

**T.C.**  
**YALOVA ÜNİVERSİTESİ**  
**SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**DEBATE ON THE STARTING POINT OF MODERN  
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM**

**YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ**  
**PINAR İNCE**

**Enstitü Anabilim Dalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler**

**Enstitü Bilim Dalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler**

**Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mehmet Ali UĞUR**

**ŞUBAT - 2016**

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**Bu tez 10/02/2016 tarihinde aşağıdaki jüri tarafından oybirliği/oyçokluğu ile kabul edilmiştir.**

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## **BEYAN**

Bu tezin yazılmasında bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uyulduđunu, başkalarının eserlerinden yararlanılması durumunda bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunulduđunu, kullanılan verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapılmadıđını, tezin herhangi bir kısmının bu üniversite veya başka bir üniversitedeki başka bir tez çalışması olarak sunulmadıđını beyan ederim.

**Pınar İNCE**

**10/02/2016**

## **PREFACE**

This study was born as I met with the provocative words of Llyotard (1979): 'incredulity towards meta-narratives'. Then I started to be more curious about the meta-narratives of my discipline and focused on the most popular one. As an IR student, I have witnessed the widespread Westphalian narrative for countless times without having any doubt about its historical accuracy or scientific objectivity. I should have had a basic idea about the coming of the current world order, and then skip to the 'real' problems of the discipline. Thus, I perceived the Westphalian narrative just as a baseline that is unquestionable and also not worth questioning, because for me, what was more important in IR was the explanation of current global problems; as if it was possible to detach them from the imaginary past they were constructed upon.

However, as I met with the theories and assertions of reflectivist scholars, along my journey, I started to have more concern about the relationship between the way history is portrayed and how current problems of IR are articulated. Furthermore, I saw that foundational myths of IR are not as objective and unquestionable as they are portrayed. As I read more about the Westphalian myth, I felt responsible to write on how controversial it is. Hence my motivation to write this thesis is in line with the words of J. Ann Tickner: "All of us IR scholars bear the responsibility for being critically reflective about how the knowledge we teach our students has been constructed historically and how the research traditions to which we subscribe are formulated." (Tickner, 2011: 5)

I admit that this thesis is an amateur attempt on the way to become a reflectivist IR scholar. So it may have occasional mistakes or misinterpretations and I would be grateful for criticisms as well as amendment proposals.

Finally I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to those who helped me extensively during this process. First come my daughters; they had to make sacrifices too early in their lives. Then to my husband, he was always kind, understanding and supportive during this process. Also to my mother,

father, mother-in-law and lovely aunt of my sisters; who took care of my kids during my hectic days and nights. Also I would like to thank to my advisor Professor Mehmet Ali Uğur for his guidance and support, to Professor Kenan Dagci for his understanding, to Professor Turan Kayaoğlu, Professor Burak Gülboy, Professor Suzan Ünal and Professor Kemal Ataman for their guidance and positive criticisms. Finally I am grateful to Elif Sak, Ahmet Safa Yıldırım, Filiz Cengiz Karakoyun, Fatih Karakoyun, Seçgin Altan, Ayfer Sönmez, Funda Eldemir, Merve Reyhan Baygeldi and to all my family members and friends for their good wishes and supports.

## CONTENTS

<b>ABBREVIATIONS .....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES.....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>ÖZET.....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>SUMMARY.....</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>PART I: THEORY, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS .....</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1. Theoretical Background .....	3
1.2. How Important is History for IR? .....	6
1.3. How does Eurocentrism Affect Historiography in IR? .....	10
1.4. How does IR Set its Benchmark Dates? .....	13
<b>PART III: HOW DO REVISIONIST SCHOLARS CHALLENGE THIS CONVENTIONAL WISDOM?.....</b>	<b>27</b>
3.1. Construction of the Westphalian Narrative.....	27
3.2. Deconstruction of the Westphalian Narrative .....	38
3.2.1. Rationalists Challenging the Westphalian Narrative.....	38
3.2.2. Reflectivists Challenging the Westphalian Narrative .....	46
3.2.2.1. Reflectivist Challenges towards the English School Interpretation of the Westphalian Narrative .....	50
3.2.2.2. Reflectivist Challenges towards the Constructivist Interpretation of the Westphalian Narrative .....	54
3.2.2.3. Reflectivist Challenges towards the Neo-Marxist and Neo- Weberian Interpretations of the Westphalian Narrative.....	58

3.2.2.4. Reflectivist Challenges towards the Postmodern Interpretation of the Westphalian Narrative .....	62
3.3. Reconstruction of Alternative Histories .....	64
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>CURRICULUM VITAE .....</b>	<b>87</b>

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>ES</b>	: English School
<b>EU</b>	: European Union
<b>HRE</b>	: Holy Roman Empire
<b>IMF</b>	: International Monetary Fund
<b>IR</b>	: International Relations
<b>MIS</b>	: Modern International System
<b>NATO</b>	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>PoW</b>	: Peace of Westphalia
<b>UN</b>	: United Nations
<b>WWI</b>	: First World War
<b>WWII</b>	: Second World War



## LIST OF TABLES

<b>Table 1:</b> Eurocentric versus Post-racist Critical IR for Hobson.....	13
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## Yalova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yüksek Lisans Tez Özeti

**Tezin Başlığı:** Modern Uluslararası Sistemin Başlangıç Noktası Hakkındaki Tartışmalar

**Tezin Yazarı:** Pınar İNCE      **Danışman:** Yrd.Doç.Dr. Mehmet Ali UĞUR

**Kabul Tarihi:** 10/02/2016      **Sayfa Sayısı:** (6) + (77) + (10)

**Anabilimdalı:** Uluslararası İlişkiler      **Bilimdalı:** Uluslararası İlişkiler

Sınırları belli, birbirine eşit, bağımsız ve egemen devletlerden oluşan modern uluslararası sistemin 1648 yılında imzalanan Vestfelya Barışı ile ortaya çıktığını öne süren yaygın ve geleneksel bir bilgi olsa da, bazı revizyonist perspektifler bu önkabulü reddetmekte ve alternatif bakış açıları sunmaktadırlar. O kadar geniş teorik arka planlardan o kadar çok sayıda akademisyen bu yaygın kanıyı eleştirmektedir ki, Vestfelya efsanesinin ana uluslararası ilişkiler ders kitaplarında hala nasıl devam ettiğini anlamak gerçekten zor olmaktadır. Bu ısrarı anlamlandırabilmek için, öncelikle literatüre dayalı bir söylem analizi yapılacak ve Vestfelya söyleminin nasıl inşa edildiği ve de yapısöküme tabi tutulduğu gösterilecektir. Daha sonra da daha az Avrupa-merkezci bir uluslararası ilişkiler tarihi oluşturmaya çalışan bazı yeniden inşa girişimlerine yer verilecektir. Bu analizin sonucunda ise ana akım uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin Avrupa-merkezci, emperyalist, bugüne odaklı, muhafazakar, dar görüşlü ve dışlayıcı olduğu söylenebilir. Gelecek nesil uluslararası ilişkiler akademisyenleri, uzmanları, devlet adamları ve diplomatları da eleştirel bakış açılarını yeterince temsil etmeyen geleneksel ders kitapları ile eğitildiği sürece, uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin gelişiminde kaydadeğer olumlu bir değişim olması ve daha iyi bir gelecek için dünyanın yeniden yorumlanması pek de kolay görünmemektedir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Vestfelya Barışı, 1648, Avrupa-merkezcilik, modern uluslararası sistemin başlangıcı, uluslararası ilişkiler tarihi

## Yalova University Institute of Social Sciences Master Thesis Summary

<b>Thesis Title:</b> Debate on the Starting Point of Modern International System
<b>Thesis Author:</b> Pınar İNCE <b>Advisor:</b> Yrd.Doç.Dr. Mehmet Ali UĞUR
<b>Date of Acceptance:</b> 10/02/2016 <b>Total Number of Pages:</b> (6) + (77) + (10)
<b>Department:</b> International Relations <b>Field of Study:</b> International Relations
<p>Although there is a widespread conventional wisdom that the modern international system of territorial, equal, independent and sovereign states has emerged with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, some revisionist perspectives reject to take this pre-acceptance as given and bring about alternative outlooks. So many scholars from a wide range of theoretical backgrounds defy this commonsense that it becomes really difficult to understand the prevalence of the Westphalian myth in main international relations textbooks. In order to understand the meaning of this persistence, I will try to make a textual discourse analysis and demonstrate the construction and deconstruction of the Westphalian narrative first. And then I will present several reconstruction attempts that try to come up with a less Eurocentric history of international relations. As a conclusion, this analysis shows that mainstream international relations scholarship is Eurocentric, imperialistic, presentist, conservative, parochial and exclusionary. And as long as next generation international relations scholars, experts, statesmen and diplomats are educated through these conventional textbooks, which do not sufficiently represent the critical perspectives; that will not be so easy to make a positive change in the development of international relations scholarship and reinterpret the world for a better future.</p>
<b>Keywords:</b> Peace of Westphalia, 1648, Eurocentrism, emergence of modern international system, history of international relations

## **INTRODUCTION**

There has been a prevalent belief among international relations (IR) scholars that the Peace of Westphalia (PoW) is the tipping point for the emergence of modern international system (MIS). However the number of revisionist scholars who have been challenging this taken-for-granted acceptance and persistence of the 'myth' of 1648 has been increasing especially since the beginning of the new millennium. So many scholars from a wide range of theoretical backgrounds defy the conventional wisdom that it becomes really difficult to understand the prevalence of the Westphalian myth in main IR textbooks.

This study was born with the provocative words of Llyotard (1979): "incredulity towards meta-narratives". And being prone to several IR textbooks during my education in the discipline, I have decided to start with one of the most basic meta-narratives of IR, that is the conventional belief that MIS started with the PoW (1648). Hence this study is not on history of IR, its case is not the content of PoW per se and it will not give details of the history of early modern Europe. Its main concern is to understand the construction and persistence of the traditional myths of IR, specifically the myth of 1648, by using discourse analysis based on the literature on this topic.

This thesis asks several 'how' questions in order to problematize this persistence: How do different theoretical perspectives justify their refusal of 1648 as the starting point of the modern international system? How can and for what purpose do the mainstream IR textbooks keep their conventional discourse regardless of what has been said for the last 20 years? How does this persistence affect IR as a discipline? In order to answer all these questions I made an extensive literature search on the PoW. I benefit from the libraries of Yalova University, Marmara University and Harvard University and reached more than a hundred academic articles through online databases such as Taylor&Francis, JStor, Emeralds, Wiley, Oxford and Cambridge Journals,

LSE Research Online among many others, besides around fifty books related to the Westphalian narrative referenced in these articles.

After scanning this literature, I decided to group them in three main categories and then made a textual discourse analysis. First, I pointed at the relationship between theory, history and historical demarcations within IR and mentioned some of the meanings and functions uploaded to the benchmark dates in this discipline and how Eurocentric they are. Second, I demonstrated the contemporary mainstream IR textbooks that still accept PoW (1648) as the starting point of IR and raise the newcomers of the discipline based on this conventional wisdom. Third, I presented the works of revisionist scholars. This part was further divided into three subgroups including major studies, which replace the PoW with another European date through reinterpreting European history; deconstruct the conventional Westphalian narrative; and reconstruct alternative world histories that emphasize the role of the East in the making of world history. And finally I made a conclusion about how come this traditional myth of 1648 can continue regardless of what has been written mostly in the last twenty years and made some humble suggestions for the critical minds of IR field.

That is suffice here to say that the persistence of the Westphalian myth in almost all of the IR textbooks is a sign of the fact that current mainstream IR scholarship is Eurocentric, imperialistic, presentist, conservative, parochial and exclusionary. And as long as IR students, who are educated through these conventional textbooks, become scholars of the future and accept their meta-narratives, keep teaching them to their students, and do not question them or try to bring alternative stories of world history; that will not be possible to make a positive change and reinterpret the world for a better future.

# **PART I: THEORY, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

## **1.1. Theoretical Background**

This thesis is an example of the fourth debate within IR; that is the debate between 'rationalists' and 'reflectivists' as was launched by Robert Keohane in 1988. What is this debate about? First, there is an ontological disagreement about the main topic of IR. What is worth to know about? Rationalists (neorealists and neoliberals) claim that IR should focus on inter-state conflict. For example, neorealists stress balance of power, whereas neoliberals emphasize international institutions as instruments of preventing wars between states. However, reflectivists (critical theorists, feminists, post-colonialists and post-structuralists) criticize them for their reductionism. Global politics is not only about conflict and cooperation, but also about norms, ideas, values, identities, imperialism, discrimination, poverty, environment, inequality and so on. Thus they disagree about what to look at. But how they look at them is a more controversial issue. (Smith, 2013: 6)

The main difference between these two groups is an epistemological one. How do they get to know what they look at? Here rationalists are positivist while reflectivists are anti-positivist. For rationalists, IR, as a nomothetic social science, develops deductive theories in order to explain current phenomena and test them through empirical facts. Theorists are neutral, thus measure their variables and test their hypothesis objectively. Hence they can come up with reliable findings, policy prescriptions and future predictions. Reflectivists, however, totally disagree with them. First, theories are not explaining a social world that exists out there and apart from them; instead theories are for understanding and constructing that world; so it is not possible to separate the theory and the 'social reality'. (Smith, 2013: 9) And second, they are skeptical about all reality claims because they do not believe in the neutrality of the theorist; theorist is also an integral part of this 'social reality'. Theorists' belief systems, ideologies, values,

interests, concerns and so on inevitably politicize what they look at and what they see, and thus what they tell. Even the facts they select are a matter of choice, thus totally subjective.

Third comes the methodological difference. Rationalist theories are structuralist and they try to externally explain the structure that determines the behaviors of the actors mostly through quantitative methods. Then they generalize their findings and deduce patterns, regularities or laws out of them. On the other hand, reflectivists put more emphasis on the agent and they try to internally understand its uniqueness through interpretive methods such as qualitative, discursive and historical methods.

Moreover, as data, rationalists focus on the observables and measurables; because they believe that they have to make some assumptions about the non-observables and leave them aside in order to come up with useful knowledge. On the contrary reflectivists focus on immeasurable contexts of behavior. And they assert that what rationalists assume as as-given is a political act. (Kurki and Wight, 2013: 20-2; Grovogui, 2002: 319) So they assert that presenting these assumptions as if they do not worth questioning is not an innocent act, but instead it is a way of legitimizing their prejudices, values, belief systems, and interests. On the other hand, as they channel the research agendas of scholars and shift their focus into other areas; they prevent any possible change and sustain their current position.

Reflectivists go further and claim that theory and reality co-constitute each other. (Kurki and Wight, 2013: 31) And theories turn out to be self-fulfilling prophecies. For example, critical theorist Robert Cox (1981) defines rationalist theories as 'problem-solving theories'; because they accept i.e.; anarchy 'as-given' and try to curtail its side-effects and cure the system as it is. However reflectivists claim that taking anarchy as-given is not a neutral act and it serves "particular interests (and closes down particular sorts of arguments) or to shift the argument on to an altogether different subject." (Kirsten and Ainley,

2009: 53) Hence as they imply that sovereignty, anarchy and states as the major actors are not questionable; then this turns out to be a commonsense within IR and prevents scholars from questioning the possibility of any other alternative thus ultimately impedes change. As it closes further investigation and debate between IR scholars, it achieves to build and perpetuate the world that it portraits.

Positivists, however, claim that what reflectivists are doing is not real science. So they disregard their works. (Smith, 2013: 5) Here comes some deeper questions such as what is science or is IR science? Here this thesis is in line with the arguments of Kurki and Wight who perceive science not as a search for absolute reality or certainty but instead as "a commitment to a constant critique". (Kurki and Wight, 2013: 25) And since social world is very complex, IR needs plurality; it has to take into account not only observable facts but also beliefs, values, interests, ideologies and power relations underlying them. Similarly, IR needs self-awareness and reflectivity. It needs to be aware of its own prejudices, myths, common-senses, as-givens and so on; plus what these serve for, whom they benefit, whom they disfavor and how they affect the social reality itself.

All these concerns boil down to the ultimate question that of whether it is worth at all? As the dominant rationalist paradigm in IR disregard the works of reflectivists, can they make a change either in theory or in practice? For reflectivists, yes! For example, critical theorist Andrew Linklater believes that current world order has already started to become more inclusive. (Kirsten and Ainley, 2009: 56) And post-colonialist Grovogui says that this attempt is not worthless and there has already been a change in the perspective about the international order through justice-seeking entrepreneurs from both academia and civil society. He gives a real world example from Africa and asserts that activists and IR theorists in the African case wish:

"...to remedy the African condition and to restore justice, autonomy and dignity to those affected by the 'collapse' of the state... This effort requires an appreciation of the domestic institutions that



corrupt public life but also of their broader context – the complex instantiations of power relations that manifest themselves temporally or spatially as international regimes. Such an approach would bring into focus the desires, wills and interests of the entities that analysts now wish to recognize and, by this token, sharpen policy prescriptions.” (Grovogui, 2002: 336)

Hence it can be said that this thesis is in line with the reflectivist claims. It aims to challenge the dominant rationalist paradigm about the Westphalian myth as its case. But first, there is a need to have a glance at the significance of history for IR.

