mediation in the process, between the social fabric and the “super-structures of which the intellectuals are in fact the ‘officials’” (39). For Said, the persistence of the spontaneous acceptance of the binary world view of the opposition West versus East builds in the scholarly world on protecting the hierarchies which maintain, for the public, the imaginary sense of binarism. These concepts of prestige, trust, and the relation between the ruling class and the intellectual are also discussed by Foucault as he elaborates on the close relation between power and knowledge, and the power regime in his works such as the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), *Civilization and Madness* (1964), and interviews published in *Power/Knowledge* (1980). A. L. Macfie summarizes Nietzsche and Gramsci’s views as follows:

According to Foucault, until the period of the Renaissance people had assumed that language reflected reality (objects, things). But in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries language came to be seen, not as a reflection of reality, but as a transparent ‘film’, dissociated from it. As a result it became possible to identify words and statements not as signs, representing objects and things, but as events, floating in a space, field or episteme. In this strange world, knowledge became not so much a matter of fact as the outcome of a struggle for power, in which events and discourses, vehicles of ‘economies of power’, created new ‘networks’ and ‘regimes’ of knowledge – regimes which would themselves survive only until such time as new ones arose, capable of taking their place.

Truth, therefore ... was not outside power or lacking in it (*Orientalism*, 41).

Said builds on Foucault's concept of discourse and truth regimes as described by Foucault, which means that power allows particular things to pass as unquestionable truths, to argue that there is nothing inherent or fixed about the Orient or the Occident or West, and that the idea of the unitary West or Western subject is built upon a contrast to its imaginary Other, the Oriental, which is depicted as inherently inferior and less capable. This is something, he says, has been accepted throughout Europe's history, and has both allowed, and been allowed to survive by power regimes.

However, a radical break with Foucault in Said's analysis concerns the approach to history and to the concept of 'episteme'. Aijaz Ahmad in "Between Orientalism and Historicism" (1991) critiques Said's focus on text "facilitates a reading of history not from the basis of material production, but from its systems of representations" (285). According to Ahmad, Said's view of Orientalism is ahistorical for two reasons: the first is counting on a non-material, non-linear understanding of history. The second, upon adopting Said's view for argument's sake, is that by foregrounding literature Said defines his object of study in ways, which are incompatible with one another. The contradiction which Ahmad refers to is between Said's general and specific definitions of Orientalism quoted at the beginning, since by doing that, Said defines two different starting points for the tradition which he studies: one of them is roughly around the end of the eighteenth century (288), the other is European antiquity with Homer's *Iliad* and Aeschylus' *The Persians* (287). By stating an earlier beginning of Orientalism, Said, according to Ahmad, accepts a humanist approach to history while his indebtedness to Foucault betrays the anti-humanist, Foucauldian, approach to history. Ahmad says that the problem with Said here is that he "tries to occupy theoretical positions which are mutually contradictory" (285). Nevertheless, in both cases Ahmad persists in his insistence on a particular mode of knowledge and history-reading, which for him is characteristic of Western academia. Ahmad therefore believes that Said has foregrounded the concept of discourse in order for him to use it as a defense against the misrepresenter of Oriental history (293).

Ahmad also refers to one of the theoretical difficulties in Said's work which is "he has never been able to work out his relationship with the two slightly older intellectuals of his generation, Foucault and Derrida, whose work has influenced him

the most” (290). This, along with the span and fluidity of Said’s definition for his object of knowledge leads Ahmad to the confusion of having to see Said either as a political writer or a theoretical writer (294). In one way or another, to be understood, Said must fit within a category, and ultimately Ahmad sees Said to be “riven between his anti-Westernist passion and his Foucauldian allegiance” (291). Ahmad gives precedence to the “Western archive of knowledge” (291)-that is, West-written history - as the true narrative which must therefore precede the discourse which Said is trying to deal with for “his anti-Westernist passion” (291). In both sides of Ahmad’s argument (historicism and disciplinarity), one can see his attempt to preserve a mode of knowledge that depends on categorization and field division, and preserving the catalogue of Western text, which has produced that knowledge. Nevertheless, requiring Said to conform to one particular mode or another, i.e. wholesale- Foucauldian (anti-humanist) or the opposite, or a mode of writing or scholarly field (political, historical, etc.), is what we are here considering as a particular mode of knowledge, with breaks in the borderlines of the epistemic field being seen as an act of violence to one’s own conception of self, as an academic in this case.

Bernard Lewis in *Islam and the West* (1993) argues that Orientalism, the academic profession of enquiry into the lives of the Orientals, cannot as a whole be criticized, especially not by someone who is not an Orientalist himself. “The most rigorous and penetrating critique of Orientalist, as of any other, scholarship has always been and will remain that of their fellow scholars, especially, though not exclusively, those working in the same field” (Lewis, 268). Lewis automatically dismisses critiques made by non-Orientalists simply for this reason. It is why he does not consider Said to be a scholar at all, and for the same reason, he dismisses non- Orientalist Marxist critiques as coming from unqualified individuals, unlike their Orientalist counterparts whose criticism is much more welcome. “Most of these critics are not themselves Orientalists ... it means that they do not possess the Orientalist skills, which are exercised with little difference by both Marxist and non-Marxist Orientalists” (257). This establishes the Orientalist as a category of qualified people who can or possess the skills and tools, which give them the right to speak about and for the Orient. Lewis refuses to accept Said as a scholar, which contrasts with his respect for other people’s academic titles, such as Dr. Abdel-Malek (256) and Professor Zakaria (267), whom he

accepts as scholarly simply because of their restriction to “known scholarly language” (256). The major part of Lewis’s attack on Said took the form of showing how Said got historical facts wrong, such as predating the rise of Arabic studies in France and ignoring German scholarship (258).

Fred Halliday in “Orientalism and Its Crisis” (1993) argues he is wedded to a classical view of history (145), where there are truths, there are actual Orientals and that what Orientalist does is find these truths and represent them. Halliday claims that the choice of the name ‘Orientalism’ itself is a form of hegemonic claim, overgeneralized, and made by Said simply due to most of the knowledge and text produced by early Orientalists having been produced within an imperialist context. Halliday says there is no reason to reject any kind of knowledge simply because of the context in which it has been produced, and he gives the example of robbing a bank, where in order to achieve that aim, one would need an actual map and plan based on real knowledge which would enable them to perform the task at hand (148). This and similar claims, however, completely mix between the geographic and statistic knowledge produced about the land, its strategic map, the distribution of natural resources in it. The description also mix with the peoples and their traditions on the one hand as scientific observable data, and the poetics in which this kind of knowledge is reproduced, where identities of Self and Other are presumed even before any of that writing takes place, or the way in which the scholar or researcher is thought of as having full capacity for accessing and producing that kind of knowledge. This all falls under the same category of generalizations. Said never condemns the objective or linguistic knowledge of the researcher or the philologist, but the idea that he is now believed to have full access, and full capacity to make the kind of generalized judgments that are then used to justify the continuity of colonization as a civilizing mission. It is a power regime that transforms the words of the scholar, thanks merely to his or her title, into truth.

Lewis also notes Said’s insistence on targeting scholarly figures more than he targets political ones. Indeed, what Said is attacking after all is a mode of knowledge for which the central, trusted position of the scholar is key. The defense of this mode of knowledge in Lewis is apparent is his giving Western scholarship precedence over everything. For him, it is the norm of knowledge, which must be followed. Anything outside the language known within the particular scholarly field in question is offensive

and not worthwhile. Criticism is only accepted from within:

Scholarly criticism of Orientalist scholarship is a legitimate and indeed a necessary, inherent part of the process. Fortunately, it is going on all the time—not a criticism of Orientalism, which would be meaningless, but a criticism of the research and results of individual scholars or schools of scholars (Lewis, 268).

The criticism, which Lewis allows only follows the known traditions of Orientalist text and does not challenge the hegemony of the scholar. It never crosses the borderlines of the idea of the academic field. Beyond that point, criticism becomes “meaningless.” Lewis finds Said’s writing to be “not merely false but absurd. It reveals a disquieting lack of knowledge of what scholars do and what scholarship is about” (258).

The insistence on material and object reality can also be seen in John M. MacKenzie’s *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts* (1995). He argues that while the East was indeed a construction (328), the construction process was mutual, but only in that the need for a market instigated a process of “natural selection” that led to the formulation of the ‘appropriate’ East (4). This was done through an interaction of the European taste and demands, and commodity production. Here, the East became what the West wanted to buy - out of its own volition, one must be inclined to presume. One must also be inclined to presume that the West had the upper hand for the East to naturally evolve into Western commodity. This commodity is nevertheless both material and sexual in nature, and serves to assert to the constructed West its own conception of itself. While MacKenzie wants to re-assert the presence of the Orient as an essential reality, he also wishes to bypass that the construction of an Other is a binary discourse that is not rooted in a material reality (5). By arguing for a natural selection process, MacKenzie is emphasizing the objective nature of two separate and clashing identities, while also confirming the power and hegemony of one onto the other. Representing the other side then is a matter of studying the material, objective and natural development of another people. His historical emphasis on material cultural manifestations disavows completely the nature of perception or the premises of intrinsically opposing identities.

Robert Irwin’s book *For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and their Enemies* (2006) is a defense of the knowledge offered by Orientalism. Irwin’s consideration of Said’s *Orientalism* as a political intervention in defense of a group against the cultural

hegemony of another reveals the representational thought of Irwin.

What does his book say? In a nutshell, it is this: Orientalism, the hegemonic discourse of imperialism, is a discourse that constrains everything that can be written and thought in the West about the Orient and more particularly about Islam and the Arabs. It has legitimized Western penetration of the Arab lands and their appropriation and it underwrites the Zionist project (2006, 3).

Irwin admits the unfavorable representation of the Orient (Arabs in particular) in Western media that has continued throughout time and especially after September 11 and the American “war against terrorism,” which, according to him, continues from a tradition of “outrageously bad press in American newspapers as well as on television” (281). His conviction is that “the Middle East crisis of 1973 provoked Said to research and write *Orientalism*” (281) and that this has been the sole reason why Said had written his book. It is therefore a defense of a misrepresented real object. As we have seen from the extract above, for Irwin, Said’s work discussed Orientalism as a “discourse of imperialism.” The rest of Irwin’s book focuses on the friction between two ends of a binary opposition, with a somewhat clear focus placed on Christian Europe on the one hand, and the Islamic East on the other—understandably so, since Irwin’s understanding of Orientalism, in his own words, counts on his “early immersion in both the Bible and in Latin texts, which proves to be useful in understanding the origins and formation of Orientalism” (2). We can see again how Irwin’s education in particular fields affects the way he views the situation with Said’s *Orientalism*, as he reflects it upon his expertise in Christian/Islamic conflicts between past nations and other political crises. His kind of history is also understood in terms of binaries and conflicts.

While recognizing the many flaws and faults in Said’s original thesis, the work still continues to stimulate new projects today as scholars test the thesis of Orientalism. One of the most recent additions is Daniel Martin Varisco’s *Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid* (2008). In his book, Varisco tries to take academia away from the debates on *Orientalism* and to urge scholars to get back to scholarship that rejects the binary-thinking that Said rhetorically opposed but intellectually promoted (1). The main point Said wants to advance is that from antiquity Westerners were depicting the Orient as their “great complementary opposite” and that these Western attitudes of the Orient form an “internally structured archive that is built on a restricted number of

encapsulations: the journey, the history, the fable, the stereotype, the polemical confrontation” (4). Varisco takes issue with Said’s contentions about the continuity between Ancient Greek writers and their modern European, and American counterparts. On Said’s understanding of Greek Orientalism, Varisco notes that the Greek animosity that was expressed towards Orientals was equally expressed towards the Picts, Celts and Etruscans. He also questions whether it is accurate to regard Ancient Greeks as European and to assume that the Western Orientalist discourse originates there. Said’s treatment of Ancient Greek intellectual history, Varisco argues, is emblematic of his treatment of the West. Varisco also points out that Said is being “disturbingly ahistorical to argue that Orientalism is one of the most profound examples of the machinery of cultural domination; it pales in actual historical impact next to the genocide of indigenous populations elsewhere” (34).

Varisco identifies one of the major problems with Said’s theory of Orientalism as being very restrictive, as it does not permit for individuality within a body of work to be distinguished from the rest. Said remarks that while he does agree with Foucault on a lot of part of the discourse, he would also advocate for an individual close reading of certain texts to determine their prevalence within the Orientalist movement (45). This however, is a limitation when it comes to asserting Orientalism as a discourse of its own as it forces Said to “flip-flop on who is a good orientalist and who is bad” (46). Furthermore, Varisco argues that the idea that the domination of the West essentially managed and produced the Orient is not only quite vague, it is also very much inaccurate as indicated by the absence of actual ground management in countries like China, Japan and most of the Middle East, an impression of superficial domination in time exemplified by the fall of the colonial powers after the second World War (55-56). Varisco ultimately critiques the way Said perceives Latent Orientalism by asserting that the way it is described by Said in *Orientalism* is written in a rhetorical style so careful with the word it uses that it almost becomes void of any singular sense (57). This indicates that finding work where Latent Orientalism is very much difficult, as, the ‘latent’ characteristics of Orientalism are so broad and fixed in time that their specific application is difficult to properly discern: “The latent tendencies must transcend rather than define a specifically Orientalist discourse” (58). Ultimately, because the Orientalist discourse is so restrictive and authoritative as to its exact components implies that

Said's critique of it is in turn confined within its own limitations.

Said's critique of the Orientalist discourse is limited by its own discourse characteristics. The way he constructs his notion of the Orient is problematic because it not only secedes much of the Asian continent's population from being considered by the theory, it also implies that the Orient is a definitive geographical space from which a particular image can be extracted, whether that image is true or not: "It does seem to me that the Orientalism I was speaking of contains a unique set of attitudes, a kind of virulence and persistence that I haven't seen elsewhere" (49), this implies that what Said wishes to criticize, this assumed dichotomy of the Orient, is indeed what he uses to justify his argumentation (49). Secondly, Said's method in both his rhetoric and discourse is so broad that it is difficult to separate what can be considered 'Orientalist' and what can't, resulting in "polemical excess, which might as well be an 'Orientalism in reverse', 'Occidentalism by detour', or even 'reverse-Euro centrism'" (62). Said's ignoring of the Oriental in *Orientalism* is manifested as well in his political positions. In his analysis of the Iranian Revolution, Said systematically failed to consider the ideas and political program of the Ayatollah Khomeini. During the Gulf War, he made little mention of the plight of the Kuwaitis who were suffering under a brutal occupation of Ba'athist regime. He also failed to speak out for the human rights of the Iraqi Kurds who were victims of the most brutal Iraqi state aggression. Instead, Said felt compelled to only speak of human rights abuses committed by America and Israel. This political position is the product of a view which Varisco acknowledges to be central in *Orientalism*: "the default theory in *Orientalism*, as well as of *Culture and Imperialism*, is that somehow Europe is uniquely imperialist and colonialist; Said is willing to take the binary of the West dominating the East as a given, even if only to deconstruct it rhetorically" (35).

Critics have found Said's Orientalism a stumbling block in the way to initiate a process of engagement with the Other without Orientalism's binaries. As criticism mounted against Orientalism's limiting tendencies, in response, Said states that even if binaries of "us" and "them" are removed, we cannot help to fall into equally other differentiations such as East – West, North – South, have – have not and so on. It would be counterproductive to assume that these binaries do not exist. Robert Young in *White Mythologies* (1990) questions this limiting aspect of Orientalism and the lack of

alternatives to the phenomenon it critiques. More importantly, Young argues, how could Said separate himself from the “coercive structures of knowledge that he is describing” when his education, teaching, and stay in the West exposed him to the same discourse of discriminatory power (127). Young tries to make the point that if Said could discursively move out of the limiting influences of Western discourse, other writers might also enable themselves to do so by following the principles that Said advocates.

After some harsh criticism after September 11, Said indicated the same limiting tendencies in his 2003 preface to *Orientalism*, where he repeats that *no one* in the West seemed to be free from the opposition between “us” and “them” after the Cold War and the first Gulf War. The consequence was a sense of “reinforced, deepened, hardened” manifestations of Orientalism (*Orientalism*, 334-5). Yet, Orientalism has alternatives in the form of strategies that Said suggests in his writings. He tries to explore some positive outcomes and goals in theorizing Orientalism. He did not want, as he writes, to perpetuate the “hostility between two rival political and cultural monolithic blocks,” but to reduce the terrible effects of the discourse (*Orientalism*, 335). Though not establishing it as his manifest purpose, he indicates that he was happy that people in America, Britain, English-speaking Africa, Asia, Australia and the Caribbean interpreted the book “as stressing the actualities of what was later to be called multiculturalism, rather than xenophobia and aggressive, race-oriented nationalism” (*Orientalism*, 335). This means that writers in the West could leave behind the restraining discourse of Orientalism if they rejected Orientalism’s conflictive binaries and empathized with the realities of the multicultural and international space.

When Said critiques what is involved in representation and studying the Other, he does come up with alternative and fairer ways with which the West might engage with the Other. According to him, those alternatives are to avoid racial thinking and uncritical acceptance of authority and authoritative ideas. Intellectuals should realize their proper sociopolitical role, the great value of skeptical critical consciousness and of “human freedom and knowledge” (*Orientalism*, 327). This possibility of moving outside of the discourse of Orientalism to engage with the Other can be seen in many places in Said, who believes that there are instances in scholarship that are “not as corrupt, or at least as blind to human reality” (*Orientalism*, 326). In Said’s view, such instances of scholarship occur in the works of Clifford Geertz, Jacques Berque, and

Maxime Rodinson. These works are “discrete and concrete,” and methodologically self-conscious to free themselves from “the rituals, preconceptions, and doctrines of Orientalism” (*Orientalism*, 326). Other scholars and intellectuals might free themselves similarly if they try to “complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experience and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion” (*Orientalism*, xxiii). Said calls for humanism as the answer, which he believes is the only and “final resistance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human history” (*Orientalism*, xxix). Rather than draw upon the “the manufactured Clash of Civilizations” Said calls for the “slow working together of cultures that overlap, borrow from each other, and live together in far more interesting ways than any abridged or inauthentic mode of understanding can allow” (*Orientalism*, xxix). Such working relationship can be realized due to advances in modern cultural theory, which believes in the universal principle that “cultures are hybrid and heterogeneous,” and that “cultures and civilizations are so interrelated and interdependent as to beggar any unitary or simply delineated description of their individuality” (*Orientalism*, 347). I argue that the text in fourth chapter advocates a similar discourse of humanism. Contrary to “the Clash of Civilizations” narrative of the earlier chapters, this text believes in the interdependence and accommodation of cultures. The interesting thing here is that difference is not even an important point of reference in this novel. The narrative mentions them, but looks for other commonalities that can iron out those differences so that characters can engage in a smooth working relationship.

Sorting out this working relationship between cultures, and engagement with the Other has been mostly counterproductive due to the use of binaries and othering. This is the primary disabling aspect of some September 11 novels that engage with the Other. The tendency is to either sympathize with the victims of September 11 or justify the terrorists. Žižek calls this disabling quality the “temptation of the double blackmail” (*Welcome to the Desert*, 50). According to him, it is an ethical enigma due to two contrary and equally exclusive categories: “If we simply, only and unconditionally condemn it, we simply appear to endorse the blatantly ideological position of American innocence under attack by a Third World Evil; if we draw attention to the deeper

sociopolitical causes of Arab extremism, we simply appear to blame the victim which ultimately got what it deserved” (*Welcome to the Desert*, 50). Narratives in chapter two fall in the first category, whereas those in chapter three would fit into the second category. As the conclusion in chapter two shows, neither the stance of othering, stereotyping, and blaming the Other nor advocating American innocence and victimhood are useful. Versluys believes that September 11 shows the “limits of tolerance” because it is problematic to respond to intolerant people (152). Consequently, writers resort to the “bad” alterity of “othering,” which “is an act of exclusion, whereby, through prejudice, ignorance, or both, one refuses to treat someone else fully as an individual” (150). Similarly the stance in chapter three of blaming America for everything in the world is problematic. Despite authors’ leaning towards one of these categories, Versluys also seems optimistic about the possibility of spaces where positive interaction with the Other might be possible through the “good” alterity model of Emmanuel Levinas, which asserts responsibility toward the Other as primal and antecedent to defining oneself as human (Versluys, 149). This human responsibility also conforms to Said’s notion of humanism. I argue that contrary to the use of binaries and the blame game in the narratives in chapter two and three, *Saturday* imagines spaces of positive interaction based on the principles of humanism and responsibility towards the Other in the cosmopolitan space.

1.5. Definition of Terms

In this part, the terms and concepts are not explored to their fullest extent. They are discussed briefly, which will help understand the issues in this study.

1.5.1. Orientalism

The term is a set of discursive, systematic and essentialist scholarly and literary practices with political motivations that constructs an image of the mysterious, feminine Orient as the ‘Other’ to the rational, articulate, masculine of the Western ‘Self’. Orientalism is a product of the imagination of the West that constructed the orient as strange, backwards, religious and ultimately other. Edward Said defined the term as the acceptance in the West of “the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny and so on” (*Orientalism*, 2).

The dissertation primarily employs Edward Said's Orientalism as the theoretical framework to study the selected September 11 novels.

1.5.2. Occidentalism

Even though Said did not elaborate on the presence of a contrapuntal conceptualization of the West in the East, there are instances where he laments that the Islamic world might have a more or less prejudiced attitude towards the West. It is concomitant to his theory because he feels that a writer has to imbibe political influences from his environment. Therefore, following his reasoning, it stands that if the West has a prejudiced attitude, the presence of a similar attitude in the East might be a possibility. Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit in their book *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies* (2004) use the term Occidentalism to name such a phenomenon. According to Buruma and Margalit, Occidentalism is a discourse in which opponents portray the West in much the same uniform and negative way Orientalism portrays the East (5). This dichotomy is reversed as the stereotypes are used to reinforce Occidentalism at the Western materialism (3, 115), immorality (117), godlessness (114), love for life and fear of death (49) and arrogance due to its power and technological advancement (15).

Buruma and Margalit argue that nationalist resistance to the West replicates Eastern world's responses against the socio-economic forces of modernization, which originated in Western culture, among utopian radicals and conservative nationalists who viewed "capitalism, secularism and liberalism as forces destructive of their societies and cultures that made non-western people seem less than fully adult human beings; they had the minds of children, and could thus be treated as lesser breeds" (12). However, the authors' version of Occidentalism seems to get dangerously close to the orientalism they criticize. They admit this aspect of their approach: "it is indeed one of our contentions that Occidentalism, like capitalism, Marxism, and many other modern isms, was born in Europe, before it was transferred to other parts of the world" (10). The roots of Occidentalism actually originated in the West rather than non-Western world while the "West was fought with ideas that originated in Europe" (82). The main strands are: hostility to the city (with its image of rootlessness and cosmopolitanism), the western mind (and its preoccupation with rationality and materialism), the settled bourgeois life

(devoted to comfort and incremental progress rather than self-sacrifice and heroism), and the infidel (embodied in the notion of the west as godless, lacking in spirituality and understanding of human suffering). The third chapter of this dissertation explores a novel that uses discourses of Occidentalism. Like a typical Orientalist, the protagonist uses the same techniques against the West.

1.5.3. Colonialism, Imperialism, Post-Colonialism

Colonialism is the conquest and control of a country by another, and relocation of a part of the conquering nation's population to the conquered lands (Boehmer, 2005, 2). It involves the settlement of territory, the exploitation of resources and government of indigenous population. Colonialism is used interchangeably with imperialism, however while "colonization involves settling the colonized land, imperialism is a more general term for exercising power over a nation through settlement, sovereignty or indirect mechanisms of control" (Kohn, 2006). Therefore, colonialism is building and maintaining colonies in one territory by people from another territory. One can see great movement of people to the new territory and living as permanent settlers. Imperialism, on the other hand, is exercising power over the conquered regions either through sovereignty or indirect mechanisms of control. Said distinguishes the difference between imperialism and colonialism by stating; "Imperialism involved the practice, the theory and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory, while colonialism refers to the implanting of settlements on a distant territory" (*Culture and Imperialism*, 8).

Post-colonialism deals with the effects of colonization on cultures and societies that were former European colonies and highlights the political, linguistic and cultural experiences these societies had (Ashcroft et al., 2007, 168). Post-colonialism does not necessarily entail a process after the colonizing force has granted the colonized their independence and departed the colonized land. Jane Hiddleston in "Understanding Postcolonialism" (2009) argues "the term 'post-colonialism' can generally be understood as the multiple political, economic, cultural and philosophical responses to colonialism from its inauguration to the present day, and is somewhat broad and sprawling in scope" (1). Cultural identity, language, power, representation, nationality, gender, subalternity and race are some of the areas in which post-colonialism challenges

the colonial narrative: “the colonial encounter resulted in the consolidation of the idea of European or Western modernity at the apex of human civilization. It also resulted in incomplete, chaotic, and traumatic attempts forcibly to transform other societies in the image of that modernity” (Amoko, 132). Frantz Fanon argued that the colonized people must strive to regain their national identity by reclaiming and not being ashamed of their own past. According to Fanon, colonialism does not only impose its law on the colonized, but it also drains the intellect of the colonized, and distorts, disfigures and destroys their pre-colonial past. They are made to believe that their past was full of barbarism, darkness and a bestial existence and the colonizers are there only to help them (*The Wretched of the Earth*, 149). On the other hand, Edward Said’s strategy of resistance involves a conscious reading of European literature, which requires the reading of major European works of literature from the standpoint of the colonized. Said states:

In the same way, I believe, we can read and interpret English novels, for example, whose engagement (usually suppressed for the most part) with the West Indies or India, say, is shaped and perhaps even determined by the specific history of colonization, resistance, and finally native nationalism. At this point, alternative or new narratives emerge, and they become institutionalized or discursively stable entities. (*Culture and Imperialism*, 51)

The third chapter of dissertation analyzes a narrative that protests against American imperialism-its belligerent foreign policy, its suppression and exploitation of Third World countries, interference in other countries, and occupation and invasion of foreign lands.

1.5.4. Post-Colonial Melancholia

A term coined by Paul Gilroy, which British use as an evasive strategy to face its colonial and imperial past. The first reason for such an attitude is the waning power of Britain, which makes its citizens feel that they are at the receiving end of the U.S. imperialism. Secondly, a large number of immigrants moving from commonwealth countries to Britain make English people feel the shrinkage of its former imperial strength. Chapter four analyzes a novel in which the rising power of America is clearly resented. Most British characters have antagonistic attitudes towards the U.S., as it has dislodged Britain from its status as superpower.

1.5.5. Islamophobia and Jihad

The enemy status of Islam, reinforced by the othering process and stereotypes, creates anxiety and fear in the Western public, which has generated the name Islamophobia. This fear grows and feeds on what the ‘Other’ is perceived to be doing and what it stands for. Depiction of Muslims as anti-West, violent and death-loving fanatics and jihadists, irrational, backward and suppressive people, contributes to Islamophobia. September 11 heightened the fear as Orientalists found evidence to prove their perceived stance. The concept of jihad has contributed immensely to deep-rooted Islamophobia in the West. The November 1997 Britain’s Runnymede Report, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, defines Islamophobia as the “dread or hatred of Islam-and, therefore, to fear or dislike all or most Muslims” (1997, 1). Such hostility towards Muslims is perpetrated by a series of closed views that imply and attribute negative and derogatory stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims. John L. Esposito argues that contemporary Islamophobic resurgence had been triggered by Muslim migration to the West in late 20th century, the Iranian revolution, hijackings, hostage - taking and acts of terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s. Conditions were therefore ripe, but September 11 “exacerbated and fed the growth of both Islamophobia in the West and anti-Americanism in the Muslim world” (Esposito, xxiii).

Islamophobia is closely connected with the concept of Jihad in Islam. According to Said, as a stereotype, jihad lurks behind all the images of Islam and Muslims in the West (*Culture and Imperialism*, 287). The stereotyped Islamic violence, suicide bombing and the death-loving cult find their strength and justification in the often-misinterpreted concept of jihad in Islamic tradition. Definition of jihad is often ambiguous to the extent that one can make anything out of it. *The Oxford English Dictionary* defines jihad as “a religious war of Muslims against unbelievers, inculcated as a duty by the Qur’an and traditions.”⁴ “Holy war” and “war against unbelievers” are included in most definitions, usually in the first entry for jihad. These ambiguities and outright generalizations, have led to all kinds of misuse and controversies about the meanings of jihad in relation to terrorism. All these strategies are meant to reinforce the image of a violent and anti-West Islam. The selected texts in chapter two contribute to

⁴ Oxford English Dictionary Online.
 <<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/101301?redirectedFrom=jihad#eid>>

this fear by depicting Islam as a violent death cult and Muslims as death – loving and fatalistic jihadists.

1.5.6. The Clash of Civilizations

Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations," theory predicted conflicts after the Cold War to be predominantly cultural and claimed that when considering all clashes around the world, Islam and the West have become the two major players in all major cultural conflicts around the world (1996, 216). It was proposed in a 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article titled "The Clash of Civilizations" in response to his former student Francis Fukuyama's book *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992). Huntington later expanded his thesis in a book.

Fukuyama claimed that dialectical history has ended after the Cold War as mankind has arrived at the final stage of its ideological evolution and universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government (*The End of History*, xi). Deep ideological cleavages earlier in this century divided the world, however, "what we may be witnessing is not just the end of Cold War, or the passing of particular period of post – war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (*The End of History*, 1). Fukuyama foresaw the end of ideological conflicts, which established a period of universal peace. The wars of ideologies and ideas were at an end because democracy proved to be better than other alternatives. All advanced countries virtually adopted or trying to adopt liberal democratic institutions. In response, Huntington argued that the dominant civilization decides the form of human government and these will not be constant.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, societies were divided by ideological differences, such as the struggle between democracy and communism. Huntington argues, "the most important distinctions among peoples are no longer ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural" (21). Religion is the societal factor that has filled the vacuum created by a loss of political ideology. People "need new sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and new sets of moral precepts to provide

them with a sense of meaning and purpose” (97). Religion is able to meet these needs. Islam became the main rival of the West after the Cold War, as Muslim societies have asserted cultural identity through the reaffirmation and resurgence of religion. Huntington argues that the resurgence of Islam “embodies the acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and the recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world” (110). It is the primary factor that distinguishes Muslim politics and society from others. The failure of state economies, the large young population, and the authoritarian style of governance have all contributed to the resurgence of Islam in society. He believes this to be a real consequence of several factors, including the previously mentioned Muslim youth bulge and population growth and Islamic proximity to many civilizations including Sinic, Orthodox, and Western. Some of the factors contributing to this conflict are that both Christianity (upon which Western civilization is based) and Islam are:

- Missionary religions, seeking conversion of others,
- Universal, “all-or-nothing” religions, in the sense that it is believed by both sides that only their faith is ultimately the correct one.
- Teleological religions, that is, that their values and beliefs represent the goals of existence and purpose in human existence.

More recent factors contributing to a Western – Islamic clash is the view that all civilizations should adopt Western values-that infuriate Islamic fundamentalists. All these historical and modern factors combined would lead to a bloody clash between the Islamic and Western civilizations. The narratives analyzed in the second chapter of this dissertation take their inspiration from the concept of the “Clash of Civilization” in which Islam and the West are perceived as antagonistic to each other because of their inherent differences.

CHAPTER II

ORIENTALISM IN POST–SEPTEMBER 11 NOVELS

The traumatic and horrendous nature of the September 11 attacks created a reactionary mood in America while the intense atmosphere of fear and anger revived a mind – set that has dominated every possible discussion that related to it. It was crowned, in Baudrillard’s words as, “the mother of all events” (*The Spirit of Terrorism*, 4). As we enter the second decade after September 11, the response to September 11 has mostly been in the form of discourse on terrorism. Two authors: John Updike and Don DeLillo try to understand the reasons and results of terrorism. However, their efforts fail to engage effectively with the ‘Other’ as they depend on Orientalist biases and stereotypes. Both authors’ works portray individual terrorists as stereotypes of Muslims and then connect those stereotypes to a constructed discourse about Islam. Their fictional terrorists’ individual actions are presented as a manifestation of their backward, monolithic, irrational, sensual, suppressive and violent religion. These characteristics are then used to contrast with an enlightened, rational, entrepreneurial, disciplined and liberal West. Based on Said’s Orientalism theory, the present chapter analyzes both texts’ depiction of Islam and Muslims.

As a constructed discourse, Orientalism is built on oppositions of the West “us” versus the East “them”. The outcome of the discourse is that it creates a subordinate Other for control and self – actualization. Using binaries, a superior self is established against an aberrant Other. Drawing upon Antonio Gramsci’s identification of hegemony as an indispensable concept for any interpretation of cultural life in the industrial West, Said considers the same hegemony employed in a “collective notion of identifying ‘us’ European as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans” (*Orientalism*, 2). The discourses of Orientalism, Colonialism, and Imperialism are all built on such unequal power relationships. So, the superior has a justification to further colonialist objectives

under the camouflage of carrying civilization and democracy to the uncivilized. Said gives a relevant example of this practice by citing Lord Macaulay's 1835 "Minutes" to the British Parliament asserting the presence of the British Empire on Indian soil so that the natives could learn from them (*Orientalism*, 152). We can also think of Octave Mannoni's 1950 book *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization* (1990), which supported France's colonization of Madagascar by citing from Shakespeare's *The Tempest* and Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* to prove the psychological inferiority of the Malagasy, and hence the justifications of France's civilizing mission in Madagascar.

