T.C.

İSTANBUL 29 MAYIS ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

THE NON-WESTERN MODERNIZATION PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE OF ISRAEL

(BATI-DIŞI MODERNLEŞME BAKIŞ AÇISI: İSRAİL ÖRNEĞİ)

(YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ)

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE

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Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bilim Dalı'nda 030116YL01 numaralı Erdem Sarıaydın'ın hazırladığı *'Batı-dışı Modernleşme Bakış Açısı: İsrail Örneği'* Konulu Yüksek Lisans Tezi ile ilgili savunma sınavı 10/12/2018 günü 14:00-16:00 saatleri arasında yapılmış olup, sorulan sorulara alınan cevaplar sonunda adayın tezinin başarılı olduğuna oy birliği ile karar verilmiştir.

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Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Oğuzhan GÖKSEL   Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Fabio VICINI

İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi   İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi

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(Tez danışmanı ve Sınav Komisyonu başkanı)

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BEYAN

Bu tezin yazılmasında bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uyulduğunu, başkalarının eserlerinden yararlanılması durumunda bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunulduğunu, kullanılan verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapılmadığını, tezin herhangi bir kısmının bu üniversite veya başka bir üniversitedeki başka bir tez çalışması olarak sunulmadığını beyan ederim.

Erdem SARIAYDIN

10/12/2018

ABSTRACT

'Non-Western modernity perspective' offers an alternative approach to understand modernity of non-Western societies, challenging the Eurocentric 'convergence thesis' which argues that modernization trajectory of societies is inscribed deterministically in historical trajectory of Western modernity and which is rooted at the heart of classical modernization theory (CMT) and the globalization discourse. The purpose of this study is to analyze a common belief that Israel is the only western country in the Middle East, and that is an outpost of western civilization from the perspective of modernization studies which examine changes taking place during the modernization process in a society. Starting with the pre-state period up to today, the study assesses Israeli case within three trajectories: economic, political (democratization) social (secularization) from a non-Western modernization perspective taking inspirations from multiple modernization paradigm (MMP) and the uneven and combined development (U&CD). After all, it was concluded that Israel is not a Western country, constituting a divergent modernization trajectory from that of the West within its own historical context, and that the idea of universal modernity is a myth as number of cases unveil a need for more comprehensive and non-determinist approaches.

Key words: non-Western modernization, Israel, CMT, MMP, U&CD, economic development, democratization, secularization

ÖZ

'Batı-dışı modernlik' bakış açısı toplumların modernleşme çizgisini determinist bir şekilde Batı modernleşmesinin çizgisine indirgeyen ve klasik modernleşme teorilerinin (KMT) ve küreselleşme söylemlerinin temelini oluşturan Avrupa-merkezci 'yakınsama tezine' meydan okuyan batı dışı toplumların modernleşmesini anlamak için alternatif bir yaklaşım sunar. Bu çalışmanın amacı İsrail'in Orta Doğu'da tek Batılı devlet olduğu ve Batı medeniyetinin bir ileri karakolu olduğu yaygın inancını, modernleşme süresince toplumlarda meydan gelen değişiklikleri inceleyen modernleşme teorileri açısından analiz etmektir. Çalışma İsrail toplumunu devlet öncesi dönemden başlayarak bugüne dek üç sütunda (ekonomik, siyasal - demokratikleşme- ve sosyal -sekülerleşme-), çoklu modernlik paradigmasından (ÇMP) ve eşitsiz ve birleşik gelişme teorisinden ilham alarak Batı-dışı modernlik bakış açısından (EBG) ele alıyor. Neticede, kendi tarihsel bağlamında ayrı bir modernleşme çizgisi meydana getiren İsrail'in bir Batılı devlet olmadığı ve birçok örnek daha kapsamlı ve determinist olmayan yaklaşımlara ihtiyacı su yüzüne çıkarırken evrensel modernite fikrinin bir efsane olduğu sonuçlarına ulaşıldı.

Anahtar kelimeler: Batı-dışı modernlik, İsrail, KMT, ÇMP, EBG, ekonomik kalkınma, demokratikleşme, sekülerleşme

TEŞEKKÜR

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Ayrıca bu çalışmanın oluşmasında değerli yorumlarını ve katkılarını esirgemeyen tez danışmanım Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Oğuzhan GÖKSEL hocama ve savunma jürisi üyelerine teşekkürlerimi sunarım.

Son olarak yüksek lisans boyunca her türlü desteklerini esirgemeyen yakın dostlarımın hepsine ayrı ayrı teşekkür ederim.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This chapter will offer the introducing remarks of the thesis in regard to its research objective, research methodology and plan, functioning as a prologue to the whole study.

1.1 Studying Israeli Modernity

The overwhelming military and in some respect economic supremacy of the Western states such as the USA, the Great Britain since the late 18th century and later the globalization discourse precipitated the idea of a single and unilinear direction of humanity to modern society which is mainly characterized as secularized, democratic and capitalist. This clearly meant that the fate of different societies is attached to that of the Western societies, namely the Western Europe and the USA. Therefore, societies embarking on a modernization program have been deemed to be Western even though they are geographically located far away from the Western civilization. The State of Israel is one of those deemed to be Western without putting it to an in-depth analysis.

The founding father of and the Jewish State in Palestine, Theodor Herzl had envisioned a Europeanized modern Jewish state which shall serve as an outpost of 'civilization against Asia and barbarism' (Herzl 1934). This vision has gradually turned into a dominant discourse that the State of Israel has been standing for Western values such as democracy and human rights in the Middle East. Israel's strategic alliance and cooperation with Western states, especially with the USA, has ostensibly made this discourse more justifiable. For instance, former Spanish prime minister and politician Jose Maria Aznar has described Israel as the 'centerpiece of Western civilization' (Isserovitz 2015). In parallel with this, 'Arab Spring' has corroborated this way of thinking as Israel has been depicted by policy makers as only stable and true democracy in the Middle East (Due-Gundersen 2018). Furthermore, the recently enacted 'Nation-State Bill' declaring the State of Israel as the nation-state of Jewish people has made the status of Israeli society even more controversial

especially in regard to the democratization trajectory of Israel (Boehm 2018; Kalın 2018; Prusher 2018).

On the other hand, Israel's developmental success is attributed by many to its Western character (Beilin 1992; Tagharobi and Zarei 2016; Wilner 2017; De Martino 2018). Namely presupposition that Israel is politically, socially and economically the only western country in the Middle East is an ostensible value-judgment argument in the scholarly literature. Although such claims generally are not grounded on a well-suited and comprehensive framework, it seems that it is natural inference of a superficial look at the differences between Israel and the Arab world. In this way of thinking, relative indicators such as high living standards and more stable democracy unavoidably put Israel into the Western category of modern societies (Barnett 1996: 6). This thesis is an attempt to suggest an in-depth research about how the above classifications of contemporary Israeli society can be read through the eyes of modernization studies.

Non-western modernization studies have come to forefront with intensive attention on experiences emerged in Asia and in Muslim-majority societies. While the 'Japanese model' and 'Asian values', became the primary focus in Asian studies, 'divergence or discrepancy of Islamic values' has been primary focus in studies of Muslim countries (Göle 2000: 159). However, the experience of Jewish people who predominate in Israeli society today has been overlooked in these studies. As it has gained independence later compared to Western states, Israeli modernization occupies a remarkable place amongst modern societies. It can be argued that as it is frequently in conflict with neighboring countries form its earliest days, studies on Israeli society focus mostly on security issues. Modernization studies rarely examine the contemporary Israeli society, which makes it lack of an integrated and consistent perspective on Israeli experience amongst modern societies (Adelman 2008: 9-10). Given the fact that more appropriate way to comprehend the development of a society is to study it from a comparative historical perspective which is offered by modernization studies grounded a consistent theoretical framework, one of the main aims of this thesis is to fill such a gap in the scholarly literature on Israeli society by benefiting from modernization theories.

1.2 Research Methodology

This thesis benefits from qualitative methodology throughout the thesis as a research methodology. As it seeks to understand and make a sense phenomenon and is more flexible, qualitative method is more suitable for the thesis. Furthermore, qualitative method allows to interpret a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon such as modernity. In this sense, as it will be seen in the subsequent chapters, since Israeli modernity will be analyzed in three vast trajectories -social, economic and political- as is mainly conceptualized in the modernization studies, qualitative method is the most fitting one for this kind of research. So, the thesis will analyze Israeli modernity on three main pillars of a society; (i) 'social' referring to secularization; (ii) 'political' referring to democratization; and (iii) 'economic' referring to economic development within its own historical trajectory. On the other hand, as the main aim of the thesis is to propound and prove the argument that Israel is a non-Western society through lenses of non-Western modernization perspective, comparative research approach constitutes the major axis of the methodology based on qualitative analysis. Comparison and contrast between Israeli and Western types of modernities will be offered throughout the thesis to construct a satisfactory and persuasive framework about the Israeli non-Western modernity. Also, this thesis obtained necessary data mostly from secondary resources such as journal articles and academic books. On the other hand, statistical data such as indicators of economic growth were provided from primary sources consisting of reports or yearbooks of international organizations like The World Bank and The United Nations.

1.3 Plan of the Thesis

Chapter 2 of this thesis examines the theoretical approaches on modernity. After it manifested different conceptualizations of the concepts, 'modernity' and 'modernization' by various scholars, it emphasizes how 'the idea of progress' constituted the cornerstone of

modernization studies. Later, the chapter analyses the main assumptions of Classical Modernization Theory (CMT) and with a critical approach reveals how CMT is based on a Eurocentric illusion supported by the convergence idea of modern societies. Lastly, taking inspirations from the Multiple Modernities Paradigm (MMP) and Uneven and Combined Development Theory (U&CD), the chapter focuses on how successful non-Western modernization perspective is in comparatively assessing the non-western societies.

Chapter 3 gives an overall review of the scholarly literature on Israeli modernity. Taking a deep look at scholarly literature in three aspects -economic, social and political- the chapter traces the question 'Is Israel economically, socially and politically modern society?' and aims to show how existing scholarly literature approaches the subject. Eventually the chapter ends up with an argument that the lack of integrated approach to Israeli modernity is one of major deficiencies in the scholarly literature.

The main aim of Chapter 4 is to give a historical background before going into detailed analyses of Israeli modernity. Tracing back to the emergence of Zionism and idea of 'Jewish National Home', the chapter focuses on historical path to establishment of modern Israeli state with a modernization perspective. In this regard, analyzing lingering influences of mass persecution against Jewish people in Europe on Israeli society and emphasizing on the origins of an external factors in initiating modernization in Israeli state, the chapter seeks to understand how Israeli modernization had been externally driven with non-Western lenses which receives help from main assumptions of U&CD theory.

Chapter 5 provides an overall analysis of Israeli economic modernization trajectory in the light of the non-Western modernization perspective. Israel's economic development was analyzed from statehood period up to cotemporary state-capital relations. The chapter particularly emphasizes the divergent aspects of Israeli economic trajectory and the economic reforms made for liberalization of economy in historical and different periods whereas it tries to show how economic development influenced on political and social trajectory of Israeli modernization. The chapter uses MMP and U&CD theory as tools to interpret divergent aspects of Israeli economic trajectory so that primary objective of the chapter is achieved.

Chapter 6 is about the political trajectory of Israeli modernity, conceptualized by modernization studies as democratization. The chapter aims to deconstruct the vested assumption in CMT that economic modernization results in political modernization, liberal democracy as understood by CMT. In this sense, the chapter seeks to prove that Israel's economic modernization did not pave the way for a consolidated liberal democracy by indicating to major deficiencies that impede the rise of a liberal structure in Israeli society. Making a counter-argument against the globalization discourse and CMT, it accordingly underscores the divergent path of Israeli case from that of the West, namely a high economic growth and non-liberal democracy.

Chapter 7 examines the place of religion, Judaism, in contemporary Israeli society in terms of social modernization namely secularization. Studying how a religiosity in Israeli society has lingered, the chapter aims to prove that religion has exclusive place as it keeps legal, political and social power in the society. In this regard, seeking to refute CMT's argument that economic modernization would lead to secularization, it essentially emphasizes the divergent characteristics of Israeli society in social modernization from Western path in the light of U&CD theory and MMP.

Finally, chapter 8 of the thesis will conclude the study. In that sense, it will touch upon primary implications and arguments presented along the thesis as well as upon the contribution of the study to the scholarly literature. Additively, it makes a discussion about potential objections the study may receive and potential avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will make a deep look at the conceptual and theoretical framework of modernity and modernization, and how they have been perceived by various scholars and thinkers before getting to the main point of the study.

2.1 Introduction

Modernization purporting to be an unprecedented supremacy of the West especially in military in the 18th century has come to be the most stunning and striking phenomenon for world societies. Thus, an intellectual initiative called 'modernization studies' has arisen in diverse fields ranging from economics, sociology to political science. Started with the colonization periods both before and after World War I, the studies have dramatically intensified with the undeniable influence of American hegemonic rise after World War II. The dominance of CMT in the 1950s and 1960s has been challenged by MMP followed recently by nascent U&CD theory and other non-Western perspectives.

The chapter will focus; firstly, on several definitions of modernity and modernization; secondly, on Classical Modernization Theory (CMT) in regards with its striking philosophical premise, 'the idea of progress' and its virtual deficiency, Eurocentrism; thirdly, on challenges by the Multiple Modernities Paradigm (MMP) and Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD) theory under the theoretical umbrella of non-Western modernization perspective.

2.2 In the Search of the Meanings of 'Modernity' and 'Modernization'

Classical approach defines 'modernity' as a triumph of reason, an emancipation or a revolution, which results from positivist/rationalist ethos immanent in interpreting every aspect of life and society (Touraine 2002: 43-44). While Emile Durkheim sees modern

society as a society living in 'industrial order' from which all other components of modernity such as 'division of labor' have emanated (Giddens 1996: 11-12). Max Weber argues that the distinct constituent of Western modernity is the triumph of 'rationality' referring indirectly to replacement of religion with 'secularization' (Weber 1990). On the other hand, specifying a time of origin and geographical location for it, Anthony Giddens makes out that it corresponds to the reorganization of social life that has taken place in Europe since the 17th century and became universal later (Giddens 1996: 1). Ross Poole - with a nuance - puts it in the same conceptual framework as Giddens does (Poole 2005: IX). However, unlike Giddens, he sees maturity of modernity in North America, and something impinged on the rest of the world. It also can be considered as the dawn of a new type of society characterized by complex processes in economic, political and cultural changes (Swingewood 1998: 9). At the philosophical root, it sets out with an intensive intellectual activity called '*Enlightenment*' which had resulted from an ideological and intellectual shift in the mind of Western men. Following settling into modern consciousness of the West in company with image 'other' towards the rest of the world, it has reached its peak by the dint of Hegel's philosophy of universal history (Altun 2002: 22-23).

As for 'modernization', Alain Touraine puts it as 'modernity in action' (Touraine 2002: 44). Likening modernity to a maelstrom, Marshall Berman argues that this maelstrom has been fed from various sources such the industrialization of production, capitalist world market, immense demographic upheavals and severing millions of people from their ancestral habitats. In the 20th century, for him, the social processes making this maelstrom come into being and sustaining this existence perpetually have come to be called 'modernization' (Berman 1988: 15-16). On the other hand, pointing the relationship between development and modernization, David Apter conceives modernization as a special kind of development. It comprises social systems which managed to be new on all the time and differentiated and flexible social structures which produce necessary science and abilities to survive in a technologically-advanced world (Apter 1987: 105). It is apparent that some take the historical experience of Western societies in the last two centuries as departure of point whereas some take the historical experience of non-Western societies.

Before adverting main assumptions and assertions of Classical Modernization Theory (CMT), it is fair to show when and how it has appeared in the scholarly literature. It is likely to touch on two political and historical necessities that help the literature of development or modernisation to take form after Second Word War (WWII): The demise of Europe in world politics and the Cold War following WWII, and politics of colonization and emergence of new nation-states. Running across the hegemony of the USA which aimed at a world order that would contribute to its strategic national interests, the scholarly literature of modernization studies has been developed by some American sociologists, economists and political scientists. Attempts of scholars to theorize development path of non-Western societies in parallel with, on the American side, the desire to integrate the newly emerging nation-states which were naturally undeveloped and deemed by the USA to be a threat to world economic order whose recovery will be explicitly serving American interest (Altun 2002: 28-53; Tipps 1973: 200; see also Coşkun 1989). Accordingly, diversification and reinforcement of modernization theory with domino effect of WWII, decolonization and the Cold War have fallen on the post-war period, the 1950s-70s (Preston 1996: 153).

2.3 'The Idea of Progress' and Modernization Theories

Firstly, to understand modernization theories better, one needs to shed light on 'the idea of progress' which is immanent in, and whose impact is enormous in almost all modernization theories. As a cornerstone of modernization theories, its philosophical roots could be found in Auguste Comte's positivism. Ongoing debate within the social theory of Western thinking with the mixture of functionalism and progressivism has been on the new track after WWII. Possibilities of stable change of societies as a subject matter has been on the agenda of social theorists. Elucidating the nature of an industrial society, it was claimed -especially by CMT-that modern societies have been converging towards a common and ineluctable destination created by technical and organizational returns of industrialization (Hawthorn 1987: 242).

Blending the idea of progress with structuralism/functionalism, Talcott Parsons, an American sociologist was the key practitioner in producing a general theory of social action after WWII (Altun 2002: 98-99; Preston 1996: 171). As a classical representative of progressivism of the 20th century, he argues that societies evolve from one polar to another polar. This evolution, which is deemed to go towards the good and the better, is a perpetual phenomenon and is about the emancipation of enchained human beings. Taking the experience of Western societies, in particular American society as an embodiment of modern society, he claims that Reformation, Renaissance and various revolutions taking place in the 18th and 19th century Europe were not spontaneous occurrences but steps taken by Western societies towards the predestined target, a modern society (Erkilet 2007: 113-119; Altun 2002: 98-110). Given Parsons's incontestable influence on later modernization scholars, all these theoretical assumptions has shaped the general framework of modernization theories although they came in for some criticisms. Namely, the idea of progress brought modernity into force, and thus interconnected the fate of different societies as its advocates believe that the others will complete the stages of modernity specified by the West.

2.4 Classical Modernization Theory (CMT)

Before anything else, it should be noted that what is commonly agreed on by the modernization theorists in body of classical literature is that modernization is a sort of 'social change' which is both transformational in its impact and progressive in its effects. Viewing it as extensive in scope, they tend to regard it as a 'multifaceted process' (Tipps 1973: 202). Although there are other pillars or dimensions like individual or cultural, the point CMT scholars arrive at a consensus is that extensive impacts of modernization trajectory have been observed as profound changes and developments since the industrial revolution in the 18th century in three interrelated and vital veins of a society: social, political and economic (He 2017: 184; Huntington 1968; Lerner 1958). Developments or changes in economic vein contain 'industrialized', 'market-based', and 'specialized' formation of economy, which will

bring other changes such as 'urbanization'; in the social field, the vein nurtures 'secularized', 'traditional value-free', and 'rationalized' social structure; in the political field, it nurtures a 'centralized' and 'bureaucratic' state formation having a 'liberal democratic regime' and 'rule of law'(He 2017: 186).

CMT, to put it simply, regards a society having embodied 'industrialization', 'secularization' and 'democratization' processes as modern one (Göksel 2015, 76-77). It is quite fair to argue that the most striking assumption of CMT is its emphasis on the supposition that there is a 'positive correlation' between these three processes. CMT scholars such as Seymour M. Lipset, Barrington Moore and Daniel Lerner argue that any increase of economic development level promotes, encourages and reinforces the increase in the level of democracy by predicating their arguments on several comparative analyses in the non-Western world. In other words, socioeconomic development and level of democracy of a society are positively related (Arat 1988: 21-23; Göksel 2015: 74-75). Logical deduction of this called 'positive feedback loop' by CMT stems mainly from the question why most of economically undeveloped societies are – or have been - ruled by authoritarian regimes whereas most of the economically developed are – or have been- governed by democratic regimes.

The transition of societies to new stages or phases of modernity, which could be carried out mainly by dynamics that modernization trajectory has brought along, is a common observation CMT scholars share. Although there are some different denotations of these successive stages within classical doctrine, essentially, it goes through from 'traditional' one which is a great obstacle to rationality, secularization and thus modernity to a 'modern' one. Considering this transitional society model as a universal makes possible the assumption that every traditional society which could be observed most concretely in the non-Western world, and which seeks to be modern, is progressing towards modern one, and that this process is ineluctable, irresistible and irreversible once a society began to modernize (He 2017: 187; Lerner 1958; Coşkun 1989: 301; Gusfield 1967: 1). This devaluation of 'tradition' by CMT

puts it in opposite of modernity, making them both irreconcilable and contradistinctive like fire and water.

2.5 Eurocentrism and CMT

Western modernity in minds as a product of the European Enlightenment had appeared when the formation of center/periphery division of the world began to arise in intellectual orientations. In this formation the Western mind put itself at the center whereas the others at the periphery (Dussel 1990: 65). That discloses an implicit illusion constituting one of the basic components of Western modernity. One of the main reasons for the constitution of this illusion is a 'great shift' in the Western thought to 'logocentric' epistemology formulated by 'anthropocentric' understanding of existence, which had come to fruition after the shift from the 'God-centered' understanding of the universe (Sunar 2016: 3-6).

The critique that CMT scholars have built their assumptions on biased cumulative fund of knowledge about the other, particularly the East, which has been provided by missionaries, travellers, and merchants in the 16th and the 17th century, is the most salient, accepted and tenable in intellectual circles (Sunar 2016: 22). This imaginary knowledge, as severely attacked by post-colonial studies, has paved the way for the genesis of an academic bigotry called 'Eurocentrism'. The incompatibilities having been fired by unexpected modernization of Iranian (Matin 2013), Turkish (Göksel 2015) and several Asian societies as a non-Western experience has further revealed this Eurocentric bigotry of CMT.