## **1.2. How Important is History for IR?**

What is the role of history in understanding the current issues of IR? There are several approaches towards this question. For the ones who find history meaningful, human mind needs to place the current international ‘reality’ in a historical context in order to understand it, so that it gains a perspective, makes some analogies, and even learns from history. Yet not every IR theory believes in the necessity of history for doing IR. For example, behavioralists contend with current problems and empirical facts. However Cox et al.’s following argument about the relationship between history and present makes sense. They claim that history is constantly being reconstructed under changing conditions and here is an example from Eastern Europe:

“...with the ending of the Cold War... ‘history’ began to assert itself with a vengeance as nations and peoples began to rediscover or reinvent an identity that had previously been submerged under the blanket of official communism. In the majority of cases this simply led to the rewriting of school textbooks. Tragically, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, history returned in the form of ethnic cleansing and new (and not-so-new) racist mythologies designed to justify nation-building in states whose individual histories had previously been subsumed under one grand progressive narrative.” (Cox et al., 2001: 2)

This case demonstrates that there is an obvious relationship between history and IR, but it has not always been a smooth one. There are two major divisions here: one is interdisciplinary and one is within IR. First, as Sofer (2009) and Cox et al. (2001) mention, there is a misunderstanding between historians and IR theorists due to the great division between nomothetic social sciences and idiographic humanities.

IR scholars (mainly the behavioralists) criticize history as being buried in the past and having few connections with the present, full of detailed empirical data, descriptive, not explanatory, and incapable of making generalizations and predictions. However, they see themselves as being connected to the present, analytical, able to deduce patterns from historical data, and capable of making generalizations, theories and predictions. On the contrary, historians charge IR theorists for constructing their theories on faulty examples, making theoretical speculations and biased selective judgments in order to support their theories and for their anachronism. (Sofer, 2009: 3; Carvalho et.al, 2011: 756).

Gulbenkian Commission Report (1996) and Cox et al. (2001) are against departmentalization of science as nomothetic social sciences including IR and idiographic humanities including history. According to this view, this great divide blocks or at least limits interdisciplinary interaction and communication and causes parochialism and thus misunderstandings and misdiagnosis of current problems and ineffective prescriptions. In this view, increasing interdisciplinary dialogue between IR, history, sociology, and others would bring more accurate understanding, diagnosis and proposals concerning the current issues of IR.

Second, within IR there are three main outlooks towards history: traditionalists, behavioralists and post-positivists. Second major debate in IR took place in 1960s between the traditionalists such as realists and idealists who emphasized a humanitarian methodology, historicism, and conceptual and interpretivist judgment; versus the behavioralists such as neo-realists who emphasized positivism and scientific methodology. (Kurki and Wight, 2013: 16) For example, unlike realist Morgenthau, neo-realist Waltz does not value history, because he thinks that anarchy will prevail as the governing rule of the world order and as the ground structure does not change in history, why care about it? It is all the same story with different actors... However Cox et al. (2001: 2) suggest that ahistoricism coming into IR with through the behavioralist boom in

1960s has already started to dilute and one example is the rise of neo-classical realism that values the role of history in IR.

Schools in IR theory have roughly three different views of history: cyclical, teleological and critical post-modern. Realism has a cyclical view of history; history repeats itself. This view is conservative in the sense that anarchy, power politics and conflicts will prevail but different great powers might raise and fall without changing the structure itself. On the contrary, liberals and Marxists are teleological in the sense that they believe that history is moving towards an ultimate end. For liberals history is in a progress, and it evolves linearly towards a Kantian perpetual peace. On the other hand, going back to Hegel, Marxists have a deterministic view of history. Under their dialectical materialism, they expect the collapse of global capitalism and class conflict with the coming of communism, which is the ultimate free and classless society. Finally critical and post-modern IR scholars do not agree with rationalist and structuralist theories. First, since they see knowledge as an act of power, they have incredulity towards all reality claims including the historical ones. And second, since history is in such a complex being under so many inter-related influences that it is not possible to determine any certain direction or make a future prediction. Especially the critical ones put a strong emphasis on human beings as agents who have the ultimate capability to create change for their own emancipation. A critical post-racist Hobson perfectly presents this view:

“‘Scientific’ theories... proclaim the positivist fact/value distinction as a means to hide their underlying meta-narrative that ultimately glorifies Western civilisation... (critical theory) is (allegedly) self-reflexive in that it is aware of its own values and biases, and it (supposedly) rejects problem-solving theory’s ahistoricism that eternalises and naturalises the present, in favour of a historicism, which reveals the social forces that issue change in world-historical time. This in turn (supposedly) enables the identification of emergent emancipatory processes that are working to create a new world order.” (Hobson, 2007: 91-2)

Although the dominant paradigm in IR has been the versions of realism since WWII, this thesis will keep with the last view, which has skepticism for the positivist claims of the modern science as in the case

of post-colonialist Grovogui who openly challenges objectivity and universality claims of any scientific attempt and calls for researchers to take into account the interests of and the pressures on the agents lying under prevailing common-senses:

“There are externalities to any discursive setting that betray even the most thorough research or theoretical agenda. These externalities include political loyalties and complex ideological, institutional and methodological pressures that shape the commonsense underlying research and theory.” (Grovogui, 2002: 318)

Additionally he believes that this scientific attempt has consequences on the implication side of the story; since Anglo-Saxon approaches reproduced “idealized and formal interpretations of the nature of politics and behavior of their agents and actors...yet they neglected the political passions, material interests and ethical perversions that give form to international regimes”. (Grovogui, 2002: 319)

Similarly, referencing Toulmin (1990: 175) in her article, Tickner presents the modern way of scientific knowledge as follows and contrasts it with the post-modern version rose up in 1990s:

“In the search for certainty in an uncertain world, modern Cartesian science, based on the separation of the rational mind from the bodily emotions, replaced Renaissance humanism. A belief in the possibility of a timeless, objective, and universal understanding of the world, independent of context – what has been described as the ‘view from nowhere’- formed the basis for modern scientific knowledge.” (Tickner, 2011: 6)

Post-modern and post-colonialist feminists also add that this Cartesian science favors differences and dichotomies such as self/other, civilized/barbarian, public/private, and white men as the subjects/agents and others as the objects of knowledge. (Tickner, 2011: 11; Willinsky, 1998: 27) And based on these dichotomies, agents constructed histories to further maximize their own interests as in the Indian case:

“Like other colonized peoples, Indians were seen as people without a history for whom a history must be constructed in order to rule them... Creating new stories and new histories for colonized peoples, as well as cataloguing, analyzing and putting the world on display scientifically from an objective distance, were acts of power.” (Tickner, 2011: 10)

Moreover, post-structuralist R.B.J. Walker (1993) states that even the MIS of sovereign states is constructed upon and still rests on an inside/outside distinction, which was first invented in the early modern era and which created the discourse of IR we still face with today.

It can be concluded that, history is indispensable in order to understand the current issues of IR. But it is not always an innocent act, so what history tells us is not unquestionable. For instance, as reflectivists deconstruct the dominant narratives of IR history, they confront with Eurocentrism, which will be discussed in the next section.

### **1.3. How does Eurocentrism Affect Historiography in IR?**

The purpose of this section is to understand what Eurocentrism is, how it was originated, and how it affects social sciences and specifically IR. To begin with, Oxford Dictionary defines Eurocentrism as “focusing on European culture or history to the exclusion of a wider view of the world; implicitly regarding European culture as pre-eminent”. Yet it is not perceived as that simple in social sciences. In order to understand its development and deeper meanings it possesses, there is a need to look at how Edward Said (2003) – by using the term Orientalism in 1970s – and Samir Amin (2009) – by using the term Eurocentrism in 1980s – present its development.

Said defines Orientalism as a system of thought that observes the Orient from afar and above, and then continues: “this false position hides historical change. Even more important... it hides the interests of the Orientalist.” (2003: 334) Then he connects the beginning of Orientalism with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, which is the starting point of the modern global phase of imperialism for him. (2003: 335) Additionally, for Amin (2009), Eurocentrism is a discursive product of the eighteenth and nineteenth century European thinkers who were in an attempt to construct a European identity in contrast with an ‘Other’ and thus legitimize European imperialism. Connecting the previous section with this one, Edward Said perfectly puts the construction of

identity and history in relation to the present issues of IR in his following words:

“Human history is made by human beings. Since the struggle for control over territory is part of that history, so too is the struggle over historical and social meaning. The task for the critical scholar is not to separate one struggle from another, but to connect them... My way of doing this has been to show that the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another different and competing alter ego. The construction of identity... involves establishing opposites and "others" whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from "us". Each age and society re-creates its "Others". Far from a static thing then, identity of self or of "other" is a much worked-over historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies... It should be obvious in all cases that these processes are not mental exercises but urgent social contests involving such concrete political issues as immigration laws, the legislation of personal conduct, the constitution of orthodoxy, the legitimization of violence and/or insurrection, the character and content of education, and the direction of foreign policy, which very often has to do with the designation of official enemies. In short, the construction of identity is bound up with the disposition of power and powerlessness in each society, and is therefore anything but mere academic wool-gathering.” (Said, 2003: 331-2)

How was this European identity constructed then? Romantic European thinkers did it through discourse. (Said, 2003; Hobson, 2007; Amin, 2009) They first constructed a European view of world history. In this history, Europe was depicted as developed and as the source of a linear progress, while the Orient was displayed as underdeveloped and as embedded in darkness. Europe was seen as immanently and permanently superior and exceptional compared to the rest of the world. So they built their identity in comparison to a constructed 'Other': Europe was displayed as civilized, in progress, enlightened, developed, superior and the agent of world politics and history while the Orient was portrayed as barbaric, backward, dark, underdeveloped, inferior and the object of world politics and history. Amin describes how this identity was historically constructed:

“The product of this Eurocentric vision is the well-known version of Western history—a progression from Ancient Greece to Rome to feudal Christian Europe to capitalist Europe—one of the most popular of received ideas. Elementary school books and popular opinion are as or even more important in the creation and diffusion

of this construct as the most erudite theses developed to justify the ancestry of European culture and civilization.” (Amin, 2009: 166)

So as the conventional wisdom describes, European self-evident progress follows this sequence: Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, feudalism, Dark Ages (where Europe is snapped off its roots), Renaissance (rebirth of Europe with its re-connection to its origins), geographic discoveries, rise of capitalism, Westphalian sovereignty, Enlightenment, scientific revolution, industrial revolution, French and American Revolutions and finally the Pax Americana. However, the rest of the world lacks this progress, they are portrayed as backward. And as the unique bearer of this progress, Europe has the right to diffuse what it has to the rest of the world. Furthermore, Europe is portrayed as if it is responsible for civilizing the dark sides of the globe through delivering those areas the sovereign state model, nationalism, democracy, human rights, so on and so forth. By the way, in return, it has the right to exploit the resources of these areas either willingly or coercively as civilization has a price tag. Hobson provides a great reflection of this process in social sciences as follows:

“Having split these mutual civilisations into ‘distinct entities’, Eurocentric thinkers then elevated the Western Self and demoted the Eastern Other... This culminated in Max Weber’s famous distinction between the Western ‘ethic of world mastery’ and the fatalistic Eastern ‘ethic of passive conformity’ to the world. Thus Western man was elevated to the permanent ‘proactive subject’ of global politics/economics – past, present and future – standing at the centre of all things. Conversely, Eastern ‘man’ was relegated to the peripheral status of global politics’ ‘passive object’, languishing on the Other side of an imaginary civilisational frontier, stripped of history and dignity.” (Hobson, 2007: 93)

What about social sciences? Hobson claims that social sciences absorbed this Eurocentric narrative and tried to explain European progress endogenously: “Rather than critique this Eurocentric package of ideas, Western social scientists – from Hegel to Marx and Mill to Weber – endogenized them into their theories of political and economic development.” (Hobson, 2009: 675) Coming to IR, he contrasts the current Eurocentric IR versus what he proposes as the post-racist critical IR. (2007: 106-108) Below you can find a summary of his views, which will be mentioned in detail in the following pages:

**Table 1. Eurocentric versus Post-racist Critical IR for Hobson**

<b>Eurocentric IR</b>	<b>Post-racist critical IR</b>
Monological thinking producing a reductive narrative where the West talks and acts regardless of the Rest	Dialogical thinking: East is also an agent and subject. East and West interactively produce global politics and economics
Eurocentric civilization is formed within Europe and by Europeans, then spread to the Rest	Hybrid civilizational entities are formed
Split the Self and the Other	Other is in the Self and Self is in the Other
Aims persistence of Eurocentrism	Aims emancipation
Civilizations as billiard balls and meet during conflicts where the West wins and the East loses	Hybridized mimicry and interstitial surprise
Monological passive receptivity	Transculturation and dialogical negotiation

As a conclusion, it can be asserted that Eurocentrism has deeply diffused into both history and social sciences either implicitly or explicitly. And the next section will present that this Eurocentrism impacts even how IR sets its benchmark dates as a discipline.

#### **1.4. How does IR Set its Benchmark Dates?**

What do the foundational stories and benchmark dates mean in IR? Why is it important to wonder about them? First, as mentioned above, there was a criticism towards behavioralists due to their ahistoricism. J. Ann Tickner is one of those who complain that especially IR scholars in USA are unaware of and not concerned about the foundational stories of their discipline on the contrary to the sociology and history oriented research methods used outside of USA. Then she emphasizes the important role of history in IR as follows: "...the way any discipline frames its foundational myths has important consequences for the questions it asks and the knowledge it deems necessary for answering them." (Tickner, 2011: 5) And these foundational myths plus how they are constructed is the major point of this thesis.



Second, as indicated earlier, since Hegel and Kant, history is believed to have a certain trajectory. Those who believe in progress, picture a step-by-step evolution/revolution towards an ultimate end. And every step means a change. As will be discussed later, while some scholars point certain dates as revolutionary points such as the emergence of MIS in 1648; some others prefer to extend this change into a period of time like accepting the emergence of MIS as a process starting with Reformation and ending with Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. In any case, periodization is important and Sofer asserts its first occurrence as follows:

“The tripartite division of history, which distinguishes between ancient, medieval, and modern history, is the invention of the seventeenth century, and later the enlightenment. Periodization is mostly a convenience of the historian for the purpose of writing human history not as a random or chaotic narrative.” (Sofer, 2009: 4)

It seems like they mean that history is on a track, and regularity seeking human mind that has a strong desire to know and control its environment has discovered the hidden linearity in history. But although he thinks that they are useful, Sofer seems to be skeptical about the accuracy of these historical demarcations:

“Historical demarcation is integral to our understanding of history. It is, of course, only a human invention, an abstract construction, part of a certain intellectual tradition found to be useful in explaining the progress of history. But at a certain point historical demarcations become self-evident, and we cease to doubt their accuracy or relevance.” (Sofer, 2009: 2)

Furthermore, post-colonialists raise an obvious challenge to the modern science’s claim that these ‘scientifically-driven’ dates are value-free, neutral and universal. They claim that history is not innocent in the sense that as an act of the powerful, it emphasizes the racial and gendered inequality that is still present. For example, Harding (1987) and Tickner (2011) claim that what is seen as important and as a progress in history so as a benchmark date is set by the Western privileged men, because they are the writers of the history. And it serves to their interests. In line with them, post-colonialists also criticize the underlying Eurocentrism in determining the benchmark dates of IR.

For example, Carvalho et.al criticize the myths of 1648 and 1919 within the IR literature as follows:

“For if these temporal boundaries have been set on the basis of a provincial European myth, rather than the universal aspirations which the discipline upholds, it is surely high time that these boundaries be transgressed and their border controls disbanded... But it is necessary because while most myths in life are constructed precisely to make us feel good about ourselves, they often entail all sorts of detrimental consequences that are ignored or simply denied and covered up. For myths can be used in different ways and serve different functions. On the one hand, their quotidian or everyday meaning of myths is stories commonly held to be true, but which are not. On the other, myths can be anchors or ‘building blocks’ for thinking and theorizing, or ‘the frame into which other phenomena are fitted and then interpreted.’ (Hall, 2006: 178)” (Carvalho et.al, 2011: 757)

It can be concluded that it is all about how IR scholars want to portray the present system. Benchmarking disciplines scholars’ minds, and through ontological and epistemological common-senses, frames what is normally contained in the discipline. Thus history and historical periodization is important in terms of this rivalry among different theories. IR seems to be anachronistic in this sense. IR scholars first define the current system, and then put it into a historical context so construct a history that brings out the current order, describe its evolution, legitimize it and its producers as superior. As they present the current order as the winner among many rivals, they can silence the ones who question or criticize it. Discussion on IR history and benchmark dates is another battlefield of rivalry between the conservatives who benefit from and defend the current order; and the criticals who are not happy with the current world order and demand for change.