The idea of an unequal power relationship and fabrication of 'Other' can also be witnessed in postcolonial theories. Frantz Fanon argues that colonialism has divided the world into halves by employing binaries to create the Other, to "paint the native as a sort of quintessence of evil" (1963, 41) that needs to be colonized and reformed. Similarly, Homi Bhabha argues that to establish systems of administration and instruction, the colonial doctrines lump all the colonized into one group of a "population of degenerate types" who are prone to violence while ignoring differences or ethnicity, and the rich cultural histories different places have (2006, 35). For the creation of the Orient and Islam, Said states that it is nothing more than an imaginary conceptualization of a contrasting Other. Said does not claim that the Other does not exist, but his theory is mainly interested in the "internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient" (*Orientalism*, 5). This assessment is more about the discourse for its uniformities, continuities, and principles rather than engaging with a correspondence between Orientalism and the Orient to identify the image created. In regards to principles employed by Orientalists, Said states:

Everyone who writes about the Orient must locate himself vis –a– vis the Orient; this location includes the kind of narrative voice he adopts, the type of structure he builds, the kinds of images, themes, motifs that circulate in the text – all of which add up to deliberate ways of addressing the reader, containing the Orient, and finally, representing it or speaking on its behalf" (*Orientalism*, 20).

The main objective of Said's theories is to explain a constructed portrayal of the Orient and its people, the ideological and socio – cultural elements that help to shape such portrayals and the colonial realities and objectives behind such efforts. Thus, Orientalism consistently misrepresents the East in Western discourse as constructed binaries have caused division of the world into two different and unbridgeable halves.

Western discourse's concept of Orient is temporal and also ideological regarding the geographical division of land and the ideological representation of that land and its people (*Orientalism*, 2).

The advocates of Orientalist discourse in the nineteenth century were the British and the French. The American empire of the twentieth century inherited this discourse from its predecessors and Orientalism has come to accommodate to the new imperialism of the United States by accepting uncritically their imperial design to control and dominate (*Orientalism*, 322). Orientalism in America galvanized in the middle of the twentieth century. Though American authors like Herman Melville and Mark Twain wrote about the Orient, and there were some diplomatic and military encounters here and there, "there was no deeply invested tradition of Orientalism" in America (*Orientalism*, 290). Orientalism became more explicit following the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. When compared to British or French, American Orientalism avoided the study of literature and language, and preferred to exercise its hegemonic role through administrative policies by "developing a self-justificatory regime of self-aggrandizing authority" (*Culture*, 89), which is of global, and all – encompassing that nothing escaped from it. This American version of Orientalism had a major difference than British and French for the fact that America mostly controlled things from a distance and its experience was less direct due to the fact that there was never actual territorial occupation of foreign lands. Unlike European powers, the US did not engage in any prolonged and bloody encounters.

Orientalism has continued within the rhetoric of terrorism after September 11 specifically because it has been seen as a peculiarly American issue with the happening on American soil and the military responses provided by the U.S. administration and backed by Western allies. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak argues that Orientalism has become more important after September 11, because the "War on Terror" essentially depends on the Western construction of terrorists as the 'Other' (Baer, 54). Similarly, Said claims that the predominant theme in the discourse of Orientalism after September 11 is the equation of terrorism with a specific religion, "what is bad about all terror is when it is attached to religious and political abstractions and reductive myths that keep veering away from history and sense" ("Islam and the West are Inadequate"). The discourse does not have any meaningful explanation historically since it attempts to

come up with a justification for the killings of innocent people around the world, rather than considering concrete evidence of exploitations, destruction, and occupations by America. Such “reductive myths” have reduced Islam to monolithic violent entities whereas a heterogeneous Muslim population is lumped into a homogenous group of radicals. These discursive efforts require a collective effort to reduce wide complexities of the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ to totalizing and misleading simplifications.

According to Said, the post-modern media has made its contribution to the circulation of such myths about Islam and Muslims (*Culture*, 295). If American literature is to be regarded as part of mainstream media, it equally shares the guilt for the discursive dissemination of these myths. Said explicitly blames the media and the self-appointed specialists for the wars waged in the Islamic world, because of they all “re-cycle the same unverifiable fictions and vast generalizations to stir up ‘America’ against the foreign evil” (*Orientalism*, xv). After the September 11 attacks, American literature took up the task of serious engagement with terror and Islam. This trend was also embraced by the American public as they “wanted to understand Islam, the Middle East, and the history of American involvement in the region” (Kauffman, 647). Fiction appeared to be an effective way to respond and interpret the event and the gamut of the conflicts. However, some of those narrative responses contributed to the dissemination of the reductive and totalizing myths of Orientalism. An example of such a myth was the incompatibility of the West and Islam and that they are in opposition to each other without any chance for peace, dialogue or reconciliation. Islamic society is portrayed as not having a place for individuality; it is fatalistic and otherworldly, against technology, progress, and freedoms. Muslims are displaced, disloyal, and sensual masses who follow the collective injunctions of their religion. West, on the other hand, is technologically advanced, democratic, peaceful, virtuous and logical. Such characteristics of the West then become the target of Islam’s jealousy and attacks. Similar to imperialism’s hegemonic discourses, George W. Bush’s persistent question, “why do they hate us?” The response is in the form of irreconcilable differences based on the binary oppositions of “us” against “them”. Such novels serve the purpose of confirming Said’s assessment that it was always ‘We are this, ‘they’ are that’ (*Culture*, 229).

2.1. Reinforcing Binary Oppositions in the post–September 11 Novels

Most of the ideas Updike and DeLillo's explore in their novels are built on the core ideas expressed in Huntington's theory that separate the Western world from the Islamic world by the values and principles they allegedly hold. Huntington divides the world as "the West and the Rest" and places more emphasis on the primary conflict between the West and Islam. Likewise, Updike and DeLillo's response to September 11 rest completely on the sheer dualistic and simplistic categorization that divide the world into two entities one revered and the other reviled. DeLillo's immediate response to attacks was an essay called "In the Ruins of the Future: *Reflections on Terror and Loss in the Shadow of September*" published in *Harper's Magazine* just three months after the attacks. The main lineament of the essay is the anger and resentment of a New Yorker who has a strong attachment to the symbols of America's technology and the existence of the binaries between the West and Islam. He employs pronouns of "us" for his Western side and "they" for Muslims.

DeLillo does not differentiate the terrorists from Muslims and identifies the two major players in the struggle for global influence: capitalism and terrorism. The two are portrayed as competing narratives: capitalism stands for all that is technologically advanced and of the future, while terrorism is old, blind, inhumane, and backward. These judgments are reinforced through the use of the division of "Us" versus "Them," the West versus the Islamist East, progress against weakness, stagnation, and outside the progressive march of historical development. The opposition of "us" versus "them" is inclusive, as DeLillo does not separate the terrorists who attacked on September 11. The opposition is furthered by Orientalist binaries such as advanced – backward, rational – irrational and future – looking, past– obsessed. DeLillo states that September 11 was the result of Islam's intrinsic hatred of the West for its "high gloss" of modernity. Muslims "see something innately destructive in the nature of technology" ("In the Ruins of the Future") as it challenges their customs and beliefs. He recognizes "godlessness" and blunt force" of American foreign policy and America's contribution to the general bitterness in the world, but does not analyze what those policies are. Instead, he blames Islam, which is at fault, because it is living in the past has brought a war to an America living in the future. DeLillo's assessments essentially reaffirm the widely held prejudice: the notion that Islam is the locus of the most severe

manifestations of anti – Western and anti –modern values. The dramatic effect of the contrast between the East with its mysticism, sensuality, extreme fundamentalism and the West with its superior modernity and rationality is systematically employed to reinforce construction of binaries. September 11 proves to be a direct result of Islam’s hatred of the West for its “high gloss” of modernity. Therefore, the orientalist discourse is patently evident in statements DeLillo had already made prior to the appearance of his novel.

Falling Man fleshes out and develops DeLillo’s cycle of othering initiated in his essay. The work equates terrorism with Islam. It contributes to stereotyping the terrorists as the valiant and avengers of Islam against a regime of apostates and atheists. Since Orientalist discourse’s predominant assumption is the chaotic conflict between the modern West and the anti – modern Islam, the discourse presupposes that modernity and Islam are incompatible (*Culture*, 261). The individual behaviors of these Muslims are portrayed as a collective duty on the community as a whole. Very similar to the constructed opposition between Islam and the West, the novel constructs a categorical division between two competing narratives: the narrative of New Yorkers representing the West, and the terrorists representing Islam. The narrative of New Yorkers represents rational modern West looking at the bright future ahead while the terrorists represent an anti – modern society ostensibly inspired by a backward religion. These oppositions are systematically employed at all levels throughout the novel.

Falling Man is set in New York, in the period immediately after the attacks. The chapters move between three characters: Keith, Lianne, and Hammad. The shock and horror of the day are introduced through Keith who has just miraculously escaped the attacks, walking out of the rubble into the chaotic and nonsensical post– September 11 world. The atmosphere is saturated with disaster, frustration, and futility. He is left traumatized and finds himself unconsciously knocking on his ex – wife Lianne’s door. His disorientation and confusion are recounted as he experiences September 11 directly as a survivor. Through him, a window opens into the life of his estranged family. Lianne is an editor for a university press who also runs therapeutic writing workshops for a group of Alzheimer patients. She runs this workshop because her father, who was an Alzheimer patient, killed himself to get rid of his loss of memory. She appears to be a woman who is trying to deal with the trauma of the attacks yet at the same time

struggling to preserve the unexpected reunion with her husband, which eventually leads to a greater detachment. Their son Justin is similarly traumatized by the events. He and his friends speak in a coded language and constantly watching the skyline with binoculars, looking for signs of terrorists and talking about a Bill Lawton, a misnomer for Bin Laden. Lianne's mother, Nina Bartos is a retired professor who is going through post-surgery complications and old age crisis. She involves in heated debates about politics with Martin Ridnour, her mysterious lover. These crises inside the family are the main fulcrum of the novel to measure the impact of the attacks on families, their response to the event, and the presence or absence of the support of its members.

The first sentence of *Falling Man* describes the transformed world after the attacks: "It was not a street anymore but a world, a time and space of falling ash and near night" (DeLillo, 3). The panic – stricken, disheveled crowds covered in ash, run for their lives with a sense of agony, trauma, and grief for the loss of loved ones. The attacks have numbed a true interpretation and understanding of this unbelievable event to such an extent that "nothing seems exaggerated anymore" (41) and, we are all suspended in a perpetual "state of abeyance" (DeLillo, 4). Public space has invaded the domestic space as no one can escape the repercussions of an event of such magnitude: "These three years past, since that day in September, all life had become public" (DeLillo, 182). The narrative's introduction details a new and dangerous world of conflicts and differences, yet there is no attempt to realize it with a new set of discourses between two civilizations. Instead, it laments on the loss of the glorious past and searches the old narratives of Orientalism to blame Islam in favor of the West. Reinforced by the othering process, the opposition between the West and Islam is evident as the narrator and characters stereotype Muslims to strengthen the old Orientalist image of Muslims and to distort the image of Islam as a religion.

The novel's treatment of the Hamburg Cell is the most significant step towards the othering process. The terrorist plot from its inception and recruitment in Germany to training in Afghanistan and its final execution in the Hudson Corridor is carefully constructed. Other terrorist characters are mentioned, but the character of Hammad is the main focus. The name is mentioned for the first time in the chapter titled "On Marienstrasse," a place in the city of Hamburg in Germany, where the actual terrorists lived and studied university. The meeting place is the local mosque. The mosque is a

terrorist base, where Muslims can plan plots and recruit new jihadists for their cause. Interestingly, this chapter and others related to hijackers are separated from the rest of the narrative, as no connections are established to the main plot. Structurally, DeLillo juxtaposes two narrative lines that move in opposite directions: forward and backward. The story moves forward in time as Hammad makes preparations for jihad. Keith's story, in contrast, moves backward from the moment when he is at work in the World Trade Centers just before the first plane hits the tower. Also, three chapters are devoted to New Yorkers while the other three to the terrorists. Characters do not meet until the end when these terrorists strike the hijacked planes into the towers. Such a structure is meant to insinuate that a peaceful engagement is far from reach except in a deadly clash.

Just like DeLillo's response to September 11 and terrorists, John Updike also made public statements that blame Islam for all the evils and conflicts. Islam is suppressive, irrational and violent while West is liberalist, virtuous, and capitalist. His novel *Terrorist* contributes to the cycle of othering by going inside the mind of the same enemy to figure out the psychology of the terrorists, and the causes of the hatred against the West. Just like DeLillo's *Falling Man*, two civilizations are strictly separated and pitted against each other. Similar to *Falling Man*, *Terrorist* shows economic and historical issues from the Muslims' side as causes for the conflict, but these are overwhelmed by his focus on their religion. Supposedly, they "fight for God against America" (Updike, 248).

Terrorist is even more intrusively Orientalist compared to DeLillo's novel, as Updike assumes an authoritative command of the Quran and a vast knowledge of Islam and Muslims. To support the claim of an inherent clash between the West and Islam, Updike unyieldingly references to the Quran and hadith. The verses he brings up are used without giving a proper context. The accuracy of such knowledge is highly questionable, as Updike does not have any background knowledge of Islam or the Arabic language. He admits this in his statement: "my conscience was pricked by the notion that I was putting into the book something that I can't pronounce" (Witt, "Why Updike Delved into Suicide Killers' Psyches"). This is the proof that the excessive use of verses from the Quran and hadiths are meant to make the reader believe in the credibility of Updike's background knowledge as something that emanates from nothing more foundational than inner guidance. Updike fails to inform that every single

Muslim would interpret these verses and sayings differently. Apparently, Updike depends on earlier examples of Orientalist narratives to make such interpretations. This lack of knowledge about the people, their culture and language is a typical characteristic of Orientalism. Knowledge of Islam is redundant “since what one is dealing with is considered to be a psychological deformation, not a “real” culture or religion” (*Covering Islam*, xxxvi). This belief in psychology than scholarly knowledge might explain why writers such as Updike arrive at an already accepted conclusion concerning the opposition between West and Islam.

The binary logic of Orientalist discourse fleshes out in Ahmad Ashmawy’ s story in *Terrorist*. Ahmad is an 18 – year – old senior high school student from New Jersey. His father, Omar Ashmawy is an Egyptian exchange student, and Teresa is an Irish – American who works as a nurse. Omar broke up with Teresa and left the United States when Ahmad was only three years old. Guided by obscure and opaque Quran, Ahmad appears to be under the heavy influence of Islamic philosophy of jihad. The reward for martyrdom awaits him in the next life. Along with fanatic Sheik Rashid, the owner of a furniture business Charlie Chehab brainwash Ahmad into killing thousands of Americans by blowing up the Lincoln Tunnel with an explosive laden truck. The counselor at Central High, Jack Levy, tries to inspire and nurture clever Ahmad into a future career. However, the American – born and raised Ahmad is spiritually torn between radical Islam and a materialist West. As an “outsider” in an Arab – American community socially and culturally, his gradual transformation from an unhappy teenager into a suicide bomber could be seen in typical stereotypes of Islam in Orientalist discourse to reinforce irreparable damage between Islam and the West.

The very first sentence of *Terrorist* puts in motion the conflict between Islam and the West when the narrator mediates through Islam and Muslim identity for a Western audience. However, he mediates through an Orientalist discourse. Ahmad while observing the girls who sway and sneer and expose their soft bodies and alluring hair at Central High School, thinks that “these devils seek to take away my God” (Updike, 3). In the next paragraph, Islam is positioned in opposition to those devils along with the Western capitalism, consumerism, and the indulgence of young boys and girls in worldly pleasures. Ahmad compares himself to his nonobservant Christians and Jewish schoolmates and believes they are weak because they are indifferent to their

religion. His limited vision is blurred by teachers and students' life of a less restraint and almost non – existent belief. In true Orientalist tones, using the binarism of “us” and “them,” everything Western is depicted as despicable to Islam, and then one after another, this sweeping hatred is detailed as the disease of the West. In the very act of choosing this particular racial identity, ills like drunkenness, moral turpitude, destruction of family structure due to sexual wantonness ending in divorce and an irreligious education system based on science are seen as an unsympathetic Orientalist diatribe couched as Islam's hatred against the West.

2.2. Stereotyping Islam as Anti – West

Anti – West resentment is a common trope in Orientalist texts. Orientalists see September 11 as a result of Islam's hate against West and then try to explain its reasons through reductive myths to justify hatred. As a broad term, the West is used to identify America, Europe, modernity, science, technology, liberal democracy, secularism, progress, fundamental freedoms and values that have some origin or association with Europe. Opposition to any of these automatically means opposition to the West and hatred towards the West is reflected in hatred towards its ideals. DeLillo and Updike selectively depend on Orientalist discourse by stereotyping the West in the eyes of Islam. But they also base their discussion on Occidentalism as they create a discourse in which Muslims stereotype the West. The stereotyping of Muslims as anti – West became immanent in the West in the 1980s following Islamic politics such as the “Arab – Israeli war, the Iranian revolution and ensuing hostage crisis” (Pinto and Piscatori, 3), which was further reinforced after September 11 (Abbas, 71).

Modernity is one of many to differentiate the West from Islam. The term modernity, like the West, is also multifaceted as it has political, economic, social, cultural and artistic connotations. In the context of Orientalism, Said uses modernity to refer to Western secularism, democracy, progress, scientific advancement and a general notion of contemporary life in the West. Baudrillard looks at modernity in conjunction with globalization in the context of expansion of capitalism, technologies, media and all the cultural and social values that go with them. Due to the totalizing nature of these expansions, a reaction rises “against this abstract universality-including Islam's antagonism to Western values” (2002, 95). Though he does not exonerate Islam, he

believes that Islam is merely “the moving front along which the antagonism crystalized” (15). Zizek also claims that modernity’s capitalism and the hegemonic role of the scientific discourse affected the Muslim world and its “symbolic universe” was disturbed by its exposure to the onrush of capitalism without “a protective screen or temporal delay” (*Violence*, 82). Orientalism, on the other hand, indicates that anti – Americanism is not due to modernity or technological progress, but is motivated by aggressive American foreign policies and practices.

In *Falling Man*, every Muslim to frequent the mosque is considered to be involved with the “struggle” against infidels of the West. They came to the West for education, but it was in these rooms in Germany “where they spoke about the struggle” (DeLillo, 79). When they come to America, they continue to plot against the Western enemies inside these rooms. However, these enemies are not specified, but an infinite generalization of “the enemy, near the enemy and far” (DeLillo, 80) is made. The struggle is a total war against the West for its material, godless, and corrupt characteristics. Orientalism is so evident that even seemingly empathetic attempts to contextualize Islam’s grievances against America turn out to be Orientalist. These grievances are not different from those already working inside the discourse. Nina’s mysterious European lover, Martin Ridnour, advocates the case of the terrorists against America. This seeming sympathizer of the terrorists was a member of the Kommune who set off bombs and killed people in Germany in the 60s. His sympathy is one of a murderer for another towards the common enemy. During their discussion about the reasons for the current crisis, Nina and Lianne recount the typical American narrative for the reasons of the conflict, whereas Martin defends the case of Muslims specifically and the downtrodden and dispossessed Third World. According to Nina, these terrorists attacked America because they panicked (DeLillo, 46). The implication is that Muslims fell behind the West technologically which resulted in an inferiority complex and eventual violence.

Nina is trying to point to the symbolic nature of the attacks. For her, this was nothing but a revolt. For Nina, Islam is rebelling, and the reason behind this rebellion is the long humiliating and frustrating wait under the shadow of Western domination and advancement. The only consolation that will remain for Islam is the hope of regaining its glorious past, but how could this happen while the West maintains its monopoly on

the present and the future by its advancement and technology. Then the only way left for Islam is to challenge the West by dragging it into the past. This will provide a return to the true, original, and authentic Islam. Therefore, the attacks on the Twin Towers harbors deep symbolic impact far beyond the physical damage, and this is exactly what lies when Nina's says: "we've lost a thousand years" (DeLillo, 83).

Martin agrees with Nina's comments but takes a different analogy to identify Islam's panic. However, his views are discredited because of his dark past. He argues that Islam is against the West for its immoral and decadent way of life. Muslims fear and resent the West and the threat which it poses to their society because "they think the world is a disease, this society, ours, a disease that's spreading" (DeLillo, 46). He claims that it is actually Islam, which is under an economic, political, and cultural attack from the West. The West has every material advantage over Islam while Muslims have only a few men willing to kill themselves for their cause. Martin says, "but this is not an attack on one country, one or two cities. All of us, we are targets now" (DeLillo, 47). The whole Western civilization is under threat, and this war is instigated by a religious and cultural rivalry between the two. Martin is ambivalent about whether the resentments are due to religion or concrete instances of interference by America. This ambivalence is resolved when his analysis of Islam's enmity towards the West in economic and political terms shifts to religious and moral grounds. Martin deduces that Islam is against the West for its technological strength and moral flaws whereas Muslims believe that the disease in the West is spreading and corrupting their countries. Hatred and resistance are not only against America but the whole Western society. DeLillo tries to bring an approach to the conflict from both perspectives but relies on the religious side and dilutes the interference of America by resorting to explain anti-Americanism in the usual binaries of modernity and technological advancements.

While Martin searches a middle ground between purely religious and a combination of military, socio-economic, and political aspects, Nina brings up religion since it is the most significant element causing anti-West sentiment. The whole discussion between Nina, Martin, and Lianne revolves around the idea of how Islam poses a threat to the West. Among all these Orientalist discursive tropes that circulate throughout their discussion, one sentence shows itself with remarkable clarity, Nina states "Dead wars, holy wars. God could appear in the sky tomorrow" (DeLillo,

46). Then Martin asks her apprehensively “Whose God would it be?” (46). Her response embodies the core of Orientalism: “God used to be an urban Jew. He’s back in the desert now” (46). Those succinct wordings bear the deep – seated Western narrative that reflects the quintessential otherness of Islam and Muslims. The air of superiority embedded in the sentence is very obvious, as it is deeply ingrained and premised on the categorical demarcation that put Islam under the rubric of stereotypes which represent it as inherently primitive and militant. Nina, the educated academic, voices the most prevalent views about the terrorists’ mind – set and motivations, she holds the argument that September 11 attacks were solely motivated only by religious fanaticism. Martin sees religion as a disguise to revert other grievances, but politically, the United States has been using force to interfere in the affairs of other countries. As a response, people from those countries “strike a blow to this country’ s dominance” to show “how a great power that interferes and occupies can be vulnerable” (DeLillo, 46). In response to Nina, Martin says “Forget God. These are matters of history. This is politics and economics. All the things that shape lives, millions of people, dispossessed, their lives, their consciousness”(46). The subtle implication of his observation is that if the United States interferes and occupies other countries, a destructive reaction is natural and logical. Nina’s historical explanation blames Islam without any context. The problem is not because of America’s interference or occupation or any imbalance in its relationship with the rest of the world but essentially a typical Third World problem (DeLillo, 47). Consistent with DeLillo’ s assessment in his real life commentaries, the latest comment shows his stand in all this discussion: it is the rest of the world to blame for the bitterness in the World.

Said sees the reason for the anti – American sentiment not as the result of hatred of modernity or technology, but “is based on a narrative of concrete interventions” in which America interferes, invades, and occupies lands (“An Interview with Edward Said”). *Falling Man* mentions bitterness and grievances against America, but fails to identify or explain them. Almost no attempts are made to contextualize the event. One major factor that might contribute to the West – Islam conflict is the Israeli and Palestinian issue. September 11 terrorists presented Israel’s intransigence as an excuse to instigate anti – American sentiment. Similarly, the terrorists in *Falling Man* cite Jews before Americans as the target of their hatred (80). Like other instances where serious

tackling of essential issues is avoided, the reasons those terrorists have deep animosity against the Jews are trivialized. They justified their fight against Jews for “defects in construction” (DeLillo, 78). Their construction has thin walls and narrow aisles. Toilets are noisy as people outside could hear the splash of urination. DeLillo obviously shrinks from contextualizing conflicts despite the fact that he mentions the bitterness created by American policies and the terrorists’ unstoppable hatred for America and Jews.

Updike’s public statements and interviews consist of sweeping negative generalizations about Muslims that subsume all differences into a monolithic fantasy. Labeling Islam as an “absolutist” religion, Updike sees it significant to go inside the mind of the Muslim ‘Other’ in *Terrorist* to figure out something about which he has already made up his mind. He tries to understand and represent “the animosity and hatred of the enemies” against the West (Witt, 4). In other words, he attempts to present to the West the outsider enemy who cannot represent himself, which Said, quoting from Karl Marx, says is typical of an Orientalist move to render the East inarticulate: “They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (*Orientalism*, 335). This comment has two possible propositions. The first is that the indigenous ‘other’ should be excluded from management functions and those heavy responsibilities should be strictly reserved for the Western. The second is that the West claims to have the authority to represent and speak for the “Other.” It is the West that articulates Muslims, and this articulation is “the prerogative, not of a puppet master, but of a genuine creator, whose life – giving power represents, animates, constitutes the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries” (*Orientalism*, 57).

Terrorist portrays Islam as without any ideals of its own. For Ahmad, Islam hates America because it is Godless and “obsessed with sex and luxury goods” (Updike, 38). According to his mentor, Sheik Rashid, the American way is the way of infidels and America has turned into a “global Satan” (Updike, 236) due to its power and wealth in the world. From top to bottom everything around Ahmad is corruption, debauchery, and immorality. He finds no pleasure in delving into such worldly pleasures. He is disgusted by the material greed and daily pleasures of the West because these are insubstantial to him and repels his interest. The real comfort lies in Islam, and to attain eternal bliss one needs to please God, which is the “only real guidance, the guidance of Allah” (Updike, 18). Born and raised in America, Ahmad believes that science, the

source of Western modernity, is incompatible with Islam. What they teach in school is godless “biology and chemistry and physics” (Updike, 4). His Christian and Jewish teachers and classmates are his enemies because they are morally weak, as they do not practice even their own religions. He justifies his meeting Jorleen to “know the enemy” (Updike, 68). Ahmad supports his hostile attitude towards unbelievers with a hadith that all infidels should be destroyed (Updike, 68). Even though Updike should provide evidence in support of such a claim, as he does in other situations, in this case, it is just one baseless and biased interpretation by the so – called Sheik. The narrator, who has a selective taste, might have found enough in the prophet’s actions and utterances to repute such a claim, but he conveniently fails to do so. Ahmad and Sheik believe that Islam does not tolerate the existence of any other religion besides theirs.

The prophet had pacts with Jews and Christians, and they were treated equally when he became the military, political and religious leader of Islam. More importantly, Islam even allows Muslim men to marry Jews and Christians (*Al-Quran*, 2:221). Esposito in *Islam: the Straight Path* (1998) states that during Muhammad’s proselytizing in Mecca, “he viewed Christians and Jews, sharing the core principles of his teachings” (17). Upon his migration from his hometown Mecca to Medina, he established an agreement known as the “Constitution of Medina” between Muslims, the major factions, Jews and Christian tribes that secured equal rights for all religions (Abbas, “Islamophobia in the United Kingdom”, 76). Even Bernard Lewis, admits these facts by stating “ the tolerated non – Muslim subjects of the Muslim state enjoyed a very large measure of autonomy in the conduct of their internal communal affairs, including education, taxation, and the enforcement of their own laws of personal status, notably marriage, divorce, and inheritance”(*The Crisis of Islam*, 39). Updike ignores these to reduce something to a myth and makes up a copious hadith of his own to reinforce othering and stereotyping. By ascribing a hadith to the prophet is meant to project a deep – rooted anti – West Islam. Said finds it especially unique in Western Orientalists to make generalizations about Prophet Muhammad’s life and hadiths without supporting evidence or reference (*Covering Islam*, xviii). Updike goes a step further by ascribing statements against non-Muslims to the Prophet to project an anti-West Islam.

Terrorist presents several occasions to refer to Quran and hadith to portray an anti – West Islam. Incomplete and selective references from the Quran and the hadith reinforce this portrayal. In one such occasion, Ahmad says to Jack Levy, “Be ruthless to unbelievers. Burn them, crush them, because they have forgotten God” (Updike, 294). This quote’s context or verse’s title is not given. Of course, there is no such verse in Quran, but it serves the purpose. Another similar incident is at the beginning of the novel when Sheik Rashid and Ahmad discuss the chapter of the “Hutama” from the Quran. Initially, the narrator talks about the crushing fire of the hell and says the God will throw the Jews and Christians in that burning hell. Then Updike introduces the Surah, which says “and who shall teach thee what the Crushing Fire is? It is God’s kindled fire, which shall mount above the hearts of the damned; it shall verily rise over them like a vault, on outstretched columns” (Updike, 6). In truth, the chapter has nine verses, but Updike befittingly excludes the first four and starts with the fifth. The first four verses go: “Woe to every slanderer, back – biter; who amasses wealth and hordes it; Does he think his wealth will abide forever; By no means, He will be thrown into Hutama” (*Al-Quran*, 104). The chapter does not even mention Jews and Christians but Updike quotes the verses in such a way as if these verses are addressed to them. The surah actually depicts the characteristics of the back – biting person, who considers his wealth to be the source of superiority (*Al-Quran*, 104). Updike deliberately manipulates Islamic scripture to reinforce an anti – West Islam and Muslims.

Updike uses words like kafir and kuffar (singular and plural forms of the infidel in Arabic) when referring to the West and Westerners as a way to prove the Islam’s rage and contempt against them. Ahmad is motivated by such misinterpretations and never doubts that he is on the side of righteous against the armies of unbelievers. To gain an eternal blessing, he must fight mercilessly against God’s enemies and if he manages to carry out his plan by blowing up explosive laden truck to kill Americans he would please God and Muslims all around the world. He dreams of Muslims dancing joyfully at the slaughter of Americans in the streets of Damascus and Karachi and scenes of destruction on television after the attacks will be “filling the Middle East with jubilation” (Updike, 281). Updike is playing on a much-trumpeted trope of pleasure in the Muslim world about the events of September 11. A few examples were repeated in the media and literature to make it a collective statement about ethos in Islamic countries around

the world. According to Said, West uses such double standards or “contradictory norms for the political, military, economic and cultural dominance” of their “crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissents and ‘others’” (*Orientalism*, xviii). Similarly, Updike ascribes statements against non – Muslims and gives several out of context and incomplete references to project an anti – West Islam.

DeLillo and Updike further resort to the stereotypical Orientalist narrative of the material – spiritual binaries and modernity – technological advancements between the West and Islam. Islam is against materialism, and as the West is obsessed with material possessions and luxuries, it automatically becomes the target of Islam. Hammad in *Falling Man* and Ahmad in *Terrorist* have a certain dislike for American materialism because of their ascetic religion. The dislike is closely related to Islam’s stereotyped dislike for life and love of death in both texts. It is explicitly expressed or implied, but Islam is stereotyped essentially different from the West.

2.3. Stereotyping Muslims as a Monolithic Entity

Said believes that since the demise of Soviet Union there has been a rush in the United States to find in an Orientalized Islam a “new empire of evil”(*Orientalism*, 346). In “Preface” to *Orientalism*, written only months before his death, Said expresses his disappointment over the continuation of the Orientalism against the perceived “empire of evil” which met with increased intensity after September 11. The selected texts in this chapter create this evil empire by describing Islam and Muslims according to the same binaries of division and opposition, and stereotypes. “These men think and feel alike” (*Falling Man*, 68), as if they have “no individuality, no personal characteristics, or experiences”(*Orientalism*, 287). They eat the same food together, pray together, say the same prayers together and all have beards. Since there is no place for individuality, Hammad and the rest of Hamburg Cell terrorists responsible for September 11 attacks are representations of all Muslims.

DeLillo speaks authoritatively and negatively about Islam in essentialist terms. Islam is responsible for the attacks, not individual terrorists because that is where they get their motivation. The interchangeable use of the totalizing word “Islam” with terrorism makes it a good example of the stereotyping Said points out in the *Orientalism*. One instance is that when the characters discuss the possible reasons for the attack, Nina,

speaking on behalf of the whole Western Civilization, does not hesitate to put the blame for the conflict on the backward nature of Islamic civilization. Apparently, she is under the heavy influence of Orientalist discourses when she says, “It is not the history of Western interference that pulls down these societies. It is their own complex and bloody history, their mentality. They live in a closed world, of choice, of necessity. They haven’t advanced because they haven’t wanted to or tried to” (DeLillo, 47). So according to Nina, Muslims’ backwardness is what makes them feel inferior. This feeling of inferiority causes a sense of panic, which turns Muslims into violent jihadists to take it out on West. This type of prejudice is so deeply ingrained in Western psyche that even an educated university professor like Nina cannot escape its influence. Each Western and Muslim character is made to think in binaries to justify difference and then rely on Orientalist dogmas to reinforce the stereotypes.

The manifestation of such reinforcements appears in the first few pages of *Falling Man*. Lianne gets a postcard from a friend in Rome after September 11. In the front of this postcard is a facsimile of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem *The Revolt of Islam* written in 1818. Even though it has been sent earlier, the postcard arrives right after the attacks. Lianne is not certain whether it is a coincidence or it indicates the retention of an old hatred between the West and Islam. The narrator calls it “a simple coincidence,” (8) but it becomes more than a coincidence when he says that it is “not so simple”(*Falling Man*, 8). It appears strange to the narrator “that a card might arrive at this particular time bearing the name of that specific book” (DeLillo, 8). However, despite its title, the poem is not focused on Islam or Muslims. It is actually a symbolic parable on liberation and ideals of revolution following the disillusionment with the French Revolution. Islam is used in the title only for that fact that the setting is a fictional state of Argolis, modeled on the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. The only possible reason for mentioning this particular poem is to create a conflicting history between the two civilizations and draw on Orientalist stereotypes. The word “*Revolt*” is specifically highlighted to imply Islam’s commitment then and now as destructive and violent outbursts against the West. This shows to which extent the way Islamic cultures and societies representation remain unchanged over a long the passage of time.