Iran Islamic Revolution in 1979 has reversed the so-called pace of history, unilinear path of modernity, notably secularization thesis that is immersed in classical modernization studies. Having been achieved in a highly urban and socio-economically modern state headed by Western-oriented elites, theocentric aspect of the revolution made it 'an exception' in Eurocentric studies (Matin 2013). Theoretical riddle, created by a peculiar polity, neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic, of Iran induced a re-appraisal of exiting theories

embodying Eurocentrism. On the other hand, the Turkish model of modernity also stands for a divergent path of non-Western modernity as it supplanted Eurocentric suppositions of mainstream modernization theories, CMT. Although it has reached high level of economic development, Turkey is unable to have a liberal democracy and a fully-fledged secular society as it is argued by 'positive correlation' of CMT. Furthermore, economic development has neither waned religion or lingering religiosity in Turkish society nor hindered emergence and rise of a strong Islamist political movement in Turkey (Göksel 2015; Göksel 2016).

Taking modernity as an institutional transformation that have their origins in the West, Giddens argues that globalization, which is foremost harvest of modernity, and is seen by him as 'process of uneven development,' cannot make modernity Western. (Giddens 1990: 175). Moreover, in an attempt to overcome the problem, Eurocentrism, Kamran Matin points out four interrelated illusions from which intellectual bigotry has resulted: 'historical', positing the endogenous and autonomous emergence of modernity in Western Europe; 'normative', claiming the superiority of Europe to the rest of the world; 'prognostic', taking European experience as universal and universalizable through mechanisms implied by the first, historical assumption; and lastly 'stadial', referring to the progressive character of modernity and thus the forthcoming occurrence of the convergence of every modern society throughout the world. Accordingly, incarcerating all societies in a 'abstract universal history', Eurocentrism makes modernity a factual process that begins with and ends with Europe. This leads to an intellectual blindness that ignores the distinct patterns of development occurring in the non-Western world and leads to obscureness of theoretical thinking of CMT when construing them as anomalous, exception (Matin 2013: 2).

2.6 Towards a Non-Western Modernization Perspective: An Inspiration from the Multiple Modernities Paradigm (MMP) and the Uneven and Combined Development Theory (U&CD)

Rapid developments brought by major reforms after the Enlightenment in many spheres of life ranging from economic, social and to political in the Western world, not least European, had encouraged CMT scholars to assume that the basic institutional constellations, the definitions of the institutional arenas and the modes of their regulation and integration that developed in European modernity, as well as the cultural program of modernity as it developed in the West would 'naturally' be absorbed by all modernizing societies, possibly with local variations. For them, this project of modernity, with its 'hegemonic' and 'homogenizing' tendencies, would not only continue in the West, but also prevail throughout the world. This theoretical argument conceptualized as 'Westernization' rather than modernization of non-Western societies has been challenged in the 1990s by some scholars (See Eisenstadt 1996; Arnason, 1993; Arnason 1997; Wagner 2000; Kaya 2004a; Kaya 2004b) with intent to tackle the modernization phenomenon within a new and broader non-Western paradigm as, in practice, some patterns of modernization glitter as an alternative way in non-Western societies like Japan, China, Iran and Turkey, the so called 'the rise of the rest' (Preyer and Gerald 2016: 109-121). Also, Israeli society poses a challenge against the Eurocentric convergence thesis. Having considerable deficiencies in democratization and secularization together with a high economic growth, Israel, as will be shown in more details in the next chapters, seems to be a non-Western society in terms of modernization paradigm.

Intellectual efforts called the 'Multiple Modernities Paradigm' (MMP), in a way, came up with contest to the above argumentation put forward Western monopoly on modernity/modernization by 'de-westernizing' this settled reasoning in CMT. Not only structural differentiation in various institutions in non-Western societies, like in education, mass communization etc., but also the ways in these areas were defined, organized and varied greatly. Different patterns influenced by cultural premises, traditions and historical experiences of these societies can be seen easily although many have taken Western modernity as a reference point (Eisenstandt 2005: 1-3). On the other hand, although a rapid rise of non-Western societies as a new model of modernity pulled attentions towards a new path of modernity, Wittrock argues that modernity has been 'multiple' from the very

beginning as is seen in different patterns within Europe itself (Wittrock 2002; See also Eisenstandt 2000).

MMP's one of the main opposition is towards the 'convergence thesis' standing for predictive argument that all modernizing and developing nations/societies will have the same societal pattern as they proceed from the beginning stage of industrialization to highly industrialized nations which is economically capitalist; socially secular; and politically the one having liberal democracy as highly affected by Talcott Parsons's 'unilinear path' theorization. As is understood MMP's definition of modernity as a 'story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs', (Eisenstadt 2005: 2) since modernity is contingent on culture, to claim the plural character of modernity/modernization is reasonable and necessary. For them, if modernity is taken as 'an open-ended horizon in which there are spaces for multiple interpretations', the illusion of supposed 'final integration', totalizing, Eurocentric bigotry in modernization theories could be overcome, thus making room for different features of non-Western cultures by new interpretive approaches to modernization (Kaya 2004a; Kaya 2004b). In other words, it is very likely to see diversified, distinct cultural meanings and programs on the way to modernization in line with their capability to interpret the basic symbolic conceptions and legacies they inherit from their pre-modern, axial past (Preyer and Gerald 2016: 59).

Last but not least, MMP scholars, regarding it as a reflection of the Eurocentric bigotry, argue that the deduction of 'positive feedback' is solely based on distinct experience of the Western societies/states. Taking Russian, Chinese and Singaporean modernizations which are under authoritarian rule despite high industrialization and mechanization as examples, MMP claims that there may be negative or even no feedback between democratization and modernization. Furthermore, in theory, a leader or ruling party of a country may spend budget of the country to win upcoming elections again, being in the pursuit of own self-interests thus preventing economy from growing (Göksel 2016: 251-52). Correspondingly, CMT's conjunctive method in assaying non-Western cases are not naturally appreciated by MMP's theoretical method which suggest a separate assay

regardless of the purported positive correlation. In other words, for MMP, modernization started in a society does not necessarily bring with secularization or democratization in that society (Göksel 2015: 85-86).

As well as MMP, another challenge has come from newly-emerging the U&CD theory whose theoretical roots can be found in Bolshevik politician and theorist Leon Trotsky's works in which he analysed modern capitalist development (Matin 2007: 428). Recently, scholars such Kamran Matin, Kerem Nisancioglu, Alexander Anievas, Justin Rosenberg have tried to develop and apply U&CD theory to various fields ranging from international relations, historical sociology to modernization studies. To understand U&CD theory better, it is necessary to dwell on four interrelated concepts upon which the basic assumptions of the theory is built regarding modernization perspective; 'the whip of external necessity', 'substitution', 'historical reshuffling' and 'the privilege of backwardness' (Matin 2013: 17-18).

Putting emphasis on influences derived from external actors outside a society, the whip of external necessity refers, in terms of modernization studies, to the idea that the struggle for survival, for a backward society, is the main trigger to embark on modernization. This is acceptable especially as one thinks of it in historical context.   The imperialist/expansionist politics of France, Britain etc. has played a great role in triggering the intensive modernization initiatives of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th and the early 20th century along with the instinct of self-defense, for example (Göksel 2015: 96; Göksel 2018). For U&CD theory, it is quite plausible to argue the impact of foreign ideas and products on a modernizing society. In this sense, being a natural and conjecturable outcome of the whip of external necessity, substitution refers to unpredictability of this impact of the flow of these ideas and products upon that society. In other words, the external driving force of the more advanced as prototype, for the less advanced, is a persuasive reasoning for U&CD theory. Thus, the mix of domestic and foreign elements brought by modernization led to the subversion of way of modernization of that society trying to imitate the prototype (Göksel 2015: 97; Göksel 2018: 69-71). This, for Matin, makes possible to assay a variety of

apparently paradoxical patterns of development and political strategies, non-Western cases (Matin 2013: 17).

Inclusion of foreign elements into the social, economic and political life of a society induces reactive motivation of that society while adopting them. Being closely linked to the phenomenon of 'substitution' and called 'historical reshuffling', this reaction to, or interaction between domestic and foreign components results in the divergence of historical process of a model country in less-developed, namely non-Western societies. The 'historical reshuffling' has dynamics to create a divergent path of modernization in non-Western societies, and thereof is to supplant convergence thesis resulting from CMT's ignorance of explicit role of international context. Accordingly, for Matin, backwardness is a privilege as the backward societies have capacity and opportunity to skip all previous stages or experiences through which the developed/prototype societies had passed (Matin 2013: 19; Göksel 2015: 97-98; Göksel 2018).

2.7 Non-Western Modernization Perspective

Given the rising dissatisfactions with mainstream modernization theories such as CMT, the importance of assaying modernizing societies through non-Western lenses has recently come to the forefront. Starting with MMP in the 1990s, endeavours to assess the different paths of modernization in a new non-Western theorizing keep up recently as reinforced by U&CD theory. Being an attempt to decentralize the hegemonic place of Western modernity in modernization studies, 'non-Western' does not refer to unmodern or anti-West societies. It, however, is an initiative to scrutinize again the changing experience of, and the definitions of modernity including concepts such as multiple-modernity, alternative modernity and local modernity (Göle 2007). Need for re-reading these societies is closely pertinent to hybrid and eclectic social formation stimulated by their own dynamics given waning ties of modernity/modernization with the Western experience. With the purpose of supplanting a monotype, unilinear trajectory of modernity, and with the inspiration from MMP and U&CD,

non-Western modernity undertakes to bring the analyses of local facts in universal discourse (Yücedağ 2010).

For all intents and purposes, non-Western modernization perspective bestows a theoretical resistance to the popularized norms of analysis that anchored both in Western discourse and in scholarly literature on modernization, rejecting the pluralistic and multi-civilizational hallmarks of modernity. It aims at decentralizing 'romanticized' conceptualization of Western modernity by rereading the non-Western civilizations or cultures diverging from Western trajectory. It, however, does not aim to erode the concept of modernity, leading to its self-erosion amounting to loss in the meaning (Göle 2000: 91-92). The premise that the Western pattern of modernity is the only authenticity of modernity has been challenged from within Europe itself though ideologically: Soviet Union as communist and Germany as fascist/national socialist type. Taking this fact into consideration as well as divergent non-Western patterns, non-Western perspective may be considered as an attempt to deconstruct idea 'convergence of all societies' presumed by CMT and uttered by the globalization discourses. Accordingly, above all, the foci point is to supplant Western monopoly on modernity (Eisenstadt 2000).

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter offered a general framework of modernization theories, starting with CMT and ending with MMP and U&CD theory. Although all theories agree on the inference that drastic changes brought by modernity/modernization occurs mainly in the three pillars of a society -political, social and economic pillar, whether there is positive correlation between them is controversial. As the recent divergent modernization trajectories of non-Western societies - such as Turkey and Iran- have shown the inconsistency of CMT whose Eurocentric approach obscures its theoretical inquiry about modernization process in the non-Western world, MMP and U&CD has well successful in revealing the ill-thought of CMT by drawing all attention towards divergence of societies rather than convergence argument corroborated by the idea

of progress of Western social theory. In this sense, the non-Western modernization perspective offers a wide-angle lens by taking historical contingency and international context into consideration with the help of inspiration from MMP and U&CD while reading even Western modernization trajectories as well as non-Western

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will make an overall review of the existing scholarly literature on Israeli modernization, offering how available scholarly studies differently approached Israeli modernity experience and thus main setbacks of various works in the literature, which comprises the chief reason for doing this thesis.

3.1 Introduction

Having been the most important phenomenon over the last century, modernity has come to take the societies by storm primarily in the West and later in the others. Three pillars - economic, political and social- of societies are areas upon which substantial changes, brought by modernization, take place constitutively. Having been established in the first half of the 20th century, Israel is not an exception among those societies. This study will ask the question 'Is Israel modern?' to the literature in the sense of changes ensuing in the three pillars of Israeli society on the course of Israeli state history. The study begins with literature review of Israeli democratization by mainly asking the research question 'Is Israel democratic?' and dealt with approaches of various scholars to the issue. In the second section, at the heart of the question 'Is Israel secular state?', scholarly literature on Israeli secularization will be analyzed. In the last section, whether Israel has modern economy or not will be examined based upon the approaches of existing literature.

3.2 Political Aspect: Is Israel a Democracy?

Firstly, the literature on whether Israel is democratic or not is highly divided. As it has key determinants a democratic state must have such regular elections, various political parties, Israel has been regarded as a highly democratic country by scholarly works in literature on Israeli democracy irrespective of its degree (See Dahl 1971; Lijphart 1984; Huntington 1991;

Eisenstadt 1985; Arian 1997; Neuberger 1991; Horowitz and Lissak 1989; Etzioni 1959; Mazie 2004). Their works are based on a-priori assumption that Israel is governed by a democratic rule (Mchenry and Mady 2006; Cohen-Almagor 1995; Yiftachel 1998).

Besides aforementioned authors above, there are those who argue that Israel is not a liberal democracy while some question the degree of Israel democracy. The claim of the former is Israel is not Western type of democracy by adding some prefixes to Israeli democracy such as 'Jewish', 'ethnic', 'ethnocracy' (Smooha 1992, 2002; Etzioni 1959; Peled 1992; Jones and Murphy 2002). Emphasize of Israeli government and polity on Jewish character of Israeli society keeps one from putting Israel into domain of democratic societies. Rejoinder to this debate is also various with the efforts to show compatibility of Jewishness and democracy (Gavison 1999; Neuberger 1988, 1991, 2003; Mazie 2004).

This disputed character of Israeli polity draws another critique on mistreatment of non-Jewish minorities of Israeli society, leading some to argue that Israel is by no means a democratic state. For them, it is true that Israel fulfills ostensibly basic requirements of democratic regimes but the essence of democracies – equal treatment to all citizens and representation etc. is missing. The critics converge on such points; uneven allocation of resources among citizens, hegemony of Jewish citizens and subjugation of non-Jewish-Arabs and other political and religious minorities (See Dowty 1999; Jones and Murphy 2002; Kopelowitz 2001; Avishai 2002; Rouhana 2006; Pappe 2000).

3.3 Social Aspect: Is Israel Modern in Relationship Between Religion and Politics?

Constituting one of the main three pillars of modernization of a society, secularization has been among the most controversial issue discussed by modernization scholars. To find out whether Israel is a modern or not, one needs to address relationship between religion and politics in Israeli society. Literature on Israeli secularization falls into two opposite groups; on the one side, those who argue Israel is a secular state although there are some setbacks as in every modern state and those who disagree on it, on the other.

At the first glance, literature on Israeli secularization has been jammed between democratization, identity/culture and security studies. Significant amount of the literature study the issue through the lenses of democratization studies. Steps taken by Israel in secularization -no matter against and for- are taken into the account the extent to which they promote or decline its democratization. That is, majority of the studies on Israeli secularization go hand in hand with democratization studies (see Mazie 2004; Hazan 1999a; Jamal 2009; Fox and Rynhold 2008; Ben-Porat 2013). Guy Ben-Porat, for example, as a leading scholar on Israeli secularization argues that many steps in favor of secularization are related to 'everyday life' practices rather than to commitments of Israeli governments to religious freedom or toleration given by liberal democratic regimes (Ben-Porat 2013, 243-44).

The relationship is seen by Eliezer Don-Yehiya as a consociational model, based on politics of accommodation. Israel has overcome extensive divisions in religious domain through this model (Don-Yehiya 1999a, 1999b). On the other hand, it is expressed by the others as a civil religion agreed upon by all Jewish parties and groups, excluding religious-secular and ethnic cleavages and by the others through 'social covenantalism' as a reciprocal compromise between the secularist and the religious (Jamal 2009, 16; See Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983; Cohen and Rynhold 2005). However, what is agreed upon by almost all the studies is that the religion (Judaism) occupies a significant place in political, social, cultural levels of Israeli society and that its relationship with politics is very intricate and stringent to separate the two from each other in many areas since the foundation of state of Israel (Jamal 2009; Fox and Rynhold 2008).

Many argue that Israel's main setback in secularization is resulting from the '*double-barreled*' character of Jewishness which makes line between ethnicity and religion blurry (see Hazan 1999a; Berlinerblau and Sarah 2014; Yadgar 2011; McGahern 2011). In this sense studies on Israeli secularization are highly connected to the studies of identity and nation. It is a common view highlighted by celebrated scholars in the literature that Jewish character is highly reflected in political behavior of Israeli society. Zionism and the state of

Israel has continued this Jewish political culture (Elazar 1989; Lewis 1995). This fact encouraged the others to argue that one cannot argue that Israel is a secular state (Tessler 1978; Rubinstein 1967). At last, overtly or covertly there is observable consensus that Israeli state has profound setbacks in its relationship with religion although it is entirely not a theocratic state. It seems that it is hard according to the scholarly literature to call Israel as a 'secular' state explicitly, nor as 'theocratic'.

3.4 Economic Aspect: Does Israel Have a Modern Economy?

Being the most fundamental causal agent for indispensable changes occurring in modern societies, economic development of a society occupies a crucial place in modernization studies. In this sense, one is supposed to ask whether Israel has a modern economy or not while studying the modernization of Israeli society.

Israel is seen by scholars as a highly modern economy today. The pre-state era and period after foundation of Israel as a state in 1948 mark the substantial economic growth though there are some setbacks and drawbacks within that process. If one takes a glance at basic development indicators of Israel, it is seen that Israel is, according to the database of The World Bank, within the 'high income' category of The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and that it has annually a gradual growth in its GDP per capita after 1985 though some fluctuations, reaching $36,190 in 2016 (Work Bank 2018a). Urban population is around 7,880,000 whereas rural population is around 666,000 by the year of 2016, which goes to show a quite urbanized society. Life expectancy at birth is around 82, which is 11th among OECD countries and adult literacy is around 91 percent in 1983 (Word Bank 2018b).

As for the academic literature, a lack of holistic perspective in the studies of economic development of Israel is the first to attract attention. In other words, the literature is devoid of an integrated theoretical approach and is full of studies analyzing Israeli economic development based on fragmented and cause-effect relations (See Sharkansky 1987; Senor

and Singer 2009). The fact that the Israeli economy has grown rapidly in the last five decades on the track of becoming a modern economy is a common ground upon which almost all scholars meet. Also, there is no any disagreement that Israel has shifted to more liberal, capitalist and open economic structure especially after the mid-1980s. Reasons that led Israel to economic transformation in the 1980s are highly controversial issue in scholarly literature of Israeli economic growth. The economic transformation Israel experienced after the 1980s divides the scholars who work on the Israeli economy; Those who attribute this transformation to 'globalization' and those who attribute it to other factors like peace process, ideological change or purely pragmatic concerns.

Israeli transition to open-market economy in the mid-1980s with several reforms was interpreted by some in the sense of ideological shift of Israeli political elites (See Aharoni 1991 and 1998; Paris 2000). Subscription of Israeli governments to a socialist ideology prior to the mid-1980s has turned into capitalist/free market economy vision with change of ruling elite in the power. The end of The Labor Party tenure in power represents this shift and the turning point. For some others, rather than ideological factors, pragmatic factors have dominantly played a great role in determining new economic opening in Israeli society (See Zilberfarb 2005; Hanieh 2003). For them, economic and financial crisis Israel has fallen into in the 1970s compelled Israeli policy makers to allow private sector to act freely within the Israeli market. On the other hand, by using a comparative analysis, David Levi-Faur takes Israeli economic growth as 'developmental model' and exceptional in its economic success by making a comparison with Taiwan and South Korea and make a claim that liberalization or privatization of economy denotes a remarkable decline of the Israeli economy after the 1980s (Levi-Faur 1998). Some argue that the ongoing Israel/Palestine conflict has been the driving force in determining the economic policy of Israeli governments without going into ideological/pragmatic factors debate (See Lochery 2007; Shafir and Peled 2000). The Peace Process and historical course of the Israeli economy are closely related to each other (See Shafir and Peled 2000). Only a peaceful Israel can participate the global 'winning and losing game' in international political economy.

As for works analyzing Israeli economic development though globalization process. They mainly attribute the development to the purely globalization process taking place all around the world (See Ben-Porat 2008; Ram 2005; Nitzan and Bichler 2002). The principal argument they hinge on is that changes in Israeli economic structure have resulted from changes in global world. The focal point is directed by them upon external factors, which means that they regard Israeli's capitalist conversion as cyclical. There are also those who study the Israeli economy from a socialist/neo-Marxist angle (See Ben-Porath 1993; Shalev 1992). The role played by socialist movements, The Labor Party and The *Histadrut* (the General Organizations of Workers), in the development of Israeli economics since the foundation of Israeli state has been a focal point in these studies. Their contributions to Israeli economic transformation or growth cannot be denied. Also, Ben-Porath argues that transition to capitalism was what the Israeli state wanted. Without any state support, transition could not be possible (Levi-Faur, 1996). On the other hand, counter-argument comes from several scholars. They basically argue that it is insufficient to claim that Socialist movements have great roles in Israeli economic development (See Rivlin 2011; Nitzan and Bichler 2002; Hanieh 200).

3.5 Conclusion

Lack of an integrated approach to the three pillars, which can be done easily through holistic modernization perceptive seems one of the most observable deficiencies in the literature. In other words, it is clearly obvious that the scholarly literature on Israeli society is devoid of a modernization perspective, which suggests a comprehensive analysis by taking cognizance of the three pillars of a modern society -social, political and economic. Opposite argumentations and views are abundant and presented in black and white terms when we go deep into the scholarly literature, meaning that one cannot find any consensus even at minimum standards of democratic principles in Israel, for example. This is most likely due to the ongoing conflict and hostility between Palestine and Israel, which results in a shattered

picture of Israeli society. In sum, the scholarly literature shows that although Israeli society is seen highly modern with its industrialized, developed and capitalist characteristics in the economic sense, it is highly arguable as for democratization and secularization of Israeli society.

CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter will function as a historical origin of Israeli modernization through non-Western perspective, which will constitute a basis for assessing later Israeli trajectories.

4.1 Introduction

The historical path to the formation of Israeli society whose roots could be found in Jewish messianic political belief, Zionism, is of vital importance to study of the modernization of Israeli society today. It is compulsory to study the political adventure of the formation of Israeli society in terms of modernization perspective given the fact that there is not a concrete social structure in the land of Palestine, which has been under Ottoman rule for years, before the foundation of Israeli state in 1948. Beginning with marginalization against Jews scattering mainly in the eastern and central part of Europe, mistreatment against them has been maintained increasingly after WWI (Klier and Lambroza 1992; Pritsak 1987). Having led to the mass immigration waves called 'Aliyah' from the late of 19th century to the first three decades of the 20th century, pogroms and holocaust against European Jews has made Zionism primary movement among world Jewry.

The first section will be about all persecutions including successive pogroms, holocaust and concomitant migrations waves while the consequences of all persecutions will be analysed in the second section. The third section will be about the role Zionism has played in the path to the establishment of the modern Israeli state. After the historical path will be assessed through lenses of the Uneven and Combined Development Theory (U&CD) in the fourth section, concluding remarks will be suggested in the last section.

4.2 Pogroms, Holocaust and Aliyah

The ancient destiny of the Jews having lived as minority for centuries had to face new and severe challenges at the turn of the 19th century and successive years. Hatred against them has reached its peak, turning into large persecutions, violence and political propaganda in the years between the 1880s and 1948, when the founding of Israeli state has been declared officially. Pogroms referring to mass persecutions, violence and killing against civilian Jewish people living in 'Pale of Settlement', an area within Czarist Russia assigned to Jews by Catherine the Great in 1790-91, had, both directly and indirectly, great influence on the emergence of modern Israeli state in the 1948 (Kramer 2007: 103-104).

Encompassing about 7 million Jews, and settlement from Odessa to Warsaw, the first wave of violence that could be credited to the pogroms against Jews instigated the first Aliyah[1] from 1882 to 1903. Inducing the second Aliyah and having started in 1903 in Kishinev and continued in 1905 in Odessa in several Jewish settlement within Czarist Russia, the second wave of pogroms forced nearly 30.000 Jews to migrate to land of Palestine with the hope to turn over a new leaf. Including the founding fathers of future Jewish state like David Ben-Gurion, this wave of the migration called 'second Aliyah' foreshadowed Jewish society whose seeds of statehood sowed mostly by the members of this Aliyah. In this sense, they formed the first kibbutz, a new form of agricultural settlement based on 'full cooperation among its members in work and on equal profit sharing' (Bregman 2007: 7-13).

Third wave of pogroms before the murderous antisemitism of the Nazis took place between 1918 and 1920, becoming more brutal until then as worsened further by the civil war of great violence between the 'Whites' and 'Bolshevik Reds' after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia (Rubinstein and Chon-Sherbok 2002: 173-175). Stimulated by these pogroms, the third Aliyah, around 26,000 arrived in Palestine between 1919 and 1923. the members of this Aliyah intensively and unprecedentedly embarked on building infrastructure for Jewish society, the so-called 'the Jewish national home'. By extension, some proto-institutions came up; 'Labor Battalion' providing Jewish settlers with jobs; the most

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[1] Hebrew term used for mass Jews immigrations to the land of Palestine before the founding of the state of Israel.

importantly 'the *Histadrut*' (the General Organizations of Workers) more than a trade union which organized migrations, employment services for immigrants, and was a large-scale owner of cooperative and industrial enterprises; lastly '*Haganah'*, (Defense in Hebrew) a clandestine organization aiming at maintaining security for Jewish minority in Palestine (Bregman 2002: 26-27). All these are institutions making a major contribution to the formation of a Jewish society before Israeli state came into being in 1948.

The biggest catastrophe of Jewish history occurred after Hitler's Nazi Germany unexpectedly invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. Russia, following the invasion of 22 June, became the lands upon which Nazi Germany carried out a policy of the genocide of the Jews, launching a campaign for the deliberate mass murder of Jews, and it has been in full swing by the end of the year. In the Western parts of the Soviet Union, particularly in Kiev, the apparent genocide was chiefly carried out by the Einsatzgruppen of the Nazi SS (Rubinstein and Chon-Sherbok 2002: 188). As a result of this persecution in Russia and rising antisemitism within Nazi Germany between 1932 and 1939, around 175,000 immigrants, new Aliyah entitled as 'German Aliyah', arrived in Palestine with help of Zionist leaders. Given that the wave included economically well-off and skilled Jewish immigrants, it was not difficult to discover the fact that significant economic expansion has taken place in Palestine after this Aliyah. On the other hand, the Aliyah gave developing Jewish minority in Palestine a European guise. In other words, the influence of European way on changing or developing attitudes of Jews became more visible (Bregman 2002: 26-27).

4.3 The Consequences of The Pogroms and The Holocaust

Among various long-term outcomes of mass persecutions against the Jews in Europe, the first and foremost is the dramatic and rapid changes in balance of Jewish population in the world by decimating Jewish numbers on the European continent, especially in eastern and central Europe. Although American Jewry was deprived of it, they have reached the central position in the balance by this shift (Rubinstein and Chon-Sherbok 2002: 224-226). Whereas

huge numbers of Jews perished, surviving Jewish people who wanted to get rid of atrocities and hostility against themselves in Europe were forced to immigrate to the different parts of the world, concentrating mostly on the USA or lands of Palestine. On the other hand, another the most important outcome rising out of persecutions is the fact 'Jewish Question became more visible both in eyes of Jews and the wold. As antisemitism has fairly come out after Nazi's brutal campaign against Jewish people, the existence of the Jewish problem began to be claimed more loudly by Jewish political and social movements, especially by Zionism, around the world.

The persecutions or mass violence imprinted on the memories of the surviving Jewish people, obtaining a substantial ground in Jewish consciousness as an unforgettable event in Jewish history. One of those capitalized on it most was the Zionist movement which has already been getting strong day by day with diplomatic efforts of its leaders. Zionism began to become the most attractive secular nationalist ideology of probably majority of the world's Jews, who saw the salvation in the creation of a Jewish state after the big catastrophe in Europe. All sorrows and pains of persecutions against Jews seemed to justify and corroborate underlying presuppositions of Zionism, especially its message that emphasizes tenaciously on the ubiquitous aspect of the antisemitism, and on the fact that the best solution for it lies behind the creation of a Jewish society which would promote status of Jewish people thus change their unfortunate destiny (Laqueur 1972: 590-591; Rubinstein and Chon-Sherbok 2002: 225).

4.4 Zionism: Towards a New Jewish Society

Before Zionism has become the main driving force of Jewish diaspora spreading around different part of Europe, it was the fact that many secular Jewish thinkers would resort to idea that establishment of Jewish state, or migration of many Jews to Palestine as permanent settlers, would be a solution to their challenges and mistreatment against them by hindering rising antisemitism (Stanislawski 2017: 11-22). 'Zionism' whose seeds could be traced back

to the 1830s arose mainly in Europe, with an assertive aim to solve the so-called 'Jewish Question', has come out even more apparently after the pogroms and subsequent holocaust by the Nazi regime. Until the very assertive discourse of Zionism came up, the dream to rule over or at least live in Palestine - the so-called 'Promised Land' – was religious in nature with the hopes that a Messiah would eventually restore it to them. It was political posture of Zionist movement to have managed to reframe it within an assertive political ideology.

As successive pogroms against Jews continued in the Eastern part of Europe, especially in Russia, in Jewish intellectual mind, short-term offer to plight of humiliated and discriminated Jewish was mass migration to elsewhere. On the other hand, in the long term, Jewish intellectual circle was ever more prone to the conviction that Jewish self-emancipation is possible through 'a return to Jewish nationalism' (Laqueur 1972: 40-84; Rubinstein and Chon-Sherbok: 306; Harms and Ferry 2008: 47-56). In practical terms, this could be easily accomplished by existing Zionist movement that had already begun to evolve towards a secularist and nationalist ground. To bring solutions to the persecutions and discrimination against Jewish community, it was rational and necessary to utilise the available political discourse of Zionism by which embodiment of long-term solution to Jewish Question has appeared in later years. Accordingly, as might be expected, bloody pogroms against Russian Jews incited Dr Leon Pinsker, a physician who argued that antisemitism is unending and false perception about Jewish, and that their unequal and vague status are the main reason for it, to lead, as ideological father, the first Zionist organization '*Hibbat Zion*' ('love of Zion' in Hebrew) in 1882. The organization successfully conducted the first Aliyah to the land of Palestine, paving the way for establishing agricultural colonies and building factories for new Jewish settlers (Rubinstein and Chon-Sherbok 2002: 306-307).

Zionism has reached its peak with Theodor Herzl's vision and action. Herzl, as the most influential activist among the other Zionist leaders, laid out most systematically his Zionist vision (Prior 1999: 5-6). Putting stress on the 'Jewish sovereignty over the land of earth's surface', he envisioned a modern democratic society rather than theocratic. The '*Der Judenstaat'* (Jewish State), a book written by him under the thumb of Dreyfus Trial which

has denoted the rising antisemitism in Europe, laid the systematic groundwork for future Israeli state. To follow his vision, in this sense, he organized and conducted the Fist Zionist Congress convened in Basle, Switzerland, in August 1897. At this congress, 'World Zionist Organization' (WZO) was established and it was frankly declared that primary aim of Zionism is to create a home for Jewish people in the land of Palestine (Laqueur 1972: 84-135; Lucas 1974: 31-34).

After Herzl's death in 1904, various fractions and internal ideological strands began to flourish within the Zionist movement, many of which has existed even after the foundation of state of Israel. To give an example, it is fair to note three relatively broad political cliques: the 'Socialist Zionists' represented by Nahman Syrkin and Dov Ber Borochov; the 'Mizrachi' the Orthodox Jewish faction opposing the secular tendency of the movement; the General Zionist expecting not to deviate general course of the movement. Although it was unable to be on the crest of the wave, the fact that some potent American and British Jews became buttress and proponent of Zionist movement was outstanding advancement of Zionism (Rubinstein and Chon-Sherbok 2002: 312-314). This has become even more apparent when American Jewish proponents of Zionism provided Zionists with paramount financial support.

The period from WWI to the official foundation of Israeli state was marked as seminal developments and achievements for Zionism although one of the extreme calamities for whole Jewish history happened in this period. Although Zionists was able to receive only very little support of whole Jewry, they contrived to find significant political support of Britain as both foreign and domestic policy of Britain, at that time, revolutionised the Zionist project. An indirect promise, called 'Balfour Declaration', to the Jewish for a national home in Palestine, was taken as result of demarches used, effectively by Zionist Federation chaired by Chaim Weizmann, who symbolized Zionists' links with Britain. Following WWI, the promise taken from British government, with Zionist efforts, turned into the shift of responsibility for the establishment of Jewish national home to Britain Mandate entrusted by The League of Nations. After Britain has taken the control of Palestine, massive, legal and illegal migrations made the availability of Jewish population in Palestine more palpable, and

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thus made Arab opposition to Zionist project more aggressive, leading to unrest between Arabs and Jewish settlers. Clashes among Jewish and local Palestinians were rekindled by the partition plan offered by Peel Commission, which proved the inapplicability of the mandate. British response to rising unrest and violence in Palestine was restrictions on land acquisition and Jewish immigration, which declared by 'White Paper' in 1939. As Zionist opposition to it has become pro-active amongst American Jewry and gained more support from the US in the regional diplomacy, mobilization of an armed struggle against the government of British mandate was a plan in practice. In the meantime, Nazi's attempt to eradicate Jewish presence in Europe has carried the Zionist movement to new ground wherein it elevated towards an internationally supported programme. Britain's submission of issue of the settlement of the Jews to The United Nations (UN) after WWII resulted in the UN partition plan, which foreshadowed the end of British Mandate in Palestine. After this point, as result of an act of force and the remarkable support of the US, Zionist movement succeeded to officially declare the establishment of the State of Israel (Prior 1999: 12-26).

On the other hand, during this period, the most outstanding transfiguration of Zionism was the 'conquest of labor' strategy of 'the *Histadrut*', created by a rising socialist wing within the Zionist movement. Reaching two-thirds of Jewish workers in Palestine, the Jewish labor force created by the *Histadrut* increased from about 20.000 to about 188.000 between 1917 and 1939. Making notable contributions in many areas, the *Histadrut* guided Jewish settlers to set up an infrastructure of industry, banking, construction, transportation and retailing as well as land purchase and settlement. As Britain permit the Jewish community to exercise autonomy in several jurisdictions, World Zionist Organizations and Jewish Agency provided Zionists with self-government, which put them forward as founders for state sovereignty when Israeli State was founded (Lucas 1974: 119-139).

4.5 Theoretical Insights: U&CD Theory and Israeli Modernization

An 'organic' character draws attention in analyzing the historical origins of Western trajectory -Britain, France and the United States of America- vis-à-vis that of Israeli. Namely, as Barrington Moore showed properly, a domestic social force, 'strong urban bourgeoisie' has been the most deterministic actor in shaping following developmental trajectories in the West (Moore 1966). After the peasantry was weakened or destroyed totally by bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy, urban bourgeoisie ensued as most economically and politically mighty giant whereupon the aristocracy was either unable to withstand its power, for example its democratizing attempts, or was eliminated totally by a bourgeoisie revolution (Moore 1966: 430-431). At the end, as an organically triggered process, the Western way of modernization has come out of the power relations between peasantry, aristocracy and capitalist bourgeoisie all of which constitutes a domestic social component.

Although the 20th century was, for Jewish history, marked by uncertainty and most importantly Jewish self-questioning, it has included many milestones for subsequent Jewish modernization. Given the whole path to the formation of Israeli state, for modernization perspective, U&CD stands in good stead when analysing modernization of the state of Israel. Withstanding against the suggested idea that modernization occurs 'organically' in non-Western societies, U&CD theory argues that it is unreasonable to dissociate it from the interaction of non-Western societies with the external (Western) modernity. Accordingly, pointing out inorganically triggered process of modernization, U&CD's principal, 'whip of external necessity' refers to a compulsion to adopt modernization as a predictable result of the 'survival instinct'. In this sense, it is reasonable to argue that Israeli modernization has been triggered by a survival instinct, an external (inorganic) trigger rather than domestic one as in the Western trajectory.

In terms of the whip of external necessity, Jewish encounter with modern Western civilization accounts for an external source as the origin of later Israeli modernization. The interaction between them appeared under the guise of successive pogroms in the late 19th and early 20th century and subsequent Nazi holocaust against European, especially eastern European Jewry. The destructive and brutal encounter with the Western civilization hereby

ends up with, among world Jewry, an awareness that having a safe homeland is critical for gaining and preserving full emancipation of Jews (Laqueur 1972: 590). Rising antisemitism, nourished by all pogroms, the holocaust and persecutions taking place in Europe, stimulated the Zionist movement whose primary aim is to establish a 'Jewish National Home' wherein world Jewy can live within wealth and safety. Having been driven by survival instinct, Zionist leaders have found definite solution to plight of European Jews in establishment of a modern state in Palestinian Land. Conducting massive and successive migrations, A*liyah*, to the region and creating proto-institutions and infrastructure for prospective modern Jewish society, Zionism has taken practical dynamics mainly from pogroms and holocaust against the Jews in Europe.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter outlined historical origins to the modern Israeli state formation with the effect of persecutions against European Jews in the late 19th and 20th century. One of prominent consequences of persecutions against Jews was the rise of Zionist movement which has, for long time, aimed at establishing a Jewish state. Thus, survival instinct has been a primary triggering factor in Israeli modernization route. In this sense, tracing inorganic character of origins of non- Western trajectories, from non-Western modernization perspective, U&CD theory fits properly within the analysis of Israeli historical path to modernization, given the fact that both the subsequent pogroms and holocaust made a lingering impact on Jewish society.

CHAPTER 5: ECONOMIC TRAJECTORY OF ISRAELI MODERNITY

This chapter will study economic trajectory (the key to modernity) of Israeli modernity within its own historical context, which starts with pre-state period, functioning as the main supportive of the argument suggested along the thesis.

5.1 Introduction

As of its existence as a state, Israel has showed relatively great success in economic development as developmental indicators manifest it clearly. As of 2016, its GNI per capita is about $36.250 while its GDP is about $317.748 billion (World Bank 2016). It also is categorized in high income groups both by The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) amongst the members and by the United Nations (UN) (OECD 2018; United Nation 2018: 144). In a non-Western respect and light with the Uneven and Combined Development Theory (U&CD), the historical trajectory of Israeli economic modernity that has created this success in the world will be main subject of this chapter together with argument that Israeli trajectory may represent Israeli trajectory of economic modernity as divergent from Western model.

The chapter consists of 8 sections. Legacy from the pre-state era will be analyzed in section 1 while section 2, 3 and 4 will present main characteristics of Israeli economic development from statehood to 1985. Section 5 and 6 will explain economic reforms in 1985 and subsequent changes brought by it from 1985 onwards. Finally, section 7 includes the assessment and re-conceptualization of the Israeli economic modernization trajectory whereas section 8 will offer a summary and closing reflections of the chapter.

5.2 The Economic Legacy from the pre-State Era

The massive immigration and flagrant necessity of settlement for the new-comers ended up with favourable alliance between Zionism and labor movement subscribing to economic collectivism as agriculture has expectedly been at the center of economic growth in the pre-state era (Shafir and Peled 2000: 130). As its practical outcomes and successes can be seen quite simply in economic development of the pre-state Jewish community, socialist ideas have been the main driving force in creating the *Histadrut* and the '*kibbutz*' and the '*moshav*' agencies which had held economic monopoly almost in all sectors ranging from agriculture to industry even after foundation of state of Israel.

Based on raising capital and allocating it, the kibbutz represents a collective ownership of means of production whereas the moshav represents a cooperative society in which agricultural lands are allocated equally and marketing, credit etc. are done collectively (Plessner 1994: 62-63; Cheng and Sun 2015; See also Near 1997). As agrarian structure of the pre-state Jewish society has hampered occurrence of a robust capitalist bourgeoisie class in the pre-state Jewish community, its lack and massive immigration waves, especially after the 1930s, which doubled basic needs, induced socialist wing of Zionist movement to pursue a collectivist economic development led primarily by Mapai[2] (Hanieh 2003: 6).

One of the most important hallmarks that sets the Israeli economy apart from the other at the time was beyond any doubt autonomy and power held in economic fields by the largest and central labor organization, 'the *Histadrut*'. Conducting main forces of economy such as economic production, marketing, the *Histadrut*, as an all-purpose quasi-state institution, was mainly driven by the 'conquest of labor' strategy. In this sense, Zionist-labor movement embarked on establishing its own industrial, financial, service etc. facilities with the aim of creating opportunities for job (Lucas 1974: 119; see also Lockman 1996) Turning from labor market into produce market, this pattern of economic organization had sustained for several decades after statehood. As it has cemented its pivotal role with additional and significant support of the state after statehood, its exclusive position gave it to operate monopolistically

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[2] 'Mapai' is the acronym for 'the party of the Israeli workers'. It later expanded and absorbed other smaller socialist parties to become the 'Labor Party'.

in wide-ranging and key economic sectors such as agriculture, industry, finance and social services. It therefore has become principal activist in capital formation and accumulation (Grinberg and Shafir 2000: 103-127). The Israeli economy from the foundation to 1985 has appeared as a reinforced state interventionism contingent on the ideological ground of Zionist labor movement, later the Labor Party, and as an economic structure wherein the *Histadrut* and other quasi-governmental agencies together with small private enterprise singly commanded different sectors of the economy (Lucas 1974: 343; Shafir and Peled 2000: 130; Hanieh 2003).

As consistent with worldview of founding-fathers of Israeli State, one of the most important economic establishments being inherited from the pre-state period is 'kibbutzim' -plural of kibbutz- developed under collectivist understating of economic growth. They are so important that as well as yield in industry, their yield in agriculture accounted for %40 of total of the country in the 1970s while their numbers reached no less than 400 by the 1980s. In industrial markets such as metal, plastic etc. at home and abroad, 164 enterprises owned by kibbutzim operated in 1969. On the other side, as they began to serve as showcase in the 1970s and the 1980s, they made significant contributions to tertiary industry, especially tourism (Cheng and Sun 2015: 165).

5.3 After Statehood from 1948 to the mid-1960s: Rapid Growth with Capital Import and State-led Massive Industrialization

As the short-term propelling factors for economic growth were an extortionate increase in population stimulated by mass immigration, and economic burden brought by the War of Independence, it can be easily argued that the Israeli economy by the mid-1980s can be featured as highly state-led economic development hinged on socialist-nationalist ideological background of the Labor Party which was able to stay in power until 1977.

Parallel to socialist ideological perspective of the Labor movement, 'national landownership' was one of the main legacies carried over from the pre-state era to statehood

period. Lands left by Arabs was nationalized as 'Israel Lands' by Israel Land Administration. 80% of these Israel lands were state-owned in the early 1960s. Later, in line with the idea to improve collective objective, the government offered entrepreneurs in various sectors to use these lands in order to encourage and revive economic activity, collective agriculture and industry, in accordance with the principles adopted in the pre-state era (Metzer 2003: 279-280).