On the other hand, what has changed and thus transformed the world order? Through which independent variables scholars define change? Is it the ideas, rules, norms, institutions, practices, material factors, distribution of power or structures that bring out the change? Are they currently transforming? If yes, in which direction? Whose order is coming next? These are all theoretical discussions and bring us to the

point that IR theory, history and historical turning points are closely inter-related and deeply Eurocentric as Kayaoğlu states below:

“International relations scholarship is shaped both by the political and the ideological affinities of international relations scholars (Oren 2003), but also, and perhaps more significantly, by arguments about the superiority of Western values and political systems. This presumption of superiority is embedded in the standard historical reference points of the discipline’s description of international relations, descriptions which are drawn almost exclusively from Europe’s internal history. This distortion influences theorizing about modern international relations because it presents European thought and practices as the engine of the international system and as the source of enlightenment, modernity, democracy, sovereignty, and human rights. Contemporary international relations theory remains caught in the notion that the West sets the standard for civilized human conduct; Western liberal democracies are constantly treated as the only entities capable of bringing any sort of order to the system.” (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 213)

How do these benchmark dates influence IR theory? IR constructs, understands, and represents itself and the reality it perceives through its benchmark dates, which are inseparable from the theory chosen. Supporting the above-mentioned point, Buzan and Lawson (2012: 11) say that “benchmark dates are necessary to theory building. IR theories mostly center on differentiating continuity from change.” They demonstrate three main reasons for the importance of benchmark dates:

“first, because they stand as points of reference for the discipline’s self-understanding; second, because they operate as markers for how IR is viewed by other disciplines; and third, because they fix attention on specific events which, in turn, privilege some drivers of change over others... Because history is a contested field of enquiry in which the importance of events and processes is regularly reassessed, choices about benchmark dates will always be subject to critical re-evaluation... Benchmark dates are used in every discipline that engages with history as a means of placing boundaries around research and teaching, identifying turning points, and simplifying analysis. In short: benchmark dates are as important as theories – both serve as lenses which foreground some things, while marginalizing others.” (Buzan and Lawson, 2012: 3)

In their article (2012), Buzan and Lawson question the orthodox benchmark dates of IR such as the emergence of the first global international system after geographic discoveries in 1500, emergence of modern sovereign state system in 1648, birth of IR as a discipline in 1919, beginning of the Cold War and a bipolar world in 1945 and end of

bipolarity and erosion of sovereignty with modern globalization in 1989. However they think that "the current set of benchmark dates in IR is unhelpful, over-privileging the experience of modern Europe, and focusing the discipline too tightly around wars and their settlements." (Buzan and Lawson, 2012: 3) They find these dates both Eurocentric in the sense that European history is accepted as world history and presentist in the sense that most of the benchmark dates are chosen from the twentieth century when the discipline sets its beginning. They portrait this position of IR as a sign of how IR is marginalized within other disciplines:

"The jump from 1648 to 1919 leaves out the inter-societal reconfiguration which, during the 'long 19th century', both marked the transformation to global modernity and enabled the West to build a hierarchical international order. This period is the central concern for sociology, historical sociology, economic history, world history and law. Its absence from IR's orthodox set of benchmark dates is both surprising and problematic." (Buzan and Lawson, 2012: 6)

Buzan and Lawson (2012:7-11) present a wonderful summary of how different IR theories set benchmark dates in order to shed light to major changes in the international order and what their criteria are in determining such points. Firstly, they point four criteria for realists: (i) change in the organizing principle of the international system such as anarchic or hierarchical; (ii) possibility of war; (iii) distribution of power and polarity; and (iv) change in the nature of the sovereign state that is the major unit of the system. Hence they bring forward such benchmark dates as 1648, 1945 and 1989 and it is in line with the orthodox dates of IR.

Realists are conservative in the sense that they do not expect any change in international structure, and believe that anarchy, conflict, wars, centrality of power distribution and sovereign state as the major unit will prevail. Instead liberals are more interested in the change of this structure. They accept 1648 as the starting point of the Westphalian order while they emphasize how it is evolving through new non-state actors in the system, cooperation, interdependence and global governance with the help of global political economy, international

regimes and organizations. So they highlight such dates as the Great Depression of 1929 or the foundation of United Nations in 1945. However there is more inclination to set benchmark dates based on military and political occurrences compared to global governance or interdependence. (Buzan and Lawson, 2012: 9)

Then comes the English School, which emphasizes the changes in the primary institutions of international society such as war, international law, balance of power, diplomacy, sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism, human rights, and so on and so forth. (Buzan and Lawson, 2012: 9-10) So these English School scholars set some dates for the evolution of these institutions such as 1648 for the birth of territorial sovereign states, 1833 for the termination of slavery or 1945 for the demise of colonialism. And for almost all of the English School members, 1648 is a benchmark date since it is the beginning of such institutions as sovereignty, international law, and balance of power.

Buzan and Lawson (2012: 9) also mention the constructivists and specifically Alexander Wendt but criticize him for his Eurocentrism. Wendt points three cultures of anarchy and sets turning points as the benchmarks dates for the transformation of international order. He highlights 1648 as the transformation from a Hobbesian (enmity) to a Lockean (rivalry) culture and 1945 as the transformation from a Lockean to a Kantian (friendship) culture. However these seem to remain regional dates.

They also state that Marxists such as Hobsbawm and Rosenberg focus on the nineteenth century Europe and coming up of industrial revolution, modern capitalism and class struggle as the marker of the modern international order. (Buzan and Lawson, 2012: 10) However Benno Teschke (2003) emphasizes English Glorious Revolution in 1688 as the initiator of new property relations that brought the MIS. Finally there is world system theorist Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) who identifies 1500 as the beginning of world capitalism and thus the MIS. However they

are mostly criticized due to their economic reductionism and do not match with the orthodox benchmark dates of IR.

Finally they mention the historical sociologists Armstrong, Walt, Halliday and Lawson who emphasize the role of revolutions in the transformation of world order such as Reformation in sixteenth century, Dutch and English Revolutions in seventeenth century, American Revolution in eighteenth century and Bolshevik Revolution in twentieth century. (Buzan and Lawson, 2012: 11) However they do not seem to be in line with the orthodox set of benchmark dates in IR either.

After analyzing all these theories, they aggregate nine criteria for the determination of benchmark dates stated by all of these theories: organizing principle, social organizing principle, interaction capacity, system scale, societal scale, systemic crises, dominant unit, distribution of power, and mode of power. (Buzan and Lawson, 2012: 12) Then they offer an alternative set of benchmark dates in the following pages but it is suffice here to say that they prefer to stress processes instead of one time events and cluster them as primary, secondary and tertiary benchmarks based on their scope and importance.

So far, Part I tried to demonstrate the relationship between theory, history and historical demarcations in IR. And the most important finding seems to be that IR scholars should enter into a debate on the Eurocentric and realism-dominated benchmark dates of IR. Europe is just one of the regions in the world and it is not fair to generalize its history to the world. IR should better take into consideration the other parts of the world in the making of world history; plus separate regional and global transformations. Additionally it is a reductionism to explain the change in the world order only through distribution of power or war, because IR has concerns also about economic, social, ideational or normative transformations. And finally it appears as a must for IR to engage in interdisciplinary dialogue in order to come up with more accurate and useful benchmark dates. Having made this evaluation

about the benchmark dates in general, now it is time to focus of the PoW (1648) as one of the significant benchmark dates of the discipline.

## **PART II: HOW DO MAIN IR TEXTBOOKS PRESENT THE WESTPHALIAN NARRATIVE?**

As freshmen start studying IR at universities, they are prone to several myths within the discipline through introductory textbooks. This is the period where universities teach the basics of the discipline, and format the minds of the newcomers according to the dominant paradigm. It is too early for students at this stage to have a critical outlook; instead they are ready to take what is given. And they usually are not yet capable of searching for the most up-to-date literature on the as-givens of the discipline. To recall Foucault, this is a very important stage of the 'power' producing and teaching the legitimate 'knowledge' about the 'reality' it constructs for its own terms. Hence next generation politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats, experts and scholars in IR are grown up through these myths (Carvalho, et.al, 2011: 736) until they are exposed to critical views or up-to-date discussions on these topics later on.

Among many others, one of the myths of IR is the claim that modern international system of sovereign, territorial and equal states emerged with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Although there are many studies that challenge this commonsense, as will be featured in the following sections, it has still been prevalent in these introductory IR textbooks. So how does IR start teaching its fresh minds?

Below findings will demonstrate what most of the IR 101 books that are taught in USA, UK and Turkey tell about the emergence of MIS. Most of them directly point 1648, without any hesitation, as the tipping point and few others are cautious about determining an exact date for that. But they neither mention any controversy on this topic in the literature nor open a space for the possibility of alternative Eastern oriented stories. And they are all Eurocentric in the way that even though they mention the possibility of any other date; that is supposed be found in the history of Europe. Now let's look at these two broad categories:



Some of the most classical ways of interpreting the emergence of MIS are as follows:

“Within Europe as a whole, however, it (the PoW) marked the advent in international law of the modern system of sovereign states. The diplomats who assembled at Westphalia represented independent powers which recognized no superior or common tie. No one any longer pretended that Europe had any significant religious or political unity... Europe was understood to consist of a large number of unconnected sovereignties, free and detached atoms, or states, which acted according to their own laws, following their own political interests, forming and dissolving alliances, exchanging embassies and legations, alternating between war and peace, shifting position with a shifting balance of power.” (Palmer et al., 2007: 141)

“The historical end point of the medieval era and the starting point of the modern international system, speaking very generally, is usually identified with the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and the Peace of Westphalia which brought it to an end.

From the middle of the seventeenth century, states were seen as the only legitimate political systems of Europe, based on their own separate territories, their own independent governments, and their own political subjects. The emergent state system had several prominent characteristics, which can be summarized. First, it consisted of adjoining states whose legitimacy and independence was mutually recognized. Second, that recognition of states did not extend outside of the European system... Third, the relations of the European states were subject to international law and diplomatic practice... Fourth, there was a balance of power between member states.” (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 14)

And here are the realism oriented ones, which stress the birth of state sovereignty in an anarchic world order with the PoW:

“This treaty established the important principle of sovereignty that remains the foundation of contemporary international politics. In an obvious blow to the Church, this meant that kings could decide domestic policy, such as the official religion within their domains, free from outside interference. The principle of sovereignty recognized in the peace of Westphalia represents an essential element in the creation of the modern nation-state.” (Spiegel, et.al, 2009: 59)

“The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), more than any other event, demarcated the change between the old and new systems. With the sovereign state at its center, this newly evolving system is anarchical.” (Rourke, 2007: 60)

“The peace agreement at Westphalia in 1648 helped solidify the trend of increasing power to the modern state at the expense of other political forms.... With the realignment of territorial borders, the notion of the sovereignty of the state also came to the fore”. (Viotti and Kauppi, 2007: 63-4)

“The Peace of Westphalia constituted the concept of sovereignty.”  
(Roskin and Berry, 2014: 30)

Moreover, Keyman and Dural (2013: 55) assert that a system of sovereign states that was based on territoriality and both internal and external sovereignty was born through the PoW. Kardaş and Balci (2014: 16) are also in line with these views that the modern sovereign state system was born in Europe after the PoW. They have a clear realist view and emphasize that a system based on maximizing interests and power and balance of power under an anarchic world order was the product of the PoW. And they claim that the states/leaders became internally and externally sovereign. Thus the MIS of territorial, independent, secular and sovereign states came into existence through the PoW.

And also there are those English School oriented contributions; which present 1648 as the beginning of a new world order with new rules and norms accepted by all its member states:

“The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years’ War, is regarded by many as the key event ushering in the contemporary international system. The Peace established the right of the German states that constituted the Holy Roman Empire to conduct their own diplomatic relations: a very clear acknowledgement of their sovereignty. They were also formally stated to enjoy ‘an exact and reciprocal Equality’: the first formal acceptance of sovereign equality for a significant number of states. More generally, the Peace may be seen as encapsulating the very idea of a society of states.” (Armstrong, 2008: 46)

“The 1648 Peace of Westphalia established the basic rules that have defined the international system ever since – the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states as equal and independent members of an international system.” (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011: 62)

Besides these determined ones, there are some other textbooks that pretend to be more cautious about 1648, but are still Eurocentric:

“Although 1648 is a convenient dividing point, the modern state system did not just appear overnight in that year: The world of 1647 did not look much different from the world of 1649. The emergence of the modern state was in reality a slow, gradual process driven by several important economic, religious, and military developments that eventually undermined the feudal order and replaced it with a new way of organizing European politics.” (Shimko, 2010: 4)

However in the following pages the same book seems to be sure about 1648:

“The modern sovereign state emerged from the maelstrom of the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia (1648)... The idea of national sovereignty was codified in the peace of Westphalia (1648) as the only feasible solution to the religious conflict that gave rise to the bloody Thirty Years War (1618–1648).” (Shimko, 2010: 217, 243)

“What we would now recognize as the modern state system gradually evolved in Northern Europe between 1500 and 1688 and was consolidated by the rise of nationalism in Europe between 1800 and 1914.” (Steans et. al, 2005: 117)

“There is much debate over exactly when the process of early modern state formation started, with some scholars looking as far back as the eighth or tenth century. Others cite the early fifteenth century, with the convening of the Council of Constance of 1414–1418, treaties agreed upon at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, or the eighteenth century as the most significant dates in the development of the state.” (Rae, 2007: 124)

“The Peace of Westphalia effectively entrenched the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio*, whereby each ruler would have the right to determine the religion of his or her own state. The treaties did not amount to a full endorsement of the principle of state sovereignty as we know it, as they contained rights of intervention to enforce their terms.” (Nye and Welch, 2011: 72)

“The Treaty is often credited with establishing the legal basis for the modern state system. Not all scholars agree on this. Some see the modern state emerging much earlier, others much later. But there is no doubt that the Peace of Westphalia is an important turning point in European politics and in world history. The Treaty established two core principles. The first was *rex est imperator in regno suo*. Literally, it means that the king is sovereign within his own domain and not subject to the political will of anyone else... The second principle was *cuius regio, eius religio*.... It was a principle that prohibited interference in the internal affairs of other states on religious grounds, and it remains important today in providing the basis for international law.” (Griffiths et.al, 2007: 246-7)

Furthermore, Heywood (2013: 31) asserts that it is a general wisdom to accept the PoW as the starting point of MIS, but in fact this transformation process took much longer in which this Peace had a very significant role. But at page 57, he defends that the political rise of the West is a result of the emergence sovereign states, which came into being through the PoW. Besides, at page 150, he claims that the PoW formalized the modern system of states and sovereign states became the major actors of an international system. And step-by-step this

system became a global order. Finally, Ari (2013: 98) claims that absolutist monarchies replaced feudalism in Europe gradually but especially after the PoW. And this process started through Renaissance in the fifteenth century and could become widespread in all around Europe only in the nineteenth century.

There seems to be only one introductory textbook by Brown and Ainley called 'Understanding International Relations' (2009) where the Westphalian myth is explicitly challenged. They mention the anti-Westphalian arguments of critical theorist Andrew Linklater, post-structuralist David Campbell, critical post-racist John Hobson and realist Stephen Krasner, plus explicitly deny the Westphalian commonsense:

"The emergence of a system of states is the product of the downfall of this world, usually dated to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648, is often seen as a convenient starting point for the new order, though this should not be taken too literally – in fact, Westphalia changed very little...

This is the story of the origins of the system state-centric International Relations tells, and a good story it is too, with plenty of opportunities for variation in the re-telling. " (Brown and Ainley, 2009: 71-2)

Except this last one, that should not be so difficult to anticipate the theoretical paradigm hidden behind these narratives although presented as if they are objective and universal. After reading any or some of these books, IR freshmen have a picture in their minds that is in line with the worldview of the dominant Eurocentric, rationalist and state-centric paradigm within IR literature. This worldview brings readers to such a conclusion: MIS definitely emerged in Europe without any Eastern effect and although there might be some minor controversial points, this new world order has some major elements that emerged through the PoW in 1648:

- there is an anarchical international system;
- states are the main actors of this originally European system;
- these states are territorial, autonomous, sovereign and equal to each other;
- they are secular and tolerant for religious freedom;

- and they act upon the principles of non-intervention, mutual recognition, international law and diplomacy.

But this is not the whole story. Hopefully these freshmen will become senior students and take courses from some critical minds where they will witness the literature on the discussion about the emergence of MIS; which will be stated in the next section.

## **PART III: HOW DO REVISIONIST SCHOLARS CHALLENGE THIS CONVENTIONAL WISDOM?**

Conventional wisdom on the emergence of MIS asserts that the most important elements of MIS came up with the PoW in 1648. But this third part will present how revisionist scholars challenge this claim. First section will mention how this Westphalian discourse has been constructed and reconstructed through time and evolved until the end of the Cold War. Second section will demonstrate the anti-Westphalian discourses of the rationalist scholars, which have risen up since 1990s. Third section will feature recent reflectivist scholars who deconstructed and/or reconstructed this Westphalian narrative. And final section will highlight the studies of post-colonialist scholars who offer alternative histories with more emphasis on the role of the East in making of the world.

### **3.1. Construction of the Westphalian Narrative**

Circumstances can change and the meanings uploaded on historical events can change accordingly. Needs and demands of the time's dominant paradigm lead reinterpretation of these historical events and give way to the reconstruction of history. Below mentioned studies of Krasner (1995), Beaulac (2000), Osiander (2001), Hobson (2009), Kayaoğlu (2009) and Schmidt (2011) demonstrate that the Westphalian myth is also a historical construct. Through an analysis of the Westphalian discourse based on these studies, I will try to demonstrate some insights about: How did the meaning of the PoW change through time? Which aspects of the treaty were brought front in different times, by whom and based on which circumstances? How was it transformed from a historical event into a historical construct? What did this myth work for? What were the implications or consequences of it? How has this process of construction and reconstruction, in turn, influenced the way through which scholars think about international politics? It will be convenient to first start with chronologically presenting the evolution of the Westphalian discourse and principles associated with it.