Updike also makes sweeping, vast generalizations about Islam to reinforce differences. He calls Islam an “absolutist” religion that makes cohabitation with other

religions almost impossible. Its authority is absolute and regulates every aspect of its followers' life, both public and private. He says, "Islam doesn't have as many shades as the Christian or the Judaic faith does. It is fairly absolutist, as you know, and you're either in or out" (Updike, "Why Updike Delved"). By their nature, all religions are didactic and absolutist as they claim to be the source of universal truths. However, Updike's comments seem to be restricted to Islam only. His attitude is an indication of othering strategy employed throughout his book, which is more provocative and has a more straightforward attitude to describe an absolutist Islam. The narrator and Western characters also contribute to this discourse of hatred. The highest authority responsible for securing America – the Secretary of Homeland Security is the most significant and predominant voice. The secretary replaces Communism with the current enemy, Islam, because "the enemy's superstitious mentality" orchestrated the September 11 attacks on capitalism's "headquarters" to bring it down by cutting off its head" (Updike, 47). He further states that Islam does not believe in democracy and freedoms and Muslims are in a conspiracy to take over the United States (Updike, 261). The secretary has no doubts about direct hatred of Muslims for the West and demands an answer to the often – referred nagging question, "Why do they hate us?" Secretary's assistant Hermione's rudimentary answer is a typical Orientalist one: "They hate the light. Like cockroaches, like bats" (Updike, 48). Hermione's assessment is harsher and more provocative than Nina's in *Falling Man*.

The novel furthers these collective and individual stereotypes in the sayings and lives of individual Muslim characters and Westerners' statements about Muslims. There is not a single individual Muslim character that can be differentiated from the group. Since they uncritically submit to a violent ideology, Muslims are the embodiment of collective and depraved stereotypes. Deprived of their individuality, Muslims draw their inspiration and guidance from the Quran and the Hadith to see the West, Jews, Christians, and everyone outside the sphere of Islam as nonbelievers and thus deserve to be killed. Islam, in essence, is against what they stand for such as freedoms, liberty, democracy, and modernity. As can be clearly seen in Secretary's views, Orientalism labels Islam to be always "antidemocratic" (*Orientalism*, 150). In just a matter of a few weeks of religious training, Ahmad submits to the philosophy of jihad. Even though he finds American people to be mostly friendly, good and civil, his faith pulls him into a

deadly certainty about the righteousness when it comes to his religion. He sympathizes with the September 11 victims, especially those who jumped from the towers. But, Updike makes him an accessory to take up a nonsense plan to carry out a massacre because his faith commands so. Ahmad's ambivalence and hesitation about carrying out his plan is an indication that while individuals might have second thoughts, it is their religion that always fuels the negative feelings towards the West.

Terrorist portrays Islam as a religion of universal aspirations, regardless of their geographical locations, boundaries or culture. Charlie Chehab claims that Islam is nothing without absolute allegiance to the "ummah," (231) – the international unifying agent. An Orientalized, monolithic religion of eternal aspirations, Islam cannot be discussed or questioned. A bright student like Ahmad would not dare to question an Islamic command even if he has doubts. However, Updike treats characters of other religions and ethnicities differently by positioning secular characters as a mouthpiece for the multicultural harmony in America and its security issues. The counselor Jack Levy is Jewish but distances himself from his religion. His wife, Beth Levy, was a Lutheran who also does not practice her religion. Ahmad's mother, Teresa is a Catholic but lives a secular life. His classmates Tylenol and Joryleen are African Americans who live a life unencumbered by religion. Even the Secretary of Homeland Security, a "stout churchgoer," has secularist views, "having left the medieval superstitions of religion long ago" (48). The only religious characters are Muslims. The horrible Sheik Rashid is an embodiment of evil, as he never utters a word that is good. He thinks that Islam is always right against the wrongs of the West, which is full of corruption, "bad philosophy and bad literature. Western culture is Godless" (38). On one side there are the Sheik's evil teachings and on the other secularist and enlightened Jack Levy who tries to help Ahmad out for a career and good life. The fanatic imam forces Ahmad to commit a ghastly crime by instigating hatred against the West on the basis of a religious ideology, yet Jack Levy talks Ahmad out of his plan for the sole reason of respect for human life and decency.

Perhaps a very distant and outstanding exception to irrational and violent stereotypes of Muslims is Charlie Chehab, who has been raised as a "pure American" (Updike, 218). He is a pragmatic businessman devoid of any morals or values. Still, as a Muslim, he does not refrain from expressing typical grievances against the West's

capitalism, consumerism, media, and America's invasion of Muslim countries. Later on, Chehab turns out to be a CIA operative planted by homeland security to ferret out the members of terrorist cells in New Jersey. Being a Muslim suits his behavior because he can easily serve the purpose of a being negative stereotype of being disloyal and tool of America. Similarly, Muslim political leaders are described as uniform stereotypes. Leaders like "Hosni Mubarak, the Saudi kings, and Muammar al – Qaddafi are tools of America" (Updike, 249) because America uses those lackey rulers to further their imperial interests. There is not a single individual Muslim character that can be differentiated from the rest of the group. A Muslim husband and father, Omar Ashmawy is portrayed as an irresponsible, disloyal, and opportunist Muslim. Omar married Ahmad's mother Teresa to get American citizenship. He deserted the family when Ahmad was only three and never contacted them since then. Teresa married Omar to show "how liberal and liberate" she was. She was captivated because he was an "oriental, exotic, third – world, put – upon" (Updike, 86). The marriage turned out to be a disaster as she tells Levy about Omar, "What a pompous, chauvinistic horse ass he was" (86). Even Ahmad thinks of his father as an escapee who "decamped" (35) when Ahmad was only three.

Both texts reinforce sweeping visual stereotypes about culture and religion. Even though there is no explicit command exhorting Muslims to grow a beard in Islam, DeLillo presents growing a beard as a religious obligation in *Falling Man*. This characterization also becomes an element of humor in the characterization of Muslims, adding to their strange habits and single – mindedness. Justin recognizes Osama bin Laden by his beard when he says, "Bin Lawton has a long beard" (*Falling Man*, 74). To make this individual preference a collective symbol, other September 11 terrorists are extremely determined to grow a beard as if it is a major sin in Islam to do otherwise. Among other things "they were all growing beards. One of them even told his father to grow a beard" (79). Men came to the flat on Marienstrasse, some to visit, others to live, men in and out all the time, growing beards (56). Hammad beats up a man without knowing why, but he thinks that the reason might be that the man did not have a beard (82). The repetition of beards suggests that DeLillo identifies beards as simultaneously a sign of Muslim and a way of suppression. His portrayal is in line with Said's description of stereotypes of Orientalist discourse of Muslims as "gun – toting, bearded fanatic

terrorists, pathologically hell – bent on destroying the great enemy the United States” (*Covering Islam*, xxvi). Updike also puts emphasize on Sheik Rashid’s beard, its color, length, shape, his playing with it and so forth to conceal his evil face.

The othering process does not even leave the most trivial detail alone if it can serve the purpose. For instance, despite the great wealth and high prestige of its literature, the Arabic language is ridiculed by comparing to the global, rational, and straightforward lingua of the West. The Secretary finds the “poetic euphemisms and pathetic braggadocio” in Arabic “alien and repellent” to his Western ears (Updike, 47) and “there is something weird about the language – it makes them feeble – minded, somehow” (259). The narrator would state the vague, unattractive and rhetorical language of the Quran has made the imam delusional, as he “inhabits a semi – real world of pure words”. It is because he “loves the Holy Quran for its language, mounted robed warriors under the cloudless sky of Arabian Desert” (168). In one ambiguous sentence, Updike presents the Arabic language, its speakers and the geography in the most exotic forms. Instead of assuming that apparent vagueness may rather be due to his own ignorance or lack of understanding, Updike resorts to the classic orientalist discourse that labels Arabic as “wordy, imprecise, complicated and high – flown” (168). Said states: an emphasis on rhetoric and its negative impressions on the Arab mind’s vagueness, and its grandiloquence... since the Arabic language is much given to rhetoric Arabs are consequently incapable of true thought” (*Orientalism*, 287). On a cultural level of othering process, Lianne has quite a hostile reaction to her neighbor when she plays music in her apartment. This part of the novel bears quasi – obvious Orientalist undertone set in mutual interaction with the strong traumatic tone that surfaces the whole narrative. She’s offended by a loud music, which she initially thinks to be “another set of traditions, Middle Eastern, North African, Bedouin ... Sufi ... music located in Islamic tradition” (*Falling Man*, 67). Infuriated by a foreign music at such a sensitive time, she “thought of knocking on the door and saying something” (67). Later she wanted to “ask her why she’s playing this particular music” (68). The narrator barges in to explain this commotion between the collectivistic Islamic and individualistic Western cultures. In true Orientalist discourse, a diverse community is stereotyped into one collective community defined by homogeneous behavior. Lianne reacts and loathes them because “they’re the ones who think alike, talk alike, eat the

same food at the same time. Say the same prayers, word for word, in the same prayer stance, day and night, following the arc of the sun and moon” (*Falling Man*, 68).

In response to stereotyping a diverse community of Muslims into a collective community, Said argues “typical Orientalist narrative usually conveys that the ‘Arab’ or ‘Arabs’ have an aura of apartness, definitiveness and collective self – consistency such as to wipe out any traces of individual Arabs with narratable life histories” (*Culture*, 229). DeLillo and Updike precisely do this when they give the Western side of the story by presenting inherent stereotypes in Islamic civilization, and claiming incompatibility with its ideals of liberty and democracy. For both authors, Islam is the “new empire of evil” (*Orientalism*, 346), set in opposition to the values of West. They do not target specific terrorists but apply harsh dictates to the whole Muslims by labeling them as absolutists. Said sees this aspect of Orientalism as a deliberate attempt to consider “Islam and fundamentalism as essentially the same thing” (*Covering Islam*, xvi). As Said has argued, Islam is equated with what Muslims do, and Muslims are united with each other. This scenario sets Islam against the West.

2.4. Stereotyping Muslim Identity with Defeat, Revenge, and Displacement

The stereotypical depiction of the collective Islamic identity is one characterized by defeat, loss, revenge and displacement. Whereas Said believes in the fluid or ever-changing nature of identity, he argues that Orientalism fixes identities, even though these are “constructed, and occasionally even invented” (*Orientalism*, 322). The essence of “the Orient” is that it is a “constituted identity” (322). In other words, it is not factual or real, but invented, in this case by others. Both novels under discussion in this chapter engage in this process of repetitious fixity. As the second strategy in stereotyping, the same fixedness is repeated in individual and collective lives. The individual stereotype merely represents the collectivity stereotype, as the individual stereotype cannot stand on its own outside of a collective identity.

Falling Man and *Terrorist* demonstrate an essential, unchanging Muslim character and mindset from the early days of Islam to the present day. This character and mindset arise from religious beliefs and shape all contemporary Muslims. Both narratives reinforce this process of repetitious fixity. Economic issues, local histories, political and social changes or the pressure of external forces on contemporary Islamic

societies are all dismissed as irrelevant than the unchanging sway of monolithic and static categorization of Islam that held over its followers' minds and behavior. As the second strategy in stereotyping, the same fixedness is recurrent in individual and collective lives. Muslims are an indistinguishable mass with un – pliable fixed identities because they are what they are, and will never change. The individual stereotype only shows the collectivity stereotype. The individual stereotype would not stand on its own outside of a collective identity, which is actually quite diverse.

Both Updike and DeLillo reinforce the notion that Muslims once had a glorious past and the West took that away. The shift of power has made Muslims jealous and revengeful. This feeling of inferiority has transformed them into violent people determined to reclaim their lost place in the history. In *Falling Man*, Martin resolutely states that Islam wants to reclaim its lost place in history: “they want their place in the world, their own global union, not ours” (116). In the same manner, the idea that Muslims feel dislocated stems from the glorious past once Islam and Muslims had. Invasion by the outside cultures, capitalism, and aggressive foreign policies of Western powers have all contributed to this dislocation. DeLillo applies this conspiracy to the whole Islamic culture in order to make it a conflict not between a few strayed individuals, but a total clash between civilizations. Thus, Muslim individuals in his novel are reacting against a lost place in history to reclaim it. As a monolithic entity, they “felt things together” (*Falling Man*, 174). This is a typical unsubtle recurrence of collectivity and mass thinking that leaves no place for an individualized thinking. In “Shattered Myths” (1975), Said argues that categorization of Muslims is not accurate and meaningful since it consists of over millions of people and dozens of different societies that “there is no truly effective intellectual method for discussing all of them together as a single monolith. Any reduction of this whole immense mass of history, societies, individuals, and realities is, therefore, a mystification” (410).

For DeLillo, Islam is resentful and revanchist because it is defeated and displaced. After centuries of isolation and dominance over their culture, these men are sent to dark and closed “rooms”. Muslims secretly meet and conspire against the powerful West in those dark and closed spaces. To obviate from the West’s corrupting influence, Muslims need to take shelter in those places as if they were bats and cockroaches. The mosques become the only secret place where these men find their

space and also plot against the West to claim their rightful place in the world. They do this because “they were too long in isolation being crowded by other cultures” (*Falling Man*, 80). The Western world is not compatible with their ideals, which forces them to shut themselves to the outside world in secret places, as “they needed space of their own” (80).

Falling Man's Hammad is the individual manifestation of the collective dislocation. He is “invisible to the outside world because of his isolation” (171). This isolation is both physical and psychological. Although Hammad is in the West physically, he is not certain about his physical being or his identity as he believed “he was not here, it was not him” (175). His characterization epitomizes the intrinsic difference between the Muslim medieval mind – set and the modern Western mind. He is clumsy, sensual, hedonistic, and gullible. Whenever he attempts at a slight critical evaluation of what he is going through he “had to fight against the need to be normal” (*Falling Man*, 83). His experiences of reality are mainly rendered through sensory impressions. Devoid of energy or initiative, Hammad's dislocation and ambivalence also manifest itself in the conversion from British to American standards of measurement. Furthermore, he is split between a past British colonialism and a present American imperialism. As a Muslim with a lost history and no hope, his identity is determined either through his attachment to the remnants of British colonialism or his accommodation to the new American imperialism.

In his book *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity* (1993), Bernard Lewis states throughout the history, Islamic world was not able to modernize and keep pace with the West in several respects, which has resulted in the Western powers to acquire dominance over them. An example of this is Muslim's inability to come up with their own system of measurement, which forced them to borrow from other cultures (117). By listing the usual litany of grievances about the Islam; failure to separate religion from politics, incompatibility of democracy and Islam, hurt pride over a lost civilization, rejection of modernity, nostalgia for the past and fascination with terrorism, Lewis argues that conflict between Islam and the West has been in the making for centuries. Lewis states “by all the standards that matter in the modern world, what was once a mighty civilization has indeed fallen low” (117). From Lewis's standpoint, Islam's inability to adjust itself to the modern standards is an indication of

its inherent inferiority and henceforth its inevitable decadence. Similarly, Fukuyama claims “Islam is the only cultural system that seems regularly to produce people like Osama bin Laden or the Taliban who reject modernity lock, stock, and barrel. This raises the question of if representative such people are of a larger Muslim community, and whether this rejection is somehow inherent in Islam” (“The West Has Won”). The Islamic world was the forefront of human achievement for centuries. The shift of power towards the West brought an anguished reaction from the Islamic world. This overwhelming sense of dislocation and ambivalence forces Hammad to take shelter in the mosque to compensate for the cultural loss. He feels safer here as a “struggle against the enemy, near enemy and far, Jews first, for things unjust and hateful, and then the Americans” (*Falling Man*, 80). Amir, the ringleader of the cell, is there to provide inspiration to fight and reclaim what’s been taken from them. During training in Florida, the cause of the group is once more described as a cosmic war against the West for “world domination to reassert their lost history” (173).

Ahmad in *Terrorist* is also displaced and disoriented. His ambivalence forces him to vehemently seek shelter from the ‘devils’ of the West inside the closed sphere of the masjid. The immoral, material and sensual West wants to take away his faith. The mosque is the only place that can provide a secure shelter to such a displaced person. The mosque is described as “shabby and fragile in its external trappings,” it could allow Ahmad as “it is woven of tenacious strands and built upon truths set deep in the hearts of men” (*Terrorist*, 148). As a physical manifestation of evil, the description of mosques in general in *Falling Man*, is dark, close, gloomy and creepy: a “closed space” in the closed inner city and its “windows have a view of only brick walls and dark clouds” (DeLillo, 234). The teachings and an anti – West atmosphere in the mosque make him a terrorist, but it is probably inside the mosque that the bombing of the Lincoln Tunnel is planned.

Ahmad’s displacement is more tangible when compared to Hammad. Her mother laments his birth and existence as “a disaster” (Updike, 89). He is the child of an unlikely union between a Catholic woman and a Muslim man. The failed marriage between Ahmad’s parents’ relays the bitter message that marriage or peace between the West and Islam is not in sight. Living in a dysfunctional family, Ahmad has no high hopes for future, and as an Arab – American he is stuck in the segregated ethnic world

of New Prospect. He is against everything America stands for, so there is no hope to establish a meaningful relationship with mainstream America. In a society where status is determined almost entirely by ethnic and religious background, Ahmad is likely to be crippled even before he graduates High School. The only possible community that can provide companionship could be the Arab – American. Even that community is unable to provide him what he is looking for since he is a “minority’s minority,” (84) and “an outsider among outsiders” (244). He is not taken seriously by the rest of society and has fewer opportunities to better his situation through education or to otherwise realize his potential.

After his father’s departure, Ahmad has to live with his Irish – American mother. There is no background information about his past interactions with the other Muslims and the only instance we have of his connection is with the imam and Charlie Chehab. Religiously and ethnically he is an outsider, and he sets psychological boundaries between himself and American society. Everyone singles him out; he is having problems with schoolmates, teachers, and his mother at home because of his religion. Even though he is articulate and confident in his interactions with people, when it comes to his religious studies at the masjid, his mother thinks that he’s “easily led” (Updike, 239). Besides, the family is in ruins economically and Ahmad has no choice but to stop his education and become a truck driver. However, Updike puts the blame on Islam for Ahmad’s educational and economic failures by saying that his future prospects are bleak because of his uncompromising “devotion to Allah, his future has been amputated” (183). Updike assumes the Islamic God not as “a God of enterprise but of submission” (184). Such an absurd comment is a deep symptom of Orientalism, as Said points out Orientals are regarded to have a “fundamental incapacity for trade, commerce, and economic rationality” (*Orientalism*, 259). Ambivalent, displaced and hopeless, Ahmad turns to the allegedly aggressive ideology of Islam to assert his identity and amount to something meaningful.

Ahmad’s dislocation is so serious and critical that his only escape can be an absolutist religion for stability, which is epitomized in the slogan “Islam is the solution” (78). Sheik Rashid feeds this fanaticism apparently, however, there are instances where Ahmad surpasses his teacher’s fanaticism in the interpretation of Islamic commands. For instance, he has no tolerance for ambiguity as to the meaning of Quran and the

hadith. When the Imam tries to discuss and interpret the Quran, for Ahmad, this is unacceptable, as his voice would remind him the “unconvincing voices of his teachers at Central High” (78). During lessons, Ahmad hears “Satan’s undertone in it, a denying voice within an affirming voice” (6). His extremism “exceeds the master’s; it frightens Sheik Rashid to be riding the winged white seed of Islam, its irresistible onrushing” (7). Those quotations label and stereotype Ahmad, the Imam and Islam as extremist. Ahmad does not tolerate the Imam, because he opens the prophet’s words to reason and questioning. In his search for absolutes and stability, he would agree easily with any absurd statement if said with enough firmness and it can be seen in the very act of suicide bombing of Lincoln Tunnel. No questions asked, and the text does not give us any external or internal motivation for this horrible act of terrorism. Updike seems to imply that such considerations do not have any significance in the case of Muslims who he stereotypes as religious fanatics and whose characters remain the same.

This stereotypical fixation is true for Ahmad throughout the novel, even after his unexpected change of heart to abort his mission. Once he sets out to embark on his horrible plan, he does not seem to have any second thoughts. The counselor Jack Levy’s effort to convince Ahmad proves fruitless. He stays determined and resolute until he sees children waving from the backseat of a car in front of Ahmad’s truck, then he drastically changes his mind. This sudden and unexpected decision is only explained with “does not want us to desecrate his creation by willing death. He wills life” (306). Indeed, this statement contradicts the whole constructed ideas about Muslims and Islam Updike had so vigorously constructed. This interesting twist of event and revelation comes out of nowhere. Updike creates an unbelievable situation leading to an equally unbelievable conclusion. Yet, the sudden and portentous change of heart does not last for a long time. While driving the truck to surrender it to the police station, he looks at Americans who are busy in their daily routine like insects and Ahmad still calls them devils. Once again the stereotyping resurfaces in the last few lines of the book when a resolution is expected. Ahmad remains the same disoriented and dislocated individual who is likely to take up another horrible act of terrorism to destroy the infidels who have displaced Islam from its ascendancy. Upon his change of heart to abort his mission, Ahmad sees Americans busy in their errands like insects and calls them devils. The stereotype is back to its beginning, as it has to stay the same.

Muslims are displaced because of the West, and it is reinforced by disorientations of individual lives due to Islam's ascetic nature. They are ready to kill thousands to get rid of the sense of defeat, dislocation, and ambivalence. Muslims in both texts are collectively displaced individuals because of the West, exacerbated further by disorientations in individual lives because of Islam's ascetic nature. Therefore, they are perceived as ready to take up suicide missions and get rid of defeat and pain that has come to define their lives as Muslims. Acts of suicide conform the stereotype Muslims identity with defeat, revenge, and displacement.

2.5. Stereotyping Muslims as Death – Loving Fanatics

A British journalist for *The Telegraph*, David Blair, wrote an article "The Americans Love Pepsi Cola, but We Love Death" from Peshawar, Pakistan on September 24, 2001, a couple of weeks before the American attack on Afghanistan. Blair talked to some mujahedeen on the Afghan border about the anticipated attack. They replied that jihad is their existence and that the sound of guns is like music for them. Their biggest slogan became the title of the article. One can imagine the impact these view of the West as soft, sickly, and sweet, a decadent civilization addicted to pleasure, and these slogans from a small number of extremists could have on people in the West. The stereotypes of Islam as a violent religion and Muslims as ruthless killers are commonplace in the West. These stereotypes are associated with other stereotypes of them as death-loving and suicidal jihadists. These closely connected stereotypes are repeated in Orientalist discourse to create an atmosphere of misperceived anxiety about Muslim culture and reinforce Islamophobia. Islam and Muslims, who embrace death as a sacred sacrifice, are perceived to threaten the existence of the West and its inhabitants. Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg argue that Westerners enact Islamophobia, while Muslims perceive they are discriminated against because of it. They believe that Islamophobia plays a critical role in convincing people that an all-consuming civilizational clash is inevitable due to the "fact" that there is "an essential and irreconcilable difference between "them" and "us" (2008, 3). As a result, the mention of Islam and Muslims in Orientalist discourse brings to mind terrorism, violence, suicide bombings, and jihad.

“In the Ruins of the Future” DeLillo states that Islam praises “suicidal fervor,” since poor, weak, and ignorant Muslims are “willing to die” in jihad against a “rich, privileged, and strong” West (“In the Ruins”). His novel reinforces the same anxiety in the portrayal of Muslims and Islam. After the attacks, Keith walks instead of driving or taking a cab, as “it might be hard to find a taxi at a time when every cabdriver in New York was named Muhammad” (DeLillo, 28). This quotation is an abundantly clear example of how an Orientalist narrative painfully toils along the traumatic narrative. Just a common name would be enough to be called a terrorist, as there is no difference between individual terrorists and the collectivities to which they belong. Muslims are violators of the Western style of life, a criminality rooted not in their being individually seditious but in their collective religion. The description of the Hamburg Cell terrorists begins with similar stereotypes. Hammad used to be a rifleman during the Iraq – Iran wars and he shares his wartime stories with the men gathered after prayers in Germany. In his story, he talks about the young Iranian boys who fought against Iraqi soldiers. Those young boys were suicide bombers who head towards the Iraqi army, some with weapons, and “nearly all destitute” (*Falling Man*, 77). The narrator describes these Iranian boys as “fanatical, violent, dull, superstitious and irrational” (78). The particular word choice is employed to reinforce Orientalist views and presents how the western audience will perceive them.

DeLillo builds on the recurring Orientalist stereotypes of violence, jihad, suicide bombings, hate for life, and love of death throughout the narrative. As these terrorists are Muslims, their nihilism appears to be a ubiquitous and agreed upon command of Islam and practiced by Muslims all around the world. Moreover, the tendency towards violence and suicide are presented as symbols of masculinity and power in Islamic society. Hammad abruptly realized his manhood and power when he wore a bomb vest for the first time in Afghanistan during his boot camp training. It was his initiation into the world of men, as after wearing the bomb vest, he knew “he was a man now” (DeLillo, 172). His impeccable delight is described as: “there was no feeling like this ever in his life” (172). What’s more significant is that he believes access to violence and a readiness to commit it “closes the distance to God” (172). Hammad and the story about Iranian boys are in absolute coercive terms without contextualization or background information. There are only a few selective instances about Hammad’s past

and those are only meant to reinforce the stereotype. He is continuously portrayed as a violent man who might pick up a fight without any reason. Updike's Ahmad is also devoid of any personal or individual understanding of his actions. He has devoted his life to violence as if this is an indistinguishable feature from a collective body. In both cases, there is no personal or individual explanation for their motivations or actions. Their limited and selective history is meant to reinforce the stereotype only. Such lack of individuality is an indispensable component of Orientalism since it might be counterproductive to the portrayal of all Muslims as depraved and violent people (*Orientalism*, 307). Another instance of the inherent violence of Islam is presented when Hammad slaughters a camel. The camel is braying, and he felt "a deep warrior" joy, standing back to watch the beast topple, then kissed the bloody knife and raised it to the ones who were watching, the robed and turbaned men, showing his respect and gratitude" (174). This was part of the training in Afghanistan is meant to prepare them for killing with ferocity and complete obedience. Ruthless and speedy killing is presumably less painful for both the victim and terrorist and would close the distance to heaven.

Ahmad also thinks that one should be merciless to unbelievers and believes death would take them closer to God. To close the distance to heaven, death through martyrdom ensures quick and easy entry to the paradise. The Department of Homeland Security closely watches online communications among Muslims around the world to find out threats to America. Of all the issues discussed, the office pays special attention to the dialogues about life and death among Muslims. These debates make fun of the unbelievers' love of life and glorify Muslims' love of death (Updike, 48). A verse from the Quran is referenced to prove Muslim's dissatisfaction with life and love of death. This line in the context of the *Terrorist* is meant to compare the life of believers to those of "the unbelievers who love this fleeting life too well" (48). The verse, in the context of the Quran, compares the eternal life in paradise with the transitory one of this world. Similarly, Hammad keeps telling himself and people around, "we are willing to die, they are not. This is our strength, to love death!" (178)

Baudrillard assumes the same predicament when he claims that terrorists defy the Western system of zero – death, as "they put their death into play, to which there is no possible response because of the impossible exchange of it" (*The Spirit of Terrorism*,

57). As a general rule, the stereotype of death – loving Muslims has been intensified in Orientalist discourse by making the interpretation of a few individuals as the highest standard. In response to this unfair assessment, Margalit and Buruma state that terrorists under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, a small minority, have hijacked and driven Islam's narrative despite the fact that "Islam is not a death cult" (2004, 69). Yet, a violent minority of any religion does not represent the great majority of that religion.

This suicidal Muslim stereotype is very obvious in Ahmad's life. People around him make the same pejorative comments about him and his religion. Joryleen is petrified by Ahmad's extremist views about worldly life. She thinks that life without laughter is miserable and believes that "Ahmad hates life" (Updike, 72). Jack Levy's wife Beth tells her sister Hermione that Muslims do not care if they die. Several times in the course of the novel, Muslims are presented as impatient individuals to die in order to escape this shadowy and illusionary world. Such stereotypical labeling indicates that the human body and all its needs are sinful; all worldly attachments are distractions because these might deviate Muslims from the way of God and jihad. Life on earth is nothing but an unreal illusion. Ahmad openly admits his death of love several times during the course of his interactions with others.

Baudrillard in his collection of essays on September 11 and terrorism tries to connect the ferocity and rectitude of Islam's war against the West and the idea behind suicidal terrorism in the context of globalization. According to Baudrillard, terrorism is not due to poverty in Third World. It goes beyond this, as terrorism is an "allergy to any definitive order, to any definitive power" (*The Spirit of Terrorism*, 6). America is the definitive power in the contemporary world and it has succeeded in absorbing and resolving crises, however creating despair in the world. In the past, people were dying of despair for no return, but "the terrorists have ceased to commit suicide for no return" (*Spirit of Terrorism*, 15). Now, they direct their death towards the opponent's Achilles heel (death), as the opponent's quasi – perfection system works "on the basis of the exclusion of death" (16). All advances in science in the West attempt to efface death from life. But, the terrorists direct their own death into a powerful weapon against the West "whose ideal is an ideal of zero deaths which is symbolic and sacrificial – that is to say, the absolute irrevocable event" (17), and that is the *Spirit of Terrorism*. The death of terrorists constitutes an effective weapon since, to the extent that it is symbolic

and sacrificial, it is more powerful than a physical weapon. The terrorists assume that the system will commit suicide in response to the challenges posed by the vertiginous cycle of impossible exchange of deaths and suicides. Through referencing Islam, Baudrillard sees the cause of terrorism in the spread of capitalism and globalization. Terrorism is like viruses for the fact that it is everywhere and accompanies any system of domination, immoral, and far beyond evil. Zizek, on the other hand, argues that suicide bombings stem from the clash between science and religion: “the clash between absolute meanings provided by religion and the Western godless way of life based on modern science” (*Violence*, 88), and the terrorist’s attempt to sacrifice himself to show the power of his belief against unbelief (*Welcome to the Desert*, 72).

Both theorists fail to explain adequately the reasons behind suicide attacks, as these try to blame Islam for suicide missions. Esposito states that, on the contrary, Islam strictly forbids taking one’s own life and that person who commits suicide is condemned to hell eternally. Even in the war, “taking one’s own life and those of other innocent people is strictly prohibited” (*What Everyone Needs to Know*, 107). Besides, suicide bombings seem to claim more lives in Islamic countries than Western metropolitans. A broad array of orientalist discourses ranging from media narratives to scholarly articles align themselves with a stance toward Islam and keep in circulation ideological propositions to perpetuate conflicts. For the clash between the West and Islam, Orientalist theories look at a few synecdochical instances and result in misleading, totalizing, and reductively confining theories to blame Muslims as a whole.

2.6. Stereotyping Islam as a Violent Religion Spreading Anxiety

Islam’s enmity against the West is mostly reinforced by the concept of jihad in *Terrorist* and *Falling Man*. DeLillo brings up the concept by claiming that Islam is a religion of the sword and that it glorifies military virtues. By using phrases like “the sword verses”(83) and “holy war” (*Falling Man*, 46), such word choices make the boundary between individuals and groups, and words and their interpretations unspecific and ambiguous. Although the term jihad is used only once in *Falling Man* (83), DeLillo somehow manages to enrich it by portraying the violence associated with it in generic terms. It is presented as an agreed upon command of Islam because a few individuals’ agreements in the novel are enough to credit it upon. However, the concept

of jihad itself is quite controversial in Islam. According to Fawaz Gerges “Jihad is supposed to be a collective duty, rather than an individual one, according to the consensus among mainstream Islamic scholars” (2005, 3). Even if it is considered as a collective duty, Islam does not specify its parameters such as who can announce jihad and under what circumstances. On such ambiguities, *Falling Man* tries to build up absolute and universal truths. Growing a beard and reciting prayers, Hammad had to “look like them and think like them to become total brothers” (DeLillo, 83). The message here is that all these rituals of looking and thinking alike are the necessary commands and cannot be separated from jihad. The fact is that in the contemporary world not a single Islamic country has ever declared a jihad against the West. Of course, some individuals have called for it on occasions, but they are certainly not representative of a whole Islamic Civilization. The intent of linking terrorists with Islam is to suggest that it is absolutely engaged in a war against the West while it is actually the Muslims suffering at the hands of dissidents who declare jihad against them. The violent actions by the so – called jihadists often strike Muslim – dominant populations, as in Iraq and Syria, where terrorist groups have killed thousands of Muslims brutally through mass killings, abductions, and beheadings.

Falling Man presents jihad as a unifying principle to bring Muslims under the banner of Islam. For motivation, the group of September 11 terrorists watch videos of “jihad in other countries” (*Falling Man*, 80). Hammad tells his other terrorist cohorts about Iranian “soldiers running in the mud, the mine jumpers, wearing keys to paradise around their necks” (80). Here a previous stereotype from the Iran – Iraq war is reinforced when the media reported that young Iranian boys were given plastic keys to wear around their necks, which ensured their direct entry into heaven. The real story behind this incident is, of course, different. The stereotype is from a misreporting about a prayer book titled “Keys to Paradise,” which was distributed to Iranian soldiers during the battle. The stereotype became famous after a *New York Times* correspondent claimed that she “saw some Iranian soldiers ready for battle wearing small gold keys that would immediately take their souls to heaven if they should die” (Sciolini, 178). This fabricated report and its use in the novel is meant to reinforce stereotyping further.

Falling Man depicts Muslims in different Islamic countries as participating in the jihad equally. Men from different Islamic countries meet to establish their

brotherhood to fight against the West. Jihad becomes an eternal war to take away the control of the world from the West. The death of innocents in the process is not considered reprehensible, as those innocent help to move the cause further. Once the evil terrorists are created, then DeLillo connects these evil characters to a collective jihad, which commands them to “make blood flow, their blood and that of others” (73). One needs to be grateful and reassured for being chosen to carry out God’s command, “to kill and be killed, and this is glorified as the highest honor in Islam” (173). As a recurrent stereotype of Orientalism, Muslims without any exception are all death – loving fanatics.