One of striking indicators of state-led growth after statehood can been seen in the first wave of industrialization policy of the Labor Party governments. The process highly contingent on 'state-led class formation' also made substantial contribution to urbanization of low-class groups within Israeli society. Having been centred mainly on the so-called 'Development Towns' designated by the state as the key sites for industrialization, the process was a certain part of a state-led growth policy. Around 30 towns were established between 1948 and 1964 in keeping with policy of the Israel government to promote economic growth of the peripheral regions. Consisting of manufactured products such chemical, metal, textiles etc. share of exports in industry from these towns reached $200 million which accounted for the %40 of Israel's total export in industry in 1971 (Efrat 1977).

The lack of a capitalist class in the pre-state period was an ongoing challenge of the Israeli economy in the early years of the post-statehood period. As a natural outcome of state-led development, formation of capitalist class was primary concern for the Labor Party. In this sense, the government, through its irresistible power of state bureaucracy, transferred almost all foreign capital stated above to privileged business group having contributed to 'National Home Project' in the pre-state period (Zilberfarb 2005: 13). Mostly owned by the *Histadrut* of Labor Zionism, these groups have played crucial role in strategy of state-led development as they involved in industrialization process and investment for development. Merging into five large conglomerates in the following years, these 'Big Five' -Bank Leumi, Bank Hapoalim, Israel Discount Bank Holdings (IDB), Koor, and Clal- have dominated both the financial and the industrial sectors of the Israeli economy as all of them, except IDB, remained adhered to Zionist movement (Shafir and Peled 2000: 133; Hanieh 2003: 7).

Towards the end of the 1960s, the state further promoted a small group of private enterprises to establish a company, the Israel Corporation, which was crucial undertaking led by the state to trigger the flourish of private capital in the Israeli economy (Beinin 1986: 36). The consolidation of private capital was -together with import liberalization and the abolition of common exchange rate system- further reinforced by the great recession in 1966-67, which sparked off major bankruptcies and farther mergers (Hanieh 2003: 7; Zilberfarb 2005: 14).

Another indicator of state-led growth is in regard to government attempts to conduct economy through importation of and allocation of foreign capital from abroad, which lasted till the mid-1960s. Mass migration that triggered drastic population growth and thus left the Israeli economy to twist in the wind, has propelled government officials to take necessary steps to solve economic burden created by their absorption as well as the burden of the War of Independence. Eliciting huge imports in consumption and investment goods, abrupt increase in population indirectly led to the growing foreign trade deficit. The Labor Party had nothing but to fill the gap in the deficit by capital import strategy from abroad. The prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, had made much-debated deal with Germany for reparation and personal restitution of the Holocaust. Besides German reparation, the sale of Israeli bonds, loan capital from foreign government, especially the USA, and personal assets of immigrants and personal remittances. Import capital conducted by the government reached 31% of total private savings between 1961 and 1964 (Plessner 1994: 38). Annual total proceeds of all these capital imports to the Israeli economy between 1950 and 1967 was estimated to be around $410 million. Making great contribution to raising living standards and welfare, capital imports promoted rapid economic growth in this period. GNP (Gross National Product) at annual average rate was %10, with per capita growth over %5, while annual per capita increase in consumption was no less than %5 in this period (Lucas 1974: 336-342; Beilin 1992: 55-56; Helpman 2003: 2).

5.4 The Israeli Economy from War to War: 1967-1973

The years between 1967 and 1973 witnessed prominent events both within and outside Israel. Starting with the Six Day War, this decade passed through the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent oil crisis in 1973. In such circumstances, it is unreasonable not to expect noteworthy impact on the economy. The Six Day War widely has been paramount catalysator in changing available economic regime of Israel. Basic *modus operandi* of economic development in this period has been shaped and driven by considerable attempts to direct concentration patterns of industrial and financial resources upon defense sectors. In other words, lingering and propelling factor -survival concern- having been constituting backbone of economic development of Israeli Jewish society has come to the forefront more visibly.

As imposed by free trade agreements in the mid-1960s, steps taken in both import liberalization and the abolition of multiple exchange rates system were, as a result of pragmatic concerns, virtually important (Zilberfarb 2005: 14). However, although there was budding vein to ease regimentation, and relative liberalization by official apparatus, as economic regime centred around interventionist atmosphere has remained basically, the trajectory of economic development has been put into a new orbit, 'military-industrial complex' stimulated by the rising security threats of the conflicts with Arab states (Grinberg 2017: 34; See also Mintz 1983). Directed broadly by interventionist apparatus of the state, movement of military production to the focal point of the economy was stepped up by the 1973 war. Financed largely by the US aids this 'war economy' of Israel was based on a 'combination of government-subsidized local military procurement' and 'burgeoning world market product for arms' (Shafir and Peled 2000: 132). Israel's defense spending relative to its GNP has increased from %10.4 in 1966 to %25 in 1980, more than twofold, and as defense sector both in industrial production and in Israeli exports takes lion's share, Israel hit the top at rates of defense exports in the world. Likewise, the share of defense production in imports has increased notably from $490 million in 1972 to $1.85 billion in 1975 at the same time loans from U.S from $475 million to $1.47 billion (Mintz 1983: 111-112).

5.5 Towards a Full Economic Liberalization: 'Lost Decade' of the Economy (1973-1985)

As influence of the wars with Arab states on the Israeli economy became even more palpable and an unprecedented crisis hit the Israeli economy, the period between 1973-1985 could be called 'lost decade' of the Israeli economy. The lingering impact of Yom Kippur War and oil crisis that was sparked by the OPEC countries dragged the Israeli economy into a very fragile economic downturn. As high defense expenditure with internal difficulties made the situation even worse, excessive deficit spending and landing policies of the government led to an unprecedented 'stagflation' depicted as 'slowdown of growth with firm soar of inflation at the same time.' Whereas foreign debt was 80% of GNP, public sector debt was 250% of GNP in 1984 (Ben-Porat 2008: 95-96). At an ever-increasing line, %12 inflation rate in 1972 unprecedentedly hit the top with rate of %444.9 in 1984 whereas GDP dropped from %18.3 in 1973-75 to %13.5 in 1977-84 (Zilberfarb 2005: 16-17).

Meanwhile, the end of protracted period of the Labor Party in government in 1977 elections signified a fundamental shift of ideological ground in economic understanding even if it was not in practical terms. The Likud Party's coalition government both with the Herut and the Liberal Party turned a new page for approaches to the operation of national economy. Represented by Liberal Party's views on economics, the coalition government declared its ideational position towards the direction of economy by emphasizing on need for reducing the level of the involvement of government and public establishments while at the same time large conglomerates became the beneficiaries of ever-increasing inflation (Zilberfarb 2005: 15; Hanieh 2003; Grinberg 1991). Although, under the leadership of the Likud Party, announcement of the coalition government, 'economic turnabout' to liberalise economic structure was highly assertive, it is fair to argue that the new ruling government was not able to alter principal trajectory of the economic structure which has been highly dominated by the Labor Party and its ally, the *Histadrut* for decades (Ben-Porath 1983). Increasing

consolidation of private capital around state-linked families has made it even harder so that together with the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the *Histadrut* owned enterprises operating in areas ranging from industry, manufacturing to communication accounted for %40 of the GNP.

The dire direction of the economy has become even worse over several years thus left the government in a lurch. Having been unremittingly reinforced by state subsidies, irresistible dominance of the *Histadrut*-owned enterprises put forward the hindsight that Israel no longer could go further with regimentation of economy. First attempt came in October 1980 by the Finance Ministry's Financial Plan which aimed at eliminating subsidized credits exploited by both the *Histadrut* and private business:

> Since 1967 incessant demands for state subsidies by *Histadrut*-owned enterprises and its private sector allies led to a fiscal crisis of the state and hyperinflation, following the liberalization of foreign currency in 1977. In this context the neoliberal roadmap offered a sound solution for state elites facing an interventionist developmental state project "gone wrong." By drastically cutting state subsidies to *Histadrut*-owned enterprises, thereby ensuring their privatization, and by ending the *Histadrut*'s control of health insurance and occupational pensions and undermining its role and influence in collective bargaining, Labor governments (or Labor ministers within coalition governments) put paid to the *Histadrut*'s extraordinary political and economic powers (Grinberg 2017: 30-31).

Although the Israeli economy in this period witnessed some steps for and ideas of free market economy, entrenched *dirigisme* has remained main propelling factor for the economic system. Meanwhile, economic crisis deepened further and began to pose a real threat to the existence of Israeli state and its economic viability towards the mid-1980s. To sum up, Israeli economic development was shaped mainly by state's ownership, regulatory and distributional roles which was undiminished until the 1985 (Kleiman, 1997: 156).

5.6 A Turning Point: The 1985 Economic Stabilization Program (ESP)

While the average growth rate was around 1.6% annually as of the early 1970s, economic crisis deepened even more with the reach of inflation at historic rate, around 440% in 1984, and reach of foreign debt at 80% of GNP (Barkey 1994: 49). After the government resigned, new elections were held in 1984. As the winner of the election, The Likud and The Labor Party under the leadership of Shimon Peres formed a new coalition government, 'National Unity'. Peres formed a group of people, ranging from some bureaucrats and academicians, which devised a plan called 'Economic Stabilization Plan' (ESP), to cease the hyperinflation and the economic downturn. Having been adopted by National Unity Government on 1 July 1985, and gone into effect in June 1985, the plan was pregnant with major changes in the economic structure so that it was called 'turning point' in Israeli economic growth (Hanieh 2003: 12; Zilberfarb 2005: 17). The plan, in the most general sense, signified the handover of task for the trajectory of economic modernisation from state to private sector. As it will be more apparent from the 1990s and onwards, private initiatives have become the new engine for economic development.

The principal elements of the plan included: (1) huge cutting in government expenditure and deficit by 7% of GDP, (2) devaluing the Israeli shekel by 20% as well as reducing import duties, (3) freeing all-shekel denominated aggregates (Aharoni 1998: 138). The ESP was, in short term, very successful in defusing the ongoing historic crisis. Firstly, its sharp disinflation policy proved to be effective given the gradual drop of inflation rate from historic level to percentage between 10 and 20 from 1986 onwards (Leiderman and Liviatan 2003: 105). On the other hand, the plan has managed to lower huge deficit in balance of payment to zero with additional help of the US aid (Barkey 1994: 49).

It would be unfair to assume that available economic decline has been the main factor in initiating the ESP. Namely, beyond the crisis posing real threats to state interests, there were other propelling factors that reinforced it. Firstly, realization of largest corporations and

investors that new, open and outward-looking economy would be more profitable given vulnerability of available strategy which holds limits to gaining of 'military-based demand' and inflationary subsidies (See Nitzan and Bichler 2001: 21-55). Secondly, political atmosphere was ripe for a revolutionary policy initiative. In other words, there was no interest for every sides, political and economic in conflicting atmosphere as the *Histadrut* which was expected to oppose the plan had to accept (see Grinberg 1991).

In the long run, unprecedented characteristics the ESP has brought in Israeli economic structure have become more of an issue given structural implications which unfolded more visibly throughout the 1990s as well as more ideational changes. Ideationally, the strong convergence of two main parties resulted in a paradigmatic shift towards a competitive, liberal and deregulated economy, which made Israeli economic policies look like that of Western economies (Ben-Porat 2008: 98). In this sense, signifying a clear break with the past economic regime, stylemarks of new economic trajectory hinge on concrete reforms made in several distinctive areas; privatization, capital and money or financial market and foreign trade regime.

The break with the past was more apparent in the privatization process which altered greatly the way of economic development. Old system could be labelled as 'crony capitalism' wherein capital accumulation was saved and upheld by the state in hands of large monopolies like the *Histadrut* or big families associated with the Zionist Labor movement. As privatization deepened, the capital accumulation began to pass into the hands of internal capital that consisted mainly of North American as well as these available privatized class (Hanieh 2003: 121-14). With parallel to rising privatization trend in the world, Israeli privatization has gone through the most matured stage in the 1990s due firstly to the collapse of communist countries, and secondly to economic hardships faced by state-owned large monopolises having been largely affected by cut-back in government subsidies (Zilberfarb 2005: 18). In this context, aiming at promoting the competition, privatization attempts resulted in reduction of state-owned enterprises, by 2002, to less than 100 which were 160 in 1985 (Ben-Porat 2008: 98).

The ESP-associated reforms have been the main force that brought ground-breaking changes also in capital market. Before 1985, all funds, pension, provident and study, used to be invested in special designed bonds of governments. Making non-tradable bonds to tradable ones, government stopped these special bonds in 1985 thus it became mandatory to invest assets of these funds in capital market. Accordingly, weight of tradable bonds totally increased from %16 in 1986 to more than %50 by the late 1990s (Zilberfarb 2005: 18; Grinberg 2017: 42). On the other hand, while credits that are controlled by the government dropped from 85% to 15% in total, government license for issuing security has been abolished as of 1987 (Aharoni 1998: 138). Reforms, which began to make the Israeli capital market more integrated into global capital markets, enabled the private sector to compete in the global stock markets like The New York Stock Exchange as they became free from government control (Ben-Porat 2008: 98).

The first action in the deregulation of foreign trade, as an international obligation, had come in 1975 after Israel signed Preferential Trade Agreement with European Economic Community (EEC). In 1985, Free Trade Agreement with the USA created further liberalization both for Israeli and foreign products. Israel's membership of World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and its already obligations imposed by GATT forced it to overhaul its regime in foreign trade. In this direction, great limitations on imports from other countries were replaced by custom tariffs although some customs duties for certain goods maintained (Kleiman 1997: 162-163). A parallel development in deregulation process has occurred progressively in foreign exchange market. The fact that increasing US aids, both gift and loans, since the mid-80s helped to reduce budget deficit as well as defense spending provided Israeli officials with opportunities to make reforms in foreign exchange regime (Shafir and Peled 2000: 138-139). In this sense, in the era between 1987 and 1998, nearly all restraints for the flow of foreign exchange were abolished. Foreign exchange reform in 1998 warranted all forbidden activities in foreign exchange. Giving freedom to inflow and outflow of the capital, these reforms created a chance to business firms to invest real and financial assets abroad (Zilberfarb 2005: 18-19; Kleiman 1997: 163).

Table 5.1

Major Economic Reforms after the 1980s

Economic Field	Major Reforms
Capital Market	○ Removal of the constraints on issuing special bonds ○ Progressive removal in the issuing of the non-tradable bonds of the government and increase in tradable bonds ○ Diminishing requirements of institutional investors for government bonds
Foreign Exchange Market	○ Abolishment of restraints on flow of foreign exchange ○ Ban of tax on capital flows (after 2003)
Money Market	○ Clear-away of administrative constraints on deposits and credits ○ Reduction in control of direct subsidies/credit by the government ○ Use of new monetary policy tools (introducing of new Israeli Shekel)
Public Sector	○ Long privatization process of state-owned enterprises, which were intensified in the 1990s

Source: Author.

To sum up, as table 5.1 shows, Israel has made major reforms to wane the interventionist regime as of the mid-1980s in the prominent fields of the economy. The reforms made the Israeli economy ever closer to the world economy with the economic take-off in the 1990s. Accordingly, the disinflation policy introduced by the ESP in 1985 indicated a new driving force in the economic trajectory, making the private sector, whose impact will be even more visible in the 1990s, the main driving power of economic development. Not only in practice but also ideologically, liberal economy has been the main agenda of two main parties – The Likud and The Labor Party- in the Israeli economic management, which ushered new attempts for further liberalization. As the liberalization attempts were intensified in the 1990s, positive outputs of the attempts reflect the statistics. Between 1985 and 1990,

GDP average growth was around 3.6% at annual rate, and rose to 7.3% of the annual rate in 1990, which accounted for almost $59 billion (World Bank 2018b).

5.7 Globalization, Peace Process, New Migration Wave: The Israeli Economy in the 1990s

The Israeli economy in the 1990s has been affected both positively and negatively by the expansion of global markets around world, the break-up of the USSR, diplomatic moves of foreign policy. The expansion of globalization made the Israeli economy even more integrated with the global economy. The collapse of USSR led to huge migration of Jews from former Soviet countries to Israel. Israel's foreign policy moves brought a peace process which has made the positive contribution to the Israeli economy.

The 1990s for the Israeli economy has been a quite productive decade given high growth rate. Israel, in fact, has been 18th economy amongst 46 OECD countries in 1996. Several factors have played significant role in this economic leap. Firstly, the end of Arab boycott after the peace process in 1991 opened a new market for Israel in central and east Asia. Secondly, desire for growing global corporations to take a dividend occurred in the peace process (Ben-Porat 2008: 101). As the main engine of economic modernization began to pass into the hands of the private sector, it has become even more visible in the 1990s. The impact of cut-off in public sector spending and institutional changes after the 1985 ESP can be seen more in the growing share of business sector whose efficiency was improved and strengthened by that impact. In this regard, share of business sector in GDP has risen from around %62-63 in 1990 to around %66-67 towards the end of the decade although that of public sector remains large (Ben-Bassat 2002: 443-446). The diminishing role of the state in the market has managed to attract foreign investments. The more the initiated reforms were expanded and the more the Israeli economy became a lucrative capital centre for global corporations and companies. Far-reaching reforms allowed national capital markets to invest in the global markets and to create new channels for the investment from abroad. As such,

the combined market value of Israeli companies traded on the USA's stock markets has been more than thirty billion dollars by 1999 (Ben-Bassat 2002: 451). On the other hand, foreign direct investment (FDI) reached $18.047 billion in 2000 while it was about $151 million at the start of the decade (World Bank 2018b)

Around 710.000 immigrants arrived in Israel in the period between 1990 and 1997. Although it seemed a burden at the first glance for the economy, Israel managed to turn it into an advantage. Integration to the global economy and the atmosphere brought by the peace process has been mainstay in meeting the enormous demand created by the migration (Zilberfarb 1996). On the other hand, the positive contribution of the migration to the Israeli economy was significant by itself. Two thirds of the immigrants were trained in scientific, technical sectors. With the other combined factors such as structural changes, this helped Israel to shift from low-tech base to high-tech given the fact that share of high-tech sector in industrial exports has reached %80 in 2001 while that of agriculture was %3 in 2000 as compared to %16.5 in 1970 (Hanieh 2003: 14; Ben-Porat 2008: 103).

Although the far-reaching reforms for the liberalization made Israeli economic structure more open, competitive and productive, the impact and hand of the state in the economic management continued to be more than that of industrialized economies in the 1990s. By and large, two factors hampered further reduction of the state's role in market mechanism. Firstly, the state's national conflict was an obstacle to diminish its conducting role in the arms industry in which Israel has been one of the largest exporters in the world. Secondly, being called 'demographic interest' most of the economic privileges devoted for the immigrants, one of the strategies of the state for absorbing the migration wave from the USSR in the early 1990s, continued to be a steering capacity of the state. In other words, the state intervention remained relatively unchanged, but its instruments suffered a change. As such, the privileges have been distributed under the name of 'entitlement to financial aid' instead of simply 'public assistance' provided by the state (Shafir and Peled 2000: 149).

5.8 After 2000: Recession and Further Liberalization and Development Driven by Private Sector through Large Boom in High-Tech Industry Sector

While Israeli governments adopted unprecedented reforms towards liberalization in the economy in the 1990s, several factors enabled state to increase social and welfare expenditures. Among these factors, one was reduction in defense expenditure during the peaceful atmosphere created by the peace process. The share of defense expenditure was assigned to that of transfer and welfare payments. Another factor was additional tax revenues brought mostly by renewed growth in the 1990s. So, transfer and welfare payments remained as a sphere on which government control continued as its share in the budget increased from %21 in 1989 to %29 in 1999 (Zilberfarb 2005: 19-20).

A slowdown towards the end of 1990s as compared to the initial years of the decade has appeared as a deepest recession Israel ever had during the early years of new century. Recession in 2001 and 2002 interrupted the early boom in economic growth. The decline in GDP growth has continued in two successive years. As such, it was %0.9 in 2001 and %0.7 in 2002 as budget deficit hit the highest in last half a decade; %4.5 of GDP in 2001 and %3.9 of GDP in 2002. Two external factors have played a major role in the outbreak of the crisis in Israel. The first was global economic downturn in high-tech industry as the crashed U.S stock market affected the key Israeli high-tech companies. The second was the outbreak of Palestinian *intifada,* a resistance movement which undermined economic growth in several sectors in economic modernization, and exports to Palestine (Hanieh 2003: 16).

The recession compelled Israeli policy makers to make a choice between carrying liberal reforms a step further and returning to state interventionism. The first option makes cuts in social and welfare payments unavoidable. Cutting largely back on welfare and transfer payments, Economic Recovery Plan devised by Benjamin Netanyahu as the minister of the finance in 2003 has adhered to a reform pace for further liberalization by choosing the first option in parallel with the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Rather than slowing down, the new plan intensified the process of moving towards free market at an even faster pace (Zilberfarb 2005: 21). While the plan, at broader level, included more privatization and eliminating the all remains of welfare state, it included some key immediate reforms as is shown in table 5.2. As the cuts in the pension benefits have further weakened the power of the *Histadrut*, some insignificant restrictions in foreign exchange market were abolished (Ben-Porat 2008: 113).

The side effects of rapidly growing and liberalizing economies such as changing consumption patterns and increase in its level are inevitable for a society that experienced it. Rapid growth in the 1990s brought this kind of side effects into the Israeli society (See Ben-Porat 2008: 104-106). A rising consumption trend during the 1990s had carried Israel into a consumption-led growth. As of 2000, an export-led growth has been the main engine for economic development as the high-tech industry has been the main sector that drives exports with other countries. Its share in the GDP was about %14 in 2007 compared to %8 in 1995 as its share of manufacturing exports comprised %46 of total exports in 2007. The increase of goods in the total exports (more than %20) made the most contribution to that with a significant increase in the share of high-tech industry in the export (Rivlin 2011: 114).