The original pioneers of the Westphalian narrative seem to be the nineteenth century German historians and international jurists. But why did this historical point become so important after two centuries? Answers can be found first in the German historiography and then in the international law tradition. For instance, Osiander (2001) asserts that the Westphalian myth was constructed by nineteenth century German historians. They portrayed Habsburgs as the ones who were responsible for impeding German unification. So they kept with an anti-Habsburg discourse. They created a dichotomy between imperial hegemony and particularistic state sovereignty, then favored the second one. Then he claims that Leo Gross (1948) revitalized this nation-state oriented discourse in the aftermath of WWII. Other IR scholars accepted this discourse because that was easy to do so and it was useful in picturing the current order. In his words: "This habit was based on the notion that the unified, centralized, sovereign nation-state was the desirable endpoint of history, and that, regrettably, Germany had failed to reach this stage in the early modern period when other countries first did so." (Osiander, 2001: 268)

In line with Osiander, referencing Keene (2002: 21), Kayaoğlu asserts that the Westphalian narrative is first produced against Napoleonic imperial pressures by the German historians:

"The alleged role of Westphalia in justifying and guaranteeing the mutual independence of states allowed the historians to justify the traditional liberties of German states secured from the Hapsburg Dynasty but now under a similar threat from the Napoleonic dynasty... These scholars argued that the Peace of Westphalia established the foundation of the European legal order... In a manner serving German interests in the first half of the nineteenth century, the German historians Koch and Hareen argued that the significance of the system established by Westphalia was its confirmation of the German states' territorial supremacy, rights, and privileges, and by setting German states as barriers between major European powers, the Peace of Westphalia secured both the mutual independence of European states and Europe's balance of power." (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 199)

Besides these historians, Kayaoğlu (2010: 197) also holds international jurists of the nineteenth century responsible for this turn. Transformation of the natural law tradition to the positivist law tradition

had a great impact on the birth of the Westphalian discourse. Until the eighteenth century, natural law tradition was the dominant paradigm. In this paradigm law and justice were regarded as unified, thus its source was accepted to be transcendental and universal. So it did not need to invent a historical event as the source of principles of territoriality or recognition to legitimize its argument about the existence of an international society of states and international law. (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 197)

However early nineteenth century transformation from natural law to positivist law influenced the way PoW was perceived. (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 198-204). Since international law was not justifiable through transcendental natural law anymore, positivist international jurists found historical and analytical justifications for that. The PoW served as a symbol, which gave a start to this new and legitimate international law and order. Ultimate authority within a defined territory was designated as sovereign state and these states reciprocally decided by their free will to constrain their sovereignties through signing treaties, applying them within their domestic borders and also between each other. International law and order meant to be derived from the PoW and its origin was presented as definitely European. It ended anarchy in Europe, brought order and should have done the same in other parts of the world. Thus in the end it served to European exceptionalism and imperialism. Europe was set as unique and superior so had the right to dominate the inferiors, and diffuse its tolerance, law and order to the 'uncivilized' parts of the world. Giving examples from unequal treaties, tariff systems, capitulations, and British, American or French courts in the Ottoman Empire, China and Japan, Kayaoğlu states that:

“Most of the international jurists acted like ideologists of European colonialism through the doctrines like Westphalian sovereignty that dispossessed non-Western rights or through extraterritoriality policies that limited non-Western legal authority, or acted as apologists for Europe’s excessive brutality in the name of its civilizing mission and expansion of international society. In sum, international jurists were often complicit in, and frequently ardent supporters of, European colonialism.” (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 204)



In order to understand the role of colonialism in the development of the norms that are supposed to derive from the PoW, we can also look at the work of Antony Anghie (1996; 321-36) who is a legal scholar. He affirms that from sixteenth to nineteenth century, European understanding of international law served to legitimize both the discovery and the expansion of colonialism in the New World. He tries to demonstrate how for example, 'discovery' or 'conquest' were legalized to become sovereign over the possessions of the 'uncivilized', territoriality was attached to the principle of sovereignty in order to deny the demands of colonized peoples; the principle of recognition by the current sovereigns was set as a barrier against the new comers, and so on. And he claims that Europeans achieved this not only through discourse but also through brutal use of military power.

But who is the first international jurist who invented the linkage between the emergence of European society of sovereign states based on international law and the PoW? Onuf (2000: 6) and Kayaoğlu (2011: 201) state that Henry Wheaton is the first international jurist who adopted Emerich de Vattel's claim that Europe created an international society based on international law and connected it to the PoW as its origin. For Wheaton, the PoW freed European states from the Church and the Holy Roman Empire (HRE), replaced religious repression with tolerance and peace, and settled diplomacy as a way of inter-state conflict resolution. All these came together and brought out a European order based on international law which was not applicable to the rest of the world of that time. (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 201). In Wheaton's words:

"The Peace of Westphalia, 1648, may be chosen as the epoch from which to deduce the history of the modern science of international law. This great transaction marks an important era in the progress of law of nations." (Wheaton, 1973 [1845]: 70)

"The Public law, with slight exceptions, has always been, and still is, limited to civilized and Christian people or to those of European origin." (Wheaton, 1936 [1866]: 15)

There are some others who wanted to promote cooperation between European states and used the PoW for the invention of international community and international law. For example, Sir Travers Twiss (1884:

xvii) argues that the PoW "laid the foundation of a new European State-System". Additionally, Wight says that nineteenth century English lawyer W.E. Hall claimed that the European cultural and historical strength and superiority brought out this international law:

"... as international law is a product of the special civilization of modern Europe, and forms a highly artificial system of which the principle could not be supposed to be understood or recognized by countries differently civilized, such states only can be presumed to be subject to it as are inheritors of that civilization... States outside European civilization must formally enter into the circle of law-governed countries." (Hall cited in Wight, 1977: 115)

So we can conclude that this nineteenth century perspective desires to have order in Europe. And to maintain order, they define an exclusively European society of sovereign states acting upon some presumptions and principles:

- There is an anarchic world order: there is no transnational authority above states to limit their behavior.
- States are free to pursue their best interests (*raison d'état*) and only the sovereigns can limit themselves on this way.
- These states are secular so they no longer fight for religious purposes but they can fight for *raison d'état*.
- And there are two major tools to limit any disorder: for realists that is the balance of power and for idealists that is the international law (this is accepted as a derivative of balance of power for the realists of the period).

What about the twentieth century? Here are some great examples of the continuance of this nineteenth century invention among the twentieth century idealists: Thomas J. Lawrence (1910: 120) says that the PoW established a world order based on Grotius' account of international law that replaced the anarchy caused by religious wars and they achieved their independence through willingly restricting their autonomy through international law. John Westlake (1904: 45) and Amos Hershey (1912: 30) assert that the PoW had a role in founding an international society of European states first and then it expanded to the rest of the

world. Frederick Sherwood Dunn (1927: 577) claims that the PoW is the beginning of a joint action in Europe, thus the origin of international constitutional law and the modern international system. And finally Elihu Root (1916), German historian Leopold von Ranke (Dorpalen, 1948: 714) and David Jayne Hill (1911: 93) support this assertion that international order and community through international law are the products of the PoW. And it is not that difficult to notice the underlying Eurocentrism in all these references.

There seems to be two traditions that sustained this nineteenth century invention after the WWI: idealists and realists. Idealists after WWI started to present the PoW as a collective action to guarantee peace and drew similarities between the PoW and the Covenant of League of Nations. And even asserted that there has been an ongoing project starting from the PoW and evolving towards the League of Nations (today United Nations (UN) and even European Union (EU)). Some popular examples include Rosting who claims that PoW is a starting point for the religious toleration and liberty of thought in Europe and continues as such: "The principle of joint action and the acceptance of common responsibilities and guarantees which are contained in this treaty, in many respects evoke comparison with the Covenant of the League of Nations." (Rosting, 1923: 643) Stowell (1931: 728) also emphasizes collective action and cooperation between states: "International Congresses, such as Westphalia, Vienna or Versailles may be considered to have constituted as it were a world gathering of humanity with plenary powers for executive, judicial and legislative action". Furthermore, Wright (1932: 102) pictures the PoW as a collective enforcement instrument to maintain peace and Edwin Borchard (1938: 779) presents similarity between the PoW and the League of Nations.

What about the realists? Even some realists of the first half of the twentieth century share this nineteenth century idea of an international law emerging with the PoW, but most of them put more emphasis on the balance of power to secure order. For example, the father of

Realpolitik Heinrich von Treitschke emphasizes international law, too; but only as a sign of balance of power and more importantly existence of an international society. For him, the PoW regulated the behaviors of sovereign and autonomous states under the lack of a supreme authority and brought order:

“This Peace of Westphalia came to be looked upon like a *ratio scripta* of international law; every one uttered thanksgiving that some sort of status quo had now been established. People began to feel themselves part of an organized European society, and all the sovereign States began, as it were, to form one great family.” (Treitschke, 1963 [1916]: 287)

However most of the realists of the period present the PoW as the tipping point for the emergence of state sovereignty and independence. They distress international community with a common morality, shared norms and ideas; instead they emphasize power and state autonomy. For example; Tor Hugo Wistrand (1921: 525) declares that the PoW brought about a Europe composed of sovereigns, who were independent and had no concern about limiting their wills in terms of any moral or religious standards. Additionally, realist Friedrich Meinecke asserts that *raison d'état* persists in world history and PoW is a sign of that. And this is an expression of the cyclical history understanding of the realists. According to him, German principalities became more powerful and independent against the Habsburg Emperor after the PoW:

“Between the Emperor and the princes there took place as it were a race for the prize of *raison d'état*; and the Peace of Westphalia, which emphatically confirmed the sovereign power of the territorial authorities and even increased it, decided this contest in favor of the princes.” (Meinecke, 1984 [1924]: 135)

Hence the PoW as a historical tipping point was popular among both realists and idealists during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. However after the hassle of WWII, there was a clear rise of the realists who harshly criticized the League of Nations for its failure to prevent the war. Until the 1970s, there was little reference to the PoW and those emphasized state sovereignty, autonomy, nonintervention, human rights protection, power and *raison d'état* aspects of the PoW while deemphasized international law, international

community, collective action and cooperation aspects. And up until 1980s realist supremacy continued with more emphasis on the association of the PoW with the principles of anarchy, self-help, non-intervention and sovereignty. (Schmidt, 2011: 611-2) However some other interpretations of the PoW (English School, constructivist, etc.) started to rise in this period, too.

To begin with, international legal scholar Leo Gross' 1948 article stands out as a masterpiece in this period. It is a frequently cited one, which had a great impact on IR literature. Although he has some conflicting statements, he prefers to stress the 'independence' principle and thinks parallel with the arguments of the early twentieth century realists on the PoW.

"Instead of heralding the era of a genuine international community of nations subordinated to the rule of the law of nations, (the Peace of Westphalia) led to the era of absolutist states, jealous of their territorial sovereignty to a point where international law came to depend on the will of states more concerned with the preservation and expansion of their power than with the establishment of a rule of law." (Gross, 1948: 38)

According to Gross, since there is no supreme authority above all sovereigns and the society of states' priority is their independence, they cooperate to guarantee this independence altogether. He defends that 'national will to self-control' and 'opposition to a higher authority' (just like German princes vis-à-vis Habsburgs) emerged with the PoW (1948: 41). Plus he adds that PoW can be seen as UN's antecedent in the case of human rights protection and law. (Gross, 1948: 24) However, he becomes popular with his emphasis on the principle of non-intervention and ones who site him in the future mostly choose this side of Gross' argument.

In line with Gross, realists Quincy Wright and John Herz also assert that non-intervention principle was set by the PoW. John Herz (1957: 477) presents PoW as a great divide between interference in medieval Europe versus autonomous and sovereign states in modern Europe maintaining non-intervention through the use of military force. Furthermore, Quincy Wright (1954: 620) claims that through the PoW sovereigns started to

determine the religion of their subjects and other states did not have any right to intervene into their internal affairs in the name of religion. However as a breach of this non-intervention principle, Buehring (1965) and Schwarzenberg (1964) present the PoW as an instrument for religious toleration and protection of minority rights. Osiander (2001: 272) will support this view in the future and say that PoW disempowered princes against their subjects and invested on human rights protection like Gross mentioned before.

After WWII, realist Hans Morgenthau seems to be pessimistic about the possibility of cooperation between states, but he still perceives international law as a sign of balance of power and claims that it brings order in an anarchic world of rational, egoistic and autonomous sovereign states. And for him the PoW first brought a common cultural understanding and shared norms. (Morgenthau, 1978: 282) Morgenthau is in line with Treitschke and declares that:

“A core of rules of international law laying down the rights and duties of states in relation to each other developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These rules of international law were securely established in 1648, when the treaty of Westphalia brought the religious wars to an end and made the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern state system.” (Morgenthau, 1948: 210)

As a realist, however, he puts more emphasis on the birth of territorial sovereign state as follows: “by the end of the Thirty Years’ War, sovereignty as supreme power over a certain territory was a political fact, signifying the victory of the territorial princes over the universal authority of emperor and pope.” (Morgenthau, 1967: 299)

However neo-realist Kenneth Waltz more strongly stresses great power politics and the norm of balance of power as a determinant of international politics, and then implies the PoW as a beginning:

“The 150-odd states in the world appear to form a system of fairly large numbers. Given the inequality of nations, however, the number of consequential states is small. From the Treaty of Westphalia to the present, eight major states at most have sought to coexist peacefully or have contended for mastery. Viewed as the politics of the powerful, international politics can be studied in terms of the logic of small-number systems.” (Waltz, 1979: 131)

Contrary to these realist arguments, from the 1970s on it is possible to claim that the liberals' interpretation of the PoW was on the rise against the realist paradigm. Liberals in these years, started to present the Westphalian system as the opposite of the emerging globalized world order that necessitates global governance, cooperation and interdependence. And according to Schmidt, 1969 comes up as a critical point in the evolution of the Westphalian discourse. For Schmidt (2011: 612-3), Richard Falk (1969) is the first one who de-historicized the PoW and transformed it from a historical event to an analytical construct with a stable and constant meaning:

"...Falk elaborated and juxtaposed what he called a "Westphalia conception" of international order, based on sovereignty, territoriality, and nonintervention, with a "Charter conception," rooted in the UN Charter and emphasizing international governance structures and cosmopolitan trends in international politics... Falk (1969: 43) further loosened the tie between his Westphalia conception and the actual Peace... This marks a decisive turning point in the discourse of the Peace in which applying the term "Westphalian" to aspects of the state system introduces a whole package of characteristics and assumptions that no longer needs to be justified in historical terms. This separation from direct historical validity is the starting point of difficulties in applying the Westphalia concept to the analysis of change in world politics, for while it might provide a convenient baseline against which to measure change, the magnitude and direction of this change might be subsequently exaggerated and oversimplified." (Schmidt, 2011: 612-3)

Constructivist John G. Ruggie (1972) also supports this liberal view and he explains how world order is being transformed from a Westphalian system to a system of state coordination. Backing this argument, Morse (1976: 45) presents that globalization brings normative shifts and increasing interdependence that challenges the old Westphalian system. Also Cooper holds this view, too:

"Growing economic interdependence thus negates the sharp distinction between internal and external policies that underlies the present political organization of the world into sovereign, territorially-based nation-states—sometimes called the Westphalian System." (Cooper, 1972: 179)

Even realists started to use Falk's concepts while they continued to stress the self-help and non-intervention aspects of the Westphalian system. For example; Samuel Kim uses the concept as follows: "China,

without saying so, has embraced the sovereignty-centered system of what Richard A. Falk calls 'the Westphalia legal order.'" (Kim, 1978: 347) and "Classical Westphalian notion that how each sovereign state treated its own citizens was none of international business." (Kim, 1990: 200) Also J. Martin Rochester (1986: 793) portrays the current world order as a "decentralized Westphalian system of territorially based sovereign states".

Nevertheless, Schmidt (2011: 614-5) also points at the scholars who still make historical remarks (without using the Westphalia concept) on the PoW such as Morgenthau (1978), Henry Nau and James Lester (1985), and Cornelius Murphy Jr. (1982) emphasizing the independence and sovereignty of states versus Martin Wight (1977) emphasizing the common culture of a state system born with the PoW.

It can be concluded that starting from the nineteenth century up until the end of the Cold War, Westphalian narrative has been constructed by the idealist and realist understandings and representations of the PoW. They each highlight different aspects of the treaty but there is one thing common; that the MIS of sovereign, territorial, autonomous and equal states was born with the PoW in 1648; plus they imply that this system is originally and exclusively European. But while the realist tradition emphasizes non-intervention, autonomy, balance of power; idealist tradition, on the other hand, emphasizes religious toleration, human rights, and international community of states acting according to international law. However we witness the enrichment of IR theories after the 1960s and especially the 1980s. For example, English School and constructivist scholars will take the flag to continue the argument that international society of states based on international law and norms was born with the PoW and evolved into the current one as in the argument below:

"The concept of independence for a similar multitude of small states in our present international society, formed from the fragmentation of empires, and their presence at the permanent congress of the United Nations, has evolved from the Westphalian settlement and bears an inherited resemblance to it." (Watson, 1992: 196)



In line with this argument constructivist John Gerard Ruggie will write that: "the most important contextual change in international politics in this millennium (is) the shift in Europe from the medieval world to the modern international system, which took full shape at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648." (Ruggie, 1986: 141) However, revisionist scholars will start to challenge this commonsense especially after 1990s. And their arguments will be represented separately in the next section.