Encouraging phrases like a “good brave kid, a great hero, a faithful son of Islam” are used to lure and induce a weak individual like Ahmad to become a fierce warrior of Islam who has a “willingness to die for Jihad” (*Terrorist*, 233). For Ahmad life is not worthy and it is cumbersome. It is purported that Islamic ideology fits persons like Ahmad who wants to escape common mental and physical problems by killing himself and others. The only escape from it is to sacrifice his life for a greater cause. An unlikely situation is created to perpetuate the notoriety of jihad in *Terrorist* when Sheik Rashid delivers a speech at the graduation ceremony. Representatives of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam are invited to the ceremony, yet it is surprisingly the imam, whose “twist of Arabic” is like “sticking a dagger into the silent audience,” who is given a chance to speak (*Terrorist*, 111). To further complicate the matters, he speaks about Jihad when there is no need and when the audience is made up of Americans. He copiously quotes from the Quran and jumps to the saying of the prophet about those who die in the way of God: “Say not of those who are slain on God’s path they are dead; nay, they are living” (112). This reference does not fit the occasion, and it is no more than an offhand attempt to exacerbate the dispute between Islam and the West, stereotype jihad and enflame Islamophobia. Jack Levy is disturbed by the imam’s “belief system that not so many years ago managed the deaths of, among others, hundreds of commuters from northern New Jersey” (112).

Essentially, jihad itself is a reductive myth in Orientalism, since it reduces controversial concepts to absolute truths. There is no qualification here to separate the wrong ideologies and actions of a few flawed individuals from their religion, and their actions are connected with their religion to malign the whole Islamic communities.

Jihad is presented as a collective ideology that assimilates and accommodates individual death – driven leanings. As a result, jihad becomes synonymous with killing the Westerners. Hammad and Ahmad are almost the same. They do not have any excitement or pleasure in their lives, and jihad provides the most convenient escape.

2.7. Stereotyping Muslims as Fatalist and Islam as a Misogynist Religion

Stereotyping Muslims as fatalists is a commonplace charge the West hurls at Islam. Since the process of stereotyping operates in a uniformed manner, all the stereotypes have to be in unison to complete each other. Instead of considering that each person is a complex bundle of ideas, motivations, and emotions, it is always easier to dismiss them as being less human, and less worthy of dignity. Exceptions would only disrupt the process. In the same manner, Muslims' controversial belief in a determined fate and altruistic attitude become dominant narratives in Orientalism. This becomes a stereotype as it appears, repeats and affirms itself as both individually as well as part of a collective response in the novels. As depicted in Orientalism, the Oriental lives a life of resignation from reality, as he has no agency in such a conception of human life. Orientals automatically and obediently submit because whatever happens to them is preordained. The future is unalterable, and this view is the overarching and limiting stereotype of inclusivity. Because the complex behind the individual or smaller group motivation is absent as a conceptual consideration: if one Muslim is a fatalist, violent or against the West, then the whole Islamic community is. Most Orientalist principles have this particular stereotyping either by means of evasion of responsibility for a violent act because of fatalism or to reinforce the irrationality of the orient. According to DeLillo and Updike, a Muslim cannot doubt their destiny, because such doubts would complicate the uniformity of the stereotype.

Falling Man portrays terrorists with a strong dependence on the idea of fatalism. Regardless of the consequences of their actions, whatever comes good or evil, it is from God, it is God's willing and cannot be undone. The terrorists believe that the end of their lives is somehow "predetermined" and that they are moving towards that fate from the minute they are born (*Falling Man*, 175). Since Muslims should rely completely on God, whatever happens must have been for better. Violence against humanity becomes a part of this same fatalistic and altruistic misconception. Out of such and many other

misconceptions, the most violent crimes are justified to please God. The terrorists in the novel believe that God chose them to kill others. DeLillo resorts to the Quran to support and reinforce this certainty. The verse “*never have we destroyed a nation whose term of life was not ordained beforehand*” (*Falling Man*, 173) is used to justify the terrorist attacks of September 11.

In Updike’s *Terrorist*, the tormented soul Ahmad is also playing “God’s instrument, cool and hard and definite and thoughtless, as an instrument must be” (285). Both narratives portray human beings as only the trustees, and they have to return their bodies when required by God. Contrary to both characters’ failures, as a Christian, the Secretary of Homeland Security uses his critical and rational mind to doubt a “will – of – God fatalism,” and a “heavy bet on the next world” (Updike, 47). He does not allow his actions in this world take their motivation from belief in fatalism. Both Updike and DeLillo enforce the notion that a Muslim cannot doubt their destiny and if they do, this would only complicate and weaken the uniformity of the stereotype. The reality is that there is no such thing as a “predetermined” notion in Islam. It is true that Muslims believe everything comes from God, but it does not mean that they should not take action in life. Esposito states that “although Islam teaches that God knows what human beings will do before they do it, they still have a free will. It actually establishes a balance between faith and action” (*What Everyone Needs to Know*, 302).

Besides stereotyping Muslims as fatalists, the oppression of women is another common charge against Islam by the Orientalist, which has progressed into a stereotype. The accusation of relegation of women to an inferior position in Muslim society actually stems from the Islamic practice of the veil or hijab (covering of entire body except the face and the hands). Muslim women use them as part of their attire and religious requirement, which has become the most demarcating symbols of the East in the West. *Terrorist* and *Falling Man* draw on the same discourse in their portrayal of women in an Islamic society. They are described as oppressed and inferior in comparison to men. Thus, the representation of female subjugation in Islam has become a common feature of Orientalist discourse. According to Leila Ahmad, “the thesis of the new colonial discourse of Islam centered on women. Islam was oppressive to women that the veil was the comprehensive backwardness of Islamic society” (2005, 152). Therefore, veiling or hijab has apparently been the most striking signal of divergence

and inferiority of Muslims from the Western viewpoint.

In *Falling Man*, all the terrorists form a uniformed personality, devoid of any individualistic characteristics. The only exception is the one who “avoided contact with dogs and women” (80). DeLillo makes oppression of women by Muslim men as a general stereotyping in a single sentence in the case of one individual. Even though such assumptions and representations are common in Orientalist discourse, DeLillo uses such stereotypes in a subtle way to label Islam as an oppressive religion towards women. Individuation and differentiation in this context only strengthen the group’s stereotypicality. Bernard Lewis also makes a strong emphasis on the issue of misogyny to differentiate Islam and the West. Lewis claims that women’s status in an Islamic society is like a non – Muslim, a slave, or children (*Islam, and the West*, 162). In response, Alam points out that such specific cultural problems occur because of variations in interpretations and Muslim intellectuals and leaders themselves are struggling against such evils in their communities (2006, 19). Alam states that though Muslims’ are trying to fight against those evils, the West still orientalizes them. Mohanty considers such orientalist approaches as reductive as it portrays specific instances of oppression in Islamic societies as “the universal oppression of women” without considering context – specific differentiated analysis (1988, 75). The meanings attached to women wearing the veil in the 1979 Iranian revolution and contemporary Iran are context – bounded, as women in both contexts were motivated by different reasons. In the initial stage of the Iranian revolution, previously unveiled women wore the veil and marched in the streets, to indicate solidarity with their working – class sisters who refuse to unveil after the Shah’s imposition of mandatory unveiling, but in contemporary Iran, “Islamic laws indicate that all women wear the veil” (Mohanty, 88). Orientalism sees specific instances as a whole and turns them into a uniform stereotype.

The portrayal of Muslims in Updike’s narrative reinforces and extends women’s oppression in Islam to be a universal practice. For instance, Ahmad pointedly tells Joryleen that the prophet advises women to cover their ornaments (Updike, 65). This command is partially true since there is no clear and decisive consensus on the mandate of hijab. Leila Ahmad argues that veiling is nowhere explicitly prescribed in the Quran and the only verses dealing with women’s clothing instruct women “to guard their private parts and throw a scarf over their bosoms” (2005, 55). Also, people interpret

covering of ornaments differently as it depends on several factors. Some orthodox Muslim societies cover their heads and faces while others show their faces but cover their heads. These differences in covering female bodies are visible even in seemingly homogenous communities. An example can be the women in the urban centers of Turkey where women have more flexible interpretation compared to women in rural populations. Also, some Muslims believe that some commands about hijab were specifically for the times of the Prophet Mohammad, or for his wives and daughters, and so the commands do not apply to them in the contemporary world. There are also exceptions to the command of hijab that allow female individuals surpassingly an immense space to exercise their free will. Although in all cases it is the religious belief that leads women to cover, their practice of veiling varies according to their perceptions of not only their religious belief but also how they view other worldly matters. Some women would wear it only for religious reasons. Some others would wear it for both religious and political reasons. Not only the reasons, but also the way or styles of the practice itself, change from one place to another, and even for the same woman in different stages or contexts of her life, which makes a generalization unattainable.

All those meanings and functions in different cultural and historical contexts have been re – combined and the veil has come to symbolize the Muslim woman and the whole religion. It becomes a stereotype when a certain interpretation, in most cases a minority's interpretation, is imposed collectively. For instance, the narrator says that women in the Middle East “withdrew into wrinkles and a proud shapelessness” (*Terrorist*, 170). There is no need to state a context here because one can read between lines due to an already established stereotype. Teresa tells Jack Levy how her husband, Omar expected her to be submissive. She believes that Sheikh is extremely hostile towards her and sees her as nothing but mere flesh. Sheikh Rashid and Ahmad say that women's evil temptations are corrupting men and trying to stop one from carrying out God's commands. The Imam plays his stereotypical role by suppressing and distorting facts symptomatic of a misogynist stereotype of Islam, as he tells Ahmad “do without these women without Heavenly – flesh, these earthly baggage, these unclean hostages to fortune” (*Terrorist*, 108). Those are the Imam's personal interpretations, and such interpretations are comparable to the diversity of sects of thought in Islam. These sects have different interpretations for each occasion, and there could be even different

interpretations of a single sect. Admittedly, one cannot talk about an agreed upon context. Updike does not provide any context or a proper basis: the Imam's interpretations are enough to credit upon.

Within this highly – charged misogynist context, Ahmad becomes an ardent believer in complete separation of men and women in the religious space. He cannot bear the sight of women sitting next to a man in the church when he goes to watch Joryleen's performance. For Ahmad the presence of women defiles and stains the church. But his religion is better since mosque or masjids are considered to be strictly a male domain. The Islamic authority Sheik Rashid says that women can never be good friends, confidantes or moral beings, because “women are animals easily led” (10). He sees the girls at Central High as devils, and his own mother as “trashy and immoral” (35).

To prove that women are “unclean” in Islam, Updike alludes to the Quran as his ultimate source. Ahmad finds that the Quran “talked of uncleanness but only regarding women, their menstruation, their suckling of infants” (156). An unnecessary and out of place reference is given to intensify the notion that Islam mistreats women. Verse 223 in the Qur'an states that “*Your wives are your field: go in, therefore, to your field as ye will*” (Updike, 156). This verse appears at a very unlikely and unexpected time in the novel. Ahmad wants to know about cleanliness in Islam after his sexual encounters with Joryleen. He consults the Quran which is devoid of any sexual advice or advice about the cleanliness of men. The narrator claims the Quran only talks about the uncleanness of women. The fact is that the commands about cleanliness are for both men and women. In a flash of inspiration, Updike brings up the verse about wives being fields to reinforce a certain stereotype after the verse about uncleanness. He connects this with another verse, which appears immediately after, by saying: “women are a pollution” (Updike, 156). According to Updike, the verse talks about women's menstruation, and their “uncleanliness”.

However, according to *Al – Quran: A Contemporary Translation*, the first verse translates: “Women are like fields for you: so seed them as you intend” (2:223), and the second verse does not translate into women's “uncleanliness” but their “stress” (2:222). As usual, the context is not given, while the out – of – context information is connected

regarding authorial comments to reach a stereotypical conclusion. By reading this line one might infer that a field refers to a field. The reality is that no one can say for sure what these words actually say. What is for certain is that this particular word has a symbolic meaning, and it could be interpreted differently in the context of reproduction, commands about proper means and ends of sex, and in some interpretations, even the appropriate way to perform sex. After so many details of orientalism in *Terrorist*, for Updike, women's condition is one of hopeless in Islam, as the Secretary believes that Islam cannot provide anything but "more oppression of women" (258). These instances are repeated and affirmed in the novel to reinforce Islam as a patriarchal religion that mistreats women. The misogyny is extended further and further. Said believes that the West has seized upon "the abrogation of women's rights in Islamic societies (*Orientalism*, xix) in its aggressive attack on contemporary Muslim societies.

As discussed in the first chapter, the response to the Orientalist stereotype has mostly come from Arab-American, British Muslims, and Third World women in the Middle East and elsewhere. Leila Ahmad has generally written about gender and Islam, and I have used her article in this dissertation in the context of veil. Maria Susaina, Aroosa Masroor, Amina Yaqeen, Kate Zebiri, and Noreen Kousar Zaman are some important names whose ideas are included in this dissertation to analyze responses in the light of their criticisms. These criticisms mostly respond to the Orientalist charge of Islam as a misogynist religion. Anna Hartnell's articles about Updike's *Terrorist* and Hamid's *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* are also noteworthy contributions from a female writer. Chandra Mohanty, an Indian-American writer has written about minority discourse and the issue of the veil in Islam. These criticisms are important because Muslim and other Third World women speak for themselves, thus enabling the subaltern to articulate their views.

It is also interesting to note that Susan Faludi's seminal work, *The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post-9/11 America* (2007), which criticizes the anti-feminine character of American response to September 11. In her examination of America's post-September 11 culture, the writer throws light on the country's psychological and emotional response to the attacks on that day. Observing responses in the media, popular culture, and political life, Faludi discovers a pattern, which attempts to restore traditional manhood, marriage, and maternity after the attack on America. She

also finds it paradoxical that instead of an attack on commercial and military symbols, these anti-feminist responses depict the attacks as directed against family home. Traditional and fixed roles of Doris Day as an ideal woman and John Wayne as an ideal male are resuscitated to save the home. Faludi finds the reasons for these anomalies in the American experience. According to her, September 11 was the first non-white attack on America in recent history. As the attacks brought humiliation, the nation tries to hide it beneath the images of strong cowboys and frail women whenever there is threat to the nation (home).

2.8. Stereotyping Muslims as Insatiable Sensualists

One of the images sharply carved into Western consciousness is the image of Muslim men as insatiable sensualists. The “marriage in heaven” with seventy-two virgins with large dark eyes is the most common notion reinforced to portray Muslims as licentious, sensual, and exotic males. The far – fetched idea is that if Muslims kills themselves in the way of God, the most desired reward is the virgins. Hence, the perceptions of gender and sensuality are perpetuated vigorously to Orientalize Islam and Muslims. Edward Said states “the sensuality of the Orient,” (*Orientalism*, 17; 206) “the association between the Orient and sex” (*Culture*, 309) and “excess of libidinous passions” (*Orientalism*, 68) as repetitive issues in the Orientalist discourse. Zebiri argues that the issue of gender became the main point of difference, as Islam was constantly criticized for its “alleged moral laxity and sensuality” in the early centuries of Muslim – Christian encounters (2011, 175). Autocracy, prophet’ s marriages, Quran’s mention of a paradise filled with houris, institutions of polygamy and the like are some repetitive connotations to label Islam and Muslims as sensualists.

DeLillo and Updike also build on the sensuous and lascivious Muslims in their portrayal of Muslims. Hammad appears to be a sexually confused man. Because of the suppression emanating from the dictates of his religion, he tries to satiate his sexual appetite by staring at women secretly. A single occurrence would be usual, but DeLillo repeats it several times during the course of Hammad’ s interactions. Sitting on a bench in a park, he gazes at young women peddling their bikes, “hair wet, legs pumping” one after another (*Falling Man*, 8). As a habit, while in “those rooms” Hammad would look outside to see if some women would pass by as he habitually “looked at women

sometimes” (171). He has an unbridled lust for every woman he comes in contact with; passerby women, sales women in stores, even his roommate’s girlfriend. He stares at women from a distance secretly and sometimes even follows them during their jogging and walking (176). As it appears, he joined the jihad to gain his manhood and suppress his carnal longing. Like other othering practices, the issues of gender and sexuality could hardly be avoided in Orientalist discourse, as there are so many perceived differences. Sensuality, sexuality, and issues of gender are all complementary in the Orientalization of Islam and Muslims.

Ahmad seems to be haunted by the same conflicts between carnal temptations and the commands of his religion. When Charlie arranges a date between Ahmad and his sexually inviting friend Joryleen, he is suddenly attracted to her. Joryleen is lying naked beside him, Ahmad reminds himself “of all those intestines, and stomach and things, packed in” (*Terrorist*, 225) to resist the temptation. He imagines the relationship between his mother and Levy and thinking about the unpleasant meeting of their bodies. However, the criticism of Americans obsession with sex is seemingly in contrast with his sexual encounter with Joryleen. Updike spares Ahmad from a tiny pang of regret about his obvious sinful act as he uses every kind of explanation from the Quran in trivial issues. Surprisingly, the narrator states Ahmad to have experienced paradise, “a convulsive transformation, vaulting inversion of his knotted self, which occurs when the soul passes at death into Paradise” (226).

Suppression of carnal desires and portrayal of Muslims as carnal bigots are recurrent themes in both texts. Hammad and Ahmad suffer a serious dilemma when it comes to sex. Hammad goes through the fears of male lust and female seduction, as he represses himself “thought all his life that some unnamed energy was sealed in his body, too tight to be released” (*Falling Man*, 78). Both Ahmad and Hammad have a sexual desire for women but cannot give up on their hope for houris in the afterlife. If the conflict is resolved, as it happens for a short period for Ahmad, violent instincts leading to terrorism will be evaded. If the sexual desires of terrorists were satisfied, terrorism would eventually come to an end because the sexual depravity leads to violence and terrorism. Contrary to Said’s argument that Orientalist discourse depicts Muslims as “oversexed degenerates” (*Orientalism*, 286), both Hammad and Ahmad are “undersexed”. Both are extreme and destined to bring extreme results. A vicious cycle

is displaying that they are oversexed so they are depraved and they are violent because they are undersexed. The conflict in their sex lives is instigated by the bigger material – spiritual divide between the West and Islam and Muslim men’s sex lives are a manifestation of that conflict between their physical body needs and spiritual restraints.

Such narratives are symptomatic of Orientalism’s lack of personal histories or pasts. Hammad appears as a newborn baby with all the repressed feelings of an able adult. The history of sexual feelings is withheld to characterize him as a stereotype. As one cannot go inside his past or mind, his individuality is lost in the collective stereotyping. Likewise, Ahmad’s past of sexual life or relationships is also missing. The only source is either the Quran or Updike’s narrator filling the gaps. Both characters’ sexual problems are left without a context and past. DeLillo and Updike delve into psychoanalysis to realize “the Muslim male suffering from unresolved issues around sexuality and masculinity” (Morey and Yaqin, 140). As the last resort to justify authorial commentaries of both authors, the psychoanalysis is not objective, because it is already clouded by their diatribes and prejudices about Islam and Muslims. Their individuality is cast into the furnace of a collective stereotype.

Although both narratives started in different settings and with different characters, they reach the same conclusions because the principles and approaches are the same. *Falling Man* began with the thesis that Islam loathes the West’s technological and economic progress. This secular hatred turns into a religious and spiritual contempt in the middle and at the end of the book. It is their religion to blame for all the evil since it is not history or economics but “a system of belief that justifies these feelings and killings” (*Falling Man*, 112). The disdain then actually stems from the religious difference. The details and manifestations are essentially the same in both narratives. Hammad regards this “world of lawns to water and hardware stacked on endless shelves as total illusions” (*Falling Man*, 173). He believes that Western people should be ashamed of their love for life. He does not understand why westerners give so much significance to it while he sees it as an “empty space” (173).

In *Terrorist*, Updike attempts to go inside the mind of the ‘Other’ as an instinctive response to September 11, but the methods Updike implements are the same Orientalist principles used by DeLillo. Once set out, the road of othering ends up in

further to misdemeanors, alienation, stereotyping, and discrimination. Hartnell sees *Terrorist* to be a departure from a typical “victim” story towards a “perpetrator” one as it throws light on “them” instead of “us” (2012, 478). Even though it is true that novel sheds light on the terrorist side of the story, the focus is always on favoring the West. This relationship with the ‘Other’ is not different from any other Orientalist narrative, as typical Orientalist principles reinforce the estrangement. Gray agrees when he points out that *Terrorist* is an unimaginative attempt, as the author fails to go inside the skin of the ‘Other’ (136).

Both texts’ characters are one – dimensional, fanatic and unsubtle, leaving no room for resolution or reconciliation. A practice that Versluys calls as “narrative perpetual motion” (2010, 161) that the narrative has gone one round and other rounds can follow infinitely, both novels follow a vicious cycle that never ends. Updike’s *Terrorist* has the same sentence at the beginning and at the end. It starts with Ahmad thinking, “*These devils seek to take away my God*” (Updike, 3), and ends with the same one only in the past tense when Ahmad thinks once again “*These devils have taken away my God*” (Updike, 310). Americans are his enemies, a disease who are still devils and “insects” (310), even though he had a change of heart and aborted his mission, as it has ascertained his fears. The novel has come one full circle to the same position from where it began. *Falling Man* starts with a scene, which happens immediately after the scene at the end of the novel. The last scene in the novel is at the time of the impact of planes and right afterward when Keith comes out of the south tower. The first scene of the novel begins from the same place. In both texts, there are repetitive cycles without closure, resolution or reconciliation. As a result, the implication is that these texts do not provide any resolution in understanding terrorism, Islam or the “Other.” Readers are left “with a sense of pathetic distance still separating “us” from an Orient destined to bear its foreignness as a mark of its permanent estrangement from the West” (*Culture*, 244). While preserving its constructed values, they enhance the classical approaches of othering, silencing, and marginalization. What they offer in their novels as the “representation” of terrorism is inflected with Orientalist parameters.

CHAPTER III

RESISTANCE NARRATIVES POST– SEPTEMBER 11 NOVELS

The Reluctant Fundamentalist is a counter – narrative to Orientalism in Western discourse that writes back to the American Empire apropos September 11 and terrorism. Mohsin Hamid approaches terrorism in terms of a critique of US imperialism. As a representative of Third World response to the attacks and terrorism, the novel is a protest against America’s aggressive foreign policy, exploitation of the Third World, mistreatment of the “Other,” and contemptuous use of imperial power against weaker nations in the wake of September 11. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* begins as a typical immigrant story in which the protagonist comes to the United States in pursuit of the American dream of prosperity and freedoms. He initially has assimilative and accommodative tendencies in the hopes of partaking in the economic and social privileges bestowed by a prestigious American education and lucrative employment in a big financial institution. The attacks of September 11 exacerbate an increasingly precarious atmosphere of discrimination in which protagonist is treated as an outsider and a suspect.

Don DeLillo, in his article entitled “In the Ruins of the Future” described September 11 as the terror that overturned history. He says “the World Trade Center attacks was the defining moment of the year – and will haunt us for decades”. The relationship between the West and Third World countries became even more strained. In the first chapter, I argued that DeLillo’ s *Falling Man* and Updike’s *Terrorist* were the West’s Orientalist responses to September 11 and terrorism in the transformed world. These two novels have limiting and prejudicial tendencies, which situate political issues in an “Orientalist frame of cultural conflict” (Maria, 114). They ignore important factors like geo – politics, imperialism, globalization, and economy as means of fully understanding the range of conflicts and biases. Said believed that America perpetuated

an ambiguous “war against terrorism” without providing answers for such a war, the enemy, and America’s controversial role in the world (“The West and Islam”). Vague suggestions were cursory and distorted to make “the Middle East and Islam” the number one enemy of the West (“The West and Islam”).

Despite these continuities of Orientalism, he was also optimistic about intellectual, ideological and political resistance narratives and challenges to Orientalism in a post-September 11 world (*Orientalism*, 326). This discourse of resistance is missing in *Orientalism* but it is fully present in *Culture and Imperialism*, where Said explains the ever-present resistance that takes place in the “interacting” experience that “links imperializer with the imperialized” (194). Relating *Culture and Imperialism* to *Orientalism*, Said writes that there was always a resistance, “the assertion of nationalist identities” and along with colonialism “there was *always* some form of active resistance” (*Culture*, xii). According to Said, where there is domination, it also vehemently seeks the hard and stern expressions of resistance; “it rejects and discovers, by crossing the divide, both the divide, both the presence of the imperial referent in the denying metropolitan text and the historical processes that text has excluded” (67).

From Said’s perspective, a befitting resistance to the discourse of Orientalism and imperialism would be an inversion of Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (1899), a colonial narrative of the ‘*voyage in*’ (*Culture*, 211) to the Third World space. Said thinks that Nagugi Thiongo’s *The River Between* (1965) and Tayeb Salih’s *Season of Migration to the North* (1969) are resistance narratives where the imperialized writers appropriate and subvert the Western discourse to resist its totalizing tendencies towards them. Such narratives reinterpret the colonial discourse to renegotiate their identities. I argue that *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* is similar narrative of voyages to and from America to renegotiate identities, and resist ‘othering,’ stereotyping, discrimination, violence and imperialism in a post-September 11 world. As representative Third World responses to September 11 and terrorism, such texts can open new spaces for interpretation, advocate for inclusion and provide multiple histories to enable the depiction of a diverse world where heterogeneity is respected and tolerated. This text grapples with discrimination against the “Other,” misrepresentation of the “Other,” and a misuse of imperial power against weaker nations in the wake of September 11.

September 11 novels criticism deplores the limiting aspects of the evolving trends – the typically Western and more specifically American response to the attacks, an unimaginative response to the conflict, and more importantly, the “War on Terror,” which Islamic countries believe to be a political maneuver against the weaker to advance the imperialist objectives. Instead of taking a balanced view, American authors have taken an Orientalist approach, which hampers any meaningful understanding of the Other, the conflict or terrorism or the event of September 11. Gray finds September 11 fiction unimaginative due to its “domestication” (51) of the crisis and its limited ability to “encounter strangeness” (32). Contrary to America’s expanding empire and its involvement in world’s affairs, authors go inside their national borders. Similarly, in comparison to Joseph Conrad’s successful engagement with “new, impersonal forces,” Randall believes that “contemporary American writers have been too preoccupied with purely national, local and domestic concerns, and in doing so have ignored the importance of their relationship with global forces” (134). This limited vision is a reminder of negative portrayal cultivated by intensified fear and anxiety in the West. The media, governments, and even literature have all contributed to the intensified perpetration of these images. In regards to September 11 attacks, Homi Bhabha claims that it is “difficult to draw a line between the outrage and the anxiety provoked by terrorist attacks and the urgent need for some more humane and historical reflection on the tragedy itself in the heat of the moment after the attacks” (*Terror and After*, 1). The result is that it has become almost impossible in the West to “invoke ‘Islamic images without remembering the Abu Ghraib scandal, the televised beheading of an American businessman, and many other entries in the Musee macabre of war and terror” (*Another Country*, 31). Some September 11 novels also contribute to “these pernicious stereotypes of Muslims by suggesting that Islam is the cause of political violence” (*Writing Muslims*, 18). This parochialism has been compounded by content focused on issues such as Islam because its discussions call up negative images perpetrated by intensified fear and anxiety in the West.

Despite these dualities of Islamophobia that haunt many post–September 11 novels in the West, there have been counter – narratives suggesting that the East is equally the victim of terrorism. These narratives also investigate America’s predominantly controversial involvement in instances of violence in Islamic countries.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist is a representative of this trend. The novel's theme is the "insular tendencies" of the American September 11 novel to the " 'postcolonial gaze' to resist the accelerated process of re – signification of older forms of colonialism by the American empire after September 11" (Hartnell, 82). These novels are part of a new era of "internationalization of the novel in English" (Head, 100) in which issues are not exclusively American or Western, but have become "worldlier" (Medovoi, 644) to include issues outside of the Western borders.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist presents internationalized and worldlier narrative of protest against the continuities of Orientalism. As a resistance narrative against Orientalism and imperialism, this sort of narrative appropriates the novel form to present "a more developed historical analysis of the circumstances of economic, political, and cultural domination and repression," and to challenge the "historical and historicizing presuppositions" in western literary canon, whose ideological perspectives put people in plots with predetermined endings of a master – slave narrative (Harlow, 78). The weaker and oppressed are held responsible for the unequal power – relationship that justifies their reasons to resort to violence. The writers of counter – narrative novels arrive at different conclusions from those discussed in chapter two by making America equally responsible for contributing to bitterness in the whole world. The burden of historical knowledge, "historical referencing" (Harlow, 80) and finding the "missing context" (Hamid, "Writing The Reluctant Fundamentalist") is on the reader, as these novels try to give new historical facts unknown to the readers up until then. Readers in the Third World might get exposed to some new facts about America, its efficient economy and educational systems, the kindness and humanity of its individuals, which might be different from the all – evil America they have assumed hitherto. Similarly, Western readers might get exposed to unofficial facts, which always blame Islam and Muslims for the troubles in the world.

Hamid's use of an extended dramatic monologue and one – sided conversational form leaves certain aspects of the context to readers' interpretation. He positions the reader as an American visitor to Pakistan who listens to a Pakistani man narrating his memories of America. The unidentified American may be an undercover assassin since the reader is not told what happens after the monologue ends. Through such a technique, readers can imagine their own "versions of what happens in the book,

and the book in turn moves and shifts and reflects in response to the individual inclinations and world views of readers” (“Writing the Reluctant Fundamentalist”). Narratives, where readers are involved can challenge, threat, surprise, and implicate the reader’s own “processes of identification” (“Moving Through America”, 83). Such a novel helps to engage with its process of identification, and question insular categorizations by providing new perspectives.

The novel seems to parallel Hamid’s own life story. He came to America when he was three, studied at Princeton, and worked at the corporate Wall Street. Education and work experience makes Hamid a credible individual who has experienced the two cultures and who has obtained a significant and meaningful knowledge of its ethos and literary discourse. This authenticity gives Hamid advantage over western writers who try to deal with September 11’s Muslim character. The hybrid identity also allows a simultaneous awareness of both “the metropolitan history that is narrated and of those histories against which (and together with which) the dominating discourse acts” (*Culture*, 51), thereby enabling protagonist to re – present history. Hamid does this by historicizing the rich and insightful historical heritage of Pakistan in the past and its current decline from power, and the fact that it is equally the victim of extremism and terrorism. Contrary to their violent and backward portrayal, the people have educational, economic, and social dreams like those in the West with its heterogeneous population.

To realize this, Hamid makes use of popular tropes in postcolonial theory to tell the interlinking experience between the imperializer and the imperialized in an atmosphere of “mutual siege” (*Culture*, 195) in the postcolonial and neo-colonial world. These themes include identity, stereotype, difference, ambivalence, home, migration, culture, hybridity, and imperialism in a migratory world of disappearing borders. The protagonist in the novel tries to negotiate a new identity in pursuit of social and economic advantages, contrary to the orientalist discourse, which operates on stable and fixed identities. The discourse increases upon the attacks of September 11, and the protagonist Changez suffers constant paranoia and disorientation, as his religious and national identity becomes a suspect in the eyes of public and law. His individual experiences of discrimination become the catalyst to engage with broader issues of identity, the conflict between America and Islam, and America’s involvement in the world affairs. Despite his innocence and secular way of life, he is forced towards his

previous static identity. After relentless discrimination and loss of hope, he resorts to his previous allegiance, becomes resentful towards America, and returns to his hometown of Pakistan. He becomes a university teacher who allies himself with jihad – inclined students and even fomenting terrorist acts.

Typically, immigrant tales are concerned with coming to America and give an account of ordeals, hopes, and disappointments of people, who strive to be successful from an immersion into American society. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* deviates from this as it details “why the protagonist came to America and elaborates as to why he left it” (Medovoi, 644). Hamid explains this as “twist on the classical immigrant tale” by representing a 21st century polarity in which “the magnet switches and pushes immigrants away” (Medovoi, 644). This is in total contradiction with what Gray expected the September 11 novels to be. Gray hoped the September 11 novels to engage imaginatively with the new crisis in the form of a narrative to deal successfully with strangeness or newness and to engage the “Other.” He considers certain novels to be successful efforts to engage with this idea of newness. The immigrant novels succeed, as their immigrant characters conjure up new identities in “their liminal conditions, their position between historical borders and cultures” (Gray, 88). Rothberg introduces the idea of “deterritorialized” (71) America, which he thinks is centripetal and should instead be a centrifugal one (153). Gray’s model is based on America becoming a universal nation, whereas Rothberg believes in the outward universalization of America. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* partially follows Gray’s universal model but then switches towards Rothberg’s model to show the outward movement and impact of “America’s global reach” to reveal “the cracks in its necessarily incomplete hegemony” (158). *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* deals with the immigrant protagonist who is initially passionate about life in America. The American dream is shattered by circumstances following the attacks, which necessitates a re – evaluation of his previous perceptions. In the protagonist’s decision to voyage out, it becomes a provocative effort to challenge the empire, and it fails to be in peaceful co – existence in a post–September 11 America.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist starts off in a local marketplace in Lahore, Pakistan, a “crossroad between a Muslim stronghold and an agency of American power” (Gray, 59). Wandering through the streets of Lahore, an American of martial aspect

fatefully encounters Changez Khan who invites him to a cup of tea and launches into a lengthy, increasingly ominous flash – back narration of his memories in America. The surrounding is suspicious and distrustful for both since there are indications in the story that each may engage in a violent outburst to gain supremacy. This is consistent with Said’s theory of resistance where the silent native speaks up to reclaim territory “as part of a general movement of resistance” (*Culture*, 212). The American appears to be a scared and displaced individual who is pulled into uncharted territories. The American listener is silenced, cornered, and intimidated. Changez himself grows increasingly cognizant that their meeting is not a coincidence. Changez has the exclusive speaking rights by pacing the mode, content, conclusions, and even interpretations on behalf of the silent American interlocutor, as he reports all of the American interlocutor words and actions. This narrative technique allows the narrator an opportunity to explore a whole spectrum of “mutual suspicion” (*Moving Through America*, 83) and provides a critical perspective on how America appears to the ‘Other’. Apparently, it is something that Hamid implies: Americans lack the ability to listen attentively and emphatically to others voices.