What is the most clear-cut in the Israeli economic structure as of the 2000s is the capital concentration in private sector as the power relations between state and classes change, and local capital integrates with global capitals. As if a natural result of privatization process, in Israel as in almost every economy experiencing privatization, oligopoly market trends comprised of small number of business groups can be seen in the market as the privatization of firms and conglomerates owned by state and *The Histadrut* during the 1990s and early the 2000s has benefited them at the most. Namely, privatizing the public enterprises uncovered suitable circumstances to dominate almost all sectors of the economy for few businesses which are mostly family-owned. By the way of illustration, being highest in the world, almost %30 of share in the stock market capitalization was held by the biggest ten Israeli business groups as of 2005 (Kosenko 2007: 76).

Table 5.2

Key changes brought by Netanyahu's Economic Recovery Plan

. Cutting in government spending – (around $2.4 billion)
. Decreasing wages in public sector – (by %8)
. Layoffs of employee in state in 2003 – (almost 4.000)
. Rising by %5 in some taxes like water tariffs, municipal taxes
. Raising the pension age to 67

Source: (Hanieh 2003)

5.9 Theoretical Insights: Assessing Israeli Economic Modernity

Is it possible to think of a state, which cannot provide its society with basic needs for living, a modern? Answer to this question would likely be 'no' in the perspective of classical modernization studies. Given the fact that economic activity has been only tool to provide such needs in modern societies, it is very plausible to associate modernity with economic development. Living standards for a better life, achieved through economic activity, became central to the process of modernization as 'development' has been a propelling and accelerating determinant to reach a modern state. A state cannot be seen a modern without achieving a certain level of economic development even though it lived up to social or political -secularization and democratization- standards that modernization studies put forward. Economic activity, high living standards nurtured by this activity, is a *sine qua non* for modern societies. This section will read Israeli economic modernity from a non-Western perspective with the help of U&CD theory and MMP.

The fact that there were hardly any private enterprises namely a capitalist class and that instead there was an all-powerful organized labor -like *The Histadrut*- performing state functions such as public sector enterprises, pension and healthcare- is an outstanding feature of Israeli case, diverging from the path of the Western – such as US and France- model in

which strong capitalist class had played a first driving force for initiating economic modernization (see Moore 1966; Hanieh 2003). While the power of the organized labor has been diminished over years, the primary actor was the state not the private sector. Economic indicators in table 5.3 show that Israel today can be evaluated as an economically modern state in accordance with the definition of economic modernity suggested by both Classical Modernization Theories (CMT) and Multiple Modernization Paradigm (MMP).

As Chapter 2 showed that trigger for Israeli modernization in sense of 'whip of external necessity' of Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD) was pogroms and subsequent Nazi holocaust against European Jewry. Zionist movement had turned these persecutions into a nation building project, 'Jews National Home' in Palestinian Land. It is obvious that this 'whip' has continued under the discourse of 'national annihilation' as it has been experienced in several wars and conflicts with Arab states. The challenge of Arab states triggered economic modernity in Israel as the wars and conflicts with Arab states was inclined to becoming chronic.

Table 5.3

Israel's current development indicators (2016)

Indicators	On the basis of	Rate
GDP	billion $	317.748
Industry	% of GDP	20,8
Agriculture	% of GDP	1,3
Service sector	% of GDP	77,8
GNI per capita	$	36,258
Urban population	% of total pop.	92,2
Life expectancy	Year at birth	82,05
Individual internet usage	% of total pop.	79,7

Source: (World Bank 2018b)

Arab states answered the declaration of Jewish Israel State in the Palestinian Land in 1948 with a declaration of war against newly-established state of Israel. As of the war in 1948 and subsequent 1967 and 1973 has much contributed to becoming chronic of the dispute between them. The dispute and tension between them, which has become a perpetual over years, was regarded by Israelis as a threat to national unity and entity. So, 'national annihilation', which had been already manifested by pogroms and holocaust in the eyes of Zionist movement, has proved to be true in the eyes of Israeli society. In this sense, as survival instinct, the threat manifested in wars and conflicts with Arab states urged Israel to be economically powerful. Otherwise, it would be unreasonable to think of economically weak Israel confronting with the threat. In sum, survival instinct has stimulated Israeli economic development thus modernization after the establishment of Israeli state in 1948 as well as in the era before statehood.

By way of illustration, survival instinct has played the key role in initiating both massive industrialization policy from the 1950s onwards and military-industrial complex from the mid-1960s onwards. As illustrated above, economic boom from the mid-1950s onwards has resulted mainly from state-led development based on massive industrialization (see Ben-Porath 1986). On the other hand, the most concrete manifestation of survival instinct can be seen in Israeli economic development based on military-Industrial complex after the mid-1960s. Although the surface cause in emergence of Israeli military industrial complex could be attributed to France's embargo on arms sale to Israel after the 1967 war, latent whip was survival instinct as is manifested in national annihilation (Mintz 1983). In a nutshell, Israeli economic modernization is in keeping with argument, the 'whip of external necessity,' of U&CD theory that modernization projects are triggered by a survival instinct as Arab states impose threats to Israel's survival.

Historical reshuffling refers -as a consequence of whip of external necessity- to divergent patterns of modernization, especially in economic modernity, that occurs in non-Western societies following modernization process is initiated. In modernization process, developmental path diverges from more-developed one -generally Western model. Local

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elements of the less-developed play a key role in shuffling the experience of the model country.

In the Israeli case, directly shaped by socialist ideas of the labor wing within Zionist movement, quasi-state institutions and organizations, which were established in the pre-state era and have existed from the early 1920s onwards, set the Israeli economic trajectory apart from the Western model as a historical reshuffling manifests. As it was showed above, *The Histadrut*, as general and the largest trade union whose functions and capacity went beyond that of a trade union, has been the leading economic activist in performing the central functions of economic development by creating an organizational complex. Supported economically by various governments and state apparatus, it owned largest companies and conglomerates in varied sectors of the economy ranging from agriculture, industry to finance. As a distinct form of economic development, it acted as a quasi-state organization by shaping the formation and the accumulation of the capital, as well as functioning as one of the largest employer in the country where an indigenous capitalist class did not emerge (Grinberg 2000; Shalev 1992).

Economic -also mostly political- dominance of *the Histadrut* did not wane after the statehood as a leading actor in state-building. This continued dominance has led to complex networks in relationship between state and quasi-state institutions. As a distinct pattern, called 'split corporatism', from that of Western type, some different peculiarities revealed in this complex pattern. 'Split corporatism' refers to combination of 'dual market labor' in which labor class is weak while capital class is strong, and 'corporatism' in which capital class is weak labor class is strong. As the former is more associated with the free-market economic model of the West, it is likely to see its concrete example in the United States of America. As the latter can be defined easily as 'state-capital cooperation', Sweden is seen as its classical example for a compromise between capital, labor and state. On the other hand, as Lev Grinberg argues, it is 'split corporatism' that typifies Israel as a distinct pattern in which both capital and labor are relatively weak in private sector based on state subsidies whereas the both are strong in the public sector (Grinberg 1991). Four peculiar characteristics

come to the fore: (1) the pivotal role played by the *Histadrut* as a quasi-state, an employer and a trade union; (2) extensive state involvement in economy and thus precedence of large public sector; (3) weak private capital dependent on state subsidies; (4) split labor force between strong public sector employees and weak industrial workers (Grinberg 1991: 61-62). Although this complex and distinct pattern began to fade after massive liberalization process in the 1990s onwards, and today, state-led economic development was almost wholly handed over to the private capitalists who dominates the economy they did not create, it was such a pattern that diverged Israeli trajectory from that of the West. So, substitution (split corporatism) manifests in Israeli economic modernity as an unpredictable result of historical reshuffling -*the Histadrut* and the other quasi-state institutions- (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.4

U&CD Theory and Economic Trajectory of Israeli Modernity

Whip of external necessity [Triggering factor]	o 'National annihilation' discourse produced reinforcingly by wars with Arab states
Historical reshuffling	o Quasi-state organizations -*The Histadrut*- shaped by the socialist collectivism of Labor Zionism
Substitution	o 'Split Corporatism' as combination of 'dual labor market' and 'corporatism'

Source: Author.

In sum, as table 5.4 shows, a distinct pattern in Israeli economic trajectory can be seen via lenses of U&CD theory. In this sense, 'national annihilation' discourse which has been persistently reinforced by sequence of wars with Arab states, accounts for the principal, whip of external necessity. As process in economic trajectory is launched by this whip, historical reshuffling manifests when dominant position of the *Histadrut* acting as quasi-state in the pre-state era continued in the post-statehood period. Accordingly, historical reshuffling has sparked off the emergence of substitution, complex power relationship which can be conceptualized as 'split corporatism'.

5.10 Conclusion

This chapter aimed at interpreting the Israeli economy constituting one of three pillars of modernization in the light of non-Western modernization perspective, U&CD theory. In the pursuit of questions such as 'Is Israel economically a modern state?', historical path of economic modernity in Israel was evaluated.

Israeli state has acted as a major actor in shaping economy building via several quasi-state institutions -*The Histadrut*- based on collectivism of Labor Zionism, which as The Labor Party has ruled the state from 1948 to 1977, in the early decades of the post-statehood period. State involvement in economy has taken place in agricultural and industrial development, investment, foreign trade, conducting labor market and incorporation of social groups in economic sectors. State apparatus exerted full control in mobilizing inflows of capital consisting of financial aids from Jewish organization around the world, and of American direct aid, and of German reparation payments. Accordingly, this has hindered emergence of private sectors until the 1990s. This interventionist politics in economy has led to military-industrial complex, which underpinned emergence of high-tech industry as from 1990s, as of the 1967 War.

As recession since the 1970s and the subsequent crisis hit the Israeli economy, to make reforms towards liberalization in the economy became one of the main targets for policy makers after the early of the 1980s. 1985 became a turning point for the transformation of the Israeli economy as ESP brought major deregulation in the economy. The process in which attempts to reconfigure the economic structure continued over the years. The Israeli economy has begun to integrate with global economy as 1990s with an economic boom. The last section of this chapter aimed at interpreting the economic trajectory of Israeli modernity via U&CD theory in the light of historical path offered in the previous sections. With a non-Western lens, the chapter tried to assess the economic modernization of Israel in the sense of arguing that the Israeli case in economic modernity may be categorized as a non-Western modernity.

The lack of strong capitalist bourgeoisie in Israeli economic trajectory also hindered the emergence of a strong democratic tradition contrary to Western trajectory in which urban bourgeoisie had played a key role in establishing and maintaining democratic governance (See Moore 1966). And the lack of a strong democratic tradition is a remarkable handicap for social modernity, namely secularization. So, the importance of the divergence of Israeli economic trajectory lies behind its influence on political and social trajectories, both of which are going to be analysed in detail in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER 6: THE POLITICAL TRAJECTORY OF ISRAELI MODERNITY- NON-LIBERAL ISRAELI DEMOCRACY

Functioning as one of backbones of the main argument suggested throughout the thesis, this chapter will study democratization, a crucial pillar of modernization, of the Israeli modernity in its own historical context from a non-Western perspective.

6.1 Introduction

As being one of the pillars of modernization process, political modernization embodied a vital importance. While Classical Modernization Theory (CMT) counts political modernization as democratization -namely liberal democracy- which is the natural result of economic modernization, MMP and U&CD perceive it as having an effective and centralized decision-making mechanism in a modern country. Analyzing political trajectory of Israeli modernity, namely Israeli democracy, which is considered as only democracy or an outpost of Western democracy in the Middle East (Wilner 2017; Beilin 1992), this chapter aims to show that Israeli non-liberal character goes to counter to CMT's Eurocentric hypothesis regarding political modernization. In this context, since the gap between qualitative and quantitative measurement of the democracy in Israel is enormous and inconsistent (see Dean and Mady 2006), it is even harder to evaluate Israeli case whether it is politically modern or not. So, quantitative elements in studying Israeli case will be used very rarely throughout the chapter.

The chapter is composed of five main sections and numerous sub-sections. The next party will touch upon a theoretical ground upon which liberal democracy is fixed by well-accepted scholars. The political trajectory, democratization, of Israel within its own historical course will be the main subject of part 3. It will be shown in this part that how Israeli path diverges, rather than converges to, from the Western trajectory, demonstrating various non-characteristics for a liberal democracy. Part 4 will try to read this divergent pattern through non-Western modernization perspective based on MMP and U&CD, arguing that MMP and

U&CD suggest the best framework for divergent case of Israeli political modernization. Finally, part 5 will give concluding remarks and a summary of the chapter.

6.2 Liberal Democracy on the Scholarly Literature

Before going into the political modernization of Israel, it is necessary to define what is a liberal democracy model, which is seen by modernization theorists as the keystone to understand political modernization, briefly based on the existing scholarly literature on political science. As the spirit of democratic governance comprises a basis for various conceptualization of democracy, the scholarly literature based on different conceptualization of democracy is vast. In other words, it is a fact that different understandings and practice of democratic governance brought about multifarious models raging from majoritarian, liberal to consociational type. Yet, it is likely to define the processes of decision-making of a society, out of which democracy emerges, despite its propensity for being contestable (Munck 200: 128-129).

Rather than the procedural conception of, which embraces only electoral procedures and to some degree political rights, it is the substantive conception of democracy that embraces a more inclusive and advanced character of democratic governance with civil liberties as well as political rights, and that is associated with liberal democracy by and large. Emerging worldwide democratic trend framed a stage on which the governance of great number of countries in the world have evolved into a form of governance displaying the features of procedural democracy but more importantly illiberal characteristics contrary to the core and the spirit of democracy (Zakaria 1997: 24). Such kind of stage makes necessary to carry the definition of democracy beyond the procedural one. In this sense, a liberal democratic governance is established on: 'effective participation', 'voting equality', enlightened understanding namely facilitation of the environment for the citizens to pass proper judgement (Dahl 1998: 37). Accordingly, a liberal democratic regime hinges on basic requirements: (i) freedom to form and join associations; (ii) freedom of expression; (3)

availability of alternative sources for information; (iii) free and fair elections; (iv) availability of institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expression of performance; (v) extent of political right to vote; (vi) right of political leaders to compete for support (Dahl 1971; Dahl 2000). 'The protection of minority rights' and 'the freedom of media' can be added to these mentioned as the former hinders the 'tyranny of majority', and the latter constitutes firm checking system on democratic governments in modern societies (Stier 2015). A consolidation in a procedural democracy towards substantive, liberal democracy is supposed to have a set of above characteristics specified in the scholarly literature. The next section will correspondingly study the democratization trajectory of Israel in accordance with these criteria in the context of political modernization.

6.3 The Unconsolidated Liberal Democracy in Israel

6.3.1 Authority Without Sovereignty: Jewish Self-government of The Labor Zionist Movement in the Yishuv Period (1920s-1948)

This section will present a historical path to Israeli political modernization in the pre-state period. The self-government experience of Jewish community in the pre-state era was the leading that had shaped the trajectory of political modernization as the socio-economic structure of quasi-state institutions dominated by the Labor movement in this era foreshadowed the external patterns of Israeli democratic governance.

The seeds of Israeli political modernization today can be found in the pre-state era. In parallel with the 'national home project', Zionist movement had started to organize in the early 20th century by itself and later mostly under the British Mandate regime from the 1920s onwards. Three distinct organizations, the *Histadrut* (The Central Trade Union) founded in 1920, The Jewish Agency in 1929, and The World Zionist Organization (WZO) in 1897, actively operated in the pre-state era as umbrella organizations. Organizing as a form of communal organizations with extensive service function at the beginning, the splits within

the precursor of Labor Zionism induced them to found political parties while their function to provide public service to Jews remained same. Having been organized mainly under *Hapoel Hatzait* and *Ahdut Ha'Avodah* by 1920 when the *Histadrut* was founded, the two has united as The Mapai (Palestine Workers' Party) under the umbrella of The *Histadrut* in 1930. Under the long-lasting leadership of David Ben-Gurion, the Mapai has been the key and dominant player in organizing and mobilizing Jewish community from the mid-1930s to the late 1970s. The increasing power of the Mapai not only consolidated the power of the *Histadrut* but also entrenched a 'labor hegemony' in the pre-state and the post-statehood period (Lucas 1974: 128-29; Halpern and Reinharz 2000: 229-267; see also Shapiro 1976).

The rise of labor hegemony meant the rise of the power of the *Histadrut* around which institutional complex was established by the Labor Movement. As the *Histadrut* grew, its functions and range expanded so substantially that it has begun to function as a 'state-in-the-making' institution. Many social services and activities ranging from employment opportunities, health, education and pensions, all of which are expected to be provided by a centralized government, were carried out by the *Histadrut*. Most importantly, the *Histadrut*'s quasi-state organizational functions were not limited to these as it had taxing and judicial apparatuses as well as economic activities (see Chapter 3). Given all these functions, it is likely to expect of an emergence of governing mechanism of all the functions. Voting rights entitled to the members have constituted The *Histadrut* Executive Committee (*Vaad Hapoel*) for four years, and the executive apparatus were controlled by the political parties (Grinberg 2017: 31-32; Sachar 1979: 65-85).

On the other hand, having been overshadowed by the *Histadrut* and the Jewish Agency, the foundation of 'National Council' could be traced back to the period of the Ottoman Turkish rule in Palestine. Jewish community's local autonomy given by the Ottoman rule in the 19th century created the enjoyment of the right to speak for the Jewish community in Palestine. Later in 1920, an executive organ, National Council, was elected by the active participation of parties and groups, which became the pivotal legislative apparatus of the Jewish community in Palestine (Lucas 1979: 135-139). Together with Zionist

collectivism derived from predisposition of Zionism's socialist wing, mechanisms were created for allocating resources based on legitimacy for which elections were benefited by the elites. Thus, elections have taken place in all 'national institutions.' Taken together, these institutions engendered a 'Jewish self-government' as well as the functional and external requirements of democracy in the grand scheme of the things during the pre-state era. However, having been far from Western-sense liberal democracy, it rather appeared as a procedural democracy based on consensual arrangements (Kimmerling 1999: 348-49).

In short, the labor movement within Zionism have made great efforts to have a central autonomy for allocating resources, and for absorbing migration waves to Palestine under the British Mandate. Resulting in the hegemony of labor movement in self-government constituted by quasi-state institutions such as the *Histadrut*, the Jewish Agency and the Palestine Executive of the WZO until the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, it hampered the emergence of or at least a burgeoning pattern of strong private initiatives such as a capitalist bourgeoisie class. In this self-government, having been underlain profoundly by Russian and Eastern European Jews, *Ashkenazis*, -later the founding fathers- collectivist predisposition for political modernization has come to the forefront while both power and status were held by a select elite, who was the combination of the 'collective aristocracy' of the land and the 'cooperative aristocracy of labor' (Ben-Eliezer 1993; Avni-Segre 1969: 346-51). All in all, both organizational and political precedence of labor over private class and capital constituted a distinct character of the pre-state Jewish self-government, passing to subsequent political regime as an inheritance in Israeli society (see Sager 1982).

6.3.2 After the Statehood: Democracy Without Bourgeoisie -Labor Force as the Engine of Democratization and the Rule of The Alliance of The Labor Party and The *Histadrut* (1948-1977)

In 1948, the Declaration of Israeli Independence announced that the State of Israel is a 'democratic and Jewish state' and warrants the equality of all rights to its all people while it

intimated the People Council as provisional and its executive branch as provisional government. The first election for a constituent assembly -later called as 'First Knesset'- was held on 25 January 1949. Notwithstanding, Israel's establishment as a democratic regime has social roots as well as political one tracing back to Jewish self-government in the pre-state era. *De facto* structural pattern based on non-liberal and collectivist viewpoint was moved to the newly independent state polity by political elites where there were no additional actors such as bourgeoisie that can carry and lead the process as in the Western trajectory. Institutionalized and effective organizational and political structure, which began to emerge after the second Aliyah in the 1910s and reached its matured embodiment under the British Mandate by 1948, became a prototype and headstone for establishing a democratic -at least institutional framework- state in Israel after the independence (Migdal 1988: 142-172). It is tenable to argue that exposure of both political elites and Jewish community to British Mandatory government, which granted large measure of autonomy and allowed free political activity, had many effects on the political modernization of independent Israel (Rubin 2009: 272; Neuberger 1990: 89).

It is a fact that the pre-state *de facto* self-government of Jewish community created a socio-political structure that is compatible with a modern polity structure. In this structure, Jewish Agency, the *Histadrut* and political parties have held hegemonic position as they carried out social, political and economic activities approximating to that of an established state (Halpern and Reinharz 2000: 311-318; Jones 1999: 159; see also Horowitz and Lissak 1977). The most vital feature of this structural pattern was the absence of a petty bourgeois or bourgeois, which strengthened Zionist collectivism based on socialism and hence its ideological counterpart, the Mapai's dominance by 1977. In other words, the small propertied class was so internally divided and poorly organized that it was unable to undermine the collectivist disposition of the Labor Zionism. More importantly, as ideological heritage passing to the post-statehood period by political elites, the collectivist viewpoint consolidated the non-liberal character of newly-established Israeli democracy (Eliezer 1993; Lucas and Troen 1995: 297-310). Reproduced and nurtured by reproductive mechanisms such as the *Histadrut* whose dominance has gone on until the creation of a capitalist class by the

privatization of the 1980s, the collectivist culture produced a non-liberal democracy as marked by dominance of the Labor Party by time when it lost elections in 1977. The concomitant result was that the middle class was not able to replace a liberal democratic regime that prioritized individualism as in the Western trajectory, France, the USA or England (Elizer 1993: 401). In other words, Israeli democratic regime was not a bourgeoisie-led process as in the West wherein strong bourgeoisie played the key role in establishing and consolidating democratic regimes (Moore 1966). Instead, Zionist political elite has taken the lead in establishing the state as a democratic regime where there was no any bourgeoisie class that could push the process in Israel (Nyrop 1979: 134-35).