### **3.2. Deconstruction of the Westphalian Narrative**

This section brings front the studies from almost all theoretical backgrounds and they all challenge the basic assertions of the Westphalian narrative constructed since the nineteenth century. As was presented above, Westphalian myth has been the dominant narrative until 1990s through not only realist and liberal, but also English School and constructivist discourses. From then on, comes the rise of revisionist scholars. But before coming to the reflectivist side, there is a need to focus on a variety of scholars from the rationalist side who are dissatisfied with this Westphalian narrative and heavily criticize it.

#### **3.2.1. Rationalists Challenging the Westphalian Narrative**

The common point of these revisionist scholars is that they all claim that the Westphalian myth is an erroneous theoretical construct that mistakenly orders the minds of both the scholars and the policy makers. And it is a hindrance for the development of IR scholarship. This section will briefly present the studies of Stephen Krasner and Sebastian Schmidt from the realist side; Andreas Osiander from liberal side; Barry Buzan and George Lawson from English School, Benno Teschke from the Neo-Marxist school, Alexander B. Murphy from the constructivist side and Stepher Beaulac from international law scholarship; also just mention the main arguments of some others.

For realist Krasner (1995 and 1999) and international law scholar Beaulac (2000) the Westphalian myth is an 'ideal' that has been constructed by the fans of sovereignty who want to build an

international system based on independent, autonomous and sovereign states. They both deconstruct the Westphalian myth through depicting Europe before and after 1648; plus by re-evaluating the process and the clauses of the Peace. Then they both conclude that 1648 is neither the beginning, nor the end of the transformation of the hierarchical structure in Europe. It was just one of the steps within this process. What was coming was the victory of central governments of autonomous monarchs against the feudal barons, the Emperor and the Pope. Autonomous and truly independent sovereign states matured much later in Europe. (Beaulac, 2000: 150-1)

For Beaulac, medieval Europe was based on a multilayered political order and there was a combination of various power struggles between the vassals, monarchs, the Emperor and the Pope. However the unifying authorities of the Pope and the Emperor had already begun to decay under the forces of Reformation and centralization of government. Both secular and religious concessions to German princes were already on the way. For example, the rule of *cuius regio eius religio* was a product of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. But German princes demanded more and more from the Emperor and rising powers of Europe such as France, England, the United Provinces of Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark who wanted to weaken HRE and/or gain territory, formed alliances with Protestant German princes during the Thirty Years' War. So the War and the following Peace were only a part of a longer power struggle.

Beaulac claims that PoW is not a multilateral treaty but instead it consists of two bilateral treaties: Osnabrück between HRE and Sweden and Münster between HRE and France. But Sweden, France and HRE took some of the German princes as their allies, thus they became parties of the agreements. "As a consequence, the Treaties became instruments not only to bring peace between the former belligerents, but also to deal with constitutional matters within the Empire." (Beaulac, 2000: 163) Realist Krasner (2001: 35) also thinks that the PoW brought a new constitution to HRE. This was even a breach of non-

intervention and state autonomy principles. (Krasner, 2001: 37) These treaties were about "religious matters, territorial settlements and the formal transfer of a treaty-making power." (Beaulac, 2000: 176) and the target of the PoW was not to bring out independent German states or to introduce a new international system. (Krasner, 2001: 38) "On the contrary, it kept the imperium very much alive, be it in the Empire's institutions, through feudal territorial links, or with restrictions as regards alliances." (Beaulac, 2000: 177)

International jurists Emmerich de Vattel and Christian Wolff have first put forward the idea that states need to be autonomous and free of external intervention. (Krasner, 2001: 20) Krasner suggests that this was in the eighteenth century and the PoW has nothing to do with it. Accordingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom, PoW did not enhance but instead restricted German princes' exclusive authority within their territories in two ways. First their internal 'autonomy' was circumscribed in religious terms. For example; "Article 5, paragraph 11, established that a ruler who chose to change its religion could not compel its subjects to do the same." (Beaulac, 2000: 167) Second, the PoW only formalized an already existing habit of forming alliances (Krasner, 2001: 37) but hampered princes' external authority in terms of conducting their foreign policy as in the Article 65 of Münster:

"They [the German polities] shall enjoy without contradiction, the Right of Suffrage in all Deliberations touching the Affairs of the Empire; but above all, when the Business in hand shall be the making or interpreting of Laws, the declaring of Wars, imposing of Taxes, levying or quartering of Soldiers, erecting new Fortifications in the Territories of the States, or reinforcing the old Garisons; as also when a Peace or alliance is to be concluded, and treated about, or the like, none of these, or the like things shall be acted for the future, without the Suffrage and Consent of the Free Assembly of all the States of the Empire: Above all, it shall be free perpetually to each of the States of the Empire, to make Alliances with Strangers for their Preservation and Safety; provided, nevertheless, such Alliances be not against the Emperor, and the Empire, nor against the Public Peace, and this Treaty, and without prejudice to the Oath by which everyone is bound to the Emperor and the Empire." (Beaulac, 2000: 167)

This clause is also a sign of the persistence and even reinforcement of imperial institutions. Imperial Diet still had authority in conducting

foreign policy, legislation and taxation and courts were still effective in safeguarding religious clauses. (Beaulac, 2000: 168) So the HRE was still alive and functioning; autonomous and sovereign states did not come out of it after the PoW. As well known, HRE lost its power and functions gradually and dissolved not in 1648 but in 1806 after Napoleon's invasion.

Constructivist Alexander B. Murphy thinks in line with Beaulac and Krasner, too. He asserts that there used to be a multi-layered political structure in Europe both before and after the PoW and it is a mistake to believe that territorial sovereignty became the guiding principle of the European order after the PoW. Instead, starting from the fourteenth century there was a gradual transition from the medieval to the modern world and several territorial models such as empires, republics, duchies, autonomous cities in Italy and absolutist states co-existed for centuries. (Murphy, 1996: 84-6) His below statement on external sovereignty is so similar to the one asserted by Krasner above:

"Many political theorists came to look back on the Peace of Westphalia as the first formal step toward the establishment of a sovereign state system. Taken literally, such a system has never come into being. There have always been external challenges to the autonomy of territorial states, and empires of one form or another have not entirely disappeared." (Murphy, 1996: 86)

Coming to the liberal side, Andreas Osiander (2001) criticizes the realists for their simplistic understanding of the Westphalian myth that emphasizes sovereignty and military power and narrows the scope of IR. He resembles the current international system to the HRE and "to landeshoheit, territorial jurisdiction under an external legal regime shared by the actors." (Osiander, 2001: 283) And he asserts that there is a transformation from classical sovereignty towards global governance based on a network of cooperation among modern states just like the estates of the HRE. Globalization, international institutions, and increasing interdependence among states facilitate this transformation. However he claims that US-led realists refuse this transformation and still insist on an anti-hegemonial order, which has been successfully kept since the PoW. But for him, this past is an

imaginary myth. This transformation was a gradual one and French Revolution and Industrial Revolution were more important than the PoW in this shift. (Osiander, 2001: 281) Furthermore, contrary to the commonsense, Thirty Years' War was not fought between hegemonic Habsburgs and particularistic others. Habsburgs were already too weak to claim Europe-wide hegemony. Instead others such as France and Sweden were trying to weaken Habsburgs and gain territory. Both were expansionist while France had more hegemonic aspirations and Sweden was more opportunistic. (Osiander, 2001: 260)

Moreover, Osiander suggests that the PoW has no clause about sovereignty, non-intervention or balance of power. He thinks in line with Beaulac and Krasner and claims that it was not about a Europe-wide international system; but was exclusively about the HRE and its constitution. Westphalian narrative was constructed by anachronistic nineteenth century German historians. They were anti-hegemonial since they saw the HRE as responsible for their late transformation into a nation-state. And twentieth century IR scholars kept with this narrative because it was more convenient and in line with the explanation of the current system. In this view sovereign state is the ultimate end without any other alternative such as empires. "This fixation on sovereignty... based on military capability... produce a narrow perception of 'international' political phenomena." (Osiander, 2001: 280) And for him, this Westphalian ideology is an impediment for a better IR theory that is more capable of answering the current problems of global politics. For instance, he asserts that:

"the dichotomy empire-sovereignty is a false one; that a low degree of autarchy of individual actors, on the one hand, and a high degree of transborder social linkage, on the other, will likely produce more elaborate forms of institutionalized cooperation; and that this has happened before and thus is not a revolutionary new phenomenon." (Osiander, 2001: 284)

However realist Sebastian Schmidt criticizes liberals who use the Westphalia concept frequently with more emphasis on setting it as a contrast to increasing interdependency, cooperation, and effectiveness

of international organizations such as UN, IMF, etc. rising with globalization:

“...it has helped scholars concerned with the study of globalization and growing international interdependence to orient their analyses of the state system and to define their arguments more clearly by serving as a conceptual foil: various incarnations of the Westphalia concept are essentially what interdependence is not, what transnationalism is not, and what integration is not.” (Schmidt, 2011: 615)

He cites several liberal and constructivist scholars who stress the change in international order towards a more globalized one. (Schmidt, 2011: 615-7) Here are three examples from Lyons and Mastanduno, Mittelman, and Ruggie: First, Lyons and Mastanduno’s book of ‘Beyond Westphalia?’ (1995: 15) brings new issues such as collective security, human rights and environment coming up through globalization as challenges to state autonomy. Second, there is a direct reference from Mittelman supporting this view:

“Globalization is, in fact, establishing new openings for non-state actors...pressuring the state, transgressing the authority of the state over its citizens, and thereby eroding the boundaries of jurisdiction defined by the Westphalian interstate system.” (Mittelman, 2000: 925)

And third, it can be clearly noticed how these globalization supporters from liberal and constructivist sides feed themselves from the previous works of liberals as in the following passage:

“The contemporary interstate system is here viewed as a modified Westphalia system (Gross 1968; Falk 1969). Since the Peace of Westphalia, the interstate system, in principle, has been a decentralized one: states are subject to no external earthly authority, and there exists no organization above states, only between them. The Westphalia system consists of a multiplicity of independent states, each sovereign within its territory, and each legally equal to every other. This system recognizes only one organizing principle, the will of states, thereby giving the collective decision-making system its decentralized character. In practice, the Westphalia system has become partially but progressively modified: spheres of influence modify the principle of equality; supranational actors modestly modify the principle of no external earthly superior authority; an ever more complex pattern of interconnectedness of decisions, events, and developments modifies the principle of independence. And to the extent that states subsequently “will” collective principles and forms of decision-making, the decentralized character of the system is itself modified.” (Ruggie, 2003: 47-8)

However, Schmidt (2011: 603) declares that IR literature should abandon the use of the Westphalia concept since it is historically inaccurate, too simplistic and teleological and then depicts its problems as such:

“first, because the Westphalian system is an ideal-type that might never have actually existed, the impact of globalization may be exaggerated by scholars who employ it. Second, its use implies a linear progression from some Westphalian configuration toward some “post-Westphalian” state of affairs, whereas actual system change is likely to be more complex.” (Schmidt, 2011: 601)

In line with Schmidt, Stephen Krasner is also against the idea that ‘starting with the PoW, states used to be independent, autonomous and sovereign actors, however this sovereignty started to erode due to changing norms of the new coming global international order’. He claims that states have been intervening into others’ internal affairs and breaching their autonomy in the name of other norms such as minority rights, human rights and so on, because “Actors say one thing and do another... All international systems... have been characterized by organized hypocrisy.” (Krasner, 2001: 19) Then he presents three reasons for that: asymmetric distribution of power, incompatibility between domestic and international norms, and conflicting international norms. (Krasner, 2001: 42) However, states compromise both others’ and their sovereignty not for the sake of complying with international norms; but instead for their interests. And since they are in an anarchic order, there is no superior authority to limit their inconsistencies. And they have been doing this compromise through “conventions, contracts, coercion, or imposition” for so long. (Krasner, 2001: 23) In his words:

“Hence, every major peace settlement from Westphalia to Dayton has involved violations of the sovereign state model. At Utrecht and Helsinki, rulers entered into contracts... In the Holy Alliance and at Versailles and Dayton, rulers in the most powerful states imposed their preferences... There was always some competing principle—the need for religious peace at Westphalia, for balance of power at Utrecht, for international peace at Vienna and Versailles..., for stability at Helsinki and Dayton—that was invoked to justify compromising the sovereign state model.” (Krasner, 2001: 41)

English School scholars Barry Buzan and George Lawson (2012) also challenge this prevalent Westphalian narrative. They accept 1648 as a

secondary benchmark date, because they accept the PoW as the birth of the absolutist sovereign state in Europe. For them, this process started in fifteenth century, then continued with Reformation, Thirty Years' War, PoW, Glorious Revolution in England and up to the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. But they see it as a secondary date because:

“The first is that it is a largely European event, therefore lacking the global credentials for primary benchmark status. Only those in thrall to the idea that European history is world history could see 1648 as globally significant. Second, Westphalia does not mark the transition to modernity. It is true that Westphalia can stand for the idea of the territorial state and, more arguably, the idea of sovereignty (but not sovereign equality) as a defining practice of international relations. What eventually spread around the world, however, was not the absolutist state associated with Westphalia, but the rational-bureaucratic state which emerged during the 19th century (for which 1860 serves as a superior segue).” (Buzan and Lawson, 2012: 21-22)

Apart from these studies there are many other revisionist scholars who challenge the Westphalian myth from a wide range of perspectives. Thomson (1994) attacks the myth of state sovereignty and suggests that European states had to share their authority to use violence with several non-state actors such as merchant companies and pirates until the twentieth century. Derek Croxton (1999) thinks in line with Krasner and claims that the purpose of the PoW is not to bring out the sovereign state; it does not have any such article inside. It was just a product of balance of power; France wanted to replace the Habsburgs in terms of European hegemony and others were trying to balance it. Sovereignty was a by-product of the PoW due to emerging multi-polarity in Europe. Caporaso (2000) suggests that MIS was not born overnight in 1648; there has always been a competition between rival systems and the emergence of MIS was a long-term process, which started centuries earlier and consolidated centuries later. Critical theorist Hendrik Spruyt (2002) thinks in line and asserts that global acceptance of legal sovereignty, non-intervention, recognition and equality took centuries to evolve; and material factors were decisive in this process. Kaplan (2007) asserts that secularism has nothing to do with the PoW and it was consolidated in Europe only in the nineteenth century. Peter Stirk



(2012) claims that sovereign equality is not a product of the PoW but comes much later in the nineteenth century and becomes global only after the WWII. Moita (2012) is strictly against the use of the misrepresentative concept of the Westphalian system; he stresses the role of industrial revolution and rise of nationalism, which transformed the 'princely-states' to modern nation states, as the most important determinants of the MIS. And finally Neo-Marxist Benno Teschke claims that Europe as a region completed its transition to international modernity only in the nineteenth century and offers its origin as follows:

"The decisive break to international modernity comes with the rise of the first modern state — England. After the establishment of a capitalist agrarian property regime and the transformation of the English state in the 17th century, post-1688 Britain starts to restructure international relations in a long-term process of geopolitically combined and socially uneven development." (Teschke, 2002: 5)

Suffice it to mention, some of these rationalist scholars are against the commonsense Westphalian narrative in IR. Even though they criticize the conventional wisdom, they replace it with other European dates or periods in general. So they are still Eurocentric. From here on, focus will be on the main argument of this thesis that is how reflectivists challenge the Westphalian myth.

### **3.2.2. Reflectivists Challenging the Westphalian Narrative**

Although all revisionists confront the commonsense Westphalian narrative, there is a major difference between Eurocentric and reflectivist scholars. While the Eurocentric scholars challenge this myth within the realm of structural theories and offer alternative dates/periods from the history of Europe; reflectivist ones totally reject the European uniqueness and try to absorb the contributions of the East into the making of the world history and world politics.

In the popular reflectivist examples below it is easy to notice that they prefer to frequently use these statements in negative terms: objectivism, positivism, neutrality, Eurocentrism, hegemony, hierarchy, domination, colonialism, imperialism, inequality, injustice,

power&knowledge relationship, universalism, absolute truth claims, and binary thinking that leads to conflicts. They suggest that modern history is a value-laden construction that serves to the interests of the powerful West. On the contrary, they all favor plurality, diversity, cultural interactions and parallel histories of the neglected and the repressed. They either use critical discourse analysis, or genealogy, or deconstruction to counter the narratives provided by the conventional wisdom. Instead they propose reconstructing them with a purpose of global justice and plurality. They all accept that social sciences are not value-free and they invite the conscience into the play.