Every genial statement from Changez and all implied statements by the American show their deep resentment for each other. Their moves point towards an impending violence in which one might kill the other. This cat and mouse game between the two – a scared antagonist of the American empire up against one of its equally scared agent – captures the “mutual siege” between the imperializer and the imperialized for control and supremacy. It is a game of deep – seated suspicion, indeed; that symbolizes on a smaller scale the bigger political game of distrust between the United States on the one hand, and the West and the Third World on the other. The uncomfortable relation is established from the beginning of the narrative. Changez states: “I noticed that you were looking for something; more than looking, in fact, you seemed to be on a mission” (Hamid, 1). The anonymous American is likely to be on a deadly mission to take Changez out for his active anti – Americanism. But what is most interesting is the way in which Hamid deconstructs the binaries between the economically superior, confident West and the uncertain, inferior East. As the story takes place on the Changez’ s territory, the typical feeling of a displaced immigrant being out of place in America is transferred to the American. Changez says: “I see I

have alarmed you. Do not be frightened by my beard: I am a lover of America” (Hamid, 1). This change in relations is effectively conveyed later in the story when Changez warns him “do not be alarmed; you are overreacting, you jump as though you were a mouse suddenly under the shadow of a hawk” (60). Changez seems to be enjoying from knowing the extent to which he has made the American uncomfortable. He describes him as an animal that “has ventured too far from its lair and is now, in unfamiliar surroundings, uncertain whether it is a predator or a prey” (31). In this tense discursive atmosphere, culinary habits signify atavistic and retrogressive effusions. He pointedly tells the American that he should eat with his hands instead of using a fork as “there is the great satisfaction to be had in touching one’s prey” (123).

The ongoing ambiguity in the recurrent references to predator and prey leaves inability to identify which position refers to Changez and which to the American. Changez says “Come, relinquish your foreigner sense of being watched” (31). Playing with this anxiety suggests a narrative that takes pleasure in pushing back against not only an imperialist discourse but also the Orientalist discourses of other September 11 novels written within American borders. Hamid’s purpose is to show how American citizenship is perceived “beyond the boundaries of the nation – state, both for American and others” (Rothberg, 158) in a state of danger outside its borders. Thus, people around the world resent its actions as an intrusive trespasser. Said claims, such resistance narratives become the methods oppressed masses “to assert their own identity and the experience of their history” (*Culture*, xii). In this suspicious and precarious atmosphere, the Orient becomes the subject and active agent of resistance. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* struggles for representation of the subaltern voice by showing the articulate subaltern rather than the silent object of the usual Orientalist narrative who is acted upon.

3.1. The Exilic Identity and Deterritorialized – Self

The identity of the author and his protagonist has a strong verisimilitude with Said’s exilic identity. Said’s identity as an Arab-Palestinian Christian, American citizen and critic in academia inform the contours of his theory. As a cultural critic, his exposure to different cultures and ideas, and his movement across cultural and national borders contribute towards his exilic, hybrid and displaced identity. In his theory,

hybridity is an effect of modern empire as “all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic” (*Culture*, xxv). Similar to Homi Bhabha’s theory of hybridity, Said considers hybridity to be an asset, as “belonging ... to both sides of the imperial divide enables you to understand them more easily” (*Culture*, xxvii). Regarding identity, both Said and Homi Bhabha believe in the unfixed, impure and ever-changing type. Identity always succumbs to change, as “each age and society recreates ... over historical, social, intellectual and political process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions” (*Orientalism*, 332). The uneven distribution of wealth between the First and Third, itself caused by colonialism and perpetrated by imperialism, the resultant migration and dislocation of people across borders in search of greener pastures, and the closing gap between the imperialized and imperialized have created conflicts among cultures and the vexing questions of identities. This has become even more important in our times, as the world has become a ‘global village’ and people have become more and more world residents in the last few decades. Thus, cultures are not pure entities anywhere, any more, if indeed they ever were. They influence one another continuously, and things change – including people, societies, thoughts and beliefs – due to economic, social and cultural mobilization of our time. By the same token, meanings that are ascribed to a particular identity or community change over time.

Hamid’s protagonist Changez also struggles with the same cultural conflicts and conflictive identities. He is in a liminal state because of this hybrid identity. He creates his identity by moving beyond borders and being exposed to different cultures. The result is the acquisition of educational and economic capital but the cultural and psychological loss of home. He is stuck between these two opposing states from the very beginning since he “has vacillated between American and Muslim cultures” (Gray, 59). Similarly, Hamid states he created Changez to ultimately realize his “split self” and split world” (“My Reluctant Fundamentalist”). His protagonist, on the other hand, wants the social and economic privileges the United States will offer. The technological advancement, high educational standards, and a rich economy overwhelm and exhaust Changez’s Third World way of life. He falls in love with a beautiful American girl, and his favorite city is New York, but he does not hide his resentment towards America. He finds Lahore to be his home and being a Pakistani his true identity but still feels a strong

affinity both for Erica and New York. His genuine efforts to negotiate his identity, discriminations of the empire inflame his decision to throw away his borrowed identity and depend on his religious and national identity. Therefore, he grapples with cultural conflicts and conflictive identity.

Like Said, Hamid's own life-experiences and conception of identity inform Changez's identity. Hamid's response to when asked whether he is a Pakistani Muslim or American is "I'm fully neither" (Medovoi, 644). This is also consistent with Homi Bhabha's definition of identity. It is neither this nor that but a hybrid which is actually different from both. Bhabha's definition of a postcolonial existence lies in a hybrid space because of amalgamation or impurity of cultures crisscrossing one another. It is the third space, a liminal space on the borderline of cultures, "a place of hybridity where the construction of a political object that is new, neither the one nor the other" (*Location of Culture*, 25). At the heart of this concept lies the idea that colonized are never fully drawn into the belief system instated by Western discourse, but neither are they always completely opposed to it. Instead, the colonized experiences both an attraction and repulsion towards the colonizer and colonial culture and thus fluctuates between complicity with and resistance to colonial culture and colonial rule. So, while Changez is a "native informant" about Pakistani culture (*Writing Muslims*, 29), as he can express first-hand experiences of Pakistan through expressive and discursive abilities acquired in the West through his education at Princeton, Said would state that the same "native informant" would be a willing servant of the empire (*Culture*, 258). Changez acts consistent with Said's assessment at the end of the novel. In a multicultural environment like Princeton, Changez could see the value of his hybrid and "exotic" identity (Hamid, 17). At Underwood Samson, he was acutely aware of an "advantage conferred" by his foreignness (42). His identity is ambivalent because, in other situations, his success depends on concealing his true national identity. Moore – Gilbert claims that to a large extent, Changez's success depends on "rendering his 'Pakistaniness' invisible" (*From the Politics of Recognition*, 192).

Changez came to America essentially for educational and economic reasons. To realize this, he needs to assimilate himself into American society, which means he has to take up a new identity. This exposure to new identity formations, which he submits initially, causes internal conflicts, a sense of disorientation and dislocation. He feels

resentful when he readily acquires a semblance of American identity, or when the new identity clashes with his previous one. The name 'Changez' is suggestive of 'changes' the change of becoming and going through is uncomfortable both for him and America which is not ready to accept this new reality for its longing for the status quo and sureties of a pre – September 11 era. The change he is becoming and going through is both uncomfortable for him as well as the United States which it is not yet ready to accept the new reality due to its longing for the status quo and sureties of a pre - September 11 era. Changez neither loves nor hates what he is becoming, which results in ambivalence and the “gnawing feeling of never quite fitting in” (Cilano, 203). As an insider and outsider, “he embodies the postcolonial condition of a world citizen who has to come to terms with his own ambivalence and in – betweenness” (Elia, 59).

Changez is desperate to be accepted into an elite consultancy firm, but the interview with the boss Jim begins with a negative perception of the interviewer and intemperate and aggressive provocations of Changez, as he thought Jim's questioning to be intrusive and annoying (Hamid, 8). Because of the mixed signals and her nostalgic attachment to Chris, his love for beautiful but melancholic Erica is ambivalent. Lasdun claims that Erica's sentimental nostalgia for Chris represents “the nation's fraught relationship with its moment of European discovery and conquest,” and her inability to accept Changez represents America's inability to welcome Changez/changes (Lasdun, 2). Their relationship is never fully functional both emotionally and sexually. After several attempts at winning intimacy with her, Changez finally takes up the persona of Chris to be acceptable to her. After the intercourse, he feels humiliated for pretending to be someone else, as he “had diminished” himself in his own eyes and “was humiliated by the continuing dominance” (Hamid, 106). On Changez's taking on a different persona that is acceptable to Erica, Moore – Gilbert sees it as an attempt on America's part to turn “the new immigrant Other into a version of the same” (192). Changez feels uncomfortable with his acquired identity, which is devoid of his otherness and it is essentially conflictive with America. He takes his classmates at Princeton in high regards for their intelligence but is bothered by their excessive spending and lack of refinement in their dealing with the elderly during their trip to Greece. He enjoys his Americanness in Manila but is disturbed by the hostile gaze of a jeepney driver for possessing the same identity.

The issue of terrorism is introduced when Changez notices that the American listener constantly stares at a scar on Changez' s arm. He feels the need to explain himself as the American might suspect the scar to be a result of an injury sustained during a terrorist activity or militant training. He has to explain himself because a stereotype creates a perceived hostility against the American Empire. He is uncomfortable, restless, and ambivalent due to his borrowed identity and the "irretrievably compromises his affiliation with power and wealth enforces in his inner life" (Mishra, 7). Ironically, religion is almost non – existent until the end. Changez does not have strong Islamic convictions; he is a habitual drinker, and even tells the ordeals he went through to get liquor in Pakistan. He claims that the great Pakistani and Indian poets and authors used to drink because "in our poetry and folklore, intoxication occupies a recurring role as a facilitator of love and spiritual enlightenment" (Hamid, 54). Against a stereotype that Muslims do not, Changez says "many Pakistanis drink" (53). Also, his beard is not because of religious aspirations as he defiantly grows it as a form of protest against the West's negative projection of it. Obviously, Hamid presents an effort to separate religion from conflicts and reconfigure them in the course of geo – politics, economy, and empire. As a resistance narrative, the novel strives to leave from Orientalism's implication of religion as a root cause of conflicts and terrorism. Even the protagonists' identification with ethnicity, culture or nation is rare and insignificant before September 11.

3.2. Frustration and Ambivalence towards the US

Changez is quite frustrated about his identity since a sense of both pride and shame is harbored in his Pakistani background. These feelings are respectively replaced by resentment and envy for America in which he made conscious efforts to assimilate. The old Gothic buildings impress him at Princeton, but then he finds out the cracks in the buildings are painted with acid to make them look old. In comparison, these buildings are matchless compared to old buildings in Lahore. He says that the enormous endowments and budgets of individual American universities that exceed the national educational budget of Pakistan tremble him. However, he describes Princeton as a prostitute who presents herself each fall when "it raised her skirt for corporate recruiters – and showed them some skin" (4). He also praises the educational environment, faculty, and students, and, later claims that he was overly generous in his earlier assumptions.

Also, Changez' s self – esteem borders a certain amount of narcissism, which is obvious throughout the novel. He takes an overly optimistic national identity in glorifying the power of the American system when comparing America to Pakistan, but he wishes to stand on the “achievements of the most technologically advanced civilization” (34) the human species had ever known, and would bring it down if the same power threatens his country.

To compensate for his hurt national ego and inadequacy, he comes up with stories of strength and grandeur from his own civilization in the past. Consistent with Said's cultural resistance notion, he tries to connect himself to a forgotten history to see it “whole, coherently, and integrally” (*Culture*, 215). Changez must mediate between his inherent Pakistani and adopted American identity to balance the relationship between a strong empire and a weak Third World country. He takes great pride in the history of his civilization, which is four thousand years old. However, the ancestors of those who colonized America were barbarians. He is moved by the rich heritage of Lahore, the “Royal Mosque, Shalimar Gardens, Lahore Fort,” monuments built when America was a “collection of thirteen small colonies, gnawing away at the edge of a continent” (102). Also, he seems to be irritated by people who are indifferent and lacks respect for his national identity. His boss Jim aggravates him for his condescending attitude towards Changez' s family and country and disturbed by Erica's father's remarks for its “American undercurrents of condescension” (55) accompanied by indifference and ignorance. He believes that these perceptions are based on news stories spread by the mass media, which constant repetition turns into a norm. A wide gap exists between the masculine pride of his national identity and an opposite projection of it by others. Nonetheless, these conflicts between his adopted identity and its perception by others create a sense of frustration and disorientation, a lack of a ‘stable core’. He is uncertain whether he belongs to “New York, in Lahore, in both, in neither” (148). Such feelings are triggered by the humiliation felt at the “positional superiority” projected by the West (*Orientalism*, 7). Even though Changez is inspired by America, he cannot see his country humiliated in the process of comparison.

Changez perceives this cultural dislocation during their tour to Greece. A historical wall in the Island of Rhodes is built to guard against Ottoman advances to Europe causes him to question his true sense of belonging. He is physically on the

Western side of the wall but culturally regards himself to be on the other side. He believes that no matter how hard he tries to assimilate himself in the West, he is constantly rejected because of his identity of belonging to the non – Western side, as he says, “how strange it was for me to think I grew up on the other side!” (23). What is more striking is that these two identities are conflictive and seek supremacy over the individual. During their encounter, the waiter brings tea, which the American unwillingly accepts. Sensing his uneasy attitude, Changez makes a comment, which lies at the heart of the Western suspicion towards the East and its people. He says, “Do not look suspicious nothing untoward will happen to you, it is not as if it has been poisoned” (11). Every gesture and move is an implication of an embedded prejudice. Changez would tell his stories about these prejudices in the past and add simultaneous conflicts occurring between him and the American at the exact time of narration. As he shed light on a past resentment, a new one would be in the process of making between him and the American interlocutor.

Most Third World countries resent the West and claim that America acquired its wealth at their expense by exploiting their resources and occupying their lands. U.S imperialism is nothing but a continuation of old colonialism only in a new form. Masao Miyoshi in “A Borderless World, From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation – State” (1993) argues that transnationalism or globalization is not an age of “*post*-colonialism but of intensified colonialism, even though it is under an unfamiliar guise” (750). Orhan Pamuk believes that people living in a Third World country have resentment against America and its wealth when they compare it with their own insubstantial share in the world’s wealth (“The Anger of the Damned”, 3). When the Third World countries compare their share in the world’s wealth, they cannot help but resent America. Said claims that the “immense economic rift between poor and rich countries have caused a structure of dependency” (*Culture*, 283) and “the debt trap” for poor countries and nations (*Culture*, 89). Changez also sees that American Empire has acquired its wealth at the expense of Third World countries like his own. He blames the American empire responsible for problems like poverty and immense national debt of his country, and America’s only fortunes are from the misfortune of others. He shows feelings of nostalgia for a lost history in which Muslims ruled large parts of the world from the eighth century to the early decades of the twentieth century. American

intrusion is responsible for all kinds of problems and most Third World countries resent the wealth of the West when they compare it with their unsubstantial share.

Changez feels that his country's historical decline can be traced in the economic decline of his family as he grew up "poor boy's sense of longing" not for what the family never had, but for what they had had and lost (71). Changez implies that Pakistan's decline was essentially caused by America, as financially it is "always burdened by debt" (101). This poverty is then averted by cultural stereotype whereby the West thinks of Pakistanis as "crazed and destitute radicals" (101). The novel connects the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan with a destabilized Afghanistan. Refugees from previous wars and the impending American attack on Afghanistan are responsible for the turmoil in his homeland. The political and security upheavals in Pakistan were the result of the overthrow of the democratic government by a military coup with the support of the United States. Changez also blames America for its lack of assistance when India was threatening military action. "America would not fight by our side" (144) nor would it "inform India that any attack on Pakistan would be treated as an attack on any American ally" (162). This shows all of America's rallying of other nations to their side and threat of "you are with us or with the terrorists" (Jackson, 128) to be entirely self – interested and self – serving.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist presents Pakistanis as explicitly blaming the U.S for security, economic, and political problems in their country. Pakistan has been an ally of the United States in the South Asian region. It became the base during the Cold War, and later the supply line in the West's war against Russia in Afghanistan in the 1980s. As America left the region after dismemberment of Russia, Pakistan experienced upheavals due to corruption, a bad economy, internal strife, civil wars in Afghanistan, and a precarious relationship with India. After September 11, Pakistan became a launching pad against the Taliban regime. The security situation exacerbated as extremist forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan turned against the Pakistani government for its complete alliance with the Western powers. It has since become a common perception in Pakistan that all kinds of problems in the country are because of America's interference and presence in the region. On the Western influence and its ramifications that contribute to the precipitous decline in strength and stability of the Third World, Said argues "Westerners may have physically left their old colonies, but they retained

them not only as markets but as locales on the ideological map over which they continued to rule morally and intellectually” (*Culture*, 27).

3.3. Identity Issue and Reacting against Stereotypes

Throughout the novel, the transformation of Changez’ s relation with the empire and its changing dynamics are visible. Initially, he is successful at pursuing his American dream, from attending Princeton to his lucrative employment in a prestigious valuation company. This is later put in sharp contrast with his disillusion following the September 11 attacks. A pre – September 11 love for America turns into resentment after September 11. He grows a strong sense of displacement and nostalgia for home, which are results of the postcolonial exploitation. The uneven distribution of wealth between the West and Third World and wars cause migration across national borders. This displacement brings the “vexed questions of identity, memory, and home” (*The Empire Writes Back*, 218). Changez reminds feelings of displacement, as he often misses “home and the settled nature” of his past life in Pakistan (Hamid, 53). In spite of opulent life and privileges in America, he feels displaced. Even other people can see what he is going through. Jim sees that Changez is too watchful, which he tacitly claims to be the result of feeling out of place (43). Erica finds him attractive because Changez gives off a “strong sense of home” (19).

As the alienation on different levels intensifies, Changez resorts to an intensified identification strategy for stability. The love of America transforms into resentment upon the September 11 attacks. His impressions of America before September 11 were exalting and encouraging. The high standards of education in Princeton, technological progress, and an efficient working economy deeply impressed him. He spoke highly of Jim for his perfect professionalism, intuitive knowledge of human nature, and leadership qualities. He loved Erica, whom critics have found stands for America (Hartnell, “Moving Through America”, 83; Lasdun, 2; Moore-Gilbert, “From Politics”, 192). After the terrorist attacks of September 11, Erica becomes the epitome of a transformed America. Before the attacks, she “attracted people to her; she had a presence, an uncommon magnetism...a lioness: strong, sleek, and invariably, surrounded by her pride at a degree of remove from those around her” (22). He was attracted to Erica because of her elusiveness, impenetrability and subtle resistance. This synthesis of

elusiveness and attraction comes from America's belief in "its inviolability and the manifest rightness of its cause" (Gray, 11). September 11 brought to the surface a "crack inside her" (Hamid, 59) as she is "disappearing into a powerful nostalgia" (113). The analogy between the two becomes explicit when Changez abruptly realizes that "America, too, was increasingly giving itself to a dangerous nostalgia at that time" (114). Just like Erica's insatiable search for dead Chris, most Orientalist responses to September 11 portray an America missing a period before the fall. Similar to the city that disappears into the body of the American empire, Erica becomes distant, wasting away before finally and inevitably vanishing. The disappearance of Erica complicates this analogy, possibly signaling America's deviation from its manifest destiny after September 11, its inability to capture its previous sense of confidence and domination, and even a sense of its imminent implosion as an empire. There is no place for Changez in (Am) Erica's new reality.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist also explores the private concerns and conflicts of one individual while also presenting his larger, more symbolic role in the collective. By highlighting the formidable complexity of individual reactions to events, and acknowledging how these individuals belong to a larger, collective identity, an attempt to fight against the stereotypical Muslim is meant to counter the popular stereotypes of Islam and Muslims in the West. One common stereotype in Orientalism is radicalism and extremism of Muslims. Changez challenges these assumptions by telling his American listener that Muslims are not the crazed and destitute radicals as portrayed by the Western media. They are peace – loving people with a rich culture and history. Also, Hamid constantly diverts the stereotype of beard to avoid the unnecessary alarm created by it in the Western psyche. This becomes more explicit when Changez tells the American, "Ah, I see I have alarmed you. Do not be frightened by my beard: I am a lover of America" (1). On another occasion, Changez' s drinking despite his beard confuses the American, as both would seem contradictory. He has to explain so that he does not "misconstrue the significance of Changez' s beard" (53). In this instance, Changez argues against two stereotypes: the beard and the alleged strong prohibition of liquor in Islam. He mentions that identity might have been a reason, but he kept it as a sign of protest. This was a common phenomenon of reaction against discrimination and stereotyping after September 11 as an "increasing number of young Muslims leaned on

their racial and religious identities as a form of protest and resistance” (Maria, 115). The stereotype was revived after attacks because Osama bin Laden and his cohorts, without exceptions had beards. Esposito states “some Muslims wear beards to honor Prophet Mohammad, but the practice is not uniform, as different Islamic societies have different norms about beards” (*What Everyone Needs to Know*, 101).

Changez was a changed man after having a beard because it changes the perception of Americans as he states: “It is remarkable, given its physical insignificance, it is only a hairstyle, after all, the impact a beard worn by a man of my complexion has on your countrymen” (130). Reactions come from all walks of life: strangers verbally abuse him during his travel on the subway, and at the firm, he becomes a subject of whisper and scorn. His Caribbean colleague, Wainwright, warns him about the beard. Even Jim thought that he was looking shabby in a beard. The most severe reaction is when a stranger calls him a “Fucking Arab”.

During their conversation Changez sees American paying attention to a bearded man who stares at a group of girls. Because of the constructed stereotypes, the American believes that the bearded man is an extremist Muslim who would not tolerate the modern dressed girls. Changez inquires: “You think he will scold them for the inappropriateness of their dress, their T – shirts and jeans” (22). Changez later explains that the reason for the man’s gazing is not religion, but the scarcity of the female presence in public. Even most religious people are attracted to the scarcely visible female presence in public. To explain the stereotyped images of Muslims, Changez mentions the context of Western media. The media presents Muslims as pure senseless radicals. As a common denominator, beard brings all the negative perceptions into a single image. The manipulation of this image by the media makes the audience perceive the bearded man as potential terrorists and stereotype them with “the frequent caricatures of Muslims as oil suppliers, as terrorists, and more recently, as bloodthirsty mobs” (*How the Media*, 6). The American appears to be under the influence of the same Western media, which Changez tries to correct by saying “but you should not imagine that we Pakistanis are all potential terrorists, just as we should not imagine that you Americans are all undercover assassins” (183). Said also brings up the destructive role of media for reinforcing Oriental stereotypes in the postmodern West (*Orientalism*, 26). Television and all media’s resources enforce the already established stereotypes into

more constructed standards. Said, rejects the negative portrayal of the east by the west and the words attributed to the Muslims, such as ‘backward,’ ‘suppressive’ and ‘inferior,’ and reflects the description and observation as “the fictions presented by writing about the Orient” (*Orientalism*, 34).

The Western media forces the already scattered stereotypes into more and more standardized forms. It continuously projects Third World countries to be corrupt, primitive, backward, and resistant to progress. Erica’s father has never been to Pakistan. He comments about Pakistan’s failing economy, unrestrained corruption, dictatorships, and fundamentalism. Changez believes Erica’s father’s comments to be “indeed, his was a summary with some knowledge, much like the short news items on the front page of *The Wall Street Journal*” (55). His limited knowledge is all derived from the media. Like Changez’ s observation, Said states that “the Orient is watched, since its almost offensive behavior issues out of a reservoir of infinite peculiarity; the European, whose sensibility tours the Orient, is a watcher, never involved, always profoundly detached, always ready for new examples of what the *Description de l’ Egypte* called ‘bizarre jouissance’, the Orient becomes a living tableau of queerness” (*Orientalism*, 103). Uncritical Americans watch invasion of other countries by their army while the self – appointed experts in the media make comments about issues of life and death without proper knowledge. Nobody truly knows about the realities on the ground or the amount of permanent damage done to innocent people.

Mohsin Hamid tries to dissociate religious connotation from the word “fundamentalist,” common in stereotypical constructions. As Moore and Gilbert astutely point out the novel reverses the “teleologies within which ‘fundamentalism’ are stereotypically framed” (*From Politics*, 193). The novel never uses the term except in the title and during Erica’s father’s comments about problems in Pakistan. To be stereotyped as a fundamentalist Muslim, Changez’ s uses the term for basic fundamentals of data analysis for better efficiency, profit, and value in the American Capitalist economy (Hamid, 154). In other words, he is reluctant to be part of a system that follows these fundamentals to the core for material gains without care for human decency. The single – minded attention to business success, gaining profit at any cost, regardless of the possible consequences for others are the characteristic typical to Americans in Changez’ s eyes. The indication of such an assessment is to imply that it

is actually technology – driven, but humanly inadequate Capitalism that is Fundamentalist, not the Islam. The identification of a few fundamentalists and violent individuals with the Muslims has become problematic because the stereotype is often applied to the whole. Then there are some Orientalists who believe that radicalism and fundamentalism are inherently Islamic. By making vague but abundant references to Islam to explain a wide variety of ills such as lack of political participation, educational shortcomings, population explosions, economic stagnation, and status of women, Fukuyama considers the whole Muslims as an “Islamic – fascist sea within which the terrorist swims” (*History and September 11*, 34).

The West has lumped together all Muslims under a single stereotyped definition of Islam, which simplifies diverse and complex communities into a homogenous entity. Even though Changez is not an Arab, his religion is confused with ethnicity. One was taken to the other, demonized and abused. Even Sikhs from India, who usually grow beards and wear turbans, were attacked because they were mistaken for Muslims (Cohen, 6). Changez finds America completely transformed once he returned from the Philippines. Beloved Manhattan is festooned with flags on every corner and transformed into an island of the insular fortress. He notices that even Muslim cab drivers displayed American flags in their cars and found affronts everywhere because of this surge in patriotism, and discovers that the rhetoric flaming these affronts come from the government and the media: “Affronts were everywhere; the rhetoric emerging from your country at that moment in history – not just from the government, but from the media and supposedly critical journalists as well – provided a ready and constant fuel for my anger” (190).

Changez witnesses an emotional response to the attacks on his way back from Manila to New York. While on the plane, the other passengers are visibly uncomfortable traveling with a member on board whose ethnicity they associate with terror. He is equally uncomfortable; and he feels guilty, too. As a protest, he starts behaving indifferently. The real form of discrimination is realized at the airport. He is separated from the rest of the group and taken to a room by armed guards and stripped down to his shorts. Once he is checked out, his colleagues at the firm stare at him with suspicion and condensation. He comes to realize that this is the face of an angry America that is now telling the world that the “the mightiest civilization” has been

slighted, and it should “beware of its wrath” (79). Furthermore, Changez recalls how the U.S. was swept by a “growing and self – righteous rage” in the weeks following the attacks. He explains how the FBI raided mosques for no apparent reason, shops, and even people’s houses without due process of law, while “Muslims were disappearing into shadowy detention centers for questioning and torture” (97). Lots of people were arrested without reasonable suspicion, manhandled, tortured, and imprisoned for very long periods of time. For such instances, Zizek predicted that “America could possibly go inside its shell, fortify itself against the outside or go outside and take that violence anywhere in the world” (*Welcome to the Desert*, 49). Thus, America should not only protect itself from violent attacks but must curb the violence in the world.

As *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* presents, America followed Zizek’s both predictions, yet instead of stopping the violence around the world, America enflamed it. Law enforcement agencies were entitled to immense authorities to defend America against Muslim immigrants. People were arrested without legitimate charges and lawful warrants. Muslims were brutally beaten by ordinary citizens, while others were arbitrarily arrested “on suspicion of terrorism on the flimsiest basis” by law enforcement agencies (Morey and Yaqin, 83). They were subjected to extraordinary exceptions in the law to create “paralegal categories, torture, and rendition” (Morey and Yaqin, 35). Similarly, in the novel, something deeper and beyond control is working against the protagonist. Since American empire mistreats Changez, he decides to strike back in the form of resistance to its capitalism and hegemony.

3.4. Geo-political Critique of *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*

The Reluctant Fundamentalist is a serious critique of the American sense of cultural and economic superiority. The novel is what Said calls the “historical experience of resistance against empire” (*Culture*, xii). In *Culture and Imperialism* Said claims that there has always been some form of resistance to colonialism and imperialism, either armed or cultural to assert national identities, to show political resistance for self – determination and gain national independence. Hamid takes the latter two forms. The resistance narrative in the novel goes even further by blaming America sweepingly for socio – political conflicts and violence around the world. As a result, it becomes an indictment of America for using force against individuals and

countries. Said recognizes the power of these narratives to disrupt the Western narrative of the Orient. The marginalized, exploited, subjugated and disenfranchised masses can take to let the mainstream discourse hear their voices and recognize their histories. The power of narration is mentioned as Changez states to the American interlocutor, “I am, after all, telling you a history, and in history, as I suspect you – an American – will agree, it is the thrust of one’s narrative that counts, not the accuracy of one’s details” (Hamid, 118). As the quote describes, Americans have been able to determine history by the thrust of a fictitious narrative for their own political and economic ends, as seen in the build – up to the invasion of Iraq. Said states, “the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism” (*Culture*, xiii). This critique seems to uncover the underlying material basis for US imperialism. However, it ultimately suggests a conception of history as simply the effect of an arbitrary construction.

The first characteristic of such resistance novels against America demonstrates ambivalence between feelings of both love and resentment. Working for the empire advances personal and professional goals. An object of romantic attachment, the empire is an “imagination has now been colonized by the United States” in the postcolonial world (Gray, 21). According to Buruma and Margalit the towers were “symbols of U.S. power and wealth; symbols of imperial, global, capitalist dominance; symbols of New York City, our contemporary Babylon; symbols of everything American that people both hate and long for” (2004, 14). It is also a violent and dangerous Empire against those who resist and protest it. Moreover, it is an object of intelligible hatred because of its condescending attitude towards other ethnicities and nations. The towers were built as fantasies of wealth and power, which would become fantasies of destruction in future. The buildings were a provocation for destruction (*Falling Man*, 116).

The virtual reality and “definitive order” of the empire, represented by The World Trade Center, provoked a reaction against it (*The Spirit of Terrorism*, 6). Baudrillard’s *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* (1995) is a striking example of what he means by virtual reality and the power of images to write history. It has in fact been written while the war was taking place and telecast on TV. The book comprises of three essays written at three different points of the war: before, during and after. The first essay was titled “The Gulf War Will Not Take Place,” and was first published in

Libération on 4 January 1991. As the war actually started and images began to flow, Baudrillard insisted on his view of the war as simulation in the essay titled “The Gulf War Is Not Really Taking Place,” on 6 February 1991. Against the sneering of his critics or anyone who might have thought he was delusional, he finally wrote “The Gulf War Did Not Take Place,” which appeared on 28 March 1991, concluding once and for all that his view is quite different from the popular notion of reality, as one of “making reality”, and that it still holds its own. The persistence of Baudrillard itself is a sign that what should have been seen is something outside of the discursive system of signification, namely, that the images are not informants but rather elements in the construction of a narrative. After the Gulf War, the kind of media made available for consumption and for training stood proof that the Gulf War was, for us, nothing more than a simulation of a war, or a knowledge-effect mediated by images. It was the war as mediated, not as a real. In other words, what has written the history of the Gulf War and made *our* experience of it was not the tanks and bombs, the killing and casualties or the blood. What made our experience of it and the history around it is the image and simulation. We lived the war as images, and it persists in history as an image. Noting the extent of distant, image-based targeting and precious bombings, Barry Buzan and Eric Herring note in *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (1998) that “Computer simulations were used intensively and extensively in training, targets were located by satellites and radar and locked onto by lasers or night sights, and evidence of destruction was gathered through video cameras and satellite photography” (192). It was termed as the “first ‘cyber-war’” by Der Deria, whom they quote:

Der Deria (1992:175) portrays the 1990-1991 Gulf War as the first “cyber-war,” by which he means “a technologically generated, televisually linked, and strategically gamed form of violence that dominated the formulation as well as the representation of U.S. policy in the Gulf. The combination of surgical video strikes and information carpet -bombing worked in maintaining support for the war and that in the Gulf, as with cyber-war more generally, war and simulation became irrevocably blurred (1992, 185).

One year after the Gulf War, the general public could play the war in a simulated video game, and could either play as an American or an Iraqi (Provenzo, 281). The concept that has moved the war has been the constant escalation on each side, Saddam and the USA. Baudrillard says that this escalation would continue until it explodes and there would be no actual war behind it, because this thwarting is itself the

event, not the event that it promises. And indeed the war has ended that way, just as the Vietnam War ended when it was “domesticated” to world order (1995, 85), not with military defeat, and it did not matter whether this domestication was under democracy or communism. When the Gulf War was over, Saddam was still in power, and everything went back to order. The thwarting has served its purpose as the images have been disseminated and the narrative written. What is significant about our experience of the Gulf War is that it has never been experienced beyond its images. The existence and use of the simulated materials, video games and images supports two things: that the history of the war was indeed a matter of dissemination of images, and that in history written by simulation, history can also be rewritten. This alterability itself is a quality that, rather than seeing as a tool of the powerful to control and shape knowledge, should be seen as an emancipatory aesthetic that enables a break from the notion of history as written by power.