The formation of the elite within Zionism occurred after the second wave of immigration to the land of Palestine between 1904 and 1914. Most of the founding fathers of Israel came to Palestine in this period. Hence, the formation of, and gaining power of political elites has taken shape within the Jewish community. David Ben Gurion, for example, has taken active roles in the establishment after holding the key positions in the *Histadrut* and the Mapai -the successor of the Labor Party (see Shapiro 1984). Uri Ben-Eliezer argues that two essential factors have played the major role in encouraging the political elites of Jewish community to adopt a collectivist and non-liberal world-view. The first was the influence of Russian society in which the development of liberalism followed a reverse trajectory as compared to the Western pattern. Given their diaspora background under Russian rule, Zionist political elites were considerably influenced by the current of thought based mainly on collectivism. The second was that exclusion of the Jews in Russia by tsarist regime prompted them to adopt collectivism as a Jewish salvation (Eliezer 1993: 399-400; See also Neuberger 1990).

Although the political system of the newly independent Israel has been established as a multi-party politics, Israeli political life could be characterized as 'dominant party' or '*de facto* one-party regime' as the political parties, the Mapai and its successor the Labor Party, of the Labor movement has dominated the Israeli politics from the first election in 1949 to 1977 when it was defeated by the Likud Party in the elections. Over long period of time after

the independence, Israeli democratization trajectory showed uncharacteristic patterns for liberal democracies -especially Western type- with the side effects of de facto one-party rule, namely the dominance of the labor movement.

Although it seems that the absence of effective independent social movements has become a condition for the political stability in the period between 1948-1977, it signified the non-liberal character of Israeli democracy wherein the political system was highly centralized and dominated by the Labor Party. Almost all institutions composed of social movements such as social organizations, lobby groups and mass media have close relations either with the political parties or with the party-affiliated organizations such as the *Histadrut*. Political opposition and social-political protests were naturally either absent or short-lived, being deprived of a capability to exert influence on the course of political events. For instance, although demonstrations against the agreement on reparations from Germany in 1952 seemed severe and unyielding, it never engendered large-scale movements and great changes in politics. The Labor Party's centralism hampered the growth of flourishing interest groups and civil society that are keystone for liberal values (Epstein 2017: 150; Mizrahi 2008: 150-52).

After the end of British Mandate in Palestine, the authority was left to a structural pattern in which its large body of authorities was dominated by the Labor Party. This all-powerful hegemony has lasted without any interruption by 1977. This hegemony prevailed not only in political sphere but also in the economic life of the country through social/collective organizations such as the *Histadrut*, the Jewish agency, the Kibbutzim etc. all of which were foundational to the political life in the country (Epstein 2017). Combining Zionist goals with the *Histadrut*'s self-interests, the dominance of the Labor Party had started in 1930s by having the control of bureaucratic apparatus and economic activities in Jewish comuunity (Medding 1972). The relationship between them has become more complex after the statehood, resulting in much more dependence of the Labor Party on the *Histadrut* which unlike a trade union functioned in many areas ranging from healthcare, pension insurance, employment, education to housing with several state-like apparatuses.

After the statehood, the Labor Party has taken on a mediator role in the trilateral relationship amongst the *Histadrut*'s quasi state functions, new state institutions and the Labor Party while its political power was underpinned by the control of the *Histadrut*'s apparatus over workers, public services and capital. In turn, large of amount of state subsidies directly and indirectly were allocated by ruling the Labor Party to the *Histadrut* and organizations dependent on it. Although the fragile balance between the three has maintained over years, it began to crack after the 1967 War, ending up with destabilizing balance between them (Grinberg 2017: 32-35). In other words, limited autonomy of individuals, especially Arabs and Oriental Jews, enabled various bodies and secondary groups to occupy the space between the government and the society.

At the theoretical and structural level, what was the most salient in this period, as uncharacteristic for liberal democracy, was the consensual politics between opposing groups, denoting the consociational model of Israeli democracy. Politics of accommodation has become the main source of the stability within which, except for individuals, political parties and affiliated organizations -the *Histadrut*, the Jewish Agency- incorporated. In this sense, Israel could be described as consociational democracy, major components of which are proportional representation, mutual veto rights, high degree of autonomy, and grand coalitions (Neuberger 1989: 70; Lijphart 1977: 25-52). Proportional principle in representation and allocation of funds can be easily seen in Israeli political system, allowing large segments of the society to have a voice in the Knesset. In this politics of accommodation, glaring feature was that achieving Zionist objectives through the Jewish state laid a foundation for the politics of coalition and compromise. On the other hand, the religious camps enjoyed a *de facto* veto power on certain religious issues as they have become coalition partners in every government with the Mapai (Galnoor 1989: 138-141). In sum, it could be argued that the continuous alliance between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox camps in Israel on state-religion issues signified the consociational approach having emerged from the early statehood to the late 1980s in Israeli democracy (Neuberger 1989: 70-71).

Also, amongst the distinct patterns, it is reasonable to point out the fact that in Israel there never was and has been a written constitution which would not only limit the government but also guarantee the observance of basic rights and freedoms. Namely, unlike in most of Western democracies -except for the United Kingdom- the protection of civil rights of people of Israel has been provided not by laws adopted by the legislative parliament but the precedent-setting decision of the Supreme Court and Basic Laws. Although a Basic Laws on Freedom and Dignity of Man was adopted in 1992, the fact that the existing Basic Laws can easily be overruled and amended by a legislative act adopted by simple majority (Neuberger 1989: 69; Epstein 2017: 152).

Also, given the fact that Israel has had severe and lingering conflicts with Arab states in the region, it is unlikely not to expect any ill effect of the military and political conflict on Israeli democratization. As one of the most troubled aspects of democratization in modern states, the civil-military relations have been the most affected by these conflicts in Israel. In two decades after the statehood, a policy and will to protect the civilian government from military oligarchy could be seen evidently by the war in 1967. Some measures for this kind of policy included banning the army members to become a candidate in the list for parliamentary membership, thus numbers of retired military members among representatives did not exceeded five. It also included making the appointment of the top commanders of the army. Taking all the measures into consideration, political propensity in civil military relations has been directed towards the protection of civilian government from military dominance (Epstein 2017: 151). However, the 1967 War became a turning point in the relations. National consensus in the security matters, referred to a consensus on the defense and foreign affairs such as the acceptance of territorial status quo created in the 1948, has begun to shatter following the occupation of new territories in the 1967 War. As the occupation created new movements outside the parliament such as Gush Emunim, the Peace Now movement, the blurring line between existing major political parties, the Likud and the Labor Party, became more apparent. On the other hand, the establishment of a military government, which had full legislative and executive authority in the occupied territories, has remarkably enfeebled the civil authority. Taking responsibility for the security and political

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issues of the military government, the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Coordination of Activities in the territories headed by a military chief has enabled the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) to take an active role in political sphere and have a voice within the civil ministries of the government. By extension, Israeli national army has taken functions and responsibilities that were very different from that of national armies in most of the Western democracies (see Peri 1981).

Also, it is appropriate to touch upon the link between bourgeoisie, existence of a free media and civil society to understand Israeli trajectory better. Like Barrington Moore argued, capitalist bourgeoisie has been the main engine of democratization in France, Britain and the USA as it could shape the political agenda through media and civil society independent from state control by insisting on its interests in the form of parliamentary governance (Moore 1966). Overpowering control of state is counterbalanced by a robust civil society and free media as it makes state accountable to social forces (Huber and Stephens 1999: 762). Thus, as in the Western trajectory, bourgeoisie assumes a guarantor position in democratization process by checking and balancing the executive, the state. Furthermore, together with the bourgeoisie, engendering social networks in which citizens can elicit information, both free media and civil society contribute in this process. Otherwise, the liberal character of the democracy would degenerate without one of them in an age in which mass communication prevails (Munck 2009).

In sum, although the State of Israel was established as a democracy by Zionist select elites, the absence of a bourgeoisie class and civil society that could function as a check and balance mechanism as in the West -France, the US and United Kingdom- is what set apart Israel from its Western counterparts. On the other hand, strongly resembling consociational model rather than liberal, political participation was confined to voting and membership in political parties and their affiliated organizations, and stability in Israeli political system was provided by these organizations rather than individual voting, showing a non-liberal character of democracy. Although Israel has performed all electoral procedures of a democratic governance in the three decades after the establishment, labor centralism,

underpinned by the Labor Party's dominance in political as well as administrative and economic systems till 1977, has manifested a non-liberal character of Israeli democracy. Also, changing civil-military relations after the 1967 War towards the direction of the dominance of the IDF could be regarded as an indicator of non-liberal character of Israeli democracy.

6.3.3 Far from Liberal Democracy: Unconsolidated Democracy and Liberal Attempts in Israeli Political Trajectory (1977 onwards)

The period between 1949-1977, during which the Labor Party held sway over the axis of the political system in Israel, terminated smoothly with '*Mahapach*', meaning electoral upheaval in the 1977 elections. Although the mechanisms of the collectivistic pattern with the hegemony of the labor movement nourishing the non-liberal character of Israeli democracy by the 1980s has begun to weaken after the mid-1980s, Israeli deviation from the trajectory of liberal democracy began to be more apparent. Regarding minority rights, enforced Jewish character of Israeli citizenship, troubled and fragile religion-state and civil-military relations, Israel democracy puts forward non-liberal attributes. This part will touch upon the deficiencies Israeli democracy showed after the end of the dominance of the labor movement in Israeli politics.

6.3.3.1 Minorities, a Non-Constitutional Democracy, a De Jure Non-Liberal Democratic Polity

Written constitutions are the keystone of most of the Western democracies, except Britain, as they became one of the vital instruments for curbing the absolute power of governments over individuals or citizens. As they occupy a higher place than ordinary laws within a legal system, having a constitution became a purpose in qualifying and protecting basic rights and

liberties based on human dignity within a country. Israel has been unable to draw up a written constitution due to the disagreement on the principles of Israeli political system since the foundation. The disagreement on how the state-religion (Judaism) relations must be has been the central factor hampering the adoption of a constitution as Jewish fundamentalist parties have been the main opponent of a formal constitution (Lerner 2004: 239). Also, Israel's obsession with existential threats, security, and Jewish character of the state have played a key role in not adopting a written constitution (Sen 2015: 108). Although the fact that Israel has not had a written constitution since the establishment seems a flaw for its democratization at first glance, the void of a written constitution has been filled by basic laws that have been enacted by the Knesset at various times. By now, 12 Basic laws on various issues ranging from referendum to judiciary were enacted in the country (See the Knesset's website).

Although the Declaration of the Independence of the State of Israel in 1948 enunciated that Israeli state "shall be based on the principles of liberty, justice and peace as conceived by the prophets of Israel; it will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens without distinction of religion, race, or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, education and culture", its lack of bindingness and inclusiveness, and reinforcement by a constitution or its substitutionary basic laws in Israeli legal structure, has been a hindrance to the establishment of a liberal democracy. The so-called 'constitution revolution', by which two Basic Laws (Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty) were enacted by the Knesset in 1992, was an attempt to take a step towards a liberal democratic pattern. The 'revolution', however, excluded number of basic rights and liberties such as rights to equality, freedom of expression, freedom of religion and conscience. Both laws also do not hint on de jure Jewish democratic character of the state. Furthermore, they included clauses authorizing the Knesset to enact laws violating values of the State of Israel as Jewish and democratic (Yonah 1999: 413-14). After all, Israeli basic laws are unable to protect the freedom of expression, the freedom of press, the freedom of religion etc. Also, Israel has not yet ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the virtue of the fact that some Israeli domestic laws collide with it.

Israel's definition as 'Jewish state' are one of the factors precluding the liberal characteristics of Israeli democratization as it evokes the blurring line between religious and ethnic connotations of being 'Jewish'. As a reflection of that, on the other hand, the Basic Laws: The Knesset article '7' clause 'a' empowers the authorities to outlaw any political party joining the elections if it does not approve and recognize the state of Israel as both Jewish and democratic (Yonah 1999: 418). Another flaw regarding de jure non-liberal characteristics of Israeli democracy pertains to in force anti-democratic laws that inherited from the British Mandate period. It should be indicated frankly that Israel has no law or legal binding document that provide a citizen with the right to freedom of speech and expression. Furthermore, the Press Ordinance of 1933 obliged a license for publishing a newspaper in the country as well as warranting the minister of internal affairs to close up any newspaper in case of a threat to public order. In parallel with that, Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 that is, too, still in force, enable authorities to annul a permit to publish a newspaper, and to censor on the subject which does not necessarily related to security matters. In the period between 1953-2002, 9 prominent newspapers, most of which were Arabic, have been either closed up or censored by the order of interior minister due allegedly to threats to public security (Neuberger 2015:729).

6.3.3.2 Citizenship Creating Exclusion of the Non-Jews

Arab-Israel relations within Israel came to be a litmus test for Israeli democracy (Dowty 1999: 8). The question arising from the particularistic (Jewish) character of Israeli democracy has been occupying the central place of debates on Israeli democracy especially after the war in 1967. Both the definition of Israel as 'Jewish state' and its lingering conflict with the Arabs have major ill effect on the status of Arab citizens in the country. Number of laws regulating issues ranging from immigration, the use of the state land to semi-governmental institutions, justify the supremacy of the Jews over, and discrimination against non-Jewish citizens (see Rouhana 1998). Comprising a basis for the exclusion of non-Jewish, not least Arabs, it is the social discourse of citizenship that introduces Jewish ethnicity as mandatory to be a party of

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the community in which one's status is determined in accordance with his contribution to common good. Thus, the exception of Arabs from military service, regarded as a vital contribution to common good, put them in a lower status than Jewish citizens. On the other hand, the fact that great number of social rights are conditional upon the fulfilment of service in the military makes the exclusion more severe (Ben-Porat 2011: 206-207).

Although they have been represented in very small proportion compare to their percentage in the country population, Israeli Arab citizens have right to vote and to be elected in the Knesset. However, they have great problems in enjoying full equal rights. For example, regarding settlement policy in the country, only Jewish people benefit from the opportunities created by the semi-governmental institutions such as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund, most of which implement the state's official policy of new settlement. Accordingly, governments expropriated many private lands whose former owner are Arabs to establish Jewish settlements. Natural result of this became a scarcity in Arab land sector. Also, the government's discriminatory expropriation has resulted in a disproportion between land acquisition and Jewish population in towns and villages (Neuberger 2015: 734-35). Also, Israeli regulations has made military service an obligatory duty for benefiting state aids, child allowances. Given the fact that Arabs are exempted from the performance of military service, many Arab citizens have been deprived of these social rights. This discriminatory act by the Israeli state has lasted by 1993 when it was stopped. Yet, an amendment to National Insurance Law, adopted in 2002, revived the discrimination against Arabs as well as Jews who do not serve in military by cutting 4 percent of the payments of child allowance and 20 percent of the payments of parents of child (Peled and Navot 2005: 16; See also Neuberger 2015).

Taking above-mentioned characteristics of Israeli citizenship into consideration, minority, especially Palestinian, in Israel has been exposed to an exclusion, alienation, and the sense of 'second-class citizenship'. Impeding the non-Jews from having a full-fledged citizenship, the exclusion has taken place not only in political rights but in social rights and benefits. Although Rabin government after 1992 has sought to enhance the rights of non-

Jewish citizens, especially Palestinians, and to weaken the exclusion, mainstream political force after 2000 reinforced the exclusion more and more, and diminished the rights of Palestinian citizens, which leads up to a non-liberal pattern of Israeli democracy (Peled and Navot 2005). It may be argued that the root of the exclusion stems from the self-contradictory definition implicit in the Declaration of the Independence that proclaimed ''complete equality of social and political rights without distinction of creed, race or sex', and Israel as 'the state of the Jewish people'.

6.3.3.3 'The Religious Status Quo' Reinforced by the Rising Power of Jewish Fundamentalist Parties in Israeli Democracy

The intricate relationship between the state and the religion -Judaism- in Israel uncovers an uncharacteristic pattern for liberal democracy. The religious 'status quo', (Rubinstein 1967) as an informal compromise reached by political and religious authorities in the early years of the statehood, has been the main driver in the relationship, by committing to the non-separation between the two in various areas of the state affairs. Israel is subjected to the religion in some official institutions and legislature. While the Ministry of Religious Affairs funds and gives autonomy to many religious organizations and education, the state allows the orthodox hegemony on personal status and family law as well as the body of laws, enacted by the Knesset, to foster religious observance in public sphere such as the Sabbath -Saturday in Hebrew- (Elman 2008: 81).

As common practice in liberal democracies, the freedom of religion in Israel was guaranteed by British Mandate Ordinance, *King's Order in Council* of 1922, which clearly indicated that ''all persons in Palestine shall enjoy full liberty of conscience, and the free exercise of their forms of worship subject only to the maintenance of public order and moral'' (UNISPAL, the United Nations). But the freedom from religion, as a right to prefer to be non-religious or not to be exposed to resort to religious authorities in civil and family issues, reveals Israel's warped trajectory, which is divergent from Western democracies, and is

moreover contradictory with its principles pledged in the Declaration of Independence (Neuberger 2015: 731-32).

As adopted in law, the religious establishment has a firm and only authority over marriage and divorce issue of every Israeli citizens in Israeli legal system. All Jewish citizens have been subordinated to the law of the Rabbinical Courts, regarding marriage and divorce, of 1953 without taking their consent to be subject to it. In practical terms, civil marriage is not recognized in Israel although it is legally possible outside of Israel. To take a legal recognition or validity, every citizen must marry in a religious ceremony directed by a religious man, the Rabbis in Judaism, in accordance with the rule of their religious law. Also, it is not legal to espouse with a person from different religion according to Israeli law, meaning that inter-religious marriage is impossible in the country. Additionally, Israeli law does not specify any connubial procedures for those who do not have a religious status. A person who have Muslim father is Muslim in Muslim law whereas a person must have a Jewish mother to be Jewish in Jewish law, for example. Since the two different religious laws contradict with each other, a person in such a status is neither formally. As this kind of legal practices means an unequivocal derogation of the freedom of conscience, it not only belies the liberal model of democracy but also contrasts with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Neuberger 2015: 731-34).

Although the presence and the participation of Jewish fundamentalist parties to democratic elections in a country contributes to the legitimacy of democracy, and promotes procedural democracy in that country, their contribution to liberal democracy is tenuous, perhaps none. In Israel, rising power of Jewish fundamentalist parties in the politics injures the liberal contours of its democratic polity (see Tepe 2005). They, as the main political guardian in the Knesset with parliamentary power, have played a key role in maintaining the religious 'status quo' in every coalition. In other words, the Jewish fundamentalist parties, to illustrate better, have a *de facto* veto power over any laws degenerating the issues of status of the religion and Jewish character of the State of Israel.

In sum, established in the early decades of the statehood, the permanent coalition based on mutual interests and consociational principle with orthodox religious groups has maintained together with the rising political power of Jewish fundamentalist parties. Having been the cardinal guardian of the religious 'status quo', Orthodox camp has held the balance of power in the Knesset throughout the Israeli political history (Yiftachel 1999: 378). Embodied in non-liberal character of Israeli democracy, the tenor did not change in the current Israeli political landscape. Although the Supreme Court interfered in some issues, the core of the religion-state regime contrived in the early of the post-statehood period has been upheld (Lerner 2013: 624).

6.3.3.4 Troubled and Fragile Civil-Military Relations in the Context of Liberal Democracy

The changing balance between the military and the civil authority in the countenance of the military has continued after the end of the labor hegemony in power. The law adopted by the Knesset in 1976 makes the defense minister in charge of defense to the governmental authority. Also, the head of the IDF is appointed by the government on the recommendation of the defense minister in accordance with the law. However, creating a gap in division of powers between the three, the provision of law leaves duties and responsibility of the each to their own initiative. There have been no legal and regulatory mechanisms to constitute a strong civilian authority independent of the control of the military (Peri 1983: 147-148; Etzioni-Halevy 1996: 405). The vague demarcations between Israeli political and security establishments have been manipulated easily and frequently (Schiff 1992: 646). This makes the civil-military relations both troubled and fragile in the context of democratization, being unable to preclude insubordination and indirect intervention of military elites to pollical arena. The fact that there has not been any coup attempts and great disputes between the civil and military wings does not mean that it would detract the liberal democratic consolidation in Israeli political trajectory.

After 1967, military elites have actively tried and managed to have an impact on political sphere in many ways due partly to the legal lacuna in the division of powers between the civil and military bloc. In terms of political and military elites, the close or almost unseparated relations between elites both from the military and political arena has foreshadowed the viability of Israeli democracy. In this sense, the top military officers actively supported and advocated various governments and policies, either in political negotiations or in public. In 1993, for example, the then head of general staff, Ehud Barak joined the negotiations of the prime minister with another party, *Yahadut Hatora* to convince it to join the coalition government. Also, regarding the share of military organs in policy formations, it has become a custom that the head of the staff actively has joined cabinet meetings since the 1967 War. Although he has not a right to vote officially in decision-making, their participation in the meetings enabled military official to bias the members, and to affect the decision-making process of the government (Etzioni-Halevy 1996: 406-408).