To begin with, feminist Tickner criticizes the Eurocentric liberal and evolutionary perspective of World History and the 'end of history' claim after the end of Cold War as such:

“The Eurocentric liberal view of World history portrays a linear progression toward modernity whereby universalist values of liberty and democracy, as well as technology and economic development, were spread around the world through the power and knowledge of European nations... IR's foundational stories and teleological accounts of progressive journeys towards a secular liberal modernity appear less and less relevant for understanding contemporary problems. Firmly rooted in the European experience and in European knowledge traditions, it is doubtful whether they were ever relevant for much of the world's population.” (Tickner, 2011: 6)

Coming to the Westphalian myth, post-colonialist Siba Grovogui tries to deconstruct the uniqueness, universality and equality assumptions of the conventional IR and tries to expose the subtle domination and exploitation intentions under the Westphalian commonsense. First, it seems that he does not believe that a universal and unique date can be set for the emergence of MIS, since a system of equal sovereign states is a fiction. He states that:

“There has never been a uniform international system of sovereignty across space and time' but instead the agents – according to their interests- applied different sets of rules and standards in different parts of the world while these plurality of regimes were 'held together by historic power relations'. (Grovogui, 2002: 316)

And this process occurred as follows:

“...to emancipate themselves from the political chaos and anarchy generated by the antagonisms of Reformations, Counter-Reformations,...the peace treaties of inter alia Augsburg (1555), Westphalia (1648) and Vienna (1815) established consensual rules of mutual recognition and the principle of cooperation for the attainment of collective historical ends... This fiction allowed European states to coalesce into the Concert of Europe, the Holy Alliance and later the North Atlantic Treaty Organization... The participant states were given formal equal standing with respect to each other, despite significant variations in their capacities and resources... However the distribution of power has served to promote mechanisms of hierarchy and domination.” (Grovoqui, 2002: 324-5)

Second, he emphasizes power-interest-knowledge relationship while interpreting the effects of the Westphalian commonsense in theory and practice. According to him, Westphalian commonsense secures its surveillance through such underlying assumptions that there was once a competition between alternative regional systems and Europe was justified for its use of violence against its competitors; European regime of sovereignty has won this competition which is a proof of Western superiority over the inferior rest; so this regime deserves to become universal; the West is more equal than the others and so still sets the norms of international regime of sovereignty; every potential member of the international society should abide with that and whoever cannot conform to that is responsible for its own failure. This commonsense –at least- neglects the role of colonization upon this failure. And for him:

“One source of this misdiagnosis is the prevailing assumption that modern sovereignty is an epiphenomenon of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The insufficiency of Westphalian commonsense becomes apparent when one considers the effects of the historical coordinates of sovereignty instituted by modern hegemonic powers in Europe and Africa. Focusing on the cases of Belgium, Switzerland and Congo, my aim is to show that their modulations of power, interest and identity continue to favor European entities at the expense of African ones.” (Grovoqui, 2002: 315)

Third, according to Grovoqui international relations have created a hegemonic and hierarchical order that corresponds to mechanisms of subordination and discrimination guided by “Western designs and conduct of foreign policies” (2002: 323), where principles of non-intervention and self-determination are also myths. Colonizers wanted their subordinated populations get along with the European

expectations. If accepted, Europeans rewarded them "with treaties of protection and political recognition" and if opposed, they punished them "through coercion, including war, resulted in punishing treaties of capitulation and concessions, or political liquidation." (Grovoqui, 2002: 327) Moreover, this international regime was used by the colonizers to legitimize the Western intervention to the so-called 'failed' states of Africa not only in the forms of conquer and colonization but also in the name of bringing democracy-stability-order-security or humanitarian intervention. However under the heading of "Conclusion: Knowledge, Objectivity and the Human Interest", he states that:

"Appeals to justice, and the rule of law miss the mark if they are framed by understandings which ignore the role of the European regime of sovereignty in the region. In other words, it serves no legitimate purpose to hold on to ethical commonplaces if the commonsense upon which they are based is erroneous." (Grovoqui, 2002: 335-6)

Monghia is another post-colonialist scholar who asserts that "current sovereignty doctrine, far from being neutral or unrelated to colonialism is, instead, deeply Eurocentric, and saturated by the inequalities of its colonial provenance." (Monghia, 2007: 387) She objects to the dominant view that sovereignty was invented in Europe through the PoW, European civilization spread the norms required and through decolonization those European norms adopted by the new comers became neutral and universal. She is against the dominant narrative in IR that gives Europe a privileged position compared to other inferior civilizations in terms of generating and spreading international law and norms such as sovereignty, territoriality, recognition, cessation by treaty and so on. And this inequality and hierarchy are perpetuated by the continuance of this narrative and its practice. And Kayaoğlu (2010: 197-204) backs Monghia's view by claiming that the nineteenth century internationalist jurists supported European imperialism by their claim that Westphalian legal system was superior and the others (Ottoman, Chinese, Japanese, African, etc.) were inferior. Hence this system should have been spread to these places in the name of bringing civilization to those areas.

How does this historical interpretation affect our understanding of the contemporary IR? According to post-colonialists what should be done? Kayaoğlu asserts that IR scholars should abandon using this Westphalian narrative since:

“(i) it distorts our understanding of the emergence of the modern international system, (ii) it leads to misdiagnoses of major aspects of contemporary international relations, and (iii) it prevents international relations scholars from theorizing cross-civilizational and cross-regional interdependencies and (iv) it thwarts the accommodation of pluralism in an increasingly globalized world.” (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 195)

Up to this point, construction of the commonsense Westphalian myth by Eurocentric realist and liberal scholars were presented. Then came the rationalist and reflectivist scholars who challenged this dominant paradigm. And now it is time to look at how reflectivists deconstruct the English School, constructivist, Neo-Marxists, Neo-Weberian and postmodern interpretations of the Westphalian discourse.

### **3.2.2.1. Reflectivist Challenges towards the English School Interpretation of the Westphalian Narrative**

In the previous sections, it was claimed that this Westphalian narrative was originated in the nineteenth century and its purpose was to restore order in Europe. But there were two traditions. First tradition is sustained by the realists today who prioritize the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, independence, autonomy and balance of power while the second tradition is pursued by the English School (ES) scholars today who prioritize an international society based on a common culture, understanding, interests, norms, international law and institutions. And this section will demonstrate the criticisms about how Eurocentric, state-centric, and teleological English School’s Westphalian narrative seems to be.

Starting as early as 1960s with Hedley Bull’s works such as ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’ (1966) and ‘Anarchical Society’ (1977) then continuing with Adam Watson’s ‘The Evolution of International Society’ (1992), we can talk about the centrality of the

purpose of 'keeping order' within an 'international society' of states in the ES tradition. Hedley Bull seems to be the first one who brought the concept of 'international society' to the center of ES thinking. Kayaoğlu (2010: 205) states that Bull was following the Eurocentric arguments of the nineteenth century international jurist Oppenheim and the German historian A.H.L. Hareen in developing his argument. For Bull, acceptance of common interests, values, and rules and cooperating through common institutions separate a system from a society of states. Then he gives the origin and properties of this society:

"The sovereign states of today have inherited from Renaissance Europe an ordered system for the conduct of their relations which may be called an international society... they are a society without government. This society is an imperfect one: its justice is crude and uncertain, as each state is judge of its own cause; and it gives rise to recurrent tragedy in the form of war; but it produces order, regularity, predictability and long periods of peace, without involving the tyranny of a universal state." (Bull, 1959: 41-50)

And finally he comes to the PoW: "The idea of international society, which Grotius propounded was given concrete expression in the Peace of Westphalia." (Bull, 1992: 75) For Bull, European states found a way to end religious wars and coexist peacefully through the PoW. (1992: 77-78) It provided "a kind of constitutional foundation of international society" (Bull, 1992: 77) and marked "the emergence of an international society as distinct from a mere international system, the acceptance by states of rules and institutions binding on them in their relations with one another, and of a common interest in maintaining them." (Bull, 1992: 75-76)

Kayaoğlu (2010) references Callahan (2004) and argues that Hedley Bull and other first generation ES scholars are afraid of a non-Western revolt that seems to be possible after decolonization. Hence they try to guarantee the dominance of Western values, norms, rules and institutions by legitimizing current international law and institutions like UN on the argument that the world needs them for international order. Hedley Bull's argument on the origin of international society combines with another evolutionary argument and brings up a teleological story

as in the writings of Adam Watson below. Look at how Watson serves the PoW to legitimize current institutions:

“The Westphalian Settlement legitimized a commonwealth of sovereign states... stated many of the rules and political principles of the new society of states... The settlement was held to provide a fundamental and comprehensive charter for all Europe. It also formulated some general ideas which have been echoed in subsequent settlements and at the permanent congresses of the League of Nations and the United Nations, such as the medieval condemnation of the evils of war and the need for a new and better order.” (Watson, 1992: 186)

Even the membership principle has evolved from the PoW for ES scholar Ian Clark. (2005: 51-70) Just as the Papacy was not accepted as a legitimate member of the new international society emerged with the PoW, non-democratic states were not included in the current one. Thus be it international society, order, international law, congresses, legitimacy or so on, the main point remains the same for ES scholars: these norms, rules or institutions has originated in Europe and evolved since the PoW. The Rest should internalize them in order to be a member of this civilized society of states so that they maintain order in the world altogether. But this view is problematic for Kayaoğlu (2010: 193) since it misrepresents the past and thus misdiagnoses and mistreats the current problems of IR.

Implicit Eurocentric bias in ES oriented Westphalian discourse maintains a dualism such as the civilized West and to-be-civilized Rest. It supposes that European culture resolved its anarchy problem through a kind of social contract but the others could not achieve this, and they can get order instead of anarchy only through following this European track.

“With this dualism, the Eurocentric notion of international society was invoked to promote the “standard of civilization.” thereby legitimizing colonialism (Keene 2002: chapter 4), dispossessing the rights of indigenous people (Keal 2003), and even socializing Japan into an imperialist state (Suzuki 2009).” (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 206)

Compared to the first-generation solidarist ES scholars who promote a thicker society of states, the second-generation pluralist ES scholars promote a thin version of it. In this pluralist version, imposing European

values on others is not acceptable. Since it will be difficult to agree on a broad range of values, it is seen enough to agree on a very basic set of truly plural and international values so bring out a very thin international society of states. But Kayaoğlu finds even their works Eurocentric. He criticizes the work of Robert Jackson because he suggests that the origin of pluralism is again in Europe:

“He argues that the Peace of Westphalia has symbolized the emergence of a pluralist ethos. Initially, this pluralism was a religious one... Eventually, however, this pluralism symbolized a more expansive political transformation: “as a reconstitution of European politics from that of a *universitas*, based on the solidarist norms of Latin Christendom, to that of a *societas*, based on the pluralist norms of state sovereignty, on political independence.” (Jackson, 2000: 164).” (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 208)

In line with above arguments, Blaney and Inayatullah (2000: 53-4) criticize all these ‘order seeking’ theories and especially the ES scholars for their antagonisms towards diversity that is in contrast with their pluralistic appearance. Blaney and Inayatullah claim that since these paradigms perceive any kind of difference as a threat to the security of social stability and order, they externalize this difference through sovereign state system and they learned to do it after the Thirty Years’ Wars and during the PoW. They justified their negative view of diversity as follows: ‘Diversity created a political chaos during the Thirty Years’ Wars so we should pacify any attempt to repeat such a devastating war’. Hence thinkers legitimized the internally homogenous sovereign authority to limit conflict and maintain order inside. And in the international arena, this ends up with a homogenous world of sovereign states acting on a standard of accepted rules, norms, and institutions. But for Blaney and Inayatullah, this is a distorted view of world politics; because ‘difference’ contains lots of benefits and opportunities for the humanity such as richness, alternatives, and learning from each other. And this perception of presenting the difference as a threat but not as an opportunity, plus preferring order, uniformity and homogeneity instead of heterogeneity and plurality legitimized European colonialism both in material and normative terms. In their words:



“Just as the Westphalian settlement attempted to sidestep the uncertainties and conflicts accompanying difference, the intellectual discourse arising under the shadow of the Thirty Years' War denigrated the positive potentials of difference, tightly tying it to chaos and strife. Thus the heritage of political thought bequeathed to us by this period -from Descartes to Hobbes, Grotius, and Locke- tends to base social order and political peace on relative religious and cultural homogeneity and a strict political uniformity... The contemporary theory and practice of the Westphalian system -or "international society" as we will generally call it- functions primarily to reinforce this suspicion of difference... Against the presumption of domestic commonality, difference is "managed" by some combination of hierarchy, assimilation, and tolerance in varying degrees and kinds.” (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2000: 32)

Post-structuralists David Campbell (1998) and William Connolly (2002) also reject all universalist claims that favor homogeneity and assert that they are not as impartial and objective as claimed. They serve to the interests of the powerful. Instead Campbell and Connolly champion difference, variety, otherness and pluralism. In this view, it is not something desirable to have a world in which everyone thinks alike.

As a conclusion, it can be claimed that this Eurocentric narrative evolving since the nineteenth century historians and international jurists, state that European states solved their anarchy problem through sovereignty, secularism, balance of power, and international law. Thus they secured order and stability inside. And when the Rest internalizes those standards of civilization set by the Europeans, they will be secured from anarchy too and will be admitted to the club of the civilized. This section presented how ES scholars continued this narrative since 1960s and now it is time to look at how constructivists did this after 1980s.

### **3.2.2.2. Reflectivist Challenges towards the Constructivist Interpretation of the Westphalian Narrative**

Constructivists prioritize the role of worldviews, ideas, norms, culture and identity compared to the structural or material factors in understanding world politics. However it is difficult to think about a homogenous group of constructivists. We can talk about conventional, critical or postmodern constructivists and they might disagree in several

topics such as the role of Westphalia in the construction of international system. This section will feature Kayaoğlu's criticism of the conventional constructivists Alexander Wendt and Daniel Philpott. He finds their Westphalian narrative as Eurocentric just like the ES scholars specifically in terms of the extension of originally European norms as if they are international. He again uses the term dualism in his criticism:

“Essentially, international norms like sovereignty, secularism, and human rights emerge from the norm-generating European core, and then diffuse into the norm-receiving non-European periphery. Core states use a variety of means (socialization, shaming, persuasion, coercion) to induce non-Western states to comply with Western identities, ideas, and norms. By a turn of circular logic, Western and non-Western dualism and categories are used to re-invent the Westphalian narrative, and then the narrative is used to justify further dualism.” (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 209)

Eurocentric constructivist arguments in terms of norm construction implicitly discriminate against the non-European norms and institutions in three ways. (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 210) First, these international norms are supposed to emerge in Europe and in contrast to the norms of other civilizations, and then spread to others. For example; Europe is secular but Islamic civilizations are 'jihadist' or European state system consists of sovereign and independent states but Chinese tribute system is suzerainty, so on and so forth. Second they disregard European imperialism and colonialism as ways of diffusion of norms and they do not touch their conflict with the norms of the 'civilized' Europe such as human rights, pluralism or tolerance. And third, they attribute power to the agent in terms of defining the underlying norms of structures; but they disregard the concerns of the weak in this process. They assume that norm construction business among the powerful are to the benefit of all although the disempowered civilizations are excluded from this process.

After this general overview, he deconstructs the works of Alexander Wendt. First of all, as a Weberian, Wendt uses ideal types for the international structures. (Wendt, 1999: 260-97) His categorization of Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures of anarchy also resembles ES scholar Martin Wight's (1991) three ways of anarchy (Machiavellian,

Grotian and Kantian). In Wendt's Hobbesian culture of anarchy, states see each other as enemies and fight without any limit. But in the Lockean one, they perceive each other as rivals. They define the rules of the game through shared ideas and norms and compete rationally while at the same time control and limit themselves. And for Wendt, PoW is the turning point for Europe because Europe passed from the Hobbesian to the Lockean culture of anarchy through the PoW.

But Kayaoğlu (2010: 211) criticizes his view in three major points. First, he claims that Wendt treats Napoleonic Wars, WWI and WWII as externalities in a Lockean culture. Even European imperialism is explained in these terms. Second, Wendt's view is a teleological one too, because he believes that this structure is evolving towards a Kantian one especially after WWII as in the case of NATO where states perceive each other as friends. (Wendt, 1999: 297) And this view is compatible with the democratic peace tradition, which argues that liberal democracies do not fight each other. Accordingly, "non-Western states needed to "socialize" into the Western international in order to realize Kantian anarchy." (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 211) And third, Wendt ignores coercion, colonialism, or violence as other ways of 'socialization' and how European state system expanded through imperialism.

Secondly, Kayaoğlu deconstructs the works of constructivist Daniel Philpott. Philpott gives priority to the ideas as they give meaning to the interests of the actors and material structures. Thus he explains systemic changes through ideational changes that mobilize material changes. In his view, as new ideas emerge and gather supporters, they start to challenge the existing ideas; then they bring out wars or revolutions, so mobilize material factors, which end up with a new order. How do ideas influence politics? In Philpott's terms: "as shapers of identities and as forms of social power." (2001: 8)

In his article (1999) and his book (2001) Daniel Philpott presents that the constitution of the modern international society came up as a result of two revolutions: PoW in 1648 and decolonization after WWII. But he

says that these revolutions resulted from prior ideational revolutions about justice and authority. (2001: 4) So the whole story of how ideational revolutions brought revolutions in sovereignty and made up the constitution of the MIS is as follows for him: Protestant Reformation brought the PoW in 1648 which is the first revolution and constituted a system of sovereign states in Europe. And nationalism and racial equality triggered the second revolution that is the decolonization after 1960s and made the extension of this sovereign state system possible. (2001: 4) Hence for him, religious ideas are responsible for the emergence of sovereign states. And the idea of liberty lies at the bottom of these revolutions. That was the freedom from the Catholic Church in the Protestant Reformation, then from the Holy Roman Empire in the PoW and finally from the Western colonizers after WWII. In his words:

“Protestantism envisioned a political space free from the temporal authority of the Catholic Church, governed by the sovereign prince. Colonial nationalism asserted statehood for colonies, immunity from the authority of their imperial metropole. Each proposition advocated liberation from a larger political entity, contradicting the established idea that legitimated it, creating a crisis of pluralism, causing the revolution. For all their difference in context and meaning, the two ideas converged upon self-determination as freedom, amounting, then, to their own unfolding logic, a movement of ideas behind the movement toward sovereignty.” (Philpott, 2001: 256)

For Philpott, Westphalia is the most important revolution and its constitution still continues. Although he sees the PoW geographically limited to Europe, in the following heading ‘Westphalian Europe and the Rest of the World’, he states that “Over the ensuing three hundred years, the history of sovereignty is largely the history of Westphalia's geographic extension.” (Philpott, 1999: 582) However, Kayaoğlu criticizes his explanation in the sense that “every freedom enhancing idea and incident is traced back to the Peace of Westphalia and thus to the Protestant reformation.” (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 212) And for Philpott (2001: 193) even the independence movements of the colonized people derivate from the Reformation and Westphalia. In Kayaoğlu's words:

“Local ideas, norms, and religions do not play any significant role in Philpott's study of decolonization. Even if some (very few) of the actors of the decolonization movement are non-Western, their

ideas, inspirations, and models are markedly Western and can be traced back to ideas propagated by theologians and philosophers of the Reformation and Westphalia." (Kayaoğlu, 2010: 212)

Hence, it can be concluded that just like the ES scholars, conventional constructivists are also Eurocentric in the sense that they claim that the ideational, normative and institutional origins of the MIS originated in Europe and through the PoW.