Similarly, knowledge of the event of September 11 would not have been what it is without mass media and the dispersion of its images all over the world. The CNN live footage has become so engraved in everybody’s memory of it that it has become part and parcel of the event. In other words, the plane crashing into the tower could no longer be envisaged crashing into the tower without the CNN logo appearing right next to it. This is the same as what Baudrillard mentions in *The Gulf War has not Taken Place*, as he refers to the famous incident when a CNN reporter approaches a group of other-channel reporters on the war, only to find out that they are in fact watching CNN in order to make the news. The event belongs in the symbolic. It materializes as an image, disguises itself as truth, and follows on as a flow of capital: “The USA has been looking for a symbolic wound, and it finally has one, allowing it to use the event as a sort of ‘credit card’ to do what it likes” (Baudrillard in Hegarty, 108). While this is seen in the turn to emergency law and anti-terrorism tactics that have threatened the democracy boasted by the USA, what we will see here is that this has been presented and dealt with using the strict Orientalist divide in how this event as well as the subsequent war on Iraq took place. Inside of the USA, the police system has changed, but it could not do so without a constant reference to an outside enemy. These media and news outlets shaping public knowledge only succeeded because of the extent to which their reproduction of their own images has been treated as a confirmation of the

same truth. Orientalism is here the most relevant heritage. Nevertheless, Orientalism has needed to occupy the same dynamics of knowledge production, of simulation and the hyper-real, in order to function at all.

Baudrillard and W. J. T. Mitchell treat images for what they are. They confirm that the image has the power to go beyond the will of its producer, but in ways, which almost seem determined by the power of the image itself. Popular reception and the turn in meaning of an image, the way it affects movements, the way it becomes memorable are not things, which the image itself controls, but are things, which it affects. It is a function of images to have this happen to them, but it is not inherent in them what direction their meaning takes. According to Mitchell,

Images cannot be destroyed. Pictures, by contrast, material objects that are the bearers of images, can of course be destroyed; but the image survives that destruction, and often becomes even more powerful in its tendency to return in other media, including memory, narrative, and fantasy (2006, 11).

This is why Baudrillard sees the collapse of the two towers of the World Trade Center as the only true event. The sheer naked visibility of the planes crashing into the towers and then the towers falling resists the system's ability to thwart images and subject them to a narrative. Baudrillard calls the collapse of the towers a "suicide" (*The Spirit of Terrorism*, 29). The collapse of the Two Towers is the death of a picture, which is not an image, which allows the image to live on through its destruction. However, because of this naked visibility, it is irreducible to a narratological element, and therefore we see no "representations" of the actual fall of the two towers. Instead, their collapse is like the gouged eyes of Oedipus, un-representable in the representational universe that we occupy. For that reason, commemoration of September 11 mainly took the form of documentary dramas based on the official governmental document, giving visibility to an invisible space, thus restoring representational distancing logic. Accordingly, Baudrillard saw World Trade Centers as twins and duplicate nature as illustrating the impossibility for the social system to represent and communicate (*The System of Objects*, 67). By mirroring one another, the towers merely represented each other, like pure simulacra without any reference to an original. Therefore, the Twin Towers became a target of terrorism due to their deeply symbolic nature. They were a symbol of economic and financial capitalism, but also a symbol of the totalizing order of America against weaker nations around the world.

Deborah Eisenberg's *Twilight of the Superheroes* (2007) argues that a "dark world of population ruthlessly exploited, inflamed with hatred and tired of waiting for change unknown to America till September 11" (33). Jay McInerney's *The Good Life* (2006) also mentions the same exploited world, which the U.S. gives importance only in "terms of investment and vacation opportunities" (2006, 50). The result of this obsession with capital is indifference in what the rest of the world could provide. An instance of this indifference is presented when Changez decides to work at the library of Near Eastern Studies. He does not want his classmates and friends to see him working because this would give the impression that he works to pay for his education and his prodigal lifestyle. The library provides a secure place, as his friends would not come to a section of the library that has books about subjects and interests beyond America's border. This is, of course, the prevailing attitude of America as its attention is on capital and material benefits. Indeed, an attempt to exclude reasons like religion and culture causing conflicts is evaded in the narrative. Instead, these perceived reasons and ideas of justice, human rights, and liberty disguise the economic interests of capitalism. Changez is disappointed by the capitalist system, which he was a part of until he decided to dash out. As an immigrant whose country was subjected to sanctions and then given aid by the same system, he was aware that "finance was a primary means by which the U.S. exercised its power" (Hamid, 156). Before reaching this conclusion, he was taught by American meritocracy on a micro – level how "to recognize another person's style of thought, harness their agenda, and redirect it to achieve our desired outcomes" (36).

America applies this principle on the macro level in its affairs with other states. Capital, human, and natural resources around the world are all exploited towards strengthening the empire at the expense of disempowered communities. Fanon argues that capitalism uses deportations, massacres, forced labor and slavery to "increase its wealth, its gold or diamond reserves, and to establish its power" (1963, 101). The senior member of the firm, Jim, says to Changez, "You're blood brought from some part of the body that the species doesn't need any more" (Hamid, 97). The empire operates like a brain, which suckles blood from other organs, making them leaner and weaker while making the brain stronger. Those countries work "to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine and machine's branches feed into it the human

material, material wealth, knowledge converted into more power” (*Orientalism*, 45). These countries are only good until they can no longer function efficiently for capitalism. Changez’ s deft observation about the exploitative nature of the highly advanced technological capitalist system forces him to give up the privileges bestowed by working inside the system. The system must work by creating value and making markets efficient. These fundamentals to increase material gains should be followed at all times.

The economic aspect of the U.S. is also evident in cultural, social, and political contexts when its adherents, come into contact with people outside its borders. Changez recognizes the American from the way he bears himself (Hamid, 2). It is not the color of his skin or sartorial preferences, but the distinct attitude of confidence. The American shows a distinct demeanor of confidence bordering on pride. During their tour to Greece, Changez was annoyed to witness the self – righteousness and overbearing manner with which his American friends treated other people. He remembers these Americans sadly “by what quirk of human history my companions were in a position to conduct themselves in the world as though they were its ruling class” (24).

Changez himself acquired a certain amount of these typical American attitudes and traits during his stay in America. Back in Pakistan, he feels saddened and ashamed of his shabby house due to his acquired American gaze. He remarks that he realized that his gaze had shifted and that he was viewing his home with “the eyes of that particular type of entitled and unsympathetic American” (141). The house had not changed it was him who did. Occasionally, Changez would feel content when taken for an American to enjoy the recognition and respect freely afforded to Americans. Even though he does not refrain from criticizing all kinds of problems in Pakistan, he would not tolerate others, especially Americans, to point out the same. Erica’s father’s comments about corruption, fundamentalism, and other socio – economic problems in Pakistan offend Changez. At this time, he was not perturbed whether the comments were true or false, but was irritated by “his tone with typically American undercurrents of condescension” (55).

During his business visit to the Philippines to appraise a company, he wants to be received by the Filipinos as one of the “members of the officer class of global

business” (65). He behaves like an American, as it was a prestigious way to get respect and recognition from the locals. Just like in Greece, the power of the empire is obvious, as the Filipinos looked up to Americans with great envy and admiration. Changez exhibited his acquired identity to claim his share of the respect. He would never tell people about who he really is but would rather prefer to tell them that he was from New York. Two disturbing experiences transform him completely. The first instance is a hostile gaze from a driver of jeepney at Changez while he is riding in a big luxury car in Manila. The driver gave him a dirty look for a long time, full of scorn and contempt. Changez could not understand the reasons for “an undisguised hostility in his expression” (Hamid, 67). His dislike is so obvious and intimate that it got under Changez’ s skin. After a deep bout of introspection, he realizes, the driver thought of Changez as an American as he was riding with the other American colleagues. He realizes that this was because he was projecting an American identity. The jeepney driver’s anger at Changez was an indication of deep resentment. It was typical of what Said claims to be a movement of fellow feelings, which bring non –Westerners together to assert their resistance against imperialism (*Culture*, 218). They believe America is a superpower that is exploiting them and devastating their lives. Their poverty is engendered by American expansionism, that, Moore – Gilbert identifies as principally economic (*Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices*, 289). The Third World is further degraded by the “state of plenty that characterizes” America (Hamid, 47). And the worst of it all, the West is not aware of the “humiliation experienced by the most of the world’s population”(Pamuk, 3). Immediately perturbed, Changez could read the mind of the driver because they both “shared a Third World sensibility” (Hamid, 67). At this moment, he identifies with the driver on the same day that he is working with Americans. He was caught by surprise by the oblivious immersion of his American colleagues in following the fundamentals of Capitalism. Their attitude towards the incident is to tell Changez, “you are so foreign” (Hamid, 67).

Changez’ s exuberantly successful path toward integration into America loses its way on the day of the attacks when he witnesses the carnage on TV in his hotel room in Manila. His initial thought for the attacks is to be some kind of Hollywood movie. Then something strange happens which is hard for him to rationalize. Before being overcome with shame, he smiles unintentionally “as despicable as it may sound, my initial

reaction was to be remarkably pleased” (Hamid, 72). Changez could not rationalize his pleasure at the killings of innocent people. He could see the American interlocutor clench his fist as Changez expressed his despicable joy in such an outrageous manner. Like so many in the Third World, Changez’ s “subaltern” mask slips (Head, 143). However, It is not, that he was pleased with the loss of human life, but “the symbolism of it all, the fact that someone had so visibly brought America to her knees” (83), a lesson of counter – violence imparted to America at large.

Francis Fukuyama thinks that these people celebrated September 11 “because it humbled a society that they believed was at its heart corrupt” (*History, and September 11*, 31). Mostly proponents of “clash of civilization” theory use this sort of reasoning to explain the celebrations. Like typical Orientalists using binaries of “good versus evil” and “us versus them,” these conclusions are based on faulty data and explain conflicts and confrontations only regarding religious and cultural differences. Similarly, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth call September 11 “collision of worlds” (2002, 1) as they are utterly perplexed by the Islamic world’s celebrations. Other writers try not to hide these unfortunate reactions to the deaths of innocent people but see the conflicts and their results in broader historical, and economic perspectives. Orhan Pamuk was surprised by his neighbor’s celebratory response to the attacks. The neighbor said, “They have bombed America. They did the right thing” (Pamuk, 1). The writer believes that these unfortunate and tragic sentiments stem from an unequal and exploitative relationship between America and the Third World. The vast material differences between the two make Third World people shameful and humiliated. Changez, and even Hamid, go through similar phases of shame and humiliation. Sadik J. Al-Azm was in Sendai, Japan for a conference when he saw the images of the attack on television. He, like Changez, “could not help experiencing a strong emotion of schadenfreude” that he tried to contain, control, and hide (“Islam, Terrorism, and the West”, 6). Later in the article, Al – Azm expands the views on differences by including historical and geo – political factors such as American foreign policy and Israeli – Palestinian crisis as more probable causes for such jubilant celebrations (Al-Azm, 6)

For Changez, September 11 symbolized an attack on the might of America. He was enchanted that “someone had so visibly brought America to her knees” (Hamid, 73). The explanations for Changez’ s happiness are rooted in America’s foreign policy.

According to Hamid, America humiliates and then threatens you, which makes it “insufferable” (Hartnell, 75). The attack was a reminder to America to stop doing the same to other nations. Changez could not understand how America could mourn the killing of its people, and then enjoy videos, “so prevalent these days, of American munitions laying waste the structures of your enemies” (Hamid, 73). This visual awareness reminds him that even Americans could not “be completely innocent of such feelings” of satisfaction. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* raises these vexing questions to make America aware of its contribution to violence in the world. Thus, the killing of innocent civilians cannot be condoned in any civilized society. If it is true of other people and nations, it should be equally true for America. However what occurred after September 11 was the incessant creation of a hostility and violence against these cultural ‘Others’ (Moore-Gilbert, 292) in which the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq following the attacks were proof enough that America desired “a time of unquestioned dominance” over the world (Hamid, 115).

Changez claims that the fight against terrorism is a disguise to advance the interests of the military industry. The discourse of counter – terrorism defines terrorism as “the organized and politically motivated killings of civilians by killers not wearing the uniforms of soldiers” (Hamid, 178). What is referred here is that America is involved in terrorism itself, but it does it with soldiers in uniform. He also shows that the word itself masks how the US – led “War on Terror” serves American economic and imperialist interests at the expense of human lives in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Such lives are treated as “collateral damage” in the larger interests of corporate America. At this moment in the narrative, Changez tells the story of a missing boy and tells highhanded tactics used by governments and law enforcing agencies against innocent civilians. The boy was charged with a plot to assassinate an American citizen in Pakistan. This innocent Pakistani boy disappeared, and it is believed that he was “whisked away to a secret detention facility in some lawless limbo between America and Pakistan” (Hamid, 182). Therefore, *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* offers a series of assumptions and reflections on the justification for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Changez’ s resentment towards America reaches its apex in another visit to a Third World country. To value a book publishing company in Chile, he meets Juan Bautista, the owner of the company. True to his name, Juan Bautista baptizes Changez into a new

life with a single deft observation: he invites Changez to compare his work at Underwood Samson with that of the medieval Ottoman Empire's Janissaries. They were used to fight against and "erase their own civilizations, so they had nothing to turn to" (172). This concept is of great importance for the book, as this analogy triggers a self – waking: he agrees and sees himself fighting for American interest against his people and country. When he comes to see his position at Underwood Samson as akin to a janissary's, the final step towards self – recognition completes the process of "inward transformation that began when he realized he was half – gladdened by the World Trade Center attacks" (Lasdun, 1). After his full awakening, he leaves Chile and goes back to New York to resign from the Underwood Samson. As Hartnell has pointed out, the initials of Underwood Samson also stands for the U.S. ("Moving through America", 83). Applying the same analogy, his resignation from the company means his dissociation from the United States. Changez says "all I knew was that my days of focusing on the fundamentals were done" (175).

Once he goes back to Pakistan, Changez openly expresses his resentment. Even though he always carried a certain amount of resentment towards America's interference in the whole world, he would not express it because of the benefits he received from America. Once he frees himself from these restraints, Changez comes to realize America's "constant interference in the affairs of others" (177) and claims "no country inflicts death so readily on the inhabitants of other countries, frightens so many people so far away, as America" (207). This is a direct criticism of America's being the world leader with the power to intervene in the affairs of other countries and the belief of righteousness and innocence that America claims. He calls the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan invasions and occupation of foreign lands by the U.S. More than Iraq, the war in Afghanistan becomes a charge against America for being very close Pakistan's porous borders and strong cultural affinity between the two. Changez sides with Afghanistan religiously by calling it a fellow Muslim nation. The American invasion of "Pakistan's neighbor – friend and a fellow Muslim nation" causes Changez "to tremble with fury" (Hamid, 100). This is when he begins to dismantle the American side of his identity. The U.S. is to blame for wreaking havoc and upheavals around the world because it organizes wars on flimsy grounds of preemption. This also becomes a machination for other stronger nations to invade and pillage weaker ones. Changez

claims that India does similar preemptive attacks when dealing with Pakistan due to an already legitimized American example (131).

Changez euphemizes that the pain that day “united” America with the attackers in their shared pain (Hamid, 168). Terrorism was already there before September 11, yet it was not much of American concern. Similarly, Zizek claims, before September 11, terrorism for Americans was something that “happens there not here” (*Welcome to the Desert*, 13). Americans were indifferent to it as it was not a part of their reality. Changez considers the U.S. responsible not only for violence in the Third World but whose wrath meant that the “entire planet was rocked” (Hamid, 168). The charge is long as the U.S. brings death, frightens people around the world, and forces weaker nations to do its requests. It is accused of what Said calls “crimes of violence, crimes of suppression” (*Culture*, 195). Changez believes the remedy for such an unsteady situation was to stop America in its interests and the larger interest of the rest of the world. Medovoi believes this side of *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* to be the beginning of the “terminal crisis” in American world – system hegemony (Medovoi, 44). Giovanni Arrighi in his article, “Hegemony Unravelling” regards U.S. hegemony in its “terminal crisis” and locates its roots back to the U.S.’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 (57). Arrighi uses the term to explain the declining influence of the U.S. because the “world rejected American leadership to the extent that had no precedent in the annals of US hegemony” (58). Medovoi uses the same term to explain the American power is moving out of its borders into the international space. This transfer also manifests in the “turn from the study of national literature to the literature of an empire” (649). As Medovoi explains, contrary to some conventionally national American novels, *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* seems anomalous as it deals with “America shifting global position” (644). The new position in the making is that of a monolithic empire that can use force to strengthen its hegemony and dominance. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a growing phenomenon of terrorism were caused by such hasty policies inflamed by anger. Paul Gilroy states that the “worst and most backward features of the latest U.S. imperial adventure” started to unfold after September 11 (xii). There was no critical thinking, as Said argues in his article “The West and Islam are Inadequate Banners”. Instead, there were collective passions and “thought – stopping fury” (*Orientalism*, xxii), which “funneled into a drive for war” (“The West and Islam”). Said wanted a rational

explanation of the situation after attacks, a revision of America's role in the world, and a new discourse of humanism to overcome confrontations and conflicts in the world. However, these ideals are too hard to be realized in the presence of a thoughtless and revanchist mindset in the post-September 11 world.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist delves into history to make the point that America is mostly responsible for the ills and violence in the world. It was America which trained and used the Mujahideen and later the Taliban in Afghanistan, the twenty-first century outcast of the world. It creates them, and once the devil turns against its creator, the empire uses all its might to destroy it. The powerful allies, friends, and saints become merciless enemies and outcasts later. In the next phase, political rhetoric tries to convince the public that "these enemies around the world despise America for its lack of power" (*Welcome to the Desert*, 49). The government empowers itself by convincing the public that it needs more funds and more authority to fight the enemy. The brute reality is that it is the excesses of American power that create resentment against it in the Third World. Based on the binaries of "us versus them," America precipitously assumes "the hawkish, imperialist aspect that provokes a widespread sense of injustice, indignation, and fear" (*Terror and After*, 4). The result is that more people are forced to feel irritated and resentful towards America. According to Bhabba, instead of George Bush's challenging rhetoric of "either you're with us or the terrorist," people should listen to dissenting voices "like Emma Goldman, Noam Chomsky, and Howard Zinn" (*Terror and After*, 123).⁵ These great writers and activists hold America to the same standards it applies to others. As the American empire discriminates, exploits, and invades other countries despite reservations and resistance,

⁵ Emma Goldman (1869-1940), a famous anarchist, political and social activist, and writer, struggled against the state's monopoly of power, Capitalism, violent authority and wars in the United States and Russia. Noam Chomsky's prolific writings critique the United States in its internal and international affairs, its use of force and support for aggressors against weaker nations, the misuse of the media for propaganda, and the monopoly of the world economy. He has also written about September 11 in his books *9/11* (2001), *Power and Terror: Post-9/11 Talks and Interviews* (2003), *Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post-9/11 World* (2005) and other related issues of terrorism and the increasing hegemonic role of American empire in the post-September 11 world. Howard Zinn (1922-2010) was an American academic historian, author, playwright, and social activist. He is known for his anti-war efforts during the Vietnam and Iraq wars, and activism in the Civil Rights movement. Though a prolific writer, his most influential book is *A People's History of the United States* (1980) in which he tries to present the history of the United States through the eyes of the common people. These writers and activists critique America's imperial and hegemonic role in the world and the use of force against weaker nations in violation of international norms and laws.

Changez is provoked and feels disenchanting. He splits himself from America by giving up his adopted role as a “modern – day janissary, a servant of the American empire” (Hamid, 152). He feels liberated from political, institutional, ideological, academic, and professional limitations, which previously forced him to observe and analyze separate parts and pieces of a system with analytical eyes. He finds America following the example of traditional empires. Like subjects of previous empires, he was suspected, quarantined, and subjected to extra measures as he belonged to a “suspect race” (Hamid, 157). He was verbally abused by a generic curse of “Fucking Arab” because in modern – day Orientalism, “Arabs are the attenuated recent examples of Others” (Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory*, 295). To resist all these effectively, Changez has started teaching at a university in Lahore and has started a movement to protest against American interference in Pakistan’s affairs.

Changez explicitly defends a disengagement from American foreign policy by the government of Pakistan. His students also participate in his campaign, and he arranges rallies with the help of his students for greater Pakistani independence in its domestic and international relations. Upon his close friends warning him that America might be displeased with the demonstrations and that he might become the target of America’s wrath, Changez responds by relating himself to “Kurtz waiting for his Marlowe” to take him down (Hamid, 183). Even though he wants to live a peaceful life, he is plagued by paranoia and haunted by an unsubstantiated fear that he is under constant surveillance. Like Kurtz, he has lost hopes of recovering. As America has become aware of his anti – American sentiments, he is scared that “America might react to my admittedly intemperate remarks by sending an emissary to intimidate me or worse” (183). The indication of Kurtz and Marlowe from Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* (1899) shows that old colonialism has resurfaced itself in the modern form of American imperialism. Changez’ s utter alienation is representative of the crisis caused by conflicts caused by an embedded discourse founded on seamless lies. Said states that “domination is at the center of the relationship, has marred chances of a peaceful co – existence in the world” (*Orientalism*, 190).

Disillusioned and disappointed with America, Changez resorts to Islam after “having been courted and then rejected by the West” (Head, 144). He transforms into a violent individual who would want to exact revenge on those who wronged him. This is

a dangerous situation and might benefit the very Orientalist discourse resisted in the course of the novel. Because he has become what stereotypes have believed him to be. Religion, culture, and nation become his refuge. Hartnell states that *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* “casts Islamism as both the product of and a rebellion against American – led globalization” (*Moving Through America*, 87). The protagonist is pushed towards identification with religion, which he uses as resistance against the very empire. However, the empire benefits from such identifications, as it reinforces them in the first place. Fukuyama argues that even though America is a favorite place for immigrants, it also has the potential to repel. The major terrorists, Mohammad Atta, and other hijackers were educated people, lived, indoctrinated, and studied in the West. They were not seduced by the West, instead “were sufficiently repelled by what they saw” (*History, and September 11*, 28). Buruma and Margalit have similar ideas about resentment among mostly Westernized populations in the Third World, who mostly consume its images (15). As the earlier discussions demonstrate, the alienation is not caused by one factor or is not caused by modernity, liberty, freedoms, the prevalence of immorality, or godlessness in the West in these novels that are the usual charges of Orientalist discourse. Instead, alienation is provoked by an intensified discourse of discrimination and othering after September 11.

The protest and resistance of *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* are consistent with Said’s theory of resistance to Orientalism, but the protagonist’s final dependence on cultural, religious and national identities is at odds with some of his assessments. Said discourages cultural resistance to imperialism taking the form of “nativism and nationalism as a private refuge” (*Culture*, 275). For this rhetoric, Said was inspired by Fanon, who chose “national consciousness” over “nationalism” for the former’s international dimensions in communicating with others (179). National consciousness stems from an inner national identity but moves outside to communicate with other nations and identities. Nationalism, on the contrary, moves inside towards national identity, without meaningful outlets for communication. Changez leaves America for Pakistan and ignites a movement, which the international press calls “anti – American” (Hamid, 179) and actively advocates Pakistan’s separation from the United States.

No sign of future engagement between Pakistan and America are provided, but the present seems extremely volatile. Said suggests an “integrative or contrapuntal”

strategy, which sees the interacting experience between the Western and non – Western as one connected by imperialism (*Culture*, 279). The imperial separation tries to separate the metropolis and the peripheries, but the two are inextricably connected, though there might not be “perfect correspondence” between the two (*Culture*, 276). But nationalism employs hierarchical structures, which resistance narratives have to resist. Similarly, *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* moves toward similar hierarchies of nationalism. The Orientalist discourse excludes them by a parochial and hierarchical process of othering. The novel depends predominantly on national identity to create a similar discourse of exclusion and separation from the center. Instead of an outward interaction in the presence of national consciousness as Fanon and Said demand, this narrative moves away towards exclusive nationalism. It is true that the novel tries to engage with the West but moves away from it in the present, with no structures of future engagement at the end except further disengagement and alienation.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist implies that the protagonist’s perceived hostile national and religious identity and his eventual alienation and disengagement from America are not initiated by him, but by the bigoted treatment of America. There is also this veiled threat that as long as America uses force and discrimination against other nations and identities, there will always be new terrors, nationalist insurgencies, resistance, alienation, and instability in the world. Accordingly, the pretense throughout the novel comes to a full circle in the final paragraph of the novel. When they reach the gates of the hotel, both parties show some violence. However, it is not certain who the predator or the prey is and who triumphs in the clash of the two civilizations that each man represents. In a stroke of brilliance, Hamid manages to leave some doubt on the final page by suggesting that no one can be sure about what will be the eventual outcome of the clash between two cultures...

CHAPTER IV

PEACEFUL ENGAGEMENT IN POST–SEPTEMBER 11 NOVELS

Ian McEwan's *Saturday* depicts a Western society disoriented by the anxiety generated by the intensified phenomenon of terrorism after September 11. Mostly Western characters find themselves anxious, fearful and discomforted due to the ubiquitous presence of individual and collective anxiety. The manifest intent is to bring these characters out from their pre-September 11 spaces of comfort into a post-September 11 world of discomfort in order to confront, engage and reconcile with people, events and phenomenon that have contributed to those discomforts. These undertakings compel them to explore a whole plethora of meaningful and productive strategies. Like the conflict between the self and the Other, and the West and Islam in most September 11 novels, *Saturday* too recognizes those differences. However, the distinct approach here is not to avoid, ignore or escape from those differences, but to look for a middle ground based on the principles of peaceful co-existence, mutual understanding, conciliation, forgiveness, humanism, tolerance and multiculturalism. The Other is accorded recognition in an international and cosmopolitan space of less divisiveness as the new discourse discourages the binary divisions of nations, ethnicities, cultures and religions.

Saturday indicates these intentions in its epigraph. The epigraph gives a manifesto of life in tough times and the ideals of a shared humanity whereby the fact that all human beings are connected to one another is given as the response to those tough times. *Saturday* depicts Western characters in Britain in a post-September 11 world of anxiety and fear. These anxieties are exacerbated by a lurking fear of terrorism, which these characters have to face and come to terms with. Family becomes the primary support to cope with the disorienting experiences created by terrorism. Literature, music, kindness, and friendship are other spaces of comfort. The novel also

emphasizes a discourse of science, secularism or atheism to confront schisms. By bringing up the crisis of rising anti-Americanism and postcolonial melancholia in the form of disagreements about America's monopoly of power, and about protests against the Iraq war in 2003, the novel advocates multiculturalism as the only workable discourse in the post-September 11 world. It also suggests a positive interaction and engagement with the Other toward cooperation and conciliation in cosmopolitan and international spaces. Such interactions and engagements are favored because they are not dependent on nationalist, religious, and cultural binaries.

Novels in chapter two use the language of a Western nationalist rhetoric, because the perspective is predominantly Western and the writers identify with that perspective. Novel in chapter three responds to such a view, but employs the language of a Pakistani nationalist rhetoric. Both are oppositional in terms of the nationalist binaries that exist. On the contrary, the novel in this chapter asks us to "attend to a world that exists beyond the binaries oppositions of the nationalist rhetoric" (Gray, 70). I argue that *Saturday* emphasizes the idea that a space for mediation might be possible, and may be the only useful space available to cope with terrorism in the fearful post-September 11 world. The politics of binaries is discarded because mainly Western characters interact with the Other in subtle ways to understand their position in a cosmopolitan space. A discourse based on the neutral principles of science, atheism or secularism, business, sports and multiculturalism is the new paradigm of this new space. The text uses imaginative ways to find this more or less middle-of-the-road discourse of a new working relationship as the old paradigms of binaries lead to further disorientation and recrimination. The idea is to let terrorism or the presence of the Other penetrate the spaces of comfort in the lives of Westerners and depict them exploring strategies and effective spaces to cope with that discomfiting and disorienting experience. Contrary to texts in chapter two, which malign and stereotype the Other, *Saturday* accentuates the notion that how someone who is a Westerner is made to see outside his Orientalist misperceptions and try to recognize the other, or to at least see and recognize the other's position. It is also important to note how empathy, conciliation, forgiveness or simple understanding of the Other might even be possible if there is no sense of how it feels to be in the Other's position. The novel also tries to understand the response of the Other regarding terrorism, Iraq War, anti-Americanism

and cultural conflicts. One thing different here is that that response is conveyed in ways other than the binaries of Orientalism.

Motivated by a genuine urge to find a viable alternative, *Saturday* distinctly supports the notion of cosmopolitanism, which envisions all humanity belonging to a single community, based on a shared morality and increasing acceptance of common values and practices. The community is based on the inclusive morality, shared interests, or a political structure that includes different entities and groups. Such a community is more consensual, nurturing, and prone to peace. The concept is not new since political thinkers have struggled for a long time to find a pragmatic principle to govern relationships in spaces of differences. Cosmopolitanism dates back to the Cynics of Ancient Greece of the fourth century BC, who used the word to name a “citizen of the cosmos” (Appiah, xiv). The Stoics used the word with similar connotations in third century B.C. Both emphasized a sense of attachment among all human beings.

Like any other concept to govern relationship among different communities, cosmopolitanism as a theory is multifaceted. The result is that the content and pragmatic character of cosmopolitanism is yet unspecified. Consequently, the concept has resisted positive and definitive specification, because “specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an uncosmopolitan thing to do” (Pollock et al., 1). Defining it would close cosmopolitanism’s door to those cultural, national or religious entities that are different. Discourses emanating from these different entities created enough conflicts in the twentieth century. Cosmopolitanism as an idea has always motivated people “to live tenaciously in terrains of historic and cultural transition” (Pollock et al., 4). *Saturday* depicts the same transitions. This narrative advocates a humanist discourse of rights and egalitarianism. Protagonist experiences their “infinite ways of being” (Pollock et al., 12), as he finds himself in transition after September 11.

Modern thinkers like Immanuel Kant thought of cosmopolitanism as the guiding principle if humanity wants to save itself from conflicts and wars (Versluys, 149). Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida consider ethics and hospitality respectively to provide a working relationship between people and cultures in the cosmopolitan space (Versluys, 149). It is noteworthy that these principles are not similar to the written laws of a society or state. Levinas’ s work is important, specifically in the context of

relationship to the Other. Similarly, Derrida emphasizes this aspect in the context of welcoming the Other in one's home. According to him, the historical space of cosmopolitanism requires to offer "unconditional hospitality ... to every other, to all newcomers, *whoever they may be* (Versluys, 22). According to Kwame Anthony Appiah, the widely known advocate of contemporary cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitanism begins "with the simple idea that in the human community, as it is in national communities, we need to develop habits of coexistence; conversation in its older meaning, of living together, association" (2006, xix), a conversation between people from different ways of life. That conversation is inevitable, since the population of the world is on the increase, and as Appiah predicts, will reach nine billion towards the end of the first-half of the 21st century.

Paul Gilroy offers a possible alternative to the radical emphasis on familiarity and an unwelcoming attitude to strangeness. He believes in the "methodical cultivation of a degree of estrangement from one's own culture and history" as a necessary step towards to a cosmopolitan commitment" (2005, 67). This estrangement entails a "process of exposure to otherness" in order to foster "the irreducible value of diversity within sameness" (67). Gilroy believes in a "planetary consciousness" against race and national thinking (75). It is important to note that these cosmopolitan writers advocate to move beyond the familiar and recognize the Other. The restricting influences of familiarity should be overcome to visualize new spaces of interaction between differences.

Novelists are "experts at imagining the unimaginable, the master of other worlds of possibilities" (Houen, 420), therefore better equipped to imagine. That's why, Houen states, newspapers hoped novelists' response to September 11 in the immediate aftermath to envision alternatives in the divisive contemporary world. Novelists' responses to the new reality have been an attempt to look for new spaces of engagement, problematize and complicate current rules of engagement and introduce ways to cope. Novelists are also important because the "creative imagination is usually associated with a certain power of explanation, an affective or empathic understanding" (Versluys, 150). They play a significant role in the "practice imaginative identification, to go into someone else's skin, and have a special affinity with the Other" (Versluys, 151). September 11 novels have common tropes of terrorism, trauma, the conflicts, and the

discrimination, anxiety, fear, and displacement that followed the attacks. While these novels are meant to bring a distinct approach or a discourse, unfortunately, most depended on the very discourses that created the problem. Novelists are presumably better equipped as they have the power to imagine those alterities.