A manipulable civil-military pattern stemming mainly from the lack of a legal basis continued in the second half of the 1990s despite of some attempts to ease the impact of the IDF on political arena. Various attempts to establish a supervision body for the IDF's activities and actions and Benjamin Netanyahu's subsequent efforts to reform the civil-military relations have come to nothing (Bar-Or 2006: 366-68). Number of cases have clearly showed that the influential role of the security networks in decision-making of the civil authority has not waned and on the contrary became more observable. The most salient one has been about adjusting defense budget of the government. The civilian body of governance funding the security agencies does not have any power to supervise military body. In other words, the government and the parliament -the Knesset- join the process in which the defense budget is adjusted but this process is effectively overshadowed by the security establishments. The fact that the actual budget of Israeli Ministry of Defense approved by the government has been often increased without informing the government sheds light on this issue patently (Sheffer and Barak 2013: 87-90).

In sum, the changing relations between civil and military authorities has continued in favor of the security networks especially IDF, demonstrating its overriding power and influence in vital decision-making process. Security network at times has become more powerful than a political party in influencing major parties in an attempt to change government's policies (Sheffer and Barak 2013: 100-101). This kind of civil-military pattern, thereof, has negative reflections on Israeli democracy, revealing uncharacteristic for Western/liberal democracy.

6.4 Theoretical Insights: Assessing the Political Trajectory of Israeli Modernity

CMT's scholars equate political modernization with democratization, meaning that a modern society will end up with the establishment of a liberal democracy. On the other hand, MMP perceives a politically modern society as one having a centralized and effective decision-making mechanism. Democratic governance let alone liberal type may not be a foregone conclusion at the ultimate stage in non-Western countries (Wagner 2012; Arnason 2003).

As is shown in the previous parts, it is not likely to define Israeli regime as a liberal democracy. Number of shortcomings, ranging from troubled religion-state and civil-military relations to the exclusion of non-Jewish, undermine liberal democratic trajectory of Israeli political experience. Rather than a liberal democracy, Israel can be defined as a 'majoritarian ethnic democracy' referring to institutionalization of the dominance of one ethnic group over the others (see Smooha 1999; 1990; 2002) or can be defined as a procedural democracy since it properly and regularly fulfils procedural requisites for democracy. In this respect, it is not possible to put Israeli experience into the category of politically modern societies through the lenses of CMT since Israel could not reach a formation of liberal democracy within its own political trajectory. Yet, showing a divergent pattern from the Western trajectory, Israel can be regarded as politically modern through lenses of MMP given the fact that it has been holding centralized and effective decision-making mechanisms since the establishment.

Divergent trajectory of Israeli political modernization can be clearly seen in the foundation of Israeli state as democracy. Jewish community in the pre-state period had a relative autonomy without sovereignty, which allowed them to spread the seeds of the forthcoming political modernization. Led by the elites of the labor Zionism, most of whom were Eastern European Jews impressed by socialist ideas, collectivist movements halted the emergence of a strong or even petit bourgeoisie in the pre-state Jewish self-government. Since the labor movement got even stronger after the statehood by remaining in power by 1977, the emergence of a flourishing and full-fledged capitalist class became possible by privatization and liberalization attempts after the mid-1980s. As such, select elites, Zionist Labor politicians, have become the primary actor in initiating and maintaining political modernization in Israel where there were not any social forces such as bourgeoisie. In other words, a petty bourgeois as a social force as in the Western trajectory emerged in the country only after the economic and social infrastructure had already been put in place by the socialists/collectivist Zionist elites of the labor movement. This Israeli divergent pattern, 'democracy without bourgeoisie', contradicts with the emergence of democracy in the Western trajectory (France, Britain, the USA) where strong capitalist class -bourgeoisie- has played the primary role in forming and promoting democratic regime and, thus started the political modernization in the West (see Moore 1966).

Referring to the supposition that economic modernization would result in the emergence and consolidation of a liberal democracy in the social trajectory of modernity, CMT's argument, 'positive feedback loop' between the economic growth and democratization is unable to account for Israeli case. As chapter 4 clearly showed that Israel can be regarded as an economically modern state not only by MMP but also by CMT. However, today Israel's unconsolidated liberal democracy fairly falsify CMT's hypothesis based on the convergence of modernities. On the other side, arguing mainly that modernization occurs in multiple and various forms or ways between and within different societies, MMP and U&CD relatively provide more tenable framework in Israeli case through non-Eurocentric lenses. So, as it was tried to emphasize throughout the chapter, the globalization discourse is in contradiction with Israeli political trajectory as well as CMT,

namely modernization – the combination of social, political and economic changes- does not necessarily lead to democratization in a country.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter studied the Israeli political modernization (democratization) in the context of non-Western modernization perspective provided reasonably by MMP and U&CD theory. Israel's divergent trajectory from the West was studied in its own historical context along the chapter, pointing to the remarkable peculiarities of democratization, which are incompatible with a liberal character of democracies. Accordingly, the chapter hinges on the argument that Israel democratization trajectory patently diverged from the Western experience regarding liberal democracy as Israeli democracy has been established by elites of Zionist Labor movement without strong social forces such as bourgeoisie during the establishing period, and in contrast to CMT's argument that it has never possessed a liberal democracy model though it can be defined as an economically modern society. Thus, the Israeli political system possessed in own historical trajectory can be regarded as modern only through the lenses of MMP and U&CD theory.

CHAPTER 7: SOCIAL TRAJECTORY OF ISRAELI MODERNITY

This chapter will study social modernization trajectory, secularization, of Israeli modernization in historical context from non-Western modernization perspective, providing supportive arguments for the main theme of the thesis.

7.1 Introduction

Social development in modernization process is regarded as profoundly tied to secularization process of modern societies as CMT perceives socially modern state as secular one. Such perception of CMT scholars result from the inevitability of secularization for modernized society as observed in the Western trajectory where traditional thus religious values had been replaced by modern ones after high level of economic and political developments. Contrarily, theories in non-Western paradigm such as MMP does not associate the religion with modernity, not presuming a positive feedback between social and other pillars, economic and political of modernization trajectory. Distinct place of Judaism in Israeli state today is a fact one can discern simply. As the religion has never left the Jews and Israeli society totally, Israel has never become a full-fledged secular society. In this sense, showing divergent pattern from Western experience, Israel social development challenge to CMT. So, the chapter aims at reading the Israeli social modernity in historical context through lenses of non-Western paradigm by the means of MMP and U&CD.

This chapter falls into 5 parts. After this introduction, the next part will trace the roots of Israeli un-secularization process, analyzing the role of Zionist movement and the status of the religion in the pre-state period, and probing the roots of the established power of the religion, Judaism. Part 3 is going to touch upon how protracted un-secularization process by the 1970s was consolidated in Israeli society. Part 4 will offer an overall analysis of the rise of Jewish fundamentalist political parties and of ethno-religious identity after the 1970s. After analysis suggested in the previous parts will be assessed in the light of non-Western

modernization perspective in part 5, part 6 will offer concluding remarks of the whole chapter.

7.2 The Pre-State Period: The Roots of Israeli Protracted Non-Secularization

7.2.1 Secular Zionism in a Religious Mantle: The Inclusion of Religious Ethos into Zionism

As the Zionist movement has played the key role in nation-building process, it is crucial to note the relationship between Zionism and Judaism before statehood. As a new political and social movement, it is necessary and crucial for Zionism to make alliances with the religious Jewish communities so that it would gain broad support of whole Jewish people. The best way of achieving this was to attach religious ethos to Zionist ethos regarding modern Jewish nationalism. Inclusion of religious ethos of Judaism regarding national home, Jewish emancipation etc. into Zionist ethos had lingering effects on the secularization of Jewish society.

Zionism emerged as secular and nationalist movement committing to Jewish emancipation broken down by rising anti-Semitism in Europe in the late 19th and the early 20th century. This secular and nationalist movement expectedly was opposed by the religious authorities since it can potentially discard the religious particularism and thus dominance (Prior 1999: 67; Ram 2008: 62-64). Also, Zionist solution to Jewish problem, to establish a national home, contradicts patently with the religious messianic belief that sees Jewish salvation in the advent of Messiah. Furthermore, Theodor Herzl, leading actor of Zionist movement in the Europe, envisioned a Jewish state in which the separation of religion and state would prevail (Herzl 1934).

However, nationalist ethos of Zionism needed power of religion that potentially unifies Jewish people as Jewish identity blurs between Jewish as ethnic and Jewish as religion and most of Jews regard religion as a natural part of nationalist idea (Fisher 2013: 219-220).

To show power of religion within Zionist movement, 'Uganda Plan' that projected Kenya as Jewish settlement was fiercely opposed and rejected by the Zionist, and the Palestine has been highlighted as historical land for Israel again. In doing so, through various religious symbols, Zionism incorporated religious reference of promised land granted by the God into the movement (Ben-Porat 2013: 29-31). Zionism has capitalized on religious symbols, rites and myths to develop nationalism predicated upon holy land or territory that had biblical past in the national-building process. The main source of national culture was Hebrew culture and religious texts were reinterpreted by Zionism leadership (see Sternhell 1998; Don-Yehia and Liebman 1983). Principal concepts used by Zionist movement such as utopian idea of 'redemption of land' or 'return to Zion' were grounded on religious myths while vastly sorting through words from holy language, Hebrew that contains a lot of transcendental components to describe secular life (Kimmerling 1999: 145; see also Scholem 1997). All in all, providing legitimacy for territorial and national claims, civil -rather than traditional-religion has shared common ground with ostensibly secular Zionism. Indeed, Zionism has attempted to replace Judaism (as religion) with Jewishness via the civil religion, which was interpreted in accordance with own purposes (Ben-Porat 2000: 233).

Consequently, as the national secular identity moulded by Zionism withered away gradually especially after the 1930s, the ethos of Judaism, including the messianic ethos, nurtured the nationalist and secular ethos of Zionism through religious symbols, myths etc., which became more apparent after the statehood (Ram 2008: 64). This resulted in the continuity of the religion as a significant social and political force after the statehood. This instrumental role utilized by Zionist movement later turned into a political power derived by Jewish fundamentalist political parties, which would exert vast adverse impacts on Israeli secularization trajectory (Ben-Porat 2013: 32).

7.2.2 The Chief Rabbinate and the 'Status Quo' Agreement: The Roots of The Power of The Religious Establishment in Israeli Society

The most important religious establishment in the pre-state period was the Chief Rabbinate which inherited from the Ottoman rule in Palestine and was preserved by British Mandate. The Chief Rabbinate was expected to have sole authority in religious matters and Jewish law. Although the main purpose, via the establishment of the Rabbinate, was extension of state control over the religion, chief rabbi had a part in most of the Zionist executives. In doing so, it not only had authority over the religious matters, but also has exerted vast influence on appearing political structure. In other words, the establishment of such a powerful institution in the pre-state period guaranteed official power concentration for religion to interpenetrate both on state and society (Tepe 2008: 83).

On the other hand, roots of subsequent religious system could be based on 'Status Quo Agreement' reached in 1947 between secular (Zionist) side and religious side (ultra-Orthodox Judaism). Then-chairman of the Jewish Agency, David Ben Gurion sent a letter that involves some concessions over certain issues of the religion to religious party, Agudat Israel. Paving a way for religious-political and secular arrangements after the statehood, the components of 'the status quo' included: (1) embracement of Saturday, which is called as 'Sabbath' and considered as holy day in Judaism, as day of rest and prohibition of stores and public services on this day; (2) applying the Jewish dietary rules (Kosher food) in all public institutions; (3) giving jurisdiction to Orthodox rabbinate and rabbinical courts over marital and burial issues; (4) religious education in public schools and autonomy for ultra-Orthodox schools ('*Yeshiva*') and accordingly exemption of yeshiva students from military service (Rubinstein 1967: 113). Creating a religious stratum in Israeli society, the status quo has become a primary source and guiding principle in religious-political conduct after statehood (Fox and Rynhold 2008, 510). It also created 'autonomous areas for religious bloc and a strong religious layer of control over the society' (Tepe 2008: 85). In sum, status quo signifies commencement of subsequent religious-secular arrangements in Israeli society, and thus of religious-secular impasse undermining Israeli secularization trajectory.

7.3 After the Statehood: The Consolidation of Non-Secularization Process

7.3.1 The Consolidation of The Status Quo Arrangements and Religious Authority Until the 1970s

The state of Israel was not founded as a theocracy in which the God is regarded as the absolute authority. Yet, it was proclaimed as a Jewish state connotating ethno-religious affiliation and thus opening knowingly or unknowingly some doors for the religion. Indeed, undergirded by concessions made by the Status Quo covenant in 1947, Judaism, particularly Orthodox Judaism, was able to get a foothold in Israeli political as well as social system after the post-statehood period as in the pre-state period. In other words, Israeli secularization trajectory has been undermined by privileges and concessions given to religious authority and ethno-religious affiliation immersed in Jewish identity.

Believing that modernization process would wipe the religion out at the end in Israeli society, Ben Gurion, as a representative of political wing, made concessions to the religious orthodox camp in 1947. In exchange for the concessions that was made about how to maintain Jewish life in the public sphere in the state, Zionist movement would receive supports for a new state (Levy 2011: 98). The pro-religion concessions provided orthodoxy camp of the religious with a quasi-state authority over legal, social and somehow political issues, ranging from the enforcement of Jewish law, *Halaka,* in some spheres to adjudicatory prohibitions affecting social lives of all citizens like kosher foods.

All components of the status quo were carried into effect though ambivalently and not in all parts of the country. *Sabbath* (Saturday) was accepted as the official rest of day whereas entertaining facilities such as stores for shopping, cinemas etc. were closed (e.g. in Tel Aviv) on Friday nights, and public transportation was not allowed in some cities on Saturday. In 1953, all Jewish citizens were implicated in jurisdiction of Rabbinical courts impowered over issues of marriage and divorce as well as burial. On other hand, as the pig

is seen as prohibited animal in Judaism, two separate laws prohibiting the sale of pig products and pig-raising were adopted by The Knesset respectively in 1957 and 1962 (Rubinstein 1968: 114). As the two-tier, religious and secular, school system was officially accepted in 1953, state allowed of autonomous ultra-Orthodox schools that had own curricula and were funded by the state, the students of these schools have been exempted from the duty of the military service (Tepe 2008: 82). The observance of *Kashrut,* -Jewish rules for dietary- in public institutions and in some private sectors was supervised by Rabbinical courts imposing kosher licences for restaurants. Making a room for religious authorities, also government has refrained from making decisions on disputed issues regarding the observance of the guiding principles of the status quo (Ben-Porat 2013: 32-33).

The general ambivalent environment helped the status quo become an effective guideline for ostensible separation of religion and state in which the latter is relatively dormant. In the atmosphere full of challenges posed by state-building process just after the declaration of the independence, the national consensus over vulnerable matters such as religion was essential to survival and avoiding conflicts. As intimidated by the religious camp, secular marriage, for example, would lead to communal subversion of Jewish people, which would be the most unfavourable status in ambivalent atmosphere (Ben-Porat 2000: 236). In this sense, consensus reached in the pre-state order had to be maintained in regard to the status quo arrangements. *Mamlahtiyut*, as the main consensus in early decades of statehood, made the principles of the status quo operational as it focused on external security threats and challenges of newly independent state by prioritizing the survival of the Jewish state. This unequivocally corresponded to short-term and long-term interests and political power of the Jewish fundamentalist parties in the parliament. Since Israeli political system does not allow any party to have absolute majority in The Knesset, it is necessary to form a coalition government with the fundamentalist parties though they are very small. In a win-win cooperation with the Mafdal (The National Religious Party), which has become a part of all coalition governments by 1992, the Labor Party has consolidated its hegemony over foreign and security policies in exchange for tolerating Orthodox interference in social and political life until 1977. Thus, the fundamentalist parties have played a gatekeeper role for

preserving arrangements provided by the status quo although they have been represented by small votes (Kimmerling 1999: 352). Given the all circumstances mentioned above, it could be argued that the relationship between religion and state was based on the politics of accommodation which preserved the status of the religion as a powerful socio-political force (Cohen and Susser 1996: 820-823; Cohen and Rynhold 2005: 728-730; see also Don-Yehiya 1999a; Don-Yehiya 1999b). Pragmatic concerns such as to build national unity and to deal only with troublesome process of state-building thus to canalize energy of society to economic development, has compelled political parties (The Labor Party and National Religious Party) to follow a politics of accommodation based on reciprocal compromises.

What the most importantly contributed to maintenance of the status quo was collective national creed contingent on Jewish religion. The mass migrations consisted of diverse country of origin after statehood obliged the political elites to adopt tradition cultivated by Jewish religion (Ram 2008: 65-66). This is much interlinked with nationalist ethos that sought to transvalue religious posture -symbols, values etc. Carved out in the pre-state period, the interdependency between religion and nationalist ethos formed by Zionism has played the key role in formation of such a creed. The religion either in the garb of tradition or in nationalism was regarded as one filling, at the common ground, the gap between religious and non-religious -secular- who hinges on the religious ethos either via nationalism or tradition. In other words, interconnected texture of the Jewish religion and nation in Israeli society constrains the non-religious and the secular from adopting marginal and pro-active attitude towards religious status quo. The most concrete manifestation of this can be seen in non-secular-nationalist definition of the Citizenship Law in I952. The law in question sets the criteria for citizenship in non-secular-nationalist and religious way by giving citizenship to a person who is born of a Jewish mother, or who has converted to Judaism, and who is not from another religion (Ben-Porat 2013: 33).

On the other hand, in parallel with the *sui generis* nexus between Jewish religion and nationalism, difficulty to keep religion, Judaism, out of the public sphere and state affairs in Israeli society results from the role religion plays as indispensable instruments especially

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after the 1967 War. One of these instruments included the need to legitimize newly-occupied lands after the 1967 War. The Religious camp regarded these occupied lands as the homeland of biblical Israel and deemed that Jewish society in Israel is on the way of redemption which had already dawned with the establishment of the State of Israel. Accordingly, prevailing view among the religious was that these territories should belong to the state of Israel (Ottolenghi 2002: 47). Hence, messianic/religious belief, 'promised land', of Judaism provided the Israeli government with the rationale that occupied lands are a blessing from God thus their natural right. Another instrumental role is religious legitimation for national identity towards rising Arab population after the occupation. The predominance of religion in public sphere, in fact, is crucial to demarcate Jewish national exclusivity towards Arabs who have begun to be more apparent due to rising population after the occupation. Namely, religion had to be on stage both for the exclusion of Arabs and for legitimation of new occupied lands. (Ram 2008: 66-70).

Shored up by the arrangements of the status quo, implicit religious power could also be observed in how to resolve the issue of national conversion that became nation-wide problem after the immigration waves triggered by the Law of Return. As the Law of Return declare that every Jews around the world may move to state of Israel and take Israeli citizenship, it does not indicate who a Jew is. Since the religious (Halachic) and secular interpretation of who a Jew is differs from each other, political debates intensified on the question, who is a Jew? after establishment. Then prime minister, Ben Gurion has expressly stated that religion authority should not be superior to state authority and preferred the non-religious interpretation of the Law of Return, which means that every Jews who wanted to be Jew would be so. However, religious pressures such as the resignation of the Mafdal's (National Religious Party) from coalition governments led him to retreat, resulting in amendment of the Law of Return and new approach of conversion that dictated non-Jews to alter their personal status only by religiously converting to Orthodox Judaism. Thereupon, being consisted of Chief Rabbinate and several ministries, a state conversion authority, which has dealt with number of cases so far, was founded (Fisher 2013: 224-227; Waxman 2013: 38). Since the Chief Rabbinate has held a more powerful position, the Halachic interpretation

of issue of 'who is a Jew?' has preceded the secular one form the 1970s onward. In parallel with the rise of religious/nationalist groups, this in the end showed that religion has not faded in public and current problems in Israeli society as involvement of state in conversion is broadly recognized and welcome by other camps of societies even the non-religious and recently became a national phenomenon (see Fisher 2013).

To conclude, the relationship between the religion and the state in Israel by the 1970s can be defined as one dominated the former in different sectors ranging from personal status on marriage, burial and conversion to religious education in government schools (Gross 2003). The power of the Jewish fundamentalist parties in the Knesset provided them with a gatekeeper role in preserving the status quo arrangements through politics of accommodations deemed to prevent a religious-secular conflict during the state-building process. The nexus between Jewish religion and nation, which has been further invigorated by the Zionist movement since the early 20th century by capitalizing on religious symbols, values rites, made another contribution to the ascendancy of the religion during this period while the *Mafdal* as a religious party has been supportive and justifier of Zionist nationalism in political arena. On the other hand, as the relative weakness of secular challenge makes status of religion stronger and somewhat given, secularism failed to be a mobilizing force in secularization process in this period.

7.4 After The 1970s: The Ascendance of Ethno-Religious Identity and Jewish Fundamentalist Political Parties

It could be easily argued that the demise of the Labor Party evoked the rise and visibility of the religion in Israeli society, paving the way for cementing the inextricable nexus between religion and nationalism with indispensable effects of the conflicts with Arabs states from the 1970s onward (see Eisenstadt 2008). The growing conflicts and tensions between the Arab countries from the late 1960s onward sparked a national conscious towards nationalism, which clinched the plurality of right-wing nationalist camp headed by the Likud Party in the

1977 elections. Relatively low façade of the secular stream during the era of the Labor hegemony turned into national religious stream, which has been stood for by the Likud, the Mafdal and the Shas Party -founded in 1983- (see Ram 2008). In this sense, while the status quo arrangements have been preserved, incorporating much more into social and political forces, the religious stream found its own ontological meaning in the relationship between the three; the God, the land and the people (Fisch 1978).