### **3.2.2.3. Reflectivist Challenges towards the Neo-Marxist and Neo-Weberian Interpretations of the Westphalian Narrative**

Above discussions were all about when sovereign states emerged. Instead this section will feature Hobson's criticisms about the Eurocentric presentations of Neo-Marxists and Neo-Weberians about how sovereignty was born. As a matter of convenience, Hobson assumes that sovereignty was born in the seventeenth century, but adds that both internal and external sovereignty was not consolidated in Europe until the end of the nineteenth century. (Hobson, 2009: 674-5) Since the 'when was sovereignty?' question accepts its emergence endogenously in Europe as given and omits the role of the East in this process; he prefers to ask another question: "Focusing on the how and where of sovereignty shifts the analysis away from evolutionism and the Eurocentric logic of immanence towards a non-Eurocentric notion of discontinuous change." (Hobson, 2009: 673)

He criticizes Marxists and Neo-Marxists for their economic reductionism and historical determinism, and he appreciates multi-causal approaches specifically the Neo-Weberians. (Hobson, 2007: 107) Nevertheless, he denounces Marxists, neo-Marxists, critical theorists, and Neo-Weberians not because of their structuralism, but instead he adds the constructivists to this group and criticizes all for their evolutionary approach and 'subliminal Eurocentrism' that is:

"the assumption that the West lies at the centre of all things in the world and that the West self-generates through its own endogenous 'logic of immanence', before projecting its global will-to-power outwards through a one-way diffusionism so as to remake the world

in its own image. I call this pervading white mythology of IR the Westphalian narrative (twinned with its accompanying Eastphobian narrative)." (Hobson, 2007: 93)

Hobson summarizes the descriptions of these scholars about how sovereign state system emerged in Europe under five arguments. (Hobson, 2009: 676-9). First of all, he quotes the historical sociologists (Gilpin, 1981; Giddens, 1985; Collins, 1986; Hall, 1986; Mann, 1986; Tilly, 1990) who emphasize Europe's unique anarchic multistate system as the source of MIS. For them, Asia had imperial or suzerain order inside, while Europe had constant competition between rational political units and this anarchy escalated into the European Military Revolution after 1550s. In order to invest on military technologies, states need more taxes and this brought the centralization of state power and bureaucracies based on Weberian rationality. In Hobson's words:

"This framework finds its clearest expression in realist and neo-Weberian theories, although it also plays an important role in various liberal and world systems accounts (cf. North and Thomas, 1973; Wallerstein, 1974; Jones, 1981). Indeed, although Wallerstein, for example, views Europe's uniqueness in its multistate system (which he confusingly calls a 'world economy'), it is in large part the presence of the capitalist 'exit threat' under conditions of state fiscal-military crisis within a multistate system that leads to the emergence of a capitalist system based on sovereign states (Wallerstein, 1974, Chapter 3). Such a progressive dynamic was impossible outside of the West as the East was allegedly dominated by Oriental despotisms, or what he calls 'world empires'." (Hobson, 2009: 677)

Secondly, and related to the first one, another source of the European system is set as the long-distance trade developed in Europe after geographic discoveries. Hobson cites Douglass North and Robert Thomas (1973), Hendrik Spruyt (1994), Wallerstein (1974) and even Braudel (1992) as the ones who find this trading system and the deepening of commercialization as the sources of MIS. He says that these scholars assert that European economy was commercialized after 1450 and powerful capitalists emerged out of it. They turned out to be the new allies of the monarchs and sponsored them to centralize their governments. (Hobson, 2009: 677)

Thirdly, there are the Neo-Marxists who claim that capitalist, centralized and sovereign states were born after the crisis of feudalism that emerged due to the demographic crisis caused by the Black Death that started in 1347. Then he cites those scholars:

“North and Thomas... arguing that the eradication of over a third of Europe’s population served to enhance the relative bargaining power of the peasantry vis-a`-vis the nobility. This ultimately saw the commutation of feudal dues for cash payments and the emergence of free wage labour and a monetized economy. And when coupled with rulers’ need for enhanced tax revenues in the face of escalating military costs, the way was opened for the emergence of centralized nation-states, that granted private property rights to the capitalist class (North and Thomas, 1973, especially Chapters 7–8)... Resulting class struggles in the context of commercialization saw the rise either of capitalist agriculture or the migration of peasants into towns, in turn leading to the rise of centralized states which protected the ruling class (Anderson, 1979 and Brenner, 1985).” (Hobson, 2009: 677-8)

Fourthly, there are the ones who emphasize the role of diplomacy and territoriality (emergence of borders) originated in the Italian city-states, in the making of European state system. (Hobson, 2009: 678) Hobson cites Garrett Mattingly (1973) who stresses the importance of Renaissance diplomacy in the development of the concept of tolerance to the sovereignty of each other. Additionally he quotes Marxist Justin Rosenberg (1994, Chapter 3), who claims that these were first seen in Italy and then spread to all Europe due to the emergence of early capitalism in the Italian city-states.

Finally, Hobson mentions the constructivist arguments that stress the importance of European ideas and norms in the emergence of MIS:

“Ruggie (1998)... while accepting that a range of materialist factors was important, nevertheless places special emphasis on the Italian Renaissance... Chris Reus-Smit (1999) takes a different tack to Ruggie, arguing that the modern form of sovereignty only emerged in the nineteenth century as the new European norm of liberal-individualism infused sovereignty with its moral purpose. And Daniel Philpott (2001) emphasizes the role of the Protestant Reformation, which produced an epistemic challenge to the hegemony of Catholicism and, with it, the Papacy. Thus, the notion of *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose the region, his the religion), which was announced as a constitutive principle of European international society at the Treaty of Augsburg in 1555, established the idea of non-interference by external authorities. And this, of course,

crystallized into the emergence of the sovereign state system at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.” (Hobson, 2009: 678-9)

Finally he heavily criticizes subliminal European exceptionalism in all these narratives. (Hobson, 2009: 678) After stating the arguments of all these scholars coming from Marxist, neo-Marxist, critical theory, world system theory, historical sociology and constructivist traditions, he concludes that they are all Eurocentric since they find the origins of all these military, political, economic, populational and ideational factors endogenously in Europe and assume that they have evolved continuously and exclusively within Europe; while they disregard the role of the East in this evolution. (Hobson, 2009: 686-7) Hence these arguments:

“...cleanse the East from the progressive story of political modernization, thereby maintaining the constructed ‘intellectual line of civilizational apartheid’ that marks Eurocentrism. Above all, it is this manoeuvre that continues to bind IR within a Westphalian straitjacket and confine it to the provincial pasture of Westphalian Europe.” (Hobson, 2009: 679)

Instead he asserts that there is a discontinuous transformation in almost all aspects of life due to unpredictable interactions between different civilizations. And there is always room for surprises. So non-deterministic, multi-causal and ontologically pluralist approaches, which are more inclusive and take into account the contributions of all civilizations bring out more accurate insights. Thus he stresses the Eastern and global influences on the emergence of sovereignty in Europe. In his approach, the East appears to be one of the agents of history as it deserves. Details of this alternative narrative will be supplied in the following section so it is suffice here to briefly cite his story:

“Beginning with the crucial economic revolutions of the post-1000 era, I note that almost all of the financial institutions for which the Italians unjustly became famous, originated in, and diffused across from, Islamic West Asia. Moreover, there would in all likelihood have been no Italian/European commercial revolution without the Eastern trade that flowed into Europe via West Asia and Egypt. Nor might there have been a Renaissance without the assimilation of Chinese, Indian, Jewish, African, but above all, Islamic ideas. Nor might there have been a European Age of Discovery, given that the critical trans-oceanic nautical and navigational techniques/technologies that



made the voyages possible diffused across from Islamic West Asia and China. Nor would the European military revolution (1550–1660) have occurred in the absence of the Chinese military revolution (850–1290). In turn, all these Eastern impulses fed directly into the rise of the sovereign European state. And while the European Enlightenment was heavily influenced by Chinese ideas, so these ideas, coupled with Chinese technologies and methods, in turn spurred on the British agricultural and industrial revolutions... None of this is to say that the Europeans were the passive beneficiaries of an Eastern diffusion process, since they put all the assimilated resource portfolios together through hybridised mimicry... the conclusion must be that without the Rest there would be no West.” (Hobson, 2007: 110)

#### **3.2.2.4. Reflectivist Challenges towards the Postmodern Interpretation of the Westphalian Narrative**

It might be a strange proposition to claim that postmoderns have a common point with the structuralists; but even some postmodern scholars have an implicit Eurocentrism in their arguments. For instance, Hobson brings a general critic of both postmodern feminists and postmodern post-colonialists for their Eurocentrism. First, he claims that postmodern feminists such as Nussbaum make a distinction between the two and examine the situation of the Eastern women from the eyes of the Western women. He says that they assess Eastern women through Western norms and find them as incapable of changing their backwardness or emancipating themselves. They cannot be agents but can only be objects of world politics and need the help of the capable Western women for their emancipation. So feminists see the women of the First World as responsible for rescuing and civilizing the women of the Third World. (Hobson, 2007: 101-2)

Second, he criticizes all postmoderns for two main reasons: their inward looking perspective and that they do not believe in and work for change. (Hobson, 2007: 100, 103-4) Firstly, he criticizes Baudrillard, Lyotard ve Foucault due to the fact that they portrait a self-sufficient Europe and denounce them since they look at Europe’s own image on its own mirror. They omit its interaction with the East and disregard European imperialism or colonialism in their criticisms. Secondly, Hobson claims that they insist on the necessity of the ‘Other’ for the being of the ‘Self’

and keep these two separately. Thus it is not possible for them to prevent this eternal conflict between the Self and the Other. For postmodern post-colonialists, history, which is based on this eternal conflict, is imminently Eurocentric. Since they do not believe in history, they think that there is no need to put any effort to change it. However Hobson asserts that just deconstructing this Eurocentric history is not enough and they should put more effort to reconstruct alternative histories. Unless they do it, there will remain only one available history in the market and its persistence will not be stopped.

What about the postmodern understanding of the PoW? At this point, there is a need to look at how Leira criticizes Foucault on the topic of the emergence of MIS. (Leira, 2009: 475-495). He asserts that Foucault has a deep desire for freedom and tolerance within plurality and thus he is against any form of hegemony. (Leira, 2009: 485-6) So Foucault seems to be close to where neo-realists stand: he perceives and interprets the international system based on the concepts of *raison d'état* and balance of power. He believes that the ultimate purpose of universal peace can only be achieved through an equilibrium between competitive equals (society of states) while diplomacy, international law, military apparatus and war are the instruments of this system. (Foucault, 2007: 297-303) And according to Leira, Foucault asserts that all these started to emerge in the 16th century Europe:

“Foucault stresses that many of the pieces of the state apparatus, such as the army, taxation and systems of justice, were not new to the 16th century but that it was only with the emergence of self-reflection that something like the state could be said to emerge:... The state then emerges as “nothing more than way of governing... nothing more than a type of governmentality.” (Foucault, 1977-8: 248).” (Leira, 2009: 479)

And Leira continues with Foucault’s claim about the origin of this new form of governmentality:

“Foucault sees the phenomenon of governmentality born from the Christian pastorate, the diplomatic-military technique and police (in the 17th-century sense of the term) (Foucault, 1977-8: 110): “With the sixteenth century we enter the age of forms of conducting, directing, and government.” (Foucault, 1977-8: 231) Following

Foucault, as quoted above, we could call this emerging polity "the administrative state." (Foucault, 1977-8: 109)." (Leira, 2009: 481)

According to Foucault, a very critical component of this system: *raison d'état* "was broadly formed during the sixteenth century". (Foucault, 2008: 4) Leira asserts that Foucault believes that the early MIS was codified with the PoW in 1648, and, these states were fundamentally different from the ones in the Middle Ages, in the sense that previously the goal was a universal empire, but since the emergence of *raison d'état*, military-diplomatic foreign policy necessitates that states compete with their equals to maximize their own interests and respect the others' absolute desire to compete for theirs, and limit their hegemonic dreams altogether. (Foucault, 2008: 6) He also claims that Foucault (2007: 299) believes that balance of power was also instituted in 1648.

However Leira disagrees with Foucault at several points. First he claims that French foreign policy (i.e.; during Napoleon) contradicts with what Foucault claims about *raison d'état*. (Leira, 2009: 487) Second, he claims that the idea of an international society was not born in seventeenth century but in nineteenth century. (Leira, 2009: 493) But the argument of this section is not about the historical accuracy of Foucault's claims. Instead the purpose is to stress the underlying Eurocentrism in his views. Just like what Hobson and Kayaoğlu said above, the same is also applicable for Foucault's views: he believes that the very essence of the MIS can be found exclusively in Europe. He is 'inward looking' in the sense that although he is critical of it, he presents the development of the underlying concepts, instruments or governmentalities of MIS in Europe and has no concern about the role of the rest of the world in this process.

### **3.3. Reconstruction of Alternative Histories**

So far, several deconstruction attempts against the conventional Eurocentric history about the emergence of MIS were displayed. But that is not enough to deconstruct these Eurocentric stories from a variety of theoretical backgrounds and new ones should be

reconstructed in order to replace them. So this section will feature several alternative stories against the Westphalian myth.

Why is there a need for alternative histories? Feminist and post-colonialist IR scholars, such as Stewart-Harawira (2005) and Tickner (2011) present the inequality and hierarchy in the world as a derivative of the foundational stories of IR. So they encourage IR scholars to deconstruct such Eurocentric and exclusionary histories that perpetuate injustice and reconstruct more inclusive and just ones. They favor bringing forward alternative and parallel stories of different peoples of the world about the development of the world order. So they favor plurality and coexistence instead of monopoly and assimilation.

Tickner (2011:12) states that post-colonial scholars such as Toulmin (1990), Smith (1999), Peterson (2000), Barkawi and Laffey (2002), Hobson (2004), and Young (2007) pretend to construct less Eurocentric and multi-cultural stories of the world history. They would like to bring front the multidimensional cultural interactions between the peoples of the world, want to perceive differences as richness and not a danger to get rid of. Getting into the daily lives of ordinary peoples and trying to understand and portray them through empathy appears to be an alternative to the modern claim of writing history objectively from outside. They prefer to stress coexistence, tolerance and cooperation instead of ethno-centrism, domination and conflict. Tickner paraphrases Young (2007: 16) and highlights the ethics and the contemporary consequences of not listening to Non-Western peoples:

“Non-Western peoples are demanding respect, dignity, and the right to tell their own history. The rise of religious fundamentalisms and ethnically driven conflicts are fueled by colonial legacies. Confronting the negative implications of these legacies depends in part on reconstructing the history of modernity, democracy and state building from the point of view of previously colonized peoples.” (Tickner, 2011: 13)

Some selected more inclusive and less Eurocentric alternative stories will be displayed below. And first there is the post-racist critical theorist Hobson, who appreciates the role of the East in the making of the West. He does not seem to be a post-structuralist because he cares about how

power rests on material factors and how ideational factors mobilize these material factors. He expresses himself as a post-racist critical scholar and states that he stands on two main principles:

“First, IR’s obsession with anarchy/sovereignty, hegemony, or capitalist globalisation serves to obscure the presence of a post-racial hierarchy which, entwined with inter-civilisational dialectics and dialogues, forms the racial sinews of power and agency that bind together and generate contemporary global politics/economics... And second, both Self and Other are not merely interconnected, rather than separate and exclusive, but are intimately entwined... the point is to (re)interpret the world in order to change it.” (Hobson, 2007: 115)

He concludes that all civilizations, in complex ways, co-constitute both the Self and the Other simultaneously, since they borrow each other’s ideas, norms, institutions and technologies and negotiate, resist, transform or reproduce them continuously in their own cultural contexts, thus new ‘hybrid civilizational entities are formed’. (Hobson, 2007: 106-7) Based on the above-mentioned five arguments of Neo-Marxists, Neo-Weberians and constructivists, he produces an alternative story in each and emphasizes the role of the East in this civilizational dialogue.