Certain September 11 novels have begun the process to explore new spaces for a meaningful engagement to halt further exacerbation. Such narratives struggle towards a peaceful, humane, and less fractious harmony. Ian McEwan *Saturday* is such a novel. Even though it does not ignore the presence of orientalism, imperialism, prejudices or injustices, it criticizes them to show the limitations of such discourses and the sufferings they have brought on people. The objective is to create a middle ground where all human beings are inextricably connected to a bigger human race against the limiting influences of inhumane and unjust policies and practices. The characters are mostly Westerners and forced to experience discomfort and anxiety, find spaces to cope with the incomprehension, suspicion, and distrust, and come together with people who have similar sufferings. *Saturday* shows its intent of peaceful engagement in the cosmopolitan space in its epigraph. It is quoted verbatim from Saul Bellow's novel *Herzog* (1964):

Well, for instance, what it means to be a man. In a city. In a century. In transition. In mass. Transformed by science. Under organized power. Subject to tremendous controls. In a condition caused by mechanization. After the late failure of radical hope. In a society that was no community and devalued the person. Owing to the multiplied power of numbers which made the self-negligible. Which spent military billions on foreign enemies but would not pay for the order at home. Which permitted savagery and barbarism in its own great cities. At the same time, the pressure of human millions who have discovered what concerted efforts and thoughts can do. As megatons of water shape organisms on the ocean floor. As tides polish stones. As winds hollow cliffs. The beautiful super machinery opening a new life for innumerable mankind. Would you deny them the right to exist? Would you ask them to labor and go hungry while you enjoyed old-fashioned Values? You are a child of this mass and brother to all the rest. (*Saturday*, 3)

Saturday follows this manifesto by weaving together facts, fiction and the present. September 11 and the protests in London on the day of the novel are actual events. As the story progresses, the protagonist is hurled into a contradictory world of transitions to get a sense of the anxieties and pleasures created by those transitions like Saul Bellow's Moses Herzog. The protagonist is confused and disoriented by terrorism,

and he explores a philosophy, a proper theory to rationalize the disorder surrounding him. Like Moses, *Saturday*'s protagonist finds peace by accepting the contradiction and ambiguities surrounding him. In terms of philosophy, psychology, self, and religion, Moses' contradictions prevail on *Saturday*. Both Moses and Perowne are disillusioned with radical hopes and big ideologies to transform society and both resort to progressivism – the gradual betterment of life for all humanity. Like Moses who saw the horrors of the Holocaust, World War II, and the Cold War, the protagonist of *Saturday*, Henry Perowne does not become isolated as a result of terrorism. He believes that such catastrophic events exist, but they should not make us cynical and shut ourselves to the world. Man can find peace and beauty in the midst of bleakness of the modern world. Even though Moses escapes into a solitary life, Perowne embraces society and sees the importance of sharing his life with others. As a man advocating peace and reconciliation, Henry finds it hard to argue for the war against Iraq. As a man of means, he finds poverty ubiquitous and disabling, as a man of success and knowledge, he finds his fate connected to the less fortunate, and as a man of science, he finds religion and literature undesirable. All these contradictory impulses are resurfaced by terrorism, which touches every aspect of human life, and Henry has to find his answers after his close encounter with violence and disturbance. Though the circumstances of each character may be different, McEwan's protagonist arrives at his own space of comfort after going through discomfort in the post-September 11 world.

4.1. Post-September 11 Anxiety and Spaces of Comfort

Saturday is set exclusively in London of 2003. Following the activities of its protagonist, it is based around twenty – four hours in the life of a successful London medical doctor, Henry Perowne. His life is almost perfect; as a highly skilled neurosurgeon, he leads a life of wealth, ease, and comfort, the very epitome of the Western way of life. His wife, Rosalind, is a highly successful lawyer. His son, Theo, is a talented and ambitious guitarist with international aspirations, whereas Daisy, his daughter, is an Oxford – educated art student living in Paris. John Grammaticus, Rosalind's father, is a venerable but splenetic poet, living in France. Life seems smooth sailing for all.

The family lives in a big and a beautiful house in Fitzrovia Square, a posh area in London which is portrayed as a “success, a brilliant invention, a biological masterpiece – millions teeming around the accumulated and layered achievements of the centuries” (*Saturday*, 5). However, there is a certain amount of discomfort, some anxiety, and a “sustained, distorted euphoria,” instigated by something Henry is not certain about. His fears are soon realized when a fiery object comes into view on the horizon. Henry’s initial thought is a meteor burning out in the sky. However, the Western civilization, symbolized by the prosperity and peace of London, perceives itself under attack from Islamic terrorism. Henry goes to sleep as the news say that the plane caught fire by accident and that it made an emergency landing due to a mechanical fault. He cannot help but make the connection to the images to the planes that hit the World Trade Center. The immediate association demonstrates the effect that this event has had on people around the world. Henry says “everyone agrees, airliners look different in the sky these days, predatory or doomed” (15). Such anxieties, as Henry thinks, are motivated by “a state of wild unreason and a folly of over interpretation” (16) in post-September 11 world.

Henry compares the contemporary anxiety and general sense of unease in the West with a peaceful, prosperous and easy existence in England in the past, which was an “innocent decade” (*Saturday*, 32). Now, as he is forced to think about the fate of the burning plane, the London protest against the impending Iraq war in the morning, and the chronic anxiety after September 11, human life is “baffled and fearful” (4). Phrases like ‘catastrophe,’ ‘mass fatalities,’ ‘chemical and biological warfare’ and ‘major attack’ have become widespread through recurrence in the news and common parlance (12). Air travel is not safe, since there are always fears of “bombs or wreckers on board,” and no one knows whether a commercial plane is “predatory or doomed” (16). News about international terror, security cordons, and preparations for wars has become common like the weather and sports news. These fears are not peculiar to England, as Henry draws from the local to arrive at macro and global conclusions. The crisis has global repercussions, as “the New York attacks precipitated a global crisis that might take a hundred years to resolve” (33). His anxieties are demonstrative of collective consciousness as he is a member of a “community of anxiety” (176).

Henry sees this change as part of the human condition. For the sense of grief

over the loss of a pre – September 11 peaceful life, Henry concludes that change is part of the evolutionary process, which requires a “new look,” just as in life “there’s always a new look” (11). He takes the optimistic view that such crises reveal “new qualities of characters under pressure” (266). Although escape might be a temporary solution, Henry wants to tackle the current crisis because “when things are difficult, tension is best maintained” (21). He keeps himself busy in preparation for the family reunion and drives to his Saturday squash game with Jay Strauss, an American anesthetist. Then, on that fateful Saturday, all the bliss is jeopardized when he twice crosses the paths with a violent thug: Baxter and his cohorts. The first encounter occurs when Henry enters a blocked road and involves run – in on the street with Baxter. The gang’s first instinct is to intimidate him and shake him down; upon his refusal to comply with their financial demands, the second instinct is to inflict severe physical damage. Henry’s response to Baxter is one of bluster and bravado; not only does he refuse to give in their demands, but he also humiliates Baxter in front of his friends. After observing Baxter’s facial tremors and reduced motor control, Henry uses his medical expertise to diagnose Baxter’s “ocular fixation, and his chorea, those quick, jerky movements” (78) as Huntington disease, a muscular disorder that will ultimately kill Baxter. He uses this knowledge to distract Baxter from his mission of violence and to alienate him from his companions (98). Henry escapes the scene, but the memory of the event haunts him fearful for the rest of the day.

The second encounter is during the family reunion. Carried away by the poem’s beauty and the emotions it conjures, Baxter alters his course of bellicosity, softens and accepts Henry’s suggestion to enroll in a fictional drug trial to cure his disease. Seizing the opportunity, Henry and Theo push Baxter down the stairs resulting in further damage to his already impaired brain. Henry is called to operate on Baxter that same evening. Motivated by his professional ethics, some degree of culpability for Baxter’s injury and a sense of forgiveness, Henry subsequently uses his magisterial surgical finesse to mend the body of the man who has been his tormentor. This act of kindness is motivated by the underlined message of the novel – care for the ‘Other’ and move beyond differences contributing to misunderstandings.

Saturday recognizes the pervasiveness of terrorism in the post–September 11 world. Rather than looking for an escape, ignoring it or considering it as an untoward

reality, it accepts its existence and looks for spaces where it could be kept at a safe distance. Henry believes that like previous wars and traumatic events, terrorism is not going away anytime soon and will sink into human consciousness as an inescapable reality in the contemporary world. To cope with this new reality, Henry finds peace in pleasures like family, sex, sleep, food and sports. His space of comfort is disrupted after seeing the burning jet from his bedroom window; he feels an unidentified discomfort. Once the news proves the falsity of his previous fears, he enters a peaceful state of mind. He goes back to his bedroom and makes love with his wife. These interludes of pleasure are interrupted by an image, as he is drifting “from the erotic to Saddam” (39). Henry’s peculiar state of mind during episodes of comfort is that of “happiness cut with aggression” (79). He connects his bitter emotions with society, as it is the whole society, which has succumbed to the anxiety of post– September 11 world. He is troubled because “it is, in fact, the state of the world that troubles him most” (80).

The March against Iraq war is a reminder of such a troubled world, and Henry feels anxious by such a reminder because it would break his Saturday routine. The presence of protest is disruptive as it forces the closure of roads and delay of plans. He has to drive to his squash game in the morning, visit his ailing mother, buy fish for his reunion dinner, and attend Theo’s musical performance. All these daily routines become impossible due to a lurking fear of terrorism. Those anxious feelings are relieved after sleep, but Henry finds himself hindered by the protest, which forces him to change his route, and in turn, brings him unto an accident. One after another, his anxieties manifest in incidents between episodes of pleasure. These incidents are meant to teach Henry the hard lesson that whatever happens to him is part of “the new order,” that continuously compels him to narrow his mental freedom and his right to roam freely (*Saturday*, 180). The whole world has changed in ways that surprised and even alarmed metropolitan citizens, who now have to confront terrorism in their midst. He enjoys whatever intermittent spaces of pleasure are available to him between those feelings of anxiety and fear for further terrorist attacks. *Saturday* asks the fundamental question whether it is possible to find some spaces of less anxiety and fear, without this invasive anxiety, “this infection from the public space” into the private space (108). Family and home are the spaces of comfort in this post–September 11 world: vindicating the embattled private realm against the importunities of public turmoil. When cooking the dinner “a

condition of the times, a compulsion to hear how it stands with the world, and to be joined to the generality, to a community of anxiety” (180).

His house’s cozy, large and uncluttered bedroom, its tall windows, the cavernous basement kitchen, the smooth stone flags in the hallway with a soothing and cool touch, the wide bathroom with green – and – white marble floors, and the extensive security of the house’s doors create an insulated sense of comfort and security. He also feels safe and protected in his sleek Mercedes where he enjoys watching the outside world in its air – conditioned comfort. According to Henry, the car’s central locking system has resolved the “ancient evolutionary dilemma; the fear of being eaten,” a fear which has become more pervasive after September 11 (121). Both the car and the house would lead to fundamental liberty if one could avoid the public sphere and concentrate on the individual, professional or familial sphere. This is exactly what he leans upon, but even there, issues outside home surround their discussions. His conversations with Theo are mostly about Iraq and terrorism. Also, his much – anticipated meeting with Daisy takes an undesirable turn towards a conversation about terrorism and Iraq. Henry advocates the attack on Iraq, but Theo and Daisy oppose it.

Saturday depicts these invasions of the public space into the private sphere, but the conclusions are mostly ambivalent, as characters are divided in their views. Henry seems confident about the attack on Iraq, but Theo and Daisy are against it. Daisy’s inflammatory objections to America are conflicting to her father. Despite these differences, the family space in *Saturday* provides comfort. The family fortress is strong. His discussions with Theo about the crisis of global scale have conflicts, but they deal with it in a rational and civilized manner. Henry shows the paternal love painfully lacking in most September 11 novels. Similarly, Henry goes to his loving wife to find a space of absolute peace and bliss, a life of “possession, belonging, and repetition” (McEwan, 40). Family and its intimacies are fundamental to Henry to carry on his “normal existence” in the face of “contemporary anxiety” (99). With Daisy, he shares a strong bond of respect, and paternal love despite disagreements about art, science, and politics. There is a sense of belonging, love, and interconnectedness within the structure of the family. A strong and stable family structure becomes the primary instrument to cope with post–September 11 fear and anxiety.

The derelict Baxter's entrance into the scene spoils the keenly anticipated family reunion. He is the manifestation of the fear despite the statistical improbability "that terrorists will murder his family tonight" (McEwan, 202). Head argues, "threat to the security of the Perownes parallels the broader insecurity of the West in the face of Islamic extremism" (2008, 124). The family is united to face that threat: everyone feels responsible and in a self – sacrificial manner to secure the safety of others. Henry and Theo silently plan for action, but they remain calm and hope for the wellbeing of the family. John Grammaticus takes noxious blows, and Daisy bears the humiliation of stripping naked for the greater good. Each is motivated by something broader than individual self – interest. For the strong bonding of the family, Versluys states "while extreme circumstances strain the bonds of solidarity and community, self – sacrifice and compassion serve to reassert one's humanity" (2008, 17). The familial bond grows stronger during and after the event, as Henry further sympathizes for Daisy, Theo, Rosalind, and even his father – in – law. Consistent with Head's context, the bonding of Perowne family proves to be an effective antidote to terrorism as it was strong enough to confront the ordeal and come out even stronger. Their lives are henceforth transformed by the memory of having participated in something much bigger than themselves.

Literature and music provide similar spaces of comfort and escape. It is a space for imagination and fantasy, which is set against Henry's personal preference to separate the fanciful from the real. Music has the capacity to restrict one's vision, to a mere twelve bars in Theo's case, as a guitarist, to experience the world in a microcosm (McEwan, 27). Contrary to Henry's view that literature is a dereliction of duty, Theo's interest in music is motivated by a motto: think small to understand the world. Although the September 11 attacks forced Theo to show an interest in international affairs, an acknowledgment that "events beyond music, home, and the music scene had a bearing on his existence" (31), his antidote is to restrict himself to music. This voluntary restriction is one of ease, grace, friendship and love to the rest of the world. It visualizes another world, a world in which we share everything we have with others, but "lose nothing of ourselves" (*Saturday*, 171). This makes Henry believe that his scientific attitude restrains him because he finds it hard to connect with others. Henry comes to recognize the power of literature after Baxter has completely terrorized his family.

Foredoomed by his defective genes, Baxter's illness cannot be cured by contemporary advancements in medicine. Henry, who reduces his vision to the human brain, to a squash game, to the present, his science is helpless and ineffective. In this hopeless situation, an old poem softens and transforms Baxter's violent mood. The poem also gave him hope, and "reminded him how much he wanted to live" (278). The incident proves Henry the power of literature as a powerful medium to communicate our longings and frustrations.

4.2. New Discourses: Atheism, Science, and Secularism

Since there is a visible unease with the binaries based on religion, culture, and identity, *Saturday*'s protagonist, Henry encourages a new atheistic and secular discourse. According to Arthur Bradley and Andrew Tate, the early years of the twenty first century saw the birth of "a curious cult calling itself 'New Atheism'" because "religious belief is not simply irrational but immoral and dangerous" (2010, 1). As a strident voice of an anti – religious movement, Dawkins remarks "belief in God is an infantile myth, folktale, or fairy story with no more truth value than belief in Father Christmas" (2010, 3). The supporters of this new discourse argue that religion is at best irrational and at worst immoral and violent while politically, intellectually, and sexually repressive (Bradley and Tate, 3). *Saturday* is inspired by this new atheist and secularist notion.

Cultural and religious rhetoric make characters uneasy, tense and anxious. To cope, characters look for a discourse not based on binaries, but something new, practicable, and less encumbered. Therefore, *Saturday* confronts religion directly. The logical materialist and instinctive agnostic, Henry's profession requires him to believe in things that he can observe, prove, and rationalize. He prefers reality to dreams and keeps a clear distance between sleep and waking which is the essence of sanity. The analogy here suggests that sleep represents religion whereas waking represents science. As an evolutionary scientist, he finds a majestic beauty in an organized and scientific view of life, because religion "amounts to what his psychiatric colleagues call a problem" (*Saturday*, 17). Religion makes one believe in things, which unwittingly contribute to one's station in life due to the decision of a supernatural being. He calls such self – serving beliefs as a form of "anosognosia, a handy psychiatric term for lack

of awareness or insight of one's own condition" (74). Instead of utopian dreams like "Christ's kingdom on earth, the workers' paradise on earth, the ideal Islamic state" (172), Henry fervently believes in what he calls "queasy agnosticism" (74), a concept to let the world evolve and improve slowly. As a neurosurgeon, who makes his living by repairing patients' brains, Henry considers the material world, the brain, sustaining consciousness. The mind is "what the brain, mere matter, performs" (66). Consciousness and everything related to it emanates from material realities.

Through contrasting Perowne and Daisy, McEwan sets literature and science against each other. Henry depends on the scientific side and prefers empirical data to subjective perceptions. He cannot appreciate literature for the basic reason that he finds it hard to see anything to live beyond the visible, tangible and the physical. He claims "the supernatural was the recourse of an insufficient imagination, a dereliction of duty, a childish evasion of the difficulties and wonders of the real" (66). Due to his instinctive discomfort, Henry states *Anna Karenina* and *Madame Bovary* did not help him to grasp something extraordinary about life. Daisy's response is that *Madame Bovary* is a "warning the world against people just like you" (67) – these people among whom she is counting her father are the ones who truly lack the imagination, the creative capacity to see the world outside of the physical limits presented to them in their daily lives. Titans of literature do not appeal to him as they endowed "supernatural powers to their characters" (67). The statement indicates that Henry is torn between the literal and the symbolic, which Daisy explains as "It is literature, not physics" (67). For Henry, the real challenge lies at the actual and not the magical. Poetry is particularly repellent to him because it is "non – serious like occasional labors – like picking grapes" (67).

To explain the world, attempts in literature and religion are evasive and futile. Instead, they reinvent the world by making things up, an "outdated strategy in the realities of the contemporary world" (66). His scientific and peculiar assumptions are questioned by other discomforting incidents. Uncertain things challenge his certainties, as he does not have all the required knowledge. When he is watching a beautiful London night, he can survey the symmetry and organization of the city. Henry's moment of admiration is shattered when the plane appears in the sky. It forces Henry to come up with a scientific explanation for the incident. A religious view of it would force him to look for a hidden order, "an external intelligence" to explain ordeals,

events, and accidents (*Saturday*, 17). He believes that religious and supernatural explanations are too subjective. Hence, in spite of fears of mysterious explanations, he believes “the best hope for the plane is that It is suffered simple, secular mechanical failure” (18). Likewise, the encounter with Baxter is another instance that “set in train a sequence of events” which led to a night of terror for his family. He tries to find an answer to why it occurred yet he cannot, as there are several factors involved. For him, terrorism is an unnerving experience, and he needs to explain it with tangible evidence. McEwan’s point is that “there is much in human affairs that can be accounted for at the level of the complex molecule” (91), and Henry spends the whole Saturday to find that explanation.

The biggest blow to this rationale and scientific view comes in the personae of Baxter. Baxter’s illness is a result of biological determinism, which cannot be cured with religion, morality, love, care or medicine (98). In a world of fragility where so much is unpredictable, Henry has to think of a rational explanation. He knows that Baxter is ill and that faith, care or medication cannot be a cure for his illness. The misfortune lies within a single gene. Here’s biological determinism in its “purest form” (94). In the present, Baxter’s situation is hopeless; it will follow the code it has been given. There is an individual who has made a free choice to carry out evil, and Henry’s science knows only about the gene, “the modern variant of a soul” (279), but does not know how to address that soul. This is consistent with Henry’s rationalization that the possibility of forgiving or understanding violent individuals in the light of their material conditions. To improve individuals, their material condition needs to be improved. This is also consistent with Henry’s philosophy of progressivism, which envisions if material conditions or the physical health are not taken care of, marginalized people will be forced to believe in superstitions and resort to violence. *Saturday* regards business an important and workable space between different communities to reduce inequities in material conditions. His motto to respond to terrorism is to “rather shop than pray” because “it isn’t rationalism that will overcome the religious zealots, but ordinary shopping and all that it entails” (126). However, his rigid attitude is once again challenged when literature transforms Baxter. Yet, Henry must hold onto a scientific and atheistic view of life because it is the only thing that can give him a meaningful explanation for the contemporary world transformed by terrorism. His doubts about

God began after the Aberfan terrorist attack in Wales, which resulted in the death of 116 children and 28 adults, which he remembers as a young boy. The idea of “kind, compassionate and child – loving God” (32) is appalling for him. Since the contemporary world is full of horrible crises and disasters, this atheistic approach has caused the new generation to acclimatize quickly to the Godlessness. A member of the new generation, Theo has been Godless, and his consciousness of the world was shaped by scenes of destruction on September 11 in front of a TV screen (32). Terrorism is part of their consciousness, as Theo’s generation has already found itself in a terroristic world, whereas Henry had seen some good times and longs for the peaceful days in the 90s.

Henry Perowne’s experiences on that fateful Saturday mirror what the United States experienced on September 11, on a microcosmic level. Terrorism is part of new generation’s conception, because they are native to a terrorized world, whereas Henry had seen some good times in the past. This difference in their attitudes becomes more evident in their views about the Iraq War. Theo and Daisy think that it would bring further disorder and instability, while Henry passionately believes that the war is justified and would make the world a safer place. Later on, Henry “worries that the invasion or the occupation will be a mess” (73). However, his scientific attitude wants order and stability in the world as the war could be the end of a “disaster and the beginning of something better” (192). Daisy regards her father’s attitude to be typical of his professional ethos and age. To him, science is the hallmark of human progress and evolution, and any disturbance to that order would bother rational people like himself. That is why, he believes in a discourse of engagement that is not based on religion, morality, and culture. On a collective level, Henry considers progress and science as an indication of overall progress and remedy of humanity. Hence, *Saturday* encourages a discourse of engagement that is not based on religion, morality, culture, or other loaded terms. These categories are counterproductive in the contemporary world because they necessarily work through the process of binaries. On a collective level, Henry considers progress in science an indication of overall progress and optimism of humanity.

4.3. The Rising Anti -Americanism and Multiculturalism

Characters in *Saturday* have different ideas in regards to America's responsibility in spreading violence around the world. The protest marches against the war in England points to the distinct discontent with American foreign policy. War against Iraq is the most important international crises, and characters are afraid that it will destabilize the region with far – reaching consequences. The rising power of U.S. is resented, as most English people have antagonistic attitudes towards it because Britain has been dislodged from its status as the superpower. This resentment is symptomatic of “postcolonial melancholia”. According to Paul Gilroy, after 1945, English attitude “has been dominated by an inability even to face, never mind mourn, the profound change in circumstances and moods that followed the end of the empire and consequent loss of imperial prestige” (2005, 90). The characters have to come to terms with the declining prestige and power of the English nation in international affairs. The troubling knowledge for England in an international context is the fear of “what is involved in being on the receiving end of imperial power”. This discomfort is realized in the form of anxiety and anger that the nation “itself is becoming a colonial dependency of the United States” (92). This disorienting fear brings characters face to face with postcolonial melancholia.

McEwan demonstrates this resentment through the conflicting views about the Iraq war. The news on television declares that in the beginning, it appears that there is a consensus but the result is global dissent. The United States and the United Kingdom root for the war on one side and the rest of the world oppose it. The news shows the French Foreign Minister being applauded in the Security Council when he announces, “Yes, say US and Britain. No, say the majority” (*Saturday*, 29). According to Theo, humanity is deeply connected, but the US government with its advanced science and technology is trying to prevent the rest of the world from access to this welfare. Compared to Theo, Daisy's is more reactionary to the war, as she calls it “barbaric” (185). She asserts in the UN's projections half – million Iraqis would die of starvation and bombings, three million would become refugees, the war would destroy homes and wreck Iraq's infrastructure. Her vision of the future is that America will take over Iraq, exploit its resources and make the country one of its colonies. She sees the irony that if the attack is intended to unseat Saddam, America is simply reversing its position, since

it was America who brought him into power. She tells her father in a very harsh tone: “and these bullying greedy fools in the White House don’t know what they’re doing, they’ve no idea where they’re leading us, and I can’t believe you’re on their side” (188). She is unable to comprehend how someone educated like her father could support a senseless war or how a mature democracy go to war with another country when the consequences could be epochal and far – reaching. Americans will simply topple Saddam, and people in the Middle East would despise the West even more for pretty obvious reasons.

Henry has personal reasons behind his advocacy for the war. His interactions with Iraqi professor, Miri Taleb, who was a victim of Saddam’s torture, motivate his advocacy. Taleb was arrested on a flimsy basis, interrogated, and tortured, resulting in permanent neurological damage on his brain. Henry saw his scars, listened to his stories and determined that the war against Saddam is legitimate and justified. However, Henry, at some point, begins to doubt Britain’s alliance with America. His interaction with Jay Strauss, the only American character in the novel, forces him to reevaluate his previous assumptions. A man of unshakable certainties, Henry is troubled by Jay’s “untroubled certainties” about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and proofs of its links with Al-Qaeda (100). These American certainties about an outright war force Henry to have second thoughts. The squash game with Jay becomes a manifestation of the conflict between a previous empire and a current one. They are both highly invested in the game while their masculine pride is tied up in the outcome. Once inside the game, Henry fights to the end to make the point to beat Jay. Instead of pure recreation and joy, the game of squash assumes a war – like experience with Henry – “dressed for combat on the court” (60). When the game reaches a tie, Henry feels weaker and feels the game exposes his character: “narrow, ineffectual, and stupid” (106). His opponent Jay, on the other hand, is “powerful, earthbound, stocky, and energetic” (100). Jay is also powerful in comparison to Henry when it comes to disquieting instances in the operating theater or talking to rowdy patients. Jay is blunt, straightforward and direct in manner, which has made him enemy to a lot of people. These are clear indications that McEwan is using Henry and Jay respectively for England and America. Squash game symbolizes a geo-political power-relationship. Henry wins the last match point, but Jay protests and forces Henry to count that point as a foul.

As a metaphor for the competition between Britain and the United States, the squash game is an indication of what Henry experiences: the inability to accept the rising power of America and the declining influence and prestige of Britain. His weakness is contrasted against Jay's strength and the contestation over who won the game displays the very real tensions in relationships and the clash of two powers, neither of whom want to accede ascendancy to the other. Henry is uncomfortable with the rising power of America and tries to come to terms with it in the context of his country becoming a colony of the United States and his own imperial past. Through the game metaphor, Henry shows extreme frustration with the rising power of the United States, its policies of military and economic domination of the world and its displacement of Britain from its ascendancy. All the reactions against the U.S are triggered by post-colonial melancholia, as America is perceived to displace England from its superpower position.

In response to rising anti-Americanism, American scholars promoted multiculturalism. This trend reached its apotheosis after September 11. However, Lynne Cheney, the wife of the then United States Vice – President criticized this trend vociferously. The notion that Americans needed to learn more about other cultures in the world, she argued, was equal to accepting, “that the events of September 11 were our fault, that it was our failure to understand Islam that led to so many deaths and so much destruction” (Verhaul and Rubin, 12). She suggested that scholars should rather concentrate on teaching the history of the American nation. These comments subvert values like multiculturalism, diversity, and tolerance embraced in the twenty first century. Dominic Head remarks that this is to turn to “domestic topics” and Western novelists display a “halt to a confident march towards internationalism or cosmopolitanism,” and therefore “confirm the impression of a turning away from the full political implications of global terrorism” (2008, 100). This turning away from internationalism is dominant in some post-September 11 novels, but *Saturday* counters the trend and Cheney's criticism by advocating multiculturalism through the presence and acceptance of an international community and the recognition of the Other in a cosmopolitan territory.

McEwan portrays a world where our private lives and the public is necessarily connected. Economy, wars, terrorism, and the whole humanity leak into the household

through personal encounters and mass media. Henry tries to separate these two spheres, but the only way to endure the overlay of the public into the personal realm is not to isolate in either space. Even though he is ambivalent about most issues, he tries to maintain his spaces of comfort. But he sees those spaces are invaded by forces beyond his control. He is extremely discomforted by Islamic terrorism (McEwan, 77). The sight of burkha – clad Muslim women, “the three black columns,” turns his stomach (124). Contrarily, he appreciates diversity and multiculturalism surrounding him. He lives and works in a multiethnic community populated by people from different ethnicities. He has two neurosurgical registrars at the hospital: Sally Madden from England, and Rodney from Guyana. Jay Strauss, the anesthetist, is an American, and assistant Gita Syal is an Indian. Then there is Miri Taleb, the Iraqi doctor, and Andrea Chapman, a young patient from Nigeria. After a painful day when Henry tries to go to sleep, he goes to the same window from where he had seen the burning plane early that morning and finds it reassuring that people are busy running about their business. The sight is relaxing because Henry could see “men and women of various races” (272) occupying the multicultural space. As he drives through the streets on his way to buy fish from the market, he sees the inner city “diverse, self – confident, obscure” with ethnic restaurants and small shops crowded by foreign people. While watching this tolerant and harmless diversity, Henry is ashamed of his previous misconceptions. The scenes of multicultural society, cohabitating a common ground fascinates him. He also recognizes the fact that his fate and happiness are somehow connected to whole humanity. This interconnectedness to other human beings “is the growing complication of the modern condition, the expanding circle of moral sympathy” (127). The circle of sympathy includes our families, people around us, and people around the world. The modern condition is a reminder of the fact that our world is not as small and isolated as we might think: outside factors and people shape our lives.

In order cooperate and engage with the Other in this multicultural world, *Saturday* uses an indirect way, as it portrays Baxter, an Englishman, the Other, a Third World person, and in some ways, an Islamic extremist. This comment seems a far-fetched hypothesis, but McEwan himself mentions him as a violent Islamic extremist in an interview with David Lynn (Lynn, “A Conversation with Ian McEwan”, 39). McEwan shows his intent of portraying the Other in writing *Saturday* when he states the

fact that after September 11, there was a “sudden restless urge to know more things” about Islam (2007, 39). The 90s were a dominantly peaceful decade in England, and there was no particular interest in the affairs of the outside world thanks to economic prosperity and domestic stability. The society at large turned their backs to “certain events that were linked” to prospective peace or otherwise in the West (Lynn, 39). This interest transformed after September 11, as McEwan began to show interest in the history of the Middle East and the nature of Islam, “which had not bothered him” before (Lynn, 39). In *Saturday*, McEwan presents Henry as haunted by the threat of Islamic terrorism and the sight of seemingly oppressed Muslim women in London. These things were ignored before September 11, but it brought Westerners confront the discomfoting experience of experiencing the difference. In such a conflicting world, if peace is the objective, the only discourse of interconnectedness among different people and cultures prove to be the alternative.

Whether the domestic poor, marginalized and diseased, or the internationally tortured, suppressed and alienated, this attachment to others is an important theme of *Saturday*. On his way to his home, Henry sees himself connected to the underpaid sweeper. As it happens in his random collision with Baxter, the sweeper and Henry are connected in fate to the degree that “could tip into each other’s life,” as Henry “feels bound to the other man, as though on a seesaw with him” (74). This recognition has a certain amount of importance; Henry’s wealth could be a result of the contribution of someone like the sweeper to the general betterment of society. To think that some “supernatural force had allotted people to their station in life” was something people believed in the past (McEwan, 74). Now humanity has become acutely aware that this belief served only one’s own betterment. Hence, Henry believes in Progressivism, the philosophy that encourages a gradual change and betterment for all in society. Also, if a less privileged individual becomes violent due to an uneven distribution of wealth, injustice or disease, like in the case of Baxter, that violence can befall on Henry as well. The incident indicates that until there is greater equality, the privileged ones like Henry owes some responsibility to and care for the underprivileged.

Henry enjoys the peace and wealth of his life, but out there is “Islamic terrorism,” and people who are “prepared to die and kill” to realize their dreams of a utopia (171). To avoid such threats to his family, Henry needs a contingency plan. The extensive

security system at his house includes “three stout Banham locks, two black iron bolts as old as the house, two tempered steel security chains, a spyhole with a brass cover, a box of electronics that works the Entryphone system, the red panic button, the alarm pad with its softly gleaming digits and the triple locks” (238). In spite of all these security measures, his family is not safe, as they are attacked inside the very security of their house. Henry comes to believe that the government uses the fear of terrorism to force docile citizens like him to obey more stringent laws and pay more for protection. Both individual efforts and the government measures fail because they are unable to keep London safe, since London lies wide open “impossible to defend, waiting for its bomb, like a hundred other cities” (276). Individual and collective reflex for safety has become fragile in the post–September 11 world because of domestic and foreign threats.

This threat of terrorism fleshes out in the personae of Baxter, who is set up as the antithesis to Henry. Elizabeth Kowaleski Wallace believes that Baxter is Henry’s nemesis” (2007, 475). Ian McEwan makes the point that Baxter’s character is “generating or materializing one of Henry’s fears” (Lynn, 51). McEwan furthers the analogy by making Henry representing the West, and Baxter as representing the forces of terrorist invasion. Head finds parallels between “Baxter and Saddam” (2008, 124). Lee Siegel sees Baxter as the “echo of the hatred and anger of the disenfranchised, militant impoverished Third World” (2005, 34). Stephen Morton thinks of Baxter’s barbarism an attempt to claim his sovereign power over his own life in response to Henry’s attempt to control the life and death of subjects who are deemed to “threaten the values of the liberal state” (*Writing Muslims*, 23). As an under – privileged nemesis of Henry, he poses the ethical challenge to Henry’s prosperous and affluent West. Their car collision seems absolute random, yet, Henry’s car is directed into this route when he steered away from marchers against the Iraq war. Confronted with Baxter’s violent plea to pay for the damages, Henry’s diagnosis of Baxter’s disease swings the balance of power back to Henry. Once Henry reveals this secret, he realizes the mistake made, and there’s this panic because one doesn’t know that yet the scale of the disaster. Sure enough, he flees the scene in the spur of the moment and leaves Baxter humiliated in front of his companions. According to Siegel, Henry, unthinkingly, in his first engagement with Baxter, shows the West’s “reflexive contempt” for the Third World (2005, 34). This contempt becomes guilt, which leaves Henry full of tension and

anxiety for the rest of the day until Baxter reappears in his house. Theo warns his father against possible retribution from Baxter, as he claims that Henry has humiliated him (McEwan, 152). This might also point towards the humiliation felt by the Islamic world and the resultant outrage that demands retribution. At the end of the dramatic encounter, Henry ultimately reasserts his dominance and restores the defenses of Mother England against foreign intruders.

More importantly, Henry develops a kind of sympathy for Baxter. Deep inside, Henry was intrigued by Baxter's struggle to fight and not give up despite his difficult situation (111). He offers help after the accident, which is motivated by good faith and sincerity. When Baxter shows up in his house that evening, Henry feels responsible, which unleashed the suppressed "destructive energy" in Baxter (88). Henry is helpless in the face of such violent energy. He does not have any strategy to deal with a violent man and its Daisy's recitation of the poem that suddenly changes the mood of the assailant. Henry is forced to recognize that Baxter has a capacity for responsiveness to poetry that he, for all his education and professional expertise, cannot match. We also know that Henry is trying to evade Baxter the second time when he offers him enrollment in a new program for Huntington's disease. Of course, there is no such program. The promise of a cure and the reality of his actions only worsen Baxter's illness. This also reminds the justification for the Iraq invasion with the excuse of installing democracy, which was overshadowed by the deaths of civilians and the destruction of homes. Henry's promise is motivated by one single factor: to save his family from Baxter's violent energy. Once Theo and Henry push Baxter from the stairs and injure him, there is another sense of guilt for Henry. This is the point where Henry has to decide between a selfish and revengeful course and a selfless act of generosity to operate on Baxter to fix the damage he inflicted on him.