New ethos could be observed in several cases such as changing strategy of the Mafdal. During hegemony of the Labor Party, the Mafdal as the strongest religious party has dealt mostly with internal issues regarding status of the religion such as preserving of the status quo acquisitions. However, its focal politics has unprecedentedly shifted to the politics of right wing ever since the 1970s. Actively supported by a religious fundamentalist movement, *Gush Emunim*, (Bloc of the Faithful), it has become the most prominent proponent of the construction of the settlements in the West Bank while encouraging the students of religious schools (Yeshiva) to perform military service. The support of *Gush Emunim*, founded in 1974, was crucial in the sense that its ideological tenets merely were derived from the messianic ethos of Judaism, 'divine redemption via settlements in the occupied areas'. The messianic settlement policy of Gush Emunim has become a driving force for Israeli policy makers both in domestic and foreign affairs as it has also become a virtual political player of right-wing politics in Israel by now (Newman 2005; Ottolenghi 2005: 46-47).

7.4.1 Untamed Fundamentalist Political Parties as one of the main actors in politics and the vanguard of the religious status quo

Pursuing their own political goals in secular politics, political parties with fundamentalist tendencies exist in Israel as in most of the Western democracies. However, Israeli case shows distinct characteristics, marking, in real terms, an evidential reasoning for unfolding how the religion drives the social trajectory of Israeli modernity. Deeply associated with the secularization trajectory of Israeli modernity, the ascendance of Jewish fundamentalist

parties reflects another dimension in the state-religion relations. This section will touch upon the roles fundamentalist political parties have been playing in Israeli secularization trajectory since the foundation.

Israeli fundamentalist parties show an unprecedented characteristic, which amounts to the fact that 'the power of political group is greater than its strength' (Arian 2005: 152). To illustrate better, although fundamentalist parties have never gained seats below 13 in the Knesset that had 120 members from 1949 to 1999, it was a satisfactory majority to make them essential and irreplaceable partners in the Israeli politics in which government without coalition has been never formed by now. Since the dominant left and right parties have depended on fundamentalist parties for the vote of confidence, they have come to form coalition governments with the fundamentalist parties since the establishment. In this sense, the Mafdal became the key fundamentalist pillar of almost all ruling coalitions by the 1980s by controlling the Ministry of Religious Affairs as well as by checking and preserving the status of the settlement in the occupied territories after the 1970s. On the other hand, having been able to be an essential axis in the following coalitions, the Shas Party (Religious Guardians of Sephardim) usually succeeded to preserve the system of religious education, the exemption of the students of this system from military service, and status of Orthodox Halachic law over personal and social issues such as marriage and burial (Elman 2008: 81-82; Tepe 2008: 288).

The arrival of the Shas Party in the 1980s amounted to the rise of fundamentalist power in political scene as it enunciated enhancing of religious status and protecting the interests of Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews against the Ashkenazi and the secular. In doing so, relatively isolated pursuit of policy it has followed came to an end, accepting the authority of its de facto supra council, the Council of Torah Sages. The underlying importance of the Shas as a fundamentalist party was the fact it virtually buttressed the political bloc of those claiming 'return to religion and religious status quo' although they differ from each other in some unimportant matters.

Given the fact that unlike in the Western world, political world in Israel falls into two clearly-divided camps, one can perceive how the religion plays a vital role in shaping the main stream of the society. What two pivotal fundamentalist parties, The Mafdal and The Shas, have commonly shared is the influence of non-political religious authorities upon their decisions and actions, which is unseen in the Western world where the Church and fundamentalist parties are separated from each other strictly. In Israel, whereas the Chief Rabbinate has been holding a determining role over The Mafdal's policies, the Council of Torah Sages holds ultimate authority over the Shas Party. There is a relationship based on mutual interests, meaning that political leaders are dependent on the appeal of religious authority in electoral campaigns whereas religious leaders are dependent on political parties in taking religious compromises from secular authority. In sum, unlike in the Western states, in Israel non-political religious leadership has intertwined with the leadership of fundamentalist political parties (Hazan 1999b: 170).

To demonstrate how effective the fundamentalist parties have been in Israeli society, it would be suitable to shed light on the settlement movements epitomized by (ultra-radical) religious movements such as Gush Emunim in the occupied territories. They have utilized state sources which they accessed via their network in the parliament -the *Mafdal* which has held several governmental positions in ruling coalitions- in order to construct settlements in the occupied areas with the rationale of 'return to the promised land' and with their political theology, the reconstruction of Israeli state as a Jewish state in which Jewish law prevails (Baumgart-Ochse, 2009: 1122-1124). Having been impeding the peace process in the 1990s (Oslo Peace Process) and the subsequent initiatives in later years, such 'Judaization' policy in these disputed areas has also impinged on the foreign affairs of the state as the settlement in these areas has become one of the matters upon which disputed parties have not agreed yet.

To sum up institutional (non-political) and political authority (fundamentalist political parties) in Israel are intertwined, which makes different it from the Western countries. The political power of the fundamentalist parties, due to Israeli parliamentary

system forcing the secular parties to form a coalition with them, makes the established religious authority one of the main actors in Israeli politics. As such, their survival and untamed status in all governmental coalitions remark this fact, making, in political arena, their bloc a vanguard and guarantor of the religious Status Quo founded in the pre-state period, and impeding the secularization trajectory of Israeli modernity.

7.4.2 Secularization Without Committing to Secularism: The Absence of a Steadfast Secular Challenge

Despite restricted and lack of an ideological buttress gingered by secularism, some secular reforms in some areas manifested in Israeli society in 1990s. The religious status quo deemed to be constitutive to Jewish character of the society has been challenged. This new challenge, however, did not come from the inner or innate forces of the demands of the secular but from outside dynamics such as rising consumption triggered by liberal reforms in the economy, and the immigrants from the countries of former Soviet Union. In this context, a partial flexibility occurred in some religious arrangements regarding civil marriage and burial, allowing of shopping on Sabbath (Saturday) and of selling pork (Ben-Porat 2013).

As Russian Jews immigrating to Israel after the collapse of Soviet Union are not recognized as orthodox Jews, they were not allowed to be buried in orthodox cemeteries and their marriage was not religiously recognized, which posed a great challenge on them taken together. With highly pragmatic concerns, their private initiatives such as applying to supreme courts etc. have brought some flexible changes in marriage and burial. Accordingly, the marriage of most Israelis who marry abroad is recognized by the state as civil marriage, and civil cemeteries were established by the state as well as by private initiatives largely for alternative burial of Russian immigrants. On the other hand, rapid economic growth in the 1990s created a consumer culture igniting a boost in commercial activities. It is impossible not to expect the impact of such a culture on limitations of shopping on Sabbath by encouraging the non-religious to demand some changes or flexibility of religious restrictions.

With the additional support of economic entrepreneurs, the restrictions were minimized whereas selling pork was allowed and restaurants selling non-kosher foods were freely opened (see Ben-Porat and Feniger 2009). In sum, an economic and pragmatic rationality played more roles than ideological forces, which is mobilized by secular concerns, in this limited secularization that has started in the 1990s. It was so limited that it has been unable to diminish the established impact of the religious status quo.

It could be argued that several reasons could be accounted for the lack of a strong secular challenge, which makes the secularization attempts both dependent on outside dynamics and limited or futile. The traditionalist dispositions of Israeli society have remained intact because of the blurred line between Jewish religion and Jewish nation. A civil religion emerging out of this the blurred line has been cultivating Zionist ethos whose weak secular ethos is unable to compete with the inextricable power of the religion and religion-dependent Jewish identity that encompasses all individuals of the society regarding the secular. When this religion-dependent identity consolidates with the lingering religiosity of the Jewish people, it is likely to behold a secular who perfroms religious practices. This really makes the line between the sacred and the secular quite blurring in the modern Israeli society (Troen 2016). Many who define themselves as a non-religious may also join in religious rituals during the holy days (such as Passover) or other private rituals such as marriage and burial. Hence, the blurred boundary between the sacred and the secular is an extant social fact which can be observed easily. This has negatively impacted on the emergence of a conducted secular challenge to the religious status quo on which Jewish self-identity is based as well. As such, such embedded self-identity has been adopted by the secular as well as the religious. Taken together, as the religious authorities, political parties and institutions did not wane considerably, the religion never ceased to exit, and remained as a socio-political power since the foundation in Israeli society. On the other hand, both the ingrained religiosity and national ethos embedding in the religion have impeded the secularization trajectory, leading to the entanglement of the religion and the state affairs as well as paving the way for an ambivalence of secularism and the secular groups in Israeli society (Ram 2008; Levy 2011; Ben-Porat 2013).

Israeli secularization trajectory has come to be very uncharacteristic compared to the Western modernization trajectory. Today in Israel a governmental chief rabbinate, The Chief Rabbinate, funded by the state has been holding its own position. Receiving funding from the government, private religious schools having their own curriculum and being supervised by the Chief Rabbinate run independently from the national education system in Israel today. Israeli citizens have to marry in a wedding ceremony conducted by an orthodox rabbi to be recognized within the law. Only marriage of couples who married abroad such as Cyprus is legally recognized as a civil marriage. Similarly, the burial ceremony of a citizen must be conducted by an Orthodox official rabbi so that the dead could be buried in the municipal cemeteries. Furthermore, supervised by the Chief Rabbinate, rabbinical courts have been keeping the hold of the jurisprudence of the laws regarding family and personal issues such alimony, inheritance, divorce and definition of who is a Jew as well as marital and burial issue (Chalom 2014: 53-56).

As for public sphere, all the religious holidays in Judaism is the official holidays of the state, which resulted in two major implications. The first is that public services and transportations do not operate on Sabbath (Saturday) even this is imposed on private initiatives sometimes (See Jamal 2009: 1160-1161). The second is that there is still an obligation of closing of shops and malls on the holidays in some cities. In case of any violation, responsible ministries, which is controlled usually by the fundamentalist political parties, fine shops despite some flexibilities in imposing the ban over two decades. Less importantly, also kosher catering prepared according to the Jewish dietary laws is mandatory in the all official institutions whereas the law in 1994, enacted by the attempts of the Jewish fundamentalist parties in the Knesset, constrains from importing non-kosher meat (Jamal 2009: 1129-1162). Taken together, all above indicate an uneven relationship between the state and synagogue affairs, which is dominated by the latter as the institutionalized religious authority is not deprived of a legal status and infrastructure having been constructed by various laws enacted by the Knesset.

7.5 Theoretical Insights: Assessing Israeli Social Modernity with the Lenses of Non-Western Modernization Perspective

So far, the chapter presented the trajectory of social modernization perceived as secularization of Israel within its own historical course. Taking the analysis offered by now into consideration, it is proper to ask such question: Is Israel socially modern (secular) society today? and is there a 'positive feedback' between the social and economic trajectory of Israeli modernity? As emphasized in Chapter 2, CMT presumes the wane of religion and religious authorities in a socially modern society. As CMT argues, the ascendance of religion either in the form of religiously oriented political parties or social movements is not likely in modern societies as traditional and religious ethos are replaced by modern ones. One of the factors giving way for the wane of religion in a modern society, for CMT, is high economic development.

Contemporary Israeli experience refuted CMT's prediction that is based on the inevitability of secularization. The State of Israel has never embarked on a far-reaching secularization program. As such, one cannot see strong and uncompromising secular elites, groups or political parties who can challenge to the religious status quo, and religious establishment has been guaranteed by laws. The religiosity of the society has remained lingering, and the religion has been occupying a remarkable place in the public sphere since the establishment of the state although it has achieved a high economic growth (see chapter 4). More importantly, it has a jurisdiction based on the Jewish law over personal status through the rabbinical courts. CMT falls short of expounding the survival and ascendance of religious political parties who have had a highly fundamentalist agenda and have become a power broker in Israeli politics by safeguarding the religious status quo established in 1947.

On the other hand, MMP envisages a flexible social modernity that does not necessarily result in a secular society. For MMP, secularization on the way of social development is not necessarily requisite as it does not presume a positive feed-back between social, economic and political developments. In this sense, since Israel reveals the

characteristics of an economically modern state, it could be classified by MMP as a modern state even if it could not attain a highly secular society in which religion almost ceased to exist. So, the Israeli trajectory diverges from that of the West where the social development, secularization, had taken place in parallel with the economic development.

Table 7.1

U&CD and Israeli social modernity

Whip of external necessity	o Survival instinct
Historical reshuffling	o Natural bond between Jewishness as religion and Jewishness as nation o Religious Status Quo concord
Substitution	o Rabbinical Courts and Chief Rabbinate o Enduring survival and ossification of (ultra) fundamentalist political parties

Source: Author.

Beyond CMT, as well as MMP, U&CD could be utilized in assessing the Israeli social trajectory (see Table 7.1). In the sense of conforming Western modernity, Zionism began to challenge to the religious ethos of the Jews in the early 19th century even though it did not refuse some messianic beliefs totally such as 'return to home'. But as a *historical reshuffling*, the natural bond between nation and religion in Jewishness was a major hindrance to organic emergence of a secular movement among the Jews. As such, in 1947, at the very beginning

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of the establishment of state of Israel, grand concessions were given to the religion in the agreement (the Status Quo Agreement) between Zionist founding fathers and the orthodox religious camp. The Status Quo arrangements were crucial in the sense that they come to underpin the lingering religiosity of Jewish people, helping the religion not to wane in the public sphere. The establishment of Rabbinical Courts, which have jurisdiction over personal status based on the Jewish law, and of the Chief Rabbinate, which is the ultimate religious authority on all the religious matters, are unexpected outcomes emerging out of the divergent path of Israeli social modernity. Deeply tied with the unwavering status of the religion, which mainly stems from the inextricable nexus between Jewish religion and Jewish nation, an unprecedented influence of (ultra) religious political parties in Israeli politics could also be classified as 'substitution' in the Israeli trajectory (see Table 7.1).

7.6 Conclusion

Aiming at analyzing the relationship between Zionism and the religion, and the status of the religion in the pre-state period as reinforced by a preserved authority -The Chief Rabbinate-, the second section of this chapter showed that the religion had a strong place in the pre-state period, and even though Zionism emerged as a secular movement, the religious ethos was dominant in mobilizing the movement. With the purpose to propound un-secularization trajectory of Israeli society during the period of the statehood, part 3 expounded a protracted trajectory of the religion in its own historical context. In this sense, it was claimed that the religion never ceased to exist in Israeli society as it has been reinforced by the self-reinforcing character of Judaism stemming virtually from the inseparable nature of Jewish religion and Jewish nation and by religious establishment represented by the Chief Rabbinate, rabbinical courts and ultra-religious political parties in the Knesset. Lastly, part 4 evaluated distinct pattern of Israeli social modernity through the lenses of non-Western modernization perspective, MMP and the U&CD, arguing that albeit Israel has achieved a high economic

growth, it has never embarked upon a far-reaching secularization program thus it diverges from the Western path in contrary to the supposition of CMT scholars.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

This chapter will offer concluding remarks of the whole thesis, potential objections and some avenues for future researches, functioning as an epilogue and sum of ideas suggested along the research.

8.1 Concluding Remarks

Can the divergent trajectory of the non-Western societies be a proof for a new challenge in modernity? Can Israel be evaluated as a non-Western society from modernization perspective contrary to the common assumption that Israel is a Western country? This thesis hinges on the main argument that the State of Israel is not a western country contrary to what is popularly believed. As Israeli modernity diverges from Western modernity, and therefore it evidently challenges the 'convergence thesis' that the non-Western societies embarking on modernization will inevitably converge on Western values romanticized by Classical Modernization Theory (CMT) and the globalization discourse. The thesis also argues that this could be proved through the non-Western modernization perspective which takes inspirations from the Multiple Modernities Paradigm (MMP) and the Uneven and Combined Development Theory (U&CD). To prove it, the thesis studies the case of Israel in three trajectories -economic, political (democratization) and social (secularization)- in its own historical context.

As chapter 5 of the thesis tried to show, Israeli economic trajectory diverges from Western economic trajectory. Israeli society today can be regarded as an economically modern society by all modernization theories as it is a highly industrialized and urbanized society with high life standards. However, what is the most remarkable fact observed in Israeli economic trajectory is that Israeli economic development has been mostly driven by state-led initiatives rather than private or social initiatives such as a capitalist bourgeoisie class unlike in the Western trajectory (France, Britain and the USA) where capitalist

bourgeoisie class has become primary initiator and driving force of economic modernization (Moore 1966). Namely, as Israeli state and state-like organizations such as the *Histadrut* have played the role in launching and pushing forward economic development of the society, Israel followed a divergent trajectory from that of the West. More importantly, this economic divergence naturally impacted on the other trajectories.

As chapter 2 of this thesis showed, CMT argues for a positive feedback loop between economic modernity and democratization, which means that high economic growth of modern society will necessarily result in a liberal democratic regime. However, although Israel could be classified as an economically modern society by CMT as well as MMP because of its high economic growth (see chapter 5), chapter 6 of the research clearly showed that high economic growth of Israel did not lead to a consolidated liberal democracy. Contrarily, the non-liberal façade of Israeli democracy outweighs liberal façade of its democracy as it has demonstrated many shortcomings, ranging from troubled civil-military relations to the exclusion of the non-Jewish, which undermines liberal character of Israeli democracy. On other hand, as is showed throughout chapter 6, a strong capitalist class - bourgeoisie- has not played a primary role in establishing and promoting democracy as in the Western trajectory. Instead, a small group of Zionist political elite was the main driving force in initiating political trajectory of Israeli modernity as the emergence of an independent capitalist class became possible only after the mid of the 1980s. In other words, Israeli democratization has been an elite-led process rather than a bourgeoisie-led process seen in the Western trajectory.

One of the most distinctive trajectories of Israel is social, secularization, trajectory as it remarkably refutes CMT's hypothesis that secularization is irreversible as traditional values necessarily disappear in a modern society. As chapter 7 sought to demonstrate, the lingering religiosity of Jewish people has negatively affected on Israeli secularization. As well as very observable place of the religion (Judaism) in the public sphere, the distorted state-religion relations and the unshaken standing of the religion in the various sectors of Israeli society today reflects this fact. Furthermore, although it can be classified as an

economically modern society, Israel has never embarked on a far-reaching secularization program or there has never been a strong challenge to the religious status quo whose basis was laid in the early years of the statehood. In the light of these, this lingering religiosity of Israel is more similar to non-Western cases such as Turkey where religiosity did not wane although it reached high economic growth in economic trajectory (Göksel 2015). After all, unexpected outcome of Israeli social modernity portrays deterministic theorem of CMT as a fail to comprehensively understand modernity and modernization.

A modernization process does not follow a fixed, single and determinate way, producing unexpected and uneven patterns. Based on the Israeli case studied throughout this thesis as well as on the other non-Western cases such as Iran (see Matin 2013) and Turkey (see Göksel 2015), the foremost finding of this research is that the non-Western perspectives such as MMP and U&CD used in this research are more accurate in assessing and comprehending the uneven outcomes of cases such as Israel. Hence, it can be argued that the idea of a universal modernity is a myth. We need more inclusive and non-determinist approaches capable of understanding the diversity of non-Western and many western societies in our age. This is also necessary for future societies that will appear on the world stage. Challenging the Eurocentric impasse of the existing modernization theories, MMP and U&CD can do that as this research and the others showed clearly and thus give a new way for the modernization studies.

8.2 Potential Objections

One of the first objection this research may receive is that primary sources have not been used for the analyses suggested along the thesis and the absence of primary sources is a disadvantage for a research of this kind. However, it should be indicated that accessible primary sources have been used throughout the thesis. Especially statistical indicators, which have a vital importance for the economic trajectory, haven taken from the primary sources such as the reports or the yearbooks of the UN. Also, it should be known that the primary

sources that are not within the bounds of the possibility of access for the author would not make much sense for the qualification and the originality of the research.

Another objection that may be received for this research is that although Israel is classified by some democracy ranking institutions as highly democratic, how can it be a non-liberal democracy? Firstly, the contradicting results of the measurement of democracy raking institutions makes data sets offered by such institutions unreliable: whereas an independent institution classifies Israel as highly democratic, another one measures it in a low rank. For this reason, reliance on the indices they reveal are very problematic for the measurement of Israeli democracy. Also, such an objection makes a room for a very deep and controversial intellectual debate: How can a democracy be measured most accurately. In this sense, the quantitative measurement of such institutions has not been used in chapter 6. Instead, based on the scholarly literature, some criteria for liberal democracy was specified at the beginning of the chapter to understand Israeli democratization better. Otherwise, as it is beyond the scope of this king of research, going into such a debate on the quantitative measurement of Israeli democracy would mean a deviation from the original purpose of the research.

8.3 Further Research Suggestions

Given the fact that this thesis has sought to explain the phenomenon of modernity from a non-Eurocentric and non-Western perspective by studying Israeli society as a case, it is likely to expect that it can be one of the vanguard studies of future modernization studies on the non-Western cases. Challenged by the economic rise of the Asian countries such as China and Japan, the non-Western perspective in modernization studies have diversified recently. The prominence of the so-called Turkish model (see Göksel 2015; 2016) and the survive of Iran Islamic Republic in modern age despite harsh critique (see Matin 2013) stand out as well-grounded case-studies in this sense. In other words, augmenting new researches on other cases, this research may trigger the expansion of the studies on the non-Western modernity trajectories that is divergent from that of the West.

The new comparative studies of non-Western cases likely help deconstruct the Eurocentric impasse of CMT. As this thesis tried to show, new researches can contribute to the falsification of the underlying idea that all modern societies will converge on one type of modernization model, Western model, which is argued by CMT and cemented by the globalization discourse. Hence, falsification may lead to the re-evaluation of the theoretical model of CMT. Namely, new country cases may promote a new inclusive theory or paradigm buildings upon the modernity so that all modernity trajectories, the Western and Eastern, could be built on a theory that is free from the Eurocentric attitude of mind and that has a capacity to coherently expound them. In parallel with the efforts to conceptualize the 'non-Western modernity', such efforts may lead to the re-account of social sciences by broadening or changing the viewpoint on it as research expand on the non-Western cases. As such, as the changed and broadened viewpoint likely favors the divergencies of modernity, a transformation or new rotation in social sciences may take place in the future.

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