Firstly, in terms of geopolitical/military sources of the sovereign state, Hobson brings front the indispensableness of the Chinese Military Revolution (c.850-c.1290) in the occurrence of European Military Revolution that is the use of guns, gunpowder and more professional military techniques. Secondly, in terms of economic resources, he asserts that commercial and financial revolution in the Western Christendom has its origins in the Italian capitalism where Europe is in touch with the Islamic West Asia. Most of the financial institutions such as bank, cheque, credit institutions and insurance originated in the Muslim World, while they were deviously accepted as belonging to the Italians. (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 216, 223) And thirdly in terms of the demographic crisis, Hobson cites William McNeill (1976) and claims that even the root cause of it that is the Black Death is originally from China (1331) and reached Europe through northwestern trade routes. Plus it had an economic effect. Hobson cites Abu-Lughod (1989, Chapter 5)

and asserts that with the closing of this route, middle and southern routes earned more importance, which nourished European economy.

Fourthly, in terms of ideational factors, Hobson asserts that without the accomplishments of Muslim thinkers and scientists such as Ibn Sina, Al Razi, Ibn al Nafis and others in philosophy, mathematics, chemistry, physics, astronomy, anatomy, medicine and so on, European Renaissance and Scientific Revolution would not be even possible. But still some others claim that these Muslim thinkers and scientists rose upon the heritage of the Ancient Greece. Then he criticizes them as follows: Muslim thinkers translated, criticized and put the Ancient Greek ideas into new directions. So Renaissance is a misleading Eurocentric term because Europe did not directly turn back to its ancestry, instead Europe transferred this revitalized heritage from the Muslim thinkers with their contributions inside. (Hobson, 2009: 685-6) And finally, it is really interesting to see Hobson claiming that even the ones who feature the role of Protestantism in the emergence of sovereignty, such as Philpott (2001) and Nexon (2009); should take into account the similarity between Islamic theology and Reformation ideas. He highlights two Islamic acknowledgements that are the 'ijtihad' as the use of reason and rationality in understanding and applying divine orders; and that the believer gets into contact with God personally, without any mediation from any other human being. Then he highlights the similarity between these Islamic ideas and the theses of Martin Luther. (Hobson, 2009: 686)

Keeping in mind the impact of the East on all these military, political, economic, populational and ideational factors about the development of sovereign statehood in Europe, it can be concluded that Hobson tries to understand the cross-cultural interactions in this very complex process. As he finally asserts: "without the manifold Eastern influences that were imparted to Europe via Oriental globalization, it seems unlikely that sovereignty would ever have been 'made in Europe'." (Hobson, 2009: 686)

Even though Hobson highlights the role of the East, he still finds the origin of sovereignty in Europe. But there are some other scholars who find the origins of IR in other parts of the world. For example, Shereen Saedi challenges the myth of 1648 by proposing a much earlier alternative. She examines Amarna letters from the fourteenth BCE between the Egyptian Eighteenth Dynasty and other states of the ancient Near East and she comes up with such a conclusion:

“The data found in the Amarna letters demonstrates that an international relations system existed in Mesopotamia well before the Westphalia treaties in 1648. The system contained actors, multipolarity, well-defined and regulated international laws, extensive diplomatic measures, and even territorial expansion and occupation... By including a study of ancient history and politics in graduate and undergraduate international relations, sociology, history, and cultural studies departments, the United States can begin to groom more well-rounded, informed scholars.” (Saedi, 2006: 22)

This study is a great example that demonstrates the Eurocentrism and anachronism prevalent in IR literature. It is hard to not to agree with her suggestion below:

“Abiding by the myth that everything “civilized” came from the Western Christian powers promotes an “us” against “them” paradigm which places in danger the entire foundation of IR. In the process, Eastern states (that in recent times are not even referred to as states, but more generally as the “Arab world” or “Muslim world”) are labeled as inferior.” (Saedi, 2006: 20)

Here is another alternative from Yongjin Zhang. Zhang criticizes IR theories in two terms: ahistoricism and Eurocentrism of the rationalist and deductive theories such as neorealism and neoliberalism; and the persistence of Eurocentrism in historically sensitive theories such as English School, constructivism and historical sociology. First he attacks ahistoricism: “Neorealism of the Waltzian brand in particular is ‘cleansed’ of history. Such concepts as state, system and sovereignty, so central to the theorizing enterprise, have rarely been historicized in their proper context.” (Zhang, 2001: 43) Then he mentions historically sensitive theories and criticizes them as such: “The nature of political orders beyond European history and their historical transformations still

remain largely outside the empirical purview of much recent theorizing of IR.” (Zhang, 2001: 44)

In his article, he asserts that ideas, institutions and practices said to be born in Europe and make up the MIS has already been present and working in Ancient China. There was a multi-state system in China as early as 770 BCE and persisted until the first Chinese Empire in 221 BCE. He claims that this civilization shared a common culture just like an international society. (Zhang, 2001: 45-6) This system had some norms or codes applied by all its members such as sovereignty, diplomacy, balance of power and *li* that is the rituals. (Zhang, 2001: 47) Firstly, in terms of external sovereignty, Ancient Chinese states:

“monopolized the right to declare war against each other... changed their allies and made treaties among themselves... were territorialized... controlled the right of passage through their territory by foreign diplomatic envoys... acknowledged mutually their right to offer political asylum... Some states also agreed on the rule related to the extradition of criminals and traitors” (Zhang, 2001: 48)

Secondly, they had intensive and rich diplomatic relations “ranging from frequent diplomatic messengers, regular court visits and conferences of princes” and had reciprocally recognized the norms of diplomatic reciprocity and immunity. (Zhang, 2001: 48-9) Zhang thirdly stresses the importance of balance of power in the persistence of this multi-state system and claims that the Qin Empire was born due to the collapse of this equilibrium of states. And he finally emphasizes the common norms, rules and practices of this system in the form of customary rituals (*li*) and resembles it to international law. (Zhang, 2001: 49)

Then he concludes that the international order of the Chinese history is just one example of the “actual diversity and richness of international life in world history”. (Zhang, 2001: 63) And other world orders in other parts of the world should be explored. From here on he makes a generalization about theorization in IR:

“Such diversity and richness is unfortunately what is sorely missing in IR theorizing. No credible IR theory, however, can be built only upon the narrow confines of the European historical experience. The empirical universe that IR theory needs to address must expand



decisively into the non-European world and beyond Westphalia.”  
(Zhang, 2001: 63)

And finally Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene argues that “the late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century Mongolian political order was akin to that of the Holy Roman Empire and the 1640 Great Code was an Inner Asian parallel to the Treaty of Westphalia.” (2010: 268) He sees an anarchic political environment containing equal sovereigns after the collapse of the Mongol central authority and compares it with HRE. Then he demonstrates that although the PoW is not the right time for the emergence of inter-state sovereignty, it has been misused on the service of Western colonialism:

“the Great Code not only recognized and legalized the independence and sovereignties of the multitude of greater and lesser uluses and princes, but also prohibited religious discrimination... In modern lexicon, the Great Code creates a ‘commonwealth’ of independent principalities with a common legal system and collective enforcement. Thus, in a way, the order established by the Great Code can be treated as a headless state, especially in the absence of a nominal sovereign comparable to that of the Holy Roman Empire. The absence of a sovereign made the order even more ‘interstate’. This was a blueprint of the new sort of inter-polity relations based on mutual respect of the sovereignties of the rulers of the polities popularly epitomized by the Treaty of Westphalia and from which what was later known as the ‘international’ or ‘sovereign state’ order evolved. In fact, the Treaty of Westphalia was concerned principally with the Holy Roman Empire... was not exactly ‘international’ or ‘interstate’ but rather intra-empire state sovereignty. Nor it was based on equality. ‘The legal supremacy of the empire was not formally surrendered... As Peter Wilson argues, the system ‘remained hierarchical, fragmented ... after 1648, but was clearly moving towards a secular order based on more equal, sovereign states . . .’ This model assumed global significance through its articulation in theories of international relations and its use by Western colonial powers in their dealings with other parts of the world (Wilson, 2009: 754).” (Munkh-Erdene, 2010: 276-7)

This section could present only some of the alternative histories standing against the Westphalian one. More examples can be found, but the main point is that IR students and scholars are not destined to be contented with the Eurocentric Westphalian myth. And it is lecturers’ responsibility to first investigate them and then to inform their students accordingly. In the end, a variety of more inclusive alternative stories from diverse traditions have a potential to persuade people about the possibility of parallel world histories and thus to enrich our

understanding of current world politics. Finally, their existence would foster respect for more justice, diversity, and plurality in the world.

## **CONCLUSION**

History matters! It has a great impact on how we perceive and interpret the present. As a human practice, history has been endlessly constructed and re-constructed under changing circumstances and the belief systems, values, biases, and interests of the interpreter inevitably affect this process and the output. Accordingly, how IR writes its history has an enormous effect on shaping the minds of both IR scholars and policy makers in terms of how they perceive the current 'reality', identify problems, frame their questions, design their research agendas and justify their policy prescriptions. Invention and perpetuation of the Westphalian narrative seems to be an example of this.

Introduction to IR 101 teaches that the MIS of sovereign, territorial and autonomous states was born endogenously in Europe based on inherently European military, political, economic or ideational processes. This system needs to be taken as granted and left unquestioned while efforts should be directed to the treatment of the inner problems of it. However, in the last twenty years, revisionist scholars from almost all theoretical backgrounds have been challenging this Westphalian myth. While structuralist ones usually challenge the US-led realism dominant paradigm, reflectivists are against almost all of them since they are all deeply Eurocentric. But this does not seem to be affecting what has been written and taught in IR 101 books.

How does the conventional narrative continue regardless of these revisionist discourses? First of all, most of IR 101 lecturers rely on one or two popular textbooks in their syllabi. First, it does not seem to be convenient to give details about the history of IR or controversies about it, given multiplicity of topics and the breadth of the course. Second, it is easy to content with all-inclusive textbooks compared to creating a reading pack containing several book chapters or recent articles from different perspectives in order to discuss each topic. And related to this, third, not all lecturers have expertise on the history of IR and they do with popular textbooks.

Secondly, as displayed above, most of the textbooks do not even mention about any kind of a discussion on the Westphalian narrative. Only some of the textbooks mention that there is a controversy about it, but they still keep the conventional wisdom. So they cite the works of the revisionist scholars but do not present their insights. Hence the reader does not understand what the revisionists claim and this citation does not bring curiosity for learning more about this controversy.

Thirdly, due to the discipline's presentism, IR scholarship and textbooks show a little interest to the history of IR and quickly come to the current issues of world politics. After a short presentation of centuries in the first chapter, they put more emphasis on the twentieth century and to post-WWII in the remaining parts of the book.

And fourthly, these textbooks try to portray IR as an inherently strong and stable discipline. Since the revisionist scholars challenge the very basic assumptions of IR, they appear as too marginal or radical to refer in textbooks. Since they shake the myths of IR including the Westphalian base of it, they can have an unexpected effect on the 'normalized' way of doing IR. Their potential to disturb conservative scholars who rest on discipline's common-senses might seem to be too confronting to face with. As Carvalho et.al (2011: 757) define; "To break with this imperialist imaginary, upon which the myth of 1648 ultimately rests, is to fundamentally confront the Eurocentric identity of the discipline... which ensures that the revisionists are often seen but rarely heard."

This last point brings us to the nature of IR as a discipline. Based on this investigation on the Westphalian myth, it can be argued that current mainstream IR scholarship is Eurocentric, imperialistic, presentist, conservative, parochial and exclusionary. To begin with, Westphalian narrative indicates how Eurocentric mainstream IR scholarship is; in the sense that it accepts that the MIS with all its elemental ideas, norms and institutions emerged out of inherently European military, political, economic or ideational processes regardless of any Eastern influence.

This narrative implies that Europe is the agent of history who is superior, so only it is capable of reproducing and setting the standards of world order. Others are only the subjects of history and should better abide with the ideas, norms, rules and institutions supplied to them by the West.

Accordingly, Westphalian narrative has served to support Western imperialism and intervention into the internal affairs of others in the name of 'civilizing' them. Conventional wisdom depicts that the European system of sovereign states has proved its supremacy against its rivals first inside such as medieval feudalism and the Holy Roman Empire; then outside such as Chinese suzerainty, African tribalism and Ottoman 'millet' system, and so on. Thus it deserves to become a 'universal standard' with all its elemental values, norms and institutions. This supremacy legitimizes the right of its European owners to spread their formula for 'development' to the rest of the world. What is displayed on the scene is the global dissemination of immanently European inventions of sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism, democracy and human rights as a sign of 'progress'. However interests of the powerful are behind the scene. In fact, the diffusion of this European regime has included coercion, domination and assimilation in the shape of capitulations, unfair treaties, imperialism or even wars as in the popular cases of China, India, Ottomans and Africa. Although this side of the story is not usually mentioned in the conventional narratives, the reflectivist way of looking at history makes it clear by deconstructing the Westphalian myth upon which this story is built.

Westphalian narrative also demonstrates that current mainstream IR scholarship is presentist and conservative. It is presentist in the sense that, lecturers briefly mention the historical background that brings us to the contemporary world as given and come quickly to post-1945 world and to the 'real' topics of IR. This is accepted as a 'matter of convenience'. (Hobson, 2009: 671) Probably not by coincidence, this date is also the beginning of US-led Western dominant modern world order. And they put their best to conserve this dominance. Because

from a critical point-of-view, the one who has the power in hand, constructs and disseminates the knowledge that best maximizes its own interests and perpetuates its dominance. Moreover, as reflectivists claim, theory is not separable from the 'reality'; they mutually constitute each other. For instance, this 'Westphalian' narrative implies that the nature of world order is inherently and inevitably anarchic, it serves to present and explain the current order under this presumption, put forward policy suggestions accordingly and then help to build a really anarchic world order. So it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and a convenient way of preventing change and perpetuating dominance.

This arrogant narrative also demonstrates how parochial and exclusionary mainstream IR scholarship is, because it closes the gates against intra-disciplinary, inter-disciplinary and cross-civilizational exchange and learning. So this conservative and static position hinders the dynamism and development of the discipline. West-centric positivist paradigm in IR resists hearing not only the insights of the reflectivists in IR, but also the sayings of other disciplines and experiences of other civilizations. By deeming the 'others' as worthless, it implies that there is no need to get into contact with any other culture or system and this limits IR scholarship's capacity to learn from others' experiences. Also as mentioned earlier, IR seems to be marginalized within other disciplines in terms of how it constructs its history and its benchmark dates. It does not go into deep discussions with other disciplines or benefit from their findings. Carvalho et.al emphasize that this dialogue does not erode the self-confidence of IR scholarship; it does just the opposite. For them "we should not fear that the students would thereby lose faith in the discipline, but rather understand our endeavor as a dynamic one where dialogue helps us to gain new and richer understandings of international phenomena." (2011: 757-8)

Furthermore, this dominant Eurocentric and rationalist position asserts that the current world order with all its underlying norms, values and institutions is 'neutral' and 'universal'. But reflectivists are skeptical about anyone who claims that something is impartial and universal,

because cosmopolitanist claims might hinder the assimilation of the weak by the powerful. It seems to be the case in the Westphalian story. This 'global' order is built on Eurocentric bases and pursues the views and interests of the West only, so it is a one-sided and exclusionary argument to claim that it is universal. As a great number of scholars stated above assert, both this world order and IR scholarship need to be more neutral, open-minded, inclusive and pluralistic. Otherwise the excluded ones might distrust these two due to the fact that they do not represent their values, beliefs, ideas, norms or institutions. In order to succeed this, IR needs to hear and articulate the voices of the 'Others' and broaden its non-Western participants. As long as it keeps excluding or disregarding the beings, experiences, findings, claims and demands of the 'others', it might lose its legitimacy and effectiveness as a discipline.

From a pluralistic point-of-view, diversity is richness and it should not be sacrificed for the sake of unity. And the 'Other' is too precious to be assimilated in the name of universalism. Humanity needs to preserve its diversity because different sets of values, norms or institutions might better serve to the needs of different peoples, times and circumstances. Being universal does not necessarily mean being unique or homogeneous; multiple ways of living in a plural world could be a better option for all. As Tickner states:

“Rather than searching for one universal history, we need to uncover stories about forgotten spaces that respect difference, show tolerance and compassion, and are skeptical about absolute truths... More inclusive stories about our discipline's foundations that respect different ways of being and knowing are needed if we are to conceptualize a more just, less hierarchical global politics.” (Tickner, 2011: 13)

Finally, what if we leave this Westphalian narrative behind? Within the discipline, we can have some extra research questions those are suppressed by the rationalists such as: the relationship between power&interest and knowledge&norm construction as offered by the critical and postmodern thinkers; the continuance of Western imperialism in terms of norm and institution construction; or the role of Eastern agents on the making of world history as offered by post-

colonialists. Is it worth it? Is it just about fantasizing in history and theory? Or can it make a change in contemporary global issues? Rationalist scholars criticize this as a non-scientific, meaningless and vain attempt since it does not make a change either in theory or in practice. But for reflectivists, it does make a change in both, because theory and reality co-constitute each other. As we can get one step closer to a more open-minded, pluralistic, tolerant and inclusive way of making IR, thus we start to build such a living on this planet. Hence it is our responsibility to be critically reflective about how we teach the coming of our age to our students, encourage them to show curiosity and respect for the diverse livings of others not mentioned in mainstream IR textbooks and appreciate the plurality of human experience.



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