McEwan's response to September 11 was "Only Love and Then Oblivion. Love Was All They Had to Set Against Their Murderers" (2001). In this essay, he emphasized qualities like "empathy and compassion," as these were precisely what the terrorists lacked. If the hijackers were able to imagine themselves in the position of passengers, he says, "They would not have been able to do what they had done." For McEwan "imagining what it is like to be someone other than yourself is the one quality "at the core of our humanity ... the beginning of morality" ("Only Love"). McEwan

assumes that empathy is the core human value and society should, therefore, be constructed so that this natural dedication to sympathy and mutual support is satisfied.

In the novel, Henry goes through a similar cycle. He is not even able to figure out why he “is undergoing a shift in sympathies,” as he regards it a weakness and delusional folly to show sympathy towards a man, sick or not, who invaded his house (*Saturday*, 230). He fully accepts his responsibility for Baxter’s condition. Even Rosalind, who considers Baxter loathsome, forgives him. She is afraid that Henry might do something wrong to exact revenge. During the operation, Henry wishes he could do something to cure Baxter’s disease. It would have been human if he could cure Baxter “with the caress of a forefinger” (269). Henry becomes a man of exceptional charity that night, as “he’ll say yes to any plan that has kindness and warmth at its heart” (269). Henry’s seeming acts of kindness might be motivated by his attempts to seek forgiveness. In the process of helping Baxter, the distance between the self and others almost becomes non – existent. *Saturday*’s guiding principle for humanity is that we should recognize bad luck wherever we see it and care for people who are less fortunate.

The main character of *Saturday* begins the process of crossing the boundaries and dealing with the Other after experiencing discomfort, tension, and anxiety in his life because of the menace of terrorism. Emphasis and maximization spirit of cooperation and humanistic exchange will lead into the right direction. *Saturday* suggests that the only spaces for interaction might be science and technology in the cosmopolitan ground for the survival of the human species. The novel creates its own space of comfort against terrorism by celebrating everyday pleasures like familial intimacies, food, work, and hobbies. It condemns terrorism but pursues and celebrates life despite its presence. It is not the self or the other and Islam or West, which bleeds every day and suffers relentless anxiety because of terrorism since we are all victims of one or another form of it. The ‘Other’ might know the pain of the self if the self could express the pain in terms of shared humanity. Henry recognizes this after going through a traumatic experience. His creation occurs with his intervention in prolonging Baxter’s life.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Writers found themselves hindered from writing about their responses to September 11 in its immediate aftermath. Toni Morrison expressed this inability when she said “I have nothing to say - no words stronger than the steel that pressed you into itself; no scripture older or more elegant than the ancient atoms you have become.”⁶ It is always difficult to write after traumatic events. Responding to the same predicament, V. S. Naipaul predicted a bleak future for fiction writers after September 11. He said that the novel’s time was over after September 11 because only non-fiction “could capture the complexities of today’s world.”⁷ It is true that many novelists found their craft inept to respond to September 11 in its immediate aftermath. Most responded in essays and articles in newspapers. But those fears and predicaments were unfounded, as we have many September 11 novels today.

One thing common among the early fictional responses was recording the impact of the attacks on American society. There are themes of before and after America, post-September 11 trauma and its connection with other pre-September 11 traumatic events, family, disturbances in private spaces due to the events in the public, a sense of dystopia, and disorientations. The conflict between the West and Islam as such is not an important theme in these early responses. The reason is that most of them focus on the above themes inside America’s national borders. A pertinent example is David Foster Wallace’s short story “The View from Mrs. Thompson’s”.⁸ The narrative describes the increased American patriotism and incessant television watching following September 11 attacks. His “Suffering Channel” is a similar attempt to demythologize the “management of insignificance” (*Oblivion: Stories*, 284) in the

⁶ Toni Morrison. “The Dead of September 11.” *Vanity Fair*, November 2001, 48-49.

⁷ V. S. Naipaul’s Nobel Lecture in at the Swedish Academy in Stockholm, 7 December 2001.

⁸ “The View from Mrs. Thompson’s.” *Rolling Stone*, 25 October 2001.

American psyche. In the story, *Style*, a fashionable magazine, based in the World Trade Centers, is looking forward to an article about a “miraculous poo” man, whose excrement takes on the form of famous artwork. A second article is about a cable TV show called the Suffering Channel, featuring pictures and videos of human pain around the world. With this mix of irony, the stories take place in 2001, and constantly refer to the oncoming disaster. Like Wallace’s two pieces, Deborah Eisenberg’s *Twilight of the Superheroes: Stories* (2007) describes a general atmosphere of decay, corruption, and uncertainty in New York that is exacerbated by September 11. None of the characters have any idea of the future or understanding of the past or present. Characters are so worried about Y2K, which did not happen, but instead September 11 did, which they could not imagine or predict. Another New York-centered piece, Jay McInerney’s *The Good Life* (2007), has a humane attitude with similar before and after September 11 views. The book is seemingly about September 11, but McInerney uses it as a background to let elitist New Yorkers find meanings in life in terms of family and fidelity. There are also novels during this time in which writers tackle head-on the day of September 11 and its immediate aftermath. Frederic Beigbeder’s *Windows On the World* (2003) is the first attempt of its kind to go inside the WTC and narrate the minute-by-minute events during and after the impact of the planes. Carthew Yortsen takes his two sons to Windows on the World, a restaurant in the World Trade Centers. The narrative happens minute-by-minute, each chapter in the book taking a minute from 8:30 to 10:28. The immediacy of the impact on the lives of New Yorkers is never far away from these writers. Jonathan Safran Foer’s *Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close* (2005) is about the trauma of Oskar Schell, a 9-year-old New Yorker, who tries to make sense of his father’s presence and eventual death, after jumping from one of the towers. In Lynne Sharon Schwartz’s *Writing on the Wall* (2005), Renata, a New York linguist, confronts her past in the aftermath of September 11. Ken Kalfus’s *A Disorder Peculiar to the Country* (2006) is about the traumatic effects of September 11 on a New York City couple who are going through a painful process of divorce. The family is already fragmented, which the September 11 event shatters completely. In Percival Everett’s *The Water Cure* (2007), Ishmael Kidder, a romantic novelist, whose 11-year-old daughter has been raped and killed, muses about topics like philosophy, politics, and religion as he tortures his daughter’s tormentor. His

rant about the U.S. government, President Bush, Guantanamo, torture and waterboarding, America's foreign policy, the general decay in society, and other topics is traumatic due to the fact that the images, narratives and language used display such trauma and anger. Paul Auster's *Man in the Dark* (2008) depicts a bleak picture of American civilization, as August Brill, a 72-year-old literary critic, narrates his struggles against a life of hopelessness and disease, along with Miriam, his depressed daughter, and Katya, his disappointed granddaughter. Brill tells himself stories in the dark, and in one such story, creates Owe Brick, a 29-year-old man who wakes up in a different world where, instead of September 11, a civil war rages in the United States.

These stories try to connect the trauma of September 11 with suffering around the world, but the emphasis is mostly on American suffering. One reason might have been because while September 11, though tragic, was an opportunity to let America visualize a world and realize its place in that world, that opportunity was lost due to sentiments of anger and an intensified patriotism in the immediate aftermath. America busied itself with attending to its own wounds by saying "we are the victims now" (*Welcome to the Desert*, 49). Seeing the event through the trauma of an individual or a family, or a community, like many of the aforementioned novels, might not be sufficiently representative of the national and human loss, but focusing on the local and the micro structures of life was an easier way to articulate the trauma. Another reason might be that to write about September 11 would need time as happened with literary responses to similar disastrous occurrences in the past. Paul Auster and Salman Rushdie expressed the same future hope for September 11 fiction in an interview a year after September 11.⁹ They believed then that it was too soon to write good literature about September 11. As the dissertation argued, that march towards great September 11 literature began as the September 11 novel moved away from the center of September 11 towards the middle of the second decade. However, understanding the terrorists and their hatred of the West was still not possible. While September 11 spurred the Western world to examine its complacency over its treatment of the East, the first impulse in fiction by American authors to deal with the Other was Orientalist. As the discussions in chapter two show, the Orientalist narratives also appeared in the middle of the 2000's. This shift from the traumatic, domestic, dystopian, and apocalyptic to an encounter with

⁹ "Authors Auster, Rushdie Reflect on Sept. 11." *NPR* Broadcast, September 8, 2002.

the Other and Islam from an American standpoint appears to have occurred in 2006. Updike's *Terrorist* appeared in 2006 while DeLillo's *Falling Man* in 2007. The problem here is that while the trend has shifted away from America itself, the engagement with Islam was as narrow as the impulse was Orientalist. It is true that writers of this phase wanted a more balanced approach, as evidenced by DeLillo's views in their non-fictional response to September 11. But they could not resist Zizek's "temptation of the double blackmail," and portrayed Islam and Muslims in Orientalist terms through the characters of the terrorists in their novels. The result is that their narratives suffer from an inability to engage with the psychology of the terrorists. Instead they portray them embedded in an Orientalist discourse, thus connecting them with Islam. Violence emanating from collective ideologies is always preferred to individuals' violence by authors in such Orientalist narratives. It is true that these Orientalist texts move away from typical domestic narratives to international in the September 11 novel, but the perspective is typically American or Western. It is also true that these narratives expand the discussion to get some sense of the conflict that might be contrary to the official stance, but we see that these attempts are supportive of those official stances. Keith believes that "by the time the second plane appears, we're all a little older and wiser" (*Falling Man*, 135), but we know that that wisdom does not help him, as he does not use it, and if he uses it, it is Orientalist. He has become more afraid of Muslims and Islam after September 11. The acquired wisdom is nothing new, but simply the resurfacing of the old deep-rooted Islam-West conflict.

The Orientalist leanings of these narratives make these authors, along with the media, responsible for disseminating the myths about Islam and Muslims. An opportunity for serious dialogue after September 11 was wasted as such narratives exacerbated the conflict further. There is not even a single instance in these narratives about the possibilities of any meaningful dialogue between the two. Instead, both emphasize the message that such a possibility is delusional due to the fact that the two are essentially different from each other. Islam and West's ideals are presented as oppositional and antagonistic in these Orientalist narratives. Such opposition is reinforced through the use of othering strategies and stereotypes. Islam is represented as a fascist religion with universal aspirations. The collective religion is perceived to condemn individuality. Consequently, all the terrorist protagonists in these narratives

look the same because they are depicted as stereotyped Muslims. Furthermore, Islam is represented as an irrational religion, which believes and lives in a backward past whereas the rational West believes in modernity, progress, democracies and liberties. Collective Islamic society is perceived as defeated, revanchist, tyrannical, repressive, eternally torpid, while Muslims in these narratives are replicas of the same collectivity. These negative stereotypes are then set in opposition with the West's advancement in science and technology, its futurity, progress, democracy, and liberalism. This difference between the West and Islam, and Islam's hatred for West's advancement and riches, are themes highlighted frequently. As discussed in the context of Said's Orientalism, Islam's hatred is not simply due to West's advancement, but due to concrete instances of aggressions and exploitations.

This discourse of hate against Islam and Muslims emanating from a "Clash of Civilization" mindset in these texts and in the media has significantly contributed to Islamophobia post-September 11. The logical response of Westerners to stereotypical death-loving Jihadist Muslims will be hate and fear. Under its influence, Muslims as well as people of other ethnicities have suffered discrimination and torture in the post-September 11 West. The discourse has intensified as it grows and feeds on instances like September 11, because Orientalists find evidence to support their claims. In the presence of such a mindset, the fear is that such instances will increase in future, as more discrimination will provoke an increasing number of immigrants to the West to react as shown by the resistance narratives in the third chapter. As discussed, these Orientalist narratives do not differentiate between terrorists and their religion. Hammad in *Falling Man* could be treated like any other individual, but it becomes a stereotype when his actions are portrayed to emanate from a religious ideology, thus evading the demarcation between the terrorist and his religion. Ahmad in *Terrorist* could have been treated like any other individual with familial, social, sexual or financial problems, but he becomes a stereotype when his character is developed within a religious discourse of hate. Both could have been treated like any other sociopathic individuals, but they become radical Muslim when their actions are couched in a religious discourse to motivate their hate. It seems that individual ills and secular terminologies prove inefficient to describe so much hate. It is also the reason for the failed engagement, as both narratives use religious binaries to connect their characters' individual ills with

their ideologies. The result is that individualities are always sacrificed to project uniformed and monolithic collective entities of Islam and Muslims. There are so many aspects to these characters and their past, but these have been completely avoided to make them stick to the stereotype. Moreover, the manipulation of religious script to find the reasons of their hate is unjustifiable.

These limitations in these narratives, along with the manifest belief in the opposition between Islam and the West, compel them to use similar strategies, symbols, and images to stereotype the Other. DeLillo's non-fictional response after September 11 accentuated the technological difference between Islam and the West. His visibly angry mood in that essay located Islam's hatred against America's symbol of technological advancement and power-the World Trade Center. *Falling Man* depicts the same difference with more detail and support. Updike, a veteran novelist of great repute, called Muslims *enemies*, and Islam a totalitarian and fascist religion. It is too optimistic to expect something good to come out of *Terrorist* due to Updike's visible dislike for Islam and Muslims. Comparatively, it would be cynical to expect a non-partisan and less biased approach from the less privileged and less educated when accomplished and seasoned writers and scholars come up with such wild stereotypes. The result is that all Muslim characters in these narratives are uniformly one-dimensional and cliched - fanatic, vicious, death-driven life-haters, and carnal bigots. There is nothing new, but in their narratives the authors merely transfer their dislike to their characters. Even the ends of their narratives do not have a sense of closure or hopes of future resolution; however, there is an ominous prediction of cycles of hate and violence. Nothing new is learned in these stories, as the Other stands further distanced since the narratives started. The only thing positive in these novels in terms of September 11 novel is that a process of engagement with Islam, though negative, has, at least, been initiated. It is true that they still favor the West by following Orientalist strategies, but they also seem precursors to the next trend in engaging with the conflict. Keeping in view the bad receptions of these novels, with a few exceptions, there does not seem to be any future fictional contribution that can be made in terms of explicit Orientalism in the September 11 novel. In any case the media performs that function better than other representations, as it has imbibed the true spirit of Orientalism in its coverage of terrorism, especially after September 11. The last seventeen years have witnessed a crystallization of patterns

in the media to stereotype Islam and Muslims, thus creating a ubiquitous sense of Islamophobia in the West.

The international reaction to September 11 came with the publication of the *Reluctant Fundamentalist*, largely due to the acclaim the former received. It might have been inspired by the intensification of Orientalism in literature, media, and common parlance after September 11 as the author was in the United States at the time of the event. In a sense, this narrative also looks like responses to the Orientalist narratives in chapter two. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* takes out the conflict from the binaries of religion and situates it in a larger discourse of conflict between the United States and the Third World. Discrimination and exploitation are continuations of Orientalism in the form of the American empire, whereas the resistance in this narrative is a continuation of historical resistance to imperialism. Economic globalization or transnationalism in this novel is the new form of that exploitation. Contrary to common phraseology, the novel transfers the concept of fundamentalism to the Western Capitalist system. Though unfortunate, this novel also brings up the issue of schadenfreude expressed in the Third World concerning September 11 in order to bring to light the resentment felt by the Third World against the United States' aggressive foreign policies. The novel indicates that the Third World people stand united in their resistance to America. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* considers it important that America should be stopped from pursuing its aggressive policies against weaker nations. According to this novel, the September 11 event itself was a manifestation of that resentment which America ignored previously. The novel believes, like Zizek, that the pain of September 11 was a taste of what America had been dishing out to other people around the world (*Welcome to the Desert*, 13). That's why Changez in *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* thinks that the pain that day "united" America with the attackers in their shared pain (168). Terrorism existed before September 11, but as it was somewhere else, America did not recognize it.

This resistance narrative also proves the point that It is not religion or culture or any other ideology that pushes people to extremism, but America's policies of discrimination and use of force against others, which make them resort to violence in return. Their argument is that instead of the problems lying elsewhere, the real issue is Orientalist narratives in which people are transformed into the very stereotypes these Orientalist narratives portray. Changez, an educated and liberal individual who has a

high regard for the West, is such an individual. Moreover, contrary to Orientalist stereotype and othering, this narrative responds to Orientalist narratives by making the point that the alienation is not caused by modernity, liberty, freedoms or the prevalence of immorality and godlessness in the West. Alienation is caused by America's discriminatory policies and its complicity in spreading violence to achieve its national interest. The novel indicates that even though the protagonist tried to engage with America, transform his identity, even go for things Western, and get exposed to enlightened ideas in the West, his efforts failed due to America's Orientalist attitude. Instead he becomes the very stereotype he is discriminated against. The resistance seems to have been justified by the novel, and serves as a kind of warning to America that as long as it continues with its highhanded policies to others, violence will continue.

Though this text does not address the September 11 event directly, the event becomes a reference point to highlight the transformed environment for Third World immigrants to the West. Some other narratives record a similar change in the Third World after the United States initiated its "War on Terror." Like *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, these novels highlight the travails of a Third World community in the post-September 11 world. Some examples are Monica Ali's *Brick Lane* (2003), Khaled Hosseini's *Kite Runner* (2004), Salman Rushdie's *Shalimar the Clown* (2006), Laila Halaby's *Once in a Promised Land: A Novel* (2007), and Kamila Shamsie's *Burnt Shadows: A Novel* (2009). All these novels express the voice of the marginalized and disenfranchised immigrants in the West, and victims of violence from Kashmir, Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, Jordan and other locations. One thing common is that the reference in these narratives has been September 11. The idea is to bring to light the suffering of those who suffered discrimination, and worse, suffered from America's "War on Terror." As the wars instigated by September 11 still continue, these resistance narratives will continue to emerge. If the current situation persists, we can expect that the discourse of the September 11 novel itself will become a point of reference to find an expression of resistance to American imperialism. Similarly, Third World writers will continue to write stories to describe the sufferings of their people due to "War on Terror" in the post-September 11 world.

Similarly, novels like *Saturday* will continue to appear in the context of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism post-September 11 due to the fact that the

distances between cultures, ethnicities, and nations are becoming smaller. This logical march towards closing distances between people and cultures will continue, and it will necessarily create conflicts due to resistance. As discussed in chapter four, the novel conveys the message that the world has become a dangerous place for people in the West as well, and they have to arrive at some kind of understanding to make life livable post-September 11. *Saturday* provides currently possible models for such a world, but the hope is that others will build on the principles this narrative provides. A scientific, atheistic, secular or agnostic attitude may be less fractious when there are so many differences on the basis of religion, culture or identity. There has been a visible leaning towards such an attitude in scholars in the West in the recent past, and McEwan advocates and subscribes to such a viewpoint. This novel clearly discourages religious, national, and cultural binaries. Contrary to the other two narrative formations, this novel looks for a middle ground between the claims of American victimhood in the former, and a charge in the latter that makes the United States responsible for all the bitterness in the world. This viewpoint requires that neither America's outrageous actions against other people and nations should be condoned without protest nor its right to defend itself against terrorism should be condemned. In terms of Multiculturalism, the novel advocates for it despite the fact that the concept declined in the aftermath of September 11. This novel tries to continue with the forward march of internationalism and multiculturalism, which was significantly halted by September 11 due to an increased emphasis on American national issues in contrast to addressing the global aspects of terrorism. If they are to be stopped from fighting one another, something less harmful should be introduced. One approach is to consider terrorism a common problem. Even this approach creates a sense of fellow - feeling once all think that they are victims of terrorism. The approach of equal victimhood also helps to reduce the distances between the Self and the Other. This narrative also brings home the message that terrorism was already there, and that although we possessed a sense of compassion, we did not do anything meaningful to stop it. Once it has arrived home, it could only be dealt with head-on.

The media in the post-September 11 world has become the biggest handicap to achieve peace because it functions to fuel the conflict between Islam and the West. It has hijacked the Orientalist discourse in contemporary world, more importantly after

September 11. Noam Chomsky considers that the media has been used as a manipulative tool to control the public in modern democracies, contrary to the ideal of public participation. According to him, Western democracies use propaganda through media like the totalitarian states use a bludgeon to control their citizens (Chomsky, 20). Consequently, mass media has become the primary vehicle for delivering propaganda in the United States. Drawing conclusions from Woodrow Wilson's Creel Commission and Bush Sr.'s war on Iraq, Chomsky examines how the mass media and public relations industries have been used as propaganda to create fear, and thus generate public support for going to war. Chomsky further touches on how the modern public relations industry has been influenced by Walter Lippmann's theory of "spectator democracy" (14), in which the public is seen as a "bewildered herd" that needs to be directed, not empowered; and how the public relations industry in the United States focuses on "controlling the public mind," and not on informing it (22). Orientalist novels are less frequently published compared with the media's creation of fears and phobias. Whatever the media is doing today is exactly what DeLillo and Updike were doing in their fiction, but they cannot compete as efficiently with the media's incessant repetition of news to instill Islamophobia.

The September 11 novel acknowledges the role that the media play in perpetuating Orientalist discourse. Novels discussed in the second chapter use similar strategies and images as the media, thus making both accessories to America's imperialism. Similarly, the resistance narrative of chapter three depicts the media as an accessory to American imperialism. There are instances where the novel critiques the strategies and images in the American media. Changez believes that the government and media provided a ready and constant fuel for his anger as the two were inciting hate against other people and nations (167). The American media as depicted is disinterested in the affairs of the rest of the world. While India and Pakistan were on the verge of a nuclear war in the subcontinent in 2002, Changez argues that the media was too preoccupied with talking about domestic affairs then. The media also circulate stereotypes of people like Changez as crazed and destitute radicals. Similarly, his protest back in Pakistan is labeled anti-American by the Western media, and he uses the same media to spread his resistance against America. His anti-American interview becomes part of the war-on-terror montage for days.

Media also play an important role in *Saturday*. Henry has a sense of doubt, anxiety, and even feelings of guilt and responsibility for what the media is doing. Through Henry's fascination with the burning Russian airplane, McEwan not only shows the sway of televised narrative to disturb mental well-being, but also the power of the media to form that narrative. As the media portrays every single terrorist event an attack on the Western way of life, Westerners look at all incidents in that frame. That's why Henry is visibly anxious when the media falsifies his fear of an Islamic terrorism. Theo also responds mockingly to a similar framing when he tells his father that the incident was not an attack on West's way of life. Moreover, the media is depicted as an invasion and infection in the contemporary world. It connects one to the general anxiety of the times. The media mostly shapes Henry's responses that day. It seems the media caters to a fear and longing in the Western mind. *Saturday* depicts a sick longing in the Western collective mind for terrorism, a desire for self-punishment, and a blasphemous curiosity. Baudrillard believe that incidents of terrorism satisfy a similar wish in Western psyche, which explains why Westerners have a deep-seated sense of complicity and guilt (5).

A case in point is Richard Flanagan's novel *The Unknown Terrorist* (2006), which situates terrorism in the government-media nexus as the new reality of life in the West. The novel depicts the postmodern media as an accessory to the discourse of Orientalism. In the narrative, a media-government nexus fabricates a story around Gina Davies, an innocent pole dancer in Sydney, Australia. She spends a night with Tariq, a small time drug dealer of Middle Eastern origins, and the media uses that one night to transform her into a homegrown terrorist overnight. The media exploits the fear of the people, as there have been bomb explosions in Sydney, with warnings of further attacks. To augment Islamophobia, she is transformed into someone whose psychology fits an Islamic ideology. As the case is built against her, a pattern develops which the Orientalist media usually employs in such cases. It achieves it through relentless repetitions, far-fetched connections with other terrorist incidents around the world, expert opinions from psychologists and terrorism experts about Islam and Muslims, montages, and collages of terrorist destruction around the world. Versluys thinks, and as it happens in *The Unknown Terrorist*, repetition of images of falling towers accompanied by chitchat is a usual pattern in contemporary media's discourse of

terrorism (6). In the novel, one terrorist event is connected with other similar events in the world. In one such montage, the scenes of Twin Towers falling on September 11, a murky London after the 7/7 bombings, and Madrid train bombing of 2004 are shown one after another to connect a terrorist event in Australia with big terrorist events around the world. The intent is to convey to the public that terrorists exist, and that they need the government and the media to watch for them. The public also shares the blame in the novel because the government uses their fear for its own benefit in the form of more resources and powers to fight terror. While Chomsky also believes that the public needs to be frightened from time to time, the media has become a useful tool to realize this purpose (30).

One thing common in contemporary media in the West is their ability to control the public mind through Islamophobia. Said's *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (1981) examines how American news media have portrayed Islam as a monolithic entity, synonymous with terrorism and religious hysteria, to create Islamophobia. He reveals the hidden agendas and distortions of fact that underlie even the most "objective" coverage of the Islamic world (28). Besides the government-media nexus, terrorists also use the media spectacle for their interests. They manipulate the media to attract attention to their misplaced causes by creating fear in the public mind. According to Baudrillard, the media is important to the discourse of terrorism because without it, terrorism becomes ineffective. It cannot do without the media as they provide the essential space for terrorism to achieve social visibility. Since the real has acquired the features of a morbid simulacrum, only a symbolic event like the terrorist incident can be experienced as a real event. He believes that there is no good media, and that media is part of the event of terrorism: "one remains dependent on the analytical conception of the media, on an external active and effective agent, on 'perspectival' information with the horizon of the real and of the meaning as the vanishing point" (Baudrillard in Hegarty, 31). It seems both the government and terrorists are using the media to control the minds of a hapless audience for their own agendas. September 11 was the most effective media event that governments and terrorists have been using to control the public mind since. Both are emboldened to exploit the post-September 11 terrorist incidences for their agendas, and also to look forward to the next one not with an apparent anxiety, but an inner longing.

From the West's perspective, It is the media that has fully imbibed the spirit of Orientalism after September 11. As in some selected texts, individuals are connected to Islam, and both Islam and Muslims are stereotyped in the process. The Media has disseminated Orientalism in the Western psyche so thoroughly that it has become almost impossible to separate individual terrorists from Islam in the post-September 11 world. Contrarily, every endeavor seems to do the opposite. The government-media nexus tries to connect individual terrorists to violent ideologies, mostly Islam, for their own interests. The result is an intensified anti-terrorism legislation, scare-tactics, and rumor-mongering in the name of public debate. Views contrary to the mainstream are not permitted. I anticipate that more stories conforming to a government template are likely to appear.

Since September 11, the media has exploited the fact that all terrorists of September 11 were Muslims. Every now and then, there are stories in the media in which the most important element in terms of its shock value is the crisis with Islam. And it has become more explosive since September 11. Just as individuals' declining careers are saved by creating Orientalist narrative around the innocent, so other lesser known news organizations and individuals can come to the forefront of the public's consciousness after contributing something to the conflict. A Danish newspaper published controversial cartoons of the prophet in 2005 and became famous overnight. The publication instigated riots and death around the world. The thoughtless publisher could not even imagine that a mere expression of freedom might have placed someone's life in jeopardy somewhere. Similarly, a less well-known pastor from Gainesville, Florida, Terry Jones, gained national and international attention in 2010 as he announced his plan to burn the Quran. Florida House of Representative Larry Metz and Senator Alan Hays's proposed bill to ban Sharia law hit headlines in the media. Similarly, a YouTube trailer was published on July 2, 2012 based on an obscure film by Nakoula Basseley called *Innocence of Muslim*. Nakoula's film created mayhem in the Islamic world.¹⁰ These people in no way represent the majority voice, and befittingly, there are never efforts to connect them to any religion. Contrarily, when there are violent reactions from some crazy Muslims, every effort is made to connect them to Islam. An example is the shooter at Fort Hood on November 5, 2009.

¹⁰ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmodVun16Q4&bpctr=1369791074>

One of the most devastating narratives of terror has centered on the Boston Marathon Bombings on April 15, 2013, in which 3 precious lives were lost, with hundreds injured, some suffering amputated limbs. Bombings took place at 2:49 PM, and within hours, the media tried to make wide-ranging claims to connect the bombings to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in the Caucasian region. *New York Post* tried to arrive at hasty conclusions with a news piece titled “Authorities ID person of interest as Saudi national in marathon bombings, under guard at Boston hospital” at 4:28 PM on April 15, 2013. The *New York Post* does not explain their source for this news or the hospital where the purported terrorists are admitted. As usual, the debate in the media is not about whether they are speaking the truth or otherwise, but how they present the news to frame Islam and Muslims. Mostly, the news gives unnecessary information to confuse the audience, and once there is enough uncertainty, the framers come to their rescue to make some sense to the audience. That sense is always colored by the perception of the anchor, presenter, commentator, or the agenda of the news organization. The result is that the coverage of Islam and Muslims in the media has been standardized into a pattern in the decade after September 11.

This pattern of coverage uses Orientalist strategies and its stereotypes. A terrorist event occurs, and the first important task in the media is to name the incident with words and phrases suggesting fear. The terrorists, in most cases Muslim, are connected to larger terrorist organizations to accentuate Islam’s war against the West. The connection is important to project an ambiguous war or jihad of Islam against the West. The reasons for the attack are lost in the same ambiguity. This configuration of media reportage of terrorism nurtures Orientalism and a culture of fear of Islam. The media has got an upper hand to feed Americans whatever they want because of limited information about Islam and Muslims. Even this limited information is mostly negative. If this pattern of media framing Islam and Muslims continues, the gap between the East and West will widen. As the population of Muslim immigrants to the West increases, the fear will increase as the Other is not only perceived there in the Third World, but also in the West. The result will be more policing and more stringent laws to fight homegrown terrorism. Western governments will also use domestic fears to get support for their war efforts around the world, as the roots of terrorism happens to be there. The remnants of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a constant war of words with Iran, and crisis

in the Middle East are not going away any time soon. As long as there is an Orientalist attitude to create Islamophobia to garner greater public support for an aggressive foreign policy, there will be violence, just like Changez warns in *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*.

A workable solution could be the one in *Saturday*. A religious discourse is simply a cover for crimes against humanity and a dereliction of responsibility. A murderer is a murderer, whether a Christian, Muslim, Jew or Hindu, and they should be called by that name. Even if it is presumed that Al-Qaeda's and its allies' war is Islam's so-called jihad against the West, Al-Qaeda and its cohorts have killed more Muslims than Westerners in the last decade. It is true that all the narratives discussed in this dissertation try to stop this killing; however, the approaches are different, and in the case of the first two, oppositional. Narrative in chapter three is more humane, as it wants peace for all in a multicultural space governed by a discourse of humanism and advocates the idea of culture as a common human heritage, transcending religious, racial, and national barriers. However, what remains harder to predict is the degree of resilience that Orientalist discourse will continue to enjoy in the September 11 novel and the media. If humanity wants to survive and prosper without sufferings and prolonged wars, the world needs to come together and look at instances of injustices and oppressions around the world critically. Orientalism's demonization of the Other can only exist to perpetuate counterproductive consequences.

If contemporary media in the West takes a more factual and constructive approach to the conflict between Islam and the West, as it does in some other fields, one can hope peaceful co-existence. It is true that media has served as a boon to mankind. It has brought humanity in touch with one another. It has become comparatively easier to exchange views, voice different opinions, share information, and reach out to a large number of people. On the other hand, global communication is empowering hitherto forgotten groups and voices in the international community. Media outlets and channels have become the arena for contestation of new economic, political, and cultural boundaries. It also makes governments accountable and transparent in terms of public policy and priorities. Similarly, the media raises issues of poverty, education, health, governance, violence, and genocide around the world. As a result, the world community has become more aware to mobilize against hitherto unknown exploitations and

repressions. An example is Journalists for Human Rights, which has worked tirelessly to bring to light issues of human rights to a larger audience in the West. There are controversies around sensationalism and propagandist leanings in news organizations, but there are some like BBC, CNN, and Reuters who come up with objective reportage by presenting different voices surrounding issues. Keeping in view media's effectiveness in informing and shaping public opinion, and its outreach to a global audience, it might play a constructive role in bringing peace to a divisive world.



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


Figure 1: An Image of the Flyer Distributed during Brexit Referendum.

Retrieved from: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-vote-leave-accused-of-fanning-the-flames-of-division-after-publishing-controversial-a7067701.html>

Brexit is the withdrawal referendum of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Orientalist rhetoric was used in the campaign to win the support of British voters. Some right-wing propaganda included above flyer to invoke the fear that terrorists from red colored areas will gain access to the United Kingdom. The rhetoric needs to be understood in general contexts of rising racism and xenophobia, response to mass migration from the south of the World and an increasing number of refugees from war-lacerated countries such as Syria and Iraq, as well as terrorist attacks in the West. The graphic contributes to heightened anxiety in the West, and it emphasizes otherness of Muslim countries.

ÖZGEÇMİŞ

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EĞİTİM

Derece	Kurum	Mezuniyet Yılı
Y. Lisans	Gaziantep Zirve Üniversitesi, Eğitim Yönetimi	2013
Y.Lisans	City University of New York, New York İngiliz Edebiyatı	2009
Lisans	Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, Amerikan Kl. ve Ed.	2001

İŞ DENEYİMLERİ

Gaziantep Zirve Üniversitesi, Hazırlık MYO, Okutman	2011 - 2016
City University of New York, New York , Öğretim Görevlisi	2008 - 2010
Bergen Community College, New Jersey, İngilizce Öğretmeni	2006 - 2008
Paterson School for Science and Technology, İngilizce Öğretmeni	2002- 2005